In January, the prospect for formal demobilization greatly decreased as the MFDC leader who signed the 2004 peace accord, Abbe Diamacoune Senghor, died. In that context, the evolution of the MFDC from a unified separatist movement aiming to redress Casamance’s grievances to a factional movement driven more by economic considerations further decreased hopes for demobilization.¹

Contrary to World Bank information, in a news interview in October 2006, Koussaynobo Alphonse Diedhiou, coordinator of the National Agency for the Reconstruction of Casamance (ANRAC) said that “It is very difficult to realise a programme of demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of the rebels, for example, without a peace process in place. There has not been a meeting between the MFDC and the government since 2004” (United Nations, 2006).² In an interview, Director General of ANRAC argued, “If they (MFDC) are serious about the peace negotiations then they should lay down their weapons. It’s their responsibility to draw up a list and present that to us. How would we know who’s in their rank and file? If they give us a list, weÕll demobilize them. But as long as there is no list, there will be no disarmament and demobilization”.³

According to a World Bank report, implementation of demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration was dependent on the formal receipt from the MFDC to the government of the list of combatants identified for demobilization. To that end, the report stated there were negotiations between the government and the MFDC. The World Bank had initiated a program for the demobilization of combatants, the reintegration of combatants, IDPs and refugees, and the reconstruction of infrastructure in areas of return.¹

No violence reported in 2014. In May, one of the leaders of MFDC, Salif Sadio, declared a unilateral ceasefire. The ceasefire was announced after a government and the MFDC delegation met in Rome under the facilitation of the Sant’Egidio Catholic Community. ⁴

Ceasefire violation was not reported in 2013. After Macky Sall won presidency in 2012, the government started to negotiate with the MFDC. Sall’s government was serious about finding a solution in Casamance. One of the obstacles however was the split in the MFDC. The MFDC splintered into four different groups and the strongest group was led by César Atoute Badiate who had 80% of combatants estimated between 1200 and 2000. Nevertheless, ceasefire held in 2013.⁵

Violence persisted into 2012.⁶ According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), clashes continued between government forces and the MFDC.⁷ Press characterized the conflict as low-level.[fn]”An Aging President Overstays His Welcome and Damages His Country’s Reputation,” Africa.com Blog, January 30, 2012.[/efn_note]

A news report from 2011 stated that despite a number of cease fires, renewed violence “over the past year” had occurred.⁸ Negotiations were hampered by the MFDC splitting into various factions.⁹ Levels of violence in the Casamance increased in 2011, and an estimated 83 people were killed as a result of the Casamance conflict.¹⁰ According to a news report, negotiations between the government and the various political and military factions of the MFDC were deadlocked.¹¹

Fighting between the Senegalese army and separatists occurred in early 2010 due to military operations that were intended to remove rebel bases.¹³ At that point, no meeting between the government and the MFDC had taken place since 1 January 2005.¹⁴ A rebel leader responded, stating that the MFDC would welcome negotiations on neutral territory, in another country. The Prime Minister stated he wanted talks to take place in Senegal.¹⁵ There were no further reports in the press on negotiations.

In October, the Senegalese army attacked a rebel base near the Gambia border.¹⁶ Fighting was also reported in December.[fn]”Rebels Attack Southern Senegal Village,” States News Service, December 28, 2010.[/efn_note]

Violence persisted in 2009 between the MFDC and the government.¹⁷ “[T]he region remains plagued by occasional violent crime, political killings, and bouts of fighting between the army and the splintered MFDC,” according to a UN news report.¹⁸ Fighting appeared to intensify later in 2009, killing at least 15 Senegalese soldiers.¹⁹

Instances of fighting were reported in 2008.²⁰ The MLPC (a splinter group of the MFDC) and the MFDC itself were reported to be fighting each other.²¹ The MFDC also appeared to be fighting with government troops as well. The program coordinator of ANCRAC commented (on the demining effort) that “[w]e need to first find a peace agreement between the MFDC and the government of Senegal.²²