Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA)

The Ouagadougou Political Agreement had two specific provisions related to the ceasefire: a confidence zone and a code of conduct. Under the confidence zone provision, parties agreed to request the impartial forces of Licorne and the United Nations Operation in C™te d’Ivoire (UNOCI) to dismantle the zone of confidence, establish an imaginary green line going from east to west along the median line of the zone of confidence, and deploy joint units comprised of equal numbers of FAFN and Defence and Security Forces (FDS) members. In the code of conduct, parties agreed to refrain from any belligerent and offensive attitude and engage in public awareness campaigns in support of the peace process.

Meaningful progress was made in terms of implementing provisions related to the ceasefire. Parties met the timeline on dismantling the confidence zone, which was established by an agreement on 31 July 2005. The chief of staff of FAFN and FDS and force commanders of UNOCI and Licorne signed an accord on 11 April 2007, which provided the legal basis for the dismantling of the zone of confidence.¹ A confidence zone, which divided Ivory Coast between the government-held and the rebel-held areas, finally started to be dismantled on 16 April 2007. The zone of confidence ceased to exist beginning 15 September 2007.² Out of 17 checkpoints established by UNOIC, eight checkpoints were dismantled by 30 November 2007.³ The UNOCI and Licorne assisted in drawing an imaginary green line for the deployment of joint units. Joint units comprising equal number of FAFN and FDS were deployed at Bangolo and Zeale areas by 30 April 2007.⁴

State media was used to unite the divided country and promote reconciliation through its revamped programs.⁵ As a way to engage in a public awareness campaign in support of the peace process, rebels met with supporters of the President for the first time on 21 April 2007.⁶

A small group of men hiding near the runway attacked Prime Minister Guillaume Soro’s airplane. He survived the attack. At least four people were killed and more than 10 were wounded.⁷ This, however, did not derail the partiesÕ commitment to the ceasefire. President Gbagbo condemned the attack and stressed the importance of the peace process in his nationally televised address.⁸ On 27 December, an attack on Forces Nouvelles personnel took place in Bouke. Sergeant Ibrahim Coulibaly, a former member of Forces Nouvelles, was allegedly involved in the attack. Eighteen arrests were made in the Bouake area in connection with the attack, which resulted in several deaths.⁹ This, however, did not derail the process.

1. “Thirteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2007/275), May 14, 2007.
2. “UN peacekeepers dismantle Ivory Coast buffer zone,” Agence France Presse, September 17, 2007.
3. “UN peacekeepers continue redeploying in Ivory Coast,” Agence France Presse, December 8, 2007.
4. “Thirteenth progress report of the Secretary-General.”
5. “Ivory Coast broadcaster vows objective coverage,” Agence France Presse, April 2, 2007.
6. “A News: Ivory Coast Rebels, ‘PatriotsÕÕ meet as Symbol of Unity,” US Fed News, April 21, 2007.
7. “Ivory Coast PM escapes rocket attack,” Agence France Presse, June 29, 2007.
8. “Fourteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2007/593), October 1, 2007.
9. “Sixteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2008/250), April 15, 2008.

The partiesÕ commitment to the ceasefire remained intact. Sergeant Ibrahim Coulibaly, a former member of Forces Nouvelles, and two French nationals were arrested for plotting a coup. In connection with this incident, an international arrest warrant was issued against Mr. Coulibaly.⁹ A change in the rebelsÕ command structure led to skirmishes in the North, particularly in Seguela and Bouake. Zacharia Kone, a rebel commander in Seguela, was dismissed for not showing up at a pre-disarmament ceremony.¹⁰ Eight were killed in ethnic clashes in the north of the country due to disputes over land issues.¹¹ While some violence occurred on issues related to voter registration and land disputes, as well as incidents involving demonstrations by disgruntled personnel from FAFN and FDS due to payment issues, the security situation remained relatively stable.¹²

1. “Voa News: Rebel Mutiny Ends in Ivory Coast, Demands Not Met,” US Fed News, June 30, 2008.
2. “Eight Killed in Ivory Coast Ethnic Clashes,” Agency France Presse, September 8, 2008.
3. “Eighteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2008/645), October 13, 2008.

While the free movement of people, goods, and service was unhindered, the security situation remained very fragile due to unresolved issues related to the disarmament of Forces Nouvelles and pro-government militias. The full deployment of joint units was not achieved due to the Integrated Command Center’s lack in capacity.¹³ As a matter of fact, the United Nations experts had warned of a possible escalation of violence as parties were rearming in the north, notwithstanding an arms embargo.¹⁴ However, there were no reports of violations of the ceasefire provision of the accord.

1. “Twenty-second progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Security Council (S/2009/495), September 29, 2009.
2. “Violence may escalate in Ivory Coast as parties rearm: UN experts,” Agence France Presse, April 19, 2009.

While both sides continued to respect the ceasefire provisions of the accord, the overall security situation was very fragile around election time. Prior to elections, those who were engaged in sustained negotiations remained concerned about the role of media in fanning tensions and the ruling party’s monopoly of state-owned media.¹⁵ Multi-party elections were held on 31 October in a mostly free and fair manner. Prior to the holding of elections, many demobilized combatants threatened to obstruct elections on issues related to outstanding demobilization allowances. Militia groups also obstructed political partiesÕ activities. After elections, targeted violence against certain ethnic groups in the Daloa area took place.¹⁶

The security scenario changed after runoff elections on 28 November. The Chair of the Independent Electoral Commission, Mr. Youssouf Bakayoko, announced the result, with opposition candidate Alassane Ouattara receiving 54.10 percent of the vote and the sitting President Laurent Gbagbo receiving 45.90 percent. The election result, however, was nullified by the President of the Constitutional Council, Mr. Paul Yao, on the ground that the commission did not announce the provisional results by the specified deadline. On 3 December, the Constitutional Council declared Laurent Gbagbo the winner with 51.45 percent of the vote and Alassane Ouattara the loser with 48.55 percent, with a turnout of 71.28 percent. Initially, a turnout of 81 percent was reported.¹⁷ Following disputed elections, Prime Minister Guillaume Soro submitted his resignation to Alassane Ouattara. Then, Alassane Ouattara re-appointed Mr. Soro as Prime Minister. Mr. Soro then appointed a 13-member cabinet on 5 December 2010. On 7 December 2010, Laurent Gbagbo also appointed his own government.¹⁷ The international community backed Alassane Ouattara, but nevertheless, the security situation deteriorated precipitously. On 13 December 2010, troops loyal to Laurent Gbagbo were deployed around the hotel that housed Alassane Ouattara. Combatants from New Forces (FN) along with UN peacekeepers were in a defensive posture against the troops loyal to Gbagbo.¹⁸ Deadly clashes broke out on 16 December as troops loyal to Laurent Gbagbo opened fire on a march organized by supporters of President-elect Alassane Ouattara.¹⁹ As violence broke out between supporters from both sides, President Laurent Gbagbo ordered U.N. peacekeeping forces to withdraw from Ivory Coast, an order which was rejected by UNOCI.²⁰

1. “Twenty-fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2010/245), May 20, 2010.
2. “Twenty-sixth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2010/600), November 23, 2010.
3. “Twenty-seventh progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2011/211), March 30, 2011.
4. “Ivory Coast troops move in on seat of Ouattara ‘government’,” Agence France Presse, December 13, 2010.
5. “Deadly Clashes Erupt In Ivory Coast Amidst Post-Poll Tensions,” RTT News, December 16, 2010.
6. “UN Forces rejects order to quit Ivory Coast,” Agency France Presse, December 19, 2010.

A full scale conflict resumed in Ivory Coast. Civilians were caught in the middle as fighting between forces that recognized Alassane Ouattara as President clashed with forces loyal to Laurent Gbagbo. It was reported that forces loyal to Alassane Ouattara took control of the capital city, Abidjan, on 31 March 2011. An estimated 800 people were killed.²¹ The UN Security Council demanded an immediate halt to escalating violence and imposed sanctions on Gbagbo.²² The US had already imposed sanctions on Gbagbo in December 2010.¹⁷

The violent conflict was put to rest once the Forces Républicaines de C™te dÕIvoire (FRCI), formerly the Forces Nouvelles, arrested Mr. Gbagbo, his wife, and members of his family, staff, and cabinet in a bunker in the presidential residence. The arrests took place on 11 April. On 1 May, President Alassane Ouattara announced the establishment of the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission.²³

1. “Ivory Coast braces for final clash; 800 killed in first town conquered by forces for elected leader,” The Toronto Star, April 19, 2011.
2. “Pro-Ouattara forces seize Ivory Coast capital,” Associated Press, March 31, 2011.
3. “Twenty-eighth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2011/387), June 24, 2011.

While full-fledged armed violence abated, violent incidents and confrontations were reported between FRCI elements and local populations. It was also reported that forces loyal to Gbagbo were rearming in Liberia for a possible attack.²⁴

1. “Thirtieth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2012/508), June 29, 2012.

No ceasefire violation reported.

No ceasefire violation reported.

No ceasefire violation reported.

The Ouagadougou Political Agreement provided that a transition government be established and the political forces in Ivory Coast exercise political power in a spirit of permanent consultation to bring about national unification, disarmament, and reconciliation. The transitional government, as per the spirit of the agreement, would cease to exist once post-conflict elections were held. The new transitional government was to be formed within five weeks of signing the accord (by 8 April 2007).

A transitional power-sharing government was formed in a timely manner. On 26 March 2007, rebel leader Guillaume Soro and President Laurent Gbagbo reached a supplemental agreement for the formation of a transitional government. As per the accord, Mr. Soro, who was Secretary General of Forces Nouvelles, would be Prime Minister. The transitional government would have 33 cabinet ministers.²⁵

By signing a decree, President Laurent Gbagbo appointed Guillaume Soro as Prime Minister on 29 March.²⁶ Soro assumed his responsibility on 4 April 2007.²⁷ On 7 April 2007, Gbabgo signed another decree establishing a transitional government comprised of 33 cabinet ministers. In the transitional government, Forces Nouvelles had seven ministers, whereas Ivorian Popular Front (FPI), the party of the president, had nine ministers; Rally of Republicans (RDR) had 5 ministers; Democratic Party of C™te dÕIvoire-African Democratic Rally (PDCI-RDA) had 5 ministers; Union for Democracy and Peace in C™te dÕIvoire (UDPCI) had 2 ministers; the Democratic and Citizens Union (UDCY), the Ivorian Labour Party (PIT), and the Movement of the Forces of the Future (MFA) each had 1 minister; and there were 2 ministers that represented civil society.²⁸ The transitional government, however, was dominated by the president’s party, which held the interior and defense ministry. Forces Nouvelles had the justice, tourism, and communication portfolios.²⁹ The main responsibility of the transitional government was to hold post-conflict presidential elections within 10 months. As per the supplemental agreement, Mr. Soro was prohibited from running in the elections.³⁰

On 27 November, Prime Minister Guillaume Soro and President Laurent Gbagbo signed a deal to hold presidential elections in late June 2008.³¹ It was also agreed that a census should be completed prior to elections.

1. “Rebel leader to become Ivory Coast Prime Minister,” Agency France Presse, March 27, 2007; “Thirteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2007/ 275), May 14, 2007; “Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in C™te DÕivoire,” African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC/PR/2(CIV)), December 19, 2007.
2. “Ivory Coast rebel leader becomes prime minister under peace deal prime minister,” Associated Press, March 29, 2007; “Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in C™te DÕivoire,” African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC/PR/2(CIV)), December 19, 2007.
3. “Former rebel leader takes over as Ivory Coast’s prime minister,” Associated Press, April 4, 2007.
4. “Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in C™te DÕivoire,” African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC/PR/2(CIV)), December 19, 2007.
5. “New Ivory Coast peace government a boost for Gbagbo,” Agence France Presse, April 12, 2007.
6. “Thirteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2007/ 275), May 14, 2007
7. “Ivory Coast Leaders Agree Elections by June 2008: Minister,” Agence France Presse, November 27, 2007.

The transition government was intact as of December 2008. Nevertheless, the mandate to hold elections within 10 months was not fulfilled. In November 2007, Prime Minister Guillaume Soro and President Laurent Gbagbo signed a deal to hold presidential elections in June 2008, which were again rescheduled for 30 November 2008. On 10 November, President Laurent Gbagbo and Prime Minister Guillaume Soro, along with prominent politician Alassane Ouattara and former President Henri Konan Bedie, agreed to postpone elections due to delays in voter registration. It was reported that former warring parties were not completely disarmed.³²

1. “Ivory Coast; Presidential Elections Delayed Again,” Facts on File World News Digest, December 23, 2008.

The transition government was intact as of December 2009. In May 2009, under tremendous international pressure from the US and the UN, the Ivory Coast government finally announced elections for 29 November 2009.³³ The much awaited elections, however, were delayed as the statuses of almost one million voters in the voter registration list were disputed and were expected to be held in late February or early March.³⁴

1. “Ivory Coast sets long-awaited election for Nov. 29,” Associated Press, May 14, 2009.
2. “Pressure Mounts for Ivory Coast Election,” Voice of America News, December 9, 2009.

The transitional government was in place as of December 2010. In August, transitional government announced that the much-delayed elections were to be held on 31 October 2010.³⁵ In the elections, President Gbagbo won 38.3 percent; ex-prime minister Alassane Ouattara won 32.08 percent, and Henri Konan Bedie won 25 percent of the vote. As none of the candidates won a clear majority, a runoff election was scheduled for 29 November.³⁶ Elections were held as scheduled and the ex-prime minister Alassane Ouattara won the elections. However, the incumbent president and his supporters rejected the results, which plunged the Ivory Coast into renewed civil wars.³⁷ Following disputed elections, Prime Minister Guillaume Soro submitted his resignation to Alassane Ouattara. Alassane Ouattara then re-appointed Mr. Soro as Prime Minister. Mr. Soro then appointed a 13-member cabinet on 5 December 2010. On 7 December 2010, Laurent Gbagbo also appointed his own government.¹⁷ As such, by the end of 2011, the power-sharing transitional government completed its mandate of holding presidential elections and was terminated.

1. “Ivory Coast long-delayed election now set for Oct,” Associated Press, August 5, 2010.
2. “Ivory Coast Presidential Elections Heads to Runoff,” CNN.com, November 8, 2010
3. “Ivory Coast election winner named; Uncertainty continues as incumbent president’s supporters reject results,” The International Herald Tribune, December 4, 2010.

The power-sharing transitional government completed its mandate of holding post-conflict elections and was terminated in December 2010.

The power-sharing transitional government completed its mandate of holding post-conflict elections and was terminated in December 2010.

The power-sharing transitional government completed its mandate of holding post-conflict elections and was terminated in December 2010.

The power-sharing transitional government completed its mandate of holding post-conflict elections and was terminated in December 2010.

The power-sharing transitional government completed its mandate of holding post-conflict elections and was terminated in December 2010.

The Ouagadougou Political Agreement had various provisions related to elections and the electoral process. In the accord, parties agreed to launch an operation to issue a new identification document for the purpose of solidifying the electoral roll. The Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) was responsible for conducting an electoral census and parties had agreed that all Ivorians of 18 years of age who held an Ivorian birth certificate or a substitute birth certificate were to be registered on the electoral roll. Those already in the electoral roll (in the electoral list established in 2000) were automatically added to the new list after presenting a birth certificate. After producing the electoral roll, CEI was responsible for publication. The peace accord also had a provision to publish the definitive electoral roll followed by the issuance of voter registration cards. The accord called for inter-agency cooperation between the National Institute of Statistics (INS) and the CEI. As such, the accord specifically provided for the electoral census, voter registration, and identification cards.

The process of implementing provisions related to electoral reform started in 2007. According to the United Nations Secretary General’s report to the Security Council, the CEI had completed central and regional structural set-up to support the task of carrying out the electoral census.¹ The mobile court, which was expected to be established for identification of the population, was not established in a timely manner. It was expected to start in April of 2007. On 5 June, magistrates were appointed for 45 jurisdictions to carry out the planned mobile court operations.³⁸ The mobile courts to identify the population began work starting 25 September. As of December, 55 technical teams (33 of which were operational) were deployed out of 111 planned mobile courts. It was reported that the court granted a total of 93,027 duplicate birth certificates nationwide.³⁹

1. “Fourteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2007/ 593), October 1, 2007.
2. “Fifteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2008/1), January 2, 2008.

Steady progress was made in terms of implementing provisions related to identifying the population and creating a new electoral roll. As of April, all 111 technical teams or mobile courts were operational and had issued 565,854 duplicate birth certificates.⁹ By the end of December, 2.8 million people were identified nationwide among the country’s population of 19 million.⁴⁰

Presidential elections did not take place in June 2008. The election was rescheduled for 30 November 2008. On 10 November, President Laurent Gbagbo and Prime Minister Guillaume Soro, along with prominent politician Alassane Ouattara and former President Henri Konan Bedie, agreed to postpone elections due to delays in voter registration.

1. “Nineteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2009/21), January 8, 2009; “Ivory Coast extends voter identification deadline,” Agence France Presse, August 19, 2008.

Population identification and voter registration was completed by the end of June. A total of 6,552,694 people were registered in a voter roll, including 38,496 Ivorians registered in 23 foreign countries.⁴¹ Parties missed the 29 August deadline for the publication of the provisional electoral list. Parties also missed another deadline of 15 September.⁴¹ The CEI announced a voter list on 23 November 2010.⁴² As soon as the provisional electoral list was published, the appeal process was initiated, which was expected to be completed by early January 2010.⁴² Presidential elections, which were scheduled to be held on 29 November 2009, were postponed.³³

1. “Twenty-second progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2009/495), September 29, 2009.
2. “Twenty-third progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2010/15), January 7, 2010.

While electoral reform finally took place in 2010, the issue of voter lists remained contentious among political parties. The President insisted on verifying the voter list and his party, FPI, asked for an audit. The Prime Minster, who was not contesting elections, held a series of meetings with stakeholders. On 2 May, the Prime Minister and the President issued a joint statement on processing the provisional voter list in two stages. In the first stage, starting 10 May, persons registered in the “gray list” were to provide evidence for registration on the “white list.” In the second stage, the appeal process — concerning the 5.3 million voters registered in the “white list” — would begin.¹⁵ The identification of voters in the “gray list” was completed by 15 June 2010. As such, 496,738 persons were eligible for voting and included in the white list, which increased to 5,775,184 voters.⁴³ In the appeal process, a total of 68,751 petitions were registered to remove 30,293 individuals from the list due to claims of fraud. The court hearing on these cases ended on 28 August 2010.⁴³ In response of fraud allegations from the President’s party, parties agreed to verify the identities of 1,792,356 persons on the “white list”. Following a meeting with the President and other stakeholders on 6 September, the Prime Minister announced the removal of some 55,000 voters from the “white list” as civil registry records could not be found for them.⁴³

A final voter list was published on 30 September. The issuance of 5,932,999 national identity cards and 5,725,720 voter cards began 6 October.⁴⁴ Elections were held on 31 October 2010.³⁵ This completed the implementation of the electoral reform provisions of the accord.

1. “Progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2010/537), October 18, 2010.
2. “Progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2010/537), October 18, 2010; “Twenty-sixth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2010/600), November 23, 2010.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

Significant achievements were made in terms of the restoration of state authority and the redeployment of the administration throughout Ivory Coast. In this regard, Comité National de Pilotage du Redéploiement de LÕadministration, or the National Commission for the Redeployment of the Administration, was established right after the establishment of the transitional government in March. The Prime Minister was to oversee the work of the Commission, with support from key ministries such as the Ministry of Public Service, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Ministry of Local Administration. As indicated in the United Nations Secretary General’s report, a total of 12,337 civil servants returned to their posts (8,381 in the north and 3,962 in the west) out of a total displacement of 24,437. The remaining restoration was expected to take place between April and June.¹ The remaining deployment, however, did not take place due to financial difficulties.³⁸ Nevertheless, the President issued a decree on 5 June 2007 and appointed 158 préfets and secretaries-general of prefectures. In another decree on 5 June, 45 magistrates were appointed to mobile courts. Similarly, 296 new sous-préfets were appointed by a decree on 15 August.³⁸ While a few restored civil servants returned due to poor living conditions in their area of deployment,³⁸ the redeployment of civil servants was completed in areas controlled by Forces Nouvelles. Rebels agreed to transfer their financial and administrative authority to the redeployed state administration.³⁹ The transfer of authority did not occur.

The redeployment of the fiscal and customs administrations, which was supposed to be completed by the end of December 2007, did not happen as provisioned in the supplementary agreement.⁹ Therefore, the Evaluation and Monitoring Committee called on parties to implement the supplementary agreement in a meeting on 21 March.⁹ As of March 2008, out of 24,437 civil servants, 6,094 were still waiting for redeployment due to a financial shortfall.⁹ While progress related to the redeployment of law enforcement, justice, and corrections personnel to the north did not happen, Forces Nouvelles transferred administrative authority to the redeployed administrations as of early July 2008.⁴⁵ However, it was reported that the commanders of Forces Nouvelles were reluctant to give up their administrative control.¹²

1. “Seventeenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,”United Nations Security Council (S/2008/451), July 10, 2008.

The full restoration of state administration, unification of the divided country, and the delivery of public services were still issues in 2009. Parties had reached a fourth supplementary agreement on 22 December 2008, asking for the total restoration of state administration, including judicial and fiscal administration, and the delivery of goods and services by 15 January 2009.⁴⁶ The effective delivery of public services had continuously been interrupted since 2007, as those working in education, civil administration, and health services were engaged in strikes.⁴⁷ As of early March, judges and public prosecutors were nominated and redeployed.⁴⁷ The same report also suggested that the reunification of the Ivory Coast did not happen.

1. “Nineteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2009/21), January 8, 2009.
2. “Twentieth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2009/196), April 13, 2009.

A full restoration of state administration was still an issue as of November 2010. Nevertheless, it was reported that some progress was made.¹⁶

The November runoff elections brought forth a full-fledged armed conflict when Mr. Gbagbo refused to relinquish power after Alassane Ouattara was declared winner of the presidential elections. Rebels captured Mr. Gbagbo on 11 April. After his arrest, it was determined that the restoration of state administration and unification of the country should be easier.²³ Indeed, some noticeable progress was made in terms of redeploying administrative and custom personnel throughout the country. On 28 September, the government also adopted a decree to reform the administrative and territorial organization of the country, increasing the number of districts and regions in the country.⁴⁸ This decree marked substantial progress in terms of the implementation of the civil administration reform provisions in the 2007 accord that asked for the restoration of administration, unification of the country, and delivery of public services.

1. “Twenty-ninth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2011/807), December 30, 2011.

As of June 2012, state authority was fully restored and started to become effective.⁴⁹

1. “Thirtieth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2012/506), June 29, 2012.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

The Ouagadougou Political Agreement had a provision for the establishment of the Permanent Consultation Mechanism (CPC), also known as the Permanent Consultative Framework (Cadre Permanent de Consultation), which had peace process stakeholders, including the President of the Republic (Laurent Gbagbo), the Secretary General of Nouvelles, representatives of other political parties, and the chairman of the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS). This mechanism was instituted to address all issues related to the accord.

As of June 2007, the CPC had been established. It had its first meeting on 12 June 2007. Because there was a delay in implementing the accord, CPC called on the Prime Minister to address the causes of delay.³⁸

The Permanent Consultative Framework (i.e., the CPC) met on 24 January and called on the government to expedite the electoral process.⁹ After the CPC meeting in May, supplementary mobile courts were deployed to issue birth certificate duplicates.¹² In its 10 November meeting, the CPC recommended that the Independent Election Commission (CEI) establish a new timeline for the identification of the population and voter registration before 31 December, as it had become impossible to hold elections on 30 November due to technical difficulties related to these two issues.⁴⁶

In its fifth meeting held on 18 May, the Permanent Consultative Framework endorsed dates for presidential elections and agreed to complete the voter registration process for 29 November and 30 June, respectively.⁵⁰ Because the election could not take place due to technical issues related to the identification of the population and completing the voter rolls, in its 3 December meeting the CPC endorsed a new timeline for the implementation of key provisions of the accord. The final electoral list was to be settled in January, identity and voter cards were to be distributed in February, and elections were to be held by early March 2010.⁴²

1. “Twenty-first progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2009/344), July 7, 2009.

The CPC had its meeting on 21 September 2010. Along with welcoming the validation of the voter list by the Independent Electoral Commission, it also welcomed the presidential decree to distribute 5,725,720 national identity cards, along with allowing an estimated 55,000 persons to submit identity documents.⁴³

There was no information regarding the activities of the Permanent Consultative Framework in 2010. This could be related to disputes related to the runoff presidential elections that essentially made the multiparty framework obsolete. Nevertheless, establishing the framework early in the implementation process was critical for the successful implementation of the accord.

The Permanent Consultative Framework became obsolete after presidential elections in 2010. Holding presidential elections signified the successful implementation of the accord’s provision, and the CPC played an important role in this regard.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

The Ouagadougou Political Agreement contained a provision for restructuring and reorganizing two armed forces (Defence and Security Forces (FDS) and Forces Nouvelles) for the creation of a new Defence and Security Forces. For this to happen, the agreement suggested enacting a law for the general framework of the organization, its composition, and its operation. For the integration of the two armed forces, the accord provided for the establishment of an Integrated Command Centre (CCI), comprised of equal numbers of officers designated by two Chiefs of Staff.

In terms of implementing the military reform provision of the agreement, President Laurent Gbagbo signed a decree on 16 March 2007 to create the CCI for the purpose of deploying mixed units comprised of equal numbers of officers from both sides and integrating both armed forces into one.⁵¹ The formal establishment of the CCI took place a month later on 16 April.³⁸ After the establishment of CCI, six joint police units consisting of personnel from Forces Nouvelles and FDS were deployed in six different locations by 15 September. By the time of the deployment of these units, the zones of confidence were also dismantled.⁵²

In terms of restructuring and reorganizing the Defence and Security Forces and integrating the two armed forces, both sides finally agreed to integrate 5,000 Forces Nouvelles out of an estimated force of 35,000. This agreement was reached when the two chiefs of staff met on 14 and 17 December 2007 in the presence of the Force Commanders of the United Nations Operation in C™te d’Ivoire (UNOCI), the French Licorne force, and the coordinator of the National Programme for Reintegration and Community Rehabilitation (NPRRC). Due to the absence of an agreement on the number of Forces Nouvelles troops to be integrated into the national army, Forces Nouvelles combatants who were deployed under the joint units had not received their salaries.³⁹

1. “Ivory Coast Takes Step to Unify Military Forces,” New York Times, March 17, 2007; “Fourteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2007/ 593), October 1, 2007.
2. Ibid.

The strength of the Integrated Command Center, comprised of government and Forces Nouvelles personnel, stood at 587. Among the 587 officers from both sides, 390 were deployed in the former zones of confidence and 197 were based at the headquarters.⁵³ Initially parties could not agree on the number of Forces Nouvelles combatants to be integrated into the new armed force nor the rank to be provided to former Forces Nouvelles combatants. In the end, they reached an agreement on the integration of 5,000 Forces Nouvelles combatants into the new armed force.¹² The integration was expected to take place within two years.⁴⁶

1. “Seventeenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2008/451), July 10, 2008.

The CCI had been established, as provisioned for in the accord, but implementation of other military reform provisions had stalled. Due to financial difficulty, the Integrated Command Center was unable to fully deploy 8,000 personnel (4,000 from the Forces Nouvelles and 4,000 from the Ivorian police and gendarmerie) in mixed brigades.⁴¹ Both sides had agreed to integrate 5,000 Forces Nouvelles combatants into the national army; however, the rank harmonization process hindered progress towards integration. Nevertheless, President Gbagbo signed several decrees on 16 November 2009 intended to resolve rank harmonization issues. By a presidential decree, Forces Nouvelles Chief of Staff, General Soumaila Bakayoko, and the Prime Minister’s Military Adviser, Colonel Michel Gueu, were promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General.⁴² This resolved the technical issue of integrating Forces Nouvelles combatants into the national army.

Some milestones were achieved in terms of implementing military reform provisions after the CCI was established in 2007. However, due to financial difficulty, the Integrated Command Center was unable to fully deploy 8,000 personnel in mixed brigades. Out of these 8,000 personnel, a total of 6,600 were able to be deployed on election day.¹⁶ After rank harmonization took place in November 2009, 3,629 Forces Nouvelles combatants were integrated into the new army. Initially, parties had agreed to integrate 5,000 Forces Nouvelles combatants.¹⁶

The contested presidential election hindered the implementation of military reform provisions, particularly the integration of Forces Nouvelles combatants. As parties effectively returned to full-fledged violence after disputed elections, Defence and Security Forces, including the police and gendarmerie, remained politicized and divided their loyalties between the President and Forces Nouvelles, which changed its name to the Forces Républicaines de C™te dÕIvoire (FRCI) on 9 March 2011.¹⁷ As the conflict ended with the capture of Mr. Gbagbo, the Ivorian government estimated that there were approximately 40,000 to 60,000 combatants among official armed groups (i.e., the police, gendarmerie, former Republican Guard, FRCI, and CECOS), militias, and foreign armed elements, including Ivorian combatants abroad.⁴⁸ Because FDS had disintegrated, the government intended to integrate former Forces Nouvelles and FDS — who joined the FRCI during the crisis — into the FRCI.⁴⁸

“With the end of the Ivorian election crisis, Alassane Ouattara ordered all militia groups to disarm and join the national army.” Claiming that the FDSI-CI refused to obey the order to disarm, the FRCI launched an assault against the militia stronghold in Abobo and killed the leader Ibrahim Coulibaly. “In the months following the event, hundreds of members of the FDSI-CI disarmed and joined the national army.”⁵⁴

“President Ouattara combined the former rebel Forces Nouvelles (FN) with cooperating elements of the Defense and Security Forces (FDS), the former government’s security forces, into the Republic Forces of Cote dÕIvoire (FRCI), the country’s new official military.”⁵⁵ The overall strength of the FRCI was at 40,000 and it was reported that an additional 40,000 personnel were recruited on an ad hoc basis during the post-election crisis.⁵⁶

“The Ivoirian government is rebranding the national army to change the force’s negative image . . . The name of the current army – Forces Républicaines de C™te d’Ivoire (FRCI), set up in March by President Alassane Ouattara – will revert back to Forces Armées Nationales de C™te d’Ivoire or (FANCI).”⁵⁷

1. UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, Cote d’Ivoire, http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=40&regionSelect=2-Sout… (accessed April 5, 2015).
2. Human Rights Report: 2011, Cote d’Ivoire, U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2011/af/186187.htm, (accessed April 5, 2015).
3. “Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2012/186), March 29, 2012.
4. “Cote d’Ivoire: Rebranding the Army,” IRIN Africa, http://www.irinnews.org/report/93886/cote-d-ivoire-rebranding-the-army (accessed April 5, 2015).

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

The Ouagadougou Political Agreement had a provision for restructuring and reorganizing two armed forces into one Defence and Security Forces. The accord calls for reform in the security sector including in the police force. Article 6.2.3 of the accord calls for the creation of joint units comprised of equal numbers of FAFN and FDS members with the responsibility for conducting police and security missions in the zone of confidence.

The United Nations Operation in C™te d’Ivoire (UNOCI) was responsible for maintaining law and order in the zone of confidence, which was supposed to be dismantled. UNOCI’s involvement was replaced by the deployment of mixed police units comprised of combatants from both sides. The Integrated Command Centre, comprised of combatants from both sides, was established with a presidential decree on 16 March 2007.⁵⁸ After the establishment of CCI, six joint police units comprised of personnel from Forces nouvelles and Defence and Security Forces (FDS) were deployed in six different places by 15 September.⁵⁹

When two chiefs of staff met on 14 and 17 December 2007 in the presence of the Force Commanders of UNOCI, the French Licorne force, and the coordinator of the National Programme for Reintegration and Community Rehabilitation (NPRRC), it was agreed that 4,000 Forces nouvelles combatants would be integrated into the national police and gendarmerie.⁶⁰ However, no Forces nouvelles combatants were absorbed or integrated in the police force as of December 2007.

1. “Ivory Coast Takes Step to Unify Military Forces,” New York Times, March 17, 2007; also see “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/593), October 1, 2007).
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/593), October 1, 2007.
3. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/1), January 2, 2008.

A facilitator presented a proposal on 5 January 2008 to integrate 600 Forces Nouvelles security auxiliaries, trained by UNOCI in 2006, and 3,400 additional Forces nouvelles combatants into the police and gendarmerie forces after meeting the national recruitment criteria.⁶¹ The process of integrating Forces Nouvelles personnel into the police and military stalled; however, parties reached an agreement on 22 December that called for the immediate, albeit temporary, integration of the Ivorian police and gendarmerie.⁶² This, however, did not take place in 2008.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/250), April 15, 2008.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2009/21), January 8, 2009.

Significant progress was made towards integrating Forces nouvelles combatants into the police force and deploying them into joint integrated units. As reported to the United Nations Security Council, 3,400 Forces nouvelles personnel were integrated and deployed as police and gendarmerie elements under the Integrated Command Center.⁶³ The 4,000 integrated Forces nouvelles combatants were deployed by the Integrated Command Centers with an equal number of police and gendarmerie from the Ivorian police force. However, it was reported that the Forces nouvelles personnel serving in the joint units did not receive their salaries while those from the Ivorian police and gendarmerie did receive salaries. ⁶⁴ This completes the police reform provision of the accord.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2009/196), April 13, 2009.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2009/495), September 29, 2009.

The police reform took place in 2009 when 4,000 Forces nouvelles combatants joined the Ivorian police and gendarmerie force and were deployed in mixed units by the Integrated Command Centre. However, it was not clear whether the integration became permanent or not.

After the contested presidential election, Defence and Security Forces, including the police and gendarmerie remained politicized and divided either as a loyal to the president or to the Forces Républicaines de C™te dÕIvoire (FRCI). Forces nouvelles changed its name to Forces Républicaines de C™te dÕIvoire (FRCI) on 9 March 2011.⁶⁵ It was uncertain whether the police and gendarmerie force would unite and be able to return to work.

However, the government made a decision to form the police, gendarmerie, and correction system based upon the old services. There were an estimated 30,000 police and gendarmes in Ivory Coast before the electoral dispute. As of June 2011, 85 percent of the forces registered to return to their work stations (Source: United Nations Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council, S/2011/387, 24 June 2011). By December 2011, over 90 percent of police and gendarmerie forces had returned to work (Source: United Nations Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council, S/2011/807, 30 December 2011).

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2011/211), March 30, 2011.

In early 2012, police and gendarmerie forces were redeployed all over the country butthey lacked infrastructural and logistical preparation.⁶⁶ A steering committee with representatives from international community along with the UNOCI was formed in an effort to reform the national police. The Minister of the Interior chaired the committee.⁶⁷

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2012/186), March 29, 2012.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2012/506), June 29, 2012.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

In the Ouagadougou Political Agreement, parties agreed to the national disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program. The parties committed themselves to various agreements negotiated before the Ouagadougou Political Agreement was signed, including the 17 previously identified and agreed-upon sites for the assembly of the combatants. The accord also provided for the establishment of the Integrated Command Centre, which was tasked with carrying out the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants.

No significant progress was made in terms of the demobilization of former combatants other than establishing the Integrated Command Centre on 16 April following a presidential decree on 16 March 2007.⁶⁸ Nevertheless, by the end of 2007 both sides had agreed on the number of Forces Nouvelles combatants to be integrated into the national army (5,000), the police force (4,000), and civic services (20,000), as well as reintegration into civilian lives (6,000), totaling 35,000 personnel.³⁹ Since Forces Nouvelles insisted on the integration of its combatants into the national army without disarming them, an estimated 30,000 Forces Nouvelles combatants had to go through the demobilization process.

1. “Ivory Coast Takes Step to Unify Military Forces,” New York Times, March 17, 2007; “Fourteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2007/593), October 1, 2007.

The third supplementary agreement set 22 December 2007 as the deadline for the commencement of the cantonment process for the state as well as the Forces Nouvelles forces. As reported on 24 January, 12,000 soldiers in the Defence and Security Forces were cantoned and registered. As of 1 April 2008, there were only 109 Forces Nouvelles ex-combatants cantoned.⁹ Among cantoned combatants, only the Forces Nouvelles combatants were to be demobilized.

By the end of the year, 11,364 out of a total of 34,678 combatants declared by Forces Nouvelles were cantoned, 455 of which were female combatants. Among cantoned combatants, “7,598 have chosen to be demobilized, including 802 foreign combatants (from Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, the Niger, Nigeria and Togo), and 3,766 have expressed interest in joining the new national army” (U.N. Security Council, 2008).¹²As progress on DDR did not move smoothly, parties negotiated a fourth supplementary agreement on 22 December 2008 that called for the completion of the DDR process two-months prior to the elections.⁴⁶

Significant progress was made in terms of demobilizing Forces Nouvelles combatants. By the end of the year, a total of 16,081 Forces Nouvelles combatants were demobilized. It was also estimated that an additional 12,000 Forces Nouvelles combatants would be demobilized.⁶⁹

Some progress was also made towards registering government militia members. The Integrated Command Center and the national program for reinsertion and community rehabilitation finished the registration process for the government militia. There were 37,436 government militia members registered for the demobilization and rehabilitation program.⁵⁰

1. “United Nations Operation in C™te d’Ivoire (23rd progress report),” United Nations Security Council (S/2010/15), January 7, 2010.

By 2010, 32,777 Forces Nouvelles combatants were registered, 23,777 of which were to be demobilized. By the end of the year, 17,601 combatants were demobilized. The demobilized combatants received a $200 cash allowance. Among those who choose to be reintegrated back into society, only a few had received reinsertion support through micro-projects.¹⁶ Only 17,301 militia members out of 37,436 were dismantled or demobilized.¹⁶

After the contested elections and the subsequent recurrence of conflict between the Forces Nouvelles and the supporters of president Gbagbo, the DDR process stalled. This occurred mostly because the state’s Defence and Security Forces remained politically divided. By the end of 2011, it was estimated that there were approximately 40,000 to 60,000 combatants comprised of official armed groups (state police, gendarmerie, former Republican guard, and Forces Nouvelles), militias and self-defence forces, and foreign armed elements. Among the 20,000 combatants that joined the FRCI (formerly Forces Nouvelles) during the conflict, 18,000 were said to have gone through the disarmament and remobilization process, of which 2,500 were cantoned for the purpose of demobilization.⁴⁸

In Arpil 2012, the DDR process started. The government intended to assemble an estimated 40,000 combatants who participated in the post-election crisis in 18 different sites across the country. The government predicted the recruitment of 2,000 into FRCI, 15,000 into the reserve force, and 23,000 into the DDR process.⁵⁶ An estimated 40,000 FRCI combatants were expected to participate out of an estimated caseload of 60,000 to 100,000.⁴⁹

With UNOCI support, a national policy concerning DDR was adopted on August 2 and provided for a single entity to oversee the process: the Authority for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (ADDR). “The Authority for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration developed a pilot programme for an initial caseload of 5,000 former combatants to be processed at the Anyama demobilization site in Abidjan. The operation targeted mainly elements associated with FRCI who had fought on the of President Ouattara during the post-elections crisis. . . . As of 18 December, 1,194 former combatants, including 63 women, have been disarmed and demobilized . . .”⁷⁰

1. “Thirty-first progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2012/964), December 31, 2012, paragraphs 34-36.

The DDR process gained momentum. In June, 5,973 former combatants, including 460 women, had been disarmed and demobilized, while 3,489 weapons, 28,355 rounds of ammunition and 2,448 items of explosive ammunition had been collected, registered and/or destroyed, with United Nations support.⁷¹ These numbers rose by December: 15,456 former combatants, including 1,002 women, had been disarmed and demobilized, while 5,838 weapons, 258,002 rounds of small arms ammunition and 6,800 items of explosive ordnance had been collected, registered and/or destroyed, with United Nations support.⁷²

“The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants remained a key priority of President Ouattara, who has requested his Government to expedite the disarmament and demobilization of 30,000 combatants by the end of 2013 and to complete the process by 2015. The Authority for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration subsequently proposed a two-year programme aimed at processing a caseload of approximately 65,000 [down from 110,000 after further verification efforts] former combatants, costing some $145 million according to Government estimates.”⁷³

Despite increased success, problems and challenges remained. The initial target of 30,000 would not be met, so the Government extended the duration of the process to June 30, 2015, with a revised target for 2013 of 23,000 combatants. Meanwhile, the caseload of eligible former combatants increased from 66,777 to 74,068.⁷⁴

Moreover, the UN condemned an attack on a convoy of the national Authority for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (ADDR) by demobilized former combatants; the attack took place on July 1 on a road between the towns of Ferkessedougou in the north and Kong in the northwest.⁷⁵ The same day, there were further reports of an uprising of demobilized former combatants in the northern town of Tengrela that invovled the exchange of fire with elements of the police force along with the Republican Forces of Cote d’Ivoire [FRCI]. “According to the banco.net website, which disclosed the information yesterday, these demobilized former combatants were demanding, through this violent demonstration, their integration within the national army.”⁷⁶

Furthermore, there were reports of disgruntled suppliers working with the ADDR as well as discontented staff members who had not received pay.⁷⁷

Ongoing concern with the DDR process, along with security sector reform and the continued circulation of weapons, helped prompt the UN Security Council to extend the mandate of UNOCI to June 30, 2014.⁷⁸

1. “Thirty-second progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2013/377), June 26, 2013, paragraph 35.
2. “Thirty-third progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2013/761), December 24, 2013, paragraph 36.
3. “Thirty-second progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2013/377), June 26, 2013, paragraphs 36, 41.
4. “Thirty-third progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2013/761), December 24, 2013, paragraph 35.
5. “Cote d’Ivoire: UN condemns attack on disarmament convoy,” IBNS, July 3, 2013.
6. “Ivorian ex-combatants attack regular army before presidential visit to north,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, July 2, 2013.
7. “Ivorian government to integrate more than 10,000 former combatants,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, September 10, 2013.
8. UN Security Council Resolution 2112, July 30, 2013 (S/RES/2112).

DDR efforts continued into 2014. “With support from UNOCI, the national Authority for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration finalized its programmatic framework, which was presented to international partners in February. It also developed partnerships with national financial, training and employment institutions, as well as international donors.”⁷⁹

“On 4 November, the Authority for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration announced that some 44,000 former combatants, including 3,538 women, had been disarmed and that a revised total of 67,460 former combatants were expected to undergo the process by 30 June 2015.”⁸⁰

Like in 2013, however, challenges persisted. “Since early 2014, enrollment of former combatants into the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process decreased significantly, including as a result of limited reinsertion and reintegration opportunities.”⁸¹

Moreover, “inclusion and transparency remained a challenge.” In May, “the rate of inclusion of combatants who had been affiliated with former President Gbagbo remained low, at 13 per cent, while a significant number of persons who had not been registered in the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration database were included retroactively.⁸²

UN Resolution 2162 expressed concern “at the low ratio of former combatants associated with the previous government that has been processed through the DDR programme and the 43,000 former combatants that remain armed and unemployed . . .”⁸³

In October, violence was renewed in Bangui and involved a continuous cycle of provocations and reprisals by armed groups, both inside and outside of Bangui.⁸⁴

1. “Thirty-fourth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2014/342), May 15, 2014, paragraph 31.
2. “Thirty-fifth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2014/892), December 12, 2014, paragraph 31.
3. Ibid., paragraph 32.
4. “Thirty-fourth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2014/342), May 15, 2014, paragraph 32.
5. UN Security Council Resolution 2162, June 25, 2014 (S/RES/2162).
6. UN Security Resolution 2196, 2015 (S/RES/2196).

UN Security Council Resolution 2169 noted, in light of recurring violence, “the need for an inclusive and effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process (DDR) as well as repatriation and resettlement (DDRRR) in the case of foreign fighters, including children formerly associated with armed forces and groups, while respecting the need to fight impunity”.⁵²

In January, Achatou Mindaoudou, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNOCI, noted that process of DDR was advancing satisfactorily. “However, she said that after June 2015, the target date set by the Ivorian authorities to complete the initiative, there would still be a surplus of about 14,000 ex-combatants to be rehabilitated and reintegrated into society.⁸⁵

The ongoing process of DDR will likely be affected by the 2015 election cycle.

1. “Cote d’Ivoire: Welcoming recent progress, UN envoy urges vigilance in run-up to elections,” IBNS, January 14, 2015.

In the Ouagadougou Political Agreement parties agreed to the national Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration program. The parties committed to various agreements negotiated before the Ouagadougou Political Agreement, including the 17 previously identified and agreed sites for the assembly of the combatants. The accord also provided for the establishment of the Integrated Command Centre for carrying out the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants.

The Integrated Command Centre (CCI) was established after the presidential decree of 16 March 2007 and was tasked with carrying out the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants.⁵¹ Nevertheless, the formal establishment of the CCI took place a month later on 16 April.³⁸

The disarmament process started when President Gbagbo officially launched the symbolic destruction ceremony in Guiglo on 19 May. During the ceremony, militia leaders handed over 555 weapons, which were then handed over to the United Nations Operation in C™te d’Ivoire (UNOCI).³⁸ However, disarmament could not be achieved due to the lack of clarity on reintegration incentives for the ex-combatants.³⁹ Parties signed a third supplementary agreement to expedite the DDR process on 7 December 2007.[fn]”Fifteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2008/1), January 2, 2008.[/efn_note] The slower disarmament process, however, may have been the result of the insistence of Forces Nouvelles on having a simplified process for its combatants to join the army without disarming.³⁸

The third supplementary agreement set a 22 December 2007 deadline for the commencement of the cantonment process for the state as well as for the Forces Nouvelles. As reported on 24 January, 12,000 soldiers in the Defence and Security Forces were cantoned and registered as provisioned for in the third supplementary agreement. They also deposited their weapons in storage. The cantonment of Forces Nouvelles combatants, however, did not progress significantly. As of 1 April 2008, there were only 109 Forces Nouvelles ex-combatants cantoned. The lack of clarity about the integration program was the likely reason for the lack of progress.⁹ Among 2,000 militia members who were registered in June 2006, only 981 were disarmed and received cash allowances.⁹

By the end of the year, out of a total strength of 34,678 combatants declared by Forces Nouvelles, 11,364 combatants, including 455 female combatants, were cantoned. Among cantoned combatants, “7,598 have chosen to be demobilized, including 802 foreign combatants (from Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, the Niger, Nigeria and Togo), and 3,766 have expressed interest in joining the new national army. Only 10 weapons and some ammunition were collected”.¹² As progress on DDR did not move smoothly, parties negotiated a fourth supplementary agreement on 22 December 2008 that called for the completion of the DDR process two months prior to the elections.⁴⁶

For the entire year, no significant progress was made in terms of the disarmament of ex-combatants. It was suggested that financial and logistical challenges slowed the DDR process.⁴²

Forces Nouvelles combatants were demobilized in October but only a limited number of weapons were collected and most of them were unserviceable.¹⁶ The limited collection of weapons was possibly the result of the Forces Nouvelles’s insistence that their combatants join the army without going through the disarmament process.

After contested elections in 2010 and the subsequent capturing of former president Gbagbo, some progress was made towards disarming former militias. Between June and December 2011, 828 weapons and 220,265 rounds of ammunition were collected from an estimated 1,300 combatants in 29 different locations.⁴⁸

With UNOCI support, a national policy concerning DDR was adopted on August 2 and provided for a single entity to oversee the process: the Authority for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (ADDR).

“The Authority for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration developed a pilot programme for an initial caseload of 5,000 former combatants to be processed at the Anyama demobilization site in Abidjan. The operation targeted mainly elements associated with FRCI who had fought on the of President Ouattara during the post-elections crisis. . . . As of 18 December, 1,194 former combatants, including 63 women, have been disarmed and demobilized, while 861 weapons have been collected. . . . The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration operations are planned to continue in other parts of the country. The two sites rehabilitated by UNOCI in Guiglo and Bouaké are ready for operations, and the remaining six, in San Pedro, Man, Séguéla, Korhogo, Bouna and Abengourou, are expected to be completed by mid-2013.”⁷⁰

“UNOCI also continued to support the National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons, which has conducted nine ad hoc operations across the country to encourage the voluntary handover of weapons. During those operations, a total of 112 weapons and 6,323 rounds of ammunition were collected.”⁸⁶

The disarmament process for militias was still going on as of November 2012, although there were outbreaks of violence in December. Since July 2011, the disarmament program that received support from UNOCI had collected 1,163 weapons and 225,154 rounds of ammunition from 1,351 combatants.⁸⁷

1. Ibid., paragraph 37.
2. “Thirtieth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2012/506), June 29, 2012, paragraph 32.

In a special report by the Secretary General in March 2013, it was noted that assessment teams in the Ivory Coast continued to identify former combatants as a “major threat” to lasting stability. Progress was noted — from the establishment of the ADDR, to the ad hoc DDR of about 2,000 former combatants, to the continued efforts to DDR a further 2,000. A more comprehensive plan was being developed with UN support although concerns persisted over the weapons-per-combatant ratio which was well below the desired 1:1 ratio.⁸⁸

Nonetheless, overall progress on disarmament was noted as being “halting and uneven”: “The national implementation strategy has yet to be finalized, and disarmament and demobilization operations therefore remain largely ad hoc in nature, often depending on negotiations between the Government and former commanders. A large number of former combatants remain unregistered, which has led to questions as to the credibility of the Government database.”⁸⁹

However, as the year went on, the process gained momentum. In June, 5,973 former combatants, including 460 women, had been disarmed and demobilized, while 3,489 weapons, 28,355 rounds of ammunition and 2,448 items of explosive ammunition had been collected, registered and/or destroyed, with United Nations support.⁹⁰ These numbers rose by December: 15,456 former combatants, including 1,002 women, had been disarmed and demobilized, while 5,838 weapons, 258,002 rounds of small arms ammunition and 6,800 items of explosive ordnance had been collected, registered and/or destroyed, with United Nations support.⁷²

“The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants remained a key priority of President Ouattara, who has requested his Government to expedite the disarmament and demobilization of 30,000 combatants by the end of 2013 and to complete the process by 2015. The Authority for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration subsequently proposed a two-year programme aimed at processing a caseload of approximately 65,000 [down from 110,000 after further verification efforts] former combatants, costing some $145 million according to Government estimates.”⁷³ Despite increased success, the initial target of 30,000 would not be met. The Government extended the duration of the process to June 30, 2015, with a revised target for 2013 of 23,000 combatants. Meanwhile, the caseload of eligible former combatants increased from 66,777 to 74,068.⁷⁴

1. “Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2013/197), March 28, 2013, paragraph 40.
2. “Thirty-second progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2013/377), June 26, 2013, paragraph 39.
3. Ibid., paragraph 35.

“With support from UNOCI, the national Authority for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration finalized its programmatic framework, which was presented to international partners in February. It also developed partnerships with national financial, training and employment institutions, as well as international donors.”⁷⁹

“On 4 November, the Authority for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration announced that some 44,000 former combatants, including 3,538 women, had been disarmed and that a revised total of 67,460 former combatants were expected to undergo the process by 30 June 2015. As at 1 December, Government statistics revealed that a total of 27,034 weapons, including grenades, and 1,537 items of explosive ordnance had been collected.”⁸⁰

“Since early 2014, enrollment of former combatants into the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process decreased significantly, including as a result of limited reinsertion and reintegration opportunities.”⁸¹

“However, inclusion and transparency remained a challenge.” In May, “the rate of inclusion of combatants who had been affiliated with former President Gbagbo remained low, at 13 per cent, while a significant number of persons who had not been registered in the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration database were included retroactively.”⁸²

According to the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire, UNOCI and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) conducted 136 disarmement and demobalization operations between December 2014 and May 2015. In those operations, 4,374 former combatants associated with FRCI and Forces nouvelles handed over 377 weapons, 49,138 rounds of small arms ammunition and 1,814 items of explosive ordnance.⁹¹

1. ” “Thirty-six progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2015/320), May 7, 2015, paragraph 40.)

The Ouagadougou Political Agreement provided that all young people who had received weapons training (including Forces Nouvelles personnel) be integrated into the civil service; it was agreed that a decree from the Council of Ministers would finalize the modalities and functions of the civil service. The accord also provided for the establishment of the Integrated Command Centre for carrying out the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants.

No significant progress was made in terms of reintegrating former combatants back into society other than establishing the Integrated Command Centre on 16 April, which was meant to carry out the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants, after the presidential decree of 16 March 2007.⁵¹ In a meeting held on 14 December, parties reached an agreement to integrate 20,000 Forces Nouvelles combatants into the civil service. An estimated 6,000 combatants would benefit from reintegration programs developed by the Programme National De Réinsertion et De Réhabilitation Communautaire.³⁹ After the meeting, the government announced the launch of the civic service program, which was scheduled to begin on 22 December.³⁹

The United Nations Peace Building Support Office approved $4 million to fund 1,000 micro-projects for the reintegration of 5,000 ex-combatants. As of October 1, only 3 projects, which benefited 30 ex-combatants, were operational. Reintegration into the civil service was also said to benefit only 15,000 ex-combatants due to limited funding.¹² By the end of the year, the civil service and the National Program for Reinsertion and Community Rehabilitation provided reintegration support to 329 ex-combatants and 675 ex-combatants, respectively.⁴⁶

In 2009, an estimated 25,000 combatants were expecting reintegration. The national institutions responsible for reintegrating ex-combatants lacked resources to implement related provisions of the accord. Nevertheless, the United Nations Operation in C™te d’Ivoire (UNOCI), in collaboration with development agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme, provided short-term reintegration support to an estimated 3,407 ex-combatants through 225 micro-projects in 23 different locations.⁴¹

Reintegration of ex-combatants did not move smoothly due to lack of funding for the national institutions responsible for carrying this out. Nevertheless, the 1,000 micro-projects funded by the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund were completed in early 2010 and benefitted 3,637 combatants. The second round of micro-projects, which were expected to benefit over 1,200 ex-combatants, was initiated in September 2010.¹⁶

After contested elections in 2010 and subsequent conflict in early 2011, the reintegration process did not move smoothly. No substantial progress was made.

The government was coordinating with UNOCI to move combatants through the DDR program. This included approval on August 2 of a national policy that established a single Authority for Disarmement, Demobilizaiton, and Reintegration (ADDR) as well as a plan for all individuals over 18 years of age who had participated in the fighting in 2002 and/or the post-elections crisis to undergo disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, with an overall caseload estimated at 100,000 former combatants.⁹²

“The Authority for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration developed a pilot programme for an initial caseload of 5,000 former combatants to be processed at the Anyama demobilization site in Abidjan. The operation targeted mainly elements associated with FRCI who had fought on the side of President Ouattara during the post-elections crisis. A total of 2,000 of those 5,000 former combatants will be integrated into the Government’s penitentiary system, while others will be considered for placement in the customs, water and forestry services.” So far, 500 former combatants had been deployed to work in prisons, while 443 were being trained.⁹³

The UN also reported that two sites rehabilitated by UNOCI in Guiglo and Bouaké were ready for operations, and the remaining six, in San Pedro, Man, Séguéla, Korhogo, Bouna and Abengourou, were expected to be completed by mid-2013.⁵²

1. “Thirtieth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2012/506), June 29 2012; “Thirty-first progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2012/964), December 31, 2012, paragraphs 34-35.
2. “Thirty-first progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2012/964), December 31, 2012, paragraph 36.

The UN reported that by early December, “a total of 15,384 demobilized individuals had benefited from reinsertion and/or reintegration support in the public or informal sectors, of whom 5,459 had officially been reintegrated, including 2,002 into the prison administration, and 9,425 continued reinsertion training, including 2,000 into the customs service and 500 into the water and forestry service.”⁷²

Moreover: “In October, another initiative was launched for 10,065 “self-reinserted” individuals to receive civic and professional training. As at December, approximately 8,000 former combatants had benefited from this project. In addition, UNOCI launched 12 community-based reinsertion initiatives.”⁸⁶

However, the DDR process struggled both to finalize the details of a national program and with lack of financial resources. “Reinsertion and reintegration in particular remain challenging because of a lack of funding and employment opportunities. While reinsertion and reintegration efforts targeting the public and private sectors were made, including in respect of opportunities for education and in the informal sector, most progress was in employment in the public sector and self-employment.”⁹⁴

1. Ibid., paragraph 40.

The UN reported that as of December 1, approximately 44,000 former combatants had benefited from reinsertion support. “UNOCI assisted the Government’s reinsertion efforts through the implementation of 79 community-based, countrywide reinsertion projects aimed at the enhancement of community safety and social cohesion, the reinforcement of the weapons collection programme and the payment of transitional safety allowances to approximately 24,000 former combatants.”⁹⁵

The head of the ADDR, Fidèle Sarassoro, reported in November that 14,000 former combatants would remain at different stages of the reinsertion process by June 2015 and requested the continued support of UNOCI for their reinsertion and reintegration.⁹⁶

1. “Thirty-fifth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2014/892), December 12, 2014, paragraph 33.
2. Ibid., paragraph 34.

The UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2219 extending the arms embargo on Cote d’Ivoire; the Council noted that it would “review the sanctions regime before the end of next April with a view of further modifying or lifting all or part of the remaining measures in light of progress in security reform, reintegration of former combatants, reconciliation and the fight against impunity. It stressed the importance, in that context, of holding peaceful and credible elections, as planned for October 2015.”⁹⁷

1. UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, “Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2219 (2015), Security Council Extends Arms Embargo on C™te dÕIvoire, Targeted Sanctions,” April 28, 2015, accessed May 5, 2015, http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11877.doc.htm.

The Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA) specified that the parties to the accord agreed to extend the scope of the amnesty law passed in 2003 and agreed to adopt a new amnesty law covering crimes committed between 17 September 2000 and the date of the Ouagadougou accord. The accord’s proposed amnesty law, however, did not cover economic crimes, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

As provided for in the accord, a new amnesty law was unveiled on 12 April 2007 that pardoned all Ivoirians living in the country and abroad who had committed crimes and offences related to national security. The law covered the time period between 17 September 2000 and 4 March 2007, when the accord was signed. The new amnesty law excluded economic crimes, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.⁹⁸ Sixty-one civilian and military prisoners (40 civilians and 21 military personnel) who had committed crimes related to national security were set free on 7 June 2007 as a result of the new amnesty law.⁹⁹

1. “VOA News: Ivory Coast President Offers Amnesty as Peace Plan Advances,” US Fed News, April 13, 2007; “Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in C™te DÕivoire,” African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC/PR/2(CIV)), December 19, 2007.
2. “Chronology of key events in Ivory Coast,” Agence France Presse, July 29, 2007; “Fourteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2007/593), October 1, 2007.

The amnesty law was passed and implemented in 2007. Thus there are no further developments.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

The Ouagadougou Political Agreement called for assistance to be provided for the return of displaced persons. The accord was not clear whether this included internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugees. Given that the major cause of the conflict was the influx of migrant workers and their resettlement in Ivory Coast, this provision mostly referred to IDPs.

In terms of implementing this particular provision of the accord, the Ministry of Solidarity and Victims of War was said to have developed an assistance program and visited the areas that the displaced would return to. Nevertheless, it was reported that the legal framework to claim that displaced persons had abandoned their homes and properties did not exist as of September.³⁸ Between 27 and 29 November, the Humanitarian Coordinator for the humanitarian mission led a delegation comprised of the UN country team, non-governmental organizations, and the donor communities to the western part of the country to evaluate the program and the needs of returnees.³⁹ It was reported that approximately 50,000 displaced persons had returned.³⁹

In 2008, the UN Secretary General’s report suggested that the majority of an estimated 700,000 IDPs were not expected to seek resettlement assistance. The humanitarian community focused on providing assistance only to an estimated 111,000 IDPs.⁹ But the return of IDPs was attributed to coordination between governmental authorities and humanitarian actors in the western part of the country. As a result, as of early July, an estimated 61,432 IDPs had returned home since the signing of the accord.⁵³ By the end of December, an estimated 76,000 had spontaneously returned to their villages.⁴⁶

By December 2009, approximately 88,790 IDPs had returned home.⁴² However, it was reported that in some areas land disputes affected the return of IDPs.¹⁰⁰

1. “Twenty-third progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2010/15), January 7, 2010; “Twentieth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2009/196), April 13, 2009.

By the end of October, a total of 90,000 IDPs had returned to their villages.¹⁶ Land and property issues remained a factor that affected sustainable socio-economic reintegration.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the government shifted its focus from humanitarian to development issues.

While substantial progress was made in terms of helping displaced persons get resettled in their communities, the recurrence of civil war after presidential elections in Ivory Coast engendered another wave of internal displacement. By the end of March, an estimated 300,000 to 700,000 people had been displaced from the Abobo region along with an additional 45,000 in the west.¹⁷ Moreover, approximately 186,000 went to Liberia as refugees.¹⁷ International organizations provided humanitarian support to IDPs and food assistance to refugees. By mid-June, an estimated 300,000 remained displaced within the country and over 200,000 persons were in neighboring countries.²³ An estimated 500,000 IDPs and over 130,000 refugees returned to their villages by the end of the year.⁴⁸

The majority of people displaced during the post-election conflict returned to their villages. However, as of June, an estimated 86,000 were still displaced internally, an estimated 58,200 refugees were in Liberia, and another 24,140 refugees were in other countries.⁴⁹ It was reported that the repatriation of displaced persons and refugees experienced funding constraints resulting in the insufficient availability of livelihood assistance programs to support their return.⁵⁶

The UN reported that by December a majority of persons displaced because of the post-election crisis had returned home, but up to 80,000 remained displaced. “The continued perception of insecurity and ineffective restoration of State authority, including limited access to basic social services, hampered the sustainable return of internally displaced persons and refugees.” About 9,300 Ivorian refugees remained in Ghana as of December. Attacks from Ghana, as well as Liberia, into the Ivory Coast, one of which targeted an IDP camp in West Ivory Coast, prompted the UN to facilitate high level government contacts while encouraging refugees to return.¹⁰¹

1. “Thirty-first progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2012/964), December 31, 2012, paragraphs 47, 28, 67, 71.

With UN support, approximately 8,200 Ivorian refugees voluntarily returned to C™te dÕIvoire from Liberia by June. Some 83,500 Ivorians remain refugees in the subregion, including some 66,400 in Liberia and 8,500 in Ghana. “Cross-border attacks in March resulted in the temporary displacement of up to 8,000 persons, with 500 going to Liberia.” The UN focused its humanitarian response on “assisting returning refugees and internally displaced persons, as well as host families and communities, by providing short-term relief packages and through activities that support rebuilding of livelihoods and strengthening of resilience.” The UN was also providing support to the Government to help provide durable solutions for IDPs, moving from relief to development, while working to build state capacity and coordination with development actors.¹⁰²

However, persisting conflicts “over land, lack of employment opportunities and lack of access to basic social services and protection often hampered their sustainable reintegration in areas of return, especially in the west of the country.”¹⁰³ The UN also noted the more general problem of statelessness in West Africa and it saw an “opportunity for hundreds of thousands of persons at risk of statelessness to acquire Ivorian nationality. UNICEF estimates that 2.8 million children remain unregistered and lack the birth certificates they need to have their rights respected.” Meanwhile, instability along the border with Liberia continued to hamper resettlement efforts.¹⁰⁴

By December, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration had assisted the voluntary repatriation of more than 16,000 refugees from neighboring countries.¹⁰⁵

1. “Thirty-second progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2013/377), June 26, 2013, paragraphs 57-59; “Thirty-third progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2013/761), December 24, 2013, paragraph 54.
2. “Thirty-second progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2013/377), June 26, 2013, paragraph 58.
3. “Thirty-third progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2013/761), December 24, 2013, paragraphs 55, 77.
4. Ibid., paragraph 52.

The outbreak of Ebola in Guinea and Liberia affected voluntary returns facilitated by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which had been suspended since March, affecting 42,000 refugees in Liberia and 6,500 refugees in Guinea. The resilience of communities in the border area was affected by the epidemic, owing to the restricted mobility of people and goods, the closure of markets and a ban on bush meat.¹⁰⁶ “Although C™te dÕIvoire has not recorded any case of Ebola, as a neighbor of three affected countries, C™te dÕIvoire has put in place stringent measures to stop its spread. Ivorian refugees from affected countries are not able to return, and the livelihoods of border communities are increasingly at risk.”¹⁰⁷

On 15 May, the western border town of Fété was attacked by a group of unidentified armed individuals, which resulted in the displacement of 3,500 community members. The Government and the UN responded by approving measures aimed at enhancing security in the western areas of the country, including increasing the presence of FRCI, launching programs to promote peace, social cohesion and security, and rehabilitating bridges. The population of the town, however, had not returned by December.¹⁰⁸

Moreover, there remained “a serious lack of livelihood opportunities, housing and land for the displaced, who also faced considerable social marginalization.”¹⁰⁹

1. “Thirty-fifth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2014/892), December 12, 2014, paragraph 50.
2. Ibid., paragraph 80.
3. Ibid., paragraph 19.
4. Ibid., paragraph 38.

In 2015, the voluntary repatriation of refugees in neighboring countries remained a top priority for the UNHCR, although efforts continued to be hampered by the ebola outbreak in West Africa.¹¹⁰

1. UNHCR, “2015 UNHCR country operations profile – C™te d’Ivoire,” accessed May 7, 2015, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e484016.html.

The Ouagadougou Political Agreement required the general identification of the population, the deployment of mobile courts for the issuance of substitute birth certificates, and the issuance of national identity cards or residence permits. The process of issuing new identity cards was said to be carried out along with the issuance of voter cards.

After much delay, the process of issuing national identity cards started in 2007. As of December, 55 technical teams out of 111 planned mobile courts were deployed, 33 of which were operational. It was reported that the court granted a total of 93,027 duplicate birth certificates nationwide.³⁹

Steady progress was made in terms of issuing duplicate birth certificates for the purpose of providing national identity cards. By the end of December, 2.8 million people among the country’s population of 19 million were identified nationwide as needing duplicate birth certificates.⁴⁰

Population identification was completed by the end of June. A total of 6,552,694 people were registered in a voter roll, including 38,496 Ivorians registered in 23 foreign countries.⁴¹ Production and distribution of national identity cards and voter cards was scheduled for October and November of 2009 but was not completed.⁴²

Production and distribution of national identity cards was rescheduled to be initiated in January and February but did not happen due to allegations of fraud. Finally, starting 6 October 2010, national identity cards for 5,932,999 individuals were distributed.⁴⁴ This completed the implementation of citizenship-related provisions of the accord.

The citizenship-related provisions in the accord were implemented in 2010.

The citizenship-related provisions in the accord were implemented in 2010.

The citizenship-related provisions in the accord were implemented in 2010.

The citizenship-related provisions in the accord were implemented in 2010.

The citizenship-related provisions in the accord were implemented in 2010.

The Ouagadougou Political Agreement required that most of its provisions, including those regarding presidential elections, be implemented within ten months of the signing of the accord. Provisions related to population identification, holding elections, disarmament, demobilization, and the reintegration of ex-combatants, including the deployment of mixed military units, were not completed as outlined in the accord.

Provisions were not completed as outlined in the accord’s timeline.

Provisions were not completed as outlined in the accord’s timeline.

Provisions were not completed as outlined in the accord’s timeline.

Provisions were not completed as outlined in the accord’s timeline.

Provisions were not completed as outlined in the accord’s timeline.

Provisions were not completed as outlined in the accord’s timeline.

Provisions were not completed as outlined in the accord’s timeline.

Provisions were not completed as outlined in the accord’s timeline.

In the Ouagadougou Political Agreement, parties to the accord agreed to request the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to lift the arms embargo imposed on Ivory Coast within three months of holding post-conflict elections. Parties also requested that the UNSC immediately allow light weapons, necessary for maintaining law and order, to be imported.

On 29 October 2007, the UNSC passed Resolution 1782 and decided to extend the arms embargo by 12 months; the embargo had been in place since 2004.[fn=value1] “Resolution 1782 (2007),” United Nations Security Council (S/RES/1782 2007), October 29, 2007.[/efn_note] The UNSC did not authorize light weapons to be imported.

Through Resolution 1842, the UNSC extended the arms embargo imposed on Ivory Coast until 31 October 2009. Nevertheless, the resolution called for a review of the embargo should Ivory Coast make progress in its peace process, especially in the holding of elections.¹¹¹

1. “Resolution 1842 (2008),” United Nations Security Council (S/RES/1842 2008), October 29, 2008.

The UNSC, through Resolution 1893, extended the arms embargo imposed on Ivory Coast until 31 October 2010. Nevertheless, the resolution called for a review of the embargo should Ivory Coast make progress in its peace process, especially in the holding of elections.¹¹²

1. “Resolution 1893 (2009),” United Nations Security Council (S/RES/1893 2009), October 29, 2009.

The UNSC, through Resolution 1946, extended the arms embargo imposed on Ivory Coast until 30 April 201. Nevertheless, the resolution called for a review of the embargo should Ivory Coast make progress in its peace process, especially in the holding of elections.¹¹³

1. “Resolution 1946 (2010),” United Nations Security Council (S/RES/1946 2010), October 15, 2010.

The UNSC, through Resolution 1980, extended the arms embargo imposed on Ivory Coast until 30 April 2012. Nevertheless, the resolution called for a review of the embargo should Ivory Coast make progress in its peace process.¹¹⁴ One of the pre-conditions for the review of the embargo was the holding of elections. Elections took place in late 2010, but because armed violence ensued following elections, the UNSC made its decision based on the lack of political and security stabilization in Ivory Coast.

1. “Resolution 1980 (2011),” United Nations Security Council (S/RES/1980 2011), April 28, 2011.

The UNSC, through Resolution 2045, replaced the arms embargo imposed on Ivory Coast in 2004 and allowed non-lethal law enforcement equipment to be imported for the purpose of maintaining public order, as well as supplies of arms and related lethal weapons to the Ivorian armed forces for use in the Security Sector Reform process.¹¹⁵ As such, the arms embargo in place was finally lifted in April of 2012.

1. “Resolution 2045 (2012),” United Nations Security Council (S/RES/2045 2012), April 26, 2012.

In April 2013, Security Council Resolution 2101 extended the embargo for one year, although supplies of arms and related lethal weapons to the Ivorian armed forces for use in the Security Sector Reform process was allowed, per Resolution 2045 (2012).¹¹⁶

1. SIPRI, “UN Arms Embargo on Cote D’Ivoire,” accessed May 7, 2015, http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/cote.

In April 2014, Security Council Resolution 2153 extended the embargo for one year. “It lifted the requirement to notify the sanction committee in advance about the supply of non-lethal equipment to the Ivorian security forces. It retained the required advance approval by the sanction committee for the supply of most types of weapons as clarified in a new list annexed to the resolution.” Supplies of arms and related lethal weapons to the Ivorian armed forces for use in the Security Sector Reform process was allowed, per Resolution 2045 (2012).¹¹⁶

UN Resolution 2219 (2015) renewed the sanctions, including the partial embargo on arms, although supplies of arms and related lethal weapons to the Ivorian armed forces for use in the Security Sector Reform process was allowed, per Resolution 2045 (2012).¹¹⁷

1. “Resolution 2219 (2015),” United Nations Security Council (S/RES/2219 2012), April 28, 2015.

As required by the Ouagadougou Political Agreement, the Evaluation and Monitoring Committee, comprised of three representatives from both sides, was established. The chair of the Evaluation and Monitoring Committee was the representative from the facilitators. This committee was mandated to assess and make recommendations on the implementation of the accord.

The Evaluation and Monitoring Committee met for the first time on 11 May 2007 on issues related to the disarmament of militias and former combatants, the reestablishment of state institutions throughout the country, and the census. The committee had its second meeting on 4 September, where it recommended that parties create a timeline for the implementation of the accord.¹¹⁸ The committee also recommended that the French company, SAGEM, handle the technical operation for the production of the documents for population identification. The parties endorsed this recommendation in a supplementary agreement on 9 November 2007.³⁹

1. “Fourteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2007/593), October 1, 2007; “Monthly Forecast: October 2007,” Security Council Report (2007): 5, accessed November 1, 2012, www.securitycouncilreport.org

The Evaluation and Monitoring Committee met on 14 January and recommended prioritizing the electoral process. In its meeting on 21 March, the committee recommended issuing a decree on issues related to the modalities for voter registration, including a suggestion to conclude the contract with SAGEM to produce national identity and voter cards. The committee also recommended that the government ensure funding for the cantonment process as well as re-establishing the fiscal and customs administration throughout the country.⁹ The committee regularly met on issues related to implementation of the accord. In meetings that took place in July and September, the committee discussed logistical issues for expediting the population identification and voter registration processes as well as measures related to resolving rank issues for Forces Nouvelles combatants being integrated into the armed force.¹²

The Evaluation and Monitoring Committee had its fifth meeting on 9 August, in which the timely resolution of security-related issues was emphasized. These issues included harmonization of the ranks for 5,000 personnel from Forces Nouvelles who were expected to join the national army. The deployment of integrated units comprised of 4,000 personnel from each side was also a priority at the meeting. In this particular meeting, the Independent Electoral Commission also released the official results of the identification and voter registration operations.¹³

There was no information regarding the activities of the Evaluation and Monitoring Committee in 2010. However, it is possible that the Evaluation and Monitoring Committee became obsolete once elections took place on 31 October.

Once the major provisions of the accord, including the distribution of national identity cards and holding of presidential elections, were implemented, the Evaluation and Monitoring Committee became obsolete.

Once the major provisions of the accord, including the distribution of national identity cards and holding of presidential elections, were implemented, the Evaluation and Monitoring Committee became obsolete.

Once the major provisions of the accord, including the distribution of national identity cards and holding of presidential elections, were implemented, the Evaluation and Monitoring Committee became obsolete.

Once the major provisions of the accord, including the distribution of national identity cards and holding of presidential elections, were implemented, the Evaluation and Monitoring Committee became obsolete.

Once the major provisions of the accord, including the distribution of national identity cards and holding of presidential elections, were implemented, the Evaluation and Monitoring Committee became obsolete.

The Ouagadougou Political Agreement had a provision that parties to the accord request the impartial forces of Licorne and the United Nations Operation in C™te d’Ivoire (UNOCI) to dismantle the zone of confidence. In fact, when the agreement was signed on 4 March 2007, more than 8,000 UN peacekeepers and French troops (Licorne) were already on the ground.¹¹⁹ Resolution 1528 of the United Nations Security Council had authorized the deployment of peacekeepers in 2004.

After the Agreement in March 2007, UNOCI and Licorne troops were involved in the management of the zone of confidence as well as in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process. The UN Security Council extended the mandate of UNOCI and Licorne until 15 January 2008; and by December 2007, 8,033 troops, 750 police personnel, and 450 civilian police remained deployed.¹²⁰

1. “Twelfth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2007/133), March 8, 2007.
2. “Fourteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2007/ 593), October 1, 2007; “Fifteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2008/1), January 2, 2008.

Resolution 1795 (2008) of the United Nations Security Council extended the mandate of UNOCI and Licorne for an additional six months until 30 June 2008. Peacekeepers had achieved some success in terms of redeploying mixed units (units comprised of state armed forces and rebel forces) in the former zone of confidence.⁹ UNOCI and Licorne were involved in providing national security, along with managing the DDR process.⁹ The Security Council extended the mandate of UNOCI and Licorne until 31 January 2009.¹² By the end of 2008, there were 8,020 troops, 750 police personnel, and 387 civilian police deployed.⁴⁶

The mandate of UNOCI and Licorne was extended until 31 July 2009 by the UN Security Council through Resolution 1865 (2009). UNOCI focused on securing and supporting the implementation of the accord, which included identification of the population and supporting the electoral process.⁴⁷ By the end of 2009, there were 7,191 troops, 744 police personnel, and 394 civilian police.⁶⁹ Licorne, however, reduced its peacekeeping troops from 1,800 to 900.⁵⁰ The mandate of UNOCI and Licorne was extended until 31 January 2010.⁴¹

The Mandate of UNOCI and Licorne was extended by the UN Security Council for an additional six months until 31 July 2009 by Resolution 1865 (2010).⁴⁷ Due to the continued presence of armed militias and an incomplete DDR process, UNOCI increased its mobility to secure and support the implementation of the agreement.⁴⁷ The mandate of the peacekeeping operation was extended for an additional six months by the UN Security Council in Resolution 1880 (2010).⁴¹ By end of September 2010, UNOCI had 7218 troops, 748 police personnel, and 432 civilian police.⁴¹

After contested presidential elections in November 2010, forces loyal to former rebels and to the sitting president, Mr. Laurent Gbagbo, engaged in full-fledged violence. Resolution 1962 (2011) of the UN Security Council extended the mandate of UNOCI and Licorne until 30 June 2011. Peacekeepers were deployed to provide security and defuse tensions between forces loyal to each side.¹⁷ Due to severe security vulnerability, the size of the UNOCI force was increased. By the end of December 2011, there were 9,616 troops, 995 police personnel, and 394 civilian police deployed.¹²¹

1. “Twenty-ninth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2011/807), December 29, 2011.

The UN Security Council, in Resolution 2000 (2011), extended the mandate of UNOCI until 31 July 2012.⁵⁶ While the election-related dispute was finally resolved and the security situation improved throughout the country with the capturing of Mr. Laurent Gbagbo, elements of the Forces Républicaines de C™te dÕIvoire (FRCI), formerly the Forces Nouvelles, were engaged in various violent activities. UNOCI’s presence was needed to support the government and to address the security challenges in the country.⁵⁶ By the end of June 2012, there were 9,297 troops, 999 police personnel, and 364 civilian police personnel.⁴⁹

Despite gradual improvements, the overall security situation in C™te dÕIvoire remained “fragile,” reported the UN, particularly along the border with Liberia. High levels of violent crime throughout the country, including banditry committed by elements of the Forces républicaines de C™te dÕIvoire (FRCI), dozos (traditional hunters), former combatants and others, as well as recurrent incidents of intercommunity violence, were reported. UN Resolution 2112 (2013) was passed which extended UNOCI’s mandate to June 30, 2014.¹²²

In December, the strength of the UNOCI military component stood at 8,669 military personnel and 435 police. The UNOCI military component was deployed in 10 battalions, including 4 in the west, 3 in the east and 3 in Abidjan, as well as enablers. “In consultation with the Government, UNOCI continued to plan the drawdown and reconfiguration of its military presence, which will consist of 7,137 military personnel by 30 June 2014, concentrating on high-risk areas.”⁵²

1. “Thirty-third progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2012/761), December 24, 2013.

The security situation remained “fragile,” especially along the border with Liberia. The UNOCI force continued to reconfigure so that it would be more mobile and concentrated in high-risk areas, pursuant to resolution 2162 (2014), in which the Security Council decided to reduce the mission’s authorized military strength to 5,437 personnel by 30 June 2015.¹²³

As of December, 840 troops had been withdrawn. The strength of the UNOCI military component stood at 6,274 military personnel and 388 police. A total of 1,120 troops were deployed in the Abidjan sector, 3,018 in the west and 2,159 in the east⁵²

1. “Thirty-fifth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2014/892), December 12, 2014.

UN Resolution 2162 (2014) called for the reduction of the mission’s authorized military strength to 5,437 personnel by June 30, 2015; in March, troop levels stood at 5,883.¹²⁴

1. UNOCI, “Facts and Figures,” accessed May 7, 2015, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/facts.shtml.

In the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (2007), parties agreed to request additional African peacekeeping troops for Ivory Coast. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) were providing military troops for peacekeeping purposes in Ivory Coast.¹²⁵

In an effort to increase the number of African troops in the post-agreement period, the President of Ivory Coast requested troops from Burkina Faso. In July, Burkina Faso decided to send 150 troops.¹²⁶ This contribution was supposed to strengthen the United Nations Operation in C™te d’Ivoire (UNOCI). The actual departure date of the military unit was not given. As of December 2007, the Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council did not suggest a substantial increase in the contribution of African or Burkina Faso troops as.¹²⁷

1. “Eleventh progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2006/939), December 4, 2006.
2. “Burkina to deploy a military unit in Ivory Coast,” Agence France Presse, July 24, 2007.
3. “Fifteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2008/1), January 2, 2008; “Thirteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2007/275), May 14, 2007; “Fourteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2007/ 593), October 1, 2007.

There was no information on any additional requests on the part of the Ivory Coast government for additional African troops for UNOCI. The United Nations Security Council, however, did not increase the strength of the peacekeeping force beyond 8,000, which could be the reason for blocking additional peacekeepers from African states. Nevertheless, various ECOWAS countries and AU members contributed troops to UNOCI.¹²⁸

1. “Seventeenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2008/451), July 10, 2008; “Nineteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2009/21), January 8, 2009.

No information was found on any additional request on the part of the Ivory Coast government for additional African troops for UNOCI. While ECOWAS and AU members had troops in UNOCI, there was no increase in African troops on the ground.¹²⁹

1. “Twentieth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2009/196), April 13, 2009; “Twenty-third progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C™te dÕIvoire,” United Nations Security Council (S/2010/15), January 7, 2010.

No information was found on any additional request on the part of the Ivory Coast government for additional African troops for UNOCI. Because of contentious presidential elections and the recurrence of violence, the U.N. Security Council authorized the deployment of up to 500 additional personnel in Ivory Coast.¹³⁰ It was, however, not clear whether the increased personnel would be coming from African countries.

1. “US eyes bigger UN force in Ivory Coast,” Associated Press, December 22, 2010.

Additional peacekeepers were deployed in Ivory Coast in 2011 and were drawn from Malawi and Niger. According to reports by the Secretary General to the Security Council, Malawi contributed 856 troops²³ and troops from Niger increased from 401 in June to 941 in December.⁴⁸ This increase, however, did not come from the request of the Ivory Coast government. Nevertheless, it helped increase the number of African peacekeepers in Ivory Coast.

After a substantial increase in troops from Malawi and Niger in 2011, there were no substantial increases in additional African troops in 2012.⁴⁹ The troop levels remained the same as they were in December 2011.

“In consultation with the Government, UNOCI continued to plan the drawdown and reconfiguration of its military presence, which will consist of 7,137 military personnel by 30 June 2014, concentrating on high-risk areas.” Moreover, UNOCI and UN Mission In Liberia (UNMIL) planners continued to “develop options for the establishment, within the UNOCI authorized military strength, of a quick-reaction force configured and equipped to respond to incidents in C™te dÕIvoire. The force would also provide support in the event of a serious deterioration in the security situation in Liberia once UNMIL reaches its residual military strength in mid-2015, and to respond to other crises in the subregion, as required.”¹²²

As of December, levels of African troops remained relatively the same, with slight reductions in troops from Senegal and Togo; the largest drop came in troops from Malawi, which were reduced from over 800 to 10.⁵²

“The UNOCI force continued to reconfigure so that it would be more mobile and concentrated in high-risk areas, pursuant to resolution 2162 (2014), in which the Security Council decided to reduce the mission’s authorized military strength to 5,437 personnel by 30 June 2015. As at 1 December, 840 troops had been withdrawn.” A large number of those withdrawn were African troops; notable reductions included about 50-60 troops each withdrawn for Senegal, Togo, and Niger while Ghana levels reduced from over 500 to 161.¹²³

UN Resolution 2162 (2014) called for the reduction of the mission’s authorized military strength to 5,437 personnel by June 30, 2015; in March, troop levels stood at 5,883. African troop levels are thus far unavailable.¹²⁴