Military Reform – 2001

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The British continued supporting security sector reform in Sierra Leone through its training of the armed forces. As of September 2001, there were 600 British trainers, which was expected to drop to 300-400 once the government expanded its control of the country.1

Through the Military Reintegration Programme (MRP), the UK-led International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) undertook a series of training programs and assisted the Sierra Leone Armed ForcesÕ instructors at the Armed Force Training Center. MRP was “designed to integrate former RUF and CDF combatants who have been through the disarmament and demobilisation process, into the new RSLAF.2.The size of RUF and CDF combatants to be integrated was said to be fairly modest, but the actual numbers are unavailable.

Military Reform – 2000

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In 2000, the British helped establish a new Sierra Leonean Ministry of Defense with a mission to “formulate, implement, monitor and evaluate a strategic defence policy for the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces that is effective and fostered within a framework of democratic governance.3The new ministry provides a framework for a closer and more efficient working relationship between civilians and the military. Unlike in the past, civilians now occupy senior positions in the military administration. The Deputy Minister of Defence and the Director General of the MOD, the equivalent of a UK Permanent Secretary, are civilians. The Director General is the government’s principal adviser on defense matters and holds primary responsibility for policy, finance, procurement and administration. The Director General is also the Principal Accounting Officer responsible to the Minister of Defence for the overall organization, management and staffing of the department. The Director is personally responsible to Parliament for the expenditure of all public money allocated for defense 4

“On 28 January 2000, Mr. Koroma submitted his resignation to President Kabbah from the Sierra Leone Army. While he would remain the leader of the AFRC, his faction would be dissolved with the impeding reinstatement of ex-sierra Leone Army elements into the current armed forces.”5

1,148 ex-armed combatants have been encamped and are waiting the screening process in order to be reinstated, if qualified.6

In his latest report to the Security Council (December 2000), the UN Secretary General informed that the newly trained Sierra Leone Army began security responsibilities in several strategic areas of the country. The United Kingdom Military trained approximately 3,000 Sierra Leonean Army personnel, with 1,000 more expected to undergo training in late December.7

Note: Though the screening process was rigorous, government reinstated thousands of ex-AFRC soldiers, who committed terrible atrocities during the war, into the army during the summer of 2000 in order to repulse the RUF’s attack towards Freetown.

Military Reform – 1999

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Military reform in Sierra Leone started well before the Lomé Agreement. “By September 1998, the government’s plans for reform of the army and police had taken shape. They involved an army of 5,000 (the army under the AFRC was at least twice as large) and rigorous screening of members of the old armed forces before they could be allowed to join. The government had also accepted advice from the Commonwealth Police Development Task Force (mainly funded by DFID) on radical reform of the police. At the same time the President made it clear that the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) would continue to play a key role in security.8

“The Sierra Leone government had explored many options in its drive to restructure and reform the armed forces. At one point, it considered the Costa Rica model — no army, but a well-trained and equipped police force. This option was not popular, in view of the security threat posed to Sierra Leone by the Liberian conflict and the then volatile Guinean security situation in the Mano River sub-region.9

“The UK developed various programmes to increase the effectiveness and accountability of the Sierra Leonean forces, including military training assistance, reintegration, and specific SSR measures designed to ensure that the security institutions had a sufficient legal basis. Though the greatest slice of these funds was devoted to the military training and assistance programmes, there was also a specific effort to implement legal and structural reforms. MOD-UK, MODAT and IMATT have also been involved in the training of future trainers of the AFRSL — platoon commanders and sergeants under the Short Term Training Teams (STTT). The 12-week training course focused on such key areas as international humanitarian law, civil—military relations, the rights of the child, budget management, and regional and sub-regional security” (Gbla 2006, 83).

Dispute Resolution Committee – 2002

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According to a report:

“A high power delegation from the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP) returned from Kono after successfully completing a fact finding mission. According to a member of the delegation, they investigated the causes of the recent clash between the RUF and Kono residents which led to the death of the notorious RUF Commander Demba Marah and also identified practical problems facing the people of the district”. The quarrel, started over the date for the termination of illicit mining, caused the death of over fifty former RUF and CDF combatants. “The CCP representative further disclosed that the government and the international community should take the issue of Kono seriously as about 95% of the population are involved in active mining.10

In early 2002, Koroma resigned from his position as head of the CCP in order to launch a political career and take part in the 2002 national elections.

No further information found. On May 14, 2002, multiparty elections took place for the President and the Parliament.