No further developments observed.

The demobilization of the URNG was a general success. After converting to a political organization, the URNG never resumed an armed strategy. The Government decided to reduce the number of troops and officers in the Armed Forces from 27,000 to 15,500 and to accelerate base closings consistent with a reorientation toward external defense only. The EMP was finally replaced by the SAAS.¹

The Government made more progress in demobilizing the EMP, which was to be replaced by the Administrative and Security Affairs Secretariat (SAAS). The EMP had 449 members remaining after 107 members were demobilized in May 2003.²

The Government demobilized 186 members of the Presidential General Staff (EMP).¹

The Armed Forces maintained several units that served no purpose for external defense and instead involved themselves in all sorts of internal affairs that should have been relegated to the National Civilian Police (PNC) and other non-military bodies. The Minister of Defense admitted that the Armed Forces were still deployed for counter-insurgency. The Chief of the General Staff spoke of a five-year plan to shift military deployment so it would comply with the agreements, but UN verifiers never received a copy of the plan.³

Over 30 of the military’s counter-insurgency units were dismantled, but further progress toward compliance with demobilization stipulations were deferred until the new deadline at the end of 2002.¹

The Armed Forces continued to deploy in patterns more suited for counter-insurgency than for national defense.¹

Military personnel reductions continued, culminating on 23 September 1998, when MINUGUA verified that the Armed Forces fulfilled the agreements, with a total number of 31,423 personnel. Unfortunately, military units were deployed in postures inconsistent with the commitment to serve in a national defense capacity only.⁴

United Nations military observers verified that the Guatemalan Armed Forces and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) separated, assembled in the proper locations, and began demobilizing on schedule—even ahead of schedule in some cases. A total of 2,928 URNG personnel assembled at the camps, which was 642 less than the 3,570 on the list submitted to the UN military observers previously, but subsequent investigations showed that the concentration of URNG forces was indeed complete. An additional 1,258 persons affiliated with the URNG were not required to go to the assembly points, but they were registered and issued identification cards. After the verification of concentration on 24 March, the URNG combatants were demobilized in three waves, beginning on 15 April and ending on 2 May.⁵

The Ministry of Defense began reducing military personnel in accordance with the Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of Armed Forces in a Democratic Society. By the end of 1997, the number of active duty troops dropped from 46,900 to 31,270, which actually exceeded the 33% reduction mandated by the agreements. However, the Armed Forces did not satisfy the agreement in terms of geographic redeployment and redistribution.⁶

There were some efforts to reform the police force in Guatemala including increasing the strength of the police force. Nevertheless, inefficiency and corruption were rampant in the police force which is one of the contributing factors to higher crime rates.⁷