Cease Fire: Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement

Annexure I: Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 31st December 2004)

Part I: The Ceasefire Arrangements

1. General and Fundamental Provisions

1.1. The Parties agree that the national ownership of the peace process, political will, and continuous dialogue are indispensable elements for sustainable peace. They shall collaborate to observe and respect the ceasefire and resort to their own wisdom to contain and solve any problem that may arise;

1.2. The Parties shall always refrain from any act or acts that may in any way spoil the peace process. They shall unceasingly create and maintain a conducive atmosphere for peace and tranquility;

1.3. The Parties shall abide by good governance, democracy and foster civil society;

1.4. The Parties agree that inclusiveness is of the essence to this Agreement and shall engage the other armed groups and political forces to become part of the peace process, play a role thereto and contribute to the sustenance of this Agreement;

1.5. The Cease fire Agreement shall ensure clarity by eliminating any room for ambiguity in all elements of the Ceasefire Agreement;

1.6. The Ceasefire Agreement shall guarantee the free movement of people, goods and services throughout Sudan;

1.7. The Parties shall, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Ceasefire Agreement, provide and share information and statistics on their troops strength, arms and military equipment and any other relevant information, among themselves and with the UN Peace Support Mission;

1.8. The Parties shall commit themselves to immediate release of prisoners of war (POWs) and as a gesture of national reconciliation release any other persons detained as a result of the war upon the endorsement of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement;

1.9. The Parties shall involve the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in the process of arranging the release of POWs and other persons detained as a result of the war;

1.10. The Parties shall commit themselves to render and facilitate humanitarian assistance through creation of conditions conducive to the provision of urgent humanitarian assistance to displaced persons, refugees and other affected persons and their right to return;

1.11. The Parties agree to inform the rank and file of their armed forces as a way of popularizing the Ceasefire Agreement;

1.12. The Parties shall commit themselves that all forces, troops under their respective command and forces allied and affiliated to them at all levels and rank and file shall fully ceasefire and stop hostilities;

1.13. The Parties shall endeavour to promote and disseminate peace culture and confidence building measures among and between the people as well as their forces as integral part of ceasefire arrangements and sustenance of the peace;

1.14. The Parties agree not to arm, train, harbour on their respective areas of control, or render any form of support to external subversive elements or internal armed groups;

1.15. Nothing in this Agreement shall in any way undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Sudan.

2. Entry into Force

The Ceasefire Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the Agreement or this Agreement) shall come into effect from the date of signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (that day hereafter referred to as D-Day).

3. Amendment of this Agreement

This Agreement may only be amended by the Presidency upon recommendation of the Ceasefire Political Commission.

4. The Parties of the Agreement

The Parties to this Agreement shall be:

4.1. The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), with all its formations and units; and

4.2. The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), with all its formations and units.

5. Principles of the Ceasefire

5.1. The Parties agree to a permanent ceasefire among all their forces with the broader objective of sustaining the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, promoting peace culture, reconciliation and confidence building;

5.2. The ceasefire shall uphold the following principles:

5.2.1 Permanent cessation of hostilities between SAF and SPLA within 72 hours of the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

5.3.l. The Permanent cessation of hostilities shall include final termination of the following activities:

5.3.1 Military activities including movement, reconnaissance, reinforcement, recruitment, draft, and military exercises other than those permitted by the Joint Defence Board (JOB). The JDB will inform the UN Peace Support Mission of permitted current and future activities;

5.3.2. Land, air, and river operations;

5.3.3. Laying of mines and other subversive activities;

5.3.4. Use of force against and abuse of civilians;

5.3.5. Replenishment of ammunition, weapons and other lethal or military equipment;

5.3.6. Hostile propaganda from inside or outside the country;

5.3.7. Occupation of new locations;

5.3.8. Any other actions that may impede the normal progress of the cease fire process.

6. The Ceasefire Zone

The scope of the ceasefire shall be:

6.1. Southern Sudan, which shall be subdivided, for all the purposes of ceasefire and monitoring activities, into three areas of:

a) Bahr el Ghazal Area;
b) Equatorial Area;
c) Upper Nile Area.

6.2 Nuba Mountains Area;

6.3 Southern Blue Nile Area;

6.4 Abyei Area;

6.5 Eastern Sudan Area (Hamashkoreb, New Rasai, Kotaneb, Tamarat, and Khor Khawaga).

7. Duration and Calendar of Major Ceasefire Activities

7.l. Duration of the ceasefire shall be divided into four phases:

7.1.1 Phase I: The Pre-interim Period duration 6 months (D-day to D-day + 6 months) ceasefire activities shall start (as per attached lists), including the redeployment of SAF from the South to the North, the beginning of the Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration and Reconciliation (DDRR) , the redeployment of SPLA forces from Eastern Sudan, the formation, co-location in training centres, training of the Joint/Integrated Units (JIUs) and the UN monitoring.

7.1.2 Phase II: First half of the Interim Period duration 36 months (D-day+ 6 mo D-day + 42 months). This phase shall cover the completion of deployment of the JIUs, redeployment of the SPLA forces from the Eastern Sudan to the South, redeployment of the SPLA forces from Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile to the South and redeployment of SAF from the South to the North. The DDR activities shall continue. The negotiations on proportionate downsizing shall also start at this phase.

7.1.3 Phase III: Second half of the Interim Period duration 36 months (D-day + 42 months to D-day + 78 months). Continuation of DDR process, training and the monitoring process. Development of plans and modalities of transforming the JIUs into integrated ones.

7.1.4 Phase IV: Post Interim Period duration 6 months (D- day + 78 months to D-day + 84 months). Formation of Sudan National Armed Forces (SNAF) in case of unity or dissolution of JIU in case of secession.

7.2. The Calendar of major ceasefire activities is agreed by the parties as per Appendix 2.

8. Disengagement

8.1. There shall be lines of disengagement according to the assembly areas, as specified in Appendix 1, and shall be adjusted by the monitors of the UN Peace Support Mission.

8.2. On the declaration of the ceasefire, the forces of the SAF, inclusive of their allied forces and the SPLA, inclusive of their allied forces, shall maintain their current positions.

8.3. All forces shall take defensive positions and be redeployed to assembly points within the first three months of the Pre-Interim Period according to the agreed timetable.

8.4. All forces shall be disengaged, separated, encamped in their assembly points, and redeployed subject to international monitoring arrangements.

8.5. The parties shall provide maps and sketches showing their current dispositions before the declaration of the ceasefire. Such maps and sketches shall include:

8.5.1. Current dispositions including deployment and weapons sites.

8.5.2. All necessary information about roads, tracks, passages, minefields, and command posts.

8.6. To safeguard against the menace and hazards posed by landmines and unexploded ordnance, the Parties agree that:

8.6.1. The laying of mines, explosive devices or booby traps of whatever type shall be prohibited;

8.6.2. The Parties and forces under their control shall promptly provide on D-day to the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC) all known information concerning the locations and descriptions of all minefields, unexploded ordnance, demolitions, booby traps and any other physical or military hazards which could affect the safe movement of persons, within the ceasefire zones. The Parties shall also promptly produce a plan to mark and signpost any danger areas and initiate this plan according to agreed priorities. The Parties shall allow and facilitate cross-line de-mining activities, the repair and reopening of roads and the removal, dismantling or destruction of mines, unexploded ordnance and all other such hazards as described above immediately upon the signature of this Agreement;

8.6.3. The Parties and forces under their control shall promptly provide to the CJMC information concerning the stockpiles of Anti Personal Mines;

8.6.4. The Parties shall conduct de-mining activities as soon as possible, and in coordination with the UN Peace Support Mission with a view to create the conditions necessary for deployment of the UN Peace Support Mission and the return of displaced populations;

8.6.5. The UN Peace Support Mission, in conjunction with United Nations Mine Action Office, will assist the Parties' de-mining efforts by providing technical advice and coordination. The Parties shall, as necessary, seek additional de-mining assistance and advice from the UN Peace Support Mission;

8.6.6 The Parties shall establish by D Day + 30 Days two de-mining authorities (Northern and Southern) that shall work together and coordinate their de-mining activities and to work jointly in close cooperation with UN Mine Action Office;

8.7. Before the declaration of the ceasefire, the Parties shall present detailed lists of size and location of their forces in each area to United Nations Advanced Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS), subject by verification of the Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT) and Joint Military Commission (JMC) Nuba Mountains. Such lists shall be attached to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

8.8. Notwithstanding 8.7 above, the Parties shall present detailed lists of particulars of all troops to the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC) or, pending the formation of the CJMC, to the VMT and JMC/Nuba. The lists shall be verified by the CJMC and/or the VMT and JMC, as the case
may be, immediately after the declaration of the ceasefire.

8.9. The Parties agree and in collaboration with the UN Peace Support Mission to pull back all the weapons of effective range fire within the other Party's assembly areas.

8.10. The Parties shall provide detailed data on their inventories and stocks including different weapons and munitions, fuel oil and lubricants, etc., and their exact locations to CJMC or the VMT in the cease fire zone. Such inventories shall be verified immediately after the declaration of the ceasefire. The Parties shall agree on ways and means of monitoring such stocks and/or stores to make sure that they are no longer accessible to the Parties.

9. Permitted Activities

In view of negative consequences of war, the key principle that shall underpin permitted activities shall be to alleviate the effects of the war on the civilians and war-affected areas and to galvanize popular support for peace. Permitted activities shall therefore include:

9.1. De-mining and decommissioning of military hazards (this shall be done in collaboration with other bodies referred to in 8.6 herein, according to agreed timetables and mechanisms, and under UN monitoring);

9.2. Development activities to include opening of roads, rehabilitation of bridges and passages, railways, airports and airstrips, and lines of river navigation etc;

9.3. Humanitarian activities such as securing unimpeded access to humanitarian relief according to agreed regulations;

9.4. Socioeconomic activities such as assisting free movement of people, goods and services;

9.5. Free movement of unarmed soldiers in plain clothes who are on leave, medical referrals, or visiting their families;

9.6. Re-supply of armed forces lethal items as shall be deemed appropriate by the IDB and coordinated with UN Mission;

9.7. Supply of non-lethal items (food, water, medicine, fuel oils and lubricants, stationery, uniforms, etc.);

9.8. Training and Refresher training.

9.9. During the disengagement of forces, they shall not exercise any military activities except the following:

9.9.1. Training and refresher training (UN Mission shall be informed of such training - location, duration and type); particularly the field training of platoon level and higher;

9.9.2. Administrative movement (e.g. replenishment with non-lethal supplies or equipment);

9.9.3. Medical evacuation.

10. Violations

10.1. The following acts shall constitute violations to this Agreement:

10.1.1. Any acts that may contravene this Agreement;

10.1.2. Unauthorized movement of troops;

10.1.3. Unauthorized recruitment, draft and/or mobilization drive;

10.1.4. Unauthorized replenishment of military equipment and supplies;

10.1.5. Hostile acts that may provoke confrontation;

10.1.6. Violation of human rights, humanitarian law and obstruction of freedom of movement;

10.1.7. Hostile propaganda and media warfare;

10.1.8. Espionage, sabotage, and acts of subversion to undermine either party and/or the Agreement;

10.1.9. Recruitment of child soldiers.

10.2 In event of any violation to provisions of this Agreement, the CJMC will determine appropriate disciplinary measures which may include, where appropriate, the following:

10.2.1. Publicizing or mentioning the parties that took part in the violations; Exposing or shaming the guilty or recommending severe punishment in event of grave violations;

10.2.2. Recommend referral to civil, criminal trial procedures, or courtmartial of individual or parties involved as applicable;

10.2.3. Recommend referral to civil, criminal trial procedures, or courtmartial of individual or parties involved as applicable;

10.2.4. The Parties agree to follow up on recommendations for disciplinary measures as proposed by CJMC.

10.3. The hostile propaganda as provided in sub-section 10.1.7 above shall be comprehensively monitored by CJMC as part of the ceasefire monitoring process;

10.4. Without prejudice to the freedom of press and media, the Parties agree to set up a Joint Media Committee upon signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to establish guidelines for the media and press to enhance conducive environment for the smooth implementation of the ceasefire.

10.5. The Parties agree that any deadlock arising out of the implementation of the ceasefire shall be referred, as of last resort, to the Presidency for consideration and action after having exhausted all avenues of dispute management at all lower levels;

11. Other Armed Groups

In accordance with Article 7 (a) of the Agreement on Security Arrangements, the Parties agree to expedite the process of incorporation and reintegration of armed groups allied to either Party, into their armed forces, other organized forces, the civil service and civil societal institutions.

11.2. The Parties agree to each setting up "Incorporation and Reintegration Adhoc Committee" to implement the provision of sub-section 11.1 above.

11.3. In accordance with the Framework Agreement on Security Arrangements during the Interim Period, no armed group allied to either party shall be allowed to operate outside the two forces. Other Armed Groups (OAGs) who have a desire and qualify shall be incorporated into the organized forces of either party (Army, Police, Prisons, and Wildlife Forces), while the rest shall be reintegrated into the Civil Service and civil society institutions.

11.4. The Parties agree to adopt a collaborative approach for handling OAGs and to establish by D day + 15 days an OAGs Collaborative Committee (OAGs CC) which shall comprise equal number of representatives from both parties (three each) and an independent observer from UN.

11.5. The OAGs CC shall, inter alia, perform the following functions:

11.5.1. Ascertain strength and armament conditions of all OAGs units which shall be verified by the VMT until UN monitors take over;

11.5.2. Ensure freedom of choice for all OAGs personnel as to the party they so desire to be incorporated in;

11.5.3. Ensure free and fair access of the parties to the OAGs;

11.5.4. Supervise and review incorporation processes of both Parties;

11.5.5. Provide a forum for the parties to exchange information and data on the OAGs as well as handling complaints that pertain to their incorporation process and their activities;

11.5.6. Receive regular updates on the progress of the OAGs incorporation;

11.5.7. Keep the Ceasefire Political Committee abreast on the progress of the OAGs incorporation;

11.5.8. Monitor the DDR programme for the OAGs.

11.6. DDR programme for the OAGs shall be worked out by Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC) by the end of the Pre-Interim Period with technical assistance from international experts. All integration options shall be open in that programme.

11.7. Upon signature of this Agreement, the process of incorporation of individual members of all other armed groups, who desire and qualify shall start as soon as possible into the ranks of either SAF or SPLA or integrated into organized forces (Police, Prisons and Wildlife Services), while the rest shall be reintegrated into the civil service or civil society institutions.

11.8. By D Day + 6 months, the OAGs Collaborative Committee after ascertaining the strength and armament conditions of OAGs units, shall ensure freedom of choice for all OAGs members to join either Party they so desire to be incorporated in, provided that no other armed groups shall continue to have a separate existence outside the command of either SAF or SPLA.

11.9. By D Day + 12 Months, the OAGs Collaborative Committee shall finish the incorporation process of OAGs members who desire and qualify into the armed forces of either Party and Police, Prisons, Wildlife Service and Civil Service.

11.10. When the incorporation process of OAGs referred to above in sub-section 11.9 is completed, the incorporated OAGs members shall not be allowed to decamp from one Party to the other nor to change from Police, Prisons, Wildlife and Civil Service to the military.

11.11. The Parties commit themselves, through OAGs Collaborative Committee and Incorporation and Reintegration of Adhoc Committees, to jointly brief all the OAGs about the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and their rights and obligations in the Agreement so as to ensure that they adhere to and respect all the provisions of the Agreement.

11.12. The Southern Sudan DDR Commission shall continue the reintegration process of the demobilized and disarmed members of OAGs into the civil service and civil society institutions in Southern Sudan, with a follow up of the OAGs Collaborative Committee.

11.13. The Parties shall not entertain, encourage, or permit reincorporation/defection of groups or individuals who were previously members or associated with any OAGs and have been incorporated into either party organized forces. Such act, if committed by either party, shall constitute a violation to sub-section 10.1.8 of this Agreement.

12. Foreign Insurgency Groups

12.1. The parties appreciate the threat and menace that the foreign insurgency groups pose on the security and stability of the Sudan and neighboring countries.

12.2. The parties have resolved to end the presence of the foreign insurgency groups on the Sudanese soil;

12.3. The parties shall work together to disarm, repatriate or expel these groups as soon as possible.

13. Verification, Monitoring, Complaints and Obligations

13.1 The structure and levels of monitoring and verification of the implementation of this Agreement shall be as follows:

13.1.1. Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC)

13.1.2. Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC)

13.1.3. Area Joint Military Committee (AJMC)

13.1.4. Joint Military Teams (JMTs)

14. The Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC)

14.1 The CPC shall be answerable to the Presidency;

14.2 The CPC shall be a political decision making body composed of:

14.2.1. One senior political representative from each Party;

14.2.2. One senior officer each from SAF and SPLA;

14.2.3. Special Representative of UN Secretary General or his deputy;

14.2.4. Senior Security officer (after the establishment of National Security Service);

14.2.5. One Legal advisor from each Party;

14.2.6. Representative of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (observer);

14.2.7. Representative of IGAD Partner's Forum (lPF) (observer);

14.3. The CPC chair shall be' rotational between the Parties;

14.4. The CPC shall reach its decisions by consensus of the Parties;

14.5. The mandate and functions of the CPC shall be to:

14.5.1. supervise, monitor and oversee the implementation of this Agreement;

14.5.2. complete negotiating any operational details as shall be necessary;

14.5.3. sound the Parties to rise up to their obligations in this Agreement;

14.5.4. update the Parties on the progress of the ceasefire implementation;

14.5.5. co-ordinate with other relevant national and international bodies;

14.5.6. settle deadlocks arising out from the cease fire implementation as reported by the CJMC and refer the unresolved ones to the Presidency;

14.5.7. provide disciplinary measures for violations;

14.5.8. provide a political forum for continuous dialogue between the Parties and the international community;

14.5.9. foster confidence building between the Parties;

14.5.10. Update the IGAD, IPF, African Union (AU) and the United Nations periodically on the process of the ceasefire implementation as deemed necessary;

14.5.11. propose amendments in the Agreement to the Presidency.

14.6. Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC)

14.6.1. The CJMC shall be answerable to the CPC and shall oversee the activities of AJMC;

14.6.2. The CJMC shall be located in Juba;

14.6.3. The CJMC shall be a military decision making body and shall be composed of: The Force Commander of the UN Monitoring Mission (Chair), The Deputy Force Commander from countries acceptable to the Parties. Considering that the official working languages in Sudan are Arabic and English; Three officers from SAF with ranks not less than Colonel; Three senior officers from SPLA Officer in charge of National Security at that level; One senior police officer at the level of Southern Sudan.

14.6.4. The CJMC shall reach its decisions by consensus of the Parties and shall establish its own internal regulations;

14.6.5. The CJMC shall have the following functions: Oversee compliance of the Parties to their obligations under this Agreement; Coordinate planning, monitoring and verification of the implementation of this Agreement; Facilitate liaison between the Parties; Coordinate monitoring and verification of disengagement, disarmament and redeployment of the forces as agreed upon in this Agreement; Check on the conduct of the military forces; Specification of current locations of troops as of the D Day; Monitoring troop strength, stocks of arms, ammunitions and other war-related equipment; Coordination and monitoring of pennitted military movement and itineraries thereof; Receiving and verifying unresolved violations, disputes and complaints and rule on them; Serving as a channel of communication between the Parties; Inspection of replenishment of supplies to the forces; Supervision of demining activities, decommissioning of unexploded ordnance and other form of military hazards; Dissemination of infonnation about this Agreement; help Parties in disarming and reintegrating armed groups; monitor and verify the disarmament of all Sudanese civilians who are illegally armed; be responsible for executing peace support operations in collaboration with VMT, JMC and CPMT, until the deployment of the UN monitors; after which the roles of the latter shall cease to exist;

14.6.6. Decisions reached by the CJMC shall be communicated down through the individual chains of command and reported up to the CPC.

14.6.7. Subject to the timing of different activities specified in the Agreement on Security Arrangements, the CJMC may readjust on practical considerations the timing of activities or obligations related to ceasefire including redeployment North and South of the 1956 North South border and activities referred to in sub-section 8.7 herein.

14.6.8. The CJMC shall compile necessary cartographical and mapping references which, once agreed to by the Parties, shall be used for the purposes of monitoring the implementation of this Agreement. However, such cartographical and mapping references shall have no bearing whatsoever on the subsequent delineation of the 11/1/1956 North/South border by the ad hoc border commission that the Parties will set up as part of the Agreement on Implementation Modalities.

14.6.9. The CJMC shall be entitled to move freely throughout the Ceasefire Zone.

14.7 Area Joint Military Committee (AJMC)

14.7.1 The AJMC that shall be established in Juba, Malakal, Wau, Kadugli, Abyei, Damazien or Kurmuk, and shall be composed as follows: The most senior UN Officer in the Area, Chairperson; Equal number of senior officers from SAF and SPLA; UN monitors.

14.7.2 AJMC shall be established in Kassala or Hamashkoreb in Eastern Sudan to monitor and verify the redeployment of SPLA forces as provided in sub-section 4 (c)(v)(a) of Agreement on Security Arrangements;

14.7.3 The AJMC shall be charged with the following functions: monitor and verify alleged violations and resolve disputes; report periodically and refer unresolved complaints to CJMC; Liaise and share information with the Security Committee in the designated area;

14.8 Joint Military Teams (JMTs)

14.8.1. JMTs shall be the lowest operating unit of the cease fire monitoring mechanism;

14.8.2. JMTs shall be established and designated by the AJMC at that level;

14.8.3. A JMT shall be composed of UN senior officer at that level, international monitors, equal number of officers from SAF and SPLA.

14.8.4. JMTs shall conduct regular patrols and visits throughout their respective areas to prevent violations, preserve the ceasefire, and assist in building confidence.

14.8.5. JMTs shall monitor, verify and report alleged violations to the appropriate AJMC.

15. UN Peace Support Mission

15.1. The Parties agree to request the United Nations to constitute a lean, effective, sustainable and affordable UN Peace Support Mission to monitor and verify this Agreement and to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement as provided for under Chapter VI of the UN Charter;

15.2. The Parties call upon the international community to provide technical and financial assistance, given the financial constraints of GoS and particularly the nature and structure of SPLA, to expedite the implementation of the cease fire activities.

15.3. International monitoring shall be carried out by UN, considering that the official working languages in Sudan are Arabic and English, who may make the use of the services of UN protection unit. The size of the UN Peace Support Mission, including any UN force protection element, shall be determined by the UN in consultation with the Parties.

15.4. For the purpose of monitoring activities related to the ceasefire, the international monitors shall have unrestricted access in accordance with a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which shall be concluded with the United Nations as soon as possible. Such SOFA shall contain the provisions agreed to by the Parties with the United Nations immediately following the conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

15.5. The parties agree that the presence and size of the UN peace support mission shall be determined by the implementation time table of this Agreement (disengagement, disarmament, redeployment, etc) and shall gradually phase out with successful implementation of the time tables, increased confidence building, and commitment of the parties towards the implementation of this Agreement.

15.6. The Parties agree to request the UN to provide cultural orientation to all its members to create conducive a s here for respect and better understanding of social values and cultures so as to ensure effective implementation of this Agreement;

15.7. The Parties undertake to respect the exclusively international nature of the UN Peace Support Mission as in terms of flag, vehicle markings, communication, travel and transport, privileges and immunities, facilities, provisions, supplies, services, sanitary arrangements, recruitment of local personnel, currency, entry, residence, departure, uniform, arms, permits and licences, military police, arrest, transfer of custody, mutual assistance, jurisdiction, deceased members and settlement of disputes;

15.8. SAF and SPLA members of AJMCs and JMTs shall have the right to participate in verification and monitoring missions, however in case of failure of either or both Parties to participate, the mission shall still continue with its verification and monitoring tasks.

15.9. The Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT), the Joint Military Commission (JMC) in Nuba Mountains and the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (CPMT) shall continue performing their duties, under' operational control of the UN Mission, according to their present and/or expanded mandate, fill the gap and carry out duties as shall be entrusted to them by the Parties until the UN Mission is operational, after which their roles shall cease to exist.

Implementation History


Intermediate Implementation

With the signing of the CPA in January 2005, the ceasefire agreement of December 2004 came into effect. In the agreement, parties agreed to international monitoring and verification of the ceasefire which included the redeployment of armed forces (from respective parties) and the monitoring of some 39,000 military personnel deployed under the joint/integrated units. The ceasefire agreement gave the UN a prominent role to play the verification and monitoring of the ceasefire by calling for the active participation of the United Nations in a number of bodies that were to be created to assist in the implementation of the Agreement. These included a Ceasefire Political Commission, a Ceasefire Joint Military Committee, Area Joint Military Committees and numerous joint military teams to be deployed throughout the area of operations.1

The United Nations Missions in the Sudan (UNMIS) was established on 24 March 2005 and the ceasefire monitoring and verification started as soon as the peacekeepers were deployed on the ground on 28 April 2005.2

The Ceasefire Political Commission, which had a mandate to supervise, monitor and oversee the implementation of the agreement as well as providing a political forum for a dialogue between parties and international community was established on 30 August 2005. Similarly, the government and SPLM started to nominate officers to form the Joint Integrated Units, the military unit of the future Sudanese National Armed Force should South Sudan prefer unity over secession in a referendum.3 It is not clear when other commissions/committees were established that were part of the ceasefire agreement. Nevertheless, there were news reports that the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee as well as Area Joint Military Committees were working.4 Nevertheless, the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee was the only committee/commission that met regularly in 2005.5 A Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC) answerable to the Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC) was established in 2005 and had its first meeting at the newly established Joint Monitoring and Coordination Office (JMCO) at the UN Compound in Juba on 8 May 2005.6 Formation of the Area Joint Military Committee (AJMC) was delayed until September. The first AJMC was held in the Nuba Mountains Area on 20 September 2005.7 The formation of the Joint Military Teams (JMTs), the lowest operating units of the Ceasefire Military Mechanism, was delayed. Also, due to the delay in the Joint Defense Board (JDB) the Joint Integrated Units were not formed in 2005.8 The Ceasefire Political Commission was established on 27 August 2005 by presidential decree and its membership announced on 1 November 2005.9

The ceasefire provision of the accord requires both sides to incorporate and reintegrate other armed groups. In this connection, the president of the government of Southern Sudan, Salva Kiir and leaders of other armed groups were negotiating on their participation in southern state governments.10 The ceasefire agreement requires both sides to expedite the process of incorporation and reintegration of armed groups allied to either side. The process continued in 2005.

Both parties have imposed restrictions on UNMO movement in Abyei in 2005.11 This was the violation of the ceasefire agreement even though no hostility was reported between the Sudan Armed Force (SPF) and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).

  • 1. "Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan," United Nations (S/2005/57), January 31, 2005.
  • 2. "UNMIS Background," UNMIS, accessed on January 9, 2012, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/background.shtml.
  • 3. "Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan," United Nations (S/2005/579), September 12, 2005.
  • 4. "Only Political Settlement Can Resolve Darfur Conflict, Secretary-General Tells Constitutional Review Commission in Sudan," U. S. Fed News, May 31, 2005; "UN: Security Council extends UN mission in Sudan until 24 March 2006, unanimously adopting resolution 1627 (2005)," M2 Presswire, September 23, 2005.
  • 5. "Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan," United Nations (S/2006/160), March 14, 2006.
  • 6. "The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA," UNMIS, March 2006.
  • 7. Ibid.
  • 8. Ibid.
  • 9. "The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA," UNMIS, February 2009.
  • 10. "U.N. Secretary General’s Report on the Sudan," United Nations (S/2005/82), December 21, 2005.
  • 11. "The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA, 2009."

Intermediate Implementation

The First Vice President of Sudan Salva Kiir and the leader of the South Sudan Defense Forces, Major General Paullino Matip, signed the “Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the South Sudan Defense Forces” on 8 January 2006. Most former SSDF commanders had officially declared their allegiance to SPLA, while a minority had decided to be loyal to the SAF. This was part of the ceasefire provisions. The ceasefire provisions also required incorporation of other armed groups into the regular forces of either of the parties or their reintegration into civil service or society to be completed by 9 January 2006. This deadline was not met and therefore, Ceasefire Joint Military Committee extended the deadline until 9 March 2006. The Ceasefire Political Commission met for the first time on 23 February 2006.12

The violence perpetrated by the Ugandan rebel group Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) remained a concern. Similarly, the Upper Nile saw numerous clashes involving other armed groups since the end of 2005.13 A fear of resumption of conflict was expected with the withdrawal of SPLM from East Sudan, as mandated by the ceasefire provisions.14 According to the Ceasefire agreement, the SPLM was said to redeploy its troops in Eastern Sudan to south Sudan. The redeployment took place in observation and monitoring of the UN mission in East Sudan. The UN had deployed 10,000 troops to observe the commitment of the government and the SPLM.15 The UNMIS verified the redeployment of 5,672 troops out of a declared strength of 8,763. The troops unaccounted were considered to have abandoned the SPLA.16 The redeployment of SAF was on schedule. According to the same report, the security mechanisms such as Ceasefire Joint Military Committee and the Area Joint Military Committees were functioning as intended.

In 2006, there were three major clashes reported. In March an unarmed convoy north of Abyei was ambushed, and in August a clash between off-duty SPLA and SFA officers in the Rubkona of Unity State left eight civilians and three soldiers dead. Similarly, heavy fighting between elements of the SFA and SPLA took place in Malakal from 27 to 30 November that left at least 150 people dead, including civilians.17 After the incident, parties agreed to a new ceasefire, a joint investigation was launched and both sides withdrew forces. This suggests the fragile situation on the ground.18

The peace process continued amidst repeated violation of ceasefire provision of the accord. Parties supported integrating other armed groups into existing military structures and to create functioning JIUs. The implementation of the formation of Joint Integrated Unites provision of ceasefire was 18 months behind the schedule. The delay was also partly contributed by the lack of logistical support.19 Similarly, the Ceasefire Political Commission proved unable to solve important issues such as restrictions imposed on UNMIS freedom of movement north of Abyei town and the status of disputed redeployment assembly areas.20

In October and December 2006, movement restrictions imposed on UNMO movement in Abyei in Abyei were lifted temporarily.21

  • 12. "Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan," United Nations (S/2006/160), March 14, 2006.
  • 13. Ibid.
  • 14. "Roundup: Conflict predicted after SPLM troops pullout from east Sudan," Xinhua General News Service, January 10, 2006.
  • 15. "UN to withdraw its mission from Eastern Sudan," BBC Monitoring Middle East, July 6, 2006.
  • 16. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan," United Nations (S/2006/728), September 12, 2006.
  • 17. "Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan," United Nations (S/2007/42), January 25, 2007.
  • 18. Johan Brosché, Sharing Power – Enabling Peace? Evaluating Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005, (Uppsala University: Uppsala, 2009), http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/18/18210_Sharing_Power.pdf, 29.
  • 19. "Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan," United Nations (S/2007/42), January 25, 2007.
  • 20. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan," United Nations (S/2006/728), September 12, 2006.
  • 21. "The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA," UNMIS, February 2009.

Intermediate Implementation

The security situation remained under control as no heavy fighting took place to disrupt the holding of the ceasefire agreement. On 22 and 23 December, violent clashes erupted in areas of Meiram, Al Girinti and Al Jurf between Misseriya tribe and SPLA units but the tension was diffused once a meeting between Misseriya leaders and the Secretary General of SPLM met on 24 December.22 Some 3,600 SAF troops remained in southern Sudan. The troops were said required to secure oil fields until the deployments of JIUs, which the SPLA disputed.23 Some progress was made in terms of the formation of JIUs. The SPLA redeployment was contingent upon the establishment of the JIUs, which reached 77% (30,112) of total anticipated strength of 39,000 troops.24 However, there were some provisions of the ceasefire agreement that were not implemented on time. The redeployment of the SAF to the north of the 1 January 1956 border between northern and southern Sudan was not completed by 9 July 2007.

In September, the SPLA was accused of not withdrawing its troops from two regions - al-Mujlad and al-Dibab- north of the border.25 Even when the Cease-fire Political Commission had determined that the SPLA should withdraw its forces from these two areas in a one week period of time, the SPLA suggested timeline indicated that the it would start to withdraw its troops by the end of February 2008.26 On issues related to relocation of SAF and SPLA, the Cease-fire Commission set the 9th January 2008 as deadline for relocation of SAF from the south and the SPLA from the Blue Nile and south Kordofan in their respective places.27

While both sides maintained ceasefire amidst some eruptions of violent activities, provisions related to redeployment of troops from both side, the formation of JIUs were delayed. Also, both parties re-imposed restrictions on UNMO movement in Abyei on 28 February 2007.28

  • 22. "Reports of the Secretary General on the Sudan," United Nations (S/2008/64), January 31, 2008.
  • 23. "Reports of the Secretary General on the Sudan," United Nations (S/2007/500), August 20, 2007.
  • 24. "Reports of the Secretary General on the Sudan," United Nations (S/2006/213), April 17, 2007.
  • 25. "Sudan: Ruling Party Accuses Ex-Southern Rebels of Breaching Cease-Fire Pact," BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 29, 2007.
  • 26. "Sudan: SPLA Refuses to Withdraw from South Kordofan State Before Feb 2008," BBC Monitoring Middle East, October 17, 2007.
  • 27. "UN envoy urges Sudan's peace partners to solve pending issues," BBC Monitoring Middle East, December 8, 2007.
  • 28. "The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA," UNMIS, February 2009.

Minimum Implementation

While all security mechanisms designed to implement ceasefire provisions of the CPA were in place, the levels of trust between the Khartoum and the SPLM remained very low. Tension between the SPLA and the SAF increased along the disputed border.29

In May 2008, the force commander of the UN Mission in Sudan and chairman of the Joint Military Commission to Monitor the Cease-Fire, Lieutenant General Jasper Singh Lidder, confirmed “the complete redeployment of 97.2 percent of the armed forces northward, compared with 11.3 percent of the total of the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) troops stationed north of the border line.”30

On May 14, clashes between the SPLM and the SAF erupted in Abyei town and lasted for two days. The fighting caused around 90 casualties and destroyed a large part of the town.31 After the clashes, it was reported an estimated 25,000 people fled the town.32 Both sides reached an agreement, Abyei Roadmap, that called for an immediate ceasefire and the removal of other armed groups from Abyei.33 The SPLM was said to be responsible for the attack in Abyei. The SAF accused the SPLM of redeploying 3000 fully armed troops from the east and placing them in the area of Akyec and Majok, around Abyei. The presence of SPLM forces caused the 31st Infantry Brigade to remain in the area.34 An immediate meeting of Ceasefire Political Committee was held after clashes. Nevertheless, the security situation remained fragile, which prompted the UN announcement of suspension of repatriation operations to Abyei region.35

On a more positive note, the SPLA, in collaboration with the Cease-fire Joint Military Committee, organized a four-day workshop in Juba to discuss the implementation of the security arrangements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.36

Along with clashes in Abyei, the ceasefire provisions of the CPA were violated. The CPA prohibits the replenishment of arms, but the government of Sudan made a decision to buy arms without consulting the SPLA.37 At the same time, the government of Sudan confirmed the military build-up in the Southern Kordofan State.38 This violated the ceasefire provision of the CPA. 

  • 29. "UN Envoy Warns that Peace Between Government And Southern Rebels in Sudan Remains Fragile," Associated Press Worldstream, February 19, 2008.
  • 30. "Sudan: UN Force Chief Says 'Nearly' All Government Forces Redeployed," BBC Monitoring Middle East, March 25, 2008.
  • 31. Johan Brosché, Sharing Power – Enabling Peace, 29.
  • 32. "Sudan; Faultline Town Deserted After Clashes," Africa News, May 16, 2008.
  • 33. "Sudan; Agreement Reached, Ending Clashes in Disputed Town," Africa News, May 16, 2008.
  • 34. "Sudan: Armed Forces Issue Statement on Abyei," BBC Monitoring Middle East, May 20, 2008.
  • 35. "Sudan: UN Suspends Repatriation Process in Abyei Due To Insecurity," BBC Monitoring Middle East, May 27, 2008.
  • 36. "Sudan's SPLA Holds Workshop on Implementation of Security Arrangements," BBC Monitoring Middle East, October 8, 2008.
  • 37. "Sudan Army Defends Decision to Buy Arms Without Consulting the Ex-Rebel Movement," BBC Monitoring Middle East, November 16, 2008.
  • 38. "Government Defends Deployment Of More Troops in Central Sudan State," BBC Monitoring Middle East, December 7, 2008.

Minimum Implementation

According to the CPA implementation update, the security situation in Malakal deteriorated after Major General Gabriel Tang returned to the town on 23 February. Fighting broke out between SPLA and SAF JIU components on 24-26 February that killed at least 50 people.39 After the CJMC’s two emergency sessions on 23 and 26 February, the situation remained stable but tense.40

On issues related to the deployment of the JIUs, both parties were slow in filling their respective quota of troops and in deployment to all eight agreed locations, complaining of logistical problems. If deployed in time with its full capacity, the JIUs could increase stability during the CPA-period, but this mechanism became a liability. As of September 2009, the 8 JIUs locations were occupied by SAF and SPLA. Locations still to be filled with the agreed quota in all locations included: Um-darfa, Menza, Wadal Mahe. Dindiro, Ulu, Gissan, Kurmuk and Taliya. The 109th CJMC meeting was held on 02-03 December 2009 in JUBA.41

  • 39. Johan Brosché, Sharing Power – Enabling Peace, 29.
  • 40. "The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA."
  • 41. Ibid.

Minimum Implementation

In its January 2010 meetings, the CJMC considered the presence of SPLA troops at Ngolongolo (07°40’30”N; 27°55’30”E) a violation to the CPA. The CJMC tasked Sector II AJMC to take up this issue with the Governor to remove SPLA from the area. They were to be replaced by the police or JIUs if there were any security issues.42 There were some reports of violation of ceasefire. The SAF aircraft was said seen by the Timsha Team Site carrying out aerial bombings on 6, 8 and 9 December. There was no report of casualties but the incident was recorded as a violation of CPA in the 132nd meeting of the CJMC. In the same meeting, the CJMC decided to carry out an investigation of aerial bombing in the Kiir River area.43 The CJMC mechanism remained one of the most important security mechanisms to resolve issues related to ceasefire violations.

Delay in the formation of JIUs led to the delay in the SPLA redeployment from Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile areas.44 As a matter of fact, there was no significant change in the deployment status of JIUs. The JIUs was at 82.6% of the mandated strength of 39,639 troops.45 The update suggests no restrictions on UNMOs movement. Nevertheless, various provision of ceasefire accord were either not implemented in timely manner or never implemented, or violated. 

  • 42. "The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA," UNMIS, January 2010.
  • 43. "The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA," UNMIS, December 2010.
  • 44. "The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA," UNMIS, January 2010.
  • 45. The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA," UNMIS, December 2010.

Minimum Implementation

Between 9 and 15 January 2011, a referendum took place in South Sudan. Following the referendum, South Sudan became an independent country 9 July 2011. The security situation, however, remained an issue even after the referendum. According to CPA update from the UNMIS, on 4 May 2011, the 141st CJMC meeting was held in Khartoum. In the meeting, CJMC requested CPC to approach the Joint Defense Board (JDB) to form a Board of Inquiry to investigate the 1 May clash in the Abyei Area resulted from the invasion of SAF. This was the breach of ceasefire agreement. On 10 May 2011 CJMC meeting, the status of SPLA in the Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States was discussed because the war was breaking out in the North before the independence of the South and thus before the end of the CPA-period.46 Once southern Sudan became an independent state, all the security mechanism established by the 2005 CPA either became obsolete or dissolved.