General Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and MFDC
Date Signed: 30 December, 2004
Accord Type: Comprehensive Peace Agreement
Country: Senegal
33.33Implementation Score after 10 years
Provisions in this Accord
Cease Fire
2005
According to a news report in April 2005, the level of violence was greatly reduced by the peace process.1 Most of the Casamance region was calm, with only isolated incidents of violence connected to criminals and rebels.2
- “Peace Pact Raises Hope in Senegal,” Africa News, April 28, 2005.
- “State Department Issues Consular Information Sheet on Senegal,” US Fed News, September 14, 2005.
2006
In 2006, fighting increased in the Casamance, spanning the Guinea-Bissau and Gambia border regions.1 Guinea-Bissau’s forces joined with Senegalese armed forces to fight the rebels. Fighting also appeared to take place between rebel factions.2 At least two splinter groups from the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC)—that is, the Movement for the Liberation of the People of the Casamance (MLPC) and the Revolutionary Front for Social Equilibrium in Senegal (FPRES)—were involved in the fighting.3
- “Fighting Continues Along Border with Guinea-Bissau,” UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, March 17, 2006.
- “Fighting resumes in Senegal; rebel leader issues ultimatum to factional rival,” BBC Monitoring Africa: BBC Worldwide Monitoring, May 9, 2006.
- “Senegal – Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor – 2006,” U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, accessed March 6, 2007, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78754.htm.
2007
Occasional fighting continued throughout 2007.1 In December, the Presidential envoy in charge of the Casamance peace process was shot dead in an attack.2
- “State Department Issues Consular Information Sheet on Senegal,” US Fed News, November 8, 2007.
- “Peace negotiator, villager shot dead in Senegal: authorities,” Agence France Presse, December 21, 2007.
2008
Instances of fighting were reported in 2008.1 The MLPC (a splinter group of the MFDC) and the MFDC itself were reported to be fighting each other.2 The MFDC also appeared to be fighting with government troops as well. The program coordinator of ANCRAC commented (on the demining effort) that “[w]e need to first find a peace agreement between the MFDC and the government of Senegal.3
- “Republic of Senegal CSI,” State Department Press Release, July 8, 2008.
- “2008 Human Rights Report: Senegal,” U.S. Department of State, accessed February 25, 2009, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119021.htm.
- “Lack of Peace Accord Hampers Demining in Casamance,” UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, May 9, 2008.
2009
Violence persisted in 2009 between the MFDC and the government.1 “[T]he region remains plagued by occasional violent crime, political killings, and bouts of fighting between the army and the splintered MFDC,” according to a UN news report.2 Fighting appeared to intensify later in 2009, killing at least 15 Senegalese soldiers.3
- “Senegal: Violence Flares Up in Casamance Again,” UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, June 15, 2009.
- “Closer to war than to peace?” UN Integrated Regional Information Networks (Nairobi), September 18, 2009.
- “Senegal’s PM, chief negotiator air different views on Casamance issue,” Xinhua General News Service, March 29, 2010.
2010
Fighting between the Senegalese army and separatists occurred in early 2010 due to military operations that were intended to remove rebel bases.2 At that point, no meeting between the government and the MFDC had taken place since 1 January 2005.3 A rebel leader responded, stating that the MFDC would welcome negotiations on neutral territory, in another country. The Prime Minister stated he wanted talks to take place in Senegal.4 There were no further reports in the press on negotiations.
In October, the Senegalese army attacked a rebel base near the Gambia border.5 Fighting was also reported in December.[fn]”Rebels Attack Southern Senegal Village,” States News Service, December 28, 2010.[/efn_note]
- “Senegal army clashes with separatist rebels,” IoL News, March 22, 2010, http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/senegal-army-clashes-with-separatist-re… same month, a MFDC leader was quoted asking the government for “sincere and all inclusive negotiations.” The Senegalese Prime Minister responded that the government was ready to receive MFDC leaders to start negotiations.1“Senegal’s PM, chief negotiator air different views on Casamance issue,” Xinhua General News Service, March 29, 2010.
- “Senegal PM urges Casamance rebels to talk peace,” Agence France Presse, April 23, 2010.
- “Rebel faction ready for talks on Senegal’s Casamance,” Agence France Presse, April 27, 2010.
- “Senegal’s Casamance rebels enter Gambia,” Xinhua General News Service, October 6, 2010.
2011
A news report from 2011 stated that despite a number of cease fires, renewed violence “over the past year” had occurred.1 Negotiations were hampered by the MFDC splitting into various factions.2 Levels of violence in the Casamance increased in 2011, and an estimated 83 people were killed as a result of the Casamance conflict.3 According to a news report, negotiations between the government and the various political and military factions of the MFDC were deadlocked.4
- “Senegal Opposition Searching for Consensus Candidate,” States News Service, May 17, 2011.
- “Ex-soldiers march for peace in Senegal’s Casamance,” Agence France Presse, February 1, 2011.
- “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011 — Senegal,” U.S. Department of State, May 24, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2011humanrightsreport/index.htm?dli….
- “Demined land handed back to locals in Senegal’s Casamance,” Agence France Presse, March 12, 2011.
2012
Violence persisted into 2012.1 According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), clashes continued between government forces and the MFDC.2 Press characterized the conflict as low-level.[fn]”An Aging President Overstays His Welcome and Damages His Country’s Reputation,” Africa.com Blog, January 30, 2012.[/efn_note]
- “2 soldiers killed in Senegal’s restive South,” International News, March 12, 2012.
- “The ICRC regional delegation in Dakar – Facts and Figures,” International Committee of the Red Cross, September 21, 2012.
2013
Ceasefire violation was not reported in 2013. After Macky Sall won presidency in 2012, the government started to negotiate with the MFDC. Sall’s government was serious about finding a solution in Casamance. One of the obstacles however was the split in the MFDC. The MFDC splintered into four different groups and the strongest group was led by César Atoute Badiate who had 80% of combatants estimated between 1200 and 2000. Nevertheless, ceasefire held in 2013.1
2014
No violence reported in 2014. In May, one of the leaders of MFDC, Salif Sadio, declared a unilateral ceasefire. The ceasefire was announced after a government and the MFDC delegation met in Rome under the facilitation of the Sant’Egidio Catholic Community. 1
Clause one: The Purpose of the Present Agreement
2. The MFDC solemnly decides to definitively give up armed combat and the use of violence as a means to conduct the political combat which it wants to conduct.
Demobilization
2005
According to a World Bank report, implementation of demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration was dependent on the formal receipt from the MFDC to the government of the list of combatants identified for demobilization. To that end, the report stated there were negotiations between the government and the MFDC. The World Bank had initiated a program for the demobilization of combatants, the reintegration of combatants, IDPs and refugees, and the reconstruction of infrastructure in areas of return.1
2006
Contrary to World Bank information, in a news interview in October 2006, Koussaynobo Alphonse Diedhiou, coordinator of the National Agency for the Reconstruction of Casamance (ANRAC) said that “It is very difficult to realise a programme of demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of the rebels, for example, without a peace process in place. There has not been a meeting between the MFDC and the government since 2004” (United Nations, 2006).1 In an interview, Director General of ANRAC argued, “If they (MFDC) are serious about the peace negotiations then they should lay down their weapons. It’s their responsibility to draw up a list and present that to us. How would we know who’s in their rank and file? If they give us a list, weÕll demobilize them. But as long as there is no list, there will be no disarmament and demobilization”.2
- “No End to Region’s Longest-Running War,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, October 16, 2006.
- Patty Chang, “No Development, No Peace? Demobilization and Reintegration in Casamance,” 2008 Annual International Studies Association Convention.
2007
In January, the prospect for formal demobilization greatly decreased as the MFDC leader who signed the 2004 peace accord, Abbe Diamacoune Senghor, died. In that context, the evolution of the MFDC from a unified separatist movement aiming to redress Casamance’s grievances to a factional movement driven more by economic considerations further decreased hopes for demobilization.1
2008
After lack of progress, the World Bank transferred its funds away from its demobilization project to other projects.1
2009
There was no mention of the demobilization program.
2010
There was no mention of the demobilization program.
2011
In 2011, the press reported that “the demobilisation, disarmament and reinsertion of some 2,000 fightersÉ has never been carried out” (Agence France Presse, 2011).1
2012
In his 2012 new year’s speech, Senegalese President Wade said he would facilitate the process of social reintegration of rebels if disarmament and demobilization took place.1
2013
While President Macky Sall’s government was negotiating with the MFDC on finding solutions, the demobilization was not initiated.
2014
Demobilization was not initiated.
Clause two: The Guarantee and Consolidation of the Agreement
2. The Parties engage to establish an observation group composed of representatives from the Government, militaries, ex-combatants from the MFDC and representatives from the political wing of the MFCD, in charge of carrying out the process of demobilization of the military wing of the MFCD and the stocking of its arms under the control of the C.I.C.R., of the Raddho and the AJAC.
3. The MFDC engages to billet, to disarm and to demobilize its military wing according to the procedures defined by the ANRAC.
Disarmament
2005
There was no mention of the disarmament program.
2006
By August 2006, the promised disarmament process had not been launched.1 In a news interview in October 2006, Koussaynobo Alphonse Diedhiou, coordinator of the National Agency for the Reconstruction of Casamance (ANRAC), said that “It is very difficult to realise a programme of demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of the rebels, for example, without a peace process in place. There has not been a meeting between the MFDC and the government since 2004”.2 In an interview, the Director General of ANRAC argued, “If they (MFDC) are serious about the peace negotiations then they should lay down their weapons. It’s their responsibility to draw up a list and present that to use. How would we know who’s in their rank and file? If they give us a list, weÕll demobilize them. But as long as there is no list, there will be no disarmament and demobilization”.3
- “Caught in the Cross-Fire, Growing up in Casamance,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, August 3, 2006.
- “No End to Region’s Longest-Running War,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, October 16, 2006
- Patty Chang, “No Development, No Peace? Demobilization and Reintegration in Casamance,” 2008 Annual International Studies Association Convention.
2007
There was no mention of the disarmament program.
2008
In 2008, a spokesperson for the human rights group Raddho stated that there had been no disarmament in the Casamance.1
2009
There was no mention of the disarmament program.
2010
In 2010, a Senegalese military official told media: “It is certain that they (rebels) have new equipment which they did not before, such as rocket launchers, mortars and machine guns”.1
- “Violence surges in Casamance as peace process stays blocked,” Agence France Presse, December 30, 2010.
2011
In 2011, the press reported that “the demobilisation, disarmament and reinsertion of some 2,000 fightersÉ has never been carried out”.1
2012
In his 2012 new year’s speech, Senegalese President Wade said he would facilitate the process of social reintegration of rebels after disarmament and demobilization.1 President Wade later also proposed what he termed a ‘DDP planÕ for the Casamance: disarmament, demining, projects.2
- “Dakar Bishop and Wade in Bid to End Rebellion,” The Nation (Nairobi), January 2, 2012.
- “Senegal’s Wade woos voters in strife-torn Casamance,” Agence France Presse, February 11, 2012.
2013
No developments observed this year.
2014
No developments observed this year.
Clause one: The Purpose of the Present Agreement
2. The MFDC solemnly decides to definitively give up armed combat and the use of violence as a means to conduct the political combat which it wants to conduct.
3. The MFDC engages to billet, to disarm and to demobilize its military wing according to the procedures defined by the ANRAC.
Reintegration
2005
There was no mention of the reintegration program.
2006
In a news interview in October 2006, Koussaynobo Alphonse Diedhiou, coordinator of the National Agency for the Reconstruction of Casamance (ANRAC), said that “It is very difficult to realise a programme of demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of the rebels, for example, without a peace process in place. There has not been a meeting between the MFDC and the government since 2004” (United Nations, 2006).1
- “No End to Region’s Longest-Running War,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, October 16, 2006.
2007
According to an NGO report, as of March 2007 no attempt at reintegration had been made.1
- “Child Soldiers Global Report 2008,” Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, http://www.child-soldiers.org/global_report_reader.php?id=97.
2008
There was no mention of the reintegration program.
2009
There was no mention of the reintegration program.
2010
There was no mention of the reintegration program.
2011
In 2011, the press reported that “the demobilisation, disarmament and reinsertion of some 2,000 fightersÉ has never been carried out”.1 Around the same time, President Wade asked the government to design a national program for the social reintegration of former MFDC fighters.2
2012
In his 2012 new year’s speech, Senegalese President Wade said he would facilitate the process of social reintegration of rebels after disarmament and demobilization.1
2013
No developments observed this year.
2014
No developments observed this year.
Clause three: Reintegration of Ex-Combatants
1. Exceptionally, the State of Senegal accepts to integrate the ex-combatants of the MFDC in the paramilitary corps, according to the principle of voluntary service following the conditions in force.
2. With the help of the Agence Nationale pour la Relance des Activites economiques et sociales en Casamance, ANRAC (The National Agency for the Stimulation of Economic and Social Activities in the Casamance) the Parties accept the principle to organize the necessary framework for the helping of ex-combatants from the MFDC who wish to do so, to start and finance income generating projects in the sectors that interest them.
3. The Parties encourage the group of Casamance officials, village chiefs and religious leaders in the Casamance to develop dynamics of forgiveness and reconciliation paving the way for the return to and reintegration in their native villages of the MFDC ex-combatants.
Human Rights
2005
In October 2005, freedom of speech was restricted when the government closed down Senegal’s leading private radio for a day under special instructions from the Interior Ministry after the station interviewed one of the leaders of the MFDC. Employees of the station were detained.1 Earlier that year a minor opposition leader was arrested on charges of inciting unrest. The communications ministry released a statement which argued that Senegal’s democratic institutions could not accommodate what it termed assaults that could lead to chaos.2
- “Senegal: Authorities Close Radios, Detain Staff Over Interview of Separatist Leader,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, October 17, 2005.
- “Senegal Government Defends Jailing Opposition Leader,” United States Fed News, May 31, 2005.
2006
According to a news report, the past two years saw an increase in violence against journalists and political activists. Government officials denied violations of freedom of speech.[fn]”VOA News Senegal’s rap artistsÕ despair over 2007 Elections,” US Fed News, August 4, 2006.[/efn_note]
2007
Freedom of speech, press, and assembly were limited nation-wide.1
- “2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,” United States Department of State (Sengal), accessed March 11, 2008, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100501.htm.
2008
A report from human rights group Article 19 decried attacks on freedom of speech and freedom of press.1“Senegal: Deterioration of Press Freedom,” Article 19, August 11, 2008, http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/press/senegal-deterioration-of-…
2009
Amnesty International reported that in general, journalists and opposition politicians were subjected to harassment and legal proceedings for expressing their opinions. Demonstrations were violently suppressed. Overall, there was very little accommodating behavior from the government.1“Senegal must not curtail freedom of expression in election run-up,” Amnesty International, January 26, 2012.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
2012
No further developments observed.
2013
The US State Department Human Rights Report suggested human rights abuses in Senegal. Nevertheless, it was reported that the government was committed to providing protection and assistance to IDPs, refugees, and stateless persons in cooperation with the Office of UN High Commissioner for Refugees. The Sall government also put forth efforts to investigate human rights abuses committed by former Wade administration officials. The freedom of movement was restricted due to MFDC use of mines and banditry.1
In April, the MFDC leader Salif Sadio had asked for the lifting of his arrest warrant as a condition for the dialogue. As the disclosure made by the Catholic Community of Sant’Egidio — a mediator between the rebel group and the Senegalese government — no international arrest warrant was issued against the MFDC leader Salif Sadio.[fn]”Mediators say ex-Senegalese rebel chief has no arrest warrant against him,” BBC Monitoring Africa, April 14, 2013.[/efn_note]
- “Country Reports on Human Rights Practice for 2013 — Senegal,” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2013.
2014
While efforts to improve human rights situations were intact with the election of Sall as president, the freedom of movement was restricted due to MFDC use of mines and banditry. 1
Clause one: The Purpose of the Present Agreement
1. As the law of amnesty is already in force the State engages to provide general security, free circulation of people and goods, in the Casamance as well as in all the rest of the territory, in accordance with the Constitution and to guarantee the exercise of fundamental freedoms in particular freedom of speech and expression in order to favour the political dialogue in the resource-rich region of the Casamance.
Amnesty
2005
In January 2005, Senegal adopted an amnesty law for all political crimes since 1983.1 One month later, it was decided that the law was constitutional.2
- “Senegal adopts amnesty law for political crimes since 1983,” Agence France Presse, January 7, 2005.
- “Amnesty law constitutional, Senegal constitutional council says,” Agence France Presse, February 15, 2005.
2006
No further developments observed.
2007
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
2009
No further developments observed.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
2012
No further developments observed.
2013
No further developments observed.
2014
No further developments observed.
Clause one: The Purpose of the Present Agreement
1. As the law of amnesty is already in force the State engages to provide general security, free circulation of people and goods, in the Casamance as well as in all the rest of the territory, in accordance with the Constitution and to guarantee the exercise of fundamental freedoms in particular freedom of speech and expression in order to favour the political dialogue in the resource-rich region of the Casamance.
Refugees
2005
The government provided returning internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees roofing materials for home construction and sacks of rice.1
- “Senegal – 2005 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,” United States Department of State, March 8, 2006.
2006
As insecurity affected the Casamance through 2006, residents fled and were displaced.1 More than 4,500 Senegalese refugees sought refuge in Gambia in August 2006.2 By the end of October, the number of refugees had grown to 6,200.3
- “Some 4,500 Displaced By Clashes Between Separatists, Guinea-Bissau Troops,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, March 20, 2006.
- “Senegalese Refugees Flood Gambia to Escape Clashes, UN Agency Says,” United Nations News Service, August 23, 2006.
- “Senegalese Fleeing to Gambia from Clashes in South now Total 6,200,” United Nations (United Nations Reports), October 31, 2006.
2007
In January 2007, renewed fighting in Southern Casamance sent Senegalese refugees, who had recently returned from Guinea Bissau, back to Guinea Bissau. In November, a faction of the splintered MFDC warned residents not to return to the Casamance from Guinea Bissau.1
- “Lack of Basics Blocks Return of War-Weary Displaced,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, January 24, 2008.
2008
Water shortage and fear of mines reportedly kept refugees from returning to their villages in the Casamance.1 In one village, those returning were kidnapped by Casamance rebels.2
- Ibid.
- “Rebels Act On Kidnap Threats in Casamance,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, March 20, 2008.
2009
In October 2009, an estimated 1,000 residents fled after fighting occurred in their villages in the Guinea-Bissau border region.1 Many of the people displaced started to return to their homes a few days after the clashes ended.2
- “Increased violence in Senegal forces 1,000 residents to flee,” Voice of America News, October 5, 2009.
- “Confronting aid challenges in volatile Casamance, Integrated Regional Information Networks,” IRIN AFRICA, October 19, 2009.
2010
Rebel fighting in 2010 led to continued migrations and displacements.1 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimated in 2010 that some 40,000 people were still displaced in the Casamance.2
- “Senegal rebels force hundreds to flee,” Agence France Presse, February 3, 2010.
- “Senegal: Microprojects restore dignity in Casamance,” International Commitee of the Red Cross, March 4, 2010.
2011
Displacement continued during the year. The number fluctuated according to the ebb and flow of the conflict with estimates over 10,000.1
2012
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the number of refugees residing in Senegal was an estimated 20,600, while the number of refugees originating from Senegal was an estimated 17,700.1
- “2012 Statistical Snapshot Senegal,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), January 2012.
2013
The US State Department Human Rights Report reported that the government was committed to providing protection and assistance to IDPs, refugees, and stateless persons in cooperation with the Office of UN High Commissioner for Refugees. It was reported that the government permitted unsupervised and informal repatriation of Casamance refugees returning from the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau.1
- “Country Reports on Human Rights Practice for 2013 — Senegal,” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2013.
2014
Unsupervised and informal repatriation of Casamance refugees from the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau continued in 2014.1
Clause four: Stimulation of Economic and Social Activities
2. The State engages to take all measures in order to facilitate the returning home of refugees and displaced persons and to give necessary support in favour of their social reintegration.
Internally Displaced Persons
2005
Improved security conditions after the December 2004 ceasefire meant that internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees continued to return during 2005. The number of IDPs was estimated to be 20,000. The government provided returning IDPs and refugees with roofing materials for home construction and sacks of rice.1
- “2005 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Senegal),” United States State Department, March 8, 2006.
2006
As insecurity affected the Casamance through 2006, residents fled and were displaced.1 More than 4,500 Senegalese refugees sought refuge in Gambia in August 2006.2 By the end of October, the number of refugees had grown to 6,200.3
- “Some 4,500 Displaced By Clashes Between Separatists, Guinea-Bissau Troops,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, March 20, 2006.
- “Senegalese Refugees Flood Gambia to Escape Clashes, UN Agency Says,” United Nations News Service, August 23. 2006.
- “Senegalese Fleeing to Gambia from Clashes in South Now, UN Agency Says,” United Nations News Service, August 23, 2000.
2007
In January 2007, renewed fighting in Southern Casamance sent Senegalese refugees, who had recently returned from Guinea Bissau, back to Guinea Bissau. The number of IDPs was an estimated total of 60,000, although it was reported that the government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to internally displaced persons, refugees, asylum seekers, and stateless persons.1 In November, a faction of the splintered MFDC warned residents not to return to the Casamance from Guinea Bissau.2
- “2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Senegal),” United States Department of State, March 11, 2008.
- “Lack of Basics Blocks Return of War-Weary Displaced,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, January 24, 2008.
2008
According to reports in 2008, the return of displaced people was made difficult by a lack of water in the abandoned Casamance villages as well as by a fear of mines.1 The director of ANRAC commented that he was not aware of a water shortage problem for people trying to return, but said the agency would be ready to help once a formal demand was received from local authorities.2
The same year, the number of displaced people was estimated to be around 60,000.3 According to the US Department of State, many people were newly displaced.4
- “Lack of Basics Blocks Return of War-Weary Displaced,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Network, January 24, 2008.
- Ibid.
- “Lack of Peace Accord Hampers Demining in Casamance,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, May 9, 2008.
- “2008 Human Rights Report: Senegal,” United States Department of State, February 25, 2009.
2009
Heavy fighting in the Casamance resulted in further displacements in 2009.1 Many of the people displaced started to return to their homes a few days after the clashes ended.2 Some reportedly commuted to their home villages by day to engage in agricultural activities, and left again at night.3
- “Heaviest Fighting in YearsÕ Hits Casamance,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, August 26, 2009.
- “Confronting aid challenges in volatile Casamance,” Integrated Regional Information Networks, October 19, 2009.
- “New displacement and challenges to durable solutions in Casamance,” iDMC Norwegian Refugee Council, June 18, 2010.
2010
Rebel fighting in 2010 had similar effects.1 While clashes between the MFDC and the Senegalese army continued, no large-scale displacement of civilians was reported. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimated in 2010 that some 40,000 people were still displaced in the Casamance.2
- “Senegal rebels force hundreds to flee,” Agence France Presse, February 3, 2010.
- “Senegal: microprojects restore dignity in Casamance,” International Comittee of the Red Cross, March 4, 2010.
2011
According to the US Department of State, many people became newly displaced during the year. The number fluctuated according to the ebb and flow of the conflict; estimates of the number of IDPs ranged from 10,000 to 40,000.1
- “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011 — Senegal,” United States Department of State, May 24, 2012.
2012
As of February 2012, villages remained heavily mined, and “thousands” displaced.1
2013
The US State Department Human Rights Report reported that the government was committed to providing protection and assistance to IDPs, refugees, and stateless persons in cooperation with the Office of UN High Commissioner for Refugees. While it was reported that no significant number of IDPs in the Casamance region attempted to return to their villages, the government supplied food to and enrolled children of IDPs in local schools.1
- “Country Reports on Human Rights Practice for 2013 — Senegal,” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2013.
2014
No significant improvement reported in terms of the situation of displaced persons or their resettlement.1 Nevertheless, as conflict in the Casamance region subsided with the ongoing peace processes, the situation should have been improved.
Clause four: Stimulation of Economic and Social Activities
2. The State engages to take all measures in order to facilitate the returning home of refugees and displaced persons and to give necessary support in favour of their social reintegration.
Economic and Social Development
2005
It was agreed that the key to future development was removing land mines in the region. According to a UN study, 93 localities were contaminated by mines and/or unexploded ordnance, affecting 90,000 people. Numerous localities were inaccessible at the time of assessment.1
- “Violence Flares Up in Casamance Again,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, June 12, 2009.
2006
In 2006, no official demining process took place. The Senegalese army demined pockets of the region on its own terms, and also cooperated with the Moroccan army to demine the Gambia and Guniea Bissau borders. Their efforts came to a halt following attacks from the MFDC.1
- “Lack of Peace Accord Hampers Demining in Casamance,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, May 9, 2008.
2007
No official demining process took place.
2008
In February — more than three years after the signing of the peace accord — the government launched a landmine clearance program. A nine-member demining team, led by the government body CNAMS, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the NGO Handicap International (HCI), began modest demining efforts close to the Casamance capital. Three months later, it was reported that there was limited progress, due to a lack of adherence to the 2004 peace accord.1 Nevertheless, commentators identify 2008 as the year when demining activities commenced.2
- “Lack of Peace Accord Hampers Demining in Casamance,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, May 9, 2008.
- “Senegal: Demining Faces Slow-Down,” Humanitarian News and Analysis, July 12, 2012.
2009
Humanitarian demining efforts of the NGO Handicap International were hampered by insecurity in Casamance.1
- “Confronting Aid Challenges in Volatile Casamance,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks (Nairobi), October 19, 2009.
2010
NGOs were engaged in demining activities.1
2011
The conflict continued to limit the economic potential of the agriculturally fertile Casamance region.1 A positive sign was the handing back of land to locals after an internationally-financed operation removed landmines in the area. Sixteen villages were reopened.2
- “Senegal, Assessing Risks to Stability,” The CSIS Africa Program, June 2011.
- “Demined land handed back to locals in Senegal’s Casamance,” Agence France Presse, March 12, 2011.
2012
As of February, many villages remained heavily mined.1 President Wade blamed MFDC rebels, who he argued were the ones that planted landmines, and said that any demining efforts would require rebel participation.2 According to the news, demining efforts were expected to slow down. In the areas of Casamance where fighting continued, mines were reportedly being planted. In other areas, no demining efforts had been made to date.3 The Casamance Head of Mission for the NGO Handicap International, Jean-François Lepetit, estimated that 90 percent of the total mined land is yet to be cleared, most of it in northern Casamance along the Gambian border. Limited progress was nevertheless made, with six villages declared mine-free in June. International actors, such as the EU, supported such efforts financially.4
- “Senegal’s Wade takes campaign to restive Casamance,” Agence France Presse, February 11, 2012.
- “Wade woos voters in strife-torn Casamance,” Agence France Presse, February 11, 2012.
- “Casamance Mine Removal Slows,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks (Nairobi), July 12, 2012.
- “Senegal: Demining Faces Slow-Down,” Humanitarian News and Analysis, July 12, 2012.
2013
As of 2013, many villages remained heavily mined. No meaningful development related activities observed.
2014
As of 2014, many villages remained heavily mined. No meaningful development related activities observed.
Clause four: Stimulation of Economic and Social Activities
1. The State encourages the ANRAC to mobilize the NGOs and bodies specialized in de-mining, together with the Army and the MFDC ex-combatants to immediately start the clearance of landmines in the Casamance in order to facilitate the resumption of economic activities.
3. The State engages to guarantee the reconstruction of the Casamance like it has been stated in the Memorandum of Understanding (Protocol agreement) concerning the technical aspects of the peace process.
Please always cite: “Annualized implementation data on comprehensive intrastate peace accords, 1989–2012.” Madhav Joshi, Jason Michael Quinn, and Patrick M. Regan. Journal of Peace Research 52 (2015): 551-562.