Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict

1991

Minimum Implementation

“On 27 November 1991, the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) delegation arrived in Phnom Penh. It was forced to flee, however, after demonstrations against the delegation became violent, and its members were attacked” (United Nations).¹ Despite the cease-fire agreement, opposing armies sought control over territory and rural populations before the deployment of UN peacekeepers.²

According to the Cambodian Defense Ministry, Pol Pot’s army strived to extend their control over areas by attacking the position of the Cambodian army. The ministry’s press release states that at dawn on November 11, 1991, “between 200 and 300 army men of Pol Pot’s Division 785 and Son Sann faction launched an offensive against three positions of the Cambodian army in the region of Kouk Rovieng, between 9 and 12 kilometres north-west of the district seat of Stoung, Kompong Thom Province.” This suggests that a breach of the ceasefire agreement occurred. From November 10 – 14, Pol Pot’s troops (between 70 to 80 infantrymen with artillery support) attacked three positions of a garrison at Puok district in Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey Province. These three assaults were repelled by the local irregular forces.³

1. “Cambodia – UNAMIC Background — Introduction,” United Nations, accessed July 19, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamicbackgr.html.
2. “Sihanouk Ends Exile, Returns to Cambodia; Troops, Rebels Clash Despite Cease-Fire,” Washington Post, November 14, 1991, A37.
3. “Defence Ministry alleges cease-fire violation,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 19, 1991; SPK News Agency, Phnom Penh, in English, November 1991, 0407 gmt 15.

1992

Minimum Implementation

The cessation of hostilities did not hold. On February 28, 1992, the UN Security Council passed a resolution that strongly urged the “Cambodian parties to agree to the complete demobilization of their military forces prior to the end of the process of registration of the elections as well as to the destruction of the weapons and ammunitions deposied (sic) into the Authoriy’s custody in excess of those, if any, which may be deemed necessary by the Authority for the maintenance of civil order and national defense, or which may be required by the new Cambodian Government” (United Nations, 1992).¹

On May 9, 1992, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) announced phase II of the ceasefire – the cantonment, disarming, and demobilization phase. UNTAC did not receive cooperation from PDK.²

“In June, the Khmer Rouge refused to disarm or allow UN peacekeeping troops on the territory they controlled. KR argued that they did not want to disarm because there still were Vietnamese forces in the country. In mid-July the KR seized six villages and attacked UN helicopters. The UN Security Council at several occasions (S/RES/766 in July, S/RES/783 in October) demanded that KR comply with phase II of the Paris Agreement. On November 30th, the Security Council adopted resolution S/RES/792 imposing a trade embargo on areas under KR control. On 2 December six UN soldiers were held capture for two days by KR accused of spying” (The New York Times, 1992).³

Using quotes from the Voice of the People of Cambodia, the BBC reported that ”between 23rd October 1991 and 23rd October 1992, the Khmer Rouge launched 244 shellings and 124 attacks on SOC (State of Cambodia) positions” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1992). The breaches ”resulted in 79 people and a Buddhist monk being killed and 140 others wounded” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1992). “The radio also reported that, according to sources at the SOC’s military coordination committee with the United Nations, the Khmer Rouge recently engaged in activities that violated the SOC sovereignty through their troopsÕ infiltration of zones under SOC control.”⁴

1. “Resolution 745 (1992),” UN Security Council (S/RES/745), February 28, 1992, par. 8.
2. “SECOND PHASE OF CEASEFIRE, MAY – NOVEMBER 1992,” Cambodia-UNTAC Background, accessed July 19, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacbackgr2.html#two.
3. “Khmer Rouge Frees 6 U.N. Soldiers in Cambodia,” The New York Times, December 5, 1992.
4. “Khmer Rouge Ceasefire Violations Reported,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 31, 1992.

1993

Minimum Implementation

On January 4, Prince Sihanouk, Chairman of the Supreme National Council (SNC), declared his withdrawal from the peace process and cooperation with UNTAC. He claimed that the increasing political violence against his party, FUNCINPEC (a French acronym that translates into the ‘National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative CambodiaÕ), and the failure of UNTAC to curtail this violence were main reasons for his withdrawal. After meetings with UNTAC officials, Sihanouk agreed to return to the peace process a week later. In late January, the transitional government forces launched a large-scale military offensive against the Khmer Rouge.

One of the UN Chief Administrators in Cambodia, Gerard Porcell, threatened to resign, citing the reasons for resignation as the UN’s failure to stop the violence and intimidation allegedly carried out by the Khmer Rouge and the CPP (the former government), which is short for the Cambodian People’s Party. Porcell stayed until the May 1993 election.¹ According to the Sydney Morning Herald report from March 31, 1993, “the Khmer Rouge has refused to disarm, which has forced the UN to stop disarming other factions. Cease-fire violations occur almost daily, threatening a key stipulation of the accords that the election be politically neutral and free of intimidation and violence” (Sydney Morning Herald, 1993).²

1. Benny Widyono, Dancing in Shadows: Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge, and the United Nations in Cambodia, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 17.
2. “Cambodians Return to an Uncertain Future,” Sydney Morning Herald, March 31, 1993,10.

1994

Minimum Implementation

On May 28, 1994, the National Assembly delegation and the Royal Government of Cambodia issued a statement in Pyongyang that top representatives of the KOC, namely the National Assembly and the Royal Government, fully accepted the king’s proposal for a cease-fire. However, the ceasefire proposal was rejected by the Khmer Rouge.¹

“The Cambodian parliament adopted legislation here Thursday to outlaw the Khmer Rouge after including amendments to safeguard against human rights abuses. Interior Minister You Hokry said here Tuesday (July 5, 1994) that the authorities were still holding 14 Thai citizens in connection with a failed coup bid during the last weekend. This included the arrest of former Interior Minister Sing Song, Interior Secretary of State Sin Sen and Senior Police Officer Tes Choy. However, the alleged coup plot co-leader Prince Norodom Chakrapong, half brother of Prince Ranariddh, was allowed, through the intervention of his father, the king, to leave the country for Malaysia. The government is currently hunting two interior minister generals and an Undersecretary of State Defense Chhay Sang Yung, all three of whom may have fled to Vietnam.”²

It was reported that the Khmer Rouge had committed atrocities against civilians in the last three months of the year, as part of their campaign against the government. From April through June attempts to begin peace talks were made, but they fail due to the Khmer Rouge refusal to agree to a ceasefire.³

1. “Khmer Rouge rejects cease-fire schedule,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 30, 1994.
2. “Cambodian parliament passes law banning Khmer Rouge,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, July 7, 1994.
3. “Cambodia,” Uppsala Conflict Data Program, accessed July 19, 2010, http://www.pcr.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=27®ionSelect=7-Eastern_Asia#1992.

1995

Minimum Implementation

The Cambodian government had offered amnesty to members of the Khmer Rouge, which expired on January 15, 1995. According to government figures, almost 2,000 fighters had surrendered in the month prior to January. The government estimated the current strength of the Khmer Rouge was between 5,000 and 10,000 hard-core troops.¹ There were some positive developments in August: members of the Khmer Rouge were reported to have said that they would go to Phnom Penh to lay the groundwork for negotiations with the Cambodian Government in order to end the country’s long-running civil war. The rebels, however, “agreed to the talks once the government dropped demands that a ceasefire be signed before negotiations.”² A ceasefire agreement was not reached.

1. “January, 1995, Cambodia,” in Keesing’s Record of World Events, vol. 41, 40366.
2. “Khmer Rouge in Peace Talks Offer,” Herald Sun, August 11, 1995.

1996

Minimum Implementation

On August 20, a breakaway faction of the Khmer Rouge, which was based in Pailin and led by Pol Pot’s former deputy Ieng Sary, and the Cambodian army agreed to a ceasefire in territories under the rebels’ control.¹ After some political maneuvering, the king signed a royal degree granting amnesty to the defector, Mr. Ieng, on September 16.²

Though the Khmer Rouge still controlled areas of Cambodia, particularly in the north near Anlong Veng, it had lost more than half of its military strength and the area around Pailin, which was rich in natural resources, including gems and logs.

1. “Khmer Rouge “coup” faction agrees to ceasefire,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, August 20, 1996.
2. “Rebel leader given amnesty Cambodian peace talks back on track,” The Globe and Mail (Canada), September 16, 1996.

1997

Minimum Implementation

In 1997, the conflict between the
government and the Khmer Rouge continued, even though clashes became less
intense due to the fact that many KR members had defected.

There were also clashes between the two government coalition parties, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) government and the main faction of the FUNCINPEC. On July 7, 1997, Hun Sen, the leader of the CPP, overthrew Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh in a brutal, bloody coup. Two days of fighting left at least 58 people dead and hundreds wounded. Ranariddh’s forces were overwhelmed. In the days following Ranariddh’s overthrow, Hun Sen’s soldiers hunted down supporters of Ranariddh’s FUNCINPEC party. Several of the victims were apparently tortured before being murdered; four of the bodyguards of Nhiek Bun Chhay, Ranariddh’s top military commander, were found with their eyes gouged out. Nhiek Bun Chhay narrowly escaped. Former Interior Minister, Ho Sok, was shot in the head while in the custody of Hun Sen’s military.¹ In late August, “King Sihanouk joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Prince Ranariddh in calling for peace talks and a mutual ceasefire. Hun Sen refused, claiming the resistance fighters are law-breakers who ought to give up or be apprehended.”²

1. Bruce Sharp, “Butchers on a Smaller Scale: Hun Sen and the Cambodian People’s Party,” 1997, accessed July 19, 2010, http://www.mekong.net/cambodia/hun_sen1.htm.
2. “Cambodian king talks with new strongman Hun Sen,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, September 6, 1997.

1998

Intermediate Implementation

On February 27, Cambodia’s warring factions agreed to a ceasefire, ending months of fighting between Phnom Penh’s troops and the deposed co-premier Prince Norodom Ranariddh’s resistance army. This ceasefire agreement completed the first of a four step Japanese peace plan aimed at enabling the exiled prince to return to Cambodia and participate in July’s scheduled elections.¹

The Khmer Rouge guerrilla movement broke the ceasefire agreement between Cambodia’s two main warring political factions on Sunday, March 1, 1998, and vowed to keep fighting the Phnom Penh government.² Many KR fighters that had come over to the government with the KR leadership, including Khiev Samphan, defected in December 1998. The last armed resistance ended with the capture of the last remaining KR soldiers, led by Ta Mok in December 1999.

1. “Ceasefire puts exiled prince back in poll picture,” The Weekend Australia, February 28, 1998.
2. “Khmer Rouge blast Cambodian ceasefire, vow to keep fighting Hun Sen,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 1, 1998.

1999

Full Implementation

In the 1997 coup, the leader of the royalist faction, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, was effectively ousted from his position as co-prime minister by rival Cambodian leader Hun Sen; also, several leaders of the royalist faction, including their military leaders, were executed. More than 5,000 of the royalist fighters who fought against Cambodian armed forces loyal to the CPP during the bloody 1997 coup officially rejoined a united military during a ceremony on Friday, February 26, 1999. The ceremony marked the final integration of the remaining royalist forces into the army. Thousands of Khmer Rouge fighters were also integrated as the guerrilla movement collapsed from mass defections.¹ The ceasefire was finally holding.

1. “Royalist resistance forces rejoin Cambodian army,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, February 26, 1999.

2000

Full Implementation

The ceasefire was maintained.

1991

Intermediate Implementation

The informal meeting of the parties to the conflict took place in Jakarta on September 10, 1990. In this meeting the composition of the Supreme National Council (SNC) was finalized. The Cambodian parties present in the informal meeting agreed that the 12 member SNC would be comprised in the following way: Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk as President; six members from the State of Cambodia; 2 members from the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF); 1 member from the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC); and 2 members from the Democratic Kampuchea or Khmer Rouge. ¹ Throughout the transitional period, the SNC was the legitimate body and source of authority in which the sovereignty, independence, and unity of Cambodia were enshrined.

On 20 November 1991, Hun Sen — leader of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and Chairman of the State of Cambodia’s Council of Ministers — and Prince Norodom Ranariddh — Secretary-General of FUNCINPEC — signed a memorandum establishing an alliance between the CPP and FUNCINPEC, as did members of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia.²

1. Nady Tan, “National Conference on Peace, National reconciliation and Democracy Building: Ten Years after the Paris Peace Agreement,” 2001, accessed July 14, 2010, http://www.camnet.com.kh/ocm/government102.htm.
2. “Alliance between CPP and FUNCINPEC,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 22, 1991.

1992

Intermediate Implementation

Throughout the transitional period, the SNC continued to work as the legitimate governing body and source of authority in which the sovereignty, independence, and unity of Cambodia were enshrined.

1993

Full Implementation

Elections took place from May 23 to 28, 1993. FUNCINPEC won 58 seats in the Constituent Assembly, CPP won 51, the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) won 10, and a fourth political party, the National Movement for the Liberation of Kampuchea (MOLINAKA), won 1. At the June 10 meeting of the SNC, which was presided over by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General issued a statement on behalf of the Secretary-General and the United Nations declaring that the elections as a whole had been free and fair. The Security Council endorsed the results of the elections with resolution 840 (1993) of June 15. However, the CPP began to make numerous allegations that electoral irregularities had occurred as the counting proceeded. It also requested that the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) hold new elections in seven provinces. At the June 10 meeting of the SNC, the CPP announced that it could not recognize the results of the elections and demanded an investigation of the irregularities.

Over time, the CPP softened its position. The duly elected Constituent Assembly began work on June 14, 1993. At the inaugural session, it adopted a resolution to make Prince Sihanouk Head of State retroactive to 1970, thus making the coup d’état of March 18, 1970 null and void. The Assembly gave the Prince full powers as Head of State. The following day, Prince Sihanouk proposed the formation of an Interim Joint Administration (GNPC) with Prince Ranariddh and Mr. Hun Sen as Co-Chairmen.¹ This occurrence indicated a degree of confidence between FUNCINPEC and the CPP.

On June 16, FUNCINPEC and the CPP agreed to interim power sharing — an agreement brokered by Sihanouk. As per this agreement, all four political parties that had won representation in the Constituent Assembly would be represented in the Provisional National Government of Cambodia (PNGC). FUNCINPEC and the CPP would divide control of the major ministries, and Ranariddh and Hun Sen would serve as Co-Chairs of the PNGC and as Co-Ministers of Defense, Interior, and Public Security.

Ranariddh and Hun Sen met on June 24 to discuss the formation of the PNGC. Although they reached an agreement on the composition of the government, this agreement had not been introduced to the Assembly as of early July.² FUNCINPEC, in the Council of Ministers, shared power with the CPP. Given that this was a unique circumstance it can be coded as continuation of power-sharing deals – perhaps of a different nature. (With a resolution adopted by the Constituent Assembly on June 14, 1993 to restore monarchy by making the coup of March 18, 1970 null and void, and with the departure of UNTAC on September 21, 1993, the power-sharing agreement between warring parties can be coded as “ended” in Cambodia. Since the SNC was still in place as of June 14, 1993, 1993 can be coded as a year where there was national power-sharing.)

1. “Cambodia – UNTAC Background,” United Nations, accessed July 19, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacbackgr2.html#two.
2. “June, 1993 Cambodia,” Keesing’s Record of World Events, vol. 39, 39513.

1994

Full Implementation

Sihanouk’s proposed formation of an Interim Joint Administration (GNPC), with Prince Ranariddh and Mr. Hun Sen as Co-Chairmen of the Council of Ministers, continued into 1994.

1995

Full Implementation

Sihanouk’s proposed formation of an Interim Joint Administration (GNPC), with Prince Ranariddh and Mr. Hun Sen as Co-Chairmen of the Council of Ministers, continued into 1995.

1996

Full Implementation

Joint leadership of the government continued between FUNCINPEC and the CCP (both signatories of the Paris agreement). Power-sharing shifted dramatically in the new coalition government.¹ The CPP never really shared power in the coalition government, but obstructed all efforts by FUNCINPEC to govern. FUNCINPEC, for its part, lacked qualified administrators. The coalition never functioned well, and over the course of the three years, it descended in an ever-worsening spiral.

1. Sorpong Peou, Intervention & Change in Cambodia: Towards Democracy? (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), ch. 5-6.

1997

Full Implementation

Power-sharing between FUNCINPEC and the CPP collapsed during the July 7, 1997 coup. Hun Sen, the leader of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), overthrew Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh in a brutal, bloody coup.¹ This formally brought about the termination of the power-sharing deals, which had extended beyond 1993 — the year when the Constituent Assembly restored the monarch and UNTAC concluded its mission in Cambodia.

1. “Butchers on a Smaller Scale: Hun Sen and the Cambodian People’s Party,” accessed July 19, 2010, http://www.mekong.net/cambodia/hun_sen1.htm.

1998

Intermediate Implementation

In a July election, Hun Sen’s ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) won 64 of parliament’s 122 seats, but was short of the number required to form a new government alone. The CPP and FUNCINPEC formed a coalition government. The CPP received 12 ministries, FUNCINPEC took 11, and two were shared, while each party appointed a deputy premier.¹ The new government was not evenly split in terms of power; the FUNCINPEC ministries were those that largely provided social services, like education, health, culture, and women’s affairs, while the CPP ministries were those with real power, including defense, interior, finance, and information. In this new arrangement, the CPP secured control over state power. As a matter of fact, this coalition government was formed not because of provisions in the peace agreement but because of the electoral outcome.

1. “Back from the Brink: Cambodian Democracy Gets a Second Chance,” International Crisis Group, Asia Report N°4 (January 1999), 8.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

Multiparty elections took place in 1998. A coalition government was formed, which was different from the power-sharing provisions in the Paris Agreement.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

Multiparty elections took place in 1998. A coalition government was formed, which was different from the power-sharing provisions in the Paris Agreement.

1991

Intermediate Implementation

The process of constitutional reform in Cambodia began after the formalization of the Supreme National Council (SNC) and before the formal signing of the Paris Agreement. On September 25, 1991, the SNC of Cambodia agreed on the number of seats in the Constituent Assembly, the number of members of the Constituent Assembly that could be adopted in a new constitution, and the time frame for the organization of elections. These were supplements to the draft agreement on Cambodia. The SNC decided that there would be 120 seats in the Constituent Assembly, and that the Constituent Assembly could adopt the new constitution only with two-thirds of its membersÕ votes. The Supreme National Council also agreed to organize elections within six months from the first day of electoral registration.¹

The National Assembly of Cambodia amended Cambodia’s constitution to make the constitutional clauses suitable to the new developments in political liberalization. The constitution was now in accordance with democracy and national reconciliation, and also particularly constructed to conform to the implementation of the peace agreement.²

1. “Cambodian SNC Reaches Three More Agreements,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 2, 1991.
2. “National Assembly Meets to Adopt Measures Following Recent Unrest,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 30, 1991.

1992

Intermediate Implementation

In a SNC meeting on September 10, “HRH Prince Norodom Sihanouk proposed the setting up of a committee to work out the principles for a new constitution and suggested that the committee should be composed of three members from the Phnom Penh administration and one member from each of the other three parties, and the representatives of UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) . HRH Prince Norodom Sihanouk, in replying to the question raised by Mr Ieng Muli with regard to the mandate of the SNC and UNTAC, stated that the task of the committee was to facilitate the work of a Constituent Assembly. The proposal of HRH Prince Norodom Sihanouk was agreed on.”¹

1. “Phnom Penh and FUNCINPEC Release Communiques on 10th September SNC Meeting,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 September 1992.

1993

Full Implementation

The elections for the Constituent Assembly took place from May 23 to 28, 1993.
The Constitution Drafting Committee began writing the Cambodian constitution on July 1 and finished it on August 18, 1993. The draft of Cambodia’s 120-article constitution was scheduled to be presented to HRH Prince Norodom Sihanouk in Pyongyang, North Korea on August 31, 1993.¹

Debate over the draft constitution began in the Constituent Assembly on September 15, 1993.² On September 21, 1993, the Constituent Assembly of Cambodia adopted a new constitution. The new constitution formally adopted a constitutional monarch.³

1. “Hun Sen, Ranariddh and Chea Sim to present constitution to Sihanouk in Pyongyang,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 23, 1993.
2. “Constituent Assembly begins constitution debate,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 16, 1993.
3. “Son Sann’s closing speech at Constituent Assembly: constitution adopted,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 22, 1993.

1994

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1995

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1991

Intermediate Implementation

Political party reform began before the signing of the Paris peace agreement. On October 18, 1991, the ruling party in Cambodia, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), declared a formal end to more than 13 years of communism, replacing its president and embracing multiparty democracy and a free-market system.¹ This could be coded as political party reform.

1. “Cambodians officially end communism,” The Globe and Mail (Canada), October 19, 1991.

1992

Intermediate Implementation

In the Supreme National Council (SNC) meeting, it was unanimously decided that only Cambodians had the right to take part in the electoral process. It was decided that appropriate amendments to the draft electoral law would be drafted in accordance with the above proposals and would be discussed in the Technical Consultative Committee.¹

According to a BBC News report (1992),² a draft of the electoral law was presented to the Supreme National Council on April 1, 1992 with the following amendments–

”The right to register to vote at the election is granted to every Cambodian person who is of, or over, the age of 18 years or will attain that age during the period of registration.”

A Cambodian person is defined as

– a person born in Cambodia, with a mother or father born in Cambodia,
– a person born outside of Cambodia, with a mother (or father born) in Cambodia whose mother or father was also born in Cambodia.

”The symbol of a political party cannot be accepted for registration if it contains a portrait of His Royal Highness Prince Norodom Sihanouk”.

”Voting facilities for overseas voters are to be provided at one polling station in Europe, one in North America and one in Australia. Registration of voters is to take place exclusively in Cambodia”.

”The election campaign period is to start on the day that the (chief) electoral officer publishes the final list of registered parties and ends four days before the start of polling”.

”Any omission which would be an offence if committed during the campaign period shall also be an offence if committed before or after the campaign”.

Parties to the conflict did not agree on the amendments to the electoral law during the August 5, 1992 meeting of the SNC. Yasushi Akashi, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Cambodia, used his power as stated in Annex 1, Part D, Paragraph 3A and adopted the law. The electoral law adopted a formula to provide voting rights to Cambodians, as had been stipulated in the 1954 Cambodian Civil Code. The law required that the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) prepare elections for Cambodians living abroad, prohibited the use of HRH Prince Norodom Sihanouk’s picture as the symbol of a party on the ballots, and also permitted amendments of the bill in accordance with the situation.³ The Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) opposed the draft law on the grounds that it would give voting rights to the Vietnamese.

This could be coded as reform in electoral law.

The registration of voters was to start on October 5, 1992, and 16 parties were expected to be provisionally registered.

1. “Communique on 10th June Supreme National Council Meeting,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 16, 1992.
2. “UNTAC; The Elections; The Peace Process,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 20, 1992.
3. “Communique on 5th August SNC Meeting,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 15, 1992.

1993

Full Implementation

Electoral violence continued and the PDK violated the ceasefire agreement. Political parties were violating electoral law. According to a UN source cited in a Reuters report, more than a dozen leading politicians, including Prime Minister Hun Sen, were sent warning letters by UNTAC earlier in the month threatening to end their candidacies if they continued to violate electoral laws.¹ The Constituent Assembly elections took place from May 23 to 28, 1993. “Mr Yasushi Akashi, head of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), yesterday (May 20, 1993) described the just-concluded election campaign as a “success” despite reports of political slayings in outlying provinces. Speaking at the last meeting of Cambodia’s Supreme National Council (SNC) before the May 23-28 elections, he said the 43-day canvassing period had been conducted properly, with “remarkably little campaign-related violence”. He said that more than 800,000 people attended about 1,500 rallies without a single major incident of violence” (The Straits Times, 1993).²

1. “Election campaign a success, says UNTAC chief,” The Straits Times, May 21, 1993.
2. Ibid.

No further developments observed.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1991

No Implementation

No information was available on judiciary reform for 1991.

1992

Minimum Implementation

During the Supreme National Council (SNC) meeting of 10 September 1991, parties discussed issues related to the peace process, including principles governing the Cambodian judicial system, legal code, and legal procedure, as well as various other issues. All parties, except for the Khmer Rouge, were unanimously in agreement on the issues discussed. The Khmer Rouge rejected the documents and principles governing Cambodia’s judicial system, legal code, and legal procedure.¹

1. “Supreme National Council Meeting on 10th September,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 14, 1992.

1993

Minimum Implementation

In 1993, Hun Sen presented a plan of action for the Provisional National Government of Cambodia (PNGC) that suggested that they “improve the judicial system and make it absolutely independent, create appeals courts and provide more judges for provincial and municipal tribunals in order to increase work efficiency in a timely manner” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1993).¹

The new Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia was promulgated on September 21, 1993. According to Article 39, “Cambodian citizens shall have the right to sue, appeal and demand reparations for damage caused by the illegal acts of state and social organizations and personnel thereof. Settlement of appeals and reparations of damage shall be under the jurisdiction of the court.”

1. “Hun Sen Presents Transitional Government’s Action Plan to Assembly,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 7, 1993.

1994

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1995

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1996

Minimum Implementation

Judicial reform was not extensive. In a newspaper report, a leading Cambodian lawyer said that Cambodia needed to implement extensive legal reforms to accommodate rapid economic changes and instill confidence in foreign investors during this crucial transition period.¹

1. “Legal Reforms Urged to Ensure Economic Growth,” Emerging Markets Data File in NATION, August 28, 1996.

1997

Minimum Implementation

“The lack of an independent judiciary also continued to pose a problem. A Supreme Council of Magistracy, mandated by Cambodia’s constitution to appoint and discipline judges, was expected to meet for the first time in November, but a Constitutional Council that is to provide independent confirmation of legislative compliance with the constitution had yet to be established.”

“U.N. Special Representative for Human Rights in Cambodia Thomas Hammarberg made several visits to Cambodia in 1997. After a visit in March, he raised concerns about the poor functioning of the judicial system.”¹

1. “Human Rights Watch World Report 1998 — Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch 1998, accessed July 20, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/worldreport/Asia-02.htm#P210_63166.

1998

Minimum Implementation

During 1998, the court system was virtually powerless. The judiciary was subject to political pressure.¹

On March 19, 1998, the Cambodian parliament passed legislation that created the Constitutional Council as the country’s supreme judicial body. The nine-member council is mandated to interpret Cambodia’s constitution and its laws.² The body’s two eldest members, Chau Sen Cocsal Chhum and Son Sann, boycotted the meeting of the Constitutional Council, claiming many of their colleagues were illegally appointed and that the body was stacked in favor of strongman Hun Sen’s ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). The CPP, which effectively controlled Cambodia’s judiciary, would now also control the Constitutional Council.³ Judiciary reform did not take place.

1. “Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 — Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch 1999, accessed July 20, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/worldreport99/asia/cambodia.html.
2. “Cambodian parliament passes law establishing supreme judicial body,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 19, 1998.
3. “Cambodia’s top judicial body finally convenes despite boycott,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 15, 1998.

1999

Minimum Implementation

The judiciary was far from independent, and numerous court decisions were influenced by corruption or political dictates.¹

1. “Human Rights Watch World Report 2000 — Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch 2000, accessed July 20, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Asia-02.htm#TopOfPage.

2000

Minimum Implementation

“Little progress was made in reforming Cambodia’s judicial system, plagued by corruption and low-paid and poorly trained personnel. A council for judicial reform, established in 1999 at the urging of Cambodia’s international donors, was completely inactive during the year. A legal reform unit established by the Council of Ministers in 2000 with World Bank funding accomplished little apart from hiring consultants to conduct a number of studies. The Supreme Council of Magistracy (SCM)- responsible for overseeing and disciplining judges and commenting on draft laws-began to meet more regularly. During the second half of the year the SCM Disciplinary Council investigated a number of complaints against court officials and took disciplinary action against five judges and one prosecutor” (Human Rights Watch, 2001).¹

1. “Human Rights Watch World Report 2001 — Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch 2001, accessed July 20, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/asia/cambodia.html.

1991

No Implementation

The United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) became operational as soon as the Paris Agreement was signed in October 1991. Brigadier-General Michel Loridon (France), Senior Military Liaison Officer, assumed command of the military elements of UNAMIC on November 12, 1991. As agreed upon in the Paris Agreement, the involved parties had to demobilize 70 percent of their rival armies. However, as of December 1991, the UN had failed to approve a budget or decide on the strength of the force it would send to Cambodia to monitor the ceasefire and demobilization of 70 percent of the rival armies and help run the country before the UN-supervised elections.¹

1. “Speed up Cambodia UN force — Evans,” The Age (Melbourne, Australia), December 18, 1991; “Cambodia – UNAMIC Background,” United Nations, accessed July 22, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamicbackgr.html.

1992

No Implementation

Demobilization was several months behind schedule. Military reform had yet to begin.

1993

No Implementation

After the May 1993 election, the new Army brought together forces previously under the control of former Prime Minister Hun Sen (i.e., the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP)), the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), and the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF). The Khmer Rouge fighters were not part of the new armed force, which started offensive attacks against the Khmers.¹ The army remained unreformed and military brutality continued in secret military camps.

1. “Cambodia’s Army, Now Unified, Attacks Recalcitrant Khmer Rouge,” Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA), August 26, 1993.

1994

Minimum Implementation

The Cambodian military remained the most unorganized armed force. In October 1994, Lieutenant General Proche Bunthol, a spokesman for the general staff, highlighted three main problems with regards to the importance of military reform: “The first problem we have to solve is corruption. Second, we must (be able to) give the real number of soldiers. Third, the military must work to increase security in the country” (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 1994). In order to reform the national armed force, the government initiated a new bill to reform the army in October 1994.¹

1. “Murder, torture, corruption charges: Cambodia’s infamous army,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, October 18, 1994.

1995

Intermediate Implementation

A major military reform took place in Cambodia during March 1995. The Cambodian Defense Ministry announced major cuts in its officer corps, with the number of generals slashed from around 2,000 to a number less than 200. Similarly, the number of colonels after the cuts went down from over 10,000 to 307. All 199 of the one-, two-, and three-star generals survived the reform.¹ The reform was intended to please the major donor countries in order to spur military support.

1. “Cambodia slashes back generals and colonels,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 17, 1995.

1996

Intermediate Implementation

In June 1996, new legislation was passed that related to the neutralization of the Cambodian military. It prohibited members of political factions from holding positions in the armed forces and required that the armed forces choose between their political and military posts. It also required that the armed forces personnel give up their party positions and their seats in the National Assembly. The bill effectively neutralized the armed forces.¹ The government was also planning on scaling down its military from about 130,000 troops to about 70,000.

1. “Embassy of Cambodia News Letter,” August 1997, accessed August 3, 2010, http://www.embassy.org/cambodia/newsletter/newslett97/aug.htm.

1997

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1998

Intermediate Implementation

The new elements of the demobilization process were designed to be part of broader military reform. The demobilization process began after a pause of some years. In December 1998, Tea Banh, Co-Defence Minister, said that the government had formulated a plan to demobilize up to tens of thousands of soldiers each year.¹

A new integrated armed force was formed. The new integrated armed forces fought amongst themselves for two days of clashes in Phnom Penh. FUNCINPEC military leaders were executed in extrajudicial killings.

1. “Cambodia: Minister on Troop Demobilization,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific — Political, December 21, 1998.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

The demobilization process was a part of broader military reform initiatives. On January 15, 1999, “the Royal Government of Cambodia announced that it would demobilize 79,000 troops – 55,000 soldiers in the Cambodian Royal Armed Forces and 24,000 policemen – over a five-year period. According to a press communiqué from the Information Ministry dated 15th January 15, 1999, Samdech Prime Minister Hun Sen submitted this proposal to the Council of Ministers’ session on the morning of January 15. The proposal was adopted at the meeting. The communiqué further said that, in order to facilitate this demobilization process, the Royal Government planned to set aside a budget to provide 1,200 dollars currency not further specified each to the demobilized personnel who would also be given vocational training in enterprises and guidance to get a job to earn a living.”¹

On 25 February 1999, the Cambodian government appealed to “donor countries and international financial institutions to provide 104m dollars in financial, technical and material support over the next five years for demobilizing 55,000 soldiers. Sok An, senior minister in charge of the office of the council of ministers, made the request in a statement on the opening day of a two-day donor conference in Tokyo. He also disclosed a timetable for downsizing the army, saying 11,500 soldiers would be cut in 2000, 11,000 in 2001, 20,500 in 2002 and the remaining 12,000 in 2003” (BBC, 1999). The government estimated that there were 148,000 soldiers. However, this figure was widely disputed. Upon completion of the program, the government estimated the share of defense in recurrent expenditure would be reduced from the 1998 figure of 35.8 percent to about 20 percent.²

As part of the reform program, 14 military officials were promoted to the rank of brigadier-general and 23 others to the rank of major-general. The promotions were “part of the army restructuring and demobilization efforts to divert the budget from this sector to the social services.”³

At a donor conference, Cambodia stated that it had discovered 15,551 “ghost” soldiers and 159,587 dependents. However, purging these individuals from the payroll has been a slow process. It was also reported that, at the end of September 1999, the number of illegal weapons confiscated consisted of 16,412 rifles, 11 land mines, and 345 hand grenades.⁴

At a conference, it was reported that people had voluntarily turned in 5,655 rifles, 190 hand grenades, and 332 land mines, and that the government had destroyed 20,112 rifles.⁵

More than 5,000 royalist fighters, who had broken away from the Cambodian armed forces following a bloody 1997 coup, officially rejoined the military during a ceremony held on Friday, February 26, 1999. These troops had rebelled after their leader, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, was effectively ousted as co-prime minister by rival Cambodian leader Hun Sen. The ceremony marked the final integration of rebel forces into the army. However, there was a dispute on how many royalist soldiers were integrated. Prince Ranariddh claimed to have 10,000 troops, while Hun Sen’s government claimed to have 5,011. The sides were expected to hold further talks to resolve the dispute. Thousands of Khmer Rouge fighters were integrated into the army in recent months due to the collapse of the guerrilla movement from mass defections.⁶

1. “Cambodia to Demobilize 79,000 Security Personnel Over Five Years,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific — Political, January 18, 1999.
2. “Cambodia Seeks 104M to Demobilize Soldiers at Japan Aid Conference,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific — Political, February 25, 1999.
3. “Cambodia: Army Officers Promoted as Part of Restructuring Programme,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific — Political, March 3, 1999.
4. “Cambodia donors satisfied but military demobilization slow,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific — Political, October 29, 1999.
5. Ibid.
6. “Royalist resistance forces rejoin Cambodian army,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, February 26, 1999.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

Military reform continued along with the demobilization process. “The last experimental demobilization was held in Battambang Province involving 421 troops starting from 11th July, 2000.”¹ The World Bank was also involved in the demobilization process — it provided 15 million dollars for military demobilization in Cambodia in 2001. The World Food Program (WFP) also promised to provide rice for demobilized soldiers. “In a pilot project, the government had cut off 1,500 soldiers from government’s pay rolls while WFP had assisted. 150 kilograms of rice to each demobilized soldier.”² This process was plagued by corruption, so much so that the funders decided to withhold funds.

NOTE: The World Bank awarded Cambodia a loan of 18.4 million dollars in 2001 to be used towards achieving the objective of military reform. The program would involve the demobilization of some 30,000 soldiers. “This DDR process only affects people who have already been integrated into the armed forces, and is aimed at leaving troop numbers at between 70,000 and 80,000. Reform of the armed forces has been delayed by mistakes committed during the DDR process and by a lack of sufficient funding. The reforms that remain to be implemented will have to deal with the demobilization of a number of inactive troops and a larger number of officers. The World Bank calculated in 1991 that DDR would lead to a saving of 10.3 million dollars a year in military spending. However, in October 2006, Government approved the compulsory military service, against the Armed Forces reduction plans, justified by the high unemployment level of young people in the country.”³ By 2006, Cambodia still had 110,000 soldiers, which were expected to be downsized to 70,000 in the future.⁴

1. “Last experimental demobilization” to be held in northwest Cambodia 15th July,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific — Political, July 7, 2000.
2. “World Bank Pledges to Assist Demobilization in Cambodia, Emerging Markets Datafile,” Xinhua, December 20, 2000.
3. “Cambodia,” ECP Escola de Cultura de pau, accessed May 10, 2010, http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/mapa/camboyai.pdf.
4. “Cambodia to downsize troops by 40,000,” Xinhua, October 16, 2006, accessed May 10, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-10/16/content_5210561.htm.

1991

No Implementation

The United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) became operational as soon as the Paris Agreement was signed in October 1991. Brigadier-General Michel Loridon (France), Senior Military Liaison Officer, assumed command of the military elements of the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) on November 12, 1991. As agreed on in the Paris agreement, parties had to demobilize 70 percent of the rival armies. But as of December 1991, the UN had failed to approve a budget or decide on the strength of the force it would send to Cambodia to monitor the ceasefire and demobilization of 70 percent of the rival armies and to help run the country before the UN-supervised elections.¹

1. “Speed up Cambodia UN force — Evans,” The Age (Melbourne, Australia), December 18, 1991; “Cambodia – UNAMIC Background,” United Nations, accessed July 22, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamicbackgr.html.

1992

Minimum Implementation

The UN force was carrying out reconnaissance throughout the country to prepare for the containment of those troops who would not be demobilized. Containment was expected to take place in early June and demobilization shortly thereafter.¹ As of September 1992, the Khmer armed group remained intact while the rival armies of the two non-communist factions had broken up in anticipation of UN-supervised demobilization. The demobilization was several months behind schedule.²

Following the beginning of phase II on June 13, 1992, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was to have completed the regrouping and cantonment process within four weeks — that is, by July 11. The process was expected to disarm and demobilize 70% of the country’s estimated 200,000 soldiers. As of July 10, of the estimated 200,000 troops, the numbers of cantoned troops were as follows: CPAF, 9,003; ANKI, 3,187; KPNLAF, 1,322[G1] . However, reflecting the PDK’s position of non-cooperation, no NADK troops were cantoned.³ “As for the cantonment process, which had begun in June with the declaration of phase II, some 55,000 troops of the three participating factions, or approximately a quarter of the estimated total number of troops, entered the cantonment sites and handed over their weapons. This process, however, had to be suspended, due to the non-compliance by PDK and the deterioration of the military situation. Some 40,000 cantoned troops were subsequently released on agricultural leave, subject to recall by UNTAC” (United Nations).⁴

1. “UN deterrent or ploy in hands of rival militias? CAMBODIA, As Khmer Rouge regularly violates a truce, critics wonder if they are using peacekeepers in a bid to expand control,” The Globe and Mail (Canada), May 4, 1992.
2. “PM calls on Cambodia at a point of no return,” The Age (Melbourne, Australia), September 25, 1992.
3. “SECOND PHASE OF CEASEFIRE, MAY – NOVEMBER 1992,” United Nations, Cambodia – UNTAC Background, accessed July 19, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacbackgr2.html#two.
4. “SECOND PHASE OF CEASEFIRE, MAY – NOVEMBER 1992,” United Nations, Cambodia – UNTAC Background, accessed July 19, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacbackgr2.html#two.

1993

Minimum Implementation

The demobilization and disarmament process was suspended. With the Khmer Rouge’s refusal to respect the terms of “Phase Two,” the other factions stopped disarming and, in most cases, called their demobilized men back into service.¹ A new Cambodian armed force comprised of the CPP, FUNCINPEC, and KPNLF armies was formed. The demobilization process was terminated without implementation.

1. “UN struggles on despite failure of peace accord Kevin Barrington reports on the difficulties the UN has faced in trying to bring the main factions together in Cambodia,” The Irish Times, April 10, 1993.

1994

Minimum Implementation

With the formation of a new armed force, the demobilization process terminated without implementation.

1995

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1996

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1997

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1998

Minimum Implementation

The demobilization process began after a pause of some years. In December 1998, Tie Banh, co-defense minister, said that the governments had formulated a plan to demobilize up to tens of thousands of soldiers each year.¹

1. “CAMBODIA: MINISTER ON TROOP DEMOBILIZATION,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific — Political, December 21, 1998.

1999

Minimum Implementation

The demobilization process began gradually. On January 15, 1999, “the Royal Government of Cambodia announced that it would demobilize 79,000 troops – 55,000 soldiers in the Cambodian Royal Armed Forces and 24,000 policemen – over a five-year period. According to a press communiqué from the Information Ministry dated 15th January (1999), Samdech Prime Minister Hun Sen submitted this proposal to the Council of Ministers’ session on the morning of 15th January. The proposal was adopted at the meeting. The communiqué further said that, in order to facilitate this demobilization process, the Royal Government planned to set aside a budget to provide 1,200 dollars currency not further specified each (sic) to the demobilized personnel who would also be given vocational training in enterprises and guidance to get a job to earn a living” (BBC, 1999).¹

On February 25, 1999, the Cambodian government “appealed donor countries and international financial institutions to provide 104m dollars in financial, technical and material support over the next five years for demobilizing 55,000 soldiers. Sok An, senior minister in charge of the office of the council of ministers, made the request in a statement on the opening day of a two-day donor conference in Tokyo. He also disclosed a timetable for downsizing the army, saying 11,500 soldiers would be cut in 2000, 11,000 in 2001, 20,500 in 2002 and the remaining 12,000 in 2003” (BBC, 1999). The government estimated that there were 148,000 soldiers. However, this figure was widely disputed. Upon completion of the program, the government estimated that the share of defense in recurrent expenditure would be reduced from the 1998 figure of 35.8 percent to about 20 percent.²

As part of the reform program, 14 military officials were promoted to the rank of brigadier-general and 23 others to the rank of major-general. The promotions were “part of the army restructuring and demobilization efforts to divert the budget from this sector to the social services” (BBC, 1999).³

At a donor conference, the Cambodian government stated that it had discovered 15,551 “ghost” soldiers and 159,587 dependents. However, purging these individuals from the payroll has been a slow process. It was also reported that, at the end of September 1999, the number of illegal weapons confiscated consisted of 16,412 rifles, 11 land mines, and 345 hand grenades. In a conference it was stated that people had voluntarily turned in 5,655 rifles, 190 hand grenades, and 332 land mines, and that the government had destroyed 20,112 rifles.⁴

1. “Cambodia to Demobilize 79,000 Security Personnel Over Five Years,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific — Political, January 18, 1999, http://www.camnet.com.kh/ocm/government35.htm.
2. “Cambodia Seeks 104M to Demobilize Soldiers at Japan Aid Conference,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific — Political, February 25, 1999.
3. “Cambodia: Army Officers Promoted as Part of Restructuring Programme,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific — Political, March 3, 1999.
4. “Cambodia donors satisfied but military demobilization slow,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific — Political, October 29, 1999.

2000

Minimum Implementation

“The last experimental demobilization was held in Battambang Province. It involved 421 troops and began on the 11th of July, 2000” (BBC, 2000).¹ The World Bank was also involved in the demobilization process. It provided $15 million dollars for military demobilization in Cambodia in 2001. The World Food Program (WFP) had also promised to provide rice for demobilized soldiers. “In a pilot project, the government had cut off 1,500 soldiers from government’s pay rolls while WFP had assisted 150 kilograms of rice to each demobilized soldier” (Xinhua, 2000).² Even if the experimental demobilization ended, there were efforts to demobilize soldiers from the Royal Cambodian Army and downsize the armed force.

NOTE: The World Bank awarded Cambodia a loan of 18.4 million in 2001 to be put toward achieving the objective of military reform in Cambodia. The program would involve the demobilization of some 30,000 soldiers. “This DDR process only affects people who have already been integrated into the armed forces, and is aimed at leaving troop numbers at between 70,000 and 80,000. Reform of the armed forces has been delayed by mistakes committed during the DDR process and by a lack of sufficient funding. The reforms that remain to be implemented will have to deal with the demobilization of a number of inactive troops and a larger number of officers. The World Bank calculated in 1991 that DDR would lead to a saving of 10.3 million dollars a year in military spending. However, in October 2006, Government approved the compulsory military service, against the Armed Forces reduction plans, justified by the high unemployment level of young people in the country” (ECP).³ By 2006, Cambodia still had 110,000 soldiers, which someone said would be downsized to 70,000 in month or year.⁴

1. “”Last experimental demobilization” to be held in northwest Cambodia 15th July,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific — Political, July 7, 2000.
2. “World Bank Pledges to Assist Demobilization in Cambodia, Emerging Markets Datafile,” Xinhua, December 20, 2000.
3. “Cambodia,” ECP Escola de Cultura de Pau, accessed May 10, 2010, http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/mapa/camboyai.pdf.
4. “Cambodia to downsize troops by 40,000,” Xinhua, October 16, 2010, accessed May 10, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-10/16/content_5210561.htm.

1991

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1992

Minimum Implementation

The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was to have completed the regrouping and cantonment stage within four weeks following the start of phase II of the disarmament process on June 13, 1992 – hence by July 11. The process was expected to disarm and demobilize 70% of the country’s estimated 200,000 soldiers. As of July 10, of the estimated 200,000 troops, the numbers of cantoned troops were as follows: CPAF, 9,003; ANKI, 3,187; KPNLAF, 1,322. However, reflecting PDK’s position of non-cooperation, no NADK troops were cantoned.² UNTAC suspended the disarmament of armed groups in Cambodia as the Khmer Rouge had refused to disarm.³

2. “Cambodia – UNTAC Background,” United Nations, accessed July 19, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacbackgr2.html#two.[/…“As for the cantonment process, which had begun in June with the declaration of phase II, some 55,000 troops of the three participating factions, or approximately a quarter of the estimated total number of troops, entered the cantonment sites and handed over their weapons. This process, however, had to be suspended, due to the non-compliance by PDK and the deterioration of the military situation. Some 40,000 cantoned troops were subsequently released on agricultural leave, subject to recall by UNTAC” (United Nations).¹Ibid.
3. “UNTAC suspends disarmament in Cambodia, Report From Japan,” United Nations, October 22,1992.

1993

Minimum Implementation

The demobilization and disarmament process was suspended. With the Khmer Rouge’s refusal to respect the terms of “Phase Two,” the other factions stopped disarming and, in most cases, called their demobilized men back into service.¹ A new Cambodian armed force comprised of the CPP, FUNCINPEC, and KPNLF armies was formed. The disarmament process terminated without implementation.

1. “UN struggles on despite failure of peace accord Kevin Barrington reports on the difficulties the UN has faced in trying to bring the main factions together in Cambodia,” The Irish Times, April 10, 1993.

1994

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1995

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1996

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1997

Minimum Implementation

With the formation of a new armed force, the disarmament process did not make any progress. There was a dramatic increase in armaments in the run-up to the July 1997 coup; Rannaridh was convicted on charges of smuggling guns into the country.

1998

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1999

Minimum Implementation

At a donor conference in March 1999, the government of Cambodia stated that it had discovered 15,551 “ghost” soldiers and 159,587 dependents. However purging these individuals from the payroll has been a slow process. It was also reported that at the end of September 1999, the number of illegal weapons confiscated constituted 16,412 rifles, 11 land mines, and 345 hand grenades. In a conference, it was stated that people had voluntarily turned in 5,655 rifles, 190 hand grenades, and 332 land mines, and that the government had destroyed 20,112 rifles.¹

1. “Cambodia donors satisfied but military demobilization slow,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific — Political, October 29, 1999.

1991

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1992

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1993

No Implementation

After the May 1993 election, the new army brought together forces previously under the control of former Prime Minister Hun Sen (or CPP), the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), and the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF). The newly formed armed force started offensive attacks against the Khmers.¹ The Khmer Rouge fighters were not part of the new armed force. No reintegration of former combatants into civilian life took place.

1. “Cambodia’s Army, Now Unified, Attacks Recalcitrant Khmer Rouge,” Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA), August 26, 1993.

1994

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1995

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1996

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1997

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1998

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1999

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2000

Minimum Implementation

A new integrated armed force was formed. Splinter factions from the Khmer Rouge were integrated into a new armed force. The Cambodian government was in the process of downsizing the armed force and reintegrating the demobilized personnel into civilian life.

1991

Minimum Implementation

Just before the signing of the agreement, “the Hun Sen government released 1,034 prisoners, including what the Cambodian government news agency described as 442 political prisoners and 483 prisoners-of-war in early October. Cambodia’s most prominent political prisoner, Ung Phan, Cambodia’s former minister of transport who was detained in May 1990 for trying to form a new political party, was released on October 17” (Human Rights Watch, 1992).¹

After the signing of the peace agreement on October 23, 1991, the political situation improved but the State of Cambodia (SOC) did not stop holding political prisoners. The Cambodian Deputy Interior Minister, Sin Sen, said on November 13 that the government in Phnom Penh was holding close to 1,000 political prisoners. AFP cited the minister as saying that political prisoners would be released “soon”, as long as they “did not create any loss or destruction against the people.” However, it was hinted that POWs might not be freed.²

1. “Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch World Report 1992, accessed July 30, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/ASW-04.htm#P195_67809.
2. “Cambodian government reportedly holding about 1,000 political prisoners,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 14, 1991.

1992

Intermediate Implementation

“In late 1991, the Phnom Penh government began releasing hundreds of political prisoners, even though it resisted supervision by the International Committee of the Red Cross until January 1992. UNTAC has now established access to both civilian and military prisons, and a Prison Control Commission has been established on UNTAC’s recommendation to oversee prison conditions and review the basis for detention of all prisoners in government custody. The government has also agreed to end abusive practices such as prolonged shackling and dark cells, and the World Food Program is preparing to provide emergency subsistence rations to all prisoners in Phnom Penh jails. However, the discovery of several clandestine SOC detention centers in and around Battambang in mid-1992 raised concerns about the SOC’s commitment to these reforms” (Human Rights Watch, 1993).¹

“UNTAC had no regular access to prisons maintained by the other Cambodian factions. There were widespread reports of summary executions of prisoners in the custody of the various military factions, including the KPNLF and FUNCINPEC. The Khmer Rouge claimed to maintain no prisons, and instead turned its prisoners over to Thai authorities, but lack of access to Khmer Rouge areas made that claim impossible to verify” (Human Rights Watch, 1993).²

1. “Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch World Report 1993, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/WR93/Asw-04.htm#P105_41321.
2. “Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch World Report 1993, accessed July 30, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/WR93/Asw-04.htm#P105_41321.

1993

Full Implementation

“In the latter half of 1993, for the first time in decades, there were no political prisoners being held in Cambodia, except possibly persons detained in Khmer Rouge areas” (U.S. Department of State, 1994).¹ “Cambodia Human Rights Practices, 1993,” U.S. Department of State, January 31, 1994, accessed July 30, 2010, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1994_hrp_report/94hrp_report_eap…

1994

Full Implementation

“Although the practice of holding political prisoners, common under the SOC, has all but disappeared, there were a few cases in which persons were detained for political reasons. Newspaper editor Nguon Non was detained in July on national security charges and released in August pending trial; there is widespread speculation that he was arrested because the Government disapproved of his coverage of the July coup attempt (see Section 2.a.). A human rights worker for the NGO Adhoc in Prey Veng province was detained from November 1993 to February 1994 under an antiterrorism law; his alleged act of ‘terrorÔ was that he created instability and chaos by encouraging villagers to reclaim their property. Human rights groups believe his detention was an act of retaliation on the part of local authorities who suspected him of being the source of a news article describing the corrupt handling of land disputes by officials. Human rights observers also believe that several prisoners held in various areas on suspicion of being Khmer Rouge members were detained for political reasons” (U.S. Department of State, 1995).¹“Cambodia Human Rights Practices, 1994,” U.S. Department of State, February 1995, accessed July 30, 2010, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1994_hrp_report/94hrp_report_eap…

1995

Full Implementation

According to the US State Department’s country report on human rights practices, there was no report of political prisoners in 1996.¹“Cambodia Human Rights Practices, 1995,” U.S. Department of State, March 1996, accessed July 30, 2010, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1995_hrp_report/95hrp_report_eap…

1996

Full Implementation

According to the US State Department’s country report on human rights practices, the Cambodian “government often arrests persons on questionable criminal charges, usually drug trafficking or espionage, when their actual ‘offensesÕ are political” (U.S. Department of State, 1997).¹“Cambodia Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996,” U.S. Department of State, January 30, 1997, accessed July 30, 2010, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/cambodia.ht…

1997

Full Implementation

According to the US State Department’s country report on human rights practices, in 1997 “there was at least one political prisoner. In a flawed September trial, Khmer Nation Party official Srun Vong Vannak and two others were sentenced to prison for their alleged roles in the November 1996 murder of Kov Samuth, the brother-in-law of Mrs. Hun Sen” (U.S. Department of State, 1998).¹“Cambodia Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997,” U.S. Department of State, January 30, 1998, accessed July 30, 2010, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1997_hrp_report/cambodia.ht…

1998

Full Implementation

According to the US State Department’s country report on human rights practices, there was no report of political prisoners in 1998.¹“Cambodia Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998,” U.S. Department of State, February 26, 1999, accessed July 30, 2010, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/cambodia.ht…

1999

Full Implementation

According to the US State Department’s country report on human rights practices, there was no report of political prisoners in 1999.¹

1. “Cambodia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 1999,” U.S. Department of State, February 23, 2000, accessed July 30, 2010, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/283.htm.

2000

Full Implementation

According to the US State Department’s country report on human rights practices, there was no report of political prisoners in 2000.¹

1. “Cambodia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2000,” U.S. Department of State, February 23, 2001, accessed July 30, 2010, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/eap/681.htm.

1991

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1992

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1993

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1994

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1995

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1996

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1997

Minimum Implementation

Hun Sen deposed Ranariddh with support from personal and state armed forces.

1998

Minimum Implementation

It was reported that the International Monetary Fund had condemned Cambodia’s declining tax-collection efficiency and the reckless and illegal exploitation of forest resources by the rival parties. The state became increasingly impoverished and directionless, and the ordinary people increasingly demoralized. Tension in Phnom Penh mounted in early 1997, as private armies of bodyguards and paramilitary forces loyal to Ranariddh or Hun Sen confronted each other.¹

1. “Some Hope for Peace In Cambodia; Tony Kevin Explains The Recent History Of This Unhappy Country As It Prepares For The Election Planned For July,” Canberra Times (Australia), April 18, 1998.

1999

Minimum Implementation

At a donor conference in March 1999, the government of Cambodia stated that at the end of September 1999, the number of illegal weapons confiscated consisted of 16,412 rifles, 11 land mines, and 345 hand grenades. It was reported that people had voluntarily turned in 5,655 rifles, 190 hand grenades, and 332 land mines, and that the government had destroyed 20,112 rifles.¹

More than 5,000 royalist fighters who had broken away from the Cambodian armed forces following a bloody 1997 coup officially rejoined the armed forces during a ceremony held on Friday, February 26, 1999. The troops had rebelled after their leader, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, was effectively ousted as co-prime minister by rival Cambodian leader Hun Sen. The ceremony marked the final integration of rebel forces into the army. Thousands of Khmer Rouge fighters were integrated into the army in the months following the collapse of the guerrilla movement, brought about by mass defections.²

Both of these incidents were considered as initiatives to deal with the militia or paramilitary forces. However, they were not considered as concrete steps taken beyond the scope of the military reform.

1. “Cambodia: Army Officers Promoted as Part of Restructuring Programme,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific — Political, March 3, 1999.
2. “Royalist resistance forces rejoin Cambodian army,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, February 26, 1999.

2000

Minimum Implementation

Some significant steps were taken in 1999. There was no information on the existence of a paramilitary force.

1991

No Implementation

With the signing of the Paris Agreement in October 1991, restrictions on freedom of association were lifted and it became possible to establish human rights monitoring organizations.¹ Other human rights components were not implemented in 1991 due to the fact that the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was yet to be established in Cambodia. UNTAC would have the responsibility of fostering an environment in which respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms were ensured and where free and fair elections might take place during the transitional period.²

On November 21, 1991, a tripartite memorandum of understanding was reached between the Thai government, the Supreme National Council (SNC), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This memorandum related to the repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons from Thailand. Thailand’s cooperation was essential in the safe and orderly return of all Cambodian refugees and displaced persons to their homeland.³ The return of refugees and displaced persons was perceived as an essential element of the peace process. It was essential that these Cambodians be given the opportunity to take part in the Constituent Assembly election and in the building of the Cambodian nation.

1. “Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch World Report 1992, accessed July 26, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/ASW-04.htm#P182_63937.
2. “Cambodia – UNTAC Background,” United Nations, accessed July 25, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacbackgr2.html.
3. “Thai-Cambodian Joint Communique Issued,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 25, 1991.

1992

Intermediate Implementation

On April 20, 1992, the Khmer Rouge, together with the leaders of Cambodia’s three other mutually hostile factions, signed two international covenants that committed them to far-reaching respect for human rights.¹ The Supreme National Council then ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. On September 10, the SNC agreed to accede to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.

“The Paris Agreements gave UNTAC the responsibility during the transitional period for fostering an environment in which respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms were ensured and where free and fair elections might take place” (United Nations).²

“The UNTAC human rights component was active in three broad areas. First, it encouraged SNC to adhere to relevant international human rights instruments and undertook a review of the existing judicial and penal systems in the light of international provisions. Secondly, it conducted an extensive human rights information and education campaign in close cooperation with the Information/Education Division of UNTAC. Thirdly, it investigated human rights-related complaints and took corrective measures where necessary. Human rights officers were progressively deployed in all 21 provinces in Cambodia, including in the zones controlled by FUNCINPEC and KPNLF. However, the component had no access to the zones controlled by PDK” (United Nations).³

“UNTAC developed a human rights education programme with particular reference to teacher training, dissemination of relevant international instruments, education of health professionals, training of public and political officials and support for local human rights organizations. Educational materials, posters, leaflets, stickers and other printed materials were disseminated throughout the country. Human rights training was introduced into the Cambodian education system, and human rights studies were incorporated in the curriculum of Phnom Penh University’s Law School and Medical Faculty. Collaboration with local human rights organizations was an important aspect of UNTAC’s work. UNTAC provided them with materials, training and expertise as well as small grants for basic office expenses. It organized an International Symposium on Human Rights in Cambodia from 30 November to 2 December 1992, and conducted a special course for human rights advocates, including a training programme on United Nations human rights procedures and a special training programme dealing with human rights issues in the electoral process. One of the most important things that happened during this time period was the growth of civil society organizations like Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (Licado), Cambodia Human Rights and Development Association (Adhoc) and center for Human Rights. These civil society organizations, however, were largely funded by international actors” (United Nations).⁴

“As part of the effort to promote the development of an independent judiciary, a major programme of training for judges, defence lawyers and public defenders was initiated. Training sessions for officials of the existing administrative structures and professional or activist groups were undertaken in almost every province. Participants included representatives of political parties, members of human rights associations, teacher trainees, justice officials and police. UNTAC closely monitored conditions of detention in civil prisons throughout Cambodia and pressed local authorities to improve the situation to the extent possible within the means available to the prison administration. It investigated all cases of prisoners whose detention might be politically motivated” (United Nations).⁵

1. “Khmer Rouge Sign Rights Covenants,” The New York Times, April 21, 1992.
2. “Cambodia – UNTAC Background,” United Nations.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

1993

Intermediate Implementation

As the Khmer Rouge resumed the guerilla insurgency, the human rights situation became worse. Ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia were frequently targeted by the Khmer. Regarding violence against ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia, UNTAC and the person in charge of human rights in Cambodia said that the Cambodian government was responsible for the protection of Vietnamese residents and that the United National could only observe the situation and adopt a wait-and-see policy. UNTAC’s stance on this, however, was rejected by the Vietnamese government because the Paris Agreement clearly pointed out that the UN was responsible for acting as the guarantor of human rights during the transitional period.¹

In May 1993, more than four million Cambodians went to the polls to vote in their first free election since the 1950s, even though the UN-administered elections were held amid much fear and uncertainty due to the outbreak of fighting around the country.²

Repatriated refugees and displaced persons were ensured voting rights in the post-conflict Constituent Assembly election. After the Constituent Assembly election, UNTAC initiated a vigorous debate in the General Assembly over the creation of a national human rights commission.³

“The U.N. Centre for Human Rights opened its first field office in Phnom Penh in late 1993, and the U.N. Secretary-General appointed a special representative for human rights in Cambodia, whose mandate was due to be reviewed in March 1995” (Human Rights Watch, 1995).⁴

1. “Vietnam and Cambodia; Hanoi Says UNTAC Responsible for Safety of Vietnamese; Cited Paris Agreement,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 29, 1993.
2. “Repression and intimidation, now a Cambodian election,” The Age (Melbourne, Australia), May 22, 1993.
3. “Cambodia Votes to Give Crown Back to Sihanouk; Prince’s critics fear he will bypass constitutional curbs on his powers,” The Guardian (London), September 16, 1993.
4. “Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch World Report 1995, accessed July 2, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/WR95/ASIA-02.htm#P133_39951.

1994

Intermediate Implementation

After the completion of the UNTAC mandate, the UN continuously monitored the human rights situation in Cambodia through its recently established UN Center for Human Rights. The UN Human Rights Center provided educational services and legal advice, and investigated military abuses and prison conditions. The U.N.’s Special Representative, Justice Michael Kirby, visited three times since the field office’s establishment in late 1993, raising a wide range of human rights concerns with the Cambodian government and publishing comprehensive reports on the human rights situation.¹

The human rights situation remained very poor. According to a UN Report, Cambodian military authorities in the northwest had been abducting people for ransom, executing them and then eating their livers in a gruesome ritual thought to imbue them with power. An investigation by the Ministry of Defense corroborated most details of the U.N. Centre’s reports, but investigators from the Prime Ministers’ office initially denied the findings. Cambodia’s Co-Premiers Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen then ordered a second investigation, but its findings, published on July 22, were inconclusive about the existence of the Cheu Kmau detention center. It did not deny the existence of the secret prison, but said that Khmer Rouge activity in the area made further inquiries too dangerous.²

1. “Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch World Report 1995, accessed July 2, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/WR95/ASIA-02.htm#P133_39951.
2. Ibid.

1995

Intermediate Implementation

The Human Rights situation continued to deteriorate.

In May 1995, the Cambodian government said that constitutional guarantees to ensure human rights were in place, and asked the UN Human Rights Center to leave Cambodia. The international human rights organization, however, called the decision premature.¹

On May 4, 1995, the Cambodian government agreed to a continued U.N. human rights presence in Cambodia but called for amendments to the mandate of the U.N. Centre for Human Rights (UNMCHR).²

In a meeting held on May 4, 1995, the first and second prime ministers of the Kingdom of Cambodia said that the Royal Government of Cambodia [RGC] would willingly accept the five-point proposal of the United Nations because it was very applicable. These five points were:

(a) regular consultations be held unofficially every three months between the RGC and the UN Human Rights Office in Cambodia; (b) a meeting be held every year, two months before the annual meeting of the UN Human Rights Office, between the RGC and the UN to enable the UN to understand Cambodia’s difficulties; (c) consultations be held before any report is sent to Geneva; (d) the RGC should allow the UN Human Rights Office to arrange seminars on human rights for administrative personnel; and (e) if the RGC accepts the four aforementioned points, the UN Human Rights Office will invite the RGC to Geneva to gain experience on human rights activities to be utilized in Cambodia.³

1. “Cambodia Asks U.N. to Close Office Protecting Human Rights,” The New York Times, March 21, 1995.
2. “Cambodia agrees to extend U.N. human rights office mandate,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, May 4, 1995.
3. “RELATIONS WITH UN; Cambodia accepts UN proposal on human rights,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 13, 1995.

1996

Intermediate Implementation

According to the Human Rights Watch World Report of 1996, “political tensions rose between the two partners in the coalition government; political violence increased, as did restrictions on freedom of the press; and a pattern of impunity continued to favor those responsible for human rights abuses, including former Khmer Rouge officials” (Human Rights Watch, 1997). In the report it was noted that the “U.N. Commission on Human Rights passed a resolution expressing concern over continuing abuses, including violence and intimidation directed at political parties and the press” (Human Rights Watch, 1997).¹ Never…, the report suggested that the UN Human Rights Center in Phnom Penh was able to carry out its activities without threats from the government. During this period, UN and other human right workers were routinely harassed, including the kidnapping of the son of one member of the UNCHR staff.

1. “Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch World Report 1997, accessed July 25, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/WR97/ASIA-02.htm#P126_70556.

1997

Intermediate Implementation

According to the Human Rights Watch World Report of 1998, “in February 1997,factional fighting erupted in Battambang province between FUNCINPEC and CPP forces, with human rights workers reporting as many as twenty soldiers killed during the armed clashes. On March 30 (1997), a grenade attack on a peaceful rally in front of the National Assembly led by KNP President Sam Rainsy left at least sixteen dead and more than one hundred wounded. The two prime ministers continued to build up their personal arsenals and private armies, with Hun Sen’s security forces numbering at least 1,500 and Ranariddh’s approaching 1,000. Tensions continued to escalate as the two factions competed to recruit defecting Khmer Rouge units, as well as to build new rival political alliances, which led to virtual paralysis of the fragile coalition. The beginning of the National Assembly’s planned three-month session, slated originally for April 21, was postponed after divisions broke out within FUNCINPEC, with a renegade faction led by Minister of State Ung Phan and Siem Reap Governor Toan Chay announcing their intention to oust Ranariddh. During the ensuing political stalemate, the National Assembly failed to convene for nearly six months, holding up passage of crucial legislation regulating the upcoming elections, nongovernmental organization (NGO) activity, political parties, and access to broadcasting frequencies” (Human Rights Watch, 1998).

“When military authorities in late May seized a shipment of weapons and ammunition, addressed to Ranariddh and marked ‘spare parts,Õ the first prime minister said he ‘did not have any choiceÔ but to procure weapons in order to protect himself from CPP forces. On June 17 (1997), fighting broke out in the streets of Phnom Penh for several hours between Ranariddh’s personal security unit and troops under CPP loyalist National Police Chief Hok Lundy, in which several people were killed” (Human Rights Watch, 1998).¹ Hun Sen gradually consolidated his power by neutralizing the opposition parties.

1. “Human Rights Watch World Report 1998 — Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch 1998, accessed July 25, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/worldreport/Asia-02.htm#P210_63166.

1998

Intermediate Implementation

The human rights situation was worse in 1998. Amid the preparation for general elections, UN Officials came to Cambodia to assess the human rights situation. After visiting for four days, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, said that there were very serious issues that needed to be resolved. She suggested that the government had a responsibility to bring about an environment that would facilitate a free and fair election.¹

According to the 1999 Human Rights Watch World Report, “A pattern of violence against opposition party workers continued late into the year. Prior to Ranariddh’s return on March 3, several high-ranking FUNCINPEC officials were assassinated in Phnom Penh, including Lt. Col. Moung Sameth on March 3, Gen. Thach Kim Sang on March 4, and Lt. Col. Chea Vutha on March 28. Local activists in the countryside were also targeted, as for example in the April 26 grenade attack against Son Sann Party members in Takeo, in which two people were killed”.² The government crackdown continued after a grenade attack on Hun Sen’s residence occurred on September 7. A Human Rights Watch Report stated that, “the government banned sixty-eight opposition politicians from leaving the country and threatened that some would be arrested. While the travel ban was effectively lifted on September 24 for most opposition leaders, Son Sann Party candidate Kem Sokha, the former chairman of the National Assembly’s Human Rights Commission, continued to be barred from leaving the country. In late September he went into hiding after a court summons was issued in connection with his role in the September demonstrations” (Human Rights Watch, 1999).³

1. “U.N. official leaves Cambodia after assessing human rights problems,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, January 25, 1998.
2. “Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 — Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch 1999, accessed July 25, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/worldreport99/asia/cambodia.html.
3. Ibid.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

“Impunity for human rights abusers, however, continued largely unabated. By October, none of the surviving Khmer Rouge leadership had been brought to justice, and throughout the year many civilian and military authorities continued to commit crimes with impunity. Human rights monitoring continued to be a risky profession, with the unsolved killing of an activist member of the Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC) and the arrest and trial of two workers from the Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (known by its acronym LICADHO), on spurious charges of having incited a demonstration against toxic waste. The two were later acquitted. Torture by police of detainees, undue use of lethal force by police in apprehending suspects, complicity of military and police in trafficking of women and children for sexual exploitation, and excessive pretrial detention periods were endemic problems, as was confiscation of land by military personnel and local officials. The judiciary was far from independent, and numerous court decisions were influenced by corruption or political dictates” (Human Rights Watch, 2000).¹

Despite these issues, there were some positive developments. Cambodia’s main political parties agreed to delay the trial of captured Khmer Rouge military chief Ta Mok until he could be charged with genocide.² After the Cambodian government rejected an earlier proposal to try Pol Pot’s former associates in a fully independent international tribunal, the UN developed detailed plans for a joint war crimes tribunal. This tribunal would be held in Cambodia and presided over by Cambodian and foreign judges. It was suggested that these judges try the former political and military leaders of the Khmer Rouge in a single trial.³

1. “Human Rights Watch World Report 2000 — Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch 2000, accessed July 27, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Asia-02.htm#TopOfPage.
2. “Cambodian parties agree on delay in Khmer Rouge leader trial,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, August 2, 1999.
3. “U.N. Plans Joint War Crimes Tribunal for Khmer Rouge,” The New York Times, August 12, 1999.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

“After more than two years of negotiations, Cambodia and the United Nations tentatively reached agreement in July to establish a national tribunal with international participation to bring former Khmer Rouge leaders to justice for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed between April 1975 and January 1979. As of October, however, the government had yet to submit revised legislation establishing the tribunal to the National Assembly, casting doubt on the government’s resolve. Although the high level of political strife that had plagued Cambodia in recent years receded, serious human rights violations continued, including political killings and torture, attacks on opposition leaders, human trafficking, substandard prison conditions, and violations associated with labor and land conflicts” (Human Rights Watch, 2001).¹

1. “Human Rights Watch World Report 2001 — Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch 2001, accessed July 27, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/asia/cambodia.html.

1991

Minimum Implementation

The United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) contained a program focusing on the repatriation of Cambodian refugees and the resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) during the Cambodian civil war. The Secretary-General, in close consultation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), designed a program to organize and establish repatriation routes, reception centers, and resettlement areas for refugees. “These activities would need to be carefully coordinated with the mine-awareness programme begun earlier in 1991 for Cambodian refugees and displaced persons in the camps along the Cambodia-Thailand border” (United Nations).¹

In order to facilitate the return of IDPs and repatriation of Cambodian refugees, the Australian government provided $1 million to the first stage of one of the largest rebuilding projects in history.²

On November 21, 1991, a tripartite memorandum of understanding was reached between the Thai government, the Supreme National Council (SNC), and the UNHCR. This memorandum related to the repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons from Thailand. Thailand’s cooperation was essential in the safe and orderly return of all Cambodian refugees and displaced persons to their homeland.³ The return of refugees and IDPs was perceived as an essential element of the peace process. It was essential that these Cambodians be given the opportunity to take part in the Constituent Assembly election and in the building of the Cambodian nation.

360,000 people were to be returned from Thai border camps, 90 percent of whom were under the age of 45 with almost half being under the age of 15.⁴

1. “Cambodia – UNAMIC Background,” United Nations, accessed July 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamicbackgr.html.
2. “Grant to Help Displaced Cambodians Go Home,” COURIER-MAIL, October 23, 1991.
3. “Thai-Cambodian Joint Communique Issued,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 25, 1991.
4. “Cambodia – The Facts: A Shattered Nation,” New Internationalist, Issue 242 (April 1993), accessed July 25, 2010, http://www.newint.org/issue242/facts.htm.

1992

Intermediate Implementation

According to the Human Rights Watch Annual Report, at the end of 1992, the UNHCR had safely transported over 200,000 refugees back to Cambodia. However, the repatriation plan had been reformulated several times throughout the process, weakening safeguards that were to ensure the free choice of destination on the part of refugees. The diminished protection was significant because the political factions controlling the Thai border camps were seeking to maintain their control by coercing some refugees to resettle in their small “zones” near the border.¹ As part of the repatriation program, every returning family was promised two hectares of farmland.² However, three months into the repatriation process, the UNHCR had found almost no suitable land for the returnees. In Battambang province, where most returnees wanted to settle, more than half the farmland was believed to be mined. The remaining land was unavailable. Therefore, the UNHCR was forced to redesign its repatriation package. Instead of farmland, the returnees were now offered a village house, tools for a new business, or cash – $50 per adult and $25 per child.³

1. “Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch World Report 1993, accessed July 25, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/WR93/Asw-04.htm#P105_41321.
2. Shaun Williams, “Internally Displaced Persons and Property Rights in Cambodia,” Refugee Survey Quarterly (2000): 19(2): 194-200.
3. “Returning to a home in ruins REFUGEES: A few Cambodians return, braving mines and devastation,” The Globe and Mail (Canada), June 29, 1992.

1993

Full Implementation

The repatriation of Cambodian refugees in Thailand progressed as scheduled. Altogether, 231,358 people had been repatriated back to Cambodia as of January 1, 1993; 124,959 Cambodians remained on Thai soil.¹
“According to Lt-Gen Sanan Khachonklam, head of the Coordination Centre for the Repatriation of Cambodian Refugees, a total of 339,109 Cambodian refugees and displaced people, or 78,231 families, had been repatriated under the programme,” according to a report on the radio. “Meanwhile, 18,000 Cambodians have returned by themselves. After the departure of today’s group of 525 refugees, about 16,000 Cambodian refugees and displaced persons will remain at Site 2. They will be repatriated gradually, and all will be back in Cambodia by April” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1993).²

By the end of April 1993, 370,000 Cambodian refugees and “displaced persons” marked the beginning of a much longer and more difficult process of resettlement and reintegration.³

1. “Cambodia: Cambodian refugee repatriation “progressing as scheduled,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 14, 1993.
2. “Cambodia: Last Cambodian Refugee Camp in Thailand Closed,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 2, 1993.
3. Grant Curtis, “Transition to What? Cambodia, UNTAC and the Peace Process,” UNRISD Discussion Paper (1993): DP48, accessed July 25, 2010, http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/%28httpAuxPages%29/2F0008467C7D3E…$file/dp48.pdf.

1994

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1995

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1991

Minimum Implementation

The United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) contained a program focusing on the repatriation of Cambodian refugees and the resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) during the Cambodian civil war. The Secretary-General, in close consultation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), designed a program to organize and establish repatriation routes, reception centers, and resettlement areas for refugees. “These activities would need to be carefully coordinated with the mine-awareness programme begun earlier in 1991 for Cambodian refugees and displaced persons in the camps along the Cambodia-Thailand border” (United Nations).¹

In order to facilitate the return of IDPs and repatriation of Cambodian refugees, the Australian government provided $1 million to the first stage of one of the largest rebuilding projects in history.²

On November 21, 1991, a tripartite memorandum of understanding was reached between the Thai government, the Supreme National Council (SNC), and the UNHCR. This memorandum related to the repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons from Thailand. Thailand’s cooperation was essential in the safe and orderly return of all Cambodian refugees and displaced persons to their homeland.³ The return of refugees and IDPs was perceived as an essential element of the peace process. It was essential that these Cambodians be given the opportunity to take part in the Constituent Assembly election and in the building of the Cambodian nation.

There were 180,000 IDPs in Cambodia, 20 percent of whom had been displaced for more than 20 months.⁴

1. “Cambodia – UNAMIC Background,” United Nations, accessed July 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamicbackgr.html.
2. “Grant to Help Displaced Cambodians Go Home,” COURIER-MAIL, October 23, 1991.
3. “Thai-Cambodian Joint Communique Issued,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 25, 1991.
4. “Cambodia – The Facts: A Shattered Nation,” New Internationalist, Issue 242 (April 1993), accessed July 25, 2010, http://www.newint.org/issue242/facts.htm.

1992

Minimum Implementation

While the refugee resettlement program was moving smoothly, the resettlement of internally displaced persons did not get much attention during its initial phase. Unlike their countrymen who had crossed over the border, IDPs did not have a vast aid program overseeing their welfare.¹ The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided 139,548 US dollars for dry-season agricultural assistance to IDPs in south-west Cambodia. “The project will provide for the procurement, transport and distribution of rice seed, fertilizer and insecticide to displaced persons, as well as assisting in land preparation (mechanized and manual) and supervision of planting and harvesting” (BBC, 1992).²

1. “Thousands of Internal Refugees Missed by Aid Program,” Sydney Morning Herald (Australia), April 1, 1992.
2. “INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS UNDP – Aid for internally displaced persons,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 15, 1992.

1993

Full Implementation

By the end of April 1993, about 165,000 internally displaced persons, who were driven from their land and means of livelihood by fighting and insecurity, joined the resettlement and reintegration program, along with 370,000 refugees and displaced persons along the Cambodia and Thailand border.¹

1. Grant Curtis, “Transition to What? Cambodia, UNTAC and the Peace Process,” UNRISD Discussion Paper (1993): DP48, accessed July 25, 2010, http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/%28httpAuxPages%29/2F0008467C7D3E…$file/dp48.pdf.

1994

Full Implementation

People were displaced by fighting between government forces and the Khmer Rouge in 1994-95.

1995

Intermediate Implementation

People were displaced by fighting between government forces and the Khmer Rouge in 1994-95.

1996

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1997

Intermediate Implementation

People were displaced by fighting in 1997-98.

1998

Intermediate Implementation

People were displaced by fighting in 1997-98.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

1991

Minimum Implementation

Post-war reconstruction of Cambodia began immediately after the signing of the Paris Accord. The initiatives, however, were largely led by the international community. It was reported that the Foreign Ministry of Japan was sending a team to Cambodia to study the reconstruction of the war-torn country.¹

1. “Foreign Ministry to send reconstruction team to Cambodia, Report from Japan,” United Nations, December 11, 1991.

1992

Minimum Implementation

In a donor conference in Tokyo, Cambodian leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk emphasized the need to assist the agricultural sector and rural peasants. Besides clearing mines, he highlighted the urgency of coming up with an expedient way of providing water to rural peasants, utilizing hand drills to dig wells in sufficient quantities, utilizing bulldozers and other machines to dig water reservoirs in large numbers, and building as many dams as possible. He prioritized the need to rehabilitate agriculture. He asked that diversified aid be given to the majority of the population in order that they would be able to deal with different reconstruction and rehabilitation issues.¹

Cambodia received tremendous international support in its various initiatives, including the reconstruction of infrastructure and rehabilitation of those displaced during the war. At the Tokyo donor conference held on June 21-22, 1992, the donor community pledged $880 million in aid. The conference concluded with the Tokyo Declaration.²

1. “Sihanouk’s Speech Emphasizes Assisting the Poor and Agriculture,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 23, 1992.
2. “Tokyo Declaration on the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Cambodia,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 24, 1992.

1993

Minimum Implementation

On July 20, 1993, the Cambodian and Japanese governments agreed to cooperate on the construction and restoration of 37 km of roads and 14 bridges.¹

On August 19, 1993, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) said it would strengthen its cooperation on Cambodia’s postwar reconstruction ahead of the establishment of a JICA office in Cambodia in September.² The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) had been the life-support system for the Cambodian economy, which was in critical condition. As the removal of UNTAC drew near, Sam Rainsy, Finance Minister of UNTAC, issued calls for continued international aid to assist in repairing and building up Cambodia’s infrastructure. Cambodia had prioritized agriculture as the centerpiece of its economic reconstruction. More than 80% of the population was engaged in farming and agriculture contributed to about 45% of the nation’s GDP. Cambodia exported rice in the 1960s, but in 1993 was unable even to meet the annual demand for domestic consumption (2.5 million tons) and had to rely on foreign donations of about 200,000 tons. Inadequate irrigation facilities and insufficient use of agrochemicals had caused the per-hectare harvest to fall to 1.2-1.4 tons, a quarter of the Japanese standard. Cambodia aimed to become a rice exporter by the end of 1995 by increasing the amount of land cultivated.³

1. “CAMBODIA; Road and bridge construction and reconstruction agreement signed with Japan,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 23, 1993.
2. “CAMBODIA; Japanese aid agency to open Phnom Penh office,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 21, 1993.
3. “Cambodia braces for U.N. pullout: SHOCK TO ECONOMY THREATENS STABILITY,” The Nikkei Weekly (Japan), October 4, 1993.

1994

Minimum Implementation

At a donor’s conference in Tokyo in March 1993, Cambodia secured 773 million US dollars for reconstruction projects. But reconstruction remained a daunting project due to the elusive political stability in post-UNTAC Cambodia. To reform and restructure the economy, on December 16, 1994, Cambodia signed loan agreements worth 44 million dollars with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.¹

1. “Cambodia signs loan accords with World Bank, ADB,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, December 16, 1994.

1995

Minimum Implementation

It was reported that the first prime minister of the Royal Cambodian Government suggested that Japan choose their own projects and pay for them themselves without giving financial aid to the Cambodian government. There was growing concern regarding the corruption in the government agency.¹

After nearly 25 years of war, the path of Cambodia’s reconstruction and economic development was long and difficult. The real problem facing Cambodia was poverty. The people in the countryside lacked food and water. According to the Christian Science Monitor report, the Cambodian economy as a whole was expanding – investment was up and inflation was down – but major foreign-backed projects were under scrutiny and ordinary people were complaining more loudly than ever about their prospects.² During the donor’s conference, Cambodia received $1.35 billion in commitments from the international community.³ “Japan, ASEAN countries, and Cambodia had initiated their tripartite cooperation to help the reconstruction of Cambodia with the emphasis on communities. The tripartite cooperation programme is regarded as a model for Cambodia’s rural development centre to be set up” (BBC, 1995).⁴

1. “Foreign relations: Ranariddh tells Japan to manage aid itself as “Cambodians might embezzle it,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 21, 1995.
2. “Cambodia: A United Nations Success Story Going Awry?” Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA), March 8, 1995, 8.
3. “Cambodia to receive 1.35 billion dollars in 1995 and 1996,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 16, 1995.
4. “Participation in reconstruction of Cambodia renewed,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 4, 1995.

1996

Minimum Implementation

According to an E.U. statement, between 1992 and August 1996 the European community had committed over 200 million dollars to Cambodia in the fields of demining, rural development, human resources development, health, and environment.¹ Special attention was given to rural development in Cambodia’s post-war reconstruction and development process. Hun Sen, the second prime minister of Cambodia, said that socio-economic development in rural areas was a powerful way to improve the livelihood of the people and thwart the influence of the Khmer Rouge.²

1. “E.U. officials inspect demining in Cambodia,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, August 5, 1996.
2. “Working together to re-construct war-torn Cambodia,” New Straits Times (Malaysia), October 28, 1996.

1997

Minimum Implementation

Another conference of donor countries met in Paris on July 1-2, 1997. In the multilateral donor meeting, Cambodia was expected to win international aid commitments of about 449 million dollars. In the conference, Cambodia was told to put its house in order or face dwindling support. Donor countries also criticized Cambodia for spending too much money on its security forces.¹ On July 7, 1997, Hun Sen, the leader of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), overthrew Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh in a brutal, bloody coup, which created resentment in the donor community. This impacted economic and infrastructure reconstruction efforts.

1. “Cambodia ‘spending too much on militaryÕ,” The Straits Times (Singapore), July 3, 1997.

1998

Minimum Implementation

Notwithstanding the political instability or uncertainty after the coup, Cambodia’s strongman vowed to continue with economic and infrastructure development efforts. He proposed measures to bring back foreign investors, including eliminating illegal tax collections, cracking down on kidnappings of businessmen, and the implementation of new infrastructure projects and judicial reform.¹

1. “Cambodian strongman vows to push reforms despite political deadlock,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, October 22, 1998.

1999

Minimum Implementation

In a donor conference held on Feb 25-27, 1999, Cambodia received pledge support of $470 million from the international community.

The Malaysian Prime Minister and Cambodian Prime Minister held a talk on the possibility of Cambodia’s entry into ASEAN. In the meeting, the Malaysian Prime Minister pledged that Malaysia would look into Cambodia’s request for training in industry, foreign policy, oil, and gas, as well as agriculture. This training included establishing water resources and building dams and water catchment areas. The Cambodian Prime Minister also asked for credit to finance such endeavors. Despite the economic downturn in the region, Malaysia continued to invest in the Cambodian project, with 31% of its total foreign direct investment going to Cambodia.¹

1. “Premier Mahathir discusses ASEAN entry, investment with Cambodian counterpart,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 6, 1999.

2000

Minimum Implementation

After attaining political stability, Cambodia continued to receive external support of its efforts to rebuild its economy and infrastructure. Ariston Sdn Bhd, a Malaysian-based multi-national corporation, has revived its massive 1.3 billion US dollar (S$ 2.2 billion) infrastructure project in Cambodia, the biggest source of foreign investment in the country.¹ In September 2000, the Asian Development Bank had approved a 16 million dollar loan for a package of infrastructure and training programs to help farmers in the Cambodian province of Kompong Thom increase their incomes by 40 percent.² Cambodia received support from the United States to rebuild its health infrastructure.³

Note: The information above gives the amount of money pledged at the donor conferences, but not the amounts that were actually spent. On the topic of socio-economic development, the boom of the garment and tourism industries that had been taking place in Cambodia since 1993 is also worth mentioning.

1. “Ariston revives stalled US $1.3b Cambodian project,” Business Times (Singapore), February 15, 2000.
2. “ADB loan to help Cambodian farmers increase incomes,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, September 6, 2000.
3. “U.S. Gives Aid to Cambodian Health Sector, Emerging Markets Datafile,” Xinhua, September 27, 2000.

1991

Intermediate Implementation

After the signing of the peace agreement, large amounts of aid were predicted to come into the country, but details of this aid were still unknown.¹

At a news conference on the 16th of December, Senator Evans from Australia announced that the Australian government had decided to grant Vietnam and Cambodia 4.4m Australian dollars as supplementary aid for development projects. Of the sum, 2m dollars would go to Vietnam.² Japan was also considering drawing up a plan to extend its financial aid, including official development assistance to Cambodia.³ Japan also planned to host a Tokyo conference to discuss the reconstruction of Cambodia.

1. “Cambodia builds on a fragile peace,” The Age (Melbourne, Australia), November 4, 1991.
2. “Australian Foreign Minister Concludes Visit to Cambodia,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 21, 1991.
3. “Japan to provide aid to Cambodia, possibly Vietnam, Report From Japan,” United Nations, October 24, 1991.

1992

Intermediate Implementation

The International Ministerial Conference on Rebuilding Cambodia, (also referred to as the Tokyo Conference), was concluded on June 22, 1992. In a press conference, UNTAC president, Yasushi Akashi, remarked that the conference was ”an unqualified and spectacular success.” In the conference, $880 Million was pledged, which exceeded the UN Secretary-General’s request. This was due ”to the fact that some needs identified by donors go beyond the minimum needs that were included in the appeal of the Secretary-General.” Japan was the largest contributor — donating 150 to 200m dollars and they were followed by the United States who donated 135m dollars. France and the UN Development Programme were the third largest contributor, giving 57m dollars each.¹

1. “UNTAC Head Says Conference a ‘Spectacular Success’,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 25, 1992.

1993

Intermediate Implementation

“The rehabilitation aid was meant to support everything from road and bridge repair to well-digging and the purchase of school books and essential medicines. But of the $800 million pledged by donor nations at a conference in Tokyo in June, only about $95 million has been disbursed. According to figures compiled by the United Nations, the United States, the largest donor at the Tokyo conference, has come up with only $14 million of the $145 million it pledged. Japan, the second-largest donor, has turned over only about $9 million of the $135 million it promised.” According to the UN transitional authority in Cambodia’s rehabilitation program director, “donor nations had held back hundreds of millions of dollars in promised reconstruction aid out of a fear that the peace process will collapse”.¹ In International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia held on 10 Sept. 1993 in Paris, donor community had pledged $119 Million.

1. “Most Cambodians See Nothing of Aid,” The New York Times, February 21, 1993.

1994

Intermediate Implementation

A two day international meeting on the reconstruction of Cambodia was held in Tokyo on March 10-11, 1994. It was generally believed that Cambodia would receive $773 million in aid and loans from 20 nations, the European Union and 9 international organizations. According to the Foreign Ministry Office of the Government of Japan, most of the assistance pledged at the second meeting of the International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia, was in addition to another $880 million pledged at the 1992 Tokyo conference and the $119 million pledged at the first ICORC meeting held in Paris last September (1993).¹

According to the Straits Time Report, half of the 880 million aid pledged during the 1992 Tokyo conference was paid out.²

In order to reform and restructure the economy, on December 16, 1994, Cambodia signed a set of loan agreements worth 44 million dollars with the World Bank and Asian Development Bank.³

1. “$773 mil. pledged to Cambodia; for reconstruction projects,” The Daily Yomiuri, March 12, 1994.
2. “Half of $ 1.3b aid pledged to Cambodia paid out,” The Straits Times (Singapore), August 6, 1994.
3. “Cambodia signs loan accords with World Bank,” ADB, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, December 16, 1994.

1995

Intermediate Implementation

A two-day international conference on aid to Cambodia opened in Paris on March 14, 1995 with representatives from some 40 countries and international organizations in attendance. This was the third international conference regarding aid to Cambodia. During the conference, donor countries agreed on a total of 473 million dollars to be given during1995 and 877 million dollars to be given during 1996.¹

1. “Cambodia to receive 1.35 billion dollars in 1995 and 1996,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 16, 1995.

1996

Intermediate Implementation

Following the three donor conferences, there was no major support pledged in the year 1996. However, the Cambodian dissidents called on Australia and other western governments to tie future aid to Cambodia to its agreement to continued free elections.¹

1. “Tie aid to democracy: Cambodian dissident,” The Weekend Australian, January 27, 1996.

1997

Intermediate Implementation

Another conference of donor countries met in Paris on July 1-2, 1997 (three days before the coup). In the multilateral donor meeting, Cambodia was expected to win international aid commitments of about 500 million dollars. In the conference, Cambodia was told to put its house in order or face dwindling support. Donor countries also criticized Cambodia for spending too much money on its security forces.¹

1. “Cambodia “spending too much on military’,” The Straits Times (Singapore), July 3, 1997.

There were no major donor support activities reported in 1998, except aid given to hold elections. It was reported that Japan would expand economic development aid to Cambodia if the elections were found to have been free and fair.¹

1. The Nikkei Weekly (Japan), July 27, 1998.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

During the Tokyo donor conference held on Feb 25-27, 1999, 16 donor nations and international organizations approved a $470 million aid package to Cambodia. On Feb 25, Cambodia and the International aid organizations and donor countries decided to set up a monitoring body that would hold quarterly meetings to assess Cambodia’s progress in implementing the reforms that were a condition for continued economic assistance.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

The Consultative Group (CG) meeting between the countries and communities on aid for our Kingdom of Cambodia was held in Paris on 25-26th May. At the CG meeting, 16 countries and seven international institutions pledged 603 million dollars in development aid for Cambodia for the year 2000.¹

The World Bank also pledged 15 million dollars to assist Cambodia in the demobilization of its army.²

1. “Cambodia: Premier ends France visit; official comments on aid, Khmer Rouge trial,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific — Political, May 29, 2000.
2. “World Bank to fund Cambodian demobilization,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, September 2, 2000.

1991

Intermediate Implementation

The Paris agreement had strictly banned all parties from seeking outside military assistance. However, UNAMIC had sent military liaison units to only the general military headquarters of each of the Cambodian parties. In addition, teams deployed to two forward positions, Battambang and Siem Reap, which were to be main bases for the mine-awareness programme.

1992

Intermediate Implementation

UNTAC had set up checkpoints along the borders between Cambodia and its three neighboring countries. Mobile military units had also been employed to monitor and investigate whether there are foreign troops remaining in Cambodia. UNTAC took these initiatives to verify not only the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops but also to make sure that the Cambodian parties would not get any military support from outside.¹

1. “UNTAC Head Addresses SNC on Foreign Troops, Immigrants,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 27, 1992.

1993

Full Implementation

“A U.N.-mandated oil embargo against Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge guerrillas took effect Friday, but officials were doubtful it would be effective. The embargo, approved by the Security Council on Nov. 30, is intended to pressure the Khmer Rouge to stop undermining U.N. efforts to bring peace to Cambodia after 13 years of civil war. A ban on log exports, imposed by Cambodian leaders to save their nation’s forests from depletion, also went into effect.”¹ This embargo against Khmer guerrillas, however, was different from the armed embargo which went into effect immediately after the signing of the peace agreement in Paris.

1. “Oil embargo against Khmer Rouge starts,” St. Petersburg Times (Florida), January 2, 1993.

1994

Full Implementation

With the withdrawal of UNTAC from Cambodia after holding constituent assembly elections in May 1993, this embargo should be coded “ended.”

1995

Full Implementation

With the withdrawal of UNTAC from Cambodia after holding constituent assembly elections in May 1993, this embargo should be coded “ended.” The Australian Government provided $5 million in military aid — however guns and ammunition will not be supplied.¹

1. “Military Aid Gives Diggers Deja Vu,” Courier-Mail, January 13, 1995.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1991

Intermediate Implementation

The Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council authorize the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), to become operational as soon as the Paris Agreement was signed in October 1991. The Security Council, in its resolution 717 (1991) of 16 October 1991, authorized UNAMIC as recommended by the Secretary-General. UNAMIC became operational on 9 November 1991 when Mr. A.H.S. Ataul Karim (Bangladesh) assumed his role as Chief Liaison Officer of UNAMIC in Phnom Penh. Brigadier-General Michel Loridon (France), Senior Military Liaison Officer, assumed command of the military elements of UNAMIC on 12 November and, on the same day, an air operations unit contributed by France arrived in Phnom Penh. UNAMIC was designed to be absorbed into the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) once UNTAC was established. Strength Initial authorization: 116 military personnel (50 military liaison officers, 20 mine-awareness personnel, 40 military support personnel); there was also provision for approximately 75 international and 75 local civilian support staff.¹

1. “Cambodia: UNAMIC Facts and Figures,” http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamicfacts.html, accessed July 22, 2010.

1992

Intermediate Implementation

Once the mission began, however, it quickly became apparent that there was an urgent need for a major de-mining effort. To this end the Security Council passed Resolution 728(1992) on January 8, 1992. This resolution expanded the size of the military personnel to 1,090.¹

On February 19, 1992, the Secretary-General submitted the implementation plan for UNTAC as well as an indication of administrative and financial aspects to the Security Council. By resolution 745 (1992) of 28 February, the Security Council established UNTAC for a period not to exceed 18 months. All the responsibilities of UNAMIC were resumed by UNTAC.²

Civil administration component: The civil administration functions envisioned in the Paris Agreements provided for UNTAC to exercise control over existing administrative structures that would have an impact on the outcome of the elections. As provided by the UNTAC plan, special representative of the UN secretary-general in Cambodia, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, stated at a 26th June (1992) press conference that the UNTAC would start taking control of the civil administration of all factions on July 1, 1992. “Mr Yasushi Akashi said that the control of the civil administration was a most necessary factor leading towards the creation of a neutral ambience for free and fair elections in Cambodia. He said that according to the Paris accords, the four Cambodian factions agreed to let the UNTAC control five ministries, namely the Ministries of National Defense, Finance, Information, Foreign Affairs and Public Security.”³

Civilian police component: The Paris Agreement had the provision of UNTAC supervision and control of a civilian police force in Cambodia.

On March 18, 1992, Gen Klass Roos, chief of the civilian police of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia met with Vice-Chairman of the State of Cambodia’s Council of Ministers and Interior Minister to seek mutual understanding on a number of issues relating to the UNTAC operations in Cambodia.⁴

The Secretary-General recommended a total of some 3,600 UNTAC civilian police monitors. With this number, and based on UNTAC’s preliminary estimate of a 50,000 strong Cambodian civil police, there would be one UNTAC monitor for every 15 individual local civil policemen. The structure of this component would include a policy and management unit at headquarters, 21 units at the provincial level and 200 district-level units. The main function of the UNTAC police monitors would be to supervise or control the local civil police in order to ensure that law and order were maintained effectively and impartially, and that human rights and fundamental freedoms were fully protected. To assist the monitors, codes of conduct and other operational guidelines were developed and implemented by the UN. Monitors would also assume other responsibilities relating to the elections and to security requirements within UNTAC itself. The UN Security Council had authorized for the deployment of 3,500 civilian police, out of which 3,359 were deployed as of June 1992.⁵

Military Component: the military component had four main functions: (1) to verify the withdrawal and non-return of all categories of foreign forces and their arms and equipment; (2) to supervise the ceasefire and related measures including regrouping, cantonment, disarming and demobilization; (3) to control weapons, including monitoring the cessation of outside military assistance; and (4) to assist in mine-clearing, including training and mine awareness programs. The Secretary-General recommended that the military component be fully deployed by the end of May 1992 and that the regrouping and cantonment process, as well as demobilization of at least 70 per cent of the cantoned forces, be achieved by the end of September 1992.

Including military observers, 15,991 troops and observers were deployed in 1992.The UN Security Council had authorized for the maximum deployment of 15,547 toops and 893 military observers.⁶

Electoral component: “The Paris Agreement entrusted UNTAC with organizing and carrying out free and fair elections in Cambodia. The Special Representative would be assisted in these responsibilities by a Chief Electoral Officer. Other personnel needs included 198 international staff operating from headquarters and from 21 provincial and municipal centers, and some 400 United Nations Volunteers operating from each of 200 districts. These personnel would undertake duties related to electoral operations, information, training, communications, compliance and complaints, and coordination. They would be supplemented by some 4,000 Cambodian personnel during the registration process, and, during the polling process, by 1,000 international supervisors and 56,000 Cambodian personnel organized into 8,000 polling teams. To maximize efficiency and minimize costs, the electoral process would be computerized. The Secretary-General recommended that registration of voters begin in October 1992 and proceed for three months, discretion being allowed to the Special Representative to extend that period if necessary.”⁷

Parties to the conflict did not agree on the electoral law during the August 5, 1992 meeting of the SNC. Yasushi Akashi, special representative of the UN Secretary-General in Cambodia, used his power as stated in Annex 1, Part D, Paragraph 3A and adopted the law. The electoral law adopted a formula to provide voting rights to Cambodians as had been stipulated in the 1954 Cambodian Civil Code. The law required that the UNTAC would prepare elections for Cambodians living abroad, prohibited the use of HRH Prince Norodom Sihanouk’s picture as the symbol of a party on the ballots, as well as permitted amendments of the bill in accordance with the situation.⁸ The PDK opposed the draft law on the grounds that it would give voting rights to the Vietnamese. This can be coded as “reform in electoral law.” The registration of voters started on October 5, 1992, and 16 parties are expected to be provisionally registered. The UNTAC also had a human rights component, Repatriation, and Rehabilitation components.

1. “Details/Information for Canadian Forces (CF) Operation MARQUIS,” http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/od-bdo/di-ri-eng.asp?IntlOpId=25…, accessed July 22, 2010.
2. “Cambodia: UNAMIC Background,” http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamicbackgr.html, accessed July 22, 2010.
3. “UNTAC to control civil administration from 1st July,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 1, 1992.
4. “OTHER REPORTS; Interior Minister receives UNTAC civilian police chief,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 24, 1992.
5. “Cambodia-UNTAC Facts and Figures.”
6. Ibid.
7. “Cambodia-UNTAC Background.”
8. “COMMUNIQUE ON 5TH AUGUST SNC MEETING,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 15, 1992.

1993

Full Implementation

The electoral campaign officially began on April 7, and the 20 political parties participated actively. The election took place from May 23-28, 1993. In the 120 seat Constituent Assembly, FUNCINPEC won 58 seats, CPP won 51, BLDP won 10 and MOLINAKA won one seat. At a meeting of the SNC, held on 10 June and presided over by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General issued a statement declaring, on behalf of the Secretary-General and the United Nations, that the elections as a whole had been free and fair. The Security Council endorsed the results of the elections by Resolution 840 (1993) on June 15. However, during the June 10 meeting of the SNC, the CPP announced that it could not recognize the results of the elections and demanded an investigation of the irregularities that had occurred. Over time, the CPP softened its position. The duly elected Constituent Assembly began work on June 14, 1993.¹

Debate over the draft constitution began in the Constituent Assembly on 15 of September, 1993.² On September 21, 1993, the Constituent Assembly of Cambodia adopted a new constitution. This new constitution formally adopted a constitutional monarch.³

Nearly all of the United Nations military force, police and civilians had left Cambodia by November 15, 1993. This was after the UN had completed its mandate. The estimated costs of the operation were $1.6 billion.⁴

1. “Cambodia-UNTAC Background.”
2. “Constituent Assembly begins constitution debate,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 16, 1993.
3. “Son Sann’s closing speech at Constituent Assembly: constitution adopted,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 22, 1993.
4. “Cambodia: UNAMIC Background.”

1994

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1995

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1991

Intermediate Implementation

The Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council authorize the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), to become operational as soon as the Paris Agreement was signed in October 1991. The Security Council, in its resolution 717 (1991) of 16 October 1991, authorized UNAMIC as recommended by the Secretary-General. UNAMIC became operational on 9 November 1991 when Mr. A.H.S. Ataul Karim (Bangladesh) assumed his functions as Chief Liaison Officer of UNAMIC in Phnom Penh. Brigadier-General Michel Loridon (France), Senior Military Liaison Officer, assumed command of the military elements of UNAMIC on November 12. That same day an air operations unit contributed by France arrived in Phnom Penh. UNAMIC was designed to be absorbed into the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) once UNTAC was established. UNAMIC’s initial authorized strength was 116 military personnel (50 military liaison officers, 20 mine-awareness personnel, 40 military support personnel); there was also provision for approximately 75 international and 75 local civilian support staff.¹

1. “Cambodia: UNAMIC Background,” http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamicfacts.html, accessed July 22, 2010.

1992

Intermediate Implementation

Once the mission began, however, it quickly became apparent that there was an urgent need for a major de-mining effort. To this end the Security Council passed Resolution 728(1992) on 8 January 1992, which expanded the size of the military personnel to 1,090.¹

On February 19, 1992, the Secretary-General submitted the implementation plan for UNTAC as well as an indication of administrative and financial aspects to the Security Council. By Resolution 745 (1992) of February 28, the Security Council established UNTAC for a period not to exceed 18 months. All the responsibilities of UNAMIC were resumed by UNTAC.²

On May 9, 1992, UNTAC announced phase II of the ceasefire – the cantonment, disarming and demobilization phase. UNTAC did not receive cooperation from PKD.³ “In June, the Khmer Rouge refused to disarm or allow UN peacekeeping troops on the territory they controlled. KR argued that they did not want to disarm because there still were Vietnamese forces in the country. In mid-July the KR seized six villages and attacked UN helicopters. The UN Security Council at several occasions demanded that KR comply with Phase II of the Paris Agreement (S/RES/766 in July, S/RES/783 in October). On November 30 the Security Council adopted resolution S/RES/792 imposing a trade embargo on areas under KR control. On December 2 six UN soldiers were held captive for two days by KR accused of spying.”⁵

“Information provided by the Cambodian parties to the military survey mission sent by the Secretary-General in November – December 1991 indicated total forces of over 200,000 deployed in some 650 separate locations. In addition, militias totaling some 250,000 operated in almost all villages. These forces were armed with over 350,000 weapons and some 80 million rounds of ammunition.”⁶

In September 1992, the UN Secretary General announced that UNTAC had successfully marshaled 52,292 Cambodian troops into cantonment and confiscated 50,000 weapons. This included 42,368 troops from the Cambodian People’s Armed Force; 3,445 from National Army of Independent Kampuchea; and 6,497 from Khmer People’s National Liberation Armed Force.⁷

“Information provided by the Cambodian parties to the military survey mission sent by the Secretary-General in November – December 1991 indicated total forces of over 200,000 deployed in some 650 separate locations. In addition, militias totaling some 250,000 operated in almost all villages. These forces were armed with over 350,000 weapons and some 80 million rounds of ammunition.”⁸

In September 1992, the UN Secretary General announced that UNTAC had successfully marshaled 52,292 Cambodian troops into cantonment and confiscated 50,000 weapons. This included 42,368 troops from the Cambodian People’s Armed Force; 3,445 from National Army of Independent Kampuchea; and 6,497 from Khmer People’s National Liberation Armed Force.⁹

1. “Details/Information for Canadian Forces (CF) Operation MARQUIS,” accessed July 22, 2010, http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/od-bdo/di-ri-eng.asp?IntlOpId=25….
2. “Cambodia: UNAMIC Background.”
3. “Cambodia-UNTAC Background,” accessed July 19, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacbackgr2.html#two.
5. “Khmer Rouge Frees 6 U.N. Soldiers in Cambodia,” The New York Times, December 5, 1992, accessed July 19, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/05/world/khmer-rouge-frees-6-un-soldiers-…

   In the 15th meeting of the Supreme National Council (SNC) held on July 23, 1992, in the chairmanship of HRH Prince Norodom Sihanouk, head of state, father of the nation and Chairman of the SNC, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, special representative of the UN Secretary-General and head of the UNTAC informed in SNC that UNTAC had personally supervised Cambodia’s national defense institution and arranged a number of measures to verify that all foreign troops, advisers and military personnel had left Cambodia and would not be able to return absolutely. Checkpoints had been set up along the borders between Cambodia and its three neighboring countries. Mobile military units had also been employed to monitor and investigate whether there were foreign troops remaining in Cambodia. In the meeting, Mr. Akashi recalled a statement from the Vietnamese government that all Vietnamese troops left Cambodia between July 17, 1982 and September 26, 1989. This statement named the divisions, regiments and battalions involved; the places from where those troops were withdrawn; the types of materials; the dates; numbers of troops; and the roads they took to return to Vietnam. That statement emphasized that Vietnam no longer had any troops, weapons or materials left on Cambodian soil, and that Vietnam had not sent troops, weapons or materials back to Cambodia. In the meeting, the UNTAC chief informed SNC that the UNTAC would still verify whether it was true that all foreign troops, advisers and military personnel had already left Cambodia.⁴“UNTAC HEAD ADDRESSES SNC ON FOREIGN TROOPS, IMMIGRANTS,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 27, 1992.

6. “Cambodia-UNTAC Background,” accessed July 22, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacbackgr2.html.
7. “Second progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia,” United Nations, (S/24578), September 21, 1992.
8. “Cambodia-UNTAC Background.”
9. “Second progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia,” United Nations.

1993

Full Implementation

The mission was unsuccessful in its attempt to disarm the Khmer Rouge and bring them into the democratic process. The Khmer also did not participate in the elections and claimed that its lack of participation was due to the fact that the Vietnamese troops were still inside Cambodia. However, UNTAC verified that there were no Vietnamese troops in Cambodia. Except for this allegation and violation of ceasefire by Khmers, the UNTAC maintained reasonable peace and security in other areas and provided security throughout the electoral process. Nearly all of the United Nations military forces, police and civilians left Cambodia by November 15, 1993 after completing their mandate. The estimated costs of the operation were $1.6 billion.¹

1. “Cambodia: UNTAC- Facts and Figures,” accessed July 22, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacfacts.html.

1994

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1995

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1991

Intermediate Implementation

The Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council authorize the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) to become operational as soon as the Paris Agreement was signed in October 1991. The Security Council, in its Resolution 717 (1991) of October 16, 1991, authorized UNAMIC as recommended by the Secretary-General. UNAMIC became operational on November 9, 1991 when Mr. A.H.S. Ataul Karim (Bangladesh) assumed his functions as Chief Liaison Officer of UNAMIC in Phnom Penh. Brigadier-General Michel Loridon (France), Senior Military Liaison Officer, assumed command of the military elements of UNAMIC on 12 November and, on the same day, an air operations unit contributed by France arrived in Phnom Penh. UNAMIC was designed to be absorbed into United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) once UNTAC was established. UNAMIC’s initial authorized strength was 116 military personnel (50 military liaison officers, 20 mine-awareness personnel, 40 military support personnel); there was also provision for approximately 75 international and 75 local civilian support staff.¹

1. “Cambodia: UNAMIC Facts and Figures,” accessed July 22, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamicfacts.html.

1992

Intermediate Implementation

Once the mission began, however, it quickly became apparent that there was an urgent need for a major de-mining effort. To this end the Security Council passed Resolution 728 (1992) on 8 January 1992, which expanded the size of the military personnel to 1,090.²

On 9 May 1992, UNTAC announced phase II of the ceasefire – the cantonment, disarming and demobilization phase. UNTAC did not receive cooperation from PKD.³ “In June, the Khmer Rouge refused to disarm or allow UN peacekeeping troops on the territory they controlled. KR argued that they did not want to disarm because there still were Vietnamese forces in the country. In mid-July the KR seized six villages and attacked UN helicopters. The UN Security Council at several occasions (S/RES/766 in July, S/RES/783 in October) demanded that KR comply with phase II of the Paris Agreement. On 30 November, the Security Council adopted resolution S/RES/792 imposing a trade embargo on areas under KR control. On 2 December six UN soldiers were held capture for two days by KR accused of spying.”⁴

A maximum of 15,991 troops were deployed⁵ (1) to verify the withdrawal and non-return of all categories of foreign forces and their arms and equipment; (2) to supervise the ceasefire and related measures including regroupment, cantonment, disarming and demobilization; (3) to control weapons, including monitoring the cessation of outside military assistance; and (4) to assist in mine-clearing, including training and mine awareness programs. The Secretary-General recommended that the military component be fully deployed by the end of May 1992 and that the regrouping and cantonment process, as well as demobilization of at least 70 per cent of the cantoned forces, be achieved by the end of September 1992.⁶

In September 1992, the UN Secretary General announced that UNTAC had successfully marshaled 52,292 Cambodian troops into cantonment and confiscated 50,000 weapons. This included 42,368 troops from the Cambodian People’s Armed Force; 3,445 from National Army of Independent Kampuchea; and 6,497 from Khmer People’s National Liberation Armed Force.⁷ “Information provided by the Cambodian parties to the military survey mission sent by the Secretary-General in November – December 1991 indicated total forces of over 200,000 deployed in some 650 separate locations. In addition, militias totaling some 250,000 operated in almost all villages. These forces were armed with over 350,000 weapons and some 80 million rounds of ammunition.”⁸

In September 1992, the UN Secretary General announced that UNTAC had successfully marshaled 52,292 Cambodian troops into cantonment and confiscated 50,000 weapons. This included 42,368 troops from the Cambodian People’s Armed Force; 3,445 from National Army of Independent Kampuchea; and 6,497 from Khmer People’s National Liberation Armed Force.⁹

2. “Details/Information for Canadian Forces (CF) Operation MARQUIS,” accessed July 22, 2010, http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/od-bdo/di-ri-eng.asp?IntlOpId=25…

   On 19 February 1992, the Secretary-General submitted the implementation plan for UNTAC as well as an indication of administrative and financial aspects to the Security Council. By resolution 745 (1992) of 28 February, the Security Council established UNTAC for a period not to exceed 18 months. All the responsibilities of UNAMIC were resumed by UNTAC.¹“Cambodia: UNAMIC Background,” accessed July 22, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamicbackgr.html.

3. “Cambodia-UNTAC Background,” accessed July 19, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacbackgr2.html#two.
4. “Khmer Rouge Frees 6 U.N. Soldiers in Cambodia, The New York Times, December 5, 1992, accessed July 19, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/05/world/khmer-rouge-frees-6-un-soldiers-….
5. “Cambodia- UNTAC Facts and Figures,” accessed July 22, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacfacts.html.
6. “Cambodia-UNTAC Background.”
7. “Second progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia,” United Nations, (S/24578), September 21, 1992.
8. “Cambodia-UNTAC Background.”
9. “Second progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia,” United Nations, (S/24578), September 21, 1992.

1993

Full Implementation

The mission was unsuccessful in its attempt to disarm the Khmer Rouge and bring them into the democratic process. The Khmer also did not participate in the elections, claiming that they would not do so because Vietnamese troops were still inside Cambodia. However, UNTAC verified that there were no Vietnamese troops inside Cambodia. Except for this allegation and violation of ceasefire by Khmers, the UNTAC maintained reasonable peace and security in other areas and providing security throughout the electoral process. Nearly all of the United Nations military forces, police and civilians left Cambodia by November 15, 1993 after completing their mandate. The estimated costs of the operation were $1.6 billion.¹

1. “Cambodia: UNTAC- Facts and Figures.”

1994

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1995

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1991

Full Implementation

The military invasion of Cambodia by the Vietnamese troops resulted in the removal of Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia. After their defeat, the Khmer started a guerilla insurgency. In this context, the 1991 Paris agreement called for the withdrawal of foreign forces, advisers, and military personnel remaining in Cambodia.

In a news conference, Hun Sen, who was the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and a member of Supreme National Council, addressed the questions related to Vietnamese residents in Cambodia and Vietnamese troops referring statistics on ethnic minorities. He informed SNC that “Vietnamese residents in the country before 1970 under Samdech Norodom Sihanouk’s rule numbered from 400,000 to 500,000. They were mostly rubber plantation workers; some lived along the Mekong River and the Tonle Sap. Under Lon Nol’s repression, a number of them fled to Vietnam. Under Pol Pot’s repression, some fled to Vietnam along with a number of Cambodians. According to the 1987 statistics, there were 130,000. Thus, compared to the 500,000 residents in 1970, it is very different. Following the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, a number of Vietnamese residents, afraid that Pol Pot might be back, returned to Vietnam. There are now over 90,000 Vietnamese residents in Cambodia.”¹ This statement can be taken as a verification of the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia.

A complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, however, was contested by the Khmer Rouge.

(Note: According to a Khmer Rouge Radio (the Great National Union Front of Cambodia radio) report, “the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea had captured a two- star Vietnamese officer around O Ta Sek along the Stoeng Sen river below Kompong Thom provincial town.” The captured officer was said to have disguised himself as a Cambodian civilian and led the lead Vietnamese forces.² Khmer Rouge Radio cannot be taken as authentic information provider.)

1. “HUN SEN HOLDS NEWS CONFERENCE IN PHNOM PENH,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 20, 1991.
2. “CAMBODIA; Khmer Rouge radio gives details of captured Vietnamese officer in Cambodia,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 30, 1991.

1992

Full Implementation

The Khmer were not convinced that the UNTAC and the government of Cambodia did enough to make sure the infiltration of Vietnamese troops did not occur along the Vietnam-Cambodia border. The Khmer demanded UNTAC deploy its troops along the border.¹

On June 5, 1992, the Voice of Vietnam external service reported that the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry sent two notes confirming that no Vietnamese troops were left in Cambodia and that the Vietnamese military aid to Cambodia had been cut out. The notes added that by the end of 1989, Vietnam had completed the withdrawal of its troops, weapons, and military equipment from Cambodia. This confirmation had made an important contribution to the signing of the Paris agreement in Cambodia. Since the signing of the peace accord on Cambodia, Vietnam has consistently implemented the agreement. Now, as in the past, Vietnam has not infiltrated its troops and equipment into Cambodia. Prince Sihanouk himself has affirmed this fact. The head of the UN office in Cambodia also pointed out that there was no evidence of the Vietnamese military presence in Cambodia.²

In the SNC meeting held on July 23, 1992, the UNTAC chief recalled the Vietnamese government’s statement that “all Vietnamese troops left Cambodia between 17th July 1982 and 26th September 1989. This statement named the divisions, regiments and battalions involved; the places from where those troops were withdrawn; the types of materiel; the dates; numbers of troops; and the roads they took to return to Vietnam. That statement emphasized that Vietnam no longer had any troops, weapons or materiel left on Cambodian soil, and that Vietnam has not sent troops, weapons or materiel back to Cambodia.”³ In the same meeting, the UNTAC chief told SNC that the UNTAC had personally supervised Cambodia’s national defense institution and arranged a number of measures to verify that all foreign troops, advisers and military personnel had left Cambodia and would not be able to return absolutely. Checkpoints had been set up along the borders between Cambodia and its three neighboring countries. Mobile military units had also been employed to monitor and investigate whether foreign troops remained in Cambodia.

In the SNC meeting on December 10, 1992, Tran Huy Chuong, a Vietnamese ambassador accredited to the SNC, affirmed that Vietnam had withdrawn all its volunteer troops from Cambodia in September 1989.⁴ Because there were no Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, Australia and Japan lifted the trade sanctions on Vietnam.⁵ As of 1992, there were no Vietnamese troops in Cambodia.

1. “KHMER ROUGE SLOGANS CONDEMN VIETNAM AND URGE UNTAC DEPLOYMENT ALONG BORDER,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 18, 1992.
2. “Vietnam ”has never infiltrated its troops and equipment into Cambodia”,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 9, 1992.
3. “UNTAC HEAD ADDRESSES SNC ON FOREIGN TROOPS, IMMIGRANTS,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 27, 1992.
4. “Vietnamese ambassador denies troop presence in Cambodia,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 16, 1992.
5. “Japan to lift trade sanctions against Vietnam, Report From Japan,” United Nations, January 6, 1992.

1993

Full Implementation

Foreign troops withdrawn in 1992 or before.

1994

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1995

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.