The government and RENAMO established a working group to address disarmament, demobilization, and integration of RENAMO combatants into the police and military. However, demobilization did not occur in 2017.[1]
[1] “Mozambique; Nysui in new dialogue with rebel leader,” Africa News, December 14, 2017.
No progress was made on demobilizing RENAMO in 2015. RENAMO continued to clash with government forces throughout the year. In June, RENAMO threatened to use its forces to reclaim control in provinces that voted for Dhlakama in the 2014 General Election following the defeat of a bill that would have allowed RENAMO to appoint the government in these provinces.[1] RENAMO additionally claimed to have forces mobilized throughout the country. [2]
[1] “Mozambique’s president says to preserve national unity at all cost,” Xinhua, June 26, 2015.
[2] “Mozambique; Renamo threatens to set up arm- report,” Africa News, June 12, 2015.
Under the Declaration of Cessation of Military Hostilities, both sides committed not to maintain militias.
A November news report noted discussions between the government and RENAMO over the demobilization, disarmament, and integration of RENAMO combatants had deadlocked over RENAMO’s refusal to provide the government with a list of combatants.[1]
[1] “Mozambique; Still no advance in disarming Renamo,” Africa News, November 18, 2014.
No further implementation observed.
The Monitoring Committee (CSA) and independent observer continued to operate in 2020.
The agreement established a Monitoring Committee (CSA) made up of regional states, regional organizations, international organizations, and the signatories to monitor the implementation of the agreement.
The CSA’s operation was briefly interrupted by the Government’s cancellation of a September meeting and the subsequent refusal of the CMA (Coalition of Azawad Movements) to participate until the reasons for the cancellation were clarified. The Secretary General reported that by December 2019, the parties had agreed to resume CSA meetings .[1] The independent observer continued to operate in 2019.
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2019/983.
The Monitoring Committee or Comité du Suivi du present Accord CSA continued to meet in 2018, although less regularly than planned due to the 2018 Presidential Election. The CSA also suffered from some internal dysfunction and disengagement of the meditators that limited its oversight capacity.[1] The independent observer continued to operate in 2018.
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer. Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process Observation period: May 1 to September 30, 2018,” The Carter Center, October 26, 2018.
The Monitoring Committee continued to meet in 2017. MINUSMA and Algeria agreed to attend all future committee meetings and to mediate disputes. The Committee did have monitoring and verification teams in the Kidal area, but had difficulty investigating alleged ceasefire disputes.[1] The Carter Center was appointed as an independent observer in late 2017.[2]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2017/1105.
[2] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2017/1105.
The Monitoring Committee continued to meet in 2016, although it was hindered by disagreements between representatives of the different parties.[1] The Carter Center was not appointed as an independent observer until late 2017.[2]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2016/1137.
[2] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2017/1105.