Demobilization: Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict

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Demobilization: Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict

Implementations

Demobilization – 1991

The United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) became operational as soon as the Paris Agreement was signed in October 1991. Brigadier-General Michel Loridon (France), Senior Military Liaison Officer, assumed command of the military elements of the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) on November 12, 1991. As agreed on in the Paris agreement, parties had to demobilize 70 percent of the rival armies. But as of December 1991, the UN had failed to approve a budget or decide on the strength of the force it would send to Cambodia to monitor the ceasefire and demobilization of 70 percent of the rival armies and to help run the country before the UN-supervised elections.1

  1. “Speed up Cambodia UN force — Evans,” The Age (Melbourne, Australia), December 18, 1991; “Cambodia – UNAMIC Background,” United Nations, accessed July 22, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamicbackgr.html.

Demobilization – 1992

The UN force was carrying out reconnaissance throughout the country to prepare for the containment of those troops who would not be demobilized. Containment was expected to take place in early June and demobilization shortly thereafter.2 As of September 1992, the Khmer armed group remained intact while the rival armies of the two non-communist factions had broken up in anticipation of UN-supervised demobilization. The demobilization was several months behind schedule.3

Following the beginning of phase II on June 13, 1992, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was to have completed the regrouping and cantonment process within four weeks — that is, by July 11. The process was expected to disarm and demobilize 70% of the country’s estimated 200,000 soldiers. As of July 10, of the estimated 200,000 troops, the numbers of cantoned troops were as follows: CPAF, 9,003; ANKI, 3,187; KPNLAF, 1,322[G1] . However, reflecting the PDK’s position of non-cooperation, no NADK troops were cantoned.4 “As for the cantonment process, which had begun in June with the declaration of phase II, some 55,000 troops of the three participating factions, or approximately a quarter of the estimated total number of troops, entered the cantonment sites and handed over their weapons. This process, however, had to be suspended, due to the non-compliance by PDK and the deterioration of the military situation. Some 40,000 cantoned troops were subsequently released on agricultural leave, subject to recall by UNTAC” (United Nations).5

  1. “UN deterrent or ploy in hands of rival militias? CAMBODIA, As Khmer Rouge regularly violates a truce, critics wonder if they are using peacekeepers in a bid to expand control,” The Globe and Mail (Canada), May 4, 1992.
  2. “PM calls on Cambodia at a point of no return,” The Age (Melbourne, Australia), September 25, 1992.
  3. “SECOND PHASE OF CEASEFIRE, MAY – NOVEMBER 1992,” United Nations, Cambodia – UNTAC Background, accessed July 19, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacbackgr2.html#two.
  4. “SECOND PHASE OF CEASEFIRE, MAY – NOVEMBER 1992,” United Nations, Cambodia – UNTAC Background, accessed July 19, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacbackgr2.html#two.

Demobilization – 1993

The demobilization and disarmament process was suspended. With the Khmer Rouge’s refusal to respect the terms of “Phase Two,” the other factions stopped disarming and, in most cases, called their demobilized men back into service.5 A new Cambodian armed force comprised of the CPP, FUNCINPEC, and KPNLF armies was formed. The demobilization process was terminated without implementation.

  1. “UN struggles on despite failure of peace accord Kevin Barrington reports on the difficulties the UN has faced in trying to bring the main factions together in Cambodia,” The Irish Times, April 10, 1993.

Demobilization – 1994

With the formation of a new armed force, the demobilization process terminated without implementation.

Demobilization – 1995

No developments observed this year.

Demobilization – 1996

No developments observed this year.

Demobilization – 1997

No developments observed this year.

Demobilization – 1998

The demobilization process began after a pause of some years. In December 1998, Tie Banh, co-defense minister, said that the governments had formulated a plan to demobilize up to tens of thousands of soldiers each year.6

  1. “CAMBODIA: MINISTER ON TROOP DEMOBILIZATION,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific — Political, December 21, 1998.

Demobilization – 1999

The demobilization process began gradually. On January 15, 1999, “the Royal Government of Cambodia announced that it would demobilize 79,000 troops – 55,000 soldiers in the Cambodian Royal Armed Forces and 24,000 policemen – over a five-year period. According to a press communiqué from the Information Ministry dated 15th January (1999), Samdech Prime Minister Hun Sen submitted this proposal to the Council of Ministers’ session on the morning of 15th January. The proposal was adopted at the meeting. The communiqué further said that, in order to facilitate this demobilization process, the Royal Government planned to set aside a budget to provide 1,200 dollars currency not further specified each (sic) to the demobilized personnel who would also be given vocational training in enterprises and guidance to get a job to earn a living” (BBC, 1999).7

On February 25, 1999, the Cambodian government “appealed donor countries and international financial institutions to provide 104m dollars in financial, technical and material support over the next five years for demobilizing 55,000 soldiers. Sok An, senior minister in charge of the office of the council of ministers, made the request in a statement on the opening day of a two-day donor conference in Tokyo. He also disclosed a timetable for downsizing the army, saying 11,500 soldiers would be cut in 2000, 11,000 in 2001, 20,500 in 2002 and the remaining 12,000 in 2003” (BBC, 1999). The government estimated that there were 148,000 soldiers. However, this figure was widely disputed. Upon completion of the program, the government estimated that the share of defense in recurrent expenditure would be reduced from the 1998 figure of 35.8 percent to about 20 percent.8

As part of the reform program, 14 military officials were promoted to the rank of brigadier-general and 23 others to the rank of major-general. The promotions were “part of the army restructuring and demobilization efforts to divert the budget from this sector to the social services” (BBC, 1999).9

At a donor conference, the Cambodian government stated that it had discovered 15,551 “ghost” soldiers and 159,587 dependents. However, purging these individuals from the payroll has been a slow process. It was also reported that, at the end of September 1999, the number of illegal weapons confiscated consisted of 16,412 rifles, 11 land mines, and 345 hand grenades. In a conference it was stated that people had voluntarily turned in 5,655 rifles, 190 hand grenades, and 332 land mines, and that the government had destroyed 20,112 rifles.10

  1. “Cambodia to Demobilize 79,000 Security Personnel Over Five Years,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific — Political, January 18, 1999, http://www.camnet.com.kh/ocm/government35.htm.
  2. “Cambodia Seeks 104M to Demobilize Soldiers at Japan Aid Conference,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific — Political, February 25, 1999.
  3. “Cambodia: Army Officers Promoted as Part of Restructuring Programme,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific — Political, March 3, 1999.
  4. “Cambodia donors satisfied but military demobilization slow,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific — Political, October 29, 1999.

Demobilization – 2000

“The last experimental demobilization was held in Battambang Province. It involved 421 troops and began on the 11th of July, 2000” (BBC, 2000).11 The World Bank was also involved in the demobilization process. It provided $15 million dollars for military demobilization in Cambodia in 2001. The World Food Program (WFP) had also promised to provide rice for demobilized soldiers. “In a pilot project, the government had cut off 1,500 soldiers from government’s pay rolls while WFP had assisted 150 kilograms of rice to each demobilized soldier” (Xinhua, 2000).12 Even if the experimental demobilization ended, there were efforts to demobilize soldiers from the Royal Cambodian Army and downsize the armed force.

NOTE: The World Bank awarded Cambodia a loan of 18.4 million in 2001 to be put toward achieving the objective of military reform in Cambodia. The program would involve the demobilization of some 30,000 soldiers. “This DDR process only affects people who have already been integrated into the armed forces, and is aimed at leaving troop numbers at between 70,000 and 80,000. Reform of the armed forces has been delayed by mistakes committed during the DDR process and by a lack of sufficient funding. The reforms that remain to be implemented will have to deal with the demobilization of a number of inactive troops and a larger number of officers. The World Bank calculated in 1991 that DDR would lead to a saving of 10.3 million dollars a year in military spending. However, in October 2006, Government approved the compulsory military service, against the Armed Forces reduction plans, justified by the high unemployment level of young people in the country” (ECP).13 By 2006, Cambodia still had 110,000 soldiers, which someone said would be downsized to 70,000 in month or year.14

  1. “”Last experimental demobilization” to be held in northwest Cambodia 15th July,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific — Political, July 7, 2000.
  2. “World Bank Pledges to Assist Demobilization in Cambodia, Emerging Markets Datafile,” Xinhua, December 20, 2000.
  3. “Cambodia,” ECP Escola de Cultura de Pau, accessed May 10, 2010, http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/mapa/camboyai.pdf.
  4. “Cambodia to downsize troops by 40,000,” Xinhua, October 16, 2010, accessed May 10, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-10/16/content_5210561.htm.