Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement

2005

Intermediate Implementation

With the signing of the CPA in January 2005, the ceasefire agreement of December 2004 came into effect. In the agreement, parties agreed to international monitoring and verification of the ceasefire which included the redeployment of armed forces (from respective parties) and the monitoring of some 39,000 military personnel deployed under the joint/integrated units. The ceasefire agreement gave the UN a prominent role to play the verification and monitoring of the ceasefire by calling for the active participation of the United Nations in a number of bodies that were to be created to assist in the implementation of the Agreement. These included a Ceasefire Political Commission, a Ceasefire Joint Military Committee, Area Joint Military Committees and numerous joint military teams to be deployed throughout the area of operations.¹

The United Nations Missions in the Sudan (UNMIS) was established on 24 March 2005 and the ceasefire monitoring and verification started as soon as the peacekeepers were deployed on the ground on 28 April 2005.²

The Ceasefire Political Commission, which had a mandate to supervise, monitor and oversee the implementation of the agreement as well as providing a political forum for a dialogue between parties and international community was established on 30 August 2005. Similarly, the government and SPLM started to nominate officers to form the Joint Integrated Units, the military unit of the future Sudanese National Armed Force should South Sudan prefer unity over secession in a referendum.³ It is not clear when other commissions/committees were established that were part of the ceasefire agreement. Nevertheless, there were news reports that the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee as well as Area Joint Military Committees were working.⁴ Nevertheless, the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee was the only committee/commission that met regularly in 2005.⁵ A Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC) answerable to the Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC) was established in 2005 and had its first meeting at the newly established Joint Monitoring and Coordination Office (JMCO) at the UN Compound in Juba on 8 May 2005.⁶ Formation of the Area Joint Military Committee (AJMC) was delayed until September. The first AJMC was held in the Nuba Mountains Area on 20 September 2005.⁷ The formation of the Joint Military Teams (JMTs), the lowest operating units of the Ceasefire Military Mechanism, was delayed. Also, due to the delay in the Joint Defense Board (JDB) the Joint Integrated Units were not formed in 2005.⁸ The Ceasefire Political Commission was established on 27 August 2005 by presidential decree and its membership announced on 1 November 2005.⁹

The ceasefire provision of the accord requires both sides to incorporate and reintegrate other armed groups. In this connection, the president of the government of Southern Sudan, Salva Kiir and leaders of other armed groups were negotiating on their participation in southern state governments.¹⁰ The ceasefire agreement requires both sides to expedite the process of incorporation and reintegration of armed groups allied to either side. The process continued in 2005.

Both parties have imposed restrictions on UNMO movement in Abyei in 2005.¹¹ This was the violation of the ceasefire agreement even though no hostility was reported between the Sudan Armed Force (SPF) and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).

1. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/57), January 31, 2005.
2. “UNMIS Background,” UNMIS, accessed on January 9, 2012, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/background.shtml.
3. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/579), September 12, 2005.
4. “Only Political Settlement Can Resolve Darfur Conflict, Secretary-General Tells Constitutional Review Commission in Sudan,” U. S. Fed News, May 31, 2005; “UN: Security Council extends UN mission in Sudan until 24 March 2006, unanimously adopting resolution 1627 (2005),” M2 Presswire, September 23, 2005.
5. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/160), March 14, 2006.
6. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
10. “U.N. Secretary General’s Report on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/82), December 21, 2005.
11. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA, 2009.”

2006

Intermediate Implementation

The First Vice President of Sudan Salva Kiir and the leader of the South Sudan Defense Forces, Major General Paullino Matip, signed the “Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the South Sudan Defense Forces” on 8 January 2006. Most former SSDF commanders had officially declared their allegiance to SPLA, while a minority had decided to be loyal to the SAF. This was part of the ceasefire provisions. The ceasefire provisions also required incorporation of other armed groups into the regular forces of either of the parties or their reintegration into civil service or society to be completed by 9 January 2006. This deadline was not met and therefore, Ceasefire Joint Military Committee extended the deadline until 9 March 2006. The Ceasefire Political Commission met for the first time on 23 February 2006.¹

The violence perpetrated by the Ugandan rebel group Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) remained a concern. Similarly, the Upper Nile saw numerous clashes involving other armed groups since the end of 2005.² A fear of resumption of conflict was expected with the withdrawal of SPLM from East Sudan, as mandated by the ceasefire provisions.³ According to the Ceasefire agreement, the SPLM was said to redeploy its troops in Eastern Sudan to south Sudan. The redeployment took place in observation and monitoring of the UN mission in East Sudan. The UN had deployed 10,000 troops to observe the commitment of the government and the SPLM.⁴ The UNMIS verified the redeployment of 5,672 troops out of a declared strength of 8,763. The troops unaccounted were considered to have abandoned the SPLA.⁵ The redeployment of SAF was on schedule. According to the same report, the security mechanisms such as Ceasefire Joint Military Committee and the Area Joint Military Committees were functioning as intended.

In 2006, there were three major clashes reported. In March an unarmed convoy north of Abyei was ambushed, and in August a clash between off-duty SPLA and SFA officers in the Rubkona of Unity State left eight civilians and three soldiers dead. Similarly, heavy fighting between elements of the SFA and SPLA took place in Malakal from 27 to 30 November that left at least 150 people dead, including civilians.⁶ After the incident, parties agreed to a new ceasefire, a joint investigation was launched and both sides withdrew forces. This suggests the fragile situation on the ground.⁷

The peace process continued amidst repeated violation of ceasefire provision of the accord. Parties supported integrating other armed groups into existing military structures and to create functioning JIUs. The implementation of the formation of Joint Integrated Unites provision of ceasefire was 18 months behind the schedule. The delay was also partly contributed by the lack of logistical support.⁸ Similarly, the Ceasefire Political Commission proved unable to solve important issues such as restrictions imposed on UNMIS freedom of movement north of Abyei town and the status of disputed redeployment assembly areas.⁹

In October and December 2006, movement restrictions imposed on UNMO movement in Abyei in Abyei were lifted temporarily.¹⁰

1. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/160), March 14, 2006.
2. Ibid.
3. “Roundup: Conflict predicted after SPLM troops pullout from east Sudan,” Xinhua General News Service, January 10, 2006.
4. “UN to withdraw its mission from Eastern Sudan,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, July 6, 2006.
5. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/728), September 12, 2006.
6. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/42), January 25, 2007.
7. Johan Brosché, Sharing Power — Enabling Peace? Evaluating Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005, (Uppsala University: Uppsala, 2009), http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/18/18210_Sharing_Power.pdf, 29.
8. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/42), January 25, 2007.
9. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/728), September 12, 2006.
10. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

The security situation remained under control as no heavy fighting took place to disrupt the holding of the ceasefire agreement. On 22 and 23 December, violent clashes erupted in areas of Meiram, Al Girinti and Al Jurf between Misseriya tribe and SPLA units but the tension was diffused once a meeting between Misseriya leaders and the Secretary General of SPLM met on 24 December.¹ Some 3,600 SAF troops remained in southern Sudan. The troops were said required to secure oil fields until the deployments of JIUs, which the SPLA disputed.² Some progress was made in terms of the formation of JIUs. The SPLA redeployment was contingent upon the establishment of the JIUs, which reached 77% (30,112) of total anticipated strength of 39,000 troops.³ However, there were some provisions of the ceasefire agreement that were not implemented on time. The redeployment of the SAF to the north of the 1 January 1956 border between northern and southern Sudan was not completed by 9 July 2007.

In September, the SPLA was accused of not withdrawing its troops from two regions – al-Mujlad and al-Dibab- north of the border.⁴ Even when the Cease-fire Political Commission had determined that the SPLA should withdraw its forces from these two areas in a one week period of time, the SPLA suggested timeline indicated that the it would start to withdraw its troops by the end of February 2008.⁵ On issues related to relocation of SAF and SPLA, the Cease-fire Commission set the 9th January 2008 as deadline for relocation of SAF from the south and the SPLA from the Blue Nile and south Kordofan in their respective places.⁶

While both sides maintained ceasefire amidst some eruptions of violent activities, provisions related to redeployment of troops from both side, the formation of JIUs were delayed. Also, both parties re-imposed restrictions on UNMO movement in Abyei on 28 February 2007.⁷

1. “Reports of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2008/64), January 31, 2008.
2. “Reports of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/500), August 20, 2007.
3. “Reports of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/213), April 17, 2007.
4. “Sudan: Ruling Party Accuses Ex-Southern Rebels of Breaching Cease-Fire Pact,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 29, 2007.
5. “Sudan: SPLA Refuses to Withdraw from South Kordofan State Before Feb 2008,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, October 17, 2007.
6. “UN envoy urges Sudan’s peace partners to solve pending issues,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, December 8, 2007.
7. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.

2008

Minimum Implementation

While all security mechanisms designed to implement ceasefire provisions of the CPA were in place, the levels of trust between the Khartoum and the SPLM remained very low. Tension between the SPLA and the SAF increased along the disputed border.¹

In May 2008, the force commander of the UN Mission in Sudan and chairman of the Joint Military Commission to Monitor the Cease-Fire, Lieutenant General Jasper Singh Lidder, confirmed “the complete redeployment of 97.2 percent of the armed forces northward, compared with 11.3 percent of the total of the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA) troops stationed north of the border line.”²

On May 14, clashes between the SPLM and the SAF erupted in Abyei town and lasted for two days. The fighting caused around 90 casualties and destroyed a large part of the town.³ After the clashes, it was reported an estimated 25,000 people fled the town.⁴ Both sides reached an agreement, Abyei Roadmap, that called for an immediate ceasefire and the removal of other armed groups from Abyei.⁵ The SPLM was said to be responsible for the attack in Abyei. The SAF accused the SPLM of redeploying 3000 fully armed troops from the east and placing them in the area of Akyec and Majok, around Abyei. The presence of SPLM forces caused the 31st Infantry Brigade to remain in the area.⁶ An immediate meeting of Ceasefire Political Committee was held after clashes. Nevertheless, the security situation remained fragile, which prompted the UN announcement of suspension of repatriation operations to Abyei region.⁷

On a more positive note, the SPLA, in collaboration with the Cease-fire Joint Military Committee, organized a four-day workshop in Juba to discuss the implementation of the security arrangements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.⁸

Along with clashes in Abyei, the ceasefire provisions of the CPA were violated. The CPA prohibits the replenishment of arms, but the government of Sudan made a decision to buy arms without consulting the SPLA.⁹ At the same time, the government of Sudan confirmed the military build-up in the Southern Kordofan State.¹⁰ This violated the ceasefire provision of the CPA.

1. “UN Envoy Warns that Peace Between Government And Southern Rebels in Sudan Remains Fragile,” Associated Press Worldstream, February 19, 2008.
2. “Sudan: UN Force Chief Says ‘Nearly’ All Government Forces Redeployed,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, March 25, 2008.
3. Johan Brosché, Sharing Power — Enabling Peace, 29.
4. “Sudan; Faultline Town Deserted After Clashes,” Africa News, May 16, 2008.
5. “Sudan; Agreement Reached, Ending Clashes in Disputed Town,” Africa News, May 16, 2008.
6. “Sudan: Armed Forces Issue Statement on Abyei,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, May 20, 2008.
7. “Sudan: UN Suspends Repatriation Process in Abyei Due To Insecurity,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, May 27, 2008.
8. “Sudan’s SPLA Holds Workshop on Implementation of Security Arrangements,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, October 8, 2008.
9. “Sudan Army Defends Decision to Buy Arms Without Consulting the Ex-Rebel Movement,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, November 16, 2008.
10. “Government Defends Deployment Of More Troops in Central Sudan State,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, December 7, 2008.

2009

Minimum Implementation

According to the CPA implementation update, the security situation in Malakal deteriorated after Major General Gabriel Tang returned to the town on 23 February. Fighting broke out between SPLA and SAF JIU components on 24-26 February that killed at least 50 people.¹ After the CJMC’s two emergency sessions on 23 and 26 February, the situation remained stable but tense.²

On issues related to the deployment of the JIUs, both parties were slow in filling their respective quota of troops and in deployment to all eight agreed locations, complaining of logistical problems. If deployed in time with its full capacity, the JIUs could increase stability during the CPA-period, but this mechanism became a liability. As of September 2009, the 8 JIUs locations were occupied by SAF and SPLA. Locations still to be filled with the agreed quota in all locations included: Um-darfa, Menza, Wadal Mahe. Dindiro, Ulu, Gissan, Kurmuk and Taliya. The 109th CJMC meeting was held on 02-03 December 2009 in JUBA.³

1. Johan Brosché, Sharing Power — Enabling Peace, 29.
2. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA.”
3. Ibid.

2010

Minimum Implementation

In its January 2010 meetings, the CJMC considered the presence of SPLA troops at Ngolongolo (07°40Õ30″N; 27°55Õ30″E) a violation to the CPA. The CJMC tasked Sector II AJMC to take up this issue with the Governor to remove SPLA from the area. They were to be replaced by the police or JIUs if there were any security issues.¹ There were some reports of violation of ceasefire. The SAF aircraft was said seen by the Timsha Team Site carrying out aerial bombings on 6, 8 and 9 December. There was no report of casualties but the incident was recorded as a violation of CPA in the 132nd meeting of the CJMC. In the same meeting, the CJMC decided to carry out an investigation of aerial bombing in the Kiir River area.² The CJMC mechanism remained one of the most important security mechanisms to resolve issues related to ceasefire violations.

Delay in the formation of JIUs led to the delay in the SPLA redeployment from Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile areas.³ As a matter of fact, there was no significant change in the deployment status of JIUs. The JIUs was at 82.6% of the mandated strength of 39,639 troops.⁴ The update suggests no restrictions on UNMOs movement. Nevertheless, various provision of ceasefire accord were either not implemented in timely manner or never implemented, or violated.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, January 2010.
2. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2010.
3. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, January 2010.
4. The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2010.

2011

Minimum Implementation

Between 9 and 15 January 2011, a referendum took place in South Sudan. Following the referendum, South Sudan became an independent country 9 July 2011. The security situation, however, remained an issue even after the referendum. According to CPA update from the UNMIS, on 4 May 2011, the 141st CJMC meeting was held in Khartoum. In the meeting, CJMC requested CPC to approach the Joint Defense Board (JDB) to form a Board of Inquiry to investigate the 1 May clash in the Abyei Area resulted from the invasion of SAF. This was the breach of ceasefire agreement. On 10 May 2011 CJMC meeting, the status of SPLA in the Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States was discussed because the war was breaking out in the North before the independence of the South and thus before the end of the CPA-period.¹ Once southern Sudan became an independent state, all the security mechanism established by the 2005 CPA either became obsolete or dissolved.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, May 2011; Johan Brosché, “The Crises Continue. Sudan’s Remaining Conflicts,” ISPI – Working Paper no. 41, accessed May 21, 2012, http://www.ispionline.it/it/documents/WP41_2011.pdf.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

There was considerable delay in the establishment of the Government of National Unity (GoNU). The CPA provided that the GoNU be established within six months of the signing of the CPA or by 9 July 2005. The dispute over the allocation of energy and mining ministerial portfolio between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLM caused the delay in the formation of the national unity government. Nevertheless, the three member presidency was inaugurated on 9 July 2005. Omer Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir was sworn in as President, John Garang de Mabior as First Vice President and Ali Osman Mohamed Taha as Vice President. The First Vice President, Dr. Garang, was killed in a helicopter crash on 30 July 2005. The vacant position was filled by SPLM leader Lt. General Salva Kiir Mayardiit.¹

President Bashir issued four decrees on 20 September 2005 establishing the GoNU. The CPA formula of power-sharing was followed in the formation of the unity government. The GoNU included one presidential assistant, 12 presidential advisors, 28 federal ministers and 33 state ministers. The NCP retained five sovereign ministries (Presidency, Interior, Justice, Defence and Federal Government), six economic ministries (Finance, Energy, Irrigation, Agriculture, International Cooperation and Animal Resources) and four service ministries (Labour and Public Service, Culture and Youth, Social Welfare and Guidance and Endowment). The SPLM received two sovereignty ministries (Council of Ministers and Foreign Affairs), three economic ministries (Foreign Trade, Investment and Transportation) and three service ministries (Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Higher Education). The disputed energy and mining ministry was retained by the president’s party NCP.² The opposition umbrella group, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) received two ministerial seats on 27 November 2005.³ Other opposition parties did not show interest in joining the GoNU.

As agreed, the National Legislature (the National Assembly and the Council of States) was formed and convened on 31 August 2005. Ahmed Ibrahim El-Tahir (NCP) was elected Speaker for the National Assembly and Atim Garang Deng (SPLM) Deputy Speaker. Ali Yahia (NCP) was elected Speaker and Remo Olair (SPLM) Deputy Speaker of the Council of States. In the 450 member National Assembly, the NCP had 234 seats, SPLM 126 seats, Northern political forces 55 seats, Southern political forces 27 seats, and the remaining eight seats were designated for national personalities. Similarly, the power-sharing formula was adopted in allocating 19 standing specialized committees in the National Assembly. The NCP chaired ten committees, SPLM five, other Northern political forces three and the other Southern political forces one.⁴

Consistent with the CPA provision, Mr. John Aungi Kasiba from SPLM and Dr. Wahabi Mohamed Mukhtar from NCP were appointed as Deputy Chief Justices. Mr. Jalal-Eddin Mohamed Osman from NCP was appointed as Chief Justice. These appointments were made on 28 November 2005. Similarly, the president and members of the Constitutional Court were sworn in on 31 December 2005.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

The National Unity Government was formed in 2005. The SPLM shared power in the presidency, in the national assembly and in judiciary.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

On14 October 2006, Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement was negotiated between the Eastern Front and the National Unity Government. In an effort to implement the accord, three leaders of the Eastern Front were appointed in the national unity government as Assistant to the President, Adviser to the President and the State Minister of Transport and Roads.¹

On 11 October 2007, the SPLM recalled all of its ministers and presidential advisers from the government of national unity as many provisions of the CPA were either rejected or not implemented by the GoNU. In its decision to withdraw its participation in the GoNU, the SPLM gave four reasons: the lack of demarcation of the north-south border, problems with wealth-sharing (the oil), delayed withdrawal and no solution to Abyei.² The SPLM alleged that the delay in the demarcation of the north-south border was a result of impediments caused by the NCP in the work of the border commission. Similarly, the SAF were also not withdrawn from the South, especially from the oil fields. The SPLM also alleged that there was no transparency on issue of wealth sharing. Finally, the SPLM was excluded from the management and development of the oil sector. On 12 December 2007, the parties reached an agreement to deal with these issues including issues related to entrust the security of the oil area to the Joint Integrated Units.³ Once the dispute resolved, President Al-Bashir issued a series of decrees appointing new SPLM ministers, state ministers and presidential advisors in the Government of National Unity (GoNU) on 26 December 2007. The new SPLM ministers were sworn in on 27 December 2007.⁴

Representatives of the Darfur Peace Agreement signatory parties also joined the National Assembly in 2007.⁵ Similarly, after the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement, the Eastern Front was allocated eight members in the National Assembly. Those members took their oath on 24 October 2007.⁶

1. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/500), August 20, 2007.
2. “Sudan; South Quits Unity Government,” Africa News, October 11, 2007.
3. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2008/64), January 31, 2008.
4. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

No major changes took place in the composition of the Government of National Unity except for the cabinet reorganization of 14 February 2008. President Al-Bashir reshuffled NCP Ministers in the GoNU and reallocated portfolios of several Ministers of State.¹

1. Ibid.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

The parties, including SPLM, continued to share power through their participation in the GoNU in 2005. No cabinet reshuffle took place in 2009.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

Following the national census and the SPLM’s objection to the national census results, which should have taken place before 9 July 2007 as provided in the 2005 CPA, the presidency reached an agreement regarding the contested census results that provided for an additional 40 seats for the south in the new National Assembly. In addition, Southern Kordofan and Abyei would be allocated four and two seats, respectively, in the new assembly. The presidential and the parliamentary elections took place in April 2010. Elections across Sudan were held, fulfilling a CPA benchmark. Omar Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir was elected President of the Republic and Salva Kiir Mayardit President of the Government of Southern Sudan. According to the CPA’s power-sharing formula, the President of the Republic issued decrees (on 14 June 2010) appointing 35 Ministers and 42 State Ministers in the national government. The NCP was allocated 24 ministerial seats, the SPLM eight, and the other parties who had participated in the elections three. The newly-appointed ministers were sworn in on 16 June.¹

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2010.

2011

Full Implementation

The CPA’s provisions related to the Government of National Unity were implemented. The power-sharing provisions, however, became obsolete once Southern Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 2011 following the April referendum.

2005

Full Implementation

According to the CPA provision to reform the executive branch of the government, the institution of the presidency should be established with one president and two vice presidents. The CPA prescribed that the office of the Vice president, prior to the election, be filled within two weeks of the signing of the CPA. This did not occur. Nevertheless, the three member presidency was inaugurated on 9 July 2005. Omer Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir was sworn in as President, John Garang de Maribor as First Vice President and Ali Osman Mohamed Taha as Vice President. The First Vice President Dr. Garang was killed in a helicopter crash on 30 July 2005. The vacant position was filled by SPLM leader Lt. General Salva Kiir Mayardiit.¹ The CPA also required that the Institution of Presidency adopt a collegial decision-making process and consult with the vice presidents. This satisfies the executive branch reform as the CPA provides.

Immediately after establishing the Government of National Unity (GoNU) on 20 September 2005, the presidency started to develop the formation and staffing of many commissions and Committees as specified by the CPA. By the end of October and November 2005, the presidency issued decrees to establish the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, the National Petroleum Commission, the Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission and the Technical Ad Hoc Border Committee, the Cease-fire Political Commission, and National Judicial Service Commission.² The Secretary General’s report also suggests that the presidency received the report defining the borders of the Abyei area from the Abyei Boundary Commission in July 2005, but had yet to implement the decision.

The executive branch of the government was reformed in 2005 by establishing a three member presidency and adopting a collegial decision making process.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly Report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
2. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/821), December 21, 2005.

2006

Full Implementation

Executive branch reform took place with the establishment of the presidency in 2005.

In 2006, the presidency issued a decree declaring the Boundaries of Southern Kordofan State as the previous boundaries of Southern Kordofan Province as defined in the 1974 Act of the Division of Provinces. Western Kordofan and Southern Kordofan merged in accordance with the decree. Similarly, the Presidency decided on 3 January 2006 that the Cabinet for the administration of the National Capital would include eight ministers: four from the NCP, two from the SPLM (one of them Deputy Governor), and two from Northern political forces (one of them Deputy Governor). By a decree issued in August 2006, the presidency established the Commission on the Protection of the Rights of Non-Muslims in the National Capital. On 18 February 2006, President Al-Bashir issued a presidential decree to form the National DDR Coordination Council (NDDRCC). The presidency failed to agree on the adoption of the Abyei Boundaries Commission submitted to the presidency on 14 July 2005.¹ The presidency, however, resolved a deadlock over the draft constitution, which was signed into law in December.²

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly Report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
2. “Report of Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/42), 25 January 2007.

2007

Full Implementation

Executive branch reform took place with the establishment of the presidency in 2005.

On 26 July 2007, the President issued a decree establishing the National Civil Service Commission. The presidency issued a decree replacing Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission (FFAMC) Chair, Ibrahim Monim Mansour, with Homahed Osaman Ibrahim. Nevertheless, the presidency failed to agree on the adoption of the Abyei Boundaries Commissions.¹

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly Report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.

2008

Full Implementation

Executive branch reform took place with the establishment of the presidency in 2005. No further developments reported.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

As agreed in the CPA, the National Legislature (the National Assembly and the Council of States) was formed and convened on 31 August 2005. Ahmed Ibrahim ElTahir (NCP) was elected Speaker for the National Assembly and Atim Garang Deng (SPLM) Deputy Speaker. Ali Yahia (NCP) was elected Speaker and Remo Olair (SPLM) Deputy Speaker of the Council of States. As far as equitable representation is concerned, the NCP had 234 seats, SPLM 126 seats, Northern political forces 55 seats, Southern political forces 27 seats, and national personalities eight seats in the 450 member National Assembly. The Interim Constitution came into effect on 9 July 2005.¹ According to the 2005 CPA, elections will be held in 2009.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

The National Assembly and the Council of States were established in 2005. According to the 2005 CPA, Elections will be held in 2009. No election date was set for the elected National Assembly and the Council of States.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

In a step towards holding general elections, the Political Parties Act was finalized. Nevertheless, a national election commission was yet to be established and an election act was yet to be enacted.¹ The election date was set for the elected National Assembly and the Council of States. Nevertheless, the Sudanese government was firm on holding election on time.²

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
2. “Sudan’s Al-Bashir tells political parties to “get ready for elections,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, January 7, 2007.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

The legislative reform provided in the 2005 CPA was to be complete once elections took place. In this regard, some progress was made in 2008. Most importantly, the National Assembly on 7 July 2008 passed the National Elections Act 2008 and the National Assembly endorsed the members of the National Elections Commission (NEC) in November 2008.¹ President Bashir was committed for the 2009 general elections.²

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
2. “Beshir Cows Sudan Elections on Time,” Agence France Presse, August 3, 2008.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

The elections were delayed by the National Election Commission due to delay in census. The election was originally scheduled for July 2009, which was set to take place on February 10 2010.¹ The Election Commission, on 30 June 2009, released a revised electoral calendar and rescheduled the election to 5-12 April 2010.²

1. “Sudan: General elections reportedly postponed to February 2010,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, April 2, 2009; “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, April 2009.
2. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, June 2009.

2010

Full Implementation

The polling for the election commenced on 11 April 2010. The election schedule was revised. In the National Assembly, the National Congress party won a total of 312 seats, the SPLM won 99 seats, the Popular Congress Party won four seats, the Federal UMMA Party won three seats, the Democratic Unionist Party won four seats, the Democratic Unionist Party-Original won one seat, the SPLM-DC won two seats, the UMMA Reform & Development won two seats, the National UMMA Party won one seat, the independent candidate won one seat, and the Muslim Brotherhood won one seat. On May 24 2010, Ahmed Ibrahim Eltahir from NCP was elected speaker for the National Assembly. Lt. Gen. Adam Musa Hamid was elected as the Speaker of the Council. Atem Garang from SPLM was elected as the deputy speaker of the National Assembly.¹ The Council of State was composed of 50 members represented by two members from each 25 states and two observers from Abyei. Members of Council of States were elected by the MPs of state legislature which took place in May.²

This satisfies the legislative branch reform provision of the 2005 CPA. This however, does not suggest that the elections were free and fair. As a matter of fact, international observers regarded the elections as deeply flawed.³“Carter Center Reports Widespread Irregularities in Sudan’s Vote Tabulation and Strongly Urges Steps to Increase Transparency (10 May 2010),” Carter Center, 2010, accessed May 22, 2012, http://cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/pr/counting-tabulation-may20…

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, May 2010.
2. “Sudan Report Says Al-Bashir to Be Sworn-in After States Council Formation,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, May 3, 2010.

2011

Full Implementation

The legislative branch reform was completed in 2010. Implementation of this provision became obsolete once Southern Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 2011 following the April referendum.

2005

Full Implementation

On 23 April 2005, the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC) was formed. The NCRC had 60 members. The National Congress Party and the SPLM had insisted “on applying general power-sharing quotas agreed upon in the January deal, which give them 52 percent and 28 percent of the seats, respectively, leaving other parties a paltry 20 percent and no power to block decisions.”¹ A few opposition parties were said not to take part in the constitution drafting process. Nevertheless, drafting of the interim constitution moved quickly upon the arrival of SPLM political advisors in Khartoum.² The commission started its work on 30 April and was expected to complete its task within six weeks. The Sudanese opposition block, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), after signing a landmark agreement with Khartoum in Cairo in June 2005 also joined the constitution drafting process. It nominated 27 members to participate in the NCRC.³ The draft interim constitution was adopted by the National Assembly and the SPLM National Liberation Council on 6 July 2005. The constitution came into effect on 9 July 2005.⁴

The drafting of the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan started separately. The 40-member Southern Sudan Constitution Drafting Committee (SSCDC) — representing SPLM (28 members), NCP (six members) and other Southern political parties (six members) – was set up to draft Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan. The draft constitution was prepared by the 14 member SPLM technical committee. The Committee submitted its draft to First vice President Salva Kiir. On 17 September 2005, the Minister of Justice formed a committee which examined the compatibility of the draft constitution with the Interim National Constitution (INC). By the end of October, the draft constitution was approved by the Transitional Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly. After the National Ministry of Justice verified the ICSSÕ compatibility with the INC on 24 November 2005, the ICSS was signed into law on 5 December 2005.⁵

1. “Sudan Sets up Constitution Committee,” Agence France Presse, April 23, 2005.
2. “Sudan People’s Liberation Movement political advisor arrives in Khartoum,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, April 29, 2005.
3. “Sudan opposition bloc to join constitution drafting process,” Agence France Presse, June 21, 2005.
4. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
5. Ibid.

2006

Full Implementation

Constitution reform took place in 2005 with promulgation of the Interim National Constitution in Sudan and the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan. No further developments reported.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

The accord does not specifically provide for inter-ethnic state relations, but the SPLM/A conflict in Sudan had religious and ethnic components to it and was envisaged to be managed through devolution of powers at the national, state and local levels of government, including in southern Sudan. In this regard, as per the 2005 CPA provision, the 2005 national interim constitution recognized autonomy status of the government of southern Sudan. The CPA and the interim constitution clearly outline autonomy status of governments at different levels and their obligation. According to the inter-governmental provisions of the CPA, the president of Sudan appointed governors of 15 northern states in 2005. Similarly, the first-vice president and president of southern Sudan appointed governors of 10 southern states in 2005. This could be taken as initiation of implementation of the inter-governmental relations provisions in the CPA. Nevertheless, the state level constitution was not finalized in 2005.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

By 19 December 2006, all fifteen Northern states had adopted state constitution. The southern state had yet to adopt a constitution.¹ An attempt to make the state constitution compatible with the Interim National Constitution resulted in a delay as the states would not overstep its constitutional boundaries. Therefore, inter-state relations provision of the accord was not implemented in 2006.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.

2007

Full Implementation

After much wrangling over the compatibility of the constitution of southern states, all 10 southern states received compatibility certificates and adopted the state constitution by July 2007. No issues emerged on intergovernmental relations.

2008

Full Implementation

All states adopted their constitutions. No issues emerged on intergovernmental relations.

2009

Full Implementation

All states adopted their constitutions. No issues emerged on intergovernmental relations.

2010

Full Implementation

In April 2010, there were elections at the state level in which the SPLM candidate won gubernatorial position in nine out of ten states in the South. In Central Equatoria State of Southern Sudan, an independent candidate won the elections. NCP candidates won the elections for the office of Governor in thirteen Northern States. In Blue Nile State, the SPLM won the election. Gubernatorial elections in Southern Kordofan were postponed as agreed upon by the CPA parties.

2011

Full Implementation

Election in Southern Kordofan took place in May 2011. The result was disputed, which led to clashes between the Sudan Armed forces and SPLM/A.¹Despite disputes related to elections results, no issues emerged regarding intergovernmental relations. Obligations and autonomy of governments at different levels were finalized in constitutions at the state level in 2006 and at southern Sudan and national levels in 2005.

1. “Sudan’s ruling party candidate wins South Kordofan State governor elections,” Xinhua General News Service, May 15, 2011.

2005

Minimum Implementation

According to the Abyei Protocol, which was part of the 2005 CPA, the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) was to be composed of five members from the government, five from the SPLM/A, and five ‘international expertsÕ from the US, UK and the IGAD. The government was required to nominate two from the Messiriya and the SPLM/A from the neighbouring Dinka tribe in the Abyei area. The experts in the commission were to consult the British and other relevant archives. The ABC was instructed to determine the boundary to be included in the special administration. The commission was expected to deliver its final report by the end of pre-interim period or 9 July 2005.

According to the CPA mandate, the ABC started its work in April of 2005. The experts presented the rules of procedure for the ABC to the parties on 11 April 2005, which parties accepted. In rules of procedure, it was said that the “commission will endeavor to reach a decision by consensus. If, however, an agreed position by the two sides is not achieved, the experts will have the final say.”¹ The government of Sudan and the SPLM/A members of the ABC submitted to the experts the two partiesÕ preliminary presentations. Then, the ABC flew to the town of Abyei. The ABC heard testimony from locals for six days. After the visit, the ABC flew to Nairobi, where they reviewed their notes and the testimony heard in southern Sudan and consulted with IGAD. The experts returned to Khartoum on 27 April and for the next two weeks examined historical documents and surveys. They also listened to the testimony of a group of Ngok Dinka and a group of Twich Dinka in Khartoum.² According to the report, the experts also went to Oxford University where they examined documents and maps. Then, they travelled to the University of Durham. In England, the experts consulted experts and anthropologists. The government and the SPLM/A positions differed. The ABC submitted its report to the Presidency on 14 July 2005, five days past of the 9 July deadline. The presidency, however, failed to agree on the adoption of the report.³

1. “Abyei Boundaries Commission Report- Part I, ” July 14, 2005, accessed January 18, 2012, http://gosscanada.org/pdf/abey_boundary_com_report-1.pdf.
2. Ibid.
3. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2006.

2006

Minimum Implementation

The parties failed to approve and implement the ABC report. Nevertheless, in May 2006, the National Congress Party and the SPLM joint leadership meeting referred the deadlock over the report to its political sub-committee for consideration. The NCP-SPLM joint high political subcommittee considered four different options: a) reach a political agreement; b) call on the ABC experts to defend their recommendations; c) refer the matter to the Constitutional Court or d) seek arbitration by a third party. Nevertheless, the deadlock continued in 2006.¹

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.

2007

Minimum Implementation

The deadlock on the ABC report continued. Nevertheless, at the invitation of government of southern Sudan and following strong criticism from the National Congress Party, the ABC experts went to southern Sudan to defend the commission’s finding. They stressed that the findings were based on scientific facts and they did not overstep their mandate.¹

1. Ibid.

2008

Minimum Implementation

Unable to resolve deadlock on the ABC report, the NCP and the SPLM joint political committee reached to a roadmap agreement that included four points dealing with security arrangements, the return of the displaced persons, the interim administration and the international arbitration tribunal. The agreement was signed by Sudanese president and the ceremony was attended by the First-Vice President on 10 July 2008.¹ On 11 July 2008, the arbitration agreement was deposited with the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).³

1. “Sudan: Plans for Interim Administration in Abyei Detailed,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, June 10, 2008.
3. “Abyei Terms of Appointment,” PCA, 2008, accessed January 18, 2012, http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/Abyei_Terms_of_Appointment_signed_24… According to the Abyei Terms of Appointment, the GoS appointed two arbitrators on 14 August 2008 and the SPLM appointed two arbitrators on 15 August 2008. The presiding arbitrator (the fifth one) was appointed by PCA on 27 October 2008. The terms of appointment were signed by both sides and the five arbitrators on 24 November 2008. The SPLM and the GoS filed their memorials on 18 December 2008.²“Permanent Court of Arbitration,” The Government of Sudan / The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (Abyei Arbitration), accessed January 18, 2012, http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1306.

2009

Minimum Implementation

International arbitration on Abyei continued its work. The GoS and SPLM submitted their counter memorials on 13 February 2009. The oral pleadings continued for six days from 18 April to 23 April 2009. The Tribunal rendered its final decision late in July 2009. “On 22 July 2009, the Abyei Arbitral Tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration rendered its decision in the Abyei dispute, finding that the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) had exceeded its mandate in some locations, but it also upheld ABC recommendations in others. The Tribunal determined that the Abyei Area’s northern boundary lies along latitude 10°10′ North, its western boundary along longitude 27°50′ East, and its eastern boundary along longitude 29°00′ East. The SPLM, NCP, and senior Misseriya and Ngok-Dinka tribal leaders all publicly reaffirmed their commitment to accept the PCA decision as final and binding.”¹ The border technical team, which comprised three from ruling national congress party, three from SPLM, two from international communities and four invited independent journalists arrived in the area on 10 September 2009.² Nonetheless, the demarcation of border stalled and was not completed in 2009.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2009.
2. “Border technical demarcation team arrives in Sudan’s oil-rich Abyei region,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 11, 2009.

2010

Minimum Implementation

The demarcation of border stalled in 2010. The parties were said to have talks over the disputed territory of Abyei on the north-south border in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa in November 2010.¹ This issue, however, was not resolved in 2010.

1. “Sudan; SPLM – Abyei Talks Due to Resume Next Week in Ethiopia,” Africa News, November 6, 2010.

2011

Minimum Implementation

The dispute continued over border demarcation as well as over who was eligible to vote in the Abyei referendum. As a result, a referendum planned in Abyei on its future status was never held.¹ As a matter of fact, Sudan invaded and occupied Abyei in May 2011.²Jeffrey Gettleman and Josh Kron, “Warnings of All-Out War in Fight Over Sudan Town,” New York Times, May 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/world/africa/23sudan.html?pagewanted=a… Sudan and South Sudan had agreed to pull their troops out of the disputed territory by the end of September 2011. The UN peacekeepers were deployed in the region to maintain peace as the disputed territory became a flashpoint between the north and the south.

1. “Sudan, South Sudan to pull out troops from Abyei – UN,” BBC News Africa, September 9, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14849100.

2005

Minimum Implementation

The 2005 CPA in Sudan sought several reforms related to political parties and electoral laws and institutions, including establishment of an impartial and representative election commissions. The election was scheduled for 2009 and no progress was made in terms of implementing the electoral system and political party reform provision of the 2005 CPA.¹ Nevertheless, the July 2005 interim constitution secures universal adult suffrage (article 42(2)).

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.

2006

Minimum Implementation

The election was scheduled for 2009 and no progress was made in terms of implementing the electoral system and political party reform provision of the 2005 CPA.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

The national assembly adopted the Political Parties Act on 6 February 2007. The Debate over the Political Parties Act was very contentious especially on issues related to registration and dissolution of the parties. Initially, the draft bill had provisions that the court could dissolve political parties. This issue was resolved by requiring the dissolution of political parties upon the decision of the Constitutional Court on the basis of a case raised by a two-third majority of the Political Parties Council, if it is proven before the court that the party violated article 40(3) of Interim National Constitution. The provision, however, was refused by the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). The National Congress Party demanded tougher requirement for party registration (Article 4 of the Act). The Act was adopted in the absence of NDA. The Act was signed by the president on 6 February 2007.¹ The Act repeals the Political Parties and Organizations Act of 2001 and establishes a Council known as Political Parties Affairs Act.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2009.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

On July 7 2008, the National Assembly passed the National Elections Act by 350 votes and 14 opposed, while two legislators abstained. The total number of MPs who participated in the vote was 366.¹ The National Election Act adopts a mixed electoral system with 60% of National Assembly’s 450 members elected through the majority votes in geographical constituencies and 40% by proportional representation party lists, of which 25% was allocated to a separate women’s party list and 15% for political party lists. For the PR seats, the parties must receive 4% of the overall votes. This act was signed into law on 14 July 2008.² Chapter Two of the Election Act provides for the establishment of an independent National Election Commission. The commission is composed of nine members appointed by the president with consultation of First-Vice President and approval of two-third members of the National Assembly. The National Election Commission’s composition is said to be inclusive of representation by including women and other civil society groups.

On November 17 2008, the National Assembly endorsed the members of the National Election Commission. The endorsed members were Abel Alier, Chairman; Abdallah Ahmed Abdallah, Deputy Chairman; and Fillister Baya, Mahassin Haj Al-Saffi, James Bol Kajmal, Abdallah Ballah Al-Hardalou, Mohamed Taha Abu Samrah, Mukhtar Al-Asam and Al-Hadi Mohamed Ahmed Hassabou.³

1. “Sudan Parliament Passes Election Law,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, July 8, 2008.
2. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2009.
3. Ibid.

2009

Full Implementation

With the establishment of an independent National Election Commission in 2008, political party and electoral system reform provisions of the 2005 CPA were fully implemented. Nevertheless, the National Election Commission delayed general election until February 2010. The election was originally scheduled for July of 2009. For the second time, the Election Commission, on 30 June 2009, released a revised electoral calendar and rescheduled the election for 5-12 April 2010.¹

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, June 2009.

2010

Full Implementation

Elections were held in April 2010 as scheduled. In the National Assembly, the National Congress party won a total of 312 seats, the SPLM won 99 seats, the Popular Congress Party won four seats, Federal UMMA Party won three seats, the Democratic Unionist Party won four seats, Democratic Unionist Party-Original won one seat, SPLM-DC won two seats, UMMA Reform & Development two seats, National UMMA Party won one seat, independent candidate won one seat, and the Muslim Brotherhood won one seat.¹

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, May 2010.

2011

Full Implementation

The provisions became obsolete with the secession of southern Sudan in 9 July 2011.

2005

Full Implementation

The 2005 CPA allowed the SPLM to maintain its control over southern Sudan as per the border of 1/1/1956. According to this provision, the SPLM troops were said to be redeployed south of the north-south border. At the same time, the accord established the executive, legislative and judicial branch of the government of southern Sudan. The accord provides for a power-sharing arrangement within the executive and legislative branch of the government of southern Sudan.

According to the 2005 CPA, SPLM Chairman Dr. John Garang was appointed and sworn in as vice president of Sudan on 9 July 2005. As president of southern Sudan, Garang issued a decree to dissolve all governments of the 10 southern states of southern Sudan and relieve all governors, minister, advisors and commissioners of their positions and instead announced an interim administration.¹ After Garang’s death in a helicopter crash, Salva Kiir Mayardiit became first vice president of Sudan and president of southern Sudan.² Pending the adoption of the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, the care-taker Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) was appointed on 22 October 2005 and sworn in on 25 October. The government was composed with representatives from 10 southern states and the National Congress Party from the North. The government was dominated by Dinka ethnic group; small tribes were not represented in the government. Similarly, Muslims were not included.³

First Vice-President Kiir appointed the Transitional Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly (TSSLA) by issuing a decree on 20 September 2005. The assembly had 161 members: 110 from SPLM, 25 from NCP, and 26 from other Southern political parties (seven from Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP), three from Sudanese African National Union (SANU), four from United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF), four from Southern Sudan Democratic Forum (SSDF), four from United Democratic Front (UDF), and four from USAP2 (splinter of USAP)). The Assembly convened its first session on 26 September 2005 and elected Mr. James Wani Igga (SPLM) as Speaker and Mr. Tor Deng (NCP) as Deputy Speaker.⁴

The Transitional Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly approved the draft interim constitution of southern Sudan in October 2005 and the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan was signed into law on 5 December 2005.⁵

The CPA had provisions for the establishment of Supreme Court of Southern Sudan and other lower courts. Ambrose Riiny was appointed as President of the Supreme Court of Southern Sudan.⁶

1. “Sudan’s New First Vice President Sets Up Interim Administration for South,” AP Worldstream, July 19, 2005.
2. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.

2006

Full Implementation

Provisions related to territorial power-sharing were implemented in 2005.

2007

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2008

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2009

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2010

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2011

Full Implementation

With the secession of southern Sudan on 9 July 2011, the territorial power-sharing provision of the accord became obsolete.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

The 2005 CPA had provisions for the executive, legislative and judiciary at the state level. This provision was institutionalized by the 2005 interim constitution which was adopted by National Assembly and the SPLM National Liberation Council on 6 July 2005 and came into effect on 9 July 2005.¹ The interim constitution’s article 24 provided that the Sudan is a decentralized state with the government at the national level, southern Sudan level of government, and state level of government and the local level of government. The constitution recognized autonomy status of the government of southern Sudan.

There are 25 states in Sudan: 15 in northern Sudan and 10 in southern Sudan. According to the CPA, prior to the elections in these states, the SPLM will have 70% of the positions in the executive and legislative branch of the state government in 10 southern states; and the National Congress Party will have 70% of the positions in 15 northern states. The remaining 20% positions both at the executive and legislative branch were allocated to other parties and groups.

According to the CPA provision, the President appointed governors for 14 northern states on 27 August 2005, and the governor of Southern Kordofan on 20 October 2005. Similarly, ten governors of southern states were appointed on 22 October 2005 by the first-vice president and president of southern Sudan.² The southern state governments were sworn in December 2005.

No significant development took place in terms of state legislatures and state judiciary.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
2. Ibid.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

By 19 December 2006, all of the fifteen Northern states had adopted a Constitution. The southern states had yet to adopt a constitution.¹ In November 2006, chief judge of the Supreme Court of Southern Sudan announced the completion of appointments of all judges and justices in the 10 southern states.²

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
2. “New Judges Appointed in 10 Southern Sudan States,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, November 2, 2006.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

After much wrangling over the compatibility of the constitution of southern states, all 10 southern states received compatibility certificate and adopted the state constitution by July 2007.¹

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.

2008

Full Implementation

All states adopted their constitutions. The northern and southern states established power-sharing executive and legislative branches. This confirms the implementation of the 2005 CPA provision on decentralization/federalism.

2009

Full Implementation

All states adopted their constitutions. The northern and southern states established power-sharing executive and legislative branches. This confirms the implementation of the 2005 CPA provision on decentralization/federalism.

2010

Full Implementation

In April 2010, there were elections at the state level in which the SPLM candidate won the gubernatorial position in nine out of ten states in the South. In the Central Equatoria State of southern Sudan, an independent candidate won the election. NCP candidates won the elections for the office of Governor in thirteen out of fifteen Northern States. Gubernatorial elections in Southern Kordofan postponed as agreed upon by the CPA parties. In the Blue Nile State, the SPLM won the election. This completes the decentralization/federalism provision of the 2005 CPA as parties moved from power-sharing executive and legislature to the elected executive and legislature with no power-sharing arrangements.

2011

Full Implementation

Provisions related to federalism/decentralization were implemented. Gubernatorial elections in South Kordofan took place in May 2011 in which the NCP candidate won the election. The result was disputed because the SPLM withdrew from vote sorting and did not recognize the result.¹ The result dispute sparked clashes in the area. This issue still is contentious even after southern Sudan’s secession on 9 July 2011.

1. “Sudan’s ruling party candidate wins South Kordofan State governor elections,” Xinhua General News Service, May 15, 2011.

2005

No Implementation

The 2005 accord contained provisions related to civil service reform in Sudan. It proposed establishing a National Civil Service Commission (NCSC) to address imbalance in the National Civil Service while formulating policies aimed at training and recruiting 20% to 30% from southern Sudan, notably at the Senior and middle-levels, within six years. Along with making the civil service a representative of the people of Sudan, the accord ensures fair competition for jobs and forbids discrimination based on religion, ethnicity, region, gender or political beliefs.

Along with promoting the representation of southern Sudan in civil service, simply establishing the civil service in southern Sudan was crucial. As a matter of fact, southern Sudan lacked meaningful civil administration and the SPLM/A sought to transform itself “into peace-time political, military and civil administrations.”¹ Nevertheless, no action was taken to reform civil service in Sudan; neither did the government of southern Sudan have meaningful civil administration. It was said that the civil service and associated management systems and institutions to oversee development programs needed to be established from scratch.²

1. “Sudan; Statesman’s Clear Vision for Future of Free Sudan,” Africa News, January 9, 2005.
2. “WORLD BANK: Southern Sudan Receives Assistance for Recovery,” M2 Presswire, December 2, 2005.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

It was reported that a preparatory team had formed to establish six CPA commissions including a National Civil Service Commission. Also, some progress was said made in terms of the drafting of the Civil Service Act and the National Service Act at the national level, which were pre-requisites for the establishment of the National Civil Service Commission. By the end of March 2006, the commission preparatory team had prepared a draft law, according to which the commission was said to remain an advisory body to the Ministry of Labour.¹ Despite this progress, there was delay in reshaping the national civil service into a more representative and professional institution, which was said to be one of the contentious issues.²

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
2. “Sudan: Speech of Vice-President Kiir at Ruling Party NC, SPLM Leadership Meeting,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, May 28, 2006.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

The National Civil Service Bill was adopted by the National Assembly on 23 January 2007. By issuing a decree on 26 July 2007, the Presidency established the National Civil Service Commission (NCCS). Prof. Moses Machar was appointed as chairman of the NCCS. The NCCS had 10 members who were appointed 4 August 2007 and met for the first time on 22 August. In September, the NCSC agreed to “establish a joint committee to follow up on the implementation of the allocation of 20%-30% of the civil service posts to the Southerners as per the provisions of the CPA, Interim National Constitution and the 2007 Civil Service Commission Act.”¹ No information is available on the implementation of the percentage of civil service positions allocated to the southern Sudan. Nevertheless, some progress was made especially after the establishment of the joint committee.

The situation of civil service in southern Sudan remained as it was. The government was said to be having difficulty with regards to completing accurate civil service and military headcounts and reviews.² Also, it was suggested that a considerable number of combatants from different armed groups were absorbed in the civil service sector.³

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
2. “Sudan; CPA Was Doomed – None of the Signatories Had Any Conviction,” Africa News, October 23, 2007.
3. “Sudan: Army, SPLA to Absorb over 54,000 Men from Armed Groups in South,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, June 24, 2007.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

The NCSC, as reported by the government media, had completed the first stage in accommodating 20% of the civil service national positions allocated for the south Sudan citizens. According to the NCSC’s secretary general, the commission was coordinating with the civil service recruitment committee in Khartoum.¹ The appointment process, however, started only in June. According to a news report, around 1,500 graduates from southern Sudan began to occupy the 20% of the public posts in the government ministries and departments.² The reform of civil service, however, was behind the originally agreed upon schedule. In August, it was reported that the NCSC chairman revealed that 700 among those interviewed in June were recruited to join public service. This represents 10% of the agreed to 20% to 30% of vacancies in public service. The remaining 10% of the allocated quota was said to be completed after population census (Source: Some 700 Southern Sudan Graduates “Recruited” into Public Service, BBC Monitoring Middle East, 10 August 2008). In September, it was reported that the Ministry of Labour had finished technical arrangements to absorb 20% southerners in public services.³

1. “Sudan Completes Arrangements for Civil Service Recruitment of Southerners,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, January 5, 2008.
2. “Sudan Government Reportedly Employing more Southerners to Address Imbalance,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, June 14, 2008.
3. “Sudan: Labour Ministry to Absorb Southerners into Public Service,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 6, 2008.

2009

Full Implementation

It was reported that the members of other armed groups who joined the peace process were absorbed into civil service.¹ Also, the energy ministry reported that it handed over a list of the vacant posts to the NCSC to be filled by citizens from southern Sudan.² By the end of 2009, it was reported that the Presidency approved 1,150 southern Sudanese candidates for appointment in the National Civil Service. Also, the Southern Kordofan State formed a special committee to facilitate the integration of 1,708 SPLM civil servants into the political and administrative structure of the state in November of 2009.³ Given that the appointment of 700 southerners in 2008 was said to meet the 10% civil service positions, it can be said that the civil service reform provisions of the accord were implemented.

1. “Ex-eastern Sudan Rebel Chief Says Peace Accord Represents Move to End Suffering,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, October 20, 2009.
2. “Sudan Adopts Transparency Principal on Oil Production — Official,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, August 17, 2009.
3. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, January 2010.

2010

Full Implementation

No detailed information is available with regards to civil service reform in 2010. Given that the appointment of 700 southerners in 2008 was said to meet the 10% civil service positions, the appointed 1,150 southerners in National Civil Service and 1,708 SPLM civil servants into the political and administrative structure of the Southern Kordofan State meet the CPA provisions for civil service reform.

2011

Full Implementation

The provisions related to civil service reform were implemented. Nevertheless, with the referendum that led to the successful secession, it is not clear whether the southerners holding civil service positions at the national level were dismissed or not. This provision became obsolete.

2005

Minimum Implementation

The 2005 CPA provided that the national unity government would work out mechanisms and forms for national reconciliation. The CPA also suggested that the presidency would start peace and reconciliation process for Abyei.

No significant efforts were made to promote the national reconciliation process by the national unity government in 2005. Similarly, the presidency was divided and it failed to make the decisions required to implement the report submitted by the Abyei Boundary Commission.¹ The division within the presidency and the National Congress Party and the SPLM on boundary report did not help the initiation of the peace and reconciliation process for Abyei.

Nevertheless, a delegation from the Sudanese Peace and Reconciliation Commission of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement went to Rwanda to learn from its reconciliation experience, focusing especially on its unity and reconciliation process, the repatriation of refugees, and the establishment of an unique armed force.²

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2006.
2. “South Sudan Delegation Visiting Rwanda to Learn About Reconciliation Process,” BBC Monitoring Africa, November 12, 2005.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

The training workshops were organized and designed to help develop programs for the youth as part of a sports for peace initiative and organized in South Sudan were very effective medium in the reconciliation process. Other mechanisms and attempts that the national unity government made to facilitate the reconciliation process remained unclear. So far as the reconciliation and peace in Abyei is concerned, the deadlock on implementing the boundary commission’s report continued in 2006.¹

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.

2007

Minimum Implementation

While president Al-Bashir called for National reconciliation in January 2007, the parties had major differences on implementation of the CPA and lacked trust of each other. In October 2007, the SPLM pulled out of the government citing a failure to begin a national reconciliation process, among other things.¹

In Abyei, the deadlock over the boundary commission’s report continued. That being said, however, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) initiated several confidence-building initiatives in response to issues related to migration including a peace conference between the Dinka Ngok and the Misseriya tribal groups.²

1. “Sudan; SPLA Pulls Out of Government,” Africa News, October 12, 2007.
2. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.

2008

Minimum Implementation

Some attempts were made in terms of promoting the national reconciliation process. President Al-Bashir, in his opening address to the National Legislature on 13 October 2008, affirmed the government’s commitment to implement the outcomes of the dialogue and affirmed the government’s determination to boost national accord and reconciliation processes.¹ In addition, the SPLM and 9 Southern Sudan Political Parties held a dialogue conference in Juba between 8 and13 November 2008. Salva Kiir, who was the 1st Vice President of the Republic, the President of the Government of Southern Sudan, and the Chairman of the SPLM, had organized the conference in order to promote dialogue among the parties. Among the resolutions and recommendation of the conference was a national reconciliation and healing process for which the all political parties were called upon by the conference to participate in peace and reconciliation processes throughout the country.² In Abyei, the NCP and the SPLM joint political committee reached to a roadmap agreement that included four points dealing with security arrangements, the return of the displaced persons, the interim administration, and the international arbitration tribunal. The agreement was signed by Sudanese president and the ceremony was attended by the First-Vice President on 10 July 2008.³

1. “Sudan: Al-Bashir Affirms ‘Determination to Boost National Accord’ Process,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, October 17, 2008.
2. “Resolutions of South- South Sudan Dialogue Conference,” Sudan Tribune, November 19, 2008.
3. “Sudan: Plans for Interim Administration in Abyei Detailed,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, June 10, 2008.

2009

Minimum Implementation

A group of legislators from the southern Sudan went to Rwanda in early May to learn that country’s unity and reconciliation process.¹ In his speech at all Sudanese Political Parties Conference in Juba, the First Vice president highlighted the need for a genuine process of reconciliation, healing, forgiveness and confidence-building.² The lack of a reconciliation process was one of the factors making the unity of Sudan less attractive to southern Sudan.³

On the Abyei issue, the International Tribunal made its decision and upheld the recommendation of the border commission.⁴ The border was not demarcated due to political differences.

1. “Rwanda; South Sudan MPs Here for Reconciliation Experience,” Africa News, May 5, 2009.
2. “Salva Kiir’s speech at All Sudan Political Parties Conference in Juba,” Sudan Tribune, September 29, 2009.
3. “Sudan; Statement on Peace Process in the South,” Africa News, December 1, 2009.
4. “Border technical demarcation team arrived in Sudan’s oil-rich Abyei region,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 11, 2009.

2010

Minimum Implementation

The border demarcation issue was not resolved in 2010 and because of this, a fear of Abyei becoming a conflict flashpoint remained very high. A delegation from the government of Southern Sudan went to Rwanda to learn from their experience with the reconciliation process and was impressed with the work of National Unity and Reconciliation Commission.¹ The team also visited the Ministry of Defense to understand the role of army in the reconciliation process.² In September, the SPML deputy chairman said that the SPLM was committed to unity, but pointed out that the parties to the CPA (SPLM and the NCP-led government) “did not work in building trust amongst themselves and neglected the national reconciliation process which could have removed psychological barriers between the north and the south.”³

1. “Sudan; South Sudan Delegation Impressed By NURC,” Africa News, June 1, 2010.
2. “Rwanda; South Sudan Delegation Visits MoD,” Africa News, June 5, 2010.
3. “Southern Sudan deputy says SPLM still committed to support unity,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 26, 2010.

2011

Minimum Implementation

With the referendum for the secession of southern Sudan, the parties failed to promote national reconciliation and peace. The issue of Abyei remained as it was. Sudan and South Sudan had agreed to pull their troops out of the disputed territory by the end of September 2011. UN peacekeepers were deployed in the area to maintain peace as the disputed territory became a flashpoint between the north and the south.

2005

Minimum Implementation

According to the 2005 CPA, all disputes related to the implementation of the ceasefire agreement would be referred to the Presidency as a last resort for dispute settlement. The agreement contained provisions for dispute settlement related to the implementation of the ceasefire agreement at lower levels. As provided, the Joint Military Team (JMT) was to monitor, verify and report alleged violations to the appropriate Area Joint Military Committee (AJMC). The AJMC was to monitor and verify alleged violations and resolve disputes. The AJMC was also instructed to refer unresolved complaints to Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC). The Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC) was to settle deadlocks arising from the ceasefire implementation as reported by the CJMC, and was to refer the unresolved ones to the Presidency.

All these mechanisms to settle disputes related to the implementation of ceasefire settlement were in place in 2005. The Ceasefire Political Commission was established on 27 August 2005 by presidential decree and its membership announced on 1 November 2005.¹

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS. February 2009.

2006

Minimum Implementation

Even with the establishment of a dispute resolution mechanism related to the implementation of ceasefire provisions, the mechanism did not function quite as well as intended. Many issues remained unresolved due to a deadlock within the Ceasefire Political Commission as well as at the level of the presidency.

2007

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2008

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2009

Minimum Implementation

The CPA provides for the freedom of movement of the UN Monitors throughout the Ceasefire Zone. However, their movement was oftentimes restricted by both sides. The JMT refereed the issue at various Ceasefire Joint Military Committee meetings and the CJMC had been regularly referred to CPC. Nevertheless, the CPC could not resolve the dispute.¹

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.

2010

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2011

Minimum Implementation

Even with the establishment of a dispute resolution mechanism related to the implementation of ceasefire provisions, the mechanism did not function quite as well as intended. Many issues remained unresolved due to a deadlock within the Ceasefire Political Commission as well as at the level of the presidency. In its meeting the CJMC requested CPC to approach the Joint Defense Board to form a Board of Inquiry to investigate the 1 May 2011 invasion in the Abyei area. Issues referred to the Ceasefire Political Commission, however, often were left unresolved due to deadlock.¹

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, May 2011.

2005

Full Implementation

The 2005 CPA contained judicial reform provisions that required the establishment of the Constitutional Court, the National Supreme Court, and appellate Courts. With respect to the Constitutional Courts, its members are appointed by the president upon the approval of the National Judicial Service Commission, and subject to two-third majority approval of all members of the Council of States. Nevertheless, the CPA requires an adequate representation of southern Sudan in the Constitutional Court. In the 2005 Interim Constitution, which was enacted in July, these reforms were institutionalized.

The National Assembly approved the Constitutional Court Act on 1 October 2005. This act became law in November. According to this act, Mr. John Aungi Kasiba from SPLM and Dr. Wahabi Mohamed Mukhtar from NCP were appointed as Deputy Chief Justices. Mr. Jalal-Eddin Mohamed Osman from NCP was appointed as Chief Justice. These appointments were made on 28 November 2005. Similarly, the president and members of the Constitutional Court were sworn in on 31 December 2005.¹

Similarly, the National Judicial Service Act was adopted in October 2005. The National Judicial Service Commission was established on 7 December 2005.² With the establishment of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court and the representation of southern Sudan in the Constitutional Court, the judicial reforms took place in Sudan as sought by the 2005 CPA.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
2. Ibid.

2006

Full Implementation

Judicial reforms took place in 2005. No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Minimum Implementation

The 2005 CPA in Sudan was unique in the sense that it legitimized the existence of the Sudan Armed Force and the Sudan People’s Liberation Armed force and suggested the creation of Joint Integrated Units comprising armed personnel from both forces. The SAF and SPLA were to be withdrawn from the 1956 border between the North and the South and the JIUs were to be deployed in those areas.

The main issues included military doctrine. Additionally, the size of the military was pending until the referendum in the South Sudan. Nevertheless, the 2005 CPA provides for the establishment of the Joint Defense Board (JDB) comprising both the SAF and SPLA in parity basis with responsibility to make a decision on external and internal security threat. The JDB would form a Technical Committee out of four senior officers from both sides with the responsibility to coordinate the two forces and resolve the various problems that could ensue. Also, both sides would integrate other interested armed groups into their armed forces; and the parties were to establish an “Incorporation and Reintegration Adhoc Committee.”

According to the Accord, both arms of the armed forces (SAF and SPLA) would complete the selection and organization of officers, non-commissioned Officers (NCOs) and men for the JIUs within three months from the beginning of the Pre-Interim Period. The JIUs, were to be dissolved with each component reverting to its mother armed forces to pave the way for the formation of the separate armed force for the emerging state, should the referendum result favor for the secession of the South from the North. If the referendum would confirm the unity, the JIUs was said to be the nucleus of the future Sudanese National Armed Forces (SNAP).

The Accord requires the formation of JIUs during the pre-interim and the interim period from the SAF and SPLA, on a parity basis. Nevertheless, the delay in the establishment of the Joint Defense Board delayed in the formation of the JIUs. The JDB was established by a presidential decree on 29 December 2005. The JIU act was endorsed by the National Assembly on 19 December 2005. By the end of December 2005, it was said that the SPLM and SAF had nominated 46% and 97% personnel joining the JIUs.

Parties were behind to integrate other armed groups in existing military structures and to create functioning JIUs. The implementation of the formation of the Joint Integrated Unites provision of the ceasefire was 18 months behind schedule. Contributing to the delay was the lack of logistical support.¹ Similarly, an Incorporation and Reintegration Adhoc Committee for the incorporation of the Other Armed Groups (OGAs) into the regular forces of the parties was not formed by the parties. However, parties had registered OGAs allied with either SAF or SPLA. The SAF disclosed that about 43,000 members of OGAs were aligned to it and SPLA claimed its overall strength to be about 270,000.²

1. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/42), January 25, 2007.
2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/821), December 21, 2005.

2006

Minimum Implementation

After its formation, the JDB met for the first time on 2-3 January 2006. The Board was jointly chaired by First Lieutenant-General Abbas Arabi Abdallah, representing the SAF, and First Lieutenant General Oyai Deng Ajak, representing the SPLA. The National Assembly passed the Joint Integrated Units Act on 17 January 2006.¹ The SPLA signed the Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration of SPLA and SSDF with Paulino Matip. The SSDF was the umbrella organization comprising the Majority of formerly SAF-aligned OAGs.² At issue for the OGAs was the fact that each of the parties had provided the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee with a list of groups that were said to be aligned with each party while the actual alignment status, composition and location of the group remained opaque.³ Also, the implementation of the formation of Joint Integrated Unites provision of ceasefire was 18 months behind the schedule. Contributing to the delay was the lack of logistical support.⁴

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
2. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
3. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/728), September 12, 2006.
4. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/42), January 25, 2007.

2007

Minimum Implementation

The JDB regularly met, as it did in 2006. In February 2007, the parties adopted a common military doctrine and code of conduct to guide the work of JIU forces.¹ It was reported that the SAF declared in May 2007 that there were no more SAF-aligned OAGs in South Sudan.² Nevertheless, the formation of JIUs was delayed and thus the redeployment of the JIUs.³

1. “Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/520), August 29, 2007.
2. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” United Nations, February 2009.
3. Ibid.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

The JDB regularly met in 2008. Progress related to the formation and deployment of the JIUs was made. As of 4 October 2008, the JIUs had reached 84.7% of their mandated strength of 39,639 troops, SAF soldiers comprising 52.4 percent and SPLA soldiers 47.6 per cent of the total.¹ There was no report on OGAs aligned with either of the parties.

1. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2008/662), October 20, 2008.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

The JDB regularly met in 2009. The other armed groups were officially banded in 2006.¹ On issues related to the deployment of the JIUs, both parties were slow in filling their respective quota of troops and in deployment to all eight agreed-upon locations, complaining of logistical problems. As of September 2009, the eight JIUs locations were occupied by SAF and SPLA. But still to be filled with the agreed quota in all locations: Um-darfa, Menza, Wadal Mahe. Dindiro, Ulu, Gissan, Kurmuk and Taliya.²

1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2009/545), October 21, 2009.
2. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2009.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

The JDB regularly met in 2010. “There has been no change on the status of the JIU since April 2009. They are at 82.6 per cent of their mandated strength of 39,639 troops.”¹

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2010.

2011

Intermediate Implementation

The JIU dissolution process had officially been completed by 9 April 2011; by the end of May 2011, the movement of the SAF JIU troops from the South to the North was underway. The SPLA JIUs in Khartoum agreed to stay there until 9 July 2011.¹ On 23 May 2011, the JDB informed the SPLA of an instruction from the President of Sudan to redeploy its forces to the south of the 1-1-56 boundary; the SAF would redeploy its forces to all the areas north of the boundary as of 1 June 2011.² Since critical issues such as the size of the armed force and the common military doctrine were contingent on the referendum result favoring the unity, military reform did not take place in Sudan.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2011.
2. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2011.

2005

Minimum Implementation

The 2005 CPA provided that the police and law enforcement organs should be dealt with as part of the power-sharing arrangement. The parties also agreed to let the police force assume its normal functions in areas where military and para-military forces had previously assumed their functions. The accord also called for the training and capacity-building of the police. Parties also recognized the need for cooperation and coordination mechanisms between the national police and other law enforcement agencies at all levels of government in order to implement the accord.

No significant progress was made regarding police reform. The Ministry of Justice Law reform had reestablished a committee to review laws to ensure their compatibility with the CPA and the Interim National Constitution on 19 October 2005. The committee had identified 50 laws requiring reforms including the Police Act.¹ In front of the training and capacity-building of police, the UN police in the field had monitored, advised and reported on the activities of the local police in South Sudan. The Police Commander of South Sudan had approved a proposal to co-locate UN police in police stations to monitor and train local police. The UN police also organized 11 training courses for 448 Sudanese police officers. The U.N. Secretary General’s report suggests that the strategic plan for police development and training had advanced.²

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
2. “U.N. Secretary General’s Report on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/821), December 21, 2005.

2006

Minimum Implementation

In the spirit of the power-sharing provisions in the CPA, the Khartoum State cabinet approved the Khartoum Police Force Bill but discussion on the bill was pending until the National Police Bill had been approved. Nevertheless, immediately after the signing of the CPA it was agreed that position discrimination towards Southerners and Darfurians would be applied at the Police College (Rabat University) with a lower entrance mark being accepted. It was suggested that at least 20% of 350 officer candidates in the police college would be from the South.¹

There was no progress with regards to deploying Joint Integrated Police Units. Nevertheless, UN Police supported both the GoNU Police and the Southern Sudan Police Services (SSPS) with capacity building and standards. The UNMIS recommended the establishment of the Police Development Committee in South Sudan Police Service to formulate policy and coordinate capacity building initiatives. The committee was representative of the SPLM, the government and National Unity and international agencies. The UNMIS police component drafted a framework and action plan for community policing in Juba. The code of conduct for Sudanese police was also at the stage of approval. The UNMIS police component played a crucial role in training the initial group of 34 officers. The human rights training for the Government of National Unity Police also began in September 2006.²

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/728), September 12, 2006.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

Some progress was made with regards to police reform. In June 2007, the Council of Ministers approved the National Police Bill that would affirm the provision of the CPA and INC that created three levels of police: national, southern, and state. The UNDP started training police and prison personnel with support from the Multi-Donor Trust Fund.¹ The UN police unit also continued to advise the SSPS on strategic developments including command and communication structures. The UN police officers were co-located in six out of 10 southern States. The first group of 29 officers graduated in 2007. The UNMIS had also received requests from five northern states for police training support.² There was no progress on deploying Joint Integrated Police Units.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly Report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/500), August 20, 2007.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

In June 2008, the National Assembly passed the National Police Bill following a protracted debate. In South Sudan, the organized forces bill (police, fire brigade and wildlife) had been drafted and forwarded to the GoSS council of ministers for consideration. In July, officers to serve in the JIPU had been identified by the GoS Police Service and the SSPS and were deployed in Abyei town. After the appointment of the Abyei police commissioner, parties had also agreed to phase-wise deployment of 1,000 joint integrated police units comprising equal numbers from both the north and south. The UN coordinator was quoted saying that 379 police officers from the north had already arrived and the police personnel from the south were expected to arrive by the end of the week.¹ The integrated units were deployed to maintain law and order in Abyei.

The UNMIS police component continued to train police officers, with a special focus on basic training. It was reported that the UNMIS trained a total of 1,700 government police officers in various specialties: forensics, crime investigation, gender issues, computers, explosives awareness and community policing. The UNMIS trained 100 women police officers in Khartoum on issues related to gender, domestic violence and child protection. In South Sudan, the UNMIS training 2,104 police officers. It was also reported that over 6,500 officers were harmonized and added to the UNMIS police personnel database.²

1. “Joint Police Force Poised for Sudan Oil Flashpoint,” Agence France Presse, July 9, 2008; “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2008/662), October 20, 2008.
2. Ibid.

2009

Full Implementation

Once the National Police Bill was passed in 2008, the Khartoum Legislative Council passed the Khartoum State Police Act in August 2009. Similarly, the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly passed the Southern Sudan Police Bill in October 2009. The Joint Integrated Police Unit remained deployed in Abyei town. Remarkable progress was made in capacity building and in the standards of the GoNU Police and Southern Police Service. In December 2009, the police unit of the UNMIS concluded 48 training courses in which 1,058 local police officers (418 GoS and 640 SSPS) participated in those courses, including 73 female officers. The UNMIS Police trained 8,351 (6004 GoS and 2,347 SSPS) local police officers, including 763 females, in Election Security Training. It was also reported that 26,955 SSPS officers had been fully registered from Sector I, II & III.¹

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2009.

2010

Full Implementation

Legal reforms related to the police were completed in 2009. Nevertheless, the UNMIS police continued to provide capacity- and confidence-building classes to national and south Sudan police service personnel. The UNMIS police officers were co-located in all 10 Southern States. Furthermore, 25,840 SSPS personnel, including 2,254 female officers, were trained in referendum security duties.¹

1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2010/681), December 31, 2010.

2011

Full Implementation

The CPA provision related to police reform became obsolete when South Sudan succeeded from the north after the referendum. Nevertheless, the UNMIS continued with support for the security sector reform in South Sudan. The new mandate that the U.N. Secretary General requested from the U.N. Mission in South Sudan also incorporated aspects of support to strengthen the capacity of the SSPS through technical advice in policy and legislative development, as well as training and mentoring.¹

1. “Special report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2011/314), May 17, 2011.

2005

Minimum Implementation

The DDR process in Sudan was recognized as very challenging given that the accord did not specifically provide detailed information regarding the number of combatants to be demobilized, disarmed and integrated into society. The accord, however, provided a phased approach by establishing an Interim DDR Program (IDDRP) before finalizing a full scale multi-year DDR program.¹ Government of Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), SPLA, non-allied OGAs, and children and women associated with the fighting forces were eligible for the DDR process. The CPA established the National DDR Coordination Council and two sub-national level commissions the Northern’ Sudan DDR Commission (NDDRC) and the Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SDDRC), which were mandated to design, implement and manage the DDR process at the northern and southern sub-national levels respectively. These institutional structures were agreed to be established within 30 days of the signing of the CPA. The CPA also provides for assembly locations for the SFA and the SPLA combatants for the DDR process.

As agreed, the Northern Sudan DDR Interim Authority was established and even established regional offices. Similarly, the Southern Sudan DDR Interim Authority was established and set up its regional offices. To carry out the DDR program, surveys and registration of disabled ex-combatants and women associated with armed groups were being carried out and the removal of child soldiers was expected to begin in January 2006. The UNMIS and the UN DDR unit provided assistance ranging from expert advice to demobilization packages.²

In 2005, the SAF disclosed that about 43,000 members of OGAs were aligned with it and SPLA claimed its overall strength to be about 270,000.³ It was not clear how many of the disclosed members of the armed forces were going to participate in the DDR process.

1. “Sudan,” UNDDR, accessed February 3, 2012, http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=35.
2. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
3. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” I (S/2005/821), December 21, 2005.

2006

Minimum Implementation

The National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Coordination Council (NDDRCC) was established on 18 February 2006. The Minister of Presidency was the chair and other members of the council were cabinet members—as well as Chief of Staff of the SAF and SPLA, General Commissioner for DDR for the Northern States, General Commissioner for DDR for the Southern States and other dignitaries to be appointed by the Presidency. The NDDRCC has the responsibility of policy formation. Therefore, on 19 February, the Northern Sudan Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration Commission (NDDRC) was established by a presidential decree. The NDDRC had responsibility to design, implement and manage the DDR process at the northern states. The GoSS established the Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC) and appointed its chairperson and the deputy chairperson. It was reported that the GoSS also formally endorsed the interim DDR program in January 2006.¹ The SPLA, in technical support of UNICEF, had demobilized and reunited some 142 children in February 2006.² It is not clear how demobilized child combatants were integrated into the society.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
2. Ibid.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

There was some momentum after the establishment of the NDDRCC and NDDRC and SSDDRC. In Southern Sudan, a technical committee on disarmament and demobilization was established in January 2007. It was also reported that the SAF conducted unilateral disarmament of its aligned former OAG members and the United National Military Observers observed the disarmament procedure. A total of 957 OAG combatants were disarmed and given a onetime payment. It did not involve the Northern and Southern Sudan DDR institutions.¹

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

UNMIS continued to work with parties to the CPA for a plan to commence the multi-year DDR program in the Sudan. In this regard, the NDDRCC in September had agreed to conduct a pilot disarmament and demobilization program for 700-1000 combatants. There were 88 children associated with the SPLA who were demobilized in May 2008. The UNICEF DDR staff, with NSDDRC in the Blue Nile State, had also started an interim program to monitor demobilized child combatantsÕ participation in the integration programs.¹

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

Important progress was made in terms of establishing the target number of DDR. It was estimated that some 180,000 combatants would participate in the DDR program, starting with 50,000 participants (25,000 each from the SAF and the SPLA) in the first phase. Approximately, 6,000 women associated with armed forces or groups (WAAFGs) and 17,500 people with disabilities as well as children associated with forces were expected to be beneficiaries of the DDR program.¹ The cost of reintegrating 182,000 combatants from both sides was estimated to be $430 million. The Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan also agreed to directly contribute $250 for each participant.

The demobilization process started in February 2009 and by the end of August 2009 a total of 12,428 combatants had been demobilized. The demobilized combatants received reintegration support in the form of cash, non-food items, and coupons from the WFP for food rations for three months.² The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA, December 2009). Also, in December of 2009, a total of 697 ex-combatants and members of special needs groups were demobilized. Those who participated in the DDR program also received counseling.³

1. “Disarmament, Demo and Reintegration- Fact Sheet,” UNMIS, 2010, accessed February 3, 2012, http://sudanddr.org/en/facts/Factsheet%20DDR%20CPA%20areas.pdf.
2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2009/545), October 21, 2009; “Disarmament, Demo and Reintegration.”
3. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2009.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

According to the UNMIS, some 21,700 adult ex-combatants including women associated with armed forces or groups were demobilized in five different centers by mid-April 2010. It was also reported that over 13,000 participants received counseling on reintegration opportunities.¹ As of 1 December 2010, the Sudan disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program had demobilized 33,693 ex-combatants — 23,678 in the North and 10,015 in the South — including 6,258 women.² By the end of December 2010, the total number demobilized stood at 37,124.³ The DDR program was said to have funding shortage.

1. “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration-Fact Sheet.”
2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2010/681), December 31, 2010.
3. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2010.

2011

Intermediate Implementation

The DDR program, as of May 2011, demobilized 48,594 combatants–27,081 for SAF and 21,513 for SPLA. In Northern Sudan, a total of 36,069 DDR participants, including 5,985 female and 3,356 disabled participants, went through the demobilization process. In Southern Sudan, a total of 12,525 DDR participants, including 6,188 female and 617 disabled participants, had been demobilized. By the end of May, 31,525 (North: 19,811; South: 11,714) ex-combatants had been counseled on reintegration opportunities in the Sudan. Of these, 21,189 registered with UNDP’s DDR program implementation partners in order to receive reintegration support.¹

The DDR program in South Sudan continued even after the successful secession in July 2011. Following the secession, the Republic of South Sudan DDR Commission was re-instituted by the interim National Constitution (July 2011). The commission expected to demobilize and disarm some 90,000 ex-combatants, of which a total of 12,525 were demobilized by December 2011. By December 2011, some 10,926 demobilized combatants (87%) registered with implementing partners for reintegration support training.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2010.

2005

Minimum Implementation

The DDR process in Sudan was understood to be challenging given that the accord did not specifically provide detailed information on combatants to be demobilized, disarmed and integrated into society. The accord, however, provided a phased approach by establishing an Interim DDR Program (IDDRP). The purpose of the establishment of the IDDRP was to identify address groups that could be clearly identified up-front while continuing to move forward on the formulation and preparation of full-scale multi-year DDR program.¹ Government of Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), SPLA, non-allied OGAs, and women and children associated with the fighting forces were eligible for the DDR process. The CPA established the National DDR Coordination Council and two sub-national level commissions:–the Northern’ Sudan DDR Commission (NDDRC) and the Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SDDRC)–which were mandated to design, implement and manage the DDR process at the northern and southern sub-national levels, respectively. It was agreed upon that these institutional structures would be established within 30 days of the signing of the CPA. The CPA also provided assembly locations for the SFA and the SPLA combatants for the DDR process. The civilian disarmament was not part of this research.

As agreed, the Northern Sudan DDR Interim Authority was instituted and it established its regional offices. Similarly, the Southern Sudan DDR Interim Authority was instituted and established its regional offices. To carry out the DDR program, surveys and registration of disabled ex-combatants and women associated with armed groups were being carried out and the removal of child soldiers as expected to begin in January 2006. The UNMIS and the UN DDR unit provided various means of assistance ranging from expert advice to demobilization packages.²

In 2005, the SAF disclosed that about 43,000 members of OGAs were aligned to it and the SPLA claimed its overall strength to be about 270,000.³ It was not clear how many of the disclosed members of the armed forces would participate in the DDR process.

Information on disarmament and number of weapon collected is not available.

1. “Sudan,” UNDDR, accessed February 3, 2012, http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=35.
2. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
3. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/821), December 21, 2005.

2006

Minimum Implementation

The National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Coordination Council (NDDRCC) was established on 18 February 2006. The Minister of Presidency was the chair and other members of the council were cabinet members as well as the Chiefs of Staff of the SAF and SPLA, General Commissioner for DDR for the Northern States, General Commissioner for DDR for the Southern States and other dignitaries to be appointed by the Presidency. The NDDRCC had the responsibility of policy formation. Similarly, on 19 February, the Northern Sudan Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration Commission (NDDRC) was established by a presidential decree. The NDDRC had the responsibility of designing, implementing and managing the DDR process in the northern states. The GoSS established the Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC) and appointed its chairperson and the deputy chairperson. It was reported that the GoSS also formally endorsed the interim DDR program in January 2006.¹

The SPLA technical support of UNICEF had demobilized and reunited some 142 children in February 2010.² It is not clear how demobilized child combatants were integrated into the society.

Information on disarmament and number of weapon collected is not available.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
2. Ibid.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

Some momentum was gained following the establishment of the NDDRCC, NDDRC and SSDDRC. In Southern Sudan, a technical committee on disarmament and demobilization was established in January 2007. It was also reported that the SAF conducted unilateral disarmament of its aligned former OAG members and the United National Military Observers observed the disarmament procedure. A total of 957 OAG combatants were disarmed and given onetime payments. It did not involve the Northern and Southern Sudan DDR institutions.¹

Information on disarmament and number of weapon collected is not available.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

UNMIS continued to work with parties to the CPA for a plan to commence the multi-year DDR program in the Sudan. In this regard, the NDDRCC in September had agreed to conduct a pilot disarmament and demobilization program for 700-1000 combatants. There were 88 children associated with the SPLA who were demobilized in May 2008. The UNICEF DDR staff with NSDDRC in the Blue Nile State had also started an interim program to monitor demobilized child combatants participation in the integration programs.¹

Information on disarmament and number of weapon collected is not available.

1. Ibid.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

Important progress was made with regards to deciding on the target number of DDR. It was estimated that some 180,000 combatants would participate the DDR program, beginning with 50,000 participants (25,000 each from the SAF and the SPLA) in the first phase. Approximately 6,000 women associated with armed forces or groups (WAAFGs) and 17,500 people with disabilities, as well as children associated with forces, were expected to be beneficiaries of the DDR program.¹ The cost of the reintegration of 182,000 combatants from both sides was estimated at $430 million. The Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan also agreed to contribute $250 directly for each participant.

The demobilization process started in February 2009 and by the end of August 2009 a total of 12,428 combatants had been demobilized. The demobilized combatants received reintegration support in form of cash, non-food items, and coupons from the WFP for food rations for three months.² Also, in December of 2009, a total of 697 ex-combatants and members of special needs groups were demobilized. Those who participated in the DDR program also received counseling.³

Information on disarmament and number of weapon collected is not available.

1. “Disarmament, Demo and Reintegration- Fact Sheet,” UNMIS, accessed February 3, 2012, http://sudanddr.org/en/facts/Factsheet%20DDR%20CPA%20areas.pdf.
2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2009/545), October 21, 2009; “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2009.
3. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2009.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

According to the UNMIS, some 21,700 adult ex-combatants, including women associated with armed forces or groups, were demobilized in five different centers by mid-April 2010. It was also reported that over 13,000 participants received counseling on reintegration opportunities.¹ As of 1 December 2010, the Sudan disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program had demobilized 33,693 ex-combatants — 23,678 in the North and 10,015 in the South — including 6,258 women.² By the end of December 2010, the total demobilized number stood at 37,124.³ The DDR program was said to have funding shortage.

Information on disarmament and number of weapons collected is not available.

1. “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration- Fact Sheet.”
2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2010/681), December 31, 2010.
3. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2010.

2011

Intermediate Implementation

The DDR program as of May 2011 demobilized 48,594 combatants 27,081 for SAF and 21,513 for SPLA). In Northern Sudan, a total of 36,069 DDR participants including 5,985 female and 3,356 disabled participants went through the demobilization process. In Southern Sudan, a total of 12,525 DDR participants including 6,188 female and 617 disabled participants had been demobilized. By the end of May, 31,525 (North: 19,811; South: 11,714) ex-combatants had been counseled on reintegration opportunities in the Sudan. Of these, 21,189 registered with UNDP’s DDR program implementation partners for receipt of reintegration support.¹

The DDR program in South Sudan continued even after the successful secession in July 2011. Following the secession, the Republic of South Sudan DDR Commission was re-instituted by the interim National Constitution (July 2011). The commission expected to demobilize and disarm some 90,000 ex-combatants of which a total of 12,525 were demobilized by December 2011. By December 2011, some 10,926 demobilized combatants (87%) had registered with implementing partners for reintegration support training.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2010.

2005

Minimum Implementation

The DDR process in Sudan was especially challenging given that the accord did not specifically provide detailed information on combatants to be demobilized, disarmed and integrated into society. The accord, however, provided a phased approach by establishing an Interim DDR Program (IDDRP). The purpose of the establishment of the IDDRP was to identify and address groups that could be clearly identified up-front while continuing to move forward with the formulation and preparation of a full-scale multi-year DDR program.¹ Government of Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), SPLA, non-allied OGAs, and women and children associated with the fighting forces were eligible for the DDR process. The CPA established the National DDR Coordination Council and two sub-national level commissions the Northern’ Sudan DDR Commission (NDDRC) and the Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SDDRC), which were mandated to design, implement and manage the DDR process at the northern and southern sub-national levels respectively. These institutional structures were agreed to be established within 30 days of the signing of the CPA. The CPA also provides assembly locations for the SFA and the SPLA combatants for the DDR process.

As agreed, the Northern Sudan DDR Interim Authority was instituted and it established its regional offices. Similarly, the Southern Sudan DDR Interim Authority was instituted and had established its regional offices set up. To carry out the DDR program, surveys and registration of disabled ex-combatants and women associated with armed groups were being carried out and the removal of child soldiers as expected to begin in January 2006. The UNMIS and the UN DDR units provided various assistance ranging from expert advice to demobilization packages.²

In 2005, the SAF disclosed that about 43,000 members of OGAs were aligned to it and the SPLA claimed its overall strength was about 270,000.³ It was not clear how many of the disclosed members of the armed forces participated in the DDR process.

Information related to the integration of the demobilized combatants is not available.

1. “Sudan,” accessed February 3, 2012, UNDDR, http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=35.
2. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
3. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/821), December 21, 2005.

2006

Minimum Implementation

The National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Coordination Council (NDDRCC) was established on 18 February 2006. Minister of Presidency was chair and other members of the council were cabinet members as well as Chief of Staff of the SAF and SPLA, General Commissioner for DDR for the Northern States, General Commissioner for DDR for the Southern States and other dignitaries to be appointed by the Presidency. The NDDRCC has responsibility of policy formation. Similarly, on 19 February, the Northern Sudan Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration Commission (NDDRC) was established by a presidential decree. The NDDRC had the responsibility of designing, implementing and managing the DDR process at the northern states. The GoSS established the Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC) and appointed its chairperson and the deputy chairperson. It was reported that the GoSS also formally endorsed the interim DDR program in January 2006.¹

The SPLA in technical support of UNICEF had demobilized and reunited some 142 children in February 2010.² It is not clear how demobilized child combatants were integrated into the society.

Information related to the integration of the demobilized combatants is not available.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
2. Ibid.

2007

Minimum Implementation

Some momentum was gained after the establishment of the NDDRCC, NDDRC and SSDDRC. In Southern Sudan, a technical committee on disarmament and demobilization was established in January 2007. It was also reported that the SAF conducted unilateral disarmament of its aligned former OAG members and the United National Military Observers observed the disarmament procedure. A total of 957 OAG combatants were disarmed and given onetime payment. It did not involve the Northern and Southern Sudan DDR institutions.¹

Information related to the integration of the demobilized combatants is not available.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.

2008

Minimum Implementation

UNMIS continued to work with parties to the CPA for a plan to commence the multi-year DDR program in the Sudan. In this regard, the NDDRCC in September had agreed to conduct a pilot disarmament and demobilization program for 700-1000 combatants. There were 88 children associated with the SPLA who were demobilized in May 2008. The UNMIS in support from the UNICEF had commented reintegration activities for them. The UNICEF DDR staff with NSDDRC in the Blue Nile State had also started an interim program to monitor demobilized child combatants participation in the integration programs.¹

Information on reintegration of demobilized combatants is not available.

1. Ibid.

2009

Minimum Implementation

Important progress was made with regards to developing the target number of DDR. It was estimated that some 180,000 combatants would participate the DDR program starting 50,000 participants (25,000 each from the SAF and the SPLA) in the first phase. Approximately 6,000 women associated with armed forces or groups (WAAFGs) and 17,500 people with disabilities, as well as children associated with forces, were expected to be beneficiaries of the DDR program.¹ The cost of the reintegration of 182,000 combatants from both sides was estimated at $430 million. The Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan also agreed to contribute $250 directly for each participant.

The demobilization process started in February 2009 and by, the end of August 2009, a total of 12,428 combatants had been demobilized. The demobilized combatants received reintegration support in form of cash, non-food items, and coupons from the WFP for food rations for three months.² Also, in December of 2009, a total of 697 ex-combatants and members of special needs groups were demobilized. Those who participated in the DDR program also received counseling.³

Information on reintegration of demobilized combatants is not available.

1. “Disarmament, Demo and Reintegration- Fact Sheet,” UNMIS, 2010, accessed February 3, 2012, http://sudanddr.org/en/facts/Factsheet%20DDR%20CPA%20areas.pdf.
2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2009/545), October 21, 2009; “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2009.
3. Ibid.

2010

Minimum Implementation

According to the UNMIS, some 21,700 adult ex-combatants including women associated with armed forces or groups were demobilized in five different centers by mid-April 2010. It was also reported that over 13,000 participants received counseling on reintegration opportunities.¹ As of 1 December 2010, the Sudan disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme had demobilized 33,693 ex-combatants — 23,678 in the North and 10,015 in the South — including 6,258 women.² By the end of December 2010, total demobilized number stood at 37,124.³ The DDR program was said to have funding shortage.

Information on reintegration of demobilized combatants is not available.

1. “Disarmament, Demo, and Reintegration- Fact Sheet,” UNMIS, 2010, accessed February 3, 2012, http://sudanddr.org/en/facts/Factsheet%20DDR%20CPA%20areas.pdf, accessed 3 February 2012.
2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2010/681), December 31, 2010.
3. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2010.

2011

Intermediate Implementation

The DDR program, as of May 2011, demobilized 48,594 combatants 27,081 for SAF and 21,513 for SPLA). In Northern Sudan, a total of 36,069 DDR participants including 5,985 female and 3,356 disabled participants went through the demobilization process. In Southern Sudan, a total of 12,525 DDR participants, including 6,188 female and 617 disabled participants, had been demobilized. By the end of May, 31,525 (North: 19,811; South: 11,714) ex-combatants had been counseled on reintegration opportunities in the Sudan. Of these, 21,189 registered with UNDP’s DDR program implementation partners in order to receive reintegration support.¹

The DDR program in South Sudan continued even after the successful secession in July 2011. Following the secession, the Republic of South Sudan DDR Commission was re-instituted by the interim National Constitution (July 2011). The commission expected to demobilize and disarm some 90,000 ex-combatants of which a total of 12,525 were demobilized by December 2011. By December 2011, some 10,926 demobilized combatants (87%) registered with implementing partners for reintegration support training.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2010.

2005

Full Implementation

After the signing of CPA in January 2005, the Sudanese government and the International Red Cross signed a protocol on 14 February 2005 regarding the rules and principles governing the release and transfer of persons detained in relation to the armed conflict in southern Sudan. A Sudanese Minister also said that the SPLM-held 700 prisoners of war who would be freed in the third week of February (Source: Red Cross, Sudan Government Sign Protocol on Prisoner release, Agence France Presse, 14 February 2005). Throughout 2005, the SPLM released a number of Prisoners of War (PoWs). The ICRC reported on the basis of partial involvement in the process and interviews that PoWs had been well-treated and had returned voluntarily.¹ According to the U.S. State Department Human Rights Report, the SPLM/A released approximately 500 prisoners of war in 2005. The Sudanese government maintained that it did not have PoWs.²

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, May 2011.
2. “2005 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- Sudan,” U.S. State Department, 2006, accessed January 10, 2012, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61594.htm.

2006

Full Implementation

Provision related to the release of the PoWs was implemented in 2005.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

The 2005 CPA requires the removal and withdrawal of the paramilitary forces (Popular Defence Forces) from areas where they were previously located. This withdrawal or removal was intended to boost the capacity of civilian police. Prior to the CPA, the paramilitary organization worked as a police force without accountability to the community or independent oversight. According to the U.N. Secretary General’s Report, “in five locations in the south, approximately 17,000 former government police remain deployed as well as the emergent police force derived from the Sudan People’s Liberation Army.”¹ Available news archives, reports from the U.N. Secretary General and CPA implementation updates available from the UNMIS on the implementation of this CPA provision do not suggest that the removal or withdrawal of the paramilitary forces did not take place. This suggests that this provision of accord was implemented. Nevertheless, the withdrawal of the paramilitary forces depended on the capacity increase of the civilian police force, which did not improve significantly.

1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/57), January 31, 2005.

2006

Full Implementation

Removal and withdrawal of the paramilitary forces took place in 2005.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

No Implementation

The 60-Member National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC) was formed on 23 April 2005; and the commission began drafting a new interim constitution on 30 April. The draft interim constitution was adopted by the National Assembly and the SPLM National Liberation Council on 6 July 2005.¹ The constitution came into effect on 9 July 2005. The Human Rights provisions, including provision to establish the National Human Rights Commissions (NHRC), were incorporated in the interim constitution. Article 142 of the interim constitution contains provisions for the NHRC. The process for establishing the NHRC, however, was not initiated in 2005. Without the Human Rights Commission Act, the commission would not be established.

With respect to human rights improvements in Sudan, the 2005 CPA brought little change. As per the CPA requirement, the government lifted state of emergency throughout Sudan but Darfur and the east. Nevertheless, human rights violations such as arbitrary arrests and detentions, killings, looting, and rape took place on a regular basis.²

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
2. “World Report — 2006,” Human Rights Watch, 2006, accessed January 23, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2006.pdf.

2006

Minimum Implementation

Some progress was made in drafting NHRC Act. The draft act was submitted to the legislative department of the Ministry of Justice. Once the review was completed at the Ministry of Justice, the act would be submitted for the approval of the Council of Ministers.¹ Nevertheless, the NHRC Act did not move forward. The NHRC was not established in 2006.

According to the Human Rights Watch, the human rights situation remained abysmal due to incidents of arbitrary arrests and detention, killings, looting and rape. Nevertheless, some progress was said made by the Government of Southern Sudan in terms of setting up the Human Rights Commission for the South.²

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
2. “World Report — 2007,” Human Rights Watch, 2007, accessed January 23, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k7/wr2007master.pdf.

2007

Minimum Implementation

The Government of National Unity in July 2007 submitted the NHRC Bill to the National Assembly to be discussed at the Assembly’s Human Rights Committee in October.¹ Nevertheless, no significant progress was made in terms of establishing the NHRC as well as the Human Rights Commission for the South. Human Rights Watch suggested in its report that the security forces killed and injured seven people involved in protests against two dam projects in northern Sudan. Also, arbitrary arrests and detention of journalists, activists as well as restrictions on freedom of expression persisted.²

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
2. “World Report — 2008,” Human Rights Watch, 2008, accessed January 23, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k8/pdfs/wr2k8_web.pdf.

2008

Minimum Implementation

Though already behind the schedule, the Human Rights Committee of the National Assembly finalized the draft law of NHRC on 29 December 2008. The draft law was said in line with the rights mentioned in the interim constitution. Also, the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly was considering the southern Sudan Human Rights Commission Bill.¹ Nevertheless, the NHCR and the Southern Sudan Human Rights Commission were not established in 2008. The human rights situation remained a serious concern. In July of 2008, the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor requested an arrest warrant for President al-Bashir on 10 counts of war crimes.²

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
2. “World Report — 2009,” Human Rights Watch, 2009, accessed January 23, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/en/node/79212.

2009

Minimum Implementation

The human rights situation remained as grave as it was in 2008. South Sudan witnessed ethnic conflicts causing atrocities of civilian targeting and rapes. The Human security situation was worse.¹ Despite grave situations related to human security, progress was made in terms of approving international conventions related to human rights. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol was ratified on 24 April 2009. The National Assembly endorsed the Child Act on 29 December 2009, which brought Sudan closer into line with the Convention on the Rights of the Child.²

With respect to progress related to the NHRC, the National Assembly adopted the NHRC bill on 21 April 2009. The act provides that the president would appoint commissioners following consultation with the presidency. After the bill was adopted, the civil society groups in October submitted a list of 15 potential candidates to the presidency. Nevertheless, the commissioners of the NHCR were not appointed in 2009.³ With respect to the Human Rights Commission in southern Sudan, the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly passed the legislation on 3 February 2009. The commission started its outreach program in October 2009 in order to monitor and report on the human rights situation in southern Sudan. Furthermore, the Southern Sudan Human Rights Commission had been expanded into eight of the ten southern states.⁴

1. “World Report 2011- Sudan,” Human Rights Watch, 2011, accessed January 30, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/en/world-report-2011/sudan.
2. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2009.
3. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2009.
4. Ibid.

2010

Minimum Implementation

According to the U.S. State Department human rights report, there were numerous reports that the government and its agents committed arbitrary and unlawful killings. The SPLA soldiers also committed extrajudicial killings. There were several reports of disappearances, arbitrary detentions and arrests.¹ The commissioners for the NHRC were not appointed in 2010.

1. “2010 Human Rights Report: Sudan,” U.S. State Department, 2011, accessed January 23, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/af/154371.htm.

2011

Minimum Implementation

The Human Rights situation did not improve. The armed group supported by Khartoum started rebellions in South Sudan against the GoSS. There was no progress in establishing a National Human Rights Commission. Also, with the secession of southern Sudan as an independent state after the referendum, the provision of the CPA referencing human rights became obsolete.

After much delay, Sudanese President al-Bashir issued a decree on 11 January 2012 to form a NHRC. He appointed 13 members in addition to Amal Hassan Babiker and Joseph Khalil Suleiman, as president and vice-President of the commission, respectively.¹

1. “President Bashir appoints members of Sudan’s human rights commission,” Sudan Tribune, January 12, 2012.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

The 2005 CPA provides that the parties were committed to render and facilitate humanitarian assistance to war affected persons including refugees and their rights to return. The parties were also committed to assisting returning refugees to start a normal, stable and safe life in their respective communities. At the time of the signing of CPA in 2005, the UNHCR estimated some 693,632 Sudanese sought asylum status in different part of the world.¹ The UNMIS estimate was over 500,000 refugees in neighboring countries.²

Over half a million former refugees were expected to return to southern Sudan.³ According to the U.N. Secretary General’s report, there had been over 500,000 spontaneous returns in the Sudan.⁴

The UNHCR had helped the first group of up to 150 southern Sudanese refugees return home from Kenya, which was said the beginning of the home-going of about 560,000 refugees from southern Sudan living in seven neighboring countries.⁵ The UNHCR estimated that some 70,000 to 80,000 South Sudanese refugees went home on their own from exile abroad in 2005.⁶

1. “2005 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook-Sudan,” UNHCR, 2007, October 26, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/4641bec40.html, accessed.
2. “Sudan IDP & Refugee Returns, Reintegration Operations Statistical Overview,” accessed October 26, 2011, http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/FEED5CE5022A706CC125753E003F3046/$file/Returns_RRR-Jan09.pdf.
3. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/57), January 31, 2005.
4. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/821), December 21, 2005.
5. “UN to Help First Group of Southern Sudan Refugees Return Home,” Xinhua General News Service, December 13, 2005.
6. “Sudan; Agreement Signed for Refugee Return from Kenya,” Africa News, January 13, 2006.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

The humanitarian situation in southern Sudan remained stable and the increased assistance of the international community with the reconstruction or repair of some 370 kilometers of road supported the return of over 10,000 refugees to southern Sudan.¹

In January 2006, Sudan and Kenya, together with the UNHCR, signed a tripartite agreement in helping South Sudanese refugees return home from Kenya. This agreement was one of seven that the UNHCR had expected to sign with neighboring countries which would clear return of some 70,000 refugees to south Sudan in the first half of 2006.² The tripartite agreement with Kenya was supposed to facilitate the return of some 10,000 Sudanese refugees from Kenya

There were several setbacks in refugee repatriation. The deteriorating security situation forced the UNHCR to reduce its operation in Darfur region.³ Similarly, increasing Lord’s Resistance Army activities in southern Sudan also hampered the return of refugees.⁴ As of early September, only 12,000 refugees went back to southern Sudan with UNHCR assistance due to lack of funds for repatriation.⁵ The cumulative number of refugees returning in 2006 was 25,811.⁶

1. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/728), September 12, 2006.
2. “Sudan; Agreement Signed for Refugee Return from Kenya,” Africa News, January 13, 2006.
3. “UN Slashes Operations for Refugees in Sudan’s Darfur,” Xinhua General News Service, March 10, 2006.
4. “Insecurity Hampering Return of South Sudan Refugees,” Agence France Presse, March 18, 2006.
5. “Sudan; Lack of Funds Threatens Refugee Repatriation – UNHCR,” Africa News, September 19, 2006.
6. “Sudan IDP & Refugee Returns, Reintegration Operations Statistical Overview,” accessed October 26, 2011, http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/FEED5CE5022A706CC125753E003F3046/$file/Returns_RRR-Jan09.pdf.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

By mid-April 2007, it was reported that some 25,000 refugees returned home from five neighboring countries.¹ To help facilitate repatriation of refugees, the UNHCR opened two new corridors from Ethiopia to Southern Sudan. It was estimated that, as of February 2007, there were some 328,000 refugees from Sudan in Uganda, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Egypt.² The UNHCR was quoted saying that approximately 50,000 refugees had returned from Ethiopia and Central African Republic voluntarily.³ After the initiation of the refugee repatriation programs in December 2005, the UN-backed refugee return to southern Sudan hit the 157,000 person mark.⁴ The cumulative result of the organized return of refugees for 2007 was 50,932.⁵ More than 40% of the estimated 418,000 refugees in neighboring countries had returned home voluntarily by the end of 2007.⁶

Funding for humanitarian assistance, as well as a fragile security situation, hindered repatriation programs.

1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/213), April 17, 2007.
2. “Sudan; Nearly 9,000 More People Have Returned to Southern Region This Year – UN Mission,” Africa News, March 27, 2007.
3. “50,000 refugees returns to South Sudan,” Suna News Agency, April 12, 2007.
4. “UN-backed Refugee Return to Southern Sudan Hits 157,000,” Xinhua General News Service, August 17, 2007.
5. “Sudan IDP & Refugee Returns, Reintegration Operations Statistical Overview,” accessed October 26, 2011, http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/FEED5CE5022A706CC125753E003F3046/$file/Returns_RRR-Jan09.pdf.
6. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2008/64), January 31, 2008.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

The monsoon caused hazardous road conditions and brought the repartition of refugees to a complete halt. Nevertheless, the UNHCR reported in October that a total of 60,665 refugees returned to Sudan in 2008. The estimated cumulative returnees were 62,185 for 2008.¹ By December 2008, some 290,000 refugees have returned to Sudan since the signing of the 2005 CPA and the UNHCR was said assisted half of them return home.²

Funding for humanitarian assistance as well as the fragile security situation hindered the repatriation programs.

1. “Sudan IDP & Refugee Returns,” Reintegration Operations Statistical Overview, accessed October 26, 2011, http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/FEED5CE5022A706CC125753E003F3046/$file/Returns_RRR-Jan09.pdf.
2. “Commissioner on Sudan-Uganda Border Urges Refugees to Return Home,” Sudan Tribune, December 25, 2008.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

The security situation and funding remained the main challenge for the repartition of refugees in Sudan in 2009. In his October 2009 report to the U.N. Security Council, the Secretary General reported that the UNHCR and its assisted programs helped repatriate a total of 171,154 refugees, of whom fewer than 32,000 were repatriated since the beginning of 2009.¹

1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2009/545), October 21, 2009.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

According to a news report, some 330,000 refugees returned from exile, the majority of them with the help of UNHCR.¹ It was also reported that the government of southern Sudan was planning to repatriate 1.5 million southern who fled to the north during the long civil war.² Exact figure of returnees from the north, however, is not available.

1. “Sudan; Thousands Heading Back Ahead of Independence Vote — UN,” Africa News, December 21, 2010.
2. “Statement by Refugees International on the Government of Southern Sudan’s Mass Repatriation Plans,” Targeted News Service, August 27, 2010.

2011

Intermediate Implementation

As South Sudan decided to became an independent state in a referendum, relief agencies had expected that some 800,000 northerners would return to the South Sudan, of which 200,000 had already returned by early February.¹ Once South Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 2011, the UNHCR, in its press release, stated that approximately 350,000 former refugees had returned to South Sudan over the past six years, and that the thousands of southerners were joining them from elsewhere in Sudan.² This suggests that not all refugees returned to Sudan.

In addition, the refugee provisions of the CPA became obsolete as southern Sudan became the independent state of South Sudan.

1. “800,000 to Return to South Sudan from North: UNHCR,” Agence France Presse, February 11, 2011.
2. “UNHCR welcomes Republic of South Sudan,” Kuwait News Agency (KUNA), July 10, 2011.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

The 2005 CPA provides that the parties were committed to humanitarian assistance to war-affected persons including IDPs and their rights to return. The parties were also committed to assisting returnees with starting normal, stable and safe lives in their respective communities. At the time of the signing of CPA in 2005, the United Nations Missions in Sudan estimated there were over four million conflict-caused internally displaced persons in Sudan.¹ The International Displacement Monitoring Center estimated 5,355,000 IDPs in Sudan in 2005.²

By the end of the year, there had been over 500,000 spontaneous returns of IDPs and refugees in Sudan.³ The IDMC statistics suggest IDPs were not resettled back to their communities as the estimated IDPs did not change for 2006. The main concern remained the security situation of the communities to which the IDPs were returning. In this regard, the UNHCR would prepare communities to receive IDPs displaced within Sudan as well as refugees returning from neighboring countries. The UNHCR had built or rebuilt schools, hospitals, vocational training centers and water points not only for IDPs but to help entire communities.⁴

1. “Sudan IDP & Refugee Returns,” Reintegration Operations Statistical Overview, accessed October 26, 2011, http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/FEED5CE5022A706CC125753E003F3046/$file/Returns_RRR-Jan09.pdf.
2. “Internal displacement caused by conflict and violence,” IDMC, 2011, http://www.internal-displacement.org/IDMC_IDP-figures_2001-2010.pdf, accessed January 24, 2012.
3. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/821), December 21, 2005.
4. “Sudan; First UN-Organized Repatriation of Southern Sudan’s Refugees Gets Under Way,” Africa News, December 19, 2005.

The International Displacement Monitoring Center estimated there were 5,355,000 IDPs in Sudan in 2006.¹ This suggests no significant resettlement of IDPs took place in 2006. The UNMIS statistics, however, indicates that 7,432 IDPs were assisted with returning back to their communities.² Ongoing conflicts as well as a lack of funding for programs posed a direct threat to the return of IDPs.³

1. “Internal displacement caused by conflict and violence.”
2. “Sudan IDP & Refugee Returns, Reintegration.”
3. “Sudan; UN Repatriation Scheme Still Faces Shortfall,” Africa News, September 22, 2006.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

As of August 2007, some 85,000 IDPs and refugees returned back to their communities with assistance from the UN as part of the joint plan agreed to by the national and southern governments and the United Nations.¹ An estimated 45,355 IDPs returned home in 2007.² The IDMC, however, suggests that the estimated number of IDPs actually increased in 2007 to 5,800,000.³ This, however, does not suggest that efforts were not made with regards to returning IDPs. Between January 23 and early February of 2007, some 747 IDPs returned home in eight convoys. Those returnees were part of an estimated 15,000 IDPs who UNHCR helped to return under an agreement signed the previous year by the world body, Sudan’s Government of National Unity and the Government of South Sudan.⁴ Nevertheless, funding for humanitarian assistance, as well as a fragile security situation, hindered the return of IDPs to their communities. It was estimated that up to 160,000 people were displaced to Darfur since the beginning of 2007 alone.⁵

1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/500), August 20, 2007.
2. “Sudan IDP & Refugee Returns,” Reintegration Operations Statistical Overview, accessed October 26, 2011, http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/FEED5CE5022A706CC125753E003F3046/$file/Returns_RRR-Jan09.pdf.
3. “Internal displacement caused by conflict and violence,” IDMC, 2011, accessed January 24, 2012, http://www.internal-displacement.org/IDMC_IDP-figures_2001-2010.pdf.
4. “Sudan; UN-Aided Return of Displaced Persons to Blue Nile State Gathers Pace,” Africa News, February 13, 2007.
5. “Sudan; Over 160,000 Have Been Displaced since January,” Africa News, October 9, 2007.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

As of October 2008, the UNHCR assisted 28,151 IDPs with returning home, which brought the total number returned to 80,938.¹ This figure includes only those who returned to southern Sudan. Resettlement in Darfur, where a civil war was ongoing for the fifth consecutive year and Abyei, where clash took place in May 2008 did not take place. According to the report of the U.N. Secretary General, of the approximately 50,000 individuals displaced, between 12,000 and 16,000 returned voluntarily to Abyei.² According to a news report that quoted UNHCR, some two million southern Sudanese who were internally displaced had returned to their homes since the signing of the peace agreement.³ The IDMC reported that the number of IDPs for Sudan declined to 4,900,000 IDPs.⁴ This suggests that about one million IDPs returned to their community in 2008.

1. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2008/662), October 20, 2008.
2. Ibid.
3. “Commissioner on Sudan-Uganda Border Urges Refugees to Return Home,” Sudan Tribune, December 25, 2008.
4. “Internal displacement caused by conflict and violence.”

2009

Intermediate Implementation

The U.N. Secretary General’s report suggested that the organized return of IDPs reached 8,687 as of July and over 90,000 when the peace process started in 2005. This figure does not include the number of spontaneous returns–over 120,000 returned spontaneously from northern Sudan to southern Sudan.¹ By October of that year, approximately 9,100 IDPs returned to southern Sudan under the joint plans initiated by the UNHCR. An estimated 1.9 million IDPs had returned spontaneously to their place of origin since 2005.² Violence was one of the factors that contributed to the delay in the return of IDPs. LRA violence displaced 54,000 people within Southern Sudan.³ Continued violence in Darfur and Abyei slowed the return of IDPs. Furthermore, the land rights issue contributed to a delay in the return of IDPs as land was cultivated by others in their absence.⁴

1. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2009/357), July 14, 2009.
2. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2009/545), October 21, 2009.
3. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2009/357), July 14, 2009.
4. “Sudan; Land Rights Hinder Darfur IDP Returns,” Africa News, November 25, 2009.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

Most of the focus on issues related to IDPs shifted upon the return of southerners who went to the north to escape the conflict. The government of Southern Sudan, in collaboration with the Repatriation Taskforce formed by South Sudan Referendum Commission, started repatriating Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from Khartoum to South Sudan by air, beginning in November 2010.21¹ As a matter of fact, Abyei received the first group of 1,200 IDPs returning from north.² Over 28,000 IDPs had returned from northern to southern Sudan by December 15, 2010.³ According to U.N. Secretary General’s report, the Government of Southern Sudan had estimated as many as 150,000 people would have returned from northern Sudan by the end of March 2011, just before the referendum.⁴

1. “Southern Sudan Begins Repatriation of IDPs from North Ahead of Referendum,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, November 26, 2010.
2. “Sudan; Abyei Receives First Batch of IDPs Returning From North Sudan,” Sudan Africa News, November 22, 2010.
3. “Over 28,000 IDPs Return from North to Southern Sudan Ahead of Referendum,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, December 16, 2010.
4. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2010/681), December 31, 2010.

2011

Intermediate Implementation

As South Sudan decided to became an independent state in a referendum, relief agencies had expected that some 800,000 northerners would return to the South Sudan, of which 200,000 had already returned by early February.¹ Once South Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 2011, the 2005 CPA provision on IDPs became obsolete.

1. “800,000 to Return to South Sudan from North: UNHCR,” Agence France Presse, February 11, 2011.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

The 2005 CPA provided that the people of South Sudan would have the right to self-determination and, in this regard, the people of south Sudan would have the option to confirm the unity or to vote for secession. South Sudan’s right to self-determination was incorporated in the interim constitution (Article 219). Similarly, the CPA gave the residents of Abyei the option to cast a separate ballot and to make a choice between retaining its special administrative status in the north or to be part of Bahr el Ghazal. This provision was also incorporated in the interim constitution (Article 183.3). The constitution came into effect on 9 July 2005.¹

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

As provided for in 2005 CPA, the National Assembly adopted the Southern Sudan Referendum Bill in December 2009. The National Assembly adopted the Abyei Referendum Bill 2009.¹

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2010.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

The members of the referendum commission were appointed in June 2010. The referendum was scheduled for 9 to 15 January 2011.¹

1. Ibid.

2011

Full Implementation

The referendum for southern Sudan took place from 9 to 15 January 2011. The referendum was conducted in the Sudan and in eight out-of-country-voting (OCV) countries (with the exception of an OCV centre in Brisbane where the polling continued until 18 January).¹ On 7 February 2011, the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission announced the final results for the Referendum. 1.17% of valid votes were cast in favor of unity, 98.83% of valid votes were cast in favor of secession with a 97.58% voter turnout (3,851,994 registered voters).² This satisfies that the provision related to self-determination for southern Sudan was implemented. Nevertheless, the Abyei referendum did not take place as after the north and south could not agree on who was eligible to vote.³ The southern Sudan called for the referendum for Abyei and insisted that the Abyei belonged to the south Sudan.⁴

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, January 2011.
2. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2011.
3. “Southern Sudan Official: Abyei Belongs with Us,” Associated Press Online, April 29, 2011.
4. “Sudan; South Calls for Abyei Referendum,” Africa News, May 26, 2011.

2005

Minimum Implementation

The 2005 CPA provided for the equal rights of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights. This provision of CPA was incorporated in the interim constitution’s Article 15.2. As such, the state was said to promote and empower women in public life. The interim constitution came into effect on 9 July 2005.¹ The constitution also allowed women as well as men to pass on Sudanese nationality to their children (Article 7). Amnesty International had welcomed the emphasis on women’s and children’s rights in Sudan’s interim constitution.² Nevertheless, only two out of 22 ministerial portfolios were given to women in interim transitional government in southern Sudan.³ The Legislative Council of Southern Kordofan was formed on 12 December 2005 and convened on 22 December 2005 with 54 members (30 NCP and 24 SPLM), seven of whom were women.⁴ Women representation in the power-sharing national assembly and the unity government is not known.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
2. “Sudan’s National Assembly Passes Constitution Paving Way for Former Rebel Leader to Be Vice President,” AP Worldstream, July 6, 2005.
3. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA.”
4. Ibid.

2006

Minimum Implementation

The Secretary General of the U.N., in his report, suggested that some progress had been made after the CPA in 2005, but indicated challenges remained regarding the political and economic empowerment of women.¹

1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/728), September 12, 2006).

2007

Minimum Implementation

It was reported that the UNMIS partnered with the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Child Affairs to formulate a work plan for the implementation of the national policy for women’s empowerment. The UNMIS gender unit also continuously provided technical support and capacity building, focusing on preventing gender-based violence and the recognition of the role of women in peace-building.¹

1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/500), August 20, 2007.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

Some significant progress was made in terms of empowering women in political and civil life. Sudan’s president, in his address to the first Sudanese Women parliamentarian’s Forum organized by the National Organization of Sudanese Women Parliamentarians, stressed that women would be given 25 percent representation in the next parliamentary, national, and state elections.¹ The National Assembly passed the National Election Act of 2008 on 7 July 2008, which gave 25 percent of the seats to a separate women’s party list.²

1. “Sudan; President Affirms Special Status for Women in Allotting Posts,” Africa News, March 21, 2008.
2. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

The UNMIS coordination mechanism was established to coordinate activities in the area of women’s participation in elections.¹

1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2009/545), October 21, 2009.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

In the April elections for the National Assembly, the NCP won 82 seats for women, the SPLM won 26 seats, the Popular Congress Party (PCP) won three seats, and the Federal UMMA Party obtained one Women’s List seat. Also, in elections for the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, the SPLM won 42 women’s seats and the SPLM-DC won one seat.¹

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, May 2010.

2011

Full Implementation

With elections of women representatives in the legislatures, provision related to equal political rights was implemented.

2005

Minimum Implementation

Under the guiding principles and directives of the state, the interim constitution, which became effective on 9 July 2005, had provisions for the welfare of children under Article 14. The constitution dictated that education through grade eight be made compulsory, prohibited exploitation of children, and established the legal age of marriages, 10 for girls and 15 for boys. Nevertheless, the government’s commitment to children’s rights and welfare was uneven and there were significant inequality in access to the health service for children living in different region of the country. The U.S. State Department Human Rights Report suggested that the government-allied militias and rebel forces accepted children into their military camps.¹ Under the DDR program, the UNMIS initiated disarmament of some 17,000 children.²

1. “2005 County Reports on Human Rights Practices-Sudan,” U.S. State Department, 2006, accessed January 26, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61594.htm.
2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/821), December 21, 2005.

2006

Minimum Implementation

The U.S. State Department Human Rights Report suggested that there were some challenges to the protection of children’s rights–despite commitment from the government regarding children’s rights and welfare.3¹ Similarly, reports from the United Nations secretary general suggested that children remained vulnerable to recruitment into armed groups.²

1. “2006 County Reports on Human Rights Practices-Sudan,” U.S. State Department, 2007, accessed January 26, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78759.htm.
2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/160), March 14, 2006.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

The U.S. State Department Human Rights Report suggested that there were some challenges to the protection of children’s rights–despite commitment from the government regarding children’s rights and welfare.¹ Nevertheless, some progress was made in terms of promoting children’s rights. In this regard, the Child Bill of 2006, which prohibits the recruitment of children, passed its first reading in the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly in June 2007. Similarly, significant progress was made in finalizing the draft child rights bill which would replace the Child Act of 2004.²

1. “2007 County Reports on Human Rights Practices- Sudan,” U.S. State Department, 2008, accessed January 26, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100506.htm.
2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/520), August 29, 2007.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

The U.S. State Department Human Rights Report suggested that there were some challenges to the protection of children’s rights–despite commitment from the government regarding children’s rights and welfare.¹ The Child Act was pending in the National Assembly in 2008.² Nevertheless, the demobilized and disarmed children were integrated and, in this effort, UNMIS supported UNICEF. Also, on 17 December 2008, the Justice Minister, Abd-al-Basit Sabdarat, issued a decree establishing specialized child attorney offices in a number of Sudan states.³

1. “2008 County Reports on Human Rights Practices- Sudan,” U.S. State Department, 2009, accessed January 26, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119026.htm.
2. “UN Human Rights Expert Concludes Visit to Sudan,” States News Service, August 6, 2007.
3. “Child attorney offices established in Sudan,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, December 20, 2008.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

The U.S. State Department Human Rights Report suggested that there were some challenges to the protection of children’s rights–despite commitment from the government regarding children’s rights and welfare.¹ However, on 29 December 2009, the National Assembly endorsed the Child Act, bringing Sudanese legislation closer into line the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). The new Child Act defines a child as a person less than 18 years of age. The Act increases the age of criminal responsibility from 7 years to 12 years of age, and increases in the maximum period of imprisonment for rape to 20 years. The Act also criminalized the corporal punishment of children in schools.²

1. “2009 County Reports on Human Rights Practices- Sudan,” U.S. State Department, 2010, accessed January 26, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135978.htm.
2. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2009.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

The U.S. State Department Human Rights Report suggested that there were some challenges to the protection of children’s rights–despite commitment from the government regarding children’s rights and welfare.¹ The UNMIS said that it had continuously tried to secure the release of children in SPLA armed forces.²

1. “2009 County Reports on Human Rights Practices- Sudan,” U.S. State Department, 2010, accessed January 26, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/af/154371.htm.
2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2010/681), December 31, 2010.

2011

Intermediate Implementation

The situation remained stable insofar as children’s rights are concerned. Following independence, a mission of the UN in South Sudan proposed to support “the government in implementing the SPLA action plan to end the recruitment and use of children” as well as to “encourage the government to ratify into law and implement a set of key international human rights treaties and conventions, including those related to women and children.”¹

1. “Special report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2011/314), May 17, 2011.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

Under the guiding principles and directives of the state, the CPA provision related to education was incorporated in the Interim Constitution (Article 13), which was enacted in July 2005. As such, the state would promote education at all levels across the Sudan and would ensure free and compulsory education programs. Prior to incorporating the free primary education in the Interim Constitution, the National Education Plan was initiated which aimed to raise the literacy rate, especially among women, and to integrate other programmes into adult education syllabus (i.e. income-generating activities, health and agricultural education, etc.).¹ Similarly, the multi-donor trust fund had provided support in the areas of government capacity-building, community development, rule of law, health, education, water and sanitation, and infrastructure development (including transport). These programs were developed in cooperation with authorities at the national and local levels.²

1. “Sudan Govt Cares for Women’s Healthcare and Education,” Malaysia General News, May 8, 2005.
2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2011/821), December 21, 2005.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

The government reiterated its commitment to education for all and the ministry allocated a special administration for technical education. The ministry also began an ambitious program designed to qualify 100,000 basic level school teachers.¹ The government of South Sudan also offered free and compulsory primary education to all children of school-going age.² The government of South Sudan also signed an education sector accord with Kenya to help strengthen the education sector in southern Sudan.³ Detailed information related to competition and fairness in education is not available.

1. “Sudan Renews Commitment to Education for All,” Suna News Agency, April 25, 2006.
2. “South Sudan Government to Offer ‘Free, Compulsory’ Primary Education,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, August 8, 2006.
3. “Kenya, Southern Sudan Sign Education Sector Accord,” BBC Monitoring Africa, August 9, 2006.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

Detailed information related to competition and fairness in education is not available. Nevertheless, southern Sudan had planned to provide education to SPLA soldiers and other members of the armed force (about 52,000 soldiers, but the number of SPLM/A soldiers is much higher) to improve the levels of education.¹ International aid agencies, including USAID, were involved in promoting education in southern Sudan. USAID promoted gender equality in education in Southern Sudan.²

1. “Southern Sudan Plans to Step up Education for Soldiers,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, March 6, 2007.
2. “USAID Promotes Gender Equity in Education in Southern Sudan,” Christian Newswire, October 24, 2007.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

Detailed information related to competition and fairness in education is not available. In Southern Sudan, however, the education minister was quoted for encouraging teaching in the mother tongue.¹ But, the Ministry of Education dismissed disabled teachers.² Nevertheless, the number of girls enrolled in schools increased from 400 in 2005 to over 40,000 in 2008.³

1. “Southern Sudan Education Minister Encourages Teaching of Mother Tongue,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, April 3, 2008.
2. “South Sudan Ministry of Education dismisses disabled teachers,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, April 7, 2008.
3. “Education Officials in Southern Sudan State Say More Girls Enrolling in Schools,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, April 18, 2008.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

Detailed information related to competition and fairness in education is not available. Nevertheless, the South Sudan government and UNICEF were campaigning to get millions more children into schools, despite a resources shortfall for those already in schools.¹ The South Sudan Ministry of Education also launched the South Sudan Institute of Education in Rumbek, Lakes State, which was first of its kind established to train educational cadres.² Under the multi-donor trust funds (MTDF), 100 schools were proposed to be rehabilitated but only 34 schools were under construction for three years, suggesting “erratic and insignificant achievements,” according to the educational panel that presented to the Security and Public Order Committee chairman on 26 August 2008. A standing panel, the Public Accounts Committee, was tasked by the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly to investigate possible misuse of Ministry of Education funds. Funds were allegedly misused by companies contracted by the Ministry of Education to build schools in addition to misuse of scholarship funds.³

1. “Sudan; South Sudan Charts Own Course in Education,” Africa News, January 30, 2009.
2. “South Sudan’s Institute of Education launched in Rumbek,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, June 27, 2009.
3. “South Sudan to probe alleged misuse of education funds,” Sudan Tribune, August 27, 2009.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

The Education Ministry of the Government of South Sudan had appealed for more support from donors to enhance the quality of education in the south.¹ In May 2010, it was reported that over 3 million students obtained a free primary education in South Sudan.² In order to enhance the quality of education, the government urged education institutions to embrace information communication technologies.³ Despite all these proposed reforms, corruption remained the main problem. Also, cultural attitudes and beliefs had curtailed girl’s enrollment in schools.⁴

1. “South Sudan appeals for more donor support to ensure quality education,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, January 27, 2010.
2. “Over 3 million people get free primary education in South Sudan,” Sudan Tribune, May 20, 2010.
3. “South Sudan urges education institutions embrace ICT,” Sudan Tribune, May 29, 2010.
4. “South Sudan: Cultural attitudes, beliefs hindering girls’ education,” Sudan Tribune, June 2, 2010.

2011

Intermediate Implementation

The government of South Sudan continuously tried to improve education sector. Nevertheless, the CPA became obsolete with the secession of South Sudan as an independent state.

2005

Full Implementation

The language provision of the 2005 CPA was incorporated in the Interim Constitution. The constitution came into effect on 9 July 2005.[fn]”The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.[/efn_note] As such, there was no discrimination against the use of any language at any levels of government. Nevertheless, it was only on 2 October 2005 that the Sudan’s National Unity Government that included the NCP, SPLM and other parties approved English as an official language, together with Arabic.¹

1. “English Official Language of Sudan Unity Government,” Agence France Presse, October 2, 2005.

2006

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2007

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2008

Full Implementation

The constitutional provisions as well as the adoption of English as the official language of National Unity government confirms the implementation of the CPA provision related to language. However, it was only in June 2008 that the National Assembly passed the National Council for Developing and Promoting the National Languages Bill.¹

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.

2009

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2010

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2011

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year. With the secession of southern Sudan as an independent state on 9 July 2011, provisions related to language became obsolete.

2005

Minimum Implementation

In Article 13(4), Sudan’s Interim Constitution recognized the cultural diversity of the country in accordance with the 2005 CPA provision. Similarly, the 2005 CPA had provisions to establish a special commission to ensure that the rights of non-Muslims were protected in the capital. No further developments reported.

2006

Full Implementation

One of the challenges facing the Sudan on issues related to cultural tradition was the protection of non-Muslim minorities in the capital city. They had formerly been subject to the Sharia law tradition, which was the cultural tradition of the dominant Arabs in the northern Sudan. In August of 2006, the Presidency issued a decree for the establishment of the Commission on the Protection of the Rights of Non-Muslims in the National Capital.[fn]”The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2009. [/efn_note]

2007

Full Implementation

The members of the Commission on the Protection of the Rights of Non-Muslims in the National Capital were appointed on 15 February 2007. The commission contained five Christians and five Muslims, ten community leaders, two traditional and customs experts, and one representative each from the Khartoum State, the Judiciary, the Ministry of Justice, the Police and National Security.¹

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2009.

2008

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2009

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2010

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2011

Full Implementation

The cultural protection provision of the CPA was implemented. Nevertheless, with the secession of southern Sudan on 9 July 2011, the provision became obsolete.

2005

Minimum Implementation

The Joint Media Committee was established in April 2005 for the purpose of promoting an understanding of the peace processes. The committee contained representatives from both parties to the CPA. The committee did not meet regularly, and the UNMIS effort to obtain the support of the committee for a public awareness proved unsuccessful.¹ Nevertheless, the agreement between the Government of Sudan and the UNMIS on 28 December of 2005 gave the UNMIS the “right to establish, install and operate United Nations radio stations under its exclusive control to disseminate to the public in Sudan information relating to its mandate.”² Programs broadcasted under the UNMIS radio stations were said to be free from any kind of censorship.

No further information is available regarding the effectiveness of the Joint Media Committee in promoting an understanding of the peace processes in Sudan. It is however worth mentioning that the freedom of press situation did not improve as suggested by the Human Rights Watch annual reports.³

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006; “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2011/821), December 21, 2005.
2. “Agreement Between the Government of Sudan and the United Nations Concerning the Status of the United Nations Mission in Sudan,” UNMIS, accessed January 30, 2012, unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Documents/General/sofa.pdf.
3. “World Report (2005-2011),” Human Rights Watch, accessed January 30, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/node/79288.

2006

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Minimum Implementation

The 2005 CPA contained provisions for the establishment of a special commission to ensure that the rights of non-Muslims were protected in the capital. On 18 October 2005, a joint ad-hoc committee, composed of ten members representing the NCP and the SPLM, was formed to discuss issues related to administering the capital during the interim period. The committee was unable to agree on the implementation of the CPA provision guaranteeing rights of non-Muslims in the capital.¹ The interim constitution contained provisions for the specialized commission to protect the non-Muslims in the nation’s capital.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.

2006

Minimum Implementation

In August of 2006, the Presidency issued a decree for the establishment of the Commission on the Protection of the Rights of Non-Muslims in the National Capital. The commission’s mandate and function, among other things, was to protect the rights of non-Muslims in “accordance with the human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Interim National Constitution as well as the principles stated in the CPA guiding judges and law enforcement agencies ‘in dispensing justice and enforcing lawÕ in Khartoum.”¹ The commission received a mandate to ensure that non-Muslims were not affected by the application of the Sharia law in the National Capital. The members of the commission were not appointed in 2007.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2009.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

By a presidential decree on 15 February 2007, the members of the commission were appointed. The commission contained five Christians and five Muslims, ten community leaders, two traditional and customs experts, and one representative each from Khartoum State, the Judiciary, the Ministry of Justice, the Police and National Security.¹ With the establishment of the commission, several important changes took place. The head of the commission revealed that a number of courts for non-Muslims were formed in the capital. It was also reported that the Judiciary released 858 non-Muslim female prison inmates accompanied by 147 children.²

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2009.
2. “Sudan: Authorities Free Hundreds of Non-Muslim Female Prisoners,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, August 3, 2007.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

Under the sponsorship of the Interior Minister, the Commission for the Rights of Non-Muslim organized a workshop and discussed the rights of non-Muslims in relation to law texts and the reality of their practice.¹ Criticizing the composition of the non-Muslim commission which contained only five Christians, the SPLM called for a special court for non-Muslims.²

1. “Sudan: Workshop Discusses Rights of non-Muslims,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, August 4, 2008.
2. “Sudan’s SPLM Calls for Special Courts for Non-Muslims,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, August 24, 2008.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

Little information is available on the non-Muslim Commission. Nevertheless, it was reported that the Commission planned to propose to the Presidency the establishment of special ministry for dealing with issues of national unity and a center for unity and integration following the Malaysian experiment in that respect.¹

1. “Sudan: Non-Muslim Commission Proposes Formation of Unity, Integration Ministry,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, May 30, 2009.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

The Non-Muslim Commission briefed the first vice-President and the president of the GoSS on the commission’s activities and operations. The commission’s future plan included programs related to peaceful co-existence between citizens of various religions and culture in the capital Khartoum.¹ In September, the non-Muslim Commission had proposed amendments to the rights of non-Muslims, which was criticized by Sudan’s Muslim scholars.² But, the Non-Muslim Commission said that the proposed law would not affect the constitution.³ No further information available on whether the proposed law was approved by the National Assembly.

1. “Sudan’s Kiir Briefed on Activities of Non-Muslims Rights Commission in Khartoum,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, August 30, 2010.
2. “Sudan’s Muslim Scholars Slam Proposed Changes to Non-Muslim Rights Laws,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 1, 2010.
3. “Non-Muslim Rights Commission Says Proposed Laws Not to Affect Sudan Constitution,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 3, 2010.

2011

Intermediate Implementation

No further information available. With the secession of southern Sudan on 9 July 2011, the provision became obsolete.

2005

No Implementation

The guiding principle of the wealth-sharing agreement in Sudan was based on the premise that all parts of Sudan are entitled to development. Similarly, the parties recognized the need for the construction and reconstitution of southern Sudan to bring up to the same level of socio-economic and public service standard of the northern state. The need for the wealth revenue distribution and establishment of two special funds were envisaged to build up local institutions and their human and economic capacities. Nevertheless, the accord was more specific regarding wealth redistribution rather than economic and social development. The accord did not specify economic and social programs as part of the economic and social reforms.

For details on the implementation of wealth-sharing provisions and land commissions, see Natural Resource Management. For Multi-Donor Trust Funds, see Donor Supports.

2006

No Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

No Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

No Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

No Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

No Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

No Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed by leaders of both parties on 9 January 2005. The deadline for the approval of the CPA was 24 January 2005 for the SPLM National Liberation Council. The peace accord was approved by the SPLM National Liberation Council on 24 January 2005. The accord was ratified unanimously by the SPLM National Liberation Council, which was presided over by the SPLM chief John Garang.¹ The National Assembly was expected to approve the CPA by 29 January and it was approved.² As such, the ratification mechanism provision of the accord was implemented.

1. “SPLM Parliament Ratifies Sudan Peace Deal,” Agence France Presse, January 24, 2005.
2. “Letter dated 30 March 2007 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,” United Nations (S/2007/185), April 3, 2007.

2006

Full Implementation

The ratification mechanism provision of the accord was implemented.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

In January 2005, immediately after the signing of the CPA, the World Bank made the decision to open its office in Sudan for the purpose to administer the Multi-Donor Trust Funds for the reconstruction and development of national and the Southern Sudan. The European Union also started to release the development fund to Sudan for the first time since 1990.[fn]”Sudan; EU Resumes Development Aid,” Africa News, January 26, 2005.[/efn_note] In April 2005, international donors pleaded for $4.5 billion, which exceeded the target of $2.6 billion.¹ The MDTFs and other funding from EU and the Government of National Unity became operational in June 2005 with the holding of the first Interim oversight Committee Meetings.² By the end of December 2005, $102.1 Million in MDTS contributions were paid in, of which $46.5 Million went to NRDF and $56.6 Million went to SRRDF. Nevertheless, the World Bank was not allowed to open its office in Sudan in 2005.

1. “Sudan; International Donors Pledge Billions for Reconstruction,” Africa News, April 12, 2005.
2. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.

2006

Full Implementation

In August 2006, the World Bank formally inaugurated its office in Khartoum to administer the MDTFs on behalf of donors.¹

1. “Inauguration of the World Bank Country Office in Khartoum,” World Bank News Release (No:2006/52/AFR), 2006, accessed May 22, 2012, http://go.worldbank.org/U016OGUEQ0.

2007

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2008

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2009

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2010

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2011

Full Implementation

By 2011, the Multi-Donor Trust Fund approved 57 programs for the budget of more than $1,072 million, of which $1,039 million was transferred.¹ It was said that the disbursement from the MTDFs had been slower than expected.

1. “Country Factsheet-Sudan,” MDTF, 2012, accessed January 31, 2012, http://mdtf.undp.org/factsheet/country/SDN.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

Many provisions of the CPA were not implemented as outlined in the implementation timeline. The establishment of CPA-mandated commissions and committees were delayed including Boundary Demarcation Commission for the Abyei Region. There was delay in the formation of National Unity Government. Similarly, there was delay in the withdrawal of forces, which led to the delay in the deployment of the Joint Integrated Units of forces. Elections for the Presidency as well as the National Assembly were delayed until April 2010. Nevertheless, many provisions of the CPA were subsequently implemented.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

While many provisions of the CPA were subsequently implemented, implementation of main provisions such as the establishment of CPA-mandated commissions and committees were delayed including Boundary Demarcation Commission for the Abyei Region. Elections were delayed as well.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2011

Intermediate Implementation

While many provisions of the CPA were subsequently implemented, implementation of main provisions such as the establishment of CPA-mandated commissions and committees were delayed including Boundary Demarcation Commission for the Abyei Region. Elections were delayed as well.

2005

Minimum Implementation

There were two main components of natural resources uses provision in Sudan’s 2005 CPA, the first focused on land-related conflict. The CPA provided that the Government of Sudan should exercise rights in land owned by the state through the appropriate or designated levels of government. The accord also established the National Land Commission and the Southern Sudan Land Commission to arbitrate between willing parties on issues related to land claims. The Land Commissions was mandated to study and record land use practices in areas where natural resource exploitation occurs. The second issue deals with sharing revenue from oil revenue. According to the CPA provision, after paying 2% of oil revenue to the oil producing states/regions in proportion to output produced in the respective state/region, fifty percent (50%) of net oil revenue derived from oil producing wells in Southern Sudan would be allocated to the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) as of the beginning of the Pre-Interim Period and the remaining fifty percent (50%) to the National Government and States in Northern Sudan.

The proposed land commissions were not established in 2005. Similarly, there was no record of the Southern Sudan receiving a 50% share of oil revenues. Nevertheless, it was estimated that the GoSS would receive $1.2 billion in oil transfers as per the GoS budget estimate of 2005.¹ This estimate was disputed in November 2005 as the North claimed the Hedlig oil field, which was the main contributor of the estimated oil revenue for the South. The revised estimate was $700 million.²

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
2. “Dispute over Sudan Oil Revenue-Sharing as North Claims Heglig Field,” World Markets Analysis, November 24, 2005.

2006

Minimum Implementation

The oil revenue dispute continued into 2006. For 2005, the south believed that the production amounted to as much as 450,000 barrels per day, while the north claimed that the production was at 330,000 barrel per day. The South received US$544 million in oil revenue which was deemed as insufficient by the southern authorities.¹ Nevertheless, oil revenues for the remainder of 2006 increased. The total oil revenue of southern Sudan amounted to $865 million in September 2006, which increased by $73.5 million in the month of October 2006.² The Joint Commission for Supervision of oil pricing and oil revenue had stressed that oil revenue accounts and shared distribution had been transparent and open.

The proposed National Land Commission was not established in 2006. The Southern Sudan Land Commission was established. The commission had five members who were appointed by the president of Southern Sudan.³

1. “Disputes in Sudan over Oil Revenues,” World Markets Analysis, February 3, 2006.
2. “Southern Sudan Government share in oil revenues,” Suna News Agency, December 10, 2006; “Southern Sudan Oil Revenue Up to $865 Mln Sept 2006,” See News Middle East & Africa, November 3, 2006.
3. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

Detailed information regarding oil revenue and its distribution for the 2007 year is not available. According to a news report, Southern Sudan netted $1.5 billion in 2007 as its share of $4.3 billion in oil revenues.¹

The proposed National Land Commission was not established in 2007.

1. “Briefing: Sudan Rising,” Energy Compass, May 2, 2008.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

The provisions related to oil sharing were implemented. In 2008, the Ministry of Finance & National Economy indicated that the total oil revenue for GoSS in 2008 was $2,888.20 million and in December of 2008 the oil revenue of GoSS stood at $265.66 million.¹ The national government continuously transferred oil revenue to the government of southern Sudan.

The proposed National Land Commission was not established in 2006.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2009.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

According to a GoSS Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning report, Sudan’s total oil revenue in 2009 from oil resources in the Southern Sudan was $2,566.16 million, of which the GoSS’s share was $1,067.7 million. Also, approximately $666.14 million had been transferred to the GoSS between July and October 2009.¹

The National Assembly adopted the National Land Commission Bill on 20 April 2009. The National Land Commission and the Southern Sudan Land Commission were independent commissions and as such had been mandated by the CPA to arbitrate between contending parties regarding claims over lands without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the courts.² Nevertheless, members of the commission were not appointed in 2009.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

Regarding their share of the oil revenue, the national government had transferred approximately $669.92 million to the GoSS in the first quarter of 2010. The total oil revenue of the Sudan in 2010 was $ 4,423 million, of which the Government of Southern Sudan’s share was $1,802 million. The government of southern Sudan received $1,553 million from the national government in 2010.¹

Although the National Legislature passed the National Land Commission Bill in 2009, members of the commission were not appointed in 2010. The South Sudan Land Commission was working to expose land use problems in South Sudan. The commission, however, was seeking financial assistance to undertake a thorough verification of land use and ownership in all ten states of Southern Sudan.²

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2010.
2. “South Sudan Land Commission Seeks Financial Assistance to Clean Up Land Ownership Issues,” Sudan Tribune, July 21, 2010.

2011

Intermediate Implementation

Detailed information regarding oil revenue distribution between the north and the south is not available.

Although the National Legislature passed the National Land Commission Bill in 2009, members of the commission were not appointed in 2011. The South Sudan Land Commission, however, was quite effective. It worked on land draft policy and handed it over to the government of South Sudan in February 2011.¹

Once southern Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 2011, provisions related to the natural resource management became obsolete.

1. “Sudan; South Draft Land Policy Under Consideration,” Africa News, February 19, 2011.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

The 2005 CPA provided that the people of South Sudan would have right to self-determination and, in this regard, people of south Sudan would have the option to confirm unity or to vote for secession. South Sudan’s right to self-determination was incorporated in the interim constitution (Article 219). As such, the people of south Sudan would exercise their self-determination in a referendum that was to be held by the end of six year interim period. Similarly, the CPA gave the residents of Abyei the opportunity to cast a separate ballot in order to make a choice between retaining its special administrative status in the north or being a part of South Sudan. This provision was also incorporated into the interim constitution (Article 183.3). The constitution came into effect on 9 July 2005.[fn]”The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.[/efn_note]

2006

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

With respect to holding a referendum in southern Sudan, some important achievements were made. As provided in 2005 CPA, the National Assembly adopted the Southern Sudan Referendum Bill in December 2009.¹

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, October 2010.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

The members of the referendum commission were appointed in June 2010. The National Assembly approved the nominees appointed to serve on the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission submitted by the Presidency on 28 June 2010. The Government of Southern Sudan nominated members to serve in the Southern Sudan Referendum Bureau who were to be sworn in in July. In August, members of the ten Southern Sudan Referendum State High Committees were nominated and sworn in. On 2 September 2010, Mohamed Osman El-Negoumi was nominated as the Secretary General of the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission; and his nomination was ratified by the Presidency. Parties to the CPA also held a post-referendum negotiation exposure workshop in Juba on 20 July 2010 as part of their discussion on post-referendum issues.¹

Once the institutional structures were in place, the referendum commission approved the voter registration training manual and training of the State Referendum High Committee state level trainers in South Sudan started and was completed on 28 October. A South Sudan political Parties Conference was also organized in Juba from 13-17 October which adopted a “Common Code of Conduct for the Referenda and Popular Consultations.”² Voter registration took place on 15 November as scheduled by the referendum commission and was extended for 7 days until 8 December 2010.³

The National Assembly adopted the Abyei Referendum Bill 2009.⁴ There was no progress on setting up an institutional framework for the referendum.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, October 2010.
2. Ibid.
3. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2010.
4. Ibid.

2011

Full Implementation

The referendum for southern Sudan took place from 9 to 15 January 2011. The referendum was conducted in the Sudan and in eight out-of-country-voting (OCV) countries (with the exception of an OCV centre in Brisbane, where the polling continued until 18 January).¹ On 7 February 2011, the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission announced the final results for the Referendum. 1.17% of valid votes were cast in favor of unity and 98.83% of valid votes were cast in favor of secession, with a 97.58% voter turnout (3,851,994 registered voters).² This confirms the provision related to self-determination for southern Sudan was implemented. Nevertheless, the Abyei referendum did not take place as the north and south couldn’t agree on who was eligible to vote.³ Southern Sudan called for a referendum for Abyei and insisted that Abyei belonged to south Sudan.⁴

Southern Sudan became an independent state of South Sudan on 9 July 2011.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, January 2011.
2. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2011.
3. “Southern Sudan Official: Abyei Belongs with Us,” Associated Press Online, April 29, 2011.
4. “Sudan; South Calls for Abyei Referendum,” Africa News, May 26, 2011.

2005

No Implementation

There was evidence of Sudan purchasing weapons from various mechanisms after the initiation of the peace process. It was documented that the Sudan acquired major weapon systems as well as light weapons from countries such as Russia, Belarus, China, Egypt, Iran and even from European Union Countries such as France, Italy and Germany between 2003 and 2008.[fn]Mike Lewis, “Skirting the Law: Sudan’s Post-CPA Arms Flows,” Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 18 (2009), accessed May 21, 2011, 23-25, http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-SWP-18-Sudan-Post-CPA-Arms… However, no complaint was lodged by the SPLM/A or the UNMIS on this issue. Chinese were exporting weapons and importing Sudanese oil.¹ Therefore, the armed embargo provision of the accord was never implemented.

1. “Arms, oil, and Darfur: the evolution of relations between China and Sudan,” Small Arms Survey HSBA Issue Brief No. 7 (2007), accessed May 21, 2012, http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-SIB-7-Arms.pdf

2006

No Implementation

Sudan acquired major weapon systems as well as light weapons from various countries in 2006.¹

1. Mike Lewis, “Skirting the Law,” 23-25.

2007

No Implementation

Sudan acquired major weapon systems as well as light weapons from various countries in 2007.¹

1. Ibid.

2008

No Implementation

Sudan acquired major weapon systems as well as light weapons from various countries in 2008.¹

1. Ibid.

2009

No Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

No Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

No Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

Many CPA provisions related to transitional arrangements, including the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC), were not established immediately after the formation of the National Unity Government. After considerable delay, the AEC was established in October 2005; and the Commission was co-chaired by Norway and Kenya.¹ The commission’s main responsibility was to assess and evaluate the implementation of the CPA. It contained 13 members and four observers and met in plenary sessions once a month. The AEC had four working groups: power-sharing, wealth-sharing, security arrangements and three areas chaired by international members (Italy, USA, UK and the Netherlands).

1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/821), December 21, 2005; “Kenyan Leader Urges International Community to Help Southern Sudan,” BBC Monitoring Africa, November 8, 2005.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

There was separate assessment and evaluation commission for Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan states, which was established by presidential decree on 26 July 2007. The AEC and its working groups met regularly and discussed issues related to the implementation of CPA along with post-referendum arrangements, negotiations, and border demarcation of Abyei which became very contentious.¹

Detailed information regarding the success of the AEC in forcing the parties to implement the CPA provision was not very clear. Also, the AEC was just the evaluation commission and it did not have authority to review the CPA itself.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, May 2011.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

The 2005 CPA provides for the establishment of UN Peace Support Mission to monitor and verify this agreement and to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement as provided for under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. The CPA provides that the Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Commission will be chaired by the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) force commander. The UN monitors were to have unrestricted access for the purpose of monitoring activities related to the ceasefire, as provided by the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA). The CPA also provided that the Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT), the Joint Military Commission (JMC) in Nuba Mountains, and the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (CPMT) would continue their duties until the UN mission is in operation.

The security council established, with resolution 1590, the United National Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) on 24 March 2005. The UNMIS consisted of 10,000 personnel, 715 police personnel and an appropriate civilian component. The Mission’s headquarters was established in Khartoum and the Joint Monitoring Coordination Team’s headquarters were established in Juba. The deployment of the UNMIS military component moved very slowly. By December 2005, only 4,291 personnel were deployed, including 468 military observers. In April 2005, the African Union Peace and Security Council increased the African Mission in Sudan force to a total authorized strength of 6,171 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police.¹

As provided in the 2005 CPA, the UNMIS force commander chaired the first Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Committee (CJMC) meeting on 8 May 2005 and agreed to convene fortnightly meetings. In the meeting, parties also agreed to the Terms of Reference (TOR) of both the CJMC and the Area Joint Military Committees (AJMCs).² In 2005, the CJMC held 15 meetings. It was reported that while progress was made in terms of collecting data to permit verification and monitoring of movements of their combatants/troops, parties had yet to provide data of their troops and movement for all sectors.³

The UNMIS was also involved in civilian monitoring and protection activities across the Sudan as well as human rights monitoring and promotion activities.

1. “UNMIS- United Nations Mission in Sudan- Background,” accessed January 20, 2012, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/background.shtml; “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/821), December 21, 2005.
2. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
3. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/821), December 21, 2005.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

The CJMC was the mechanism to verify and monitor the implementation of the ceasefire component of the CPA in addition to investigating violations and resolving disputes through discussions. While, CJMC’s role had avoided many incidents that would have otherwise triggered wider conflict, the Sudan Armed Force (SAF) notified UNMIS that a number of towns in the north of UNMIS Sector VI were to be excluded from monitoring and verification, restricting the area operation of the UNMOs. Also, in September 2006, the SPLA imposed restrictions on the movement of UNMIS monitors south of Abyei.¹ In October and December 2006, movement restrictions in Abyei were lifted temporarily.²

The CPA requires its signatories to demobilize children in their ranks by July 2005. It was verified that 1,000 children were released one year later. The reason for the delay was the denial of the SAF of the presence of children in their units. The SAF, however, accepted the fact at the CJMC that there are children in unincorporated other armed groups and in incorporated armed groups in the SAF in southern Sudan. It was estimated that there were approximately 19,000 soldiers in those units and significant number of them were under 18 years of age.³

The CJMC, through the Joint Monitoring and Coordination Office, had successfully trained 66 national monitors (of a planned total of 225) who had been deployed to the sector.⁴ According to the Ceasefire agreement, the SPLM was to redeploy its troops in Eastern Sudan. The redeployment took place in the observation and monitoring of the UN mission in East Sudan. The UN had deployed 10,000 troops to observe the commitment of the government and the SPLM.⁵ The UNMIS verified the redeployment of 5,672 troops out of a declared strength of 8,763. The troops unaccounted for were considered to have abandoned the SPLA.⁶ The redeployment of SAF was on schedule. According to the same report, the security mechanisms such as Ceasefire Joint Military Committee and the Area Joint Military Committees were functioning as intended. It was reported that although each party had provided the CJMC with a list of aligned other groups, their actual alignment status, composition and location of these groups remained vague.⁷

The UNMIS continued its civilian monitoring and protection activities, as well as their human rights monitoring and promotion activities, across the Sudan.

1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
2. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
3. “Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/662), August 17, 2006.
4. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/160), March 14, 2006.
5. “UN to withdraw its mission from eastern Sudan,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, July 6, 2006.
6. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/728), September 12, 2006.
7. Ibid.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

Both parties imposed restrictions on the movement of UNMOs in the Abyei area (Source: UNMIS. 2009. The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA, February 2009), which affected the mission’s monitoring and verification ability. It was reported that the CJMC chair and force commander convened special sessions to address discrepancies in data provided by the parties on the formation of JIUs and the alignment of other armed groups. The UNMIS military personnel had verified the composition of JIUs.¹

The UNMIS continued to work with parties towards the full redeployment and verification of forces. Nevertheless, the deadline of 9 July 2007, by which the SAF was expected to mark the full redeployment of its troops to the north of the 1956 boundary line, was not met Similarly, the status of SAF troops in the south remained not finalized.² Under verification by joint monitoring teams, the SPLA began the redeployment of its remaining forces in southern Kordofan and Blue Nile State in July 2007.

By December 2007, the special representative of the UN Secretary-General verified that the SAF had completed about 80 percent of the redeployment of its troops to the north beyond 1956 border, while the SPLA had redeployed 8 percent. The main challenge for the verification and monitoring was the unilateral movement of troops by both sides. Therefore, the parties were asked to respect the 1956 border line and not to make unilateral movements for the security of oil installations (as well as placing no other forces in the proximity of the oil installations).³ Following the CJMC meeting on 1 January 2008, restrictions imposed by both parties in the Abyei area were lifted.⁴

The UNMIS continued its civilian monitoring and protection activities across the Sudan as well as human rights monitoring and promotion activities.

1. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/213), April 17, 2007.
2. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/500), August 20, 2007.
3. “UN Envoy Urges Sudan’s Peace Partners to Solve Pending Issues,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, December 8, 2007; “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2008/64), January 31, 2008.
4. Ibid.

2008

Full Implementation

The SAF announced that it had completed its redeployment from the south in accordance with the agreed deadline of 9 January, 2008. The UNMIS verified 88 percent of some 46,000 SAF troops as of 15 January. The figure included voluntarily demobilized soldiers, who comprised 16.2 percent of the total. The SPLA, however, continued to question the existence of the voluntary demobilization of SAF troops as they had been receiving a salary.¹

The Ceasefire Political Commission asked the CJMC to lead an inquiry into the events in Abyei of 14 and 20 May and to produce a report. However, the report was delayed by both sides of the committee. As of 4 December 2008, the UNMIS verified 96.9% of 46,403 total redeployment of SAF troops. The CJMC accepted this verification. The SPLA’s verified and accepted redeployment of troops stood at 10.6 percent of 59,168 troops initially stated as being present north of the current border line. It was also verified that the Joint Integrated Units had reached 84.7 per cent of their mandated strength of 39,639 troops, SAF soldiers comprising 52.4 per cent and SPLA 47.6 per cent of the total.² The SPLA, in collaboration with the CJMC, organized a four day workshop in Juba to discuss the implementation of the security arrangements in the CPA.³

Also, the NCP and the SMLM reached the Abyei Roadmap agreement. With the agreement in place, the UNMO had freedom of movement with the Abyei Administrative Area.⁴ Nevertheless, the UNMIS monitoring and verification in the north and east of Abyei was stopped by the SPLA troops on 13 November.⁵

The UNMIS continued its civilian monitoring and protection activities as well as human rights monitoring and promotion activities across the Sudan.

1. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2008), January 31, 2008.
2. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2008/662), October 20, 2008.
3. “Sudan’s SPLA Holds Workshop on Implementation of Security Arrangements,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, October 8, 2008.
4. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
5. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2009/61), January 30, 2009.

2009

Full Implementation

The CJMC submitted its comprehensive redeployment review to the CPC for consideration after the SAF verified redeployed figures standing at 95.5 per cent (of the 46,403 initially stated) and SPLA verified the figures standing at 13.7 per cent (of the 59,168 initially stated) and this figure was increased to 33.7% as accepted by the parties in the 108th CJMC meeting on 16 November.¹ Similarly, it was reported in the 100th meeting of CJMC held in 14 July 2009, SPLA redeployment from Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States stood at 27.6 per cent, while SAF redeployment from the South was at 100 per cent, not including Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States.²

The UNMIS continued its civilian monitoring and protection activities across the Sudan as well as human rights monitoring and promotion activities.

1. “Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sudan,” United Nations (S/2009/357), July 14, 2009; “Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sudan,” United Nations (S/2010/31), January 19, 2010.
2. “Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sudan,” United Nations (S/2009/545), October 21, 2009.

2010

Full Implementation

While all verification mechanisms were working steadily, very little progress was made in terms of the revivification of redeployments and joint integrated units. According to the report, the SAF redeployment from the south was completed and the SPLA redeployment from the north stood only at 37.7%, as verified at the CJMC meeting of 14-15 December. Nevertheless, the SPLA redeployed from the Nuba Mountains to White Lake Jaw and Duar. In Duar, only 752 of 2,700 SPLA troops were confirmed present.¹ The verified size of the JIUs remained unchanged since April 2009.

Along with the monitoring and verification of troop redeployment and deployment of the JIUs, the UNMIS continued its civilian monitoring and protection activities across the Sudan as well as human rights monitoring and promotion activities. This however, does not mean that the UNMIS had successfully carried out its mandate related to verification and monitoring of the ceasefire agreement.

1. “Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sudan,” United Nations (S/2010/681), December 31, 2010.

2011

Full Implementation

The number of troops in JIUs remained the same. Also, no significant change occurred in terms of redeployment of troops. During a monitoring and verification mission in 2010, the majority of 4,003 SPLA elements were found just inside Blue Nile State, at Yafta. As far as the redeployment of the SPLA from Southern Kordofan is concerned, 3,071 of 5,147 SPLA elements were at the SPLA assembly point in White Lake.¹ This suggests that the UNMIS had verified the ground reality but does not suggest that it successfully carried out its mandate related to implementing ceasefire provisions.

With the referendum approving for secession, all the verification and monitoring provisions of the CPA became obsolete. Also, the UNMIS mandate ended on 9 July 2011- the date the southern Sudan became an independent state.

1. “Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sudan,” United Nations (S/2011/314), May 17, 2011.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

The 2005 CPA provides for the establishment of UN Peace Support Mission to monitor and verify this Agreement and to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement as provided for under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Accordingly, the security council by its resolution 1590, established the United National Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) on 24 March 2005. The UNMIS consisted of 10,000 personnel, 715 police personnel and the appropriate civilian components. The Mission’s headquarters was established in Khartoum and the Joint Monitoring Coordination Team in Juba. The deployment of the UNMIS military component moved very slowly. By December 2005, only 4,291 personnel were deployed including 468 military observers.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

Following the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement on May 2006, the UN Secretary General, in his 28 July 2006 (S/2006/591) report to the Security Council, suggested a UN Peacekeeping force of as many as 18,600 troops to protect civilians, especially IDPs living in camps across Darfur’s three states. The UN Security Council by its resolution 1706 (2006) expanded the mandate of the UNMIS to include its deployment to Darfur and authorized a maximum of up to 17,300 personnel and up to 3,300 civilian police personnel. The request of the Secretary General to accept the UN peacekeeping role in Darfur, however, was rejected by the Sudanese government. As an alternative, the Security Council by its resolution 1769 (2006), authorized the establishment of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The UNMIS continued its support mission “by providing good offices and political support to the parties, monitoring and verifying their security arrangements and offering assistance in a number of areas, including governance, recovery and development.”¹ By 27 August 2006, 9,608 military personnel (695 observers, 8,727 troops, 186 staff officers) and 666 civilian police personnel were deployed under UNMIS.²

1. “UNMIS- United Nations Mission in Sudan- Background,” accessed January 20, 2012, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/background.shtml.
2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/728), September 12, 2006.