Military Reform – 1997

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Military Reform – 1997

1997

Intermediate Implementation Intermediate implementation

The “Xaman case” set a precedent for the civilian judiciary’s jurisdiction over common crimes committed by military personnel. On 12 June 1996, Legislative Decree 14-96 codified this revision to military privilege.1

The Armed Forces performed an internal review of the Kaibil Special Operations and Training Center, where Guatemala’s notorious commandos had been trained. Only minor changes were instituted.2

In accordance with the stipulation in the agreements to reduce military spending, the Government began cutting the budget of the Armed Forces. The Education and Doctrine Command was created to initiate reforms in military education and training.3

The Strategic Analysis Secretariat (SAE) was created as part of the intelligence services reforms stipulated in the Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society. The SAE was intended to be a civilian intelligence body in service of the President, but it was initially run by members of the Armed Forces, in violation of the agreements.4

The accord does not require a reduction in the armed force; however there is a, suggested size for the military. As of 1996, the military strength of Guatemala was 36,000 personnel, which was reduced to 30,000 personnel in 1997.5

  1. “Verification Report: Status of the Commitments of the Peace Agreements Relating to the Armed Forces,” United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), May 2002.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Ibid.
  4. Ibid.; “Report of the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) for the Consultative Group Meeting for Guatemala,” United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), January 18, 2002.
  5. D. Scott Bennett and Allan Stam, “EUGene: A Conceptual Manual,” International Interactions 26 (2000):179-204; see http://eugenesoftware.org.