Military Reform: Agreement on Ending Hostilities in the Republic of Congo
Implementations
Military Reform – 2000
Military reform provisions of the agreement involved the reorganization of armed forces, including the unconditional reinstatement of those soldiers who left the armed forces to the same rank and the recruitment of Forces for Self Defence and Resistance into security forces. The reorganization of the armed forces was much needed because of the disintegration of the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC), which started with the outbreak of hostilities in June 1997 as military officers and soldiers loyal to the previous regimes deserted the armed forces and joined different militia groups.1 Major combatant groups, such as the Ninjas, Cobras, and Cocoyes, were affiliated with the Congolese Movement for Democracy and Integral Development (MCDDI) headed by former Prime Minister Kolélas, the Congolese Labor Party (PCT) by headed by Sassou-Nguesso, and the Pan-African Union for Social Democracy (UPADS) headed by former President Lissouba, respectively. Among the 30,000 ex-combatants, it was estimated that 6,000 belonged to the armed forces (military, gendarme, and police). Those in the military were mostly disqualified because they did not meet basic education, age, or fitness requirements. The reform sought to disarm and demobilize those combatants.2
The integration of soldiers who were formerly in militia groups started immediately after the signing of the accord. The government was obliged by the accord it signed to reinstate all former rebels who had been soldiers. The accord also gave a kind of promise that those who had not been soldiers but militia members would be accepted into the FAC.
In February 2000 the government announced that it would not be possible to integrate all of the ex-fighters into the armed forces. Only 500-1,200 former Ntsiloulous were incorporated into the military.3 An estimated 3200-5200 ex-Cobras were accepted into the army between 1997 and 2002.4 Finally, an estimated 700-1600 ex-Cocoyes were able to join the armed forces.5
- R. Anders Nilsson, “Dangerous Liaisons: Why Ex-Combatants Return to Violence. Cases from the Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone” (PhD diss., Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2008).
- Nelson Alusala and Guy Lamb, “Emerging Human Security Issues in the Planned Implementation of MDRP Fund in the Republic of Congo (RoC),”(paper contribution to DDR and Human Security: Post-conflict Security-building in the Interests of the Poor, University of Bradford, July 2008).
- Anders Themner, Violence in Post-Conflict Societies: Remarginalization, Remobilization and Relationships (London: Routledge, 2011), 56.
- Ibid., 66.
- Ibid., 77.
Military Reform – 2001
No further developments observed.
Military Reform – 2002
No further developments observed.
Military Reform – 2003
No further developments observed.
Military Reform – 2004
No further developments observed.
Military Reform – 2005
No further developments observed.
Military Reform – 2006
No further developments observed.
Military Reform – 2007
No further developments observed.
Military Reform – 2008
No further developments observed.
Military Reform – 2009
No further developments observed.