Verification/Monitoring Mechanism: Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement

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Verification/Monitoring Mechanism: Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement

Implementations

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 2005

The 2005 CPA provides for the establishment of UN Peace Support Mission to monitor and verify this agreement and to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement as provided for under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. The CPA provides that the Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Commission will be chaired by the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) force commander. The UN monitors were to have unrestricted access for the purpose of monitoring activities related to the ceasefire, as provided by the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA). The CPA also provided that the Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT), the Joint Military Commission (JMC) in Nuba Mountains, and the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (CPMT) would continue their duties until the UN mission is in operation.

The security council established, with resolution 1590, the United National Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) on 24 March 2005. The UNMIS consisted of 10,000 personnel, 715 police personnel and an appropriate civilian component. The Mission’s headquarters was established in Khartoum and the Joint Monitoring Coordination Team’s headquarters were established in Juba. The deployment of the UNMIS military component moved very slowly. By December 2005, only 4,291 personnel were deployed, including 468 military observers. In April 2005, the African Union Peace and Security Council increased the African Mission in Sudan force to a total authorized strength of 6,171 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police.1

As provided in the 2005 CPA, the UNMIS force commander chaired the first Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Committee (CJMC) meeting on 8 May 2005 and agreed to convene fortnightly meetings. In the meeting, parties also agreed to the Terms of Reference (TOR) of both the CJMC and the Area Joint Military Committees (AJMCs).2 In 2005, the CJMC held 15 meetings. It was reported that while progress was made in terms of collecting data to permit verification and monitoring of movements of their combatants/troops, parties had yet to provide data of their troops and movement for all sectors.3

The UNMIS was also involved in civilian monitoring and protection activities across the Sudan as well as human rights monitoring and promotion activities.

  1. “UNMIS- United Nations Mission in Sudan- Background,” accessed January 20, 2012, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/background.shtml; “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/821), December 21, 2005.
  2. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
  3. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/821), December 21, 2005.

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 2006

The CJMC was the mechanism to verify and monitor the implementation of the ceasefire component of the CPA in addition to investigating violations and resolving disputes through discussions. While, CJMC’s role had avoided many incidents that would have otherwise triggered wider conflict, the Sudan Armed Force (SAF) notified UNMIS that a number of towns in the north of UNMIS Sector VI were to be excluded from monitoring and verification, restricting the area operation of the UNMOs. Also, in September 2006, the SPLA imposed restrictions on the movement of UNMIS monitors south of Abyei.1 In October and December 2006, movement restrictions in Abyei were lifted temporarily.4

The CPA requires its signatories to demobilize children in their ranks by July 2005. It was verified that 1,000 children were released one year later. The reason for the delay was the denial of the SAF of the presence of children in their units. The SAF, however, accepted the fact at the CJMC that there are children in unincorporated other armed groups and in incorporated armed groups in the SAF in southern Sudan. It was estimated that there were approximately 19,000 soldiers in those units and significant number of them were under 18 years of age.5

The CJMC, through the Joint Monitoring and Coordination Office, had successfully trained 66 national monitors (of a planned total of 225) who had been deployed to the sector.6 According to the Ceasefire agreement, the SPLM was to redeploy its troops in Eastern Sudan. The redeployment took place in the observation and monitoring of the UN mission in East Sudan. The UN had deployed 10,000 troops to observe the commitment of the government and the SPLM.7 The UNMIS verified the redeployment of 5,672 troops out of a declared strength of 8,763. The troops unaccounted for were considered to have abandoned the SPLA.8 The redeployment of SAF was on schedule. According to the same report, the security mechanisms such as Ceasefire Joint Military Committee and the Area Joint Military Committees were functioning as intended. It was reported that although each party had provided the CJMC with a list of aligned other groups, their actual alignment status, composition and location of these groups remained vague.9

The UNMIS continued its civilian monitoring and protection activities, as well as their human rights monitoring and promotion activities, across the Sudan.

  1. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
  2. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
  3. “Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/662), August 17, 2006.
  4. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/160), March 14, 2006.
  5. “UN to withdraw its mission from eastern Sudan,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, July 6, 2006.
  6. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/728), September 12, 2006.
  7. Ibid.

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 2007

Both parties imposed restrictions on the movement of UNMOs in the Abyei area (Source: UNMIS. 2009. The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA, February 2009), which affected the mission’s monitoring and verification ability. It was reported that the CJMC chair and force commander convened special sessions to address discrepancies in data provided by the parties on the formation of JIUs and the alignment of other armed groups. The UNMIS military personnel had verified the composition of JIUs.10

The UNMIS continued to work with parties towards the full redeployment and verification of forces. Nevertheless, the deadline of 9 July 2007, by which the SAF was expected to mark the full redeployment of its troops to the north of the 1956 boundary line, was not met Similarly, the status of SAF troops in the south remained not finalized.11 Under verification by joint monitoring teams, the SPLA began the redeployment of its remaining forces in southern Kordofan and Blue Nile State in July 2007.

By December 2007, the special representative of the UN Secretary-General verified that the SAF had completed about 80 percent of the redeployment of its troops to the north beyond 1956 border, while the SPLA had redeployed 8 percent. The main challenge for the verification and monitoring was the unilateral movement of troops by both sides. Therefore, the parties were asked to respect the 1956 border line and not to make unilateral movements for the security of oil installations (as well as placing no other forces in the proximity of the oil installations).12 Following the CJMC meeting on 1 January 2008, restrictions imposed by both parties in the Abyei area were lifted.13

The UNMIS continued its civilian monitoring and protection activities across the Sudan as well as human rights monitoring and promotion activities.

  1. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/213), April 17, 2007.
  2. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/500), August 20, 2007.
  3. “UN Envoy Urges Sudan’s Peace Partners to Solve Pending Issues,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, December 8, 2007; “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2008/64), January 31, 2008.
  4. Ibid.

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 2008

The SAF announced that it had completed its redeployment from the south in accordance with the agreed deadline of 9 January, 2008. The UNMIS verified 88 percent of some 46,000 SAF troops as of 15 January. The figure included voluntarily demobilized soldiers, who comprised 16.2 percent of the total. The SPLA, however, continued to question the existence of the voluntary demobilization of SAF troops as they had been receiving a salary.13

The Ceasefire Political Commission asked the CJMC to lead an inquiry into the events in Abyei of 14 and 20 May and to produce a report. However, the report was delayed by both sides of the committee. As of 4 December 2008, the UNMIS verified 96.9% of 46,403 total redeployment of SAF troops. The CJMC accepted this verification. The SPLA’s verified and accepted redeployment of troops stood at 10.6 percent of 59,168 troops initially stated as being present north of the current border line. It was also verified that the Joint Integrated Units had reached 84.7 per cent of their mandated strength of 39,639 troops, SAF soldiers comprising 52.4 per cent and SPLA 47.6 per cent of the total.14 The SPLA, in collaboration with the CJMC, organized a four day workshop in Juba to discuss the implementation of the security arrangements in the CPA.15

Also, the NCP and the SMLM reached the Abyei Roadmap agreement. With the agreement in place, the UNMO had freedom of movement with the Abyei Administrative Area.16 Nevertheless, the UNMIS monitoring and verification in the north and east of Abyei was stopped by the SPLA troops on 13 November.17

The UNMIS continued its civilian monitoring and protection activities as well as human rights monitoring and promotion activities across the Sudan.

  1. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2008), January 31, 2008.
  2. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2008/662), October 20, 2008.
  3. “Sudan’s SPLA Holds Workshop on Implementation of Security Arrangements,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, October 8, 2008.
  4. “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
  5. “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2009/61), January 30, 2009.

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 2009

The CJMC submitted its comprehensive redeployment review to the CPC for consideration after the SAF verified redeployed figures standing at 95.5 per cent (of the 46,403 initially stated) and SPLA verified the figures standing at 13.7 per cent (of the 59,168 initially stated) and this figure was increased to 33.7% as accepted by the parties in the 108th CJMC meeting on 16 November.16 Similarly, it was reported in the 100th meeting of CJMC held in 14 July 2009, SPLA redeployment from Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States stood at 27.6 per cent, while SAF redeployment from the South was at 100 per cent, not including Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States.18

The UNMIS continued its civilian monitoring and protection activities across the Sudan as well as human rights monitoring and promotion activities.

  1. “Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sudan,” United Nations (S/2009/357), July 14, 2009; “Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sudan,” United Nations (S/2010/31), January 19, 2010.
  2. “Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sudan,” United Nations (S/2009/545), October 21, 2009.

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 2010

While all verification mechanisms were working steadily, very little progress was made in terms of the revivification of redeployments and joint integrated units. According to the report, the SAF redeployment from the south was completed and the SPLA redeployment from the north stood only at 37.7%, as verified at the CJMC meeting of 14-15 December. Nevertheless, the SPLA redeployed from the Nuba Mountains to White Lake Jaw and Duar. In Duar, only 752 of 2,700 SPLA troops were confirmed present.19 The verified size of the JIUs remained unchanged since April 2009.

Along with the monitoring and verification of troop redeployment and deployment of the JIUs, the UNMIS continued its civilian monitoring and protection activities across the Sudan as well as human rights monitoring and promotion activities. This however, does not mean that the UNMIS had successfully carried out its mandate related to verification and monitoring of the ceasefire agreement.

  1. “Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sudan,” United Nations (S/2010/681), December 31, 2010.

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 2011

The number of troops in JIUs remained the same. Also, no significant change occurred in terms of redeployment of troops. During a monitoring and verification mission in 2010, the majority of 4,003 SPLA elements were found just inside Blue Nile State, at Yafta. As far as the redeployment of the SPLA from Southern Kordofan is concerned, 3,071 of 5,147 SPLA elements were at the SPLA assembly point in White Lake.20 This suggests that the UNMIS had verified the ground reality but does not suggest that it successfully carried out its mandate related to implementing ceasefire provisions.

With the referendum approving for secession, all the verification and monitoring provisions of the CPA became obsolete. Also, the UNMIS mandate ended on 9 July 2011- the date the southern Sudan became an independent state.

  1. “Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sudan,” United Nations (S/2011/314), May 17, 2011.