Verification/Monitoring Mechanism: Comprehensive Peace Agreement

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Verification/Monitoring Mechanism: Comprehensive Peace Agreement

Implementations

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 2006

The CPA provided that the UN provides assistance with the monitoring of human rights, the management of arms and armies and that they observe the elections for the Constituent Assembly. The human rights monitoring responsibility was also given to the National Human Rights Commissions.

Once the CPA was signed on 22 November 2006, the Ceasefire Monitoring Committee established in the Ceasefire Code of Conduct was replaced by the Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA). This agreement established the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee (JMCC), which was comprised of representatives from both sides and chaired by the UN for the purpose of monitoring, reporting and coordinating. The AMMAA also established the Joint Monitoring Teams (JMTs) as the mechanism for monitoring the cessation of hostilities. The AMMAA agreement was signed on 6 December 2006.[fn]”Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/235), April 26, 2007; “Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies,” Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, December 8, 2006, http://www.peace.gov.np.[/efn_note] According to the agreement, the nine-member JMCC would have a chairman appointed by the UN Mission. The JMCC would also consist of two vice chairmen, one from the Maoist Army, and one from the NA. The remaining six members would consist of two from the UN, two from the NA and two from the Maoist Army.

To establish the UN’s political mission, the Secretary General of the UN dispatched a multidisciplinary assessment mission to Nepal that lasted from the 9th to the 17th of December. The mission developed plans for the rapid deployment of up to 35 monitors and 25 electoral personnel as approved by the Security Council resolution S/PRST/2006/49.[fn]”Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/7), January 9, 2007.[/efn_note] The assessment mission identified a number of technical and electoral processes, related to the Constituent Assembly elections including voter registration and voter education. In terms of human rights monitoring, the OHCHR had been involved since 2005 and after the peace agreement was signed the mission had a stronger civil component and representatives deployed in the regions.[fn]”Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/7), January 9, 2007.[/efn_note]

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 2007

The United Nations Missions in Nepal (UNMIN) was established on 23 January. The Secretary General Appointed Ian Martin as his personal representative in Nepal on 8 February 2007.1

Management of arms and the armies: The first step in the management of arms and armies was to initiate the cantonment process and register the Maoist combatants and verify the return of the Nepal Army to their barracks. This process should also have included the deposit of weapons in containers. The cantonment of the Maoist combatants started as soon as the United Nations Mission in Nepal was established on 23 January 2007. In a press statement on 23 February 2007, the UNMIN claimed that 32,250 Maoist combatants were registered either in the seven major cantonment sites or in the 21 satellite sites. A news report attested that the first phase of the registration of combatants was completed within one month. The UNMIN reported the results to the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee (JMCC) on March 8 confirming 31,252 personnel and 3,475 weapons.2 The registered number of Maoist combatants later increased slightly to 32,250.3 Once the cantonment process was complete, the UNMIN had to verify the registered combatants, in order that those unqualified for reintegration could be demobilized. This verification process was completed by the end of 2007.

According to the CPA and the subsequent AMMAA agreement, 3,475 of the Maoist’s weapons were registered and stored in cantonment locations. The process was completed in April 2007. In accordance with the agreement, 2,855 of the Nepal Army’s weapons were registered and stored. Among the weapons registered by the Maoists, 96 weapons were retained outside the cantonments for the security of the Maoist leaders.4 The UNMIN was also involved in the clearance of the mines.

Human Rights: According to the Secretary General’s report, the OHCHR continued to monitor the human rights situation, with particular attention to the peace process. The UNMIN and OHCHR coordinated together. The OHCHR documented a number of human rights violations. The UNMIN continued to push for a credible independent national monitoring mechanism for the peace process that would include appointing members of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). Five members of the NHRC members were appointed in September after a parliamentary hearing. In June, the government also agreed in principle to establish a high-level monitoring body.5

Constituent Assembly Elections: The UNMIN contributed to the work of the Election Commission on various issues including the adoption of an electoral code of conduct, candidate nomination, and the procedures to meet the complex quota system of the electoral legislations. As a part of their electoral assistance, the UNMIN helped to recruit international and national volunteers, who took up positions as district electoral advisers.6 After postponing elections twice in 2007, the CA elections were rescheduled for April 2008.

By October 2007, the five UNMIN regional offices, in Dhangadi, Nepalgunj, Pokhara, Kathmandu, and Biratnagar, were operational. As of 30 September, 881 of the planned 1,073 personnel were at their posts and more staff was deployed in regions and districts than at headquarters.7

  1. “UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/235), April 26, 2007.
  2. “UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/235), April 26, 2007.
  3. Ameet Dhakal, “The People’s Liberation Army (PLA),” Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2009.
  4. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/235), April 26, 2007.
  5. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/ 442), July 18, 2007; (S/2007/612), October 18, 2007.
  6. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/612), October 18, 2007.
  7. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/612), October 18, 2007.

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 2008

Management of arms and the armies: The UNMIN verified 19,602 ex-combatants as meeting their criteria and 8,640 as not available for verification. Among initially registered combatants, 4,008 were disqualified. Among these disqualified combatants, 1,035 were recruited after the ceasefire code of conduct was signed on 26 May 2006. 2,973 Maoist combatants were under the age of eighteen by the time of the ceasefire code of conduct agreement.1 According to the report, the disqualified combatants received allowances. However, their scheduled discharge or demobilization did not occur because of the political uncertainty that surrounded the formation of the government after the Constituent Assembly elections.2

The UNMIN Mine Action Unit has fulfilled their obligations under the Agreement on Monitoring the Management of Arms and Armies to locate mine sites. Accordingly, the UNMIN unit destroyed over 7,250 kilograms of explosive items including 14,682 improvised explosive devices at nine locations.3 Out of the 53 minefields laid by the Nepal Army during the civil conflict, only five land minefields were cleared by October 2008.4

Human Rights: The human rights situation remained very serious as a number of armed groups emerged in the eastern and southern parts of the country. In 2008, 541 people were killed. This figure included 50 people killed by the state and eight people killed by Maoist-affiliated organizations. Similarly 729 people were abducted. This included 138 people abducted by the Maoists and 162 by its sister organization, the Young Communist League. In electoral related violence, it was reported that the Maoists killed 12 people, injured another 383, beat 813, threatened 142, and abducted 304. Other political parties were also involved in similar activities, but the MaoistsÕ violations of human rights surpassed all other parties.5 The delay in the formation of the government after the CA elections in April led to the delay in the establishment of a transitional justice mechanism. This would have included establishing a truth and reconciliation commission and a commission on disappearance as agreed in the 2006 CPA.6

The Constituent Assembly (CA) elections The CA elections took place on 10 April 2008. A mixed electoral system was adopted. Accordingly, 240 members were elected based on a first-past-the-post election and the 335 members were elected on the basis of proportional representation. The remaining 26 members were nominated by each political party present in the CA.7 The Maoists won 120 seats in the first-past-the-post election and 100 seats in the PR portion. The NC won 37 first-past-the-post seats and 73 proportional-representation seats. The Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) (UML) won 33 first-past-the-post seats and 70 proportional representation seats. The MPRF obtained 30 first-past-the-post seats and 22 proportional representation seats, while the other two UDMF parties between them won 13 first-past-the-post seats and 16 proportional representation seats.8 After the elections for the Constituent Assembly were held, the interim parliament dissolved. The CA was convened on 28 May 2008. The CA is highly representative in terms of the number of seats held by women, minorities and Dalits. These successful elections completed the UN Security Council’s mandate as well as the CPA’s provisions regarding the role of the UNMIN with respect to electoral monitoring.

As of 10 October the overall number of staff of the UNMIN was 283, out of the authorized 306 civilian personnel. This figure includes 85 arms monitors out of the authorized strength of 90.9

  1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/259), April 18, 2008.
  2. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/454), July 10, 2008.
  3. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/454), July 10, 2008.
  4. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/670), October 24, 2008.
  5. “Human Rights Yearbook 2009,” Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), 2009; “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2009/313), May 12, 2008.
  6. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/670), October 24, 2008.
  7. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/313), May 12, 2008.
  8. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/313), May 12, 2008.
  9. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/670), October 24, 2008.

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 2009

Management of arms and the armies: After months of delay, the demobilization of unqualified combatants started on 11 October 2009.1 This process, however, was not completed in 2009. Similarly, political deadlock delayed the integration and rehabilitation of the qualified ex-combatants. The JMCC, which was mandated to monitor partiesÕ compliance with the agreement, continued to meet under the chairmanship of the UNMIN Chief Arms Monitor. The UNMIN Monitors were also present when the salary payment was made for August and September to verified Maoist combatants.2

Human Rights: Overall, the human rights situation remained very serious given the surge in violent activities by different armed outfits. INSEC reported 1420 counts of human rights violations by the state and 5,137 counts of violations by non-state actors, (the Maoists included).3 The OHCHR raised concerns regarding security personnel’s involvement in extrajudicial killings in the troubled Tarai region. Concurrently, the NHRC’s recommendations were not implemented by the government.4

As of 16 October, 261 of the 278 authorized personnel were assigned to the Mission.5

  1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2009/553), October 26, 2009.
  2. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2009/553), October 26, 2009.
  3. “Human Rights Yearbook 2007,” Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), 2010.
  4. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2009/553), October 26, 2009.
  5. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2009/553), October 26, 2009.

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 2010

The human rights situation remained serious: “In September, OHCHR-Nepal released a summary of concerns entitled “Investigating allegations of extrajudicial killings in the Terai.”1 The report documents 39 incidents in the Terai region which resulted in the deaths of 57 persons between January 2008 and June 2010, all involving credible allegations of the unlawful use of force by security forces.2 The same report also suggested phasing out the OHCHR-Nepal regional office as per the agreement.

Management of arms and the armies: The discharge or demobilization of the disqualified and of children was completed on 8 February 2010. According to the discharge plan, the UN monitored the discharge process and provided rehabilitation support for discharged child combatants.3

The Special Committee was responsible for supervising the integration and rehabilitation of the Maoist army. It formed a secretariat comprised of the former members of the Technical Committee. The committee appointed a secretariat coordinator. The issues related to the integration and rehabilitation of the Maoist army, however, did not make progress because parties failed to reach a consensus on the number and modality of the reintegration. They also did not decide on the exact composition of a support package for those choosing rehabilitation.

Throughout the year, the JMCC continuously investigated and resolved reported violations of the AMMAA agreement.

According to a report, 33 of the 53 minefields have been cleared by the Nepal Army demining teams with technical support from the United Nations mine action team.4

In 2010 the UNMIN was involved in a serious controversy. The UNMIN conveyed its disapproval when the Nepal Army announced a vacancy for 3,434 soldiers, including 250 officer positions, and invited applications from eligible and interested Nepali citizens. The UNMIN was criticized for being too partial to the Maoists. The UNMIN in the past had adopted a soft approach to the MaoistsÕ non-compliance with the AMMAA agreement. This controversy led to the NA boycotting a meeting of the JMCC, which had put the NA recruitment on its agenda for 26 August 2010.5 While the Maoists wanted the UNMIN to continue its work in Nepal, other political parties, including the government, concluded that the UNMIN’s presence would create incentives for the Maoists to delay the integration and rehabilitation of their ex-combatants. Even though these tensions prevailed, the government and the Maoists still sent a joint letter asking for the seventh extension of the UNMIN for four months on 14 September.6 On 15 September 2010, the Security Council decided that the present UNMIN mandate would be terminated on 15 January 2011. As of 29 November 2010, 254 of the authorized 278 personnel were serving in the Mission.7

  1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2010/658), December 23, 2010.
  2. Ibid.
  3. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2010/183), April 13, 2010.
  4. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2010/658), December 23, 2010.
  5. “Nepal Army to boycott JMCC meet,” Kathmandu Post, August 26, 2010.
  6. “Govt, Maoists send second letters to UN,” Kathmandu Post, September 15, 2010.
  7. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2010/658), December 23, 2010.

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 2011

As scheduled, the UNMIN withdrew its mission in Nepal on 15 January 2011. Originally established for one year on 23 January 2007, its mandate was extended on 23 January 2008 for six months, on 24 July 2008 for six months, on 24 January 2009 for six months, on 24 July 2009 for nine months and for 3 weeks.on 15 May 2010 for four months, and on 16 September 2010 for four months. During its tenure, the UNMIN assisted in the holding of successful Constituent Assembly elections, the registration of the Maoist combatants, and the verification and demobilization of child and unqualified Maoist combatants. It also monitored human rights situations. Nevertheless, the mission could not complete its mandate to reintegrate and rehabilitate the Maoist army.1

Once the UNMIN withdrew from Nepal, a Special Committee (SC) replaced it. The Special Committee is currently monitoring the arms and armies. Nevertheless, the issues surrounding the integration and rehabilitation of the Maoists combatants remain contentious.

In June 2011, all landmines planted during insurgency periods were cleared.2

  1. “The UN Mission in Nepal-UNMIN’s Humiliating Withdrawal,” Conflict Study Center (Situation Update 100), March 21, 2011.
  2. “Nepal celebrates becoming the second country in Asia to become free of minefields,” UNICEF, June 22, 2011, accessed August 12, 2011, http://www.unicef.org.

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 2012

The UNMIN was withdrawn in 2011.

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 2013

No further developments observed.

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 2014

No further developments observed.

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 2015

No further developments observed.