Estimates of the percentage of pledges fulfilled between 2015 and the end of 2018 ranged from 90 to 99%.[1] However, it is unclear what portion of the funds earmarked for Northern Mali were actually disbursed by the central government.[2]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali,” United Nations S/2015/1013.
[2] “Report of the Independent Observer: Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process,” The Carter Center, September 16, 2019.
Estimates of the percentage of pledges fulfilled between 2015 and the end of 2018 ranged from 90 to 99%.[1] By the end of 2017, the government had disbursed 1.1 billion USD to the Northern Regions.[2]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali,” United Nations S/2015/1013.
[2] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2017/1105.
Estimates of the percentage of pledges fulfilled between 2015 and the end of 2018 ranged from 90 to 99%.[1] However, it is unclear what portion of the funds earmarked for Northern Mali were actually disbursed by the central government.[2]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali,” United Nations S/2015/1013.
[2] “Report of the Independent Observer: Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process,” The Carter Center, September 16, 2019.
The agreement invited international support to facilitate development in northern Mali and humanitarian aid to facilitate the return of displaced persons and refugees.
In October 2015, the International Conference for the Economic Recovery and Development for Mali resulted in pledges of 3.6 billion USD for Mali, a portion of which was earmarked for the northern regions. Estimates of the percentage of pledges fulfilled between 2015 and the end of 2018 ranged from 90 to 99%.[1] However, it is unclear what portion of the funds earmarked for northern Mali were actually disbursed by the central government.[2]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali,” United Nations S/2015/1013.
[2] “Report of the Independent Observer: Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process,” The Carter Center, September 16, 2019.
No further implementation observed.
The DDR program was hampered by protracted negotiations between the parties throughout 2020. By December, approximately 1,776 ex-combatants had been demobilized and disarmed in preparation for integration into the military.[1]
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process, The Carter Center, December 2020.
The DDR program continued to be hindered by disagreements over eligible opposition combatants in 2019. [1]
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process,” The Carter Center, January, 2020.
The parties agreed to speed up the DDR process in the fall of 2018 and established requirements for eligibility for the new armed forces. By 2018, the DDR program had registered 32,908 combatants. 13,019 were under evaluation for integration into the armed forces, while 4,998 were designated for reintegration.[1] It was difficult to assess what percentage of troops needed to be demobilized as this was one of the primary disagreements between the signatories. The opposition groups identified large numbers of eligible fighters, which the government claims are medically or otherwise ineligible. [2]
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer. Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process Observation period: May 1 to September 30, 2018,” The Carter Center, October 26, 2018.
[2] “Report of the Independent Observer on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process,” The Carter Center, January, 2020.
The DDR process was delayed due to disagreements regarding the number of former combatants to be integrated into the new security forces. Opposition groups failed to provide combatant lists in 2017.[1]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2017/1105.
The National DDR Commission was established by 2016 but was not operational. The DDR program was drafted but was not functioning.[1]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2016/1137.
