Agreement on Ending Hostilities in the Republic of Congo

The Agreement on Ending Hostilities in the Republic of Congo (29 December 1999) sought to end armed conflict throughout the Republic of Congo and particularly in the Bouenza, Pool, Lekoumou, Niari, and Kouilou regions. All parties to the accord, in this regard, agreed to give up their arms and establish a Monitoring Commission for the Agreements on Ceasefire and Ending Hostilities, responsible for monitoring and verifying stipulations for the implementation of the ceasefire in conflict zones. Parties to the conflict reached an agreement on the modality, function, and composition of the Monitoring Commission on 10 January 2000. On 14 February 2000, four different presidential decrees were announced on the creation, organization, and operation of the Monitoring Commission for the Agreements on Ceasefire and Ending Hostilities (decree 2000-4), for the organization and operation of the Coordination Committee General Secretariat of the Monitoring Commission (decree 2000-5), for the appointment of members of the executive committee of the Monitoring Commission (decree 2000-6), and for the appointment of members of the General Secretariat of the Monitoring Commission (decree 2000-7).¹ The Monitoring Commission had a Coordination Committee and an Executive Committee (Article 3, Decree 2000-4); there was an international observer in the Executive Committee (Article 9, Decree 2000-4), which was organized into several specialized working committees, including committees for the collection of weapons and war ammunition (Article 10, Decree 2000-4). The decree also established regional committees throughout the national territory that also included international observers (Article 15 and 17, Decree 2000-4). The Executive Committee was chaired by General GilbertMokoki.² Louis Gaston Matanghoye was the international observer in the Executive Committee.³

There was no report of violation of the ceasefire agreement.

1. “Décrte Portant Création, Organisation et Fonctionnement du Comité de Suivi Des Accords de Cessez-le-Feu et de Cessation des Hostilités en République du Congo,” Presidence de La Republique (Decrét No 2000—4, 2000-5, 2000-6, 2000-7), February 14, 2000.
2. “International Meeting on the Republic of the Congo: A Country in Transition,” ReliefWeb, accessed February 23, 2012, http://reliefweb.int/node/66683.
3. “Agreement on Ending Hostilities in the Republic of Congo,” Public International Law & Policy Group, accessed February 17, 2012, http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/….

Clashes were reported in 2001. There were some clashes on 19 and 20 May 2001 between the army and armed men identified as ex-militia loyal to former Prime Minister Bernard Kolelas. In an incident, two civilians and one soldier died and an estimated 30,000 inhabitants were internally displaced. The Congo Armed Force (FAC) was dispatched to the conflict site to beef up the security.¹

1. “ROC: Additional troops sent to restore security in Mindouli,” IRIN News, EAST AFRICA: IRIN-CEA Weekly Round-up 77 (9 – 15 June 2001), accessed May 18, 2012, http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=22195#rocadd.

Rebel forces were still in control of the town of Vindza in the Pool region in 2002, but the government recaptured the town of Kimba from the rebel groups.¹ In April 2002, the rebels had captured and took an army general hostage, which preluded a distinctive conflict beginning in June 2002.² The Ntsiloulous faction was fighting for their role in the army and in political decisions. As tensions grew, the rebels attacked the capital city, Brazzaville, which was the first such attack in the capital since the conflict restarted.³ The attack on Brazzaville was dubbed a terrorist act by President Denis Sassou-Nguesso.⁴ In November 2002, the President gave a month for rebels to surrender.⁵ Along with the Ntsiloulou group, their leader, Ntoumi, maintained hold of the Pool region with some 1,500 combatants. In late March 2002, fighting re-erupted between Ntsiloulou fighters and the government troops.

1. “Government forces recapture southern Republic of Congo town, reports say,” Associated Press, May 23, 2002.

2. “Republic of Congo’s ‘Ninja’ rebels take general hostage; Catholic priest missing,” Associated Press, April 6, 2002.
3. “Gunfire breaks out in capital of Republic of Congo,” Associated Press, June 14, 2002.
4. “President says rebel attack on the Republic of Congo’s capital was terrorist act.” Associated Press, June 19, 2002.
5. “Republic of Congo president gives Ninja rebels one month to lay down arms.” Associated Press, November 19, 2002.

Ceasefire violations continued in early 2003. The Ntsiloulou rebels attacked a series of villages in the southern Republic of Congo in the regions of Pool and Bouenza. This group was led by renegade pastor Frederic Bitsangou, who had signed the 1999 ceasefire agreements but had taken up arms again. In the attacks more than 15 villagers were killed and the rebels looted and torched homes.¹ The Nsiloulous rebels attacked a military train in February, killing one civilian and one soldier.²

There was no report of a violation of the ceasefire after the first three months. This could be attributed to secret negotiations between the government and the Ntsiloulous. Both sides reached an agreement in March 2003 in which the Ntsiloulous reaffirmed their commitment to the 1999 accords and, in return, the government offered amnesty and integration of Ntsiloulous into the national armed forces.³

1. “Rebels attack villages in Republic of Congo, killing more than 15,” Associated Press, January 5, 2003.
2. “Republic of Congo rebels attack military train, killing 2,” Associated Press, February 7, 2003.
3. “UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia,” Uppsala Conflict Data Program, accessed February 23, 2012, www.ucdp.uu.se/database.

Low-intensity violence was reported during this year. A rail service between the Republic of Congo’s main port of Pointe-Noire and the capital city, Brazzaville, was disrupted by Ninja/Nsiloulous rebels.¹

1. “Congo: Rebels cut train service to coast,” IRIN News, accessed May 18, 2012, http://www.irinnews.org/Report/51754/CONGO-Rebels-cut-train-service-to-c… “Republic of Congo rebel attacks force suspension of key railway line,” Associated Press, October 19, 2004.

A few violent incidents involving ex-rebels were reported in October. In one incident, ex-rebels detonated bombs in the capital of Brazzaville several times in one week. It was also reported that the government security forces had launched an operation to uproot former rebels who did not disarm after the 2003 agreement.¹ In April, ex-rebels looted UN convoys on their way to a humanitarian mission to assess needs in the poverty-stricken region of the country.²

1. “Government forces battle ex-rebels in Republic of Congo capital,” Associated Press, October 19, 2005.
2. “Rebels stop, loot U.N. convoy in Republic of Congo,” Associated Press, April 24, 2005.

It was reported that the International Red Cross had halted its operations in the south of the Republic of Congo in January 2006. The halt came after a threat was made against its staff.¹ This constituted a violation of the ceasefire agreement. Nevertheless, no clash was reported.

1. “Red Cross suspends operations in southern Republic of Congo for security concerns,” Associated Press, January 16, 2006.

Ntsoulous rebels blocked key railway lines in September 2007 and the army and ex-rebels exchanged gun-fire. The incident was related to the failure of Frederic Bitsangou to take up his new post as Peace Minister in Brazzaville as planned.¹

1. “Republic of Congo’s former rebels block key railway line,” Associated Press, 12 September 2007.

No violation of the ceasefire was reported since 2007.

No violation of the ceasefire was reported.

Two accords signed in November 1999 and December 1999 called for national dialogue to restore and preserve peace. The accord does not specifically call for constitutional reform or amendments. Nevertheless, the purpose of holding a national dialogue was to decide the constitutional and political future of the country.

In the 40th independence celebration ceremony, President Sassou-Nguesso announced national dialogue from September 2000 to the end of the year on a draft constitution drawn up by a group of legal experts. Lissouba was excluded from the national dialogue and he issued a statement on 14 August criticizing the process.¹

1. “Republic of Congo celebrates 40th anniversary of independence,” Associated Press, August 15, 2000.

The Inclusive National Dialogue (dialogue nationale sans exclusive) was held between March 17 and April 14. At the end of the dialogue, some 1,600 delegates representing many different positions along the political spectrum attended the second phase of the national dialogue, which led to the endorsement of the draft constitution. The draft constitution was signed by President Denis Sassou-Nguesso, opposition leaders, former rebels, and representatives of civil society. The draft constitution had noted the need to turn in weapons, reorganize the armed forces, reform the judiciary and ensure freedom of the press along with provisions for an elected president and a two-chamber parliament. The draft constitution was presented in a national referendum for approval with elections expected in 2002.¹ Nevertheless, former prime minister Bernard Kolelas and former president Pascal Lissouba were excluded from participating in the national dialogue as both were in exile and convicted in absentia for the crimes they committed during the 1997 civil war.² The national dialogue was heavily dominated by the government with around 75% of the delegates sympathizing with the government.³

After the finalization of the draft constitution through the national dialogue in April, the interim parliament approved the new constitution, adding a series of amendments.⁴ The national referendum on a draft constitution was scheduled for 20 January 2002, and the presidential, legislative and municipal elections were scheduled for the first half of 2002.⁵

1. “Delegates at Republic of Congo talks sign peace convention,” Associated Press, April 14, 2001.
2. Ibid.
3. R. Anders Nilsson, “Dangerous Liaisons: Why Ex-Combatants Return to Violence. Cases from the Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone” (PhD diss., Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2008).
4. “The Republic of Congo since the return of Sassou Nguesso,” Agence France Presse, March 7, 2002.
5. “Republic of Congo announces dates for 2002 elections,” Associated Press, December 18, 2001.

While rights groups had urged international donors not to support the voting on the draft constitution for reasons of alleged electoral fraud, the referendum took place on 20 January 2002 as scheduled.¹ In the referendum, the new constitution was overwhelmingly approved. Out of 1.6 million registered voters, 78% casted their votes in the referendum and 84% of those voted in favor and 11% in opposition of the constitution. The referendum, however, was boycotted by opposition parties and at least one opposition leader rejected the result.² After the approval of a draft constitution in a referendum, presidential, legislative and municipal elections were scheduled for March 10, May 12 and June 9 respectively.³

In the presidential elections held on 13 March 2002, Sassou Nguesso was elected and received 89.41 percent of the vote.⁴ The first round of legislative elections was held in May, as scheduled. 137 seats were up for grabs . After allegations of voting irregularities, elections in 11 districts did not take place. Elections in all eight districts in Pool region also did not take place.⁵ Candidates needed to win at least 50% of the vote to be elected; in the first round of elections, the ruling Congolese Workers Party won 29 out of 55 seats. The second round of voting for 82 seats was scheduled for June 23.⁶ When final results came in in June, president’s party and its allies won 83 of 137 seats.⁷ The first municipal elections took place on 30 June 2002.⁸ The majority of municipalities were won by the ruling party. Following the elections, the president announced his new cabinet on 19 August 2002.⁹

As envisioned in the national dialogue, a new constitution was drafted and elections for presidential, legislative and municipal bodies took place. This provided a foundation for the return of the Republic of Congo in a democratic process. The whole process, however was dominated by the governing party; and those elections were not regarded as free and fair.¹⁰

1. “Rights groups urge donors not to support Republic of Congo election process,” Associated Press, January 15, 2002; “Republic of Congo approves new constitution,” Associated Press, January 23, 2002.
2. “Republic of Congo approves new constitution,” Associated Press, January 23, 2002.
3. Ibid.
4. “Republic of Congo since the return to power of Sassou Nguesso,” Agence France Presse, May 22, 2002.
5. “Republic of Congo legislative elections held again in six districts,” Associated Press, May 29, 2002.
6. “Ruling party leads in first round of Republic of Congo legislative elections,” Associated Press, June 4, 2002.
7. “President supporters win parliamentary majority in Republic of Congo,” Associated Press, June 28, 2002.
8. “Republic of Congo holds first municipal elections in five years,” Associated Press, June 30, 2002.
9. “Republic of Congo president names new Cabinet,” Associated Press, August 19, 2002.
10. “UK Home Office Immigration and Nationality Directorate Country Report – The Republic of Congo (Brazzaville),” United Kingdom: Home Office, last edited April 1, 2004, accessed June 21, 2012, http://www.refworld.org/docid/40a887857.html.

No developments observed this year.

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In 2007, multiparty elections were held for the National Assembly. All seats (137) were up for contests. In elections, Congolese Workers Party (PCT) and its 16 allies won 88 seats with PCT winning 46 seats. Pan-African Union for Social Democracy (UPADS) won 11 seats, Union for Democracy and the Republic (UDR-Mwinda) won only one seat and independent candidates won 37 seats. The PCT’s share of seats declined in the 2007 elections whereas the UPADS’s share increased from 3 to 11 seats.¹

1. “Elections in Congo-Brazzaville (Republic of the Congo),” African Elections Database, accessed July 21, 2012, http://africanelections.tripod.com/cg.html#2007_National_Assembly_Election.

No developments observed this year.

Presidential elections took place in July 2009. In elections, Denis Sassou-Nguesso was reelected as president by winning 78.61% of the vote. The election, however, was boycotted by opposition.¹ The African Union had declared the elections to be free and fair. In contrary, human rights NGOs and opposition candidates cited irregularities. The elections, however, were said to be very peaceful.²

1. “Congo leader in pardon for ex-president at start of new term,” Agence France-Presse, August 14, 2009.
2. “2009 Human Rights Report: Republic of the Congo,” U.S. Department of State, accessed March 11, 2010. http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135948.html.

The Accords signed in November and December of 1999 required the demilitarization of political parties. Major combatant groups such as Ninjas, Cobras, and Cocoyes were affiliated with the Congolese Movement for Democracy and Integral Development (MCDDI) headed by former Prime Minister Kolelas, the Congolese Labor Party (PCT) headed by Sassou-Nguesso, and the Pan-African Union for Social Democracy (UPADS) headed by former President Lissouba. According to Themner (2011), after a 1997 law banned the militia groups, the Republic of Congo government started to forcefully disarm militia groups. This initiative, however, was not very successful and the violence recurred in 1999. Once parties reached a settlement after signing two accords (one in November 1999 and one in December 1999), militia groups had formally been dissolved.¹ There were splinter factions active until 2003, but political parties were demilitarized.

Notwithstanding occasional confrontation between the governing party and the opposition parties, political parties were allowed to function normally. Nevertheless, the governing party and its allies had dominance in the process.

1. Anders Themner, Violence in Post-Conflict Societies: Remarginalization, Remobilization and Relationships, (London: Routledge, 2011).

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Detailed information on civil service reform, especially the reinstatement of civil servants who left government jobs to join the rebellion, was not available. According to the provisions of the accords, civil servants had to be reinstated unconditionally. Given that those who deserted security forces to join the rebellion were reinstated, it can be said that the same was true of civilian workers. Nevertheless, the exact number reinstated was not available.

In a different effort to reform the civil service, the Republic of Congo government discovered 9,710 false names on the government payrolls, indicating massive corruption. The government suspended the salaries of those officials until there was proof to the contrary. Before the discovery, an estimated 65,000 civil servants worked for the government.[fn]”Salaries Suspended As Ghost Workers Sought,” Africa News, October 8, 2001.[/efn_note]

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Military reform provisions of the agreement involved the reorganization of armed forces, including the unconditional reinstatement of those soldiers who left the armed forces to the same rank and the recruitment of Forces for Self Defence and Resistance into security forces. The reorganization of the armed forces was much needed because of the disintegration of the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC), which started with the outbreak of hostilities in June 1997 as military officers and soldiers loyal to the previous regimes deserted the armed forces and joined different militia groups.¹ Major combatant groups, such as the Ninjas, Cobras, and Cocoyes, were affiliated with the Congolese Movement for Democracy and Integral Development (MCDDI) headed by former Prime Minister Kolélas, the Congolese Labor Party (PCT) by headed by Sassou-Nguesso, and the Pan-African Union for Social Democracy (UPADS) headed by former President Lissouba, respectively. Among the 30,000 ex-combatants, it was estimated that 6,000 belonged to the armed forces (military, gendarme, and police). Those in the military were mostly disqualified because they did not meet basic education, age, or fitness requirements. The reform sought to disarm and demobilize those combatants.²

The integration of soldiers who were formerly in militia groups started immediately after the signing of the accord. The government was obliged by the accord it signed to reinstate all former rebels who had been soldiers. The accord also gave a kind of promise that those who had not been soldiers but militia members would be accepted into the FAC.

In February 2000 the government announced that it would not be possible to integrate all of the ex-fighters into the armed forces. Only 500-1,200 former Ntsiloulous were incorporated into the military.³ An estimated 3200-5200 ex-Cobras were accepted into the army between 1997 and 2002.⁴ Finally, an estimated 700-1600 ex-Cocoyes were able to join the armed forces.⁵

1. R. Anders Nilsson, “Dangerous Liaisons: Why Ex-Combatants Return to Violence. Cases from the Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone” (PhD diss., Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2008).
2. Nelson Alusala and Guy Lamb, “Emerging Human Security Issues in the Planned Implementation of MDRP Fund in the Republic of Congo (RoC),”(paper contribution to DDR and Human Security: Post-conflict Security-building in the Interests of the Poor, University of Bradford, July 2008).
3. Anders Themner, Violence in Post-Conflict Societies: Remarginalization, Remobilization and Relationships (London: Routledge, 2011), 56.
4. Ibid., 66.
5. Ibid., 77.

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It was very difficult to evaluate reforms in the police force or in gendarmerie after the signing of the two accords in 1999 as neither accord was very clear about police force reform. The only provision related to the police was that which specified the reinstatement of policemen to the jobs they abandoned to join the rebel movements. After the accord was signed, between 500 and 600 ex-Ntsiloulous were integrated into the police force.¹ Similarly, an estimated 1000-1500 ex-Cobras were accepted into the police force,² as well as an estimated 500-600 ex-Cocoyes.³ Most of the reinstatements took place before 2002.

1. Anders Themner, Violence in Post-Conflict Societies: Remarginalization, Remobilization and Relationships. (London: Routledge, 2011), 56.
2. Ibid., 66.
3. Ibid., 77.

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The demobilization process in the Republic of Congo was not very systematic as it did not go through the assembly or the cantonment phase. As soon as the accords were signed in November and December 1999, combatants affiliated with armed groups (i.e. Ntsiloulous, Cobras, and Cocoyes) self-demobilized. According to Themner (2011), the self-demobilization of combatants started in 1997 when the government disbanded militia groups and started to disarm them forcefully. An estimated 5,700-6,000 Ntsiloulous were demobilized since 1997. An estimated 13,200 ex-Cobras were demobilized when its last unit was dissolved in 2000 and an estimated 10,800 Cocoyes were demobilized from 1997-2000.¹ In total, an estimated 30,000 ex-combatants were demobilized, according to the Programme National de Désarmament, Démobilisation et Réisertion (PNDDR).² The PNDDR was responsible for the planning of the demobilization process and had a meager $25,000 budget.³

1. Anders Themner, Violence in Post-Conflict Societies: Remarginalization, Remobilization and Relationships, (London: Routledge, 2011).
2. Nelson Alusala and Guy Lamb, “Emerging Human Security Issues in the Planned Implementation of MDRP Fund in the Republic of Congo (RoC),”(paper contribution to DDR and Human Security: Post-conflict Security-building in the Interests of the Poor, University of Bradford, July 2008).
3. Ibid.

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Because the demobilization program was not systematically pursued, not all combatants were demobilized right away. As a matter of fact, an estimated 2,000 ex- Ntsiloulous loyal to Ntoumi reorganized themselves in the Pool region. In April 2003, an estimated 2,300 ex-Ntsiloulous surrendered their arms and were demobilized.¹ The PNDDR was responsible for the planning of the demobilization process and had a meager $25,000 budget.² The last Cobra stable (cell) was dissolved only in the second half of 2000.³ In the DDR process, the Republic of Congo was part of the World Bank’s regional Multi-Donor Trust Fund for demobilization and reintegration. Nevertheless, the funding was used mostly for the reintegration program and not for the demobilization program.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Themner, Violence in Post-Conflict Societies: Remarginalization, Remobilization and Relationships.

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While most of the combatants self-demobilized after the 1997 ban on militia groups, disarming ex-combatants proved to be very challenging. In January 2000, the government of the Republic of Congo proposed to demobilize and reintegrate as many as 22,000 ex-combatants and collect an estimated 71,500 weapons. The weapon collection estimate, however, was not met as only 6,500 weapons were collected from an estimated 15,000 combatants.¹ The government created an oversight committee. In July 2000, a project involving weapons collection and destruction in support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and IOM was created. This program also had a component of reintegration and a micro-project focusing on ex-combatants.

1. A. Caramés, “Congo (PNDDR, 2004-2008),” DDR 2009: Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes in the World during 2008 (Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace, 2009), 59-64.

No developments observed this year.

At the end of the program in December 2002, 11,140 weapons (3,100 small arms and 8,000 grenades and explosives) had been collected.

In April 2003, 2,300 Ntsiloulous surrendered their arms after signing an agreement in March of that year.¹ As such, the progress made in terms of weapons collections was not very successful. The Programme National de Désarmament, Démobilisation et Réisertion (PNDDR) was responsible for the planning of the disarmament process.

1. Ibid.

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Disarmament was an integral part of PNDDR and was undertaken by UNDP through a project known as Projet de Collect et destruction dÕArmes pour le Développement (PCAD) in coordination with other national security forces. The first phase of the PCAD started in November 2005 and ended in November 2006. With a budget of 2 million Euro, the PCAD collected 1,308 small arms, 626,503 ammunition rounds, and 2,434 assorted explosives.¹

1. Nelson Alusala and Guy Lamb, “Emerging Human Security Issues in the Planned Implementation of MDRP Fund in the Republic of Congo (RoC),”(paper contribution to DDR and Human Security: Post-conflict Security-building in the Interests of the Poor, University of Bradford, July 2008).

The first phase of the PCAD ended in November 2006.

No developments observed this year.

The second phase of the PCAD was supposed to start immediately after the closure of the first phase in November 2006. The program did not start until June 2008 when the PCAD received $2,913,524 in funding from the government of Japan. In this phase the program was focused outside of Brazzaville. It was expected that some 3,000 arms, 3,000 explosives, 60,000 large-caliber ammunition, and 1,000,000 cartridges would be collected.¹ Whether the PCAD II met its objective or not is not known.

1. “Projet PCAD II,” UNDP, accessed March 2, 2012, http://www.cg.undp.org/ViewPage.aspx?ProjetID=52&NewsID=13&Parte=0.

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UNDP started the reintegration of demobilized soldiers in 2000; approximately 15,000 ex-combatants were registered in that year. Individual combatants received $20 each.

The reintegration program was interrupted in 2001. The High Commission for the Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants (HCDRE) was set up, but it did not start providing assistance until mid-2002.¹

1. Anders Themner, Violence in Post-Conflict Societies: Remarginalization, Remobilization and Relationships (London: Routledge, 2011).

By late 2002, some 11,000 ex-combatants received partial assistance for reintegration. An estimated 8,019 ex-combatants had officially received reintegration support through 2,610 micro-projects funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).¹ The reintegration program was largely supported by Multi Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) and in the Republic of Congo, the program was carried out by the Republic of Congo Emergency Reintegration Program (RCERP). The program was expected to support some 30,000 demobilized combatants with reintegration into society by providing support to micro-projects so that the ex-combatants would have sustainable livelihood support. Nevertheless, not all combatants received reintegration support. In the initial stage, a large percentage of ex-Ninjas did not register for the reintegration program out of fear for their security.²

By the end of December 2002, only 2,182 ex-Ntsiloulous were registered to participate in the reintegration program, representing approximately 27% of all beneficiaries of the reintegration program.³ Part of the reason for the low rate of participation among ex- Ntsiloulous was the concentration of the UNDP reintegration program in Brazzaville while most ex-Ntsiloulous resided in the Pool region. By the time the UNDP moved its focus to the Pool region, the funding sources had dried up. The High Commission for the Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants (HCDRE) began to provide assistance mid-2002.⁴

Between August 2000 and April 2002, about 4,300 ex-Cobras received assistance from UNDP to start micro-projects. An estimated 2,200 to 4,700 ex-Cobras did not participate in the UNDP program or did not receive reintegration support. Only 1,223 former Cocoyes received access to micro-credit support via the UNDP programs, leaving a large percentage of ex-combatants without access to reintegration support. Mboungou-Mboungou, former vice-president of CNR, became a commissioner of HCDRE. HCDRE was able to assist around 5,400 former Cocoyes until the termination of the program in 2005. An estimated 6,600 former Cocoyes did eventually receive reintegration benefits from UNDP and HCDRE. An estimated 2,000-3,000 did not receive any support.⁵

1. A. Caramés, “Congo (PNDDR, 2004-2008),” DDR 2009: Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes in the World during 2008 (Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace, 2009), 59-64.
2. Themner, Violence in Post-Conflict Societies: Remarginalization, Remobilization and Relationships.
3. Ibid., 56.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., 77.

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The High Commission for the Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants (HCDRE) terminated its program in 2005.

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No further developments occurred in 2009.

According to a MDRP Final Report, an estimated 15,179 out of an estimated 30,000 ex-combatants–(about 51%)– had received reintegration support by the end of July 2010.¹ There were allegations, however, that the HCDRE only provided patronage to former rebel leaders and did little to nothing for ordinary former combatants.

1. “MDRP Final Report: Overview of Program Achievements,” International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, July 2010, accessed March 7, 2012, http://mdrp.org/PDFs/MDRP_Final_Report.pdf.

The Pointe Noire truce of November 1999 as well as the Agreement on Ending Hostilities of December 1999 require the release of all civilians and military personnel detained because of war. The exact number of civilians and military personnel detained because of war is not available. Nevertheless, the government was released a few of those who were detained because of war. According to the U.S. State Department Human Rights Report for 1999, the government released 30 persons who had been detained in late 1998 and were unaccounted for; they were transferred late in the year to Impfondo, in the Likouala region, and were subsequently released. In February 1999, before the ceasefire agreement, Nestor Makoundzi-Wolo, who had been detained in November 1998 for his connection with his service on the Lissouba-era Constitutional Court, was released. In October 1999, another former Constitutional Court member was also released. In October, government also freed 12 Lissouba-era military officers.¹ After the agreement in December 1999, the government released 17 political prisoners who had been held since Pointe Noire (1998) and then moved to Impfondo. The detainees were minor officials of the former Lissouba Government and affiliated parties. One of the detainees, Gabriel Louya, died in detention after suffering a stroke as a result of torture and prison conditions.²

Rev. Frederic Bitsangou, chief of the National resistance Council, released five prisoners and turned in seven automatic rifles on 15 February 2000 (Source: Republic of Congo rebel leader orders followers to turn in weapons, Associated Press, 16 February 2000).

1. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- 1999- Republic of Congo,” U.S. State Department, 2000, accessed February 27, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/237.htm.
2. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- 2000- Republic of Congo,” U.S. State Department, 2001, accessed February 27, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/af/763.htm.

International organizations had such as International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), local human rights NGOs such as Congolese Observatory for Human Rights (OCDH), the association for the human rights of Incarcerated (ADHUC) and a Catholic Church Organization visited prisons throughout 2001. There were no political prisoners.¹ According to the U.S. State department report, in 2001 there were no political prisoners being detained by the government of Republic of Congo.²

1. “The Republic of Congo Country Report-April 2004,” Home Office, 2004, accessed June 21, 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/40a887857.pdf.
2. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- 2001- Republic of Congo,” U.S. State Department, 2002, accessed February 27, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/af/8335.htm.

According to the U.S. State department report, in 2002 there were no political prisoners being detained by the government of Republic of Congo.¹

1. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- 2002- Republic of Congo,” U.S. State Department, 2003, accessed February 27, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18178.htm.

According to the U.S. State department report, in 2003 there were no political prisoners being detained by the government of Republic of Congo.¹

1. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- 2003- Republic of Congo,” U.S. State Department, 2004, accessed February 27, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27722.htm.

According to the U.S. State department report, in 2004 there were no political prisoners being detained by the government of Republic of Congo.¹

1. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- 2003- Republic of Congo,” U.S. State Department, 2004, accessed February 27, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41598.htm.

According to the U.S. State department report, there were at least 10 political prisoners in government detention centers in 2005.¹ Nevertheless, it is not clear whether those prisoners were affiliated with rebel groups which were part of the agreements in 1999.

1. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- 2005- Republic of Congo,” U.S. State Department, 2006, accessed February 27, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61564.htm.

According to the U.S. State department report, there were at least 10 political prisoners in government detention centers in 2006.¹ Nevertheless, it is not clear whether those prisoners were affiliated with rebel groups which were part of the agreements in 1999.

1. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- 2006- Republic of Congo,” U.S. State Department, 2007, accessed February 27, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78729.htm.

There were a few political prisoners in Republic of Congo in 2007. In August 2007, following protests by prisoners, 242 prisoners (including numerous political prisoners) were released citing space concerns in overcrowded prisons.¹ It was not clear if those prisoners were affiliated with the parties which signed accords in 1999.

1. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- 2007- Republic of Congo,” U.S. State Department, 2008, accessed February 27, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100476.htm.

According to the U.S. State department report, there were few political prisoners.¹ Nevertheless, it is not clear if those prisoners were affiliated with rebel groups which were part of the agreements in 1999.

1. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- 2008- Republic of Congo,” U.S. State Department, 2009, accessed February 27, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/118996.htm.

According to the U.S. State department report, there were few political prisoners.¹ Nevertheless, it is not clear if those prisoners were affiliated with rebel groups which were part of the agreements in 1999.

According to the U.S. State department report, in 2010 there were no political prisoners being detained by the government of Republic of Congo.²

1. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- 2008- Republic of Congo,” U.S. State Department, 2009, accessed February 27, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135948.htm.
2. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- 2010- Republic of Congo,” U.S. State Department, 2011, accessed February 27, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/af/154341.htm.

The accord signed in December 1999 did not have provisions for paramilitary groups as clear as those contained in the accord signed in November 1999. The November accord demanded the dissolution of all militias that were signatories of the accord. As the December 1999 accord was the extended version of the November accord, and the militia groups were affiliated with the political parties, it is safe to assume that the provision for the demilitarization of political parties was related to paramilitary groups associated with political parties.

Major combatant groups such as Ninjas, Cobras, and Cocoyes were affiliated with the Congolese Movement for Democracy and Integral Development (MCDDI) headed by former Prime Minister Kolelas; the Congolese Labor Party (PCT) was headed by Sassou-Nguesso and the Pan-African Union for Social Democracy (UPADS) was headed by former President Lissouba. According to Themner (2011), after the 1997 law banning militia groups, the Republic of Congo government started to forcefully disarm militia groups. This initiative, however, was not very successful and violence recurred in 1999. Parties reached a settlement after signing two accords: one in November 1999 and one in December 1999. After these accords, militia groups were formally dissolved.¹

1. Anders Themner, Violence in Post-Conflict Societies: Remarginalization, Remobilization and Relationships, (London: Routledge, 2011).

No developments observed this year.

No developments observed this year.

In April 2003, an accord was signed in which a splinter ex-Ninja group and some 2,300 ex-Ninjas surrendered their arms.¹ Further information on militia groups was not available. Militia groups were banned and all militia groups, including splinter factions, were disarmed and demobilized between 1997 and 2003.

1. A. Caramés, “Congo (PNDDR, 2004-2008),” DDR 2009: Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programs in the World during 2008 (Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace, 2009), 59-64.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

The 1999 Agreement on Ending Hostilities in the Republic of Congo required the government to adopt and promulgate a general amnesty law covering acts of war committed between 5 June 1997 and 29 December 1999. Similar provisions were also made in the Pointe-Noire Ceasefire Agreement on 16 November 1999. Immediately after the signing of the Pointe-Noire Ceasefire Agreement, an amnesty for three warring factions that were part of the accord was announced by the Sassou-administration, followed by an amnesty law (Law no. 21-99) on 20 December 1999.¹ As such, before the final accord was signed on 29 December, the government promulgated the amnesty law. However, it was not clear how many combatants (or others involved in the civil wars) were granted amnesty. Nevertheless, the amnesty was conditional on rebels laying down their arms and was not extended to Lissouba and Kolelas.² Several others, such as Yhombi-Opango and Moungunga Nkombo Nguila, were also not given amnesty.

1. Robert Muggah, “The Anatomy of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in the Republic of Congo,” Conflict, Security & Development 4(1): 21-37 (2004): 23.
2. “Republic of Congo since the return to power of Sassou Nguesso,” Associated Press, May 22, 2002.

It appeared that not all politicians involved in past conflict received amnesty. The lack of amnesty for the former Prime Minister, Bernard Kolelas, remained a contentious issue as the government warned that he would be arrested if he returned from exile.¹ Lissouba and others were also sentenced. The former Prime Minister was sentenced to death in absentia in 2000 after being convicted of arbitrary arrests, beatings, rape, and other crimes during 1997.

1. “Prosecutor: Ex-premier faces arrest if returns to Republic of Congo,” Associated Press, April 10, 2001.

A Ninja rebel faction, led by renegade pastor Frederic Bitsangou and operating primarily in the southern Pool region, was given a deadline of one month to disarm in exchange for amnesty in November 2002. The faction had an estimated 10,000 combatants. Only a tiny portion of that group (371 soldiers) surrendered their arms in exchange for amnesty.¹ Nevertheless, Congolese credited Sassou-Nguesso with securing peace through amnesty provisions to enemy fighters.²

Further detail on the effectiveness of amnesty provisions on securing peace was not available.

1. “Tiny fraction of Republic of Congo rebels trade arms for amnesty, military police say,” Associated Press, December 19, 2002.
2. “Republic of Congo holds first presidential race since war’s end,” Associated Press, March 2002.

Secret negotiations between the government and the Ntsiloulous took place in early 2003. The two sides reached an agreement in March 2003 in which the Ntsiloulous reaffirmed their commitment to the 1999 accords and, in return, the government offered amnesty and the integration of Ntsiloulou’s career into the new national armed forces.¹ Because of the secret nature of the negotiations, it is not clear how many received amnesty.

1. “UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia,” Uppsala Conflict Data Program, accessed February 23, 2012, www.ucdp.uu.se/database.

No developments observed this year.

The amnesty provision of the accord had been implemented. Former Prime Minister Bernard Kolelas, who was not granted amnesty and was in exile, returned to the Republic of Congo for the burial of his wife. President Denis Sassou-Nguesso allowed his return on humanitarian grounds. The government considered granting him amnesty, which he did, in fact, receive in November 2005.¹

1. “Former Republic of Congo militia leader returns home to bury wife,” Associated Press, October 14, 2005; “Republic of Congo profile,” BBC News, accessed February 23, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14121195.

No developments observed this year.

It was reported that President Sassou-Nguesso would allow former President Pascal Lissouba to return and granted him a pardon for the 2001 in absentia conviction for “economic crimes.” However, former President Pascal Lissouba had not returned to the Republic of Congo as of early 2008. In May 2007, the Council of Ministers granted amnesty to former Prime Minister Joachim Yhombi-Opango for the 2001 in absentia conviction for improperly selling the country’s oil while in office.¹

1. “State Department Issues Background Note on Republic of Congo,” US Fed News, August 1, 2008.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

An estimated 40,000 people had fled the Republic of Congo (ROC) as of 1999.¹ As soon as the accords were signed in November and December 1999, refugees started to return. In November 1999, 350 refugees who had returned to the ROC from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) went missing, or rather, were disappeared.² According to a news report, refugees started to return to the Pool region of the country.

Refugees started to return in trainloads: the first train brought some 2,300 refugees to the Pool region on 18 March 2000; some 1,800 refugees arrived in the Mindouli region on the second trainload on 26 March 2000.³ It was reported that the United Nations was trying to generate international support to meet the humanitarian needs of refugees.⁴ According to Muggah, the number of refugees declined to 12,340 in 2000.⁵

1. Robert Muggah, “The Anatomy of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in the Republic of Congo,” Conflict, Security & Development, 4(1): 21-37 (2004): 22.
2. “Still in Search of Justice Ten Years since the Disappearances of Over 350 in Republic of Congo,” International Refugee Rights Initiative, Refugee Rights News 2009, accessed June 22, 2012, http://www.refugee-rights.org/Publications/RRN/2009/May/V5.I3.StillInSea….
3. “Thousands return to devastated Republic of Congo region,” Associated Press, March 23, 2000.
4. “End to civil war in Republic of Congo creates humanitarian crisis,” Associated Press, February 23, 2000.
5. Robert Muggah, “The Anatomy of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in the Republic of Congo,” 22.

Information related to the repatriation of refugees was not available. Periodic violence was reported. The rebels took a military general hostage and a French priest went missing from the conflict zone.¹ Due to conflict, the number of refugees grew in 2001 to 119,150.²

1. “Republic of Congo’s ‘Ninja’ rebels take general hostage; Catholic priest missing,” Associated Press, April 6, 2002.
2. Robert Muggah, “The Anatomy of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in the Republic of Congo,” 22.

The continued fighting hurt the refugee repatriation programs. By the end of 2002, there were an estimated 109,150 refugees.¹

1. Ibid., 22.

After 2003, not much information was available on refugees or how refugees were resettled once they were repatriated. According to the final report of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), there were an estimated 28,000 refugees originating from the ROC in 2002 and 29,000 in 2003.¹

1. “MDRP Final Report: Overview of Program Achievements,” International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, July 2010, accessed March 7, 2012, http://mdrp.org/PDFs/MDRP_Final_Report.pdf.

According to the final report of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), there were an estimated 28,200 refugees in 2004.¹

1. “MDRP Final Report: Overview of Program Achievements.”

According to the final report of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), there were an estimated 24,400 refugees in 2005.¹

1. Ibid.

According to the final report of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), there were an estimated 20,600 refugees in 2006.¹

1. Ibid.

According to the final report of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), there were an estimated 19,700 refugees in 2007.¹

1. Ibid.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

Over 800,000 people were displaced in the Republic of Congo as of 1998.¹ As soon as the accords were signed in November and December 1999, displaced individuals started to return to their communities. Nevertheless, by the end of 1999, there were still 650,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs).² With the termination of conflict, the Republic of Congo faced a humanitarian crisis. Those displaced had never received humanitarian support.³

By the end of 2000, the number of IDPs had declined to 125,000.⁴

1. Robert Muggah, “The Anatomy of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in the Republic of Congo,” Conflict, Security & Development 4(1): 21-37 (2004): 22.
2. Ibid., 22.
3. “End to civil war in Republic of Congo creates humanitarian crisis,” Associated Press, February 24, 2000.
4. Robert Muggah, “The Anatomy of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in the Republic of Congo.”

Over the years the security situation improved, especially with the initiation of a follow-up committee seeking to identify, disarm, and demobilize the combatants. A project was launched by the UNDP with the IOM at the request of the government, which aimed to disarm and reintegrate ex-combatants and provide training and micro-projects. The program was also supported by the World Bank’s five million dollar credit support to the newly formed Haut Commissariat pour la Démobilisiation et Reinsertion des ex-Combatant in July 2001. These programs were important given the displacement caused by sporadic violence as well as the displacement of former combatants. However, sporadic violence made displacement more frequent, and by the end of 2001 there were 139,000 IDPs.¹

1. Ibid.

The security situation deteriorated with the constitutional referendum in January 2002. Ntsiloulous combatants, as well as a group affiliated to the Ntsiloulou leader, Ntoumi, were involved in several violent activities, including a Ninja rebel group’s attack on a train in April 2002. This led to an additional 75,000 displacements internally.¹ The spread of violence also led to the close of the humanitarian corridors used by international aid agencies. It was estimated that there were 68,000 IDPs by the end of 2002.²

1. Ibid., 24.
2. Ibid.

Rebel attacks near the Loulombo railway station in the southern Republic of Congo led to the internal displacement of at least 50,000 individuals, according to a U.N. estimate.¹ The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) completed a further aid distribution program for displaced people in the Republic of Congo. The ICRC offered help to some 10,000 IDPs.²

1. “Republic of Congo rebels attack military train, killing 2,” Associated Press, February 7, 2003.
2. “ICRC offers help to 10,000 displaced people in Republic of Congo,” Xinhua General News Service, July 16, 2003.

No developments observed this year.

No developments observed this year.

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) referenced a government estimate that only 7,800 people remained displaced in the Pool region by 2006.

No developments observed this year.

No developments observed this year.

The government estimate of displaced people did not change as of 2009.¹ According to the final report of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), there were an estimated 7,800 IDPs from 2006 to 2009 in the Republic of Congo.²

1. “Peace and oil dividends fail to benefit remaining IDPs and other vulnerable populations,” Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 2009, accessed February 27, 2012, http://www.internal-displacement.org.
2. “MDRP Final Report: Overview of Program Achievements,” The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2010, accessed March 7, 2012, http://mdrp.org/PDFs/MDRP_Final_Report.pdf.

Information on whether or not schools were rebuilt was not readily available. The Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion (PNDDR), which was established to oversee DDR programs, was also responsible for the rehabilitation of community infrastructure; i.e. schools, health facilities, etc.¹ Nevertheless, the PNDDR and DDR programs had not been adequately funded, and it was difficult to assess the extent to which war-damaged school facilities had been restored. It was also not clear which programs had affected children in terms of relaxing the official schooling-age requirement.

1. “DDR and Human Security in Congo Brazzaville. Mini case study,” CICS, University of Bradford, 2008, accessed March 6, 2012, http://www.ddr-humansecurity.org.uk/images/DDR%20Mini%20Case%20Study%20R….

No developments observed this year.

No further developments occurred this year. If one uses gross pre-primary school enrollment as an indicator of reconstruction of schools destroyed during conflict, it appeared that the enrollment rate had increased from 2% to 5% in 2002, and gradually increased to 12%, increasing in increments of 1% annually.¹

1. “World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance,” World Bank, 2012, accessed March 8, 2012, http://databank.worldbank.org.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

The Agreement on Ending Hostilities in the Republic of Congo (29 December 1999) sought to end armed conflict throughout the Republic of Congo and particularly in the Bouenza, Pool, Lekoumou, Niari, and Kouilou regions. All parties to the accord, in this regard, agreed to give up their arms and establish the Monitoring Commission for the Agreements on Ceasefire and Ending Hostilities, responsible for monitoring and verifying the stipulations of the implementation of ceasefires in conflict zones. The chairman of the Monitoring Commission was appointed by the international mediator, a position filed by Gabon’s President, Omar Bongo.

To implement the provisions of the accord, parties to the conflict reached an agreement on the modality, function, and composition of the Monitoring Commission on 10 January 2000.

On 14 February 2000, four different presidential decrees were announced concerning: (1) the creation, organization, and operation of the Monitoring Commission for the Agreements on Ceasefire and Ending Hostilities (decree 2000-4); (2) the organization and operation of the Coordination Committee General Secretariat of the Monitoring Commission (decree 2000-5); (3) the appointment of members of the Executive Committee of the Monitoring Commission (decree 2000-6); and (4) the appointment of members of the General Secretariat of the Monitoring Commission (2007).¹ The Monitoring Commission had a Coordination Committee and an Executive Committee (Article 3, Decree 2000-4). The Monitoring Commission had an international observer in the Executive Committee (Article 9, Decree 2000-4), which was organized into several specialized working committees, including committees for the collection of weapons and war ammunition (Article 10, Decree 2000-4). The decree also established regional committees throughout the national territory that also included international observers (Article 15 and 17, Decree 2000-4). The Executive Committee was chaired by General Gilbert Mokoki.² Louis Gaston Matanghoye was the international observer in the Executive Committee.³ However, it is not clear whether General Gilbert Mokoki was appointed by an international facilitator. General Mokoki belonged to the High Command of the Security Forces of the Republic of Congo.

1. “Decrét Portant Création, Organisation et Fonctionnement du Comité de Suivi Des Accords de Cessez-le-Feu et de Cessation des Hostilités en République du Congo,” Présidence de La République, (2000—4, 2000-5, 2000-6, 2000-7), February 14, 2000.
2. “International Meeting on the Republic of the Congo: A Country in Transition,” ReliefWeb, July 6, 2000, accessed February 23, 2012, http://reliefweb.int/node/66683.
3. “Report on Ending Hostilities in The Republic of Congo,” Public International Law & Policy Group, accessed February 17, 2012, http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/….

No developments observed this year.

The effectiveness of the monitoring mechanisms, which involved international observers, was difficult to gauge as the monitoring mechanisms were dominated by the Security Forces of the Republic of Congo. Two of the primary responsibilities of the monitoring mechanisms were to collect weapons and demobilize combatants; these efforts were not very successful. The Republic of Congo was also a part of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) launched in 2002. It was expected that some 30,000 ex-combatants would benefit from reintegration, some 11,000 combatants would be demobilized, and some 11,000 would be reintegrated. According to a July 2010 report from the MDRP, only 15,179 benefited from reintegration in the Republic of Congo.¹

1. “MDRP Final Report. Overview of Program Achievements – MDRP Secretariat – July 2010,” MDRP, 2010, accessed February 28, 2012, http://www.mdrp.org/doc_rep.htm.

A secret settlement was negotiated with the Ntsiloulou leader, Ntoumi, in March 2003.¹

1. “UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia,” Uppsala Conflict Data Program, accessed February 23, 2012 www.ucdp.uu.se/database.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.