Cease Fire: Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement

Written by

« Back to Accord

Cease Fire: Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement

Implementations

Cease Fire – 2005

With the signing of the CPA in January 2005, the ceasefire agreement of December 2004 came into effect. In the agreement, parties agreed to international monitoring and verification of the ceasefire which included the redeployment of armed forces (from respective parties) and the monitoring of some 39,000 military personnel deployed under the joint/integrated units. The ceasefire agreement gave the UN a prominent role to play the verification and monitoring of the ceasefire by calling for the active participation of the United Nations in a number of bodies that were to be created to assist in the implementation of the Agreement. These included a Ceasefire Political Commission, a Ceasefire Joint Military Committee, Area Joint Military Committees and numerous joint military teams to be deployed throughout the area of operations.1

The United Nations Missions in the Sudan (UNMIS) was established on 24 March 2005 and the ceasefire monitoring and verification started as soon as the peacekeepers were deployed on the ground on 28 April 2005.2

The Ceasefire Political Commission, which had a mandate to supervise, monitor and oversee the implementation of the agreement as well as providing a political forum for a dialogue between parties and international community was established on 30 August 2005. Similarly, the government and SPLM started to nominate officers to form the Joint Integrated Units, the military unit of the future Sudanese National Armed Force should South Sudan prefer unity over secession in a referendum.3 It is not clear when other commissions/committees were established that were part of the ceasefire agreement. Nevertheless, there were news reports that the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee as well as Area Joint Military Committees were working.4 Nevertheless, the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee was the only committee/commission that met regularly in 2005.5 A Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC) answerable to the Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC) was established in 2005 and had its first meeting at the newly established Joint Monitoring and Coordination Office (JMCO) at the UN Compound in Juba on 8 May 2005.6 Formation of the Area Joint Military Committee (AJMC) was delayed until September. The first AJMC was held in the Nuba Mountains Area on 20 September 2005.7 The formation of the Joint Military Teams (JMTs), the lowest operating units of the Ceasefire Military Mechanism, was delayed. Also, due to the delay in the Joint Defense Board (JDB) the Joint Integrated Units were not formed in 2005.8 The Ceasefire Political Commission was established on 27 August 2005 by presidential decree and its membership announced on 1 November 2005.9

The ceasefire provision of the accord requires both sides to incorporate and reintegrate other armed groups. In this connection, the president of the government of Southern Sudan, Salva Kiir and leaders of other armed groups were negotiating on their participation in southern state governments.10 The ceasefire agreement requires both sides to expedite the process of incorporation and reintegration of armed groups allied to either side. The process continued in 2005.

Both parties have imposed restrictions on UNMO movement in Abyei in 2005.11 This was the violation of the ceasefire agreement even though no hostility was reported between the Sudan Armed Force (SPF) and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).

  1. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/57), January 31, 2005.
  2. “UNMIS Background,” UNMIS, accessed on January 9, 2012, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/background.shtml.
  3. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/579), September 12, 2005.
  4. “Only Political Settlement Can Resolve Darfur Conflict, Secretary-General Tells Constitutional Review Commission in Sudan,” U. S. Fed News, May 31, 2005; “UN: Security Council extends UN mission in Sudan until 24 March 2006, unanimously adopting resolution 1627 (2005),” M2 Presswire, September 23, 2005.
  5. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/160), March 14, 2006.
  6. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
  7. Ibid.
  8. Ibid.
  9. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
  10. “U.N. Secretary General’s Report on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/82), December 21, 2005.
  11. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA, 2009.”

Cease Fire – 2006

The First Vice President of Sudan Salva Kiir and the leader of the South Sudan Defense Forces, Major General Paullino Matip, signed the “Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the South Sudan Defense Forces” on 8 January 2006. Most former SSDF commanders had officially declared their allegiance to SPLA, while a minority had decided to be loyal to the SAF. This was part of the ceasefire provisions. The ceasefire provisions also required incorporation of other armed groups into the regular forces of either of the parties or their reintegration into civil service or society to be completed by 9 January 2006. This deadline was not met and therefore, Ceasefire Joint Military Committee extended the deadline until 9 March 2006. The Ceasefire Political Commission met for the first time on 23 February 2006.1

The violence perpetrated by the Ugandan rebel group Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) remained a concern. Similarly, the Upper Nile saw numerous clashes involving other armed groups since the end of 2005.2 A fear of resumption of conflict was expected with the withdrawal of SPLM from East Sudan, as mandated by the ceasefire provisions.3 According to the Ceasefire agreement, the SPLM was said to redeploy its troops in Eastern Sudan to south Sudan. The redeployment took place in observation and monitoring of the UN mission in East Sudan. The UN had deployed 10,000 troops to observe the commitment of the government and the SPLM.4 The UNMIS verified the redeployment of 5,672 troops out of a declared strength of 8,763. The troops unaccounted were considered to have abandoned the SPLA.5 The redeployment of SAF was on schedule. According to the same report, the security mechanisms such as Ceasefire Joint Military Committee and the Area Joint Military Committees were functioning as intended.

In 2006, there were three major clashes reported. In March an unarmed convoy north of Abyei was ambushed, and in August a clash between off-duty SPLA and SFA officers in the Rubkona of Unity State left eight civilians and three soldiers dead. Similarly, heavy fighting between elements of the SFA and SPLA took place in Malakal from 27 to 30 November that left at least 150 people dead, including civilians.6 After the incident, parties agreed to a new ceasefire, a joint investigation was launched and both sides withdrew forces. This suggests the fragile situation on the ground.7

The peace process continued amidst repeated violation of ceasefire provision of the accord. Parties supported integrating other armed groups into existing military structures and to create functioning JIUs. The implementation of the formation of Joint Integrated Unites provision of ceasefire was 18 months behind the schedule. The delay was also partly contributed by the lack of logistical support.8 Similarly, the Ceasefire Political Commission proved unable to solve important issues such as restrictions imposed on UNMIS freedom of movement north of Abyei town and the status of disputed redeployment assembly areas.9

In October and December 2006, movement restrictions imposed on UNMO movement in Abyei in Abyei were lifted temporarily.10

  1. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/160), March 14, 2006.
  2. Ibid.
  3. “Roundup: Conflict predicted after SPLM troops pullout from east Sudan,” Xinhua General News Service, January 10, 2006.
  4. “UN to withdraw its mission from Eastern Sudan,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, July 6, 2006.
  5. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/728), September 12, 2006.
  6. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/42), January 25, 2007.
  7. Johan Brosché, Sharing Power — Enabling Peace? Evaluating Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005, (Uppsala University: Uppsala, 2009), http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/18/18210_Sharing_Power.pdf, 29.
  8. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/42), January 25, 2007.
  9. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/728), September 12, 2006.
  10. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.

Cease Fire – 2007

The security situation remained under control as no heavy fighting took place to disrupt the holding of the ceasefire agreement. On 22 and 23 December, violent clashes erupted in areas of Meiram, Al Girinti and Al Jurf between Misseriya tribe and SPLA units but the tension was diffused once a meeting between Misseriya leaders and the Secretary General of SPLM met on 24 December.1 Some 3,600 SAF troops remained in southern Sudan. The troops were said required to secure oil fields until the deployments of JIUs, which the SPLA disputed.2 Some progress was made in terms of the formation of JIUs. The SPLA redeployment was contingent upon the establishment of the JIUs, which reached 77% (30,112) of total anticipated strength of 39,000 troops.3 However, there were some provisions of the ceasefire agreement that were not implemented on time. The redeployment of the SAF to the north of the 1 January 1956 border between northern and southern Sudan was not completed by 9 July 2007.

In September, the SPLA was accused of not withdrawing its troops from two regions – al-Mujlad and al-Dibab- north of the border.4 Even when the Cease-fire Political Commission had determined that the SPLA should withdraw its forces from these two areas in a one week period of time, the SPLA suggested timeline indicated that the it would start to withdraw its troops by the end of February 2008.5 On issues related to relocation of SAF and SPLA, the Cease-fire Commission set the 9th January 2008 as deadline for relocation of SAF from the south and the SPLA from the Blue Nile and south Kordofan in their respective places.6

While both sides maintained ceasefire amidst some eruptions of violent activities, provisions related to redeployment of troops from both side, the formation of JIUs were delayed. Also, both parties re-imposed restrictions on UNMO movement in Abyei on 28 February 2007.7

  1. “Reports of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2008/64), January 31, 2008.
  2. “Reports of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/500), August 20, 2007.
  3. “Reports of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/213), April 17, 2007.
  4. “Sudan: Ruling Party Accuses Ex-Southern Rebels of Breaching Cease-Fire Pact,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 29, 2007.
  5. “Sudan: SPLA Refuses to Withdraw from South Kordofan State Before Feb 2008,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, October 17, 2007.
  6. “UN envoy urges Sudan’s peace partners to solve pending issues,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, December 8, 2007.
  7. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.

Cease Fire – 2008

While all security mechanisms designed to implement ceasefire provisions of the CPA were in place, the levels of trust between the Khartoum and the SPLM remained very low. Tension between the SPLA and the SAF increased along the disputed border.1

In May 2008, the force commander of the UN Mission in Sudan and chairman of the Joint Military Commission to Monitor the Cease-Fire, Lieutenant General Jasper Singh Lidder, confirmed “the complete redeployment of 97.2 percent of the armed forces northward, compared with 11.3 percent of the total of the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA) troops stationed north of the border line.”2

On May 14, clashes between the SPLM and the SAF erupted in Abyei town and lasted for two days. The fighting caused around 90 casualties and destroyed a large part of the town.3 After the clashes, it was reported an estimated 25,000 people fled the town.4 Both sides reached an agreement, Abyei Roadmap, that called for an immediate ceasefire and the removal of other armed groups from Abyei.5 The SPLM was said to be responsible for the attack in Abyei. The SAF accused the SPLM of redeploying 3000 fully armed troops from the east and placing them in the area of Akyec and Majok, around Abyei. The presence of SPLM forces caused the 31st Infantry Brigade to remain in the area.6 An immediate meeting of Ceasefire Political Committee was held after clashes. Nevertheless, the security situation remained fragile, which prompted the UN announcement of suspension of repatriation operations to Abyei region.7

On a more positive note, the SPLA, in collaboration with the Cease-fire Joint Military Committee, organized a four-day workshop in Juba to discuss the implementation of the security arrangements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.8

Along with clashes in Abyei, the ceasefire provisions of the CPA were violated. The CPA prohibits the replenishment of arms, but the government of Sudan made a decision to buy arms without consulting the SPLA.9 At the same time, the government of Sudan confirmed the military build-up in the Southern Kordofan State.10 This violated the ceasefire provision of the CPA.

  1. “UN Envoy Warns that Peace Between Government And Southern Rebels in Sudan Remains Fragile,” Associated Press Worldstream, February 19, 2008.
  2. “Sudan: UN Force Chief Says ‘Nearly’ All Government Forces Redeployed,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, March 25, 2008.
  3. Johan Brosché, Sharing Power — Enabling Peace, 29.
  4. “Sudan; Faultline Town Deserted After Clashes,” Africa News, May 16, 2008.
  5. “Sudan; Agreement Reached, Ending Clashes in Disputed Town,” Africa News, May 16, 2008.
  6. “Sudan: Armed Forces Issue Statement on Abyei,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, May 20, 2008.
  7. “Sudan: UN Suspends Repatriation Process in Abyei Due To Insecurity,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, May 27, 2008.
  8. “Sudan’s SPLA Holds Workshop on Implementation of Security Arrangements,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, October 8, 2008.
  9. “Sudan Army Defends Decision to Buy Arms Without Consulting the Ex-Rebel Movement,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, November 16, 2008.
  10. “Government Defends Deployment Of More Troops in Central Sudan State,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, December 7, 2008.

Cease Fire – 2009

According to the CPA implementation update, the security situation in Malakal deteriorated after Major General Gabriel Tang returned to the town on 23 February. Fighting broke out between SPLA and SAF JIU components on 24-26 February that killed at least 50 people.1 After the CJMC’s two emergency sessions on 23 and 26 February, the situation remained stable but tense.2

On issues related to the deployment of the JIUs, both parties were slow in filling their respective quota of troops and in deployment to all eight agreed locations, complaining of logistical problems. If deployed in time with its full capacity, the JIUs could increase stability during the CPA-period, but this mechanism became a liability. As of September 2009, the 8 JIUs locations were occupied by SAF and SPLA. Locations still to be filled with the agreed quota in all locations included: Um-darfa, Menza, Wadal Mahe. Dindiro, Ulu, Gissan, Kurmuk and Taliya. The 109th CJMC meeting was held on 02-03 December 2009 in JUBA.3

  1. Johan Brosché, Sharing Power — Enabling Peace, 29.
  2. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA.”
  3. Ibid.

Cease Fire – 2010

In its January 2010 meetings, the CJMC considered the presence of SPLA troops at Ngolongolo (07°40Õ30″N; 27°55Õ30″E) a violation to the CPA. The CJMC tasked Sector II AJMC to take up this issue with the Governor to remove SPLA from the area. They were to be replaced by the police or JIUs if there were any security issues.1 There were some reports of violation of ceasefire. The SAF aircraft was said seen by the Timsha Team Site carrying out aerial bombings on 6, 8 and 9 December. There was no report of casualties but the incident was recorded as a violation of CPA in the 132nd meeting of the CJMC. In the same meeting, the CJMC decided to carry out an investigation of aerial bombing in the Kiir River area.2 The CJMC mechanism remained one of the most important security mechanisms to resolve issues related to ceasefire violations.

Delay in the formation of JIUs led to the delay in the SPLA redeployment from Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile areas.3 As a matter of fact, there was no significant change in the deployment status of JIUs. The JIUs was at 82.6% of the mandated strength of 39,639 troops.4 The update suggests no restrictions on UNMOs movement. Nevertheless, various provision of ceasefire accord were either not implemented in timely manner or never implemented, or violated.

  1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, January 2010.
  2. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2010.
  3. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, January 2010.
  4. The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2010.

Cease Fire – 2011

Between 9 and 15 January 2011, a referendum took place in South Sudan. Following the referendum, South Sudan became an independent country 9 July 2011. The security situation, however, remained an issue even after the referendum. According to CPA update from the UNMIS, on 4 May 2011, the 141st CJMC meeting was held in Khartoum. In the meeting, CJMC requested CPC to approach the Joint Defense Board (JDB) to form a Board of Inquiry to investigate the 1 May clash in the Abyei Area resulted from the invasion of SAF. This was the breach of ceasefire agreement. On 10 May 2011 CJMC meeting, the status of SPLA in the Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States was discussed because the war was breaking out in the North before the independence of the South and thus before the end of the CPA-period.1 Once southern Sudan became an independent state, all the security mechanism established by the 2005 CPA either became obsolete or dissolved.

  1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, May 2011; Johan Brosché, “The Crises Continue. Sudan’s Remaining Conflicts,” ISPI – Working Paper no. 41, accessed May 21, 2012, http://www.ispionline.it/it/documents/WP41_2011.pdf.