Verification/Monitoring Mechanism: Arusha Accord – 4 August 1993

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Verification/Monitoring Mechanism: Arusha Accord – 4 August 1993

Implementations

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 1993

The July 1992 N’sele Cease-fire Agreement had provisions for the deployment of Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) under the supervision of the OAU Secretary General. The NMOG, with 50 military observers, was said to supervise the ceasefire leading to political negotiations and a peace treaty between the two conflicting parties in Rwanda. According to this mandate, the OAU Secretary General appointed his personal representative to Rwanda to supervise a ceasefire on 29 July 1992.The ceasefire agreement was expected to go into effect by the end of July.1 The joint political and military commission comprising representatives of the Rwandan government, the RPF and international observers met at the OAU headquarter and a commander for a NMOG was appointed.2

The ceasefire agreement went into effect and a violation of the ceasefire was reported. However, the NOG was not assembled completely. Nevertheless, Senegal had already dispatched 10 military officers to Rwanda.3

NMOG tried to resolve the accusation and counter accusation of a violation of the ceasefire agreement alleged by both sides. On 22 October 1992, in the joint political and military commission meeting, the Rwandan ambassador representing the Rwandan government side accused the RPF of having shelled the town of Biumba and attacking the government position (which was refuted by the NMOG head by making it clear that the RPF action was in retaliation).4

The RPF alleged that the French troops were providing support to the Habyarimana regime and that the French troops were said to have starting clashing with the NMOG, who were deployed to monitor the ceasefire agreement.5

In January 1993 a violation of ceasefire was reported and a 50-member NOMG had no offensive capability.6 As ceasefire violations continued, the Rwandan government declared ceasefire and asked the NMOG to verify the truce and the return of the RPF to its previous position.7 The commander of the NMOG, however, stressed that his group be strengthened with additional staff and adequate equipment to deal with the situation caused by the resumption of conflict.8 As a matter of fact, the UNMOG was not given authorization by the Kigali Army Head Quarter to go to the spot where the ceasefire was broken off.9
The Rwandan government and the RPF committed themselves to implementing the ceasefire from 9 March after a high-level meeting held from 5th to 7th march. The NMOG’s remained intact as monitoring the ceasefire agreement.10 THE NMOG verified the withdrawal of RPF troops from the Mutara, Byumba and Ruhengeri areas to the 8th February 1993 before position.11 After the withdrawal, the area between the government and the RPF forces became a demilitarized zone and was administered by the NMOG.12

On 3 August 1993, the Arusha accord was signed. According to the agreement the current NMOG would remain in Rwanda until the deployment of international military force.13

On 5 October 1993, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 872 to establish the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda for a period of six months with mandate related to contributing to the security of the capital city, monitoring observance of the ceasefire agreement, assisting with mine clearance, monitoring the repatriation of refugees and resettlement of the IDPs for an initial period of six months.14 The UN Operation operated in four different phases. The first phase would be to establish conditions for the secure installation of national unity government, which was expected by the end of 1993. By the end of this phase, the UNAMIR strength was expected to be 1,428 military personnel. The second phase, expected to last for 90-days, involved the process s of disengagement, demobilization and integration of armed forces and gendarmerie. The UNAMIR strength was expected to be 2,548 by the end of this phase. The third phase, which was expected to last for nine months, would establish, supervise and monitor a new demilitarized zone and the mission strength was expected to reduce to 1,240 personnel. The fourth phase of four month was designed to the final stage leading up to the election. The strength of the UNAMIR was expected to be 930 personnel.15 The authorized strength for the mission was 2,548 military personnel, including 2,217 troops and 331 military observers, and 60 civilian police.16

On 5 October 1993 the UNAMIR was established and the UNAMIR commander arrived in Kigali on 22 October 1993 followed by an advance party of 21 military personnel on 27 October. On November 1, 1993, the NMOG II was integrated into UNAMIR. The UNAMIR continue to function both as peacekeeping operation and verification mission.

  1. “OAU to Observe Ceasefire in Rwanda,” Xinhua General News Service, July 29, 1992.
  2. “Rwanda’s Warring Parties Sign Reconciliation Agreement,” Xinhua General News Service, August 1, 1992.
  3. “Rwanda: Glimmer Of Understanding at Peace Talks,” IPS-Inter Press Service, August 14, 1992.
  4. “Rwanda RPF Radio Reports on Issues Discussed at Arusha Talks,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 26, 1992.
  5. “Rwanda RPF Says Habyarimana Sabotaging Arusha Talks,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 18, 1992.
  6. “Rwanda: Peace Negotiations Halted As Fighting Rages on,” IPS-Inter Press Service, February 11, 1993.
  7. “Rwanda; Government Declares Cease-Fire; Wants RPF to Return to Previous Positions,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 17, 1993.
  8. “Rwanda: MOG Wants More Staff and Equipment; Government Proposes Meeting With RPF,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 18, 1993.
  9. “Rwanda: Fighting Continues, Reportedly Closer to Kigali,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 6, 1993.
  10. “Rwanda: Foreign Minister and Observer Group Commander Discuss Cease-Fire,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 12, 1993.
  11. “Rwanda: Government And RPF Sign Proposals on Army Merger; RPF Troop Withdrawals,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts/The Monitoring Report, March 22, 1993.
  12. “Rwanda; Military Observer Group Confirms that RPF Has Withdrawn Its Forces,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 22, 1993.
  13. “Rwanda: Hundreds Rejoice over Peace Accord,” IPS-Inter Press Service, August 4, 1993.
  14. “Rwanda — UNAMIR,” accessed September 27, 2011, http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unamir_b.htm.
  15. Ibid.
  16. Ibid.

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 1994

As the establishment of transitional government was delayed, the security situation deteriorated. Prominent political leaders were assassinated. It was reported that the UNAMIR escorted RPF convoy was ambushed. Under the grave security situation, the UN Security Council on 30 March 1994, the secretary general recommended that the UNAMIR should continue to support the negotiations and recommended an extension of the UNMIR’s mandate. Accordingly, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of UNAMIR until 29 July 1994. Aircraft carrying President Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi crashed at Kigali airport crashed on 6 April 1994 killing all those on board. This incident was followed by the months of genocidal violence. The UNAMIR tried to bring both sides together for securing a ceasefire but both sides maintained rigid positions. On 21 April 1994, the Security Council adopted a resolution 912 to reduce the number of UNAMIR personnel and adjusted the mandate of the UNAMIR to act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure ceasefire agreement and resume humanitarian reliefs including the security of civilians. As of early May the UNAMIR strength was 444 personnel.1

On 13 May 1994, however, the Secretary-General recommended a new mandate for UNAMIR, which would include 5,500 troops. The Security Council, by its resolution 918 (17 May 1994) authorized the expansion of the UNAMIR to 5,500 troops and imposed an arms embargo on Rwanda. The objective of the UNAMIR’s expanded mandate was to promote security in all sectors of Rwanda and create conditions for return and settlement of refugees and IDPs as well as support the humanitarian response. By October, all 5,500 troops were deployed and by 15 November 80 of 90 police observers authorized for UNAMIR were deployed.2 Related to the creating climate of security in camps and facilitating the resettlement of IDPs, the UNAMIR undertook an operation from 13 to 15 December 1994 to enhance security in the KIBEHO and Ndago displaced persons camps where disruptive elements had been active.3 According to the Secretary General’s report, 60 human rights monitors were deployed in the country to monitor the condition of returning refugees and IDPs. The UNMIR also helped the government to restore its administration capacity in western zones.4

  1. Ibid.
  2. Ibid.
  3. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/107), February 6, 1995.
  4. “UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1994/1133), October 6, 1994.

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 1995

The UNAMIR Continued to monitor the situation. As of January 1995, UNAMIR’s strength was 5,740 including all rank forces that were providing security in the IDP camps and the border region. The mission helped a lot in establishing a suitable conditions and a favorable climate for the lunching of Operation Retour, which was an integrated inter-agency initiative aimed at facilitating the safe resettlement of IDPs. The UNHCR and the UN Volunteers continued to monitor the human rights situation.1 By the end of November, the force level stood at 1,783 troops and 37 staff officers and 285 military observers.2 The UNAMIR also provided security to the International Tribunal and the Human Rights Field Operations. By the end of November 1995, the UN Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda had some 120 members deployed in Kigali and in 10 field offices located throughout the country.3

The UNMIR troops had been deliberately targeted as the UNAMIR headquarters was hit by grenades and small arms fire on 15 February. While investigating the attack the following day, eight members of a UNAMIR patrol were injured by a landmine. Similarly on March 5, three grenades were thrown at the guard post which injured to soldiers.4 The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) continued to deny UNAMIR access to part of the country, searched and seized UNAMIR vehicles and equipment, and participated in anti-UNAMIR demonstrations. The UNAMIR and RPA used to hold meetings on a fortnightly basis which did not take place for months.5

UNAMIR’s civilian police component continued to assist in training a new integrated national police force. As of April report by the UN Sectary General, UNAMIR civilian police component was expecting to complete the training of 300 gendarmes and 20 instructors. It was requested to train additional 400 gendarmes before the training of 100 instructors. The police component also assisted the National Gendarmerie in operational requirements to ensure that the gendarmes were ready and properly equipped for deployment after their training.6 The civilian police component, as part of the UNAMIR’s monitoring and investigatory activities, were deployed in a team of 3-4 observers in each of Rwanda’s 11 prefectures. The observers worked closely with local authorities, UN agencies and NGOs and assisted human rights and the UNAMIR personnel.7 By the end of the year, there were 85 civilian police observers deployed, who continued to perform monitoring activities. By the end of November, the civilian police component trained some 403 gendarmes and the training of additional 515 was scheduled to be completed by December. The civilian police trained 918 of the 6,000 trained gendarmes needed.8

The Secretary General advised the Security Council on 1 December 1995 that national reconciliation in Rwanda required the creation of conditions for the safe return of refugees and the extension of UNAMIR’s mandate was desirable.9 The Rwandan government, however, officially informed the Secretary General on 8 December 1995 that the UNAMIR as peacekeeping mission did not respond to Rwanda’s priority needs. The government, however, indicated the continued presence of UN for the purpose to assist rehabilitation and reconstruction, including technical expertise, financial assistance and equipment.10 For the smooth withdrawal of the UNAMIR, the Security Council by its resolution 1029 (1995) of 12 December, extended the mandate for a final period until 8 March 1996.11

  1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/107), February 6, 1995.
  2. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/1002), December 1, 1995.
  3. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/1002), December 1, 1995.
  4. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/297), April 9, 1995.
  5. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/457), April 9, 1995.
  6. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/297), April 9, 1995.
  7. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/297), April 9, 1995.
  8. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/1002), December 1, 1995.
  9. “Rwanda-UNAMIR Facts and Figures.”
  10. Ibid.
  11. Ibid.

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 1996

The mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), ended on 8 March 1996. After the withdrawal of UNAMIR, UN opened its office in Rwanda with major activities to coordination the UN activities at a senior level and serve as an advisory office for Rwanda.1

The observer role of the UNAMIR concluded in Rwanda in 1996. However, UNHCR continued to coordinate the repatriation and rehabilitation of refugees.

  1. “Rwanda; UN secretary-general’s envoy outlines role of new UN office,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 26, 1996.

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 1997

The UNAMIR concluded its mandate in March 1996.

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 1998

No further developments observed.

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 1999

No further developments observed.

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 2000

No further developments observed.

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 2001

No further developments observed.

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 2002

No further developments observed.