Taif Accord

Power sharing arrangement in the Chamber of Deputies did not occur in 1989.

According to the U.S. State Department Human Rights report, political reforms stipulated in the Taif accord were approved through the constitutional amendments by parliament in August (21) 1990 and signed into law by the president in September (21) of that year. According to the revisions, the parliamentary seats will be equally divided between Christians and Muslims in an in an expanded 108-member Parliament.¹ The seats were further divided between all of Lebanon’s 18 officially recognized religious sects.²“Lebanon Election 2009 – Lebanon’s election system,” accessed April 5, 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/lebanon2009/2009/06/20096211481936043… The increases of new nine seats (from 99 to 108) were to be Muslim seats allocated to areas with Muslim demographic concentration.

1. “Human Rights Report- Lebanon,” U.S. Dept. of State Dispatch, February 1, 1991.

It was only in 1991 that the parliament passed Law 51 in 1991 making allocation of the increased seats.

According to Khazan (Khazen), the balance of power both within Lebanon and between Beirut and Damascus had changed significantly by 1992. “Amid speculation and rumours in the press about the number of deputies, the Council of Ministers decided to adopt 134, an addition of 26 to the 108 agreed on in the Ta’if document. The stated reason for raising the number of deputies was to modify the representation of some sects (Druze and Greek Catholic). The tacit reason was to make the number 128 more acceptable to its opponents.”¹ Finally government adopted Law 154 in 1992 raised the number of parliamentary seats to 128 instead of 108, thus adding 29 new seats to the prewar parliament.² The additional nine and twenty nine seats were allocated in the following manner:

Maronite from 30 to 34, Greek Orthodox from 11 to 13, Greek Catholic from 6 to 8, Armenian Orthodox from 4 to 5, American catholic from 1 to 0, Protestant from 1 to 0, Minorities from 1 to 0, Sunni from 20 to 27, ShiÕa from 19 to 27, Druze from 6 to 8, and Alawite got 2 seats from none.³

1. Farid el. Khazan, “Lebanon’s First Postwar Parliamentary Election, 1992: An Imposed Choice,” 1992, accessed April 5, 2011, http://almashriq.hiof.no/ddc/projects/pspa/elections92-part1.html.
2. Bassel F. Salloukh, “The Limits of Electoral Engineering in Divided Societies: Elections in Postwar Lebanon,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 39 (2006): 644.
3. Ibid.

Power-sharing provision of the Taif agreement was implemented in 1992.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

As part of the political reform, Lebanon’s parliament elected Rene Moawad, 64, a longtime Christian politician and who was strongly backed by Syria. He received 52 of 58 votes. There were only 58 survivors of the 99-member parliament elected in 1972 (Soruce: President Elected In Lebanon; Aoun Rejects Decision; New Leader Appeals to Army, But Backing Remains Uncertain, The Washington Post, November 6, 1989). Immediately after the election of the president, Moslem acting Prime Minister Selim Hoss announced the resignation of his government. But, president Moawad designated Selim Hoss as prime minister on 13 November 1989. The reform stripped the Christian president of some power to give the prime minister and Parliament speaker, both Moslems, a broader role.[fn]”Lebanon elects new president,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, November 6, 1989.[/efn_note]

Newly elected President Rene Moawad was assassinated on November 22, 1989. Two days after Moawad was killed, Lebanese parliament elected a moderate Maronite Christian Elias Hrawi as Lebanon’s new president. His presidency was supported by Syria.[fn]”Deputies Elect New President In Lebanon; Leader Pledges to Pursue Efforts to End Civil War,” The Washington Post, November 25, 1989.[/efn_note] After the election, president Hrawi designated Selim Hoss, a Sunni Moslem, as prime minister.

On 28 November 1989, the government appointed Adm. Emile Lahoud as the country’s chief of armed forces replacing Gen. Aoun.[fn]”Lebanon’s Cabinet Appoints New Army Commander,” Xinhua General News Service, November 28, 1989.[/efn_note] This was part of the initiatives to reform the executive branch of the government and give more power to the cabinet.

The executive branch reform envisaged in the Taif agreement was implemented in 1989.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

Reform related to legislative branch of government in Lebanon did not take place in 1989.

In August 1990, the legislature made constitutional revisions including provisions related to seats in the parliament. According to the revisions, the parliamentary seats will be equally divided between Christians and Muslims in an in an expanded 108-member Parliament.[fn]”Human Rights Report- Lebanon,” U.S. State Department Dispatch, February 1, 1991.[/efn_note] The seats were further divided between all of Lebanon’s 18 officially recognized religious sects.[fn]”Lebanon Election – Lebanon’s election system,” accessed April 5, 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/lebanon2009/2009/06/20096211481936043… The increases of nine seats (from 99 to 108) were to be Muslim seats allocated to areas with Muslim demographic concentration.

It was only in 1991 that the parliament passed Law 51 allocating increased seats.

According to Khazan (Khazen), the balance of power both within Lebanon and between Beirut and Damascus had changed significantly by 1992. “Amid speculation and rumours in the press about the number of deputies, the Council of Ministers decided to adopt 134, an addition of 26 to the 108 agreed on in the Ta’if document. The stated reason for raising the number of deputies was to modify the representation of some sects (Druze and Greek Catholic). The tacit reason was to make the number 128 more acceptable to its opponents.”¹ Finally government adopted Law 154 in 1992 raised the number of parliamentary seats to 128 instead of 108, thus adding 29 new seats to the prewar parliament.² The additional nine and twenty nine seats were allocated in the following manner:

Maronite from 30 to 34, Greek Orthodox from 11 to 14, Greek Catholic from 6 to 8, Armenian Orthodox from 4 to 5, American catholic from 1 to 0, Protestant from 1 to 0, Minorities from 1 to 0, Sunni from 20 to 27, ShiÕa from 19 to 27, Druze from 6 to 8, and Alawite got 2 seats from none.³

On 24 July 1992, the Lebanese government set a date for Lebanon’s first general elections since 1972 amidst strong Christian opposition, as elections were set to go before a Syrian troops withdrawal. Despite strong opposition and requests to withhold elections until the security situation had improved, election were held on August 23 in Beirut, on August 30 in Mount Lebanon, and on September 6 in southern Lebanon. Elections were held for Governorates as agreed in the Taif accord. In certain areas, especially in Mount Lebanon, elections were held in districts (qada’) as the Mohafazah was divided into qada’s (districts). This was a Violation of Taif accord. The elections were plagued by violence and fraud, and the abstention of Christians created a wider gap between the Christian and Muslims.⁴

Since the 1992 elections were based on sectarian formula, the senate was not formed as stipulated in the Taif accord.

1. Farid el. Khazen, “Lebanon’s First Postwar Parliamentary Election, 1992: An Imposed Choice,” 1992, accessed April 5, 2011, http://almashriq.hiof.no/ddc/projects/pspa/elections92-part1.html.
2. Bassel F. Salloukh, “The Limits of Electoral Engineering in Divided Societies: Elections in Postwar Lebanon,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 39 (2006): 644.
3. Farid el. Khazen, “Lebanon’s First Postwar Parliamentary Election.”
4. “Christian-Muslim Gap Widens in Aftermath Of Lebanon Election,” Christian Science Monitor, September 11, 1992.

Legislative reform was incomplete as the Senate was not formed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

Electoral/political party reform did not take place in 1989.

In August 1990, the legislature (based on Taif recommendations) made constitutional revisions including the provision of related seats in the parliament. According to the revisions, the parliamentary seats will be equally divided between Christians and Muslims in an in an expanded 108-member Parliament.[fn]”Human Rights Report- Lebanon,” U.S. Dept. of State Dispatch, February 1, 1991.[/efn_note] The seats were further divided between all of Lebanon’s 18 officially recognized religious sects.[fn]”Lebanon Election 2009 – Lebanon’s election system,” accessed April 5, 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/lebanon2009/2009/06/20096211481936043… The increases of nine seats (from 99 to 108) were to be Muslim seats allocated to areas with Muslim demographic concentration.

It was only in 1991 that the parliament passed Law 51 allocating the increased seats.

According to Khazen, the balance of power both within Lebanon and between Beirut and Damascus had changed significantly by 1992. “Amid speculation and rumours in the press about the number of deputies, the Council of Ministers decided to adopt 134, an addition of 26 to the 108 agreed on in the Ta’if document. The stated reason for raising the number of deputies was to modify the representation of some sects (Druze and Greek Catholic). The tacit reason was to make the number 128 more acceptable to its opponents.”¹ The government adopted Law 154 in 1992, raising the number of parliamentary seats to 128 instead of 108 and thus adding 29 new seats to the prewar parliament.² The additional nine and twenty nine seats were allocated in the following manner:

Maronite from 30 to 34, Greek Orthodox from 11 to 13, Greek Catholic from 6 to 8, Armenian Orthodox from 4 to 5, American catholic from 1 to 0, Protestant from 1 to 0, Minorities from 1 to 0, Sunni from 20 to 27, ShiÕa from 19 to 27, Druze from 6 to 8, and Alawite from 0 to 2.³

On 24 July 1992, the Lebanese government set a date for Lebanon’s first general elections since 1972 amidst strong Christian opposition, as elections were set to go before a Syrian troop withdrawal. Despite strong opposition and requests to withhold elections until the security situation had improved, elections were held on August 23 in Beirut, on August 30 in Mount Lebanon, and on September 6 in southern Lebanon. Elections were held for Governorates as agreed in the Taif accord. The elections were plagued by violence and fraud, and the abstention of Christians created a wider gap between the Christian and Muslims.⁴

The only reform that materialized was the increase in the size of the legislature from 99 to 128 to balance the representation of Christian and Muslims.

1. Farid el. Khazen, “Lebanon’s First Postwar Parliamentary Election, 1992: An Imposed Choice,” 1992, accessed April 5, 2011, http://almashriq.hiof.no/ddc/projects/pspa/elections92-part1.html.
2. Bassel F. Salloukh, “The Limits of Electoral Engineering in Divided Societies: Elections in Postwar Lebanon,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 39 (2006): 644.
3. Farid el. Khazen, “Lebanon’s First Postwar Parliamentary Election.”
4. “Christian-Muslim Gap Widens in Aftermath Of Lebanon Election,” Christian Science Monitor, September 11, 1992.

Some electoral reforms took place in 1991 and 1992.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

Administrative decentralization as agreed in the Taif accord was not initiated and no draft law on administration decentralization was introduced in the parliament.

No developments observed this year.

No developments observed this year.

No developments observed this year.

No developments observed this year.

No developments observed this year.

There had been various proposals presented for discussions since 1995, but they lack a clear distinction between the central government and the decentralized units. “The only area where the decentralization has been applied is at municipalities. The Taif Agreement calls for another higher level of decentralization than that of Qadaa (district), but a decentralization law is still pending.”[fn]”Lebanon: Local governance in Complex Environments- Project Assessment,” UNDP, 2010, accessed April 5, 2011, http://www.undp.org, accessed 5 April 2011.[/efn_note] Taif agreement calls for the model that combines aspects of decentralization at the level of the eight governorates and 25 districts (Qudaa) with administrative decentralization at the municipal level.

No developments observed this year.

No developments observed this year.

Prime Minister of Lebanon, Salim al-Huss, delivered his government’s policy statement on 14 December 1998. One of his policy statements was related to administrative decentralization and was listed as number 10 in his outline of national goals. He was prioritizing an approval of a bill for the administrative decentralization.¹ But a bill on decentralization was not introduced in the assembly in 1998.

1. “Lebanon: prime minister delivers government policy statement,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, December 15, 1998.

No bill was introduced despite it being 10 years after the accord was signed.

The council of ministers in 2001 approved a law that would give more powers to municipalities including the authority to allocate and prioritize resources and projects. During 2002 and 2003, UNDP implemented a project Promotion of Decentralization and Local governance with resources provided by the Democratic Governance Trust Fund.¹ As of 2010, the administration decentralization law was not proposed by the Ministry of Interior.

1. “Lebanon: Local governance in Complex Environments- Project Assessment.”

No information available as to whether top level jobs were equally distributed between Christians and Muslims.

No information available as to whether top level jobs were equally distributed between Christians and Muslims.

Discrimination based on religion or sectarian identity existed. The Government had agreed in principle to Muslim-Christian parity in top-level positions and to the elimination of the use of sectarian criteria for top-level positions. The Government held a seminar during the summer of 1991 to draw up an administrative reform plan; one provision aimed to abolish confessionalism for positions at the lower ranks.[fn]”Human Rights Report -1991-Lebanon,” U.S. State Department, February 1992.[/efn_note] Government had yet to abolish the mention of sect and denomination on the identity card as required by the Taif accord.

It was reported that the administrative reform was the main priority and objective of the Hariri government.¹ But, no record of administrative reform found for that year except that the government formulated a framework for the “National Administrative Rehabilitation Programme (NARP) of the Government (1992) to bring the Lebanese post-war public administration into the 21st century.”² Government yet had to abolish the mention of sect and denomination on the identity card as required by the Taif accord.

1. “Born-again Lebanon gets its very own Ross Perot,” The Ottawa Citizen, October 29, 1992.
2. “Cluster Projects Fact Sheet: Support to Administrative Reform and Development,” UNDP, 2001, accessed April 7, 2011, http://www.undp.org.lb.

Various efforts were made to modernize the administration. Nevertheless, government yet had to abolish the mention of sect and denomination on the identity card as required by the Taif accord.

Lebanese government yet had to abolish the mention of sect and denomination on the identity card as required by the Taif accord.

Lebanese government yet had to abolish the mention of sect and denomination on the identity card as required by the Taif accord.

Lebanese government yet had to abolish the mention of sect and denomination on the identity card as required by the Taif accord.

On 17 March 1997, listing of religion in the government issued identity card was dropped. The religious or sectarian identity was not mentioned in the card but that information was said to be stored in a central data bank since Lebanon’s sectarian-based political and social system would require religious affiliations in many cases.¹ Government in 1997 passed a law to create specialized units within the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR).²

Since public jobs were equally divided and the sectarian identity was abolished, reforms related to civil service can be coded as implemented.

1. “Lebanon introduces new ID card to deter forgery,” Associated Press Worldstream, March 17, 1997.
2. “Cluster Projects Fact Sheet:Support to Administrative Reform and Development.”

Taif provision on civil administration reform was implemented in 1997.

The Constitutional Council, as envisioned in the Taif Accord was empowered to look after the constitutionality of laws as well as settle disputes related to contests emanating from presidential and parliamentary elections. While presidential elections took place in November 1989, the Constitutional Council did not materialize prior to holdings of elections even the article 19 of Lebanon’s constitution had provided for that.

Constitutional Council did not materialize in 1990.

Constitutional Council did not materialize in 1991.

While presidential elections took place in November 1989 and the Parliamentary elections were held in 1992, the Constitutional Council did not materialize in 1992.

At a Ramadan dinner banquet on 18 March 1993, Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri discussed the government’s eagerness to speed up the establishment of the Constitutional Council and said that the government would soon refer to the Chamber of Deputies.[fn]”Lebanon; Prime Minister Sets Out Priorities in Reconstruction and Reconciliation,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 20, 1993.[/efn_note] The bill was approved on 25 June 1993. According to the law, “the Constitutional Council will be composed of 10 members, half of whom to be appointed by the house of representatives and the other half nominated by the government. council members, whose age cannot exceed 74 years at the time of nomination, will have to be the present or former judges or university professors of law with at least 20 years of working experience.”[fn]”Lebanon’s parliament approve establishment of constitutional council,” Xinhua General News Service, June 25, 1993.[/efn_note] The council was established under law No. 250 of 1993; and revised by by-laws under law 243 of 2000.

However delayed, the Constitutional Council was established in 1993.

No developments observed this year.

The Constitutional Council struck down the election law that was passed by the parliament in July of 1993.¹ The government, then, amended the bill in August 1993.

1. “Lebanon court rules against election law,” United Press International, August 8, 1996.

No further developments observed.

The peace plan as laid down in the Taif accord was approved by the Lebanon’s Parliament on 5 November 1989.[fn]”Lebanon elects new president,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, November 6, 1989.[/efn_note] This approval materializes much needed shifts in the composition of Lebanon’s governance closer to changing demography. Since the independence from France in 1943, Maronite Catholics, the largest Christian sect, dominated top posts of the government, army, judiciary, and the central bank.[fn]”Light in Lebanon,” Christian Science Monitor, October 12, 1990.[/efn_note] By giving judiciary body to elect certain number of members of Higher Judiciary Council, the Taif accord brought significant judiciary reform. But it is unclear exactly how many members of the council were elected by the judiciary body.

Judiciary reform took place in 1989.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

Lebanon had a 42,000 strong armed force factionalized along sectarian lines and of which Gen. Michel Aoun commanded about 20,000 — mainly Christian troops. Of the remaining 22,000 soldiers in the army, most were Muslims. General Aoun was interim military government and was fired by president Elias Hrawi immediately after his election in the special session of the assembly on 25 November 1989.[fn]”Lebanon’s New President Fires Interim Military Government,” Xinhua General News Service, November 25, 1989; for different perspectives see other other sources; for example Robert Rabil, Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel, and Lebanon (Lynne Rienner, 2003).[/efn_note] On 28 November 1989, the government appointed Adm. Emile Lahoud as the country’s chief of armed force replacing Gen. Aoun.[fn]”Lebanon’s Cabinet Appoints New Army Commander,” Xinhua General News Service, November 28, 1989.[/efn_note] These initiatives were taken in an effort to strengthen the armed force of Lebanon. But, the Lebanese army was yet to be redeployed, which is part of the program to secure territory.

Lebanon invited the Syrian troops to help oust rebel Gen. Aoun in a bid to strengthen the armed force of Lebanon. In doing so, the president told Israel and the United States in confidence that “a Syrian assault involving warplanes and tank and infantry units would not be opposed or obstructed.”¹ The rebel Gen. Michel Aoun was defeated and on 13 October 1990 and he took refuge in the French embassy.² As the situation improved, the Lebanese army ordered all military personnel who had left their posts to rejoin these posts no later than the evening of October 19 or face disciplinary proceedings.³

In 21 December 1990, rival Lebanese Shiite Amal and Hezbollah issued a joint statement after their meeting that they had agreed to facilitate the deployment of the Lebanese army throughout south Lebanon and the west Bekaa area.⁴

1. “U.S. Agreed Not to Block Move By Syria on Aoun, Lebanon Says,” Washington Post, October 16, 1990 (First Section, Page A16).
2. “Profile of Internal Displacement: Lebanon,” Global IDP Database, 2001, accessed April 4, 2011, http://www.idpproject.org, 17.
3. “Lebanon in brief; Army orders all personnel to rejoin their units,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 18, 1990.
4. “Shiite Malitias Agree to Facilitate Deployment Of Lebanese Army in South Lebanon,” Xinhua General News Service, December 22, 1990.

In order to strengthen the armed forcesÕ control over territory, the Lebanese government ordered the deployment of the army in south Lebanon. As of 7 February 1991, as many as 2,000 Lebanese troops were deployed in south Lebanon and Bekaa area according to army commander general Emile Lahoud.¹

On 13 April 1991, it was reported that the Lebanese Forces, the Amal Movement and the Progressive Socialist Party wanted to assimilate into the Lebanese state establishments a total of more than 36,000 Lebanese military and civilian militia members. The newspapers note that the Lebanese Forces (Christian militia) have submitted a list of 18,500 members, the Amal Movement 10,200 members and the PSP 8,500 members. The government has officially proposed the assimilation of 16,000 members in the state’s institutions, equally divided between Muslims and Christians.²

As of 2 July 1991, the Lebanese army completed its redeployment in south Lebanon and forced the PLO militias to flee to refugee camps. More than 10,000 armed personnel were deployed.³ It was reported that the Lebanese army and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) set up a joint committee on December 24, 1991, to consider replacing the UN force in a region near the Israeli buffer zone in south Lebanon.⁴

1. “Lebanese Army Deploment in South Lebanon, Bekaa Completed,” Xinhua General News Service, February 7, 1991.
2. “Lebanon in brief; Three militias announce size of forces,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 16, 1991.
3. “Lebanese Army Completes Deployment in South Lebanon,” Agence France Presse, July 2, 1991.
4. “Army To Replace UNIFIL Troops in South Lebanon Villages,” Agence France Presse, December 24, 1991.

The Lebanese army continued to strengthen its position throughout the country. The army was in high alert in south Lebanon due to Israeli maneuver. No further information available.

It was reported that the Lebanese government was taking “steps to deploy its army in areas controlled by the UN Interim Force (UNIFIL) north of the Israeli-held security zone along the southern border.”¹ But the situation remained tense in south Lebanon as the Israeli Army reinforced positions in southern Lebanon.

1. “Lebanon considering deploying army north of security zone,” Agence France Presse, August 2, 1993.

Following 17 years of civil war that split the national defense into rival factions, General Emile Lahoud said that the army had been fully rebuilt, unified and disciplined to be the “most effective defence force Lebanon had.” It was reported that “[B]efore the civil war, the army’s strength was estimated at 20,000-25,000. Thousands of its troops defected to various confessional militias when the war began in 1975, reducing its strength to about 15,000. Its current strength is around 50,000 and is expected to rise to 55,000-60,000 next year with conscription.”¹ The rebuilding and reorganization of the armed force suggests some important achievement in strengthening the armed force capable of protecting its border.

1. “Lebanon rebuilding the army,” Moneyclips, August 28, 1994.

The Lebanese army continued to strengthen its position throughout the country. The president was to have Lebanese army patrolling the border with Israel once the peace is established.¹ No further information available.

1. “Lebanon wants its army to assume control along Israeli border,” Agence France Presse, December 29, 1995.

In April 1996, Lebanon’s army commander, Gen. Emile Lahoud acknowledged that the Lebanese army is weak in means and capability compared to that of Israeli armed force and therefore was not ready to defend its border.¹

1. “Still Rebuilding, Lebanon’s Army Not Yet Ready to Defend Its Borders,” April 29, 1996.

No further information available except that the Lebanese armed force engaged in fighting with the Israeli armed force in southern Lebanon amidst ongoing debate on Israeli pullout from Lebanon.

1998: Substantial achievement made in terms of strengthening the armed force of Lebanon. According to a news report, the Lebanese army was made up of 65,000 servicemen and women. It has 12 brigades, including five currently deployed in southern Lebanon and the eastern Bekaa valley along the Israeli occupied border zone. As of 1998, the army received 10% of the 4.9 billion dollar state budget. It was said that the army had a capacity of promptly deploying at least 20,000 forces when Israel withdrew from the area.¹ But, by the end of the year, Israel ruled out the possibility of withdrawal from Lebanon.

1999: No further information available except that the Lebanese armed force engaged in fighting with Israeli backed militias in southern Lebanon. The armed force remained in high alert amidst the ongoing debate of the Israeli pullout from Lebanon.

2000: Even if the armed forces have been significantly transformed since 1989 and developed an image of national reconciliation with no sectarian loyalties, it is still struggling to maintain control over territory as foreign-backed militias remained in the country. The South Lebanon Army (SLA) disintegrated in May 2000 following the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.

1. “Lebanon’s Army: A Well-Organised Force Now Free of Religious Conflict,” Agence France Presse, April 1, 1998.

Within six months of the approval of the accord in the national assembly, all militias were said to be dissolved. The accord was approved on 22 October 1989 by 58 parliament deputies (out of 62 deputies), in the course of a ceremonial meeting held in Taif. According to the agreement, all armed groups must be dissolved in early 1990.

Dissolution of militias was still a problem as the national unity government had not formed. Furthermore, all militia groups remained active until the Southern Lebanese Army headed by Gen. Michel Aoun was defeated in October 1990. Prime Minister Dr Salim al-Huss on October 16, 1990 emphasized that the countdown for the dissolution of the militias had begun in practice with the publication of the constitutional amendments law.[fn]”Lebanon in brief; Huss on dissolution of militias,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 16, 1990.[/efn_note] Nevertheless, the dissolution did not occur in 1990.

On December 24, 1990 that the national unity government was formed under the leadership of Umar Karami, which provided some momentum towards the dissolution of sectarian militia groups. The National Assembly ordered the dissolution of all militias by 30 April but Hezbollah was allowed to remain active and the South Lebanon Army (SLA) refused to disband.¹

On 13 April 1991, it was reported that the Lebanese Forces, the Amal Movement and the Progressive Socialist Party wanted to assimilate into the Lebanese state establishments a total of more than 36,000 Lebanese military and civilian militia members. The newspapers note that the Lebanese Forces (Christian militia) submitted a list of 18,500 members, the Amal Movement 10,200 members and the PSP 8,500 members. The government officially proposed the assimilation of 16,000 members in the state’s institutions, equally divided between Muslims and Christians.”²

The hand-over of weapons belonging to the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) to Lebanese and Syrian army officials was reported by Radio Lebanon on the April 28. At the same time, it was reported that the Palestinian militias would not be an obstacle for the redeployment of the Lebanese army.³ By the deadline of April, Hezbollah had not disarmed and remained active. Some other militia groups including the PLO also remained active.

On August 26, 1991, the National Assembly granted amnesty for all crimes committed during the civil war from 1975-1990. Gen Aoun received a presidential pardon and was allowed to leave for France.⁴ In May 1991, the Council of Ministers decided to rehabilitate 20,000 civilian and military militia members with the option to volunteer for army and police service.⁵

1. “Profile of Internal Displacement: Lebanon,”Global IDP Database, 2001, accessed April 4, 2011, http://www.idpproject.org, 9.
2. “Lebanon in brief; Three militias announce size of forces,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 16, 1991.
3. “Militias agree to disband in Lebanon; weapons’ hand-over begins,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 30, 1991.
4. “Profile of Internal Displacement: Lebanon.”
5. “Lebanon in Brief; Government plans to ”rehabilitate” 20,000 militia members,” BCC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 31, 1991.

While Christian and Druze militias were disbanded, Hezbollah remained operative with the backing from Iran. The Palestinians militia also remained in the refugee camps.¹ The Israel militia presence also remained there.

1. Reuven Erlich, “The Taif Accord: Its main components and implications,” 2005, accessed March 29, 2011, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il.

Militia groups which had non-Lebanese backing (i.e. Hezbollah and Palestinian groups especially PFLP-GC and Fatah Intifada inside Palestinian refugee camps) remained active in Lebanon and were not disarmed.

Militia groups which had non-Lebanese backing remained active in Lebanon and were not disarmed.

Militia groups which had non-Lebanese backing remained active in Lebanon and were not disarmed.

Militia groups which had non-Lebanese backing remained active in Lebanon and were not disarmed.

Militia groups which had non-Lebanese backing remained active in Lebanon and were not disarmed.

During the Lebanese civil war of 1975—1990, almost a third of the country’s population was displaced. The Taif Accord did not stop violence and the displacement. The conflict ended when the South Lebanon Army (General Aoun) was defeated in 1990. According to UNDP report, hundreds of thousands of people who had found refuge abroad, about 450,000 persons remained internally displaced in Lebanon.[fn]”Profile of Internal Displacement: Lebanon,” UNDP, 1997, accessed April 4, 2011, http://www.idpproject.org.[/efn_note] No information available on settlement of refugees and IDPs in year 1989.

No information available on settlement of IDPs and refugees.

No information available on settlement of IDPs and refugees. However, the 1991 U.S. State Department Human Rights Report stated that ” the government was confronted with the problem of providing appropriate shelter to an estimated 800,000 Lebanese displaced during the years of civil unrest.”¹

1. “Lebanon Human Rights Practices, 1991” U.S. State Department Dispatch, February 1992.

No further information available except that the government was confronted with the resources necessary to providing shelter to displaced persons.¹

1. “Lebanon Human Rights Practices, 1992,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, March 1993.

According to State Department report, the Lebanese government started the process of encouraging those who emigrated to return to Lebanon. Similarly, the government started to encourage internally displaced persons to return to their homes. According to the report, “The process was slowed by financial constraints as well as lingering insecurity felt by the displaced. Hundreds of families, however, received keys to their homes and began to repair them. The Government concentrated its efforts on returning Christians to areas of the Shuf and ‘Alayh from which they had fled in the wake of Christian-Druze fighting in the mid-1980s.”¹

To facilitate the process, the Lebanese government created two main structures in 1993 at the government-level to implement the return of the displaced. The first was the establishment of the Ministry of Displaced Persons to rehabilitate infrastructure and housing, improve the economic sector, as well as the education, health and social services, and to achieve national reconciliation. The second was the formation of the Central Fund of the Displaced to finance the return of the displaced.²

1. “Lebanon Human Rights Practices, 1993,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, March 1994.
2. “Profile of Internal Displacement: Lebanon.”

There are no legal restrictions on the right of citizens to return to Lebanon. Some progress was made in terms of encouraging displaced individuals to return to their home. According to the State Department report, those displaced persons had begun to reclaim their homes abandoned during the war. However, a vast majority of them had yet to reclaim their property. “The resettlement process is slowed by tight budgetary constraints, destroyed infrastructure, the lack of schools and economic opportunities, and the fear that physical security is still lacking in some parts of the country.”¹

1. “Lebanon Human Rights Practices, 1994,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, March 1995.

No further information available except that the resettlement process was slowed by tight budgetary constraints and difficulties in reconstruction of infrastructure. Physical security was also a concern.¹

1. “Lebanon Human Rights Practices, 1995,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, March 1996.

Resettlement of IDPs was still a problem. According to the State Department report, there were still over 600,000 IDPs and vast majority of them had not reclaimed and rehabilitated their homes abandoned or damaged during the war. The resettlement process was slowed by tight budgetary constraints and difficulties in reconstruction of infrastructure. Physical security was also a concern.¹

1. “Lebanon Human Rights Practices, 1996,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, March 1997.

IDP Global Database cites UNDP (1997) that the majority of the displaced population was from Mount Lebanon (about 62%) and 52.7% of those displaced arrived in that governate.¹ But a vast majority of displaced persons still had yet to return and reclaim their property.

1998: Problems of resettlement of displaced remained. A vast majority of displaced persons had yet to return and reclaim their property.

1999: Problems of resettlement of displaced remained. A vast majority of displaced persons had yet to return and reclaim their property.

By establishing the Ministry of Displaced Persons and the Central Fund of the Displaced, the government tried to implement the provisions of the Taif accord but fell short of rehabilitating damaged infrastructure and providing security. Ten years after signing of the accord, its provisions had not been fully implemented. According to the IDP Global Database (2001), the Lebanese government estimated that $400m was needed to cover the return of all the displaced in Lebanon. However between 1991 and 1999, $800 million was spent and about 20 percent of the displaced were able to return to their villages. “Only nine percent of those who returned were fully reimbursed for their expenditure on house reconstruction, the great majority of returnees having to pay for reconstruction from private funds. Overt mismanagement and embezzlement of funds led to tension between the former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, the parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri and the Minister for the Displaced.”²

1. “Profile of Internal Displacement: Lebanon,” 17.
2. Ibid.

During the Lebanese civil war of 1975—1990, almost a third of the country’s population was displaced. The Taif Accord did not stop violence and the displacement. The conflict ended when the South Lebanon Army (General Aoun) was defeated in 1990. According to UNDP report, hundreds of thousands of people who had found refuge abroad, about 450,000 persons, remained internally displaced in Lebanon.[fn]”Profile of Internal Displacement: Lebanon,” UNDP 1997, in Global IDP Database, 2002, accessed April 4, 2011, http://www.idpproject.org.[/efn_note] No information available on settlement of refugees and IDPs in year 1989.

No information available on settlement of IDPs and refugees.

No information available on settlement of IDPs and refugees. However, the 1991 U.S. State Department Human Rights Report stated that ” the government was confronted with the problem of providing appropriate shelter to an estimated 800,000 Lebanese displaced during the years of civil unrest.”¹

1. “Lebanon Human Rights Practices, 1991,” U.S. State Department Dispatch, February 1992.

No further information available except that the government was confronted with the resources necessary to providing shelter to displaced persons.¹

1. “Lebanon Human Rights Practices, 1992,” U.S. State Department Dispatch, February 1993.

According to State Department report, the Lebanese government started the process of encouraging those who emigrated to return to Lebanon. Similarly, the government started to encourage internally displaced persons to return to their homes. According to the report, “The process was slowed by financial constraints as well as lingering insecurity felt by the displaced. Hundreds of families, however, received keys to their homes and began to repair them. The Government concentrated its efforts on returning Christians to areas of the Shuf and ‘Alayh from which they had fled in the wake of Christian-Druze fighting in the mid-1980s.”¹

To facilitate the process, in 1993 the Lebanese government created two main structures at the government level to implement the return of the displaced. The first was the establishment of the Ministry of Displaced Persons to rehabilitate infrastructure and housing, improve the economic sector, as well as education, health and social services, and to achieve national reconciliation. The second was the formation of the Central Fund of the Displaced to finance the return of the displaced.²

1. “Lebanon Human Rights Practices, 1993,” U.S. State Department Dispatch, February 1994.
2. “Profile of Internal Displacement: Lebanon,” Global IDP Database, 2001, accessed April 4, 2011, http://www.idpproject.org.

There are no legal restrictions on the right of citizens to return to Lebanon. Some progress was made in terms of encouraging displaced individuals to return to their home. According to the State Department report, those displaced persons had begun to reclaim their homes abandoned during the war. However, a vast majority of them had yet to reclaim their property. “The resettlement process is slowed by tight budgetary constraints, destroyed infrastructure, the lack of schools and economic opportunities, and the fear that physical security is still lacking in some parts of the country.”¹

1. “Lebanon Human Rights Practices, 1994,” U.S. State Department Dispatch, February 1995.

No further information available except that the resettlement process was slowed by tight budgetary constraints and difficulties in reconstruction of infrastructure. Physical security was also a concern.¹

1. “Lebanon Human Rights Practices, 1995,” U.S. State Department Dispatch, February 1996.

Resettlement of IDPs was still a problem. According to the State Department report, there were still over 600,000 IDPs and vast majority of them had not reclaimed and rehabilitated their homes abandoned or damaged during the war. The resettlement process was slowed by tight budgetary constraints and difficulties in reconstruction of infrastructure. Physical security was also a concern.¹

1. “Lebanon Human Rights Practices, 1996,” U.S. State Department Dispatch, February 1997.

IDP Global Database cites UNDP (1997) that a majority of the displaced population was from Mount Lebanon (about 62%) and 52.7% of those displaced arrived in that governate.¹ But, still a vast majority of displaced had yet to return and reclaim their property.

1998: Problems of resettlement of displaced persons remained. A vast majority of displaced had yet to return and reclaim their property.

1999: Problems of resettlement of displaced persons remained. A vast majority of displaced had yet to return and reclaim their property.

By establishing the Ministry of Displaced Persons and the Central Fund of the Displaced, the government tried to implement the provisions of the Taif accord but fell short in rehabilitating damaged infrastructure as well as providing security. Ten years after signing the accord, its provisions had not been fully implemented. According to the IDP Global Database (2001), the Lebanese government estimated that $400 million was needed to cover the return of all the displaced in Lebanon. However, between 1991 to 1999, $800 million was spent and about 20 percent of the displaced were able to return to their villages. “Only nine percent of those who returned were fully reimbursed for expenditure on house reconstruction, the great majority of returnees having to pay for reconstruction from private funds. Overt and blatant mismanagement and embezzlement of funds led to tension between the former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, the parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri and the Minister for the Displaced.”²

1. “Profile of Internal Displacement: Lebanon,” 17.
2. “Profile of Internal Displacement: Lebanon.”

No information available on education reform. The Taif accord stipulates the following: obligatory primary education; strengthening state control over private schools; the development of new curricula and the uniting of history and civics textbooks published by the Educational Center for Research and Development (ECRD), a governmental institute in charge of curriculum planning and development; and the writing of textbooks for the public sector.

No developments observed this year.

No developments observed this year.

The state of public education was deteriorating. About 75% of Lebanese families sent their children to private schools. To rein control over private schools, government prohibit the cost of educating a child from exceeding £Leb 500,000 annually. But many schools slapped a surcharge of £Leb100,000 on the school fees, which ended schooling for many children.[fn]”Peace comes to Lebanon but now poverty haunts it,” Manchester Guardian Weekly, May 24, 1992.[/efn_note] No further information available on other reforms related to education.

No developments observed this year.

According to Farayah, the Lebanese government developed the ‘Plan for Educational ReformÕ in 1994. “The plan included objectives such as: (a) the strengthening of national affiliation and social cohesion among students; and (b) providing the new generation with the basic knowledge, skills and expertise, with emphasis on national upbringing and authentic Lebanese values, such as liberty, democracy, tolerance and rejection of violence.”¹ This plan’s initiatives, however, do not mean that the government actually carried out curriculum development as envisaged in the Taif accord.

1. “Lebanon, Ministry of Education, 1994,” 8, in Nemer Frayah, “Curricular Change: Education and Social Cohesions in Lebanon,” Prospects 33, no. 1 (2003): 84.

No developments observed this year.

No developments observed this year.

According to Farayah (2003:86), “the adaptation of the Educational Reform Plan was followed by the development of new curricula. The foregoing objectives were stated in the curricula developed in 1997 and implemented in 1998. The social studies curriculum, in particular, has a number of detailed objectives concerning Lebanon’s identity as an Arab State, respect and acceptance of others, tolerance, value of personal freedom and human rights.”¹

1998: The curricular change made in 1997 was implemented in 1998.²

1999: No further information available on education reform. It is difficult to assess the impact of educational reform as the curricular change was implemented only in 1998.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.

Media reform did not take place.

Media reform did not take place.

Media reform did not take place.

Media reform did not take place.

The Taif accord called for the recognition of information media under the canopy of the law and within the framework of responsible liberties. This proposal, however, remained controversial and by the end of 1993, government yet had to submit a draft law to parliament.[fn]”Lebanon Human Rights Practices, 1993,” U.S. Department of State Dispact, 1994.[/efn_note]

In March 1994, the Lebanese government forced private television and radio stations to stop broadcasting news and other political programs. The government was said to introduce a new press law which would cram the press censorship.¹

1. “No News on Lebanon’s Private TV And Radio,” Xinhua News Agency, March 24, 1994.

No developments observed this year.

In 1996, government passed a new media law to restrict radio and television broadcasting.¹

1. “Lebanon Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996,” U.S. Department of State, 1997.

Instead of promoting media freedom, the press law of 1996 further restricted the media and force journalists to impose self-censorship.

Information on creation of a socioeconomic council for development is not available.

The 1990 constitutional amendments, which were a part of the Taif Accord, created the Economic and Social Council as an agent of continuous dialogue about public socio-economic policies. However, the laws establishing the council itself were not introduced in the assembly.

The laws establishing the the Economic and Social Council were not introduced in the assembly.

The laws establishing the the Economic and Social Council were not introduced in the assembly.

The laws establishing the the Economic and Social Council were not introduced in the assembly.

The laws establishing the the Economic and Social Council were not introduced in the assembly.

Prior to the establishment of the Economic and Social Council, the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) worked on reconstruction and rehabilitation of infrastructure. In 1995 the CDR said that the state would launch schemes worth $3.5 billion to rebuild its war-ravaged infrastructure.[fn]”Lebanon to launch reconstruction projects worth 3.5 billion dollars,” Agence France Presse, January 16, 1995.[/efn_note] The efforts to rebuild infrastructure were supported by Arab countries.

The laws establishing the the Economic and Social Council were not introduced in the assembly.

The laws establishing the the Economic and Social Council were not introduced in the assembly.

2000: On 30 August 2000, a decree related to the internal statue governing the Economic and Social Council was published in the official gazette. The decree has provisions for eight different committees within the council related to different aspects of socio-economic policies. As soon as the members of the council were nominated, the committees in the council started to work.¹

1. “Tomorrow’s Lebanon – Towards an Economic and Social Vision,” The Economic and Social Council, 2006, accessed April 4, 2011, http://www.ces.gov.lb/SiteCollectionDocuments/Files/English.pdf.

The peace plan as laid down in the Taif Accord was approved by Lebanon’s Parliament on November 5, 1989.[fn]”Lebanon elects new president,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, November 6, 1989.[/efn_note]

The accord was approved by Lebanon’s Parliament in November 1989.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

The political reforms happened within the timeframe. Implementation of the provisions related to strengthening the armed force as well as militia groups was delayed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

Taif Accord sought to exercise the sovereignty of the Lebanese state over its internationally recognized territory and therefore had the provisions of troop withdrawal. At the time of the signing of the agreement, Syria has about 40,000 troops in Lebanon controlling about 65% of the country. Israel had a force of 1,500-3,000 in southern Lebanon in the so-called “security zone”. Israel had also resettled some 200,000 of its 2.7 million population in the controlled territory.[fn]Sandra M. Saseen, “The Taif Accord and Lebanon’s Struggle to Regain Its Sovereignty,” American University Journal of International Law and Policy 6, no. 1 (1990): 57, footnotes 2, 3.[/efn_note] Syria had accepted the principle of an eventual troop withdrawal from all the Lebanese territory but not such withdrawal took place in 1989. Similarly, Israel continued its occupation.

No troop withdrawal took place neither from Israel nor from Syria. As a matter of fact, after the election of Elias Hrawi as president of Lebanon as per the Taif accord, Gen. Michel Aoun refused to recognize him or the Taif accord. Lebanon invited the Syrian troops to help oust rebel Gen. Aoun. In doing so, the president took Israel and the United States in confidence that “a Syrian assault involving warplanes and tank and infantry units would not be opposed or obstructed.”¹ The rebel Gen. Michel Aoun, was defeated but the presence of the foreign troops continued.

1. “U.S. Agreed Not to Block Move By Syria on Aoun, Lebanon Says,” Washington Post, October 16, 1990, Page A16.

On 15 May 1991, Lebanon and Syria agreed on a treaty for coordination in defense and foreign policy. The agreement bolstered the presence of Syria in Lebanon as well as created a situation of military maneuvers on the side of Israel. Israel had maintained its military presence as well as funded a militia group, Southern Lebanon Army, to carry out joint military activities.¹ Troop withdrawal did not take place.

1. “Lebanon, Syria agree on strategic alliance,” United Press International, May 17, 1991.

Troop withdrawal did not occur. According to the Taif accord, Syrian troops were to withdraw within two years or by September 1992.¹ As a matter of fact, Syria pushed for the elections in Lebanon so that it could ensure electoral success of its close allies when it had a military presence there.

1. “Mr. Assad’s Lebanon,” The Washington Times, August 11, 1992 (Editorial, F2).

Neither Israel nor Syria withdrew their troops from Lebanon. In the ongoing Middle East Peace talks, Lebanon called for Israel to give up the Security Zone in southern Lebanon. Britain’s foreign secretary also called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon.¹ On the other hand, the US foreign secretary Warren Christopher called for Syria to withdraw from Lebanon. Both countries maintained the presence of their troops in Lebanon.

1. “Hurd calls for Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon,” Agence France Presse, January 3, 1994.

Military withdrawal did not take place in 1994.

Military withdrawal did not take place in 1995.

Military withdrawal did not take place in 1996. There was a pressure from U.S. lawmakers on Syria to get out of Lebanon but it was believed that Syria would not “remove its troops from Lebanon before Israel would pull out from the Golan and a narrow strip of land in southern Lebanon.”¹

1. “Lawmakers urge Syria out of Lebanon,” United Press International, June 20, 1996.

Syria and Israel did not withdraw their troops from Lebanon in 1997.

1998: The strength of the South Lebanon Army deteriorated in south Lebanon due to persistent resistance by Hezbollah. On March 1, 1998, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the acceptance of Resolutions 425 with condition of receiving security guarantee from Lebanon.¹ No information available about the withdrawal of Syrian troops.

1999: In early June 1999, Israel’s proxy militia pulled back from the strategic Jezzine region in what was widely seen as a trial run for a full Israeli withdrawal.² No information available about the withdrawal of Syrian troops.

2000-2005: The troop withdrawal component of the Taif agreement was not fully implemented even though 10 years had passed since the signing of the agreement. On 24 May 2000, Israel completely withdrew its troops from southern Lebanon.³ The move was also welcomed by Syria. On May 31, 2000, Syria agreed that Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon was complete, implementing resolution 425.⁴ After Israel’s withdrawal, Syria gradually withdrew some of its troops from Lebanon (five redeployments). Nevertheless, as of 2004, there were still 20,000 Syrian troops in Lebanon.

As Security Council Resolution 1559 demanded withdrawal of Syrian troops in September 2004, Syria started limited withdrawal of troops from Beirut. By 30 September 2004 about 3,000 Syrian troops were pulled out of outskirts of Beirut.⁵ But this limited withdrawal was viewed as the breach of the resolution which had demanded for complete withdrawal. As the international pressure mounted for the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, the Syrian president announced a two stage withdrawal of its troops in Lebanon to the border. However, as the pressure to provide timeline of withdrawal grew, Syria said that, ” it would withdraw one-third of its 15,000 troops and 5,000 intelligence agents in Lebanon by the end of March, as the first stage of an operation”. In the second stage, the remaining military and intelligence assets were to be withdrawn into Lebanon’s eastern Bekaa Valley by the end of the month leading to the shutdown of the intelligence headquarters in Beirut by April 1.⁶ On 26 April 2005, Syria officially informed UN of final withdrawal from Lebanon.

1. “Key dates in Israel’s 22-year involvement in Lebanon,” Agence France Presse, March 5, 2000.
2. Ibid.
3. “Israel Empties Out of Southern Lebanon, Leaving Security Vacuum,” CNN, May 24, 2000.
4. “Syria agrees Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon is complete,” Agence France Presse, May 31, 2000.
5. “Syria Completes Limited Troop Withdrawal from Lebanon,” World Markets Analysis, September 30, 2004.
6. “Syria lays out withdrawal of troops from Lebanon,” The Star-Ledger (Newark, New Jersey), March 13, 2005.