Satisfied with the progress on military reform, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that the US would lift its ban on military aid to Guatemala.¹ As of 2005, the military strength declined by another 1,000 personnel to 29,000.²

The Government decided to reduce the number of troops and officers in the Armed Forces from 27,000 to 15,500, to reduce the military budget to 0.33% of GDP, and to accelerate base closings consistent with a reorientation toward external defense only. The EMP was finally replaced by the SAAS and the Ministry of Defense publicly introduced a new military doctrine based on human rights. Civilian regulation of military and intelligence structures was yet insufficient, however.³ As of 2004, the military declined by 1,000 personnel to 30,000.⁴

Congress passed the Civil Service Act, which provides for a civilian alternative to mandatory military service. The Government continued to use the Armed Forces for public security tasks. After consulting with civil society organizations, the Government created the Advisory Council on Security in February 2003. The Armed Forces made progress in shifting its deployment posture to match the external defense strategy mandated by the agreements and in demobilizing the EMP.⁴

The Ministry of Defense prepared a report to set the main themes for future reforms of the Military Code and military prison system. The Ministry also publicly committed to reducing military spending back down to the level stipulated in the peace agreements, but then military commanders began withholding spending reports, and refusing to divulge information even before Congress, on the grounds of national security. The lack of a clear defense policy also left matters of military arms and equipment procurement ambiguous.⁵

The Armed Forces made very little progress with regard to intelligence services reform throughout the peace agreement implementation process to date. The one significant improvement was the creation of the Strategic Analysis Secretariat (SAE) in 1997. Although it was heavily influenced by the Armed Forces at first, it later became a truly civilian entity. However, the SAE’s work was hampered by the Government’s failure to create the Department of Civilian Intelligence and Information Analysis (DICAI) and the unauthorized intelligence functions of the Armed Forces, both of which are violations of the agreements.⁶

The EMP was still functioning, and the SAAS did not have the capacity to handle all the security duties previously upheld by the EMP. The Armed Forces also shirked their commitments in the agreements by remaining steeped in internal affairs—training new recruits for the National Civilian Police (PNC) and conducting independent public security operations.⁷

Military personnel became more involved in matters of public security, in violation of the agreements.⁸ At the heart of all the military reforms was the objective of demilitarizing Guatemalan society and strengthening civilian rule over all government agencies. The Government fell well short of this aim.⁹

The Joint Group, composed of civil society and military leaders, proposed a draft Civic Service Act that would set the standards for a universal, human-rights-compliant, non-compulsive system of military and civil service in accordance with the peace agreements. The Follow-up Commission and Peace Secretary endorsed the draft and forwarded it to the President’s office to submit to Congress. The Strategic Affairs Secretariat (SAE) prepared a draft Free Access to Information Act, which was approved by the Follow-up Commission and also submitted to Congress. The SAE also began working on a draft Supervision of State Intelligence Agencies act. A group of legislators with the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) presented a new draft to the Arms and Munitions Act, which was only reviewed and shelved.¹

Following positive dialogues over the Handbook of Military Doctrine of the Armed Forces of Guatemala, Government Accord 456-2001 established a process of soliciting input from civil society on national defense policy. The Civilian Affairs Directorate of the General Staff also began reforming its Civilian Affairs Doctrine handbook, which was originally designed for a counter-insurgency strategy that manipulated the civilian population for military ends, and was far from consistent with international human rights law norms.²

While the 2001 budget, like the 2000 budget, was set to allocate appropriate amounts for military spending, financial transfers from the Executive to the Ministry of Defense increased military spending to 0.96% of GDP, a level that far exceed the amount permitted by the agreements. At the same time, the Government allocated insufficient amounts to the Priority Program for Peace, in violation of the National Budget Law and the peace agreements.³

MINUGUA confirmed reports that military personnel carried out two extrajudicial executions and colluded with illegal armed groups, which carried out many lynchings and other egregious human rights violations.⁷

The Government began to make progress toward dissolving the Presidential General Staff (EMP), which was responsible for many human rights violations during the armed conflict. As an alternative, the Government created the Secretariat of Administrative Affairs and Security (SAAS).¹

The posture of the Armed Forces toward civilian affairs was not conducive to the relationship envisioned by the agreements. The Guatemalan military still operated as a counter-insurgency force in many ways, and as such tended to treat the civilian population as potential enemies. Civilian affairs in the military spent their time tracking the political leanings of civilians and continued to deploy “psychological operations squadrons” and “ideological operators.” The Armed Forces also continued their involvement in matters of public safety, bolstered by the Support for Civil Security Forces Act passed by Congress. These trends defied the demilitarization of public security mandated in the peace agreements.¹⁰

The time line of the peace agreements originally stipulated the end of 2000 as the deadline for compliance with military reform components. Since the Government had fallen too far behind to meet this deadline, the Follow-up Commission rescheduled the final deadline for 2004. Among the delayed commitments were the creation of a new military doctrine, changes to the military education system and intelligence programs, and the termination of the EMP.¹¹

While the 2000 budget was set to allocate the appropriate amount for military spending (0.66% of GDP), the Executive ended up transferring so much more money to the Ministry of Defense that actual expenditures reached 0.83%.¹²

As of 2000, the military strength of Guatemala was 31,000 personnel, which was an increase of 1,000 personnel from 1999.¹³

On 30 August 1999, the budget of the armed forces reached the benchmark of a 33% reduction in military spending as a proportion of GDP. However, by the end of the year, the size of the military budget relative to GDP came out at 0.68%, which slightly exceeded the stipulated amount of 0.66% of GDP.¹¹

The referendum for the full package of constitutional amendments occurred on 16 May 1999. With low turnout, voters denied the proposed amendments, which included military reforms under the heading of executive agency. While this vote prevented the complete fulfillment of many components of the peace agreements, the parties to the agreements for their part showed good faith by drafting, submitting and approving the reforms. Government and civil society leaders also began working on alternative paths to enact structural reforms.¹²

In October 1999, the President’s office submitted a bill to reform the Arms and Munitions Act and implement the related stipulations in the Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society. No further progress was made on it, however.¹³

Ministry of Defense leaders worked on comprehensive reforms in the design of military education. At the end of 1999, the President of the Republic ceremoniously delivered to MINUGUA a copy of the new Handbook of Military Doctrine of the Armed Forces of Guatemala. MINUGUA and the Follow-up Commission convinced the government that the handbook needed to be treated as a draft proposal subject to scrutiny from verification bodies and civil society.¹⁴

As of 1999, the military strength of Guatemala was 30,000 personnel.¹⁵

Reductions in military spending continued and fell to percentages of GDP lower than required by the agreements.¹

Even after the Follow-up Commission approved an extension to the first quarter of 1998, the Government failed to set up an Advisory Council on Security, draft legislation regulating the bearing of arms, or advance the Civil Service Act.¹² As of 1998, the military strength of Guatemala was 30,000 personnel.¹³

The “Xaman case” set a precedent for the civilian judiciary’s jurisdiction over common crimes committed by military personnel. On 12 June 1996, Legislative Decree 14-96 codified this revision to military privilege.¹³

The Armed Forces performed an internal review of the Kaibil Special Operations and Training Center, where Guatemala’s notorious commandos had been trained. Only minor changes were instituted.¹⁴

In accordance with the stipulation in the agreements to reduce military spending, the Government began cutting the budget of the Armed Forces. The Education and Doctrine Command was created to initiate reforms in military education and training.¹⁵

The Strategic Analysis Secretariat (SAE) was created as part of the intelligence services reforms stipulated in the Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society. The SAE was intended to be a civilian intelligence body in service of the President, but it was initially run by members of the Armed Forces, in violation of the agreements.¹⁶

The accord does not require a reduction in the armed force; however there is a, suggested size for the military. As of 1996, the military strength of Guatemala was 36,000 personnel, which was reduced to 30,000 personnel in 1997.¹⁷

The Guatemala judiciary ten years after the accord is considered one of the most inefficient and corrupt institutions in Guatemala.¹⁴