No further developments observed.
Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 1995
No further developments observed.
Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 1994
No further developments observed.
Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 1993
The mission was unsuccessful in its attempt to disarm the Khmer Rouge and bring them into the democratic process. The Khmer also did not participate in the elections and claimed that its lack of participation was due to the fact that the Vietnamese troops were still inside Cambodia. However, UNTAC verified that there were no Vietnamese troops in Cambodia. Except for this allegation and violation of ceasefire by Khmers, the UNTAC maintained reasonable peace and security in other areas and provided security throughout the electoral process. Nearly all of the United Nations military forces, police and civilians left Cambodia by November 15, 1993 after completing their mandate. The estimated costs of the operation were $1.6 billion.1
Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 1992
Once the mission began, however, it quickly became apparent that there was an urgent need for a major de-mining effort. To this end the Security Council passed Resolution 728(1992) on 8 January 1992, which expanded the size of the military personnel to 1,090.2
On February 19, 1992, the Secretary-General submitted the implementation plan for UNTAC as well as an indication of administrative and financial aspects to the Security Council. By Resolution 745 (1992) of February 28, the Security Council established UNTAC for a period not to exceed 18 months. All the responsibilities of UNAMIC were resumed by UNTAC.3
On May 9, 1992, UNTAC announced phase II of the ceasefire – the cantonment, disarming and demobilization phase. UNTAC did not receive cooperation from PKD.4 “In June, the Khmer Rouge refused to disarm or allow UN peacekeeping troops on the territory they controlled. KR argued that they did not want to disarm because there still were Vietnamese forces in the country. In mid-July the KR seized six villages and attacked UN helicopters. The UN Security Council at several occasions demanded that KR comply with Phase II of the Paris Agreement (S/RES/766 in July, S/RES/783 in October). On November 30 the Security Council adopted resolution S/RES/792 imposing a trade embargo on areas under KR control. On December 2 six UN soldiers were held captive for two days by KR accused of spying.”6
“Information provided by the Cambodian parties to the military survey mission sent by the Secretary-General in November – December 1991 indicated total forces of over 200,000 deployed in some 650 separate locations. In addition, militias totaling some 250,000 operated in almost all villages. These forces were armed with over 350,000 weapons and some 80 million rounds of ammunition.”7
In September 1992, the UN Secretary General announced that UNTAC had successfully marshaled 52,292 Cambodian troops into cantonment and confiscated 50,000 weapons. This included 42,368 troops from the Cambodian People’s Armed Force; 3,445 from National Army of Independent Kampuchea; and 6,497 from Khmer People’s National Liberation Armed Force.8
“Information provided by the Cambodian parties to the military survey mission sent by the Secretary-General in November – December 1991 indicated total forces of over 200,000 deployed in some 650 separate locations. In addition, militias totaling some 250,000 operated in almost all villages. These forces were armed with over 350,000 weapons and some 80 million rounds of ammunition.”9
In September 1992, the UN Secretary General announced that UNTAC had successfully marshaled 52,292 Cambodian troops into cantonment and confiscated 50,000 weapons. This included 42,368 troops from the Cambodian People’s Armed Force; 3,445 from National Army of Independent Kampuchea; and 6,497 from Khmer People’s National Liberation Armed Force.10
Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 1991
The Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council authorize the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), to become operational as soon as the Paris Agreement was signed in October 1991. The Security Council, in its resolution 717 (1991) of 16 October 1991, authorized UNAMIC as recommended by the Secretary-General. UNAMIC became operational on 9 November 1991 when Mr. A.H.S. Ataul Karim (Bangladesh) assumed his functions as Chief Liaison Officer of UNAMIC in Phnom Penh. Brigadier-General Michel Loridon (France), Senior Military Liaison Officer, assumed command of the military elements of UNAMIC on November 12. That same day an air operations unit contributed by France arrived in Phnom Penh. UNAMIC was designed to be absorbed into the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) once UNTAC was established. UNAMIC’s initial authorized strength was 116 military personnel (50 military liaison officers, 20 mine-awareness personnel, 40 military support personnel); there was also provision for approximately 75 international and 75 local civilian support staff.11
UN Transitional Authority – 2000
No further developments observed.
UN Transitional Authority – 1999
No further developments observed.
UN Transitional Authority – 1998
No further developments observed.
UN Transitional Authority – 1997
No further developments observed.