Chapultepec Peace Agreement
Date Signed: 16 January, 1992
Accord Type: Comprehensive Peace Agreement
Country: El Salvador
95.83Implementation Score after 10 years
Provisions in this Accord
Cease Fire
1992
The cease-fire between the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN formally began on 1 February 1992, in keeping with the timeline established by the Peace Agreement. ONUSAL verified that the cease-fire agreement was upheld throughout the year and no major incidences occurred. Only one close call was reported, in which tensions over lands in former zones of conflict led the Government to deploy a police contingent consisting of recently demobilized troops from the FAES in late October 1992. ONUSAL and the Archbishop of San Salvador intervened before the incident escalated.123
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999), May 26, 1992.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/24833), November 23, 1992.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations Security Council (S/25006), December 23, 1992.
1993
The discovery of secret caches of FMLN weapons in Nicaragua in February 1993 raised tensions significantly, but did not lead to renewed armed conflict. The most serious threat to the cease fire agreement came from the resurgence of “death squads” in the latter portion of 1993. Several politically motivated illegal armed groups, some fashioned after groups active during the civil war, emerged. They carried out brazen acts of violence, including assassinations of former FMLN combatants, and threatened more. Fortunately, both parties to the Peace Agreement, in cooperation with the ONUSAL and the office of the UN Secretary-General, decisively condemned the actions of the death squads and took proactive measures to reign them in.4
- “Ninth report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations General Assembly, Security Council (A/49/59, S/1994/47), January 18, 1994.
1994
The cease fire was upheld with no major incidents threatening a return to armed conflict.
1995
No further developments observed.
1996
No further developments observed.
1997
No further developments observed.
1998
No further developments observed.
1999
No further developments observed.
2000
No further developments observed.
2001
No further developments observed.
NEW YORK ACT (31 December 1991)
The Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) hereby declare that they have reached definitive agreements which, combined with those previously signed at San Jose, Mexico City and New York, complete the negotiations on all substantive items of the Caracas Agenda and the New York “Compressed Negotiations”. Their implementation will put a final end to the Salvadorian armed conflict.
An agreement has also been reached on all technical and military aspects relating to the separation of the warring parties and the cessation of the armed conflict, which includes the end of the military structure of the FMLN and the reintegration of its members, within a framework of full legality, into the civil, political and institutional life of the country.
The parties have also agreed that the cessation of the armed conflict shall take effect formally on 1 February 1992 and shall conclude on 31 October 1992.
A further meeting between the parties has been scheduled for 5 January 1992 to negotiate the timetable for implementing the agreements and the procedure for ending the military structure of the FMLN and reintegrating its members, within a framework of full legality, into the civil, political and institutional life of the country.
Such negotiations must be successfully concluded by 10 January 1992 at the latest. Otherwise, the parties undertake to accept, by 14 January 1992 at the latest, a formula for resolving outstanding issues to be proposed to them by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Final Peace Agreements will be signed at Mexico City on 16 January 1992.
The parties undertake to preserve the atmosphere necessary for maintaining and expanding the unilateral decisions which they have taken in order to avoid all military activity.
Chapultepec Agreement (16 January 1992)
Chapter VII: Cessation of the Armed Conflict
1. The cessation of the armed conflict (hereinafter referred to as the CAC) is a brief, dynamic and irreversible process of predetermined duration which must be implemented throughout the national territory of El Salvador. During the CAC, there shall be no substantive negotiations but only the measures necessary to put into practice the agreements reached during the negotiating process.
2. The CAC shall begin on 1 February 1992 (hereinafter referred to as D-Day) and shall be completed on 31 October 1992.
3. The CAC consists of four elements, as defined herein:
a. The cease-fire;
b. The separation of forces;
c. The end of the military structure of FMLN and the reintegration of its members, within a framework of full legality, into the civil, political and institutional life of the country;
d. United Nations verification of all the abovementioned activities.
This chapter also includes agreements on the restoration of public administration in conflict zones and the use of the mass media to promote reconciliation (see annexes E and F).
The cease-fire
4. The cease-fire shall enter into force officially on D-Day.
5. As of that date, each of the parties shall, as appropriate, refrain from carrying out any hostile act or operation by means of forces or individuals under its control, meaning that neither party shall carry out any kind of attack by land, sea or air, organize patrols or offensive manoeuvres, occupy new positions, lay mines, interfere with military communications or carry out any kind of reconnaissance operations, acts of sabotage or any other military activity which, in the opinion of ONUSAL, might violate the cease-fire, or any act that infringes the rights of the civilian population.
6. Official verification of compliance with the undertaking described in the preceding paragraph shall begin on D-Day. Any alleged violation of the cease-fire shall be investigated by ONUSAL.
7. During the period between the signing of this Agreement and D-Day, the two parties shall observe an informal cease-fire under which they undertake not to carry out any of the activities described in paragraph 5.
8. ONUSAL shall deploy its personnel and equipment during the informal cease-fire period, so as to be able to verify all aspects of the CAC as of D-Day.
Separation of forces
19. As of D-Day, the naval and air force components of the FAES shall refrain from carrying out any offensive operation. They shall carry out only such non-hostile missions as are necessary for the discharge of their duties unrelated to the armed conflict. ONUSAL shall be advised in advance of all military flight plans. Such flights shall not be carried out over places where FMLN forces have been concentrated.
21. With special reference to FAES forces deployed near places where there are FMLN forces, in other words, those listed in appendix 1 to annex A and those listed in appendix 1 to annex C, the Government agrees that such forces shall be authorized to leave their locations only with the consent of ONUSAL and for the following purposes:
a. To carry out troop rotations and relief;
b. To carry out liaison and coordination activities between commands at battalion level and above;
c. To deliver logistical supplies;
d. To take part in programmes for the deactivation, removal and destruction of mines;
e. To go on leave or seek medical care or for other humanitarian reasons, individually, in civilian clothing and unarmed.
However, ONUSAL shall not grant permission for any movement, even in the above cases, if it believes that such movement could jeopardize the cease-fire or other aspects of this Agreement or disturb the process of détente and reconciliation. Forces that leave their locations for the purposes listed in paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) shall be accompanied by ONUSAL, which shall verify that such movements are in keeping with this Agreement.
22. Similarly, during the CAC period ONUSAL liaison officers shall be posted in the listed locations where FMLN forces are to be concentrated in order to coordinate movements by those forces. FMLN agrees that its forces may leave the locations in question only with the consent of ONUSAL and for the following purposes:
a. To carry out liaison and coordination activities between its high command and the commands of the forces stationed at the various locations indicated;
b. To supply provisions, clothing or vital necessities;
c. To take part in programmes for the deactivation, removal and destruction of mines;
d. To go on leave or seek medical care or for other humanitarian reasons, individually, in civilian clothing and unarmed.
However, ONUSAL shall not grant permission for any movement, even in the above cases, if it believes that such movement could jeopardize the cease-fire or other aspects of this Agreement or disturb the process of détente and reconciliation. Forces that leave their locations for the purposes listed in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) shall be accompanied by ONUSAL, which shall verify that such movements are in keeping with this Agreement.
24. During the cease-fire, COPAZ shall systematically evaluate the progress being made in implementing the Agreements. If it notes that a situation is developing which might result in a crisis, it shall draw such conclusions and make such recommendations as may be necessary to prevent a collapse of the cease-fire or a crisis of public order. It shall transmit its conclusions and recommendations to the Chief of ONUSAL.
Constitutional Reform
1992
The accord called for three constitutional reforms: reining in the military (civilian control), judicial reforms to protect human rights (2/3 house majority to elect Supreme court judges, and Human Rights Commission), and electoral reform (Supreme Electoral Tribunal).
The constitutional reforms required to enact judiciary reform were made in 1992.5 In January 1992, the Amnesty Law was passed by the legislature.6 El Salvador’s legislative assembly approved a series of provisional reforms to the electoral code in July 1992, to pave the way for the FMLN’s legalization as a political party. The reforms were approved by 76 of the 84 deputies, despite the fact that the constitution forbids armed groups to form political parties.7
On July 20, 1992, the National Assembly amended El Salvador’s constitution, removing police powers from the armed forces and creating a new national civilian police force and police academy.8
- “Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of ONUSAL,” United Nations Security Council (S/24066), June 5, 1992; “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/24833), November 23, 1992.
- “El Salvador Amnesty Law Approved by National, Assembly,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 25, 1992.
- “El Salvador: FMLN Suspends Demobilization,” IPS-Inter Press Service, July 31, 1992.
- Department of Consolidating Peace and Democracy in El Salvador, Statement before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, United States House of Representatives (July 9, 1992) (statement of Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Washington, DC), State Dispatch July 20, 1992.
1993
A new electoral code proposed by a special commission of the Legislative Assembly was enacted in 1993. Constitutional reforms created the Supreme Electoral Court (TSE) to replace the Central Election Council, and a special body to ensure the impartiality of the TSE and its members, who were to be elected by the Legislative Assembly. This set of changes fulfilled the reforms in the peace accord.9
- Ricardo Córdova MacÃas, “Demilitarizing and Democratizing Salvadoran Politics,” in El Salvador: Implementation of the Peace Accords, USIP, ed. Margarita S. Studemeister.
1994
No further constitutional changes called for by the accord were carried out.
1995
No further developments observed.
1996
No further developments observed.
1997
No further developments observed.
1998
No further developments observed.
1999
No further developments observed.
2000
No further developments observed.
2001
No further developments observed.
MEXICO AGREEMENT (27 April 1991)
The Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (hereinafter referred to as “the Parties”),
Reaffirming their intention to make speedy progress towards the restoration of peace, national reconciliation and the reunification of Salvadorian society, in accordance with the common will of the Salvadorian people as expressed by both Parties in the Geneva Agreement of 4 April 1990;
Considering that the peace negotiations being conducted pursuant to the Geneva Agreement and the Caracas Agenda of 21 May 1990 call for a number of constitutional reforms embodying the political agreements emanating therefrom;
Bearing in mind the urgent need to submit to the Legislative Assembly whose term expires on 30 April 1991 those constitutional reforms on which the Parties have reached agreement, even where such agreements are partial and do not deal with all aspects under the item as envisaged in the Caracas Agenda;
Considering that various points on which agreement has been reached can be put into practice through secondary legislation or through further political agreements elaborating on the Constitution;
Have reached the agreements summarized below, which comprise constitutional reforms and issues referred to secondary legislation, as well as other political agreements:
I. Armed Forces
1. Agreements on constitutional reforms aimed at:
a. A clearer definition of the subordination of the armed forces to civilian authority.
b. The creation of a National Civil Police for the maintenance of peace, tranquility, order and public safety in both urban and rural areas, under the control of civilian authorities. It is expressly understood that the National Civil Police and the armed forces shall be independent and shall be placed under the authority of different ministries.
c. The creation of a State Intelligence Agency independent of the armed forces and under the direct authority of the President of the Republic.
d. Redefinition of the system of military justice with a view to ensuring that only those cases which affect a strictly military legal interest are submitted to it.
II. Judicial System and Human Rights
1. Agreements on constitutional reforms designed to improve significant aspects of the judicial system and establish mechanisms for safeguarding human rights, such as:
a. Reorganization of the Supreme Court of Justice and a new procedure for the election of the Supreme Court judges. Henceforth, a two-thirds majority of deputies elected to the Legislative Assembly shall be required to elect judges to the Supreme Court of Justice.
b. An annual allocation from the State budget to the judiciary amounting to no less than 6 per cent of current income.
c. Creation of the post of a National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights, whose primary function shall be to promote and ensure respect for human rights.
d. Election of the Attorney-General of the Republic, the Chief State Counsel and the National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights by a two-thirds majority of deputies elected to the Legislative Assembly.
III. Electoral System
1. Agreements on constitutional reform aimed at:
a. The establishment of a Supreme Electoral Tribunal to replace the Central Board of Elections. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal shall be the highest administrative authority and jurisdiction with respect to the electoral matters. It has been agreed that the composition of the Tribunal shall be determined by secondary legislation, making sure that no party or coalition of parties predominates it. It has also been agreed that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal shall include members without any party affiliation, elected by a qualified majority within the Legislative Assembly.
b. It has also been agreed that legally registered political parties shall have the right to monitor the compilation, organization, publication and updating of the electoral roll.
V. Final Declaration
The parties state for the record that the foregoing is a summary of the main political agreements which they reached during the round of negotiations held at Mexico City between 4 April 1991 and today’s date. This summary shall in no way detract from, distort or contradict the authentic text of all the agreements reached, which are annexed to this document.
The Parties likewise reaffirm their commitment to take all necessary steps to execute the agreements fully. In particular, the Government of El Salvador solemnly undertakes to promote the approval by the current legislature of the constitutional reforms agree to by the Parties in this round of negotiations. Matters relating to the ratification of these reforms shall be considered in the framework of the ongoing negotiations, under the timetable for the implementation of future agreements.
VI. FMLN stated for the record that the wording of article 211, where the armed forces are described as a “permanent” institution, is incompatible with its position on the matter. It made it clear that it considers there to be certain constitutional reforms still awaiting negotiation, including demilitarization, article 105 on the limit of rural land ownership and the need to open up the mechanism for reform of the Constitution, either by amending article 248 or by other procedures such as popular referendum. FMLN maintains its position on all these points.
Electoral/Political Party Reform
1992
The accord called for several institutional requirements necessary to have free and fair elections. The Legislative Assembly appointed the Special Electoral Tribunal in 1992 after some delays. COPAZ appointed the Special Commission which was governed by the Tribunal. The Government put forth legislation to establish the FMLN as a political party.1 The Parties subsequently reached a negotiated agreement to propose legislation to facilitate the legalization of the FMLN as a political party by 30 June 1992.10 However, the FMLN did not gain permission to formally begin the process of becoming a political party until 30 July 1992. Full recognition as a party was hindered by the delays in the DDR process as a whole.11 The FMLN was ultimately legalized as a political party on 14 December 1992, in coordination with the formal cessation of armed conflict on 15 December 1992.3
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999/Add.1), June 16, 1992.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/24833), November 23, 1992; (S/23999), May 26, 1992.
1993
Elections were scheduled for March 1994 and the Government of El Salvador requested UN observers for those first elections. ONUSAL began making preparations shortly after, working in coordination with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal.12
The institutional framework for the election process was established, and parties prepared candidates. The major concern was low levels of voter registration.13 After concerted effort by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, 787,834 Salvadorians registered to vote by the year’s end—a success in the judgment of ONUSAL.14 A Board of Vigilance composed of representatives of all the political parties was created to advise citizens on problems they encountered in getting voter registration cards.15
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/25812), May 21, 1993.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/26606), October 20, 1993.
- “Tenth report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/49/116 S/1994/385), April 5, 1994).
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/179), February 16, 1994.
1994
The deadline for voter registration was extended to 19 January 1994, by which time a total of 2,653,871 persons had been registered. The deadline for registering candidates for lower offices was extended to 31 January 1994. Many discrepancies persisted in the registration records, and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal did not meet the deadline for issuing registration cards after the push to register as many voters as possible. The Attorney-General of the Republic selected an Electoral Counsel in January 1994 to address complaints about the electoral process. 15 By 16 March 1994, more than 74,000 persons requesting voter registration cards still had not received them due to insufficient documentation.16
The elections occurred on 20 March 1994 without any significant scandals or disruptions, and ONUSAL considered them acceptable. Approximately 1.5 million voters participated, amounting to roughly 55% of registered voters, which was lower than expected. No one presidential candidate received a majority, which forced a run-off election.17 The Electoral Division made many corrective recommendations to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to be implemented before the second round of elections on 24 April 1994. The Tribunal made several improvements, satisfying the Electoral Division. The second round, like the first, occurred with nothing more than some minor irregularities. About 1.2 million valid votes were counted, and Armando Calderon Sol, the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) candidate, was elected president with 68% of the votes. While approving of the elections, the Electoral Division still called for “a thorough reform of the electoral system.”18
A new Supreme Electoral Tribunal was elected on 30 July 1994.19
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/304), March 16, 1994.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/375), March 31, 1994.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/536), May 4, 1994.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/1000), August 26, 1994.
1995
No further electoral reforms took place as provided for by the accord.
1996
No further developments observed.
1997
No further developments observed.
1998
No further developments observed.
1999
No further developments observed.
2000
No further developments observed.
2001
No further developments observed.
MEXICO AGREEMENT (27 April 1991)
The Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (hereinafter referred to as “the Parties”),
Considering that various points on which agreement has been reached can be put into practice through secondary legislation or through further political agreements elaborating on the Constitution;
Have reached the agreements summarized below, which comprise constitutional reforms and issues referred to secondary legislation, as well as other political agreements:
III. Electoral System
1. Agreements on constitutional reforms aimed at:
(a) The establishment of a Supreme Electoral Tribunal to replace the Central Board of Elections. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal shall be the highest administrative authority and jurisdiction with respect to electoral matters. It has been agreed that the composition of the Tribunal shall be determined by secondary legislation, making sure that no party or coalition of parties predominates it. It has also been agreed that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal shall include members without any party affiliation, elected by a qualified majority of the Legislative Assembly.
(b) It has also been agreed that legally registered political parties shall have the right to monitor the compilation, organisation, publication and updating of the electoral roll.
2. Other issues raised in the negotiations were referred to secondary legislation and to other political agreements. Although the set of political agreements on the electoral system envisaged by the Parties in the Caracas Agenda has still to be negotiated, the following agreements have been reached during the current round:
(a) The electoral roll shall be compiled in such a way that the lists of citizens eligible to vote are published at least 20 days before the date of the election. A simple and expeditious procedure shall be established for making legitimate corrections requested by any interested party.
(b) Within 60 days after the establishment of the new Supreme Electoral Tribunal, a Special Commission presided over by the Tribunal and composed of representatives of all legally registered parties and, possibly, independent experts shall be established to prepare a comprehensive proposal for reform of the electoral system.
Political agreements elaborating on the constitutional reform
With a view to elaborating on some of the aspects which the agreed constitutional reform refers to secondary legislation, the Parties have agreed to the following:
B. Electoral system
1. The electoral roll shall be compiled in such a way that the lists of citizens eligible to vote are published at least 20 days before the date of the election. A simple and expeditious procedure shall be established for making legitimate corrections requested by any interested party. 2. Within 60 days after the establishment of the new Supreme Electoral Tribunal, a Special Commission presided over by the Tribunal and composed of representatives of all legally registered parties and, possibly, independent experts shall be established to prepare a comprehensive proposal for reform of the electoral system, to be completed and submitted to the Legislative Assembly within 120 days of the Commission’s establishment. The Special Commission shall in any case be set up at least two years before the next legislative elections, and the Assembly shall vote on the proposed reforms at least one year before the date of those elections.
Chapultepec Agreement (16 January 1992)
Chapter IV: Electoral System
The parties reaffirm their commitment, made in the Mexico Agreements, to promote a comprehensive proposal for reform of the electoral system. To that end, they request COPAZ to appoint the Special Commission envisaged for that purpose in the Mexico Agreements. That Commission shall study the preliminary draft amendments to the Electoral Code Submitted to the Legislative Assembly by the Central Board of Election, as well as any proposals put forward by its members or by independent experts invited for that purpose. The Special Commission shall organize its work in such a way that the results can be used within the time-limits set for the reform of the electoral system.
Chapter VI: Political Participation by FMLN
The following agreements have been reached concerning political participation by FMLN, and shall be subject to the implementation timetable contained in this Agreement:
5. Cessation of the armed conflict implies the commitment and the right of FMLN to full political participation, without any restrictions other than those deriving from the new institutional and legal framework established by the agreements reached during the negotiations.
6. Legalization of FMLN as a political party, through the adoption of a legislative decree to that end.
7. Guarantee that FMLN will be able to conduct its activities normally when it becomes a political party, meaning:
a. Freedom to canvass for new members;
b. The right to set up an appropriate infrastructure (premises, printing works, etc.);
c. Free exercise of the right of assembly and mobilization for FMLN leaders, activists and members;
d. Freedom for FMLN to purchase and use advertising space in the mass media.
8. Legal solution to the participation of FMLN members in COPAZ, once the latter formalizes its existence.
Civil Administration Reform
1992
Efforts were made for the return of judges, mayors and governance to former conflict zones. The FMLN, with the support of some communities and NGOs, blocked the return of some judges and mayors. ONUSAL stepped in to facilitate open dialogue and help the process move forward.1 In May 1992, the El Salvadorian government announced a reconstruction plan aimed to upgrade the country’s public services, including drinking water supplies, electricity, health and education, at a cost of more than 1.4 billion dollars.20 Also, an agreement was reached on 16 September 1992 to coordinate the return of all judges by the end of 1992.2
1993
The returned mayors organized public town meetings to make plans for reconstruction in their communities and elect representatives to municipal reconstruction and development commissions.12
1994
Mayors and judges were nearly 100% restored to former conflict zones. Other basic services, such as education and health care, were still lacking in some places. The Government cited resource scarcity as the reason for rather slow and incomplete action to restore civilian administration.21 After presidential elections in 1994, it can be said that most of the civil administration is restored. Nevertheless, some places still lacked water and electricity.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/1212), October 31, 1994.
1995
Provisions related to civil administration reform were implemented by the end of 1994.
1996
No further developments observed.
1997
No further developments observed.
1998
No further developments observed.
1999
No further developments observed.
2000
No further developments observed.
2001
No further developments observed.
CHAPULTEPEC AGREEMENT (16 January 1992)
Chapter VII, Annex E: Restoration of Public Administration in Conflict Zones
With the entry into force of the cease-fire, public administration shall gradually be restored in conflict zones, in accordance with the following principles:
A. The full range of public services (such as water, electricity, telecommunications and roads) and other services provided by the State in such areas as agriculture, education and health shall be restored as soon as possible.
B. Mayors who, because of the armed conflict, have performed their functions on an itinerant basis shall take up residence in their respective municipalities as soon as possible, in close consultation with ONUSAL, in order to strengthen the process of détente and reconciliation.
C. The administration of justice shall be re-established in a manner appropriate to the purposes of this Agreement and, in particular, to the process of peace and reconciliation. Accordingly:
(a) The administration of justice shall be re-established as soon as possible, in close consultation with ONUSAL, in order to strengthen the process of détente and reconciliation.
(b) The Government shall take appropriate steps to ensure that the re-establishment of the administration of justice does not impair the effectiveness of the legislative or other measures adopted within the framework of this Agreement and of the peace and reconciliation process to guarantee members of FMLN the full exercise of their civil and political rights.
D. The restoration of public administration shall not be detrimental to either the existence or the functioning of the non-governmental organizations of a cultural, economic or social nature that have been established in conflict zones. As part of the process of peace and reconciliation, appropriate channels between these organizations and the respective authorities shall be maintained, with the support of ONUSAL.
Truth or Reconciliation Mechanism
1992
U.N Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali installed the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador on 13 July 1992. The Commission consisted of three members, including former Colombian president Belisario Betancur, former Venezuelan foreign minister Reinaldo Figueredo and former president of the Inter-American Court for Human Rights Thomas Buergenthal. The Commission had a mandate to investigate serious acts of violence that have taken place in El Salvador since 1980 and whose impact on society urgently demanded that the public know the truth.22 The Commission on the Truth began its work on 13 July 1992. Its ability to investigate every report was limited by its six-month mandate, so it maintained an “open-door” policy for hearing testimony throughout its operation, and resolved to only report on complaints which it could confirm. The commissioners were not chosen from El Salvador to maintain impartiality.23
- “U.N. Chief Installs Truth Commission for El Salvador,” Xinhua General News Service, July 13, 1992.
- “From Madness to Hope: The 12-year War in El Salavador,” United States Institute of Peace Library, January 26, 2001, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/ElSalvador-Report.pdf.
1993
The commission did not meet its 6-months deadline to submit its final report. The report was handed over on 15 March 1993 in New York, United States. It had received over 22,000 complaints of serious acts of violence occurring between January 1980 and July 1991. Over 60% of the complaints related to extrajudicial killings, over 25% to forced disappearances, and over 20% to torture. The majority of the violations were committed by the FAES and other Government agents. The Commission’s report included a number of recommendations for administrative, legislative and constitutional reform to hold perpetrators of violations accountable and prevent future crimes.12 As the report implicated some generals, the United States asked president Cristiani and gave him one week to purge 15 officers. The Secretary General also asked to get rid of implicated generals.24
The High Command of the FAES, the President of the Supreme Court, some high-ranking government officials and political leaders, and segments of the media rejected the conclusions and recommendations of the Commission. A week after the release of the report, the Legislative Assembly approved a general amnesty, negating the Commission’s recommendations and drawing swift criticism from the FMLN.25 UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali criticized the amnesty law, insisting that the full implementation of the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth was an integral part of the peace process.26
ONUSAL saw the report of the Commission on the Truth as one of the most importation human rights developments during its mission. It was clear that it viewed the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth as mandatory for the parties to the conflict.27
As death squad activity—mainly directed at former FMLN and affiliated combatants—flared up again after the general amnesty, the FMLN leadership complained that the Commission on the Truth failed to adequately investigate the death squad phenomenon and demanded that the Commissioners release the names of all known death squad members still operating in El Salvador. The Commissioners did not release any additional names than those in the report, which included only a few key FAES decision-makers.28 On April 2, 1993, the government agreed to remove 15 high-ranking military officers according to the TRC recommendation.29
- “The World this Week: Truth time for the generals in El Salvador,” The Independent (London), March 15, 1993.
- ibid., UNSC (S/25812).
- “U.N. chief criticized Salvador’s amnesty for war abuses,” United Press International, International Section, March 24, 1993.
- “Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador up to 30 April 1993,” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/47/968 S/26033), July 2, 1993.
- Jorge Pina, “El Salvador: FMLN leader demands and end to death squad impunity,” Inter-Press Service, October 26, 1993.
- “El Salvador: Government Agrees to Dismiss Top Military Officers,” IPS-Inter Press Service, April 2, 1993.
1994
UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali strenuously impressed upon the Government of El Salvador to finally phase out the National Police, complete the reintegration process and institute the constitutional reforms recommended by the Commission on the Truth. Despite multiple appeals, President Cristiani and the Government remained reluctant to move on these issues.30
The Legislative Assembly passed some constitutional amendments to incorporate some, but not all, of the recommendations from the Commission on the Truth.31
- “Letter Dated 28 March from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (199 S/1994/361), March 30, 1994.
- “Eleventh Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (1 March — 30 June 1994),” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/49/281 S/1994/886), July 28, 1994.
1995
The recommendations of the Commission on the Truth were not fully implemented, despite urgings from Salvadoran human rights groups for the Government to at least admit to the crimes detailed in the report.32
- Juan Jose Dalton, “El Salvador — Human Rights: Army urged to follow Argentina’s lead,” Inter-Press Service, April 27, 1995.
1996
The TRC completed its mandate and submitted its report in 1993. Some recommendations were implemented but issues related to commemorating the victims of the conflict did not happen. Similarly, an ongoing forum for truth and reconciliation was never created.33 Due to the general amnesty issued by the Government following the release of the report of the Commission on the Truth in 1993, no one was ever held accountable for the crimes identified by the Commission.34
- “Assessment of the Peace Process in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/51/917), July 1, 1997.
- “El Salvador: 10th anniversary of Peace Accords, still no justice for victims of human rights violations,” Amnesty International (AI Index AMR 29/001/2002), January 16, 2002.
1997
No further developments observed.
1998
No further developments observed.
1999
No further developments observed.
2000
No further developments observed.
2001
No further developments observed.
MEXICO AGREEMENT (27 April 1991)
IV. Commission on the Truth
Agreement has been reached to establish a Commission on the Truth, which shall be composed of three individuals appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations after consultation with the Parties. The Commission shall elect its Chairman. The Commission shall be entrusted with the task of investigating serious acts of violence that have occurred since 1980 and whose impact on society urgently requires that the public should know the truth. The Commission shall take into account:
a. The exceptional importance that may be attached to the acts to be investigated, their characteristics and impact, and the social unrest to which they gave rise; and
b. The need to create confidence in the positive changes which the peace process is promoting and to assist the transition to national reconciliation.
The characteristics, functions and powers of the Commission on the Truth and other related issues are set forth in the corresponding annex.
Annex: Political Agreements Elaborating on the Constitutional Reform
Commission on the Truth:
The Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (hereinafter referred to as “the Parties”),
Reaffirming their intention to contribute to the reconciliation of Salvadorian society;
Recognizing the need to clear up without delay those exceptionally important acts of violence whose characteristics and impact, and the social unrest to which they gave rise, urgently require that the complete truth be made known and that the resolve and means to establish the truth be strengthened;
Considering that, although the need to put an end to impunity was raised in the discussion on the item on the armed forces of the Agenda for the negotiations adopted at Caracas on 21 May 1990, the means of investigation which the Parties themselves have been prepared to set up are addressing situations whose complexity warrants independent treatment;
Agreeing on the advisability of fulfilling that task through a procedure which is both reliable and expeditious and may yield results in the short term, without prejudice to the obligations incumbent on the Salvadorian courts to solve such cases and impose the appropriate penalties on the culprits;
Have arrived at the following political agreement:
1. There is hereby established a Commission on the Truth (hereinafter referred to as “the Commission”). The Commission shall be composed of three individuals appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations after consultation with the Parties. The Commission shall elect its Chairman.
Functions:
2. The Commission shall have the task of investigating serious acts of violence that have occurred since 1980 and whose impact on society urgently demands that the public should know the truth. The Commission shall take into account:
(a) The exceptional importance that may be attached to the acts to be investigated, their characteristics and impact, and the social unrest to which they gave rise; and
(b) The need to create confidence in the positive changes which the peace process is promoting and to assist the transition to national reconciliation.
3. The mandate of the Commission shall include recommending the legal, political or administrative measures which can be inferred from the results of the investigation. Such recommendations may include measures to prevent the repetition of such acts, and initiatives to promote national reconciliation.
4. The Commission shall endeavour to adopt its decisions unanimously. However, if this is not possible, a vote by the majority of its members shall suffice.
5. The Commission shall not function in the manner of a judicial body.
6. If the Commission believes that any case brought to its attention does not meet the criteria set forth in paragraph 2 of this agreement, it may refer the case to the Attorney-General of the Republic, should it deem appropriate, for handling through the judicial channel.
Powers:
7. The Commission shall have broad powers to organize its work and its functioning. Its activities shall be conducted on a confidential basis.
8. For the purposes of the investigation, the Commission shall have the power to:
(a) Gather, by the means it deems appropriate, any information it considers relevant. The Commission shall be completely free to use whatever sources of information it deems useful and reliable. It shall receive such information within the period of time and in the manner which it determines.
(b) Interview, freely and in private, any individuals, groups or members of organizations or institutions.
(c) Visit any establishment or place freely without giving prior notice.
(d) Carry out any other measures or inquiries which it considers useful to the performance of its mandate, including requesting reports, records or documents from the Parties or any other information from State authorities and departments.
Undertaking by the Parties:
9. The Parties undertake to extend to the Commission whatever cooperation it requests of them in order to gain access to sources of information available to them.
10. The Parties undertake to carry out the Commission’s recommendations.
Report:
11. The Commission shall submit a final report, with its conclusions and recommendations, within a period of six months after its establishment.
12. The Commission shall transmit its report to the Parties and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall make it public and shall take the decisions or initiatives that he deems appropriate.
13. Once the report has been handed over, the Commission’s mandate shall be considered terminated and the Commission shall be dissolved.
14. The provisions of this agreement shall not prevent the normal investigation of any situation or case, whether or not the Commission has investigated it, nor the application of the relevant legal provisions to any act that is contrary to law.
Dispute Resolution Committee
1992
In accordance of the agreement, the National Commission for the Consolidation of the Peace (COPAZ) was formally instituted on 1 February 1992 comprising 10 members–two members each from the FMLN and the government and rest of the members from other political parties. The COPAZ was responsible to arbitrate disagreements that might arise from the implementation of the accord. Nevertheless, the COPAZ did not initially play as important a role as envisioned in the agreements.35
- “Situation of human rights in El Salvador,” United Nations General Assembly (A/47/596), November 13, 1992.
1993
COPAZ worked to seek consensus among its constituent members on various measures related to the Peace Agreement, but met many disagreements over its mandate. It discussed the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth, but moved very slowly and failed to come up with a unified proposal.12
1994
COPAZ continued to operate, and conversations began of it becoming a peace foundation once its mandate was officially fulfilled.19
1995
According to the new timetable for implementation agreed upon on 19 May 1994, COPAZ was set to terminate on 30 April 1995, but it became clear that the Peace Accords would not be fulfilled by that date, and so COPAZ sought an extension on the grounds that its mandate was to ensure the complete implementation of the Peace Accords.36
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1995/220), March 24, 1995.
1996
The mandate of COPAZ expired on 10 January 1996. The Government of El Salvador and the members of COPAZ viewed it as a success, with only a few aspects of the peace process left incomplete—notably the land transfer and rural re-settlement programs. Some of the former members of COPAZ went on to serve in non-governmental organizations, such as Fundapaz, which endeavored to fulfill a similar role as that of COPAZ.37
- “National peace commission closes as its work comes to an end,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 15, 1996.
1997
The COPAZ was a multi-party mechanism designed to facilitate the implementation of the accord and its completed its mandate of dispute resolutions. The COPAZ was dissolved once its mandate expired on 10 January 1996.
1998
No further developments occurred this year.
1999
No further developments occurred this year.
2000
No further developments occurred this year.
2001
No further developments occurred this year.
NEW YORK AGREEMENT (25 September 1991)
The Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (hereinafter called “the Parties”),
Convinced of the need to give a final impetus to the process of negotiations currently taking place with the active participation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, so that the set of political agreements required to bring a definitive end to the armed conflict in our country can be reached as speedily as possible,
Conscious of the fact that, in order to achieve the aforementioned objective, it is essential to establish a set of conditions and guarantees which will ensure the full implementation of those political agreements by both Parties,
Have reached the following political agreement:
I. Comisión Nacional para la Consolidación de la Paz
1. The Comisión Nacional para la Consolidación de la Paz (National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace) (COPAZ) shall be responsible for overseeing the implementation of all the political agreements reached by the Parties. COPAZ is a mechanism for the monitoring of and the participation of civilian society in the process of the changes resulting from the negotiations, in relation both to the armed forces, in particular, and to the other items on the agenda.
4. Powers
a. COPAZ shall not have executive powers since it is for the Parties, through their internal machinery, to carry out the peace agreements.
b. The Parties shall be obliged to consult COPAZ before adopting decisions or measures relating to relevant aspects of the peace agreements. Similarly, COPAZ may consult the Parties, at the highest level, whenever it deems it appropriate to do so. In the event of a difference of opinion as to whether a matter should be submitted to COPAZ, the question shall be decided by COPAZ.
c. At the request of three or more of its members, COPAZ shall be convened immediately and its opinion heard.
d. COPAZ shall have direct access to the President of the Republic and shall meet with him whenever COPAZ itself or the President deems it appropriate.
e. COPAZ shall have access to and may inspect any activity or site connected with the implementation of the peace agreements.
f. COPAZ shall have the power to issue conclusions and recommendations of any kind relating to the implementation of the peace agreements and to make them public. The Parties undertake to comply with those conclusions and recommendations.
g. COPAZ shall have the power to prepare the preliminary legislative drafts necessary for the development of the agreements which have been reached, both on the subject of the armed forces and on the other items on the agenda.
h. COPAZ shall have the power to oversee the implementation of the agreements reached by the Parties, both on the subject of the armed forces and on the other items on the agenda.
i. COPAZ shall be responsible for the preparation of the preliminary legislative drafts necessary to ensure that all those wounded in the war and, where appropriate, the families of combatants who have died, on both sides, are incorporated into the social security system of the State or receive adequate economic compensation, as provided for by law.
j. In the performance of its functions, COPAZ shall be authorized to address the relevant organs of the United Nations, through the Secretary-General.
k. COPAZ shall have full powers to organize its work in the manner which it deems most appropriate and to appoint any groups or subcommissions which it may deem useful in the discharge of its mission. For that purpose, it shall have its own budget.
5. Form In addition to being the product of this political agreement, COPAZ shall be confirmed by law.
6. Duration
a. Between the date of this agreement and the cessation of the armed conflict, two representatives of the Government, including one member of the armed forces, two representatives of FMLN and one representative of each of the parties or coalitions represented in the Legislative Assembly shall work under a special operational régime of a transitional nature which they themselves shall define.
This work shall include the preparation of the preliminary draft legislation to formalize the establishment of COPAZ.
b. The preliminary draft legislation to formalize the establishment of COPAZ shall be submitted to the Legislative Assembly within eight (8) days following the signing of the cessation of armed conflict. The formal establishment of COPAZ shall take place within eight (8) days following the promulgation of the said law.
c. COPAZ shall be dissolved once the implementation of the peace agreements has been completed. Its dissolution shall be decided upon by COPAZ itself, by means of an agreement receiving a favourable vote from at least two thirds of its members.
Judiciary Reform
1992
The majority of constitutional reforms required to enact judiciary reform were made, but delays on secondary legislation prevented the full implementation of the new judicial system.2
The judiciary began to receive 6% of the State budget and a career judicial service was set up, with measures to ensure stability and independence. Military courts were confined to trying crimes perpetrated by members of the FAES in active duty only.38 The judicial system as a whole remained largely unable to ensure due legal process and hold human rights violators accountable.35 Institutions of Judiciary were in place as required by the accord, but effectiveness of the system was the main concern.
- “Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of ONUSAL,” United Nations Security Council (S/24066), June 5, 1992.
1993
The Ministry of Justice promoted a national legal reform plan to improve the capacity and credibility of the judicial system, but ONUSAL was dissatisfied with the lack of progress in practice. Positive reforms were made in instituting a consistent norm of habeas corpus proceedings, but the remedy remained ineffective overall.27 Multiple legislative initiatives regarding the administration of justice mandated by the Peace Agreements, the Commission on the Truth and the Human Rights Division were not adopted. The Supreme Court of Justice handled some cases of derelict judges, but many of the proceedings did not lead to appropriate corrective action.39
- “Ninth report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/49/59 S/1994/47), January 18, 1994.
1994
The Ministry of Justice submitted a bill to the Legislative Assembly that affords prisoners basic human rights in compliance with international standards.14 ONUSAL contended that the main source of human rights abuses was impunity, which stems from a weak justice system. The Legislative Assembly had the task of appointing new members of the Supreme Court of Justice when the prior court’s term ended on 30 June 1994. The Commission on the Truth had recommended that the Legislative Assembly pass constitutional reforms that would decentralize the judiciary, but it did not do so.40
The ONUSAL Human Rights Division pushed for an overhaul of the penal system, including several high-level reforms to the judiciary, in order to bring the system into conformity with internationally recognized standards.41
- “Eleventh Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (1 March — 30 June 1994),” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/49/281 S/1994/8861994), July 28, 1994.
- “Twelfth Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) (1 July — 30 September 1994),” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/49/585 S/1994/1220), October 31, 1994.
1995
The new Supreme Court of Justice began to modernize and purify the judiciary, as recommended by the Commission on the Truth and ONUSAL. The Court stopped short of complying with the recommendations to decentralize, however. By the time of the last report by the ONUSAL Human Rights Division, the National Council of the Judiciary was not developed into the empowered independent body envisioned in the Peace Agreements and the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth. At the same time, the Judicial Training School had not enacted selection criteria that would adequately implement the Peace Agreements, and reforms had not been made to curtail arbitrary detention, pre-trial detention and punishment.42
MINUSAL later confirmed that the Legislative Assembly failed to pass a number of required reforms by the end of the year, let alone the 31 October 1995 deadline. Stalled reforms included the criminal code, penitentiary law, repeal of the 1996 police law, and guarantees of due process.43
The Supreme Court of Justice contemplated creating special courts with anonymous judges to hear cases of alleged crimes detailed in the report of the Commission on the Truth.44
- “Thirteenth Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/49/888 S/1995/281), April 18, 1995.
- “Mission of the United Nations in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/50/935), April 23, 1996.
- “El Salvador considers special courts,” United Press Internaitonal, February 14, 1995.
1996
The Supreme Court continued to make improvements in the judiciary. Issues addressed include professional ethics, delays in the judicial process, prison overpopulation, defendantsÕ legal counsel, and the vetting of lower judges.43
In response to public outcry, the Legislative Assembly passed an emergency crime law, which had the effect of undermining some judicial reforms prescribed by the Peace Agreement and the Commission on the Truth, especially due process.43 In December 1996, the Legislative Assembly approved the Code of Criminal Procedure aimed to improve the judicary.33
1997
Despite the important structural reforms to the judiciary, the system was inefficient and lacked adequate capacity to continuously vet judges and officials.33
1998
Judiciary reform took place when constitutional revisions were made in 1992. Nevertheless, there were issues related to the judicial reforms recommended by the Commission on the Truth, which was not fully implemented (Source: Amnesty International.45
- “El Salvador: 10th anniversary of Peace Accords, still no justice for victims of human rights violations,” AI Index AMR (29/001/2002), January 16, 2002.
1999
No further developments observed.
2000
No further developments observed.
2001
No further developments observed.
MEXICO AGREEMENT (27 April 1991)
II. Judicial system and human rights
1. Agreements on constitutional reforms designed to improve significant aspects of the judicial system and establish mechanisms for safeguarding human rights, such as:
a. Reorganization of the Supreme Court of Justice and a new procedure for the election of Supreme Court judges. Henceforth, a two-thirds majority of deputies elected to the Legislative Assembly shall be required to elect judges to the Supreme Court of Justice.
b. An annual allocation from the State budget to the judiciary amounting to no less than 6 per cent of current income.
c. Creation of the post of a National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights, whose primary function shall be to promote and ensure respect for human rights.
d. Election of the Attorney-General of the Republic, the Chief State Counsel and the National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights by a two-thirds majority of deputies elected to the Legislative Assembly.
2. Other issues raised in the negotiations were referred to secondary legislation and to other political agreements. Although the set of political agreements on the judicial system envisaged by the Parties in the Caracas Agenda has still to be negotiated, the following agreements have been reached during the current round:
a. National Council of the Judiciary
Agreement has been reached to restructure the National Council of the Judiciary so that its composition guarantees its independence from the organs of State and from political parties and its membership includes not only judges but also sectors of society not directly connected with the administration of justice.
b. Judicial Training School
The National Council of the Judiciary shall be responsible for organizing and operating the Judicial Training School, whose purpose shall be to ensure a steady improvement in the professional training of judges and other judicial officials.
c. Career judicial service
The secondary legislation shall contain provisions to ensure that admission to the career judicial service is based on mechanisms guaranteeing objective selection, equal opportunities for all candidates and the selection of the best-qualified candidates. Such mechanisms shall include competitive examinations and attendance at the Judicial Training School.
Political agreements elaborating on the constitutional reform
With a view to elaborating on some of the aspects which the agreed constitutional reform refers to secondary legislation, the Parties have agreed to the following:
A. Judicial system
a. Supreme Court of Justice
For the purposes of the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court of Justice as envisaged in the constitutional reform, the National Council of the Judiciary shall keep a list of 60 candidates representative of the main schools of legal thought, which shall be renewed after each election of judges. Thirty of the candidates shall be nominated by the lawyers associations of the different regions of the country.
b. National Council of the Judiciary
Agreement has been reached to restructure the National Council of the Judiciary as follows:
1. The composition of the National Council of the Judiciary shall be such as to guarantee its independence from the organs of State and from political parties, and to ensure as far as possible that its membership includes not only judges but also representatives of sectors of society not directly connected with the administration of justice. The act regulating the National Council of the Judiciary shall be amended to bring it into line with the provisions of this Agreement within 90 days following ratification of the constitutional reform by the Legislative Assembly whose term begins on 1 May 1991. A new National Council of the Judiciary shall be elected within 90 days following approval of that legislative reform.
2. The National Council of the Judiciary shall be responsible for organizing and operating the Judicial Training School, whose purpose shall be to ensure a steady improvement in the professional training of judges and other judicial officials and of members of the Office of the Attorney-General of the Republic; to investigate the country’s judicial problems and promote solutions thereto; and to foster greater bonds of solidarity among members of the judiciary and a coherent overall vision of the function of the judiciary in a democratic State.
c. Career judicial service
The secondary legislation on the career judicial service shall satisfy the following requirements:
1. The secondary legislation shall contain provisions to ensure that admission to the career judicial service is based on mechanisms guaranteeing objective selection, equal opportunities for all candidates and the selection of the best-qualified candidates. Such mechanisms shall include competitive examinations and attendance at the Judicial Training School.
2. Candidates shall be admitted to the career judicial service only if they fulfil the admission requirements established by law.
CHAPULTEPEC AGREEMENT (16 January 1992)
Chapter III: Judicial System
1. National Council of the Judiciary
A. The Parties reaffirm that, as already agreed in the Mexico Agreements, the composition of the National Council of the Judiciary shall be such as to guarantee its independence from the organs of the State and from political parties and its membership shall, as far as possible, include not only judges but also sectors of society not directly connected with the administration of justice. In accordance with the New York Agreement, they refer the matter to COPAZ to prepare the corresponding preliminary legislative draft.
B. Judicial Training School
a. Pursuant to the Mexico Agreements, the preliminary draft referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include provisions regulating the Judicial Training School, which shall function under the responsibility of the National Council of the Judiciary and whose purpose shall be to ensure a steady improvement in the professional training of judges and other judicial officials and of members of the Office of the Attorney-General of the Republic; to investigate the country’s judicial problems and promote solutions thereto; and to foster greater bonds of solidarity among members of the judiciary and a coherent overall vision of the function of the judiciary in a democratic State.
b. The rules for the administration and organization of the Judicial Training School shall be such as to ensure its academic independence and its openness to the various schools of legal thought.
2. Office of the National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights
A. The National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights shall be appointed within 90 days following the entry into force of the constitutional reform resulting from the Mexico Agreements.
B. COPAZ shall be entrusted with preparing the preliminary bill organizing the Office of the National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights.
C. The preliminary bill shall establish appropriate means for putting into effect the firm commitment assumed by the Parties in the course of the negotiations to identify and eradicate any groups which engage in a systematic practice of human rights violations, in particular, arbitrary arrests, abductions and summary executions, as well as other attempts on the liberty, integrity and security of persons. This includes the commitment to identify and, where appropriate, abolish and dismantle any clandestine jail or place of detention. In any event, the Parties agree to give top priority to the investigation of such cases, under ONUSAL verification.
Military Reform
1992
The accord does not require integration of FMLN into El Salvador’s military. The accord intends to reform the military and make it respectful to human rights and under the control of the civilian government and downsize to below 22,000 personnel. In this regard, the Legislative Assembly met the deadlines for passing constitutional reforms regarding military reform, but the Treasury Police and National Guard failed to formally disband and integrate within the Armed Forces of El Salvador (FAES) on time.1 The Parties subsequently reached a negotiated agreement to present legislation to definitively abolish the National Guard and Treasury Police and establish a “Special Brigade for Military Security” (with no further transfers from military bodies to the National Civil Police) by 30 June 1992.10 The Academic Council of the Military College was established more than two months late, with members finally appointed on 31 July 1992.2
The National Intelligence Department was disbanded ahead of schedule, but the new State Intelligence Agency was founded six weeks late and the director was appointed three months late. The FMLN complained that the FAES were still conducting intelligence operations inside El Salvador, but ONUSAL was not able to verify these claims.46
The FAES ceased making arrests after the commencement of the cessation of armed conflict on 1 February 1992.
In conjunction with the negotiations that brought a formal end to the armed conflict on 15 December 1992, the President of the Republic agreed to implement the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission on purification. President Cristiani promptly responded to the decision of the Commission, but failed to heed all of the Commission’s recommendations.47
There were around 60,000 military personnel in El Salvador in 1991, which decreased to the strength of 49,000 personnel.48 The accord called for the reduction in the armed force to 22,000 personnel.
- ibid. United Nations Security Council (S/24833).
- “Letter Dated 7 January 1993 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/25078), January 9, 1993.
- Bennett, D. Scott, and Allan Stam, “EUGene: A Conceptual Manual.” International Interactions (2000), 26:179-204.
1993
Correspondence between President Cristiani and UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali continued regarding the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Commission on purification. The concerns centered around 15 military officers for whom President Cristiani did not follow the recommendations of the Commission at first. On 30 June 1993, the FAES High Command issued an order that removed the officers, bringing the Government into compliance with the Ad Hoc Commission’s recommendations.49
The 22 December 1992 agreement stipulated that the Government of El Salvador should inform the public of the new FAES doctrine, but it was slow to do so.50
As a step towards reform, the military incorporated lessons on the rule of law, international humanitarian law, and respect for human rights into its trainings.27
ONUSAL verified that the National Intelligence Department was formally dismantled in November 1993, and the new State Intelligence Agency was created. It was part of the military reform. It was not clear whether the FAES were still engaged in intelligence activities outside those permitted by the Peace Agreements51
The estimated strength of El Salvadorian armed force remained 49,000 personnel in 1993.52
- (S/25078), January 9,1993; “Letter Dated 7 July 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/26052), July 8, 1993.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/25812), May 21, 1993; “Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/26790), November 23, 1993.
- (S/26790), November 23, 1993.
- Scott and Stam, “EUGene: A Conceptual Manual,” 26:179-204.
1994
The ONUSAL Human Rights Division worked with the FAES to develop military training modules in democracy, rule of law, human rights, and the new doctrine of national defense.14 Progress was made in these educational efforts, but evidence of criminal activity by FAES personnel continued to surface.31
Compensation of demobilized members of the FAES, which began on 15 December 1993, proceeded quickly in early 1994, and it was agreed on 28 January 1994 that the indemnities should be fully distributed by 30 June 1994.53
The estimated strength of El Salvadorian armed force reduced to 22,000 personnel in 1994.52
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/561), May 11, 1994.
1995
ONUSAL reported multiple instances of the FAES conducting public security tasks, despite the transfer of policing responsibilities to the National Civil Police. The Constitution grants the President of the Republic the power to deploy the FAES for public safety in dire cases, and the President indeed authorized the FAES to aid the National Civil Police with law enforcement due to high crime rates.42
The estimated strength of El Salvadorian armed force reduced to 22,000 personnel in 1994.52
1996
The FAES stayed out of matters of public security and maintained appropriate numbers for conditions of peace.54 The military was sensitized with human rights education and remained under control of civilian government. As of 2002, the strength of the El Salvadorian military was estimated around 17,000 personnel.52 The military was drastically downsized from 60,000 in 1991 to 17,000 in 2002.
- “El Salvador: 10th anniversary of Peace Accords, still no justice for victims of human rights violations,” January 16, 2002.
1997
No further developments observed.
1998
No further developments observed.
1999
No further developments observed.
2000
No further developments observed.
2001
No further developments observed.
MEXICO AGREEMENT (27 April 1991)
Political agreements elaborating on the constitutional reform
C. Armed forces
The political agreements on the armed forces are being referred for consideration under the corresponding item of the Caracas Agenda. Nevertheless, the Parties agree that those agreements shall include the following points:
1. The professional training of members of the defence and public security forces shall emphasize the pre-eminence of human dignity and democratic values, respect for human rights and the subordination of those forces to the constitutional authorities.
2. The secondary legislation on military jurisdiction shall be amended, where necessary, to ensure that under no circumstances shall any offences whose victims are civilians or include civilians be deemed to be purely military offences or misdemeanours and, likewise, that civilians shall not be subject to military jurisdiction under any circumstances, except in the case of military offences committed in connection with an international armed conflict involving El Salvador.
CHAPULTEPEC AGREEMENT (16 January 1992)
Chapter I: Armed Forces
1. Doctrinal principles of the armed forces
The doctrine for the armed forces, on the basis of the constitutional reform agreed to in April 1991,as defined by law, shall conform to the principles set forth below, and henceforth their institutional regime and educational system shall be based exclusively on those principles and their operations shall be bound by strict observance of them:
A. The mission of the armed forces is to defend the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of its territory, according to the terms of the regime defined for them by the Constitution and the laws. The performance of this mission is inseparable from democratic values and strict respect for all parts of the Constitution.
B. As established in the Constitution, the armed forces are a permanent institution in the service of the nation. They shall be obedient, professional, apolitical and non-deliberative. Their institutional regime and operations shall also be consistent with the principles deriving from the rule of law, the primacy of the dignity of the human person and respect for human rights; respect for and defence of the sovereignty of the Salvadorian people; the concept of the armed forces as an institution free from all considerations of politics, ideology or social position or any other discrimination; and the subordination of the armed forces to the constitutional authorities.
C. The armed forces owe respect to the political order determined by the sovereign will of the people and all political or social changes generated by that will, in accordance with democratic procedures consistent with the Constitution. Their institutional regime and operations shall be defined in terms ensuring a harmonious relationship at all times with civilian society and the normal activities of their members as part of that society.
D. As a State institution, the armed forces play an instrumental, non-decision-making role in the political field. Consequently, only the President of the Republic and the basic organs of government may use the armed forces to implement the provisions they have adopted, within their respective constitutional areas of competence, to enforce the Constitution. Similarly, those authorities have exclusive competence to verify whether the political or social changes referred to in the preceding paragraph are consistent with the Constitution.
E. The doctrine of the armed forces is based on a distinction between the concepts of security and defence. National defence, the responsibility of the armed forces, is intended to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity against outside military threat. Security, even when it includes this notion, is a broader concept based on unrestricted respect for the individual and social rights of the person. It includes, in addition to national defence, economic, political and social aspects which go beyond the constitutional sphere of competence of the armed forces and are the responsibility of other sectors of society and of the State.
F. The maintenance of internal peace, tranquillity, order and public security lies outside the normal functions of the armed forces as an institution responsible for national defence. The armed forces play a role in this sphere only in very exceptional circumstances, where the normal means have been exhausted, on the terms established in the constitutional reform approved in April 1991.
2. Educational system of the armed forces
Reiterating fully their previous agreements, whereby the professional training of members of the armed forces shall emphasize the pre-eminence of human dignity and democratic values, respect for human rights and the subordination of such forces to the constitutional authorities, the Parties have reached the following agreements:
A. The legal framework of the armed forces educational and training system shall be defined on the basis of the provisions of articles 212 and 213 of the constitutional reform agreed to in April 1991.
B. The doctrinal framework of the armed forces educational system shall be defined by the doctrinal principles set forth in this chapter. Those principles shall be the doctrinal foundation of all armed forces educational and training programmes at all levels.
C. Curricula and study programmes for the training and education of the armed forces shall include, in addition to military and technical subjects, scientific and humanistic studies in order to provide an all-round education which gives students the necessary skills to participate actively in the institutional life of the country and promotes at all times an harmonious relationship with civilian society, as well as their normal activities as members of that society.
D. In order to attain fully the goals outlined in the preceding paragraph, members of the armed forces shall be encouraged to take professional and postgraduate courses at the country’s universities.
E. The Military College shall be run on a collegiate basis in teaching matters. Its Director shall be the President of an Academic Council which shall include members of the military and civilians from the academic world. Members of the Academic Council shall be appointed by the President of the Republic.
F. COPAZ shall decide on the number of members of the Academic Council, which shall comprise an equal number of civilians and military personnel.
G. Civilian members of the Academic Council shall be appointed by the President of the Republic, on the basis of criteria of political pluralism, from lists of three candidates proposed by COPAZ.
H. The teaching staff shall be appointed by the Academic Council, which shall ensure that no political tendency predominates among that staff.
I. The Director of the Military College shall be appointed by the President of the Republic.
J. The admissions system shall be determined by the Academic Council, which shall ensure that it is not discriminatory.
K. COPAZ shall oversee, in particular, the implementation of paragraphs (G), (H) and (J), under the terms laid down in the New York Agreement of 25 September 1991.
3. Purification
The Parties agree to a process of purification of the armed forces, within the framework of the peace process and with a view to the supreme objective of national reconciliation, based on evaluation of all members of the armed forces by an ad hoc Commission.
A. The evaluation shall take into account the past performance of each officer, including, in particular: (1) his record of observance of the legal order, with particular emphasis on respect for human rights, both in his personal conduct and in the rigour with which he has ordered the redress and punishment of unlawful acts, excesses or human rights violations committed under his command, especially if there have been serious or systematic omissions in the latter respect; (2) his professional competence; and (3) his capacity to function in the new situation of peace, within the context of a democratic society, and to promote the democratization of the country, guarantee unrestricted respect for human rights and reunify Salvadorian society, which is the common purpose agreed upon by the Parties in the Geneva Agreement. The existence of serious deficiencies in any one of the above-mentioned areas could be sufficient grounds for the ad hoc Commission to take the decisions required under paragraph (G) of this section.
B. The evaluation shall be carried out by a rigorously impartial ad hoc Commission composed of three Salvadorians of recognized independence of judgement and unimpeachable democratic credentials. It shall also include two officers of the armed forces with impeccable professional records, who shall have access only to the deliberations of the Commission; they shall not have access to the investigation phase to be carried out by the ad hoc Commission, nor be involved in the final phase of the investigation, but they may have access to its conclusions.
The selection of the three civilian members of the ad hoc Commission is the result of a process of consultations carried out by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the outcome of which has already been communicated to both Parties. The President of the Republic shall issue, within five days from the signing of this Agreement, his endorsement giving legal form and force to the Commission. If necessary, the same procedure shall be used to replace any member of the Commission who is permanently unable to serve. The two officers of the armed forces who are to participate in the ad hoc Commission on the conditions indicated above shall be appointed by the President of the Republic.
C. The Commission on the Truth established by the Mexico Agreements of 26 April 1991 (hereinafter referred to as “the Commission on the Truth”) may appoint an observer to the ad hoc Commission.
D. The ad hoc Commission shall be provided with such civilian support staff as it considers necessary.
E. The Ministry of Defence and Public Security, 1 as well as any public entity, shall supply the ad hoc Commission with any information it requests, including information on the service record of each officer. In any case, the ad hoc Commission may avail itself of information from any source which it considers reliable.
F. The ad hoc Commission shall adopt and, where necessary, request the adoption of any measure which, in its view, is necessary for its own safety and to ensure the safety and physical and moral integrity of persons who, in any form or manner, cooperate with it in the fulfilment of its mission.
G. The ad hoc Commission shall adopt its conclusions, after hearing the parties concerned, on the basis of the provisions of paragraph (A) of this section. Its conclusions may include a change of duty station and, where necessary, the discharge of the staff evaluated.
H. The ad hoc Commission shall endeavour to adopt its decisions unanimously, but if this is not possible a vote by the majority of its members shall suffice.
I. The evaluation shall be extended to non-commissioned officers when, in the judgement of the ad hoc Commission, there is justification for doing so.
J. The ad hoc Commission shall conclude its evaluation within a maximum period of three months from the date of its establishment. The corresponding administrative decisions shall be taken within 30 days from the date on which the conclusions are communicated to the Government by the ad hoc Commission and shall be implemented within 60 days from that date.
K. The results of the evaluation shall not prevent the implementation of such recommendations as the Commission on the Truth may make at the appropriate time.
4. Reduction
The new situation of peace shall include the reduction of the armed forces to a size appropriate to their doctrine and to the functions assigned to them by the Constitution within the framework of the constitutional reform resulting from the Mexico Agreements. Accordingly, pursuant to the New York Agreement, the Government has submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a plan for the reduction of the armed forces, which the Secretary-General has made known to FMLN. The implementation of the plan must have the practical consequence of making reductions in the various branches of the armed forces.
A. Organization
The organization of the armed forces shall be adapted to their institutional mission in peacetime, in keeping with the functions assigned to them by the Constitution. This means:
a. The type of units appropriate for performing the various tasks corresponding to that mission;
b. The appropriate structure, organization and equipment for such units by branch, service, category (rank) and speciality; and
c. Staffing requirements, by unit, mission and rank.
B. Units
a. Reduction of units shall be based on the reorganization of the armed forces. The number and type of units shall be in keeping with the new organization;
b. In any case, the reduction covers units established as a consequence of the conflict.
C. Personnel
The reorganization and the reduction of units involve cutting back personnel in the various categories, branches and services or specialities of the armed forces. The number of officers shall be reduced in accordance with the reduction plan and shall be commensurate with the normal needs of an army.
D. Matériel and equipment
Matériel and equipment shall be in keeping with the new organization, the doctrine and constitutional mission of the armed forces.
E. Facilities
Reduction involves the conversion, return or disposal of facilities no longer used by the armed forces.
F. Administrative and service structures
All administrative and service structures shall be adapted to the new situation of peace and to the doctrine and the new constitutional mission of the armed forces.
G. Military spending
5. End to impunity
The Parties recognize the need to clarify and put an end to any indication of impunity on the part of officers of the armed forces, particularly in cases where respect for human rights is jeopardized. To that end, the Parties refer this issue to the Commission on the Truth for consideration and resolution. All of this shall be without prejudice to the principle, which the Parties also recognize, that acts of this nature, regardless of the sector to which their perpetrators belong, must be the object of exemplary action by the law courts so that the punishment prescribed by law is meted out to those found responsible.
6. Public security forces
A. Under the constitutional reform resulting from the Mexico Agreements, the safeguarding of peace, tranquillity, order and public security in both urban and rural areas shall be the responsibility of the National Civil Police, which shall be under the control of civilian authorities. The National Civil Police and the armed forces shall be independent and shall be placed under the authority of different ministries.
B. According to the terms of chapter II of this Agreement, the National Civil Police shall be a new force, with a new organization, new officers, new education and training mechanisms and a new doctrine.
C. The National Guard and the Treasury Police shall be abolished as public security forces and their members shall be incorporated into the army.
7. Intelligence services
A. The National Intelligence Department shall be abolished and State intelligence services shall be entrusted to a new entity to be called the State Intelligence Agency, which shall be subordinated to civilian authority and come under the direct authority of the President of the Republic. During the transitional period, the Director of the State Intelligence Agency shall be a civilian appointed by the President of the Republic on the basis of his ability to attract broad acceptance. He may be dismissed by resolution of the Legislative Assembly on grounds of serious human rights violations.
B. The legal regime, staff training, organizational lines, operational guidelines and, in general, the doctrine of the State Intelligence Agency shall accord with democratic principles; the concept of State intelligence as a State function for the common good, free from all considerations of politics, ideology or social position or any other discrimination; and strict respect for human rights.
C. The activities of the State Intelligence Agency shall be restricted to those required for compiling and analysing information in the general interest, by the means and within the limits authorized by the legal order and, in particular, on the basis of strict respect for human rights.
D. The activities of the State Intelligence Agency shall be supervised by the Legislative Assembly, using the oversight mechanisms established by the Constitution.
E. Alternative employment and compensation shall be offered to staff currently attached to the National Intelligence Department who are not incorporated into the new State Intelligence Agency. International support shall be sought for that purpose.
F. The incorporation into the State Intelligence Agency of staff of the National Intelligence Department who so request shall be permitted only after rigorous evaluation of their past performance, abilities and capacity to adapt to the new doctrine. Such evaluation shall be made by the Director of the Agency, under the authority of the President of the Republic, with the support of international advisory services and United Nations verification.
G. The State Intelligence Agency shall be organized by its Director, under the authority of the President of the Republic.
8. Rapid deployment infantry battalions
The Parties recognize that the rapid deployment infantry battalions were created at a specific moment in the conflict and that their existence must therefore be reviewed as circumstances dictate. Consequently, they also recognize that the rapid deployment infantry battalions will not be needed in the new situation of peace, with the result that in these circumstances it will be possible to disband them and to redeploy or discharge personnel currently assigned to them.
9. Subordination to civilian authority
The President of the Republic, in exercise of the power of discretion conferred on him by the Constitution, may appoint civilians to head the Ministry of Defence. In any case, appointees must be persons fully committed to observing the peace agreements.
10. Paramilitary bodies
A. The Parties recognize the principle that any paramilitary force or group must be proscribed in a State governed by the rule of law.
B. Civil defence. Civil defence units shall be disbanded. This process shall be gradual and shall be subject to the implementation timetable for the peace agreements.
C. System of armed forces reserves. A new system of armed forces reserves shall replace the present system of territorial service, according to the following terms:
a. The system shall be responsible for the organization and functioning of the following aspects: (1) up-to-date registration of citizens in reserve status and citizens fit for military service; (2) updating of the military skills of reserves; (3) when necessary, calling reserves up for active duty to perform the mission entrusted to the armed forces by the Constitution.
b. The new system shall be under the authority of the Ministry of Defence.
c. Armed forces reserves may undertake missions only if assigned to active duty in the armed forces and in conformity with the Constitution, and shall not perform any function related to public security or monitoring of the population or the territory.
d. The laws, regulations and orders in force on this subject shall be made compatible with the terms of this Agreement.
D. Regulation of private security services. The Parties recognize the need to regulate the activities of all those entities, groups or persons who provide security or protection to private individuals, corporations or State institutions, in order to guarantee the transparency of their activities and also their strict subordination to the law and to respect for human rights. To that end:
a. A special law shall regulate the activities of entities, groups or persons who provide security or protection to private individuals, corporations or State institutions. That law shall establish the requirements which must be met in order to offer and provide such services; a system for the public registration of the staff, weapons and offices, if any, of such groups, entities or persons; appropriate oversight mechanisms, including their supervision by the National Civil Police; and, in general, the necessary limitations and prohibitions to ensure that such security services operate exclusively within the framework of the law.
b. The law shall also establish peremptory deadlines for fulfilling the above requirements, where relevant. Once those deadlines have expired, entities which have not fulfilled the above requirements shall be considered illegal and their members and organizers shall be subject to application of the corresponding legal penalties.
c. To that end, the Parties express their agreement with the outline of the preliminary legislative draft included as an annex to this Agreement, which they refer to COPAZ, together with the above considerations, for it to prepare the corresponding preliminary draft.
11. Suspension of forcible recruitment
A. Any form of forcible recruitment shall be suspended when the cessation of the armed conflict comes into effect, pending the entry into force of the law referred to in the next paragraph.
B. A new law governing military service and reserve service shall be promulgated. That law shall establish as fundamental principles of military service that it shall be universal and compulsory and shall be imposed fairly and without discrimination.
C. Pursuant to the above, the law shall establish that all Salvadorians must present themselves at the proper time at the corresponding registration centres. Recruitment shall be effected exclusively by calling up individuals through the drawing of lots, and by registering volunteers. Military service may be performed over one continuous period or over several periods of time.
D. The above law shall envisage administrative penalties for failure to fulfil the obligations provided for therein and shall determine the grounds for temporary or permanent exemption from military service, equivalences between types of military service and other general provisions.
E. The law shall also regulate the armed forces reserves in accordance with paragraph (C) of section 10 of this chapter.
12. Preventive and promotional measures
Within the context of the objectives of this Agreement, the Parties recognize the need to adopt a number of measures designed to promote enhanced respect for the rules which must govern the armed forces and to prevent infringements of those rules. These measures include the following:
A. Supervision of armed forces operations by the Legislative Assembly.
B. Effective functioning of the Armed Forces General Inspectorate. The Inspector General shall be a member of the armed forces with an impeccable professional record, appointed by the President of the Republic.
C. Creation of an armed forces court of honour to try acts which, although not necessarily punishable, are contrary to military honour. This shall be without prejudice to the requirement that soldiers who have broken the law must be brought before the courts.
D. Amendment of the law penalizing unlawful enrichment to expressly include within its jurisdiction senior commanders of military units and those performing administrative functions at the same levels.
E. Cancellation of licences for private individuals to bear weapons that are for the exclusive use of the armed forces, and immediate recall of such weapons.
F. Dissemination of the doctrine of the armed forces so that the whole of society is familiar with it.
G. Adaptation of the legislation on the armed forces to the constitutional reform approved in April 1991, to the New York Agreement and to this Agreement.
13. Redeployment and discharge
A. Troops belonging to units that are to be abolished or disbanded shall be redeployed within the armed forces where such redeployment is compatible with the armed forces troop strength required by the objectives of this Agreement, and with the conclusions and recommendations of the ad hoc Commission provided for in section 3 of this chapter.
B. All troops discharged as a result of these agreements shall be given compensation equivalent to one year’s pay at their wage level and the Government shall promote projects permitting the integration of such individuals into civilian life.
Police Reform
1992
The Attorney-General of the Republic gained new powers to investigate crimes.38
The Academic Council of the Military College was established more than two months late, with members finally appointed on 31 July 1992.2
The National Intelligence Department was disbanded ahead of schedule, but the new State Intelligence Agency was founded six weeks late and the director was appointed three months late. The FMLN complained that the FAES were still conducting intelligence operations inside El Salvador, but ONUSAL was not able to verify these claims.55
The FAES ceased making arrests after the commencement of the cessation of armed conflict on 1 February 1992.
In conjunction with the negotiations that brought a formal end to the armed conflict on 15 December 1992, the President of the Republic agreed to implement the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission on purification. President Cristiani promptly responded to the decision of the Commission, but failed to heed all of the Commission’s recommendations.47 The recommendation called for the dissolution of the police force and to establish a new Civilian Police Force. According to the accord, FMLN would recommend 20% personnel to the new police force.
ONUSAL had a Police Division to monitor activities of National Police during the transitional phase as well as maintain public by helping Auxiliary Transitory Police (PAT) maintain civilian order until the new National Civil Police was established.56 This helped the ONUSAL Police division to train the PNC in field.57 The accord established two interrelated institutions. The new National Civil Police and the new civilian police academy (Academia Nacional de Seguridad Publica – ANSP). After the 16 January 1992 Chapultepec (Mexico) Agreement between FMLN and the government, the technical mission was established in March 1992 to work on drafting of the National Academy of Public Security (ANSP). In April 1992, its director was appointed and the institution started its work in May 1992.58
The ANSP started to enroll PNC agents in August 1992.59
- ibid.(S/24833).
- “El Salvador- ONUSAL Background,” accessed January 4, 2012, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onusalbackgr2.html.
- William Stanley, “Building new police forces in El Salvador and Guatemala: Learning and counter-learning,” International Peacekeeping, (1999), 6(4):113 -134.
- “Academia Nacional De seguridad Publica El Salvador, C.A.,” accessed January 4, 2012, http://www.ansp.gob.sv/index.php.
- Stanley, “Learning and counter-learning,” pp. 116.
1993
The 22 December 1992 agreement stipulated that the Government of El Salvador should inform the public of the new FAES doctrine, but it was slow to do so.50
ONUSAL verified that the National Intelligence Department was formally dismantled in November 1993, and the new State Intelligence Agency was created. It was not clear whether the FAES were still engaged in intelligence activities outside those permitted by the Peace Agreements60
In February 1993, 600 PNC agents graduated from ANSP. Subsequent classes graduated approximately 300 agents on a monthly basis. Within two years, the academy was expected to train 5,700 basic police agents and 240 officers.61 According to a report, the new National Civilian Police (PNC) began replacing the old National Police (PN) on a department-by-department schedule in March 1993. And by the end of 1993, the PNC was deployed in 7 of El Salvador’s 14 departments.62
- ibid. (S/26790).
- Stanley, “Learning and counter-learning,” 6(4):113 -134.
- “El Salvador Human Rights Practice, 1993,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, February 1994.
1994
UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali strenuously impressed upon the Government of El Salvador to finally phase out the National Police and institute the constitutional reforms recommended by the Commission on the Truth. Despite multiple appeals, President Cristiani and the Government remained reluctant to move on these issues.63 The matter was scandalized when a television crew filmed a deadly armed robbery on 22 June 1994 and the Chief of the Investigative Department of the National Police was later arrested for his involvement.19
A Select Review Committee was created to investigate the issue of personnel with military backgrounds being transferred to the National Civil Police. The Government continued to delay the demobilization and reintegration of National Police personnel.53 However, some significant achievements were made in terms of deploying the new National Civil Police force. By the end of October 1994, the National Civil Police was fully deployed in all but 2 of the 14 departments in El Salvador.21 The National Police was redeployed on 31 December 1994.64
- “Letter Dated 28 March from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/361), March 30, 1994.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1995/220) March 24, 1995; “El Salvador Human Rights Practice, 1994,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, March 1995.
1995
“The Government completed demobilization of the military-dominated National Police in December 1994, and deployed nearly half of the planned 20,000 officers of the new National Civilian Police (PNC) in its place.”65
The FAES conducting public security tasks, despite the transfer of policing responsibilities to the National Civil Police. The Constitution grants the President of the Republic the power to deploy the FAES for public safety in dire cases, and the President indeed authorized the FAES to aid the National Civil Police with law enforcement due to high crime rates.42
- “El Salvador Human Rights Practice,” U.S. State Department, accessed January 4, 2012, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1995_hrp_report/95hrp_report_ara….
1996
Even after the consolidation of the National Civil Police, the military continued to provide protection for PNC patrols in rural areas, a measure begun in 1995 in response to action by well-armed criminal bands. Then PNC received human rights education but there were reports of human rights abuses by PNC cadres.66
- “El Salvador Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996,” U.S. State Department, accessed January 4, 2012, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/elsalvad.html.
1997
The old police force was dissolved and the new National Civil Police (PNC) was fully established that was more efficient compared to the National Police. The PNC was more efficient than the old PN, and it was deployed throughout El Salvador in 1995, thereby completing the police reform provisions of the accord.
1998
No further developments observed.
1999
No further developments observed.
2000
No further developments observed.
2001
No further developments observed.
2002
No further developments observed.
CHAPULTEPEC AGREEMENT (16 January 1992)
Chapter II: National Civil Police
1. Establishment of the National Civil Police
The National Civil Police shall be established in accordance with the constitutional reform resulting from the Mexico Agreements. The National Civil Police shall be a new force with a new organization, new officers, new education and training mechanisms and a new doctrine.
A. The National Civil Police shall be the only armed police body with national jurisdiction. Its mission shall be to protect and safeguard the free exercise of the rights and freedoms of individuals, to prevent and combat all types of crimes, and to maintain internal peace, tranquility [sic], order and public security in both urban and rural areas.
B. In accordance with the provisions of the New York Agreement, the organization of the National Civil Police and the general outlines of its staff profile shall be determined, on the terms set forth in this Agreement, under close international cooperation and supervision, coordinated by the United Nations.
2. Doctrine
A. The legal regime, staff training, organizational lines, operational guidelines and, in general, the institutional definition end operation of the National Civil Police shall accord with democratic principles; the concept of public security as a service provided by the State to its citizens, free from all considerations of politics, ideology or social position or any other discrimination; respect for human rights; the effort to prevent crime; and the subordination of the force to the constitutional authorities. Citizens’ exercise of their political tights may not be impaired by police activities.
B. The National Civil Police shall be a professional body, independent of the armed forces and free from all partisan activity. Without prejudice to the tight of its members to make, as citizens, their own political choicest they shall not be able to use their status for partisan purposes.
C. Members of the National Civil Police shall at all times observe the duties imposed on them by law , serving the community and protecting all persons from illegal acts, in keeping with the high degree of responsibility required by their profession.
D. In the performance of their tasks, members of the National Civil Police shall respect and protect human dignity and shall preserve and defend the human rights of all persons.
E. Members of the National Civil Police may use force only when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the fulfillment of their tasks.
F. Questions of a confidential nature of which members of the National Civil Police have knowledge shall be kept secret, unless compliance with duty or the needs of justice strictly demand otherwise.
G. No member of the National Civil Police may inflict, instigate or tolerate any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, nor invoke the orders of a superior or special circumstances, such as a state of war or threat of war, threats to national security, internal political instability or any other public emergency to justify torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
H. All orders from above shall be in keeping with the laws of the Republic. Obeying the orders of a superior is no justification for committing acts which are clearly punishable.
I. Members of the National Civil Police shall ensure full protection of the health of persons in their custody and, in particular, shall take immediate steps to provide medical care when necessary.
J. Members of the National Civil Police shall not commit any act of corruption. They shall also strongly oppose such acts and shall combat them.
K. Members of the National Civil Police who have reason to believe that a breach of these rules of conduct has occurred or is about to occur shall so inform their superiors and, if necessary, any authority or appropriate agency having powers of control or correction.
L. In the performance of their functions, members of the National Civil Police shall, as far as possible, utilize non-violent means before resorting to the use of force an8 firearms. They may use force and firearms only when other means prove ineffective or do not in any way guarantee the achievement of the legitimate anticipated result.
M. Members of the National Civil Police shall not use firearms against people except in self-defence or in defence of other people, or in case of imminent danger of death or serious injury or with the intention of preventing the commission of a particularly serious crime involving a serious threat to life, or for the purpose of arresting a person who represents such a threat and resists their authority, and only where less extreme means prove insufficient to achieve such objectives. In any case, lethal weapons may be used intentionally only when strictly unavoidable for the protection of a life.
N. As part of the performance of their duty to safeguard the exercise of the rights of individuals, members of the National Civil Police shall protect the exercise of the right of assembly and demonstration. When, for legal reasons, they are compelled to break up a demonstration or a meeting, they shall use the least dangerous means and only to the minimum extent necessary. Members of the National Civil Police shall refrain from using firearms in such cases, save where the meetings are violent and other means have been exhausted, and only under the circumstances provided for in the preceding paragraph.
3. Functional and Territorial Structure
The functional and territorial structure to be adopted by the National Civil Police is defined in the following general framework. This structure shall be reflected in the organizational chart and in the law on the organization of the National Civil Police.
A. General legal framework
a. National Civil Police authorities
(1) The National Civil Police shall be under the control of civilian authorities (art. 168, para. 17, of the Constitution). These shall be: the President of the Republic, the Minister, the Vice-Minister, the Director-General of the Police, the Deputy Directors-General, the Inspector General, the division of chiefs of each service and the chiefs of departmental delegations.
(2) the Director-General of the National Civil Police shall be appointed by the President of the Republic. He may be dismissed by the resolution of the Legislative Assembly for serious violations of human rights. The leadership of the National Civil Police shall be civilian.
(3) without prejudice to the provisions of this chapter concerning the transitional regime, the National Civil Police shall be placed under the authority of a new Ministry of the Interior and Public Security. To that end, the existing Ministry of the interior shall be restructured. A Vice-Ministry of Public Security shall be established and shall be responsible for relations with the National Civil Police. The public security structure shall be entirely new.
b. Nature of the organization
The National Civil Police shall have a centralized organization. in that it will be structured at the national level in such a way as to cover all tasks assigned to the police. Its operation, on the other band, shall be decentralized, because there shall be departmental police delegations in accordance with the administrative divisions of the country.
Owing to the nature of the functions assigned to certain units which belong organizationally to the National Civil Police, these unite may remain under the functional control of other authorities, under the terms set forth in this chapter.
B. Organs reporting to the Director-General
a. Offices of Deputy Directors-General
b. The General Inspectorate
Under the authority of the Director-General, the General Inspectorate of Police shall be responsible for monitoring and supervising the activities of the operational services of the force.
The Inspector General shall be appointed by the Director-General, in consultation with the Attorney-General of the Republic and the National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights.
The General Inspectorate shall comprise a Monitoring Division, which shall have the function of monitoring all police services, and a Disciplinary Investigation Division, which shall have the function of investigating breaches of discipline by police officers.
c. Legal advisory services
These services shall be staffed by legal experts specialized in police matters. They shall be organized in accordance with the needs of the various functional and territorial police structures.
d. International legal advisory services
International legal advisory services shall be staffed by suitable personnel and high-level specialists. They shall be coordinated by the United Nations and are envisaged as a transitional arrangement.
C. Office of the Deputy Director-General for Operations
a. Divisions
(1) Public Security Division
The Public Security division shall be responsible for the maintenance of tranquility [sic], order and public security. It shall have the following departments: prevention, traffic, public order, control of private security, juveniles and general coordination with departmental delegations.
(2) Criminal Investigation Division
Under the functional control of the Attorney-General of the Republic, the Criminal Investigation Division shall responsible for investigating criminal acts and gathering evidence to identify the perpetrators of such acts. It shall also carry out investigations and other activities within its field of competence as required by the Attorney-General of the Republic, judges and courts.
The Chief of the Division shall be appointed by the Director-General of the National Police, in consultation with the Attorney-General and the President of the Supreme Court of Justice.
The spheres of operation of this Division shall be organized on the basis of punishable offences having the greatest social impact. It shall also have technical support departments.
The legal regime applicable to this Division shall be harmonized with the provisions of the Constitution concerning auxiliary organs of the system of justice.
(3) Frontiers Division
This Division shall be responsible for monitoring and supervising the admission, departure, activities and expulsion of aliens and the migration of nationals and for the monitoring and supervision of public and private civilian airports, without prejudice to the constitutional duty of the armed forces to defend the integrity of the territory of the State.
(4) Finance Division
Under the functional control of the Ministry of Finance and without prejudice to the fiscal oversight or other functions performed by it, this Division shall be responsible for preventing and combating infringements of tax law. It shall be the police support organ of the Ministry of Finance. It shall have two departments: customs and taxes.
The Finance Division shall be the only police organ with competence in the areas of customs and taxes. Consequently, following its entry into operation, all provisions and structures incompatible with this principle shall cease to exist.
The Chief of the Finance Division shall be appointed by the Director-General of the National Police with the prior approval of the Minister of Finance.
(5) Arms and Explosives Division
This Division shall be responsible for preventing and combating infringements of the constitutional and legal regime on the manufacture, import, export, trading, possession and bearing of weapons, ammunition, explosives and similar articles.
(6) Division for the Protection of Eminent Persons
This Division shall be responsible for protecting and escorting senior State officials; foreign dignitaries visiting the country and other persons on the basis of decisions of the Government or of the courts and for guarding public buildings and the offices of diplomatic missions or international organizations.
(7) Environment Division
Under the functional central of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, this Division shall he responsible for preventing and combating crimes and misdemeanours against the environment.
The Chief of the Environment Division shall be appointed by the Director-General of the National Civil Police with the prior approval of the Minister of Agriculture and Livestock.
b. Territorial distribution
One police delegation per department and one metropolitan delegation for San Salvador shall be established. The headquarters of delegations shall be located in departmental capitals. Within each delegation, there-may also be sub-delegations located in the main urban centres and also police posts in rural areas.
(1) Departmental delegations
The chiefs of departmental delegations shall have authority over all the units in their department. They shall be appointed by the Director-General of the National Police on the proposal of the Deputy Director-General for Operations , who shall be their direct supervisor. The organizational structure of delegations shall be adapted to the needs of each department.
(2) Sub-delegations and police posts
Sub-delegations shall be established in urban centres and shall be organized on the basis of local needs. Police posts shall operate in rural areas.
D. Office of the Deputy Director-General for Management
The Office of the Deputy Director-General for Management shall be responsible for implementing and coordinating the administrative and logistical support activities of the police. Its initial structure shall consist of the following divisions:
– Infrastructure Division
– Data-Processing Division
– Administration Division
– Logistics Division
– Planning and Budget Division4. Personnel of the National Civil Police
The personnel of the National Civil Police shall be organized on the basis of a hierarchized manning table with three levels: basic, executive and senior. Each level shall consist of the ranks determined by law. The staff profile and general regime shall be in keeping with the terms of this Agreement.
A. Profile
a. Personnel of the National Civil Police must have a vocation of service to the community, a capacity for human relations and emotional maturity, and the conduct and physical condition required to serve as a police officer. They must also be suited to serving in a police force which is designed, structured and operated as a civilian institution with the purpose of protecting and guaranteeing the free exercise of the rights and freedoms of individuals; preventing and combating all types of crimes; and maintaining internal peace, tranquility [sic], order and public security. They must also be able to adjust their conduct satisfactorily to the doctrine and legal regime of the National Civil Police.
Both admissions to the National Public security Academy and final admission to the police force shall require checking the profile of candidates. Specific evaluation criteria shall be established for this purpose, with rigorous standards set for each level of responsibility.
b. Educational level
(1) Basic level.
(a) Police officers must have completed the ninth grade of education.
(b) Police sergeants must hold a high school diploma
(2) Executive level. The successful completion of three years of university studies or their equivalent is required.
(3) Senior level. A university degree or its equivalent is required.
c. General requirements for admission to the Academy
In order to enter the National Public Security Academy, applicants are required to:
(1) Be Salvadorian by birth.
(2) Have reached the age of 18 before submitting the application.
(3) Have completed the level of studies required for the category concerned.
(4) Be physically fit.
(5) Have full exercise of their civic rights.
(6) Have no criminal record, i.e. convictions resulting from a final verdict.
(7) Pass the entrance examinations, which shall be designed to ensure that candidates fit the profile required to belong to the National Civil Police, according to each of the levels of responsibility defined in this chapter. The entrance examinations shall consist of a test of general knowledge, a physical examination, a medical examination and a psychological examination. These examinations shall be supplemented by personal interviews with the candidates.
d. The preparation of the examinations referred to in the preceding paragraph and the formation of the boards of examiners responsible for administering them shall be carried out on the basis of exclusively technical criteria.
e. Special emphasis shall be placed on the training of police personnel, so that they are given the best possible preparation and are trained to perform their duties in strict conformity with the doctrine of the police force, with special emphasis on unrestricted respect for human rights.
B. General Regime
a. Members of the National Civil Police shall be career professionals and agent8 of authority.
b. The duties, tights, responsibilities and disciplinary regime of the members of the National Civil Police shall be determined by law.
c. Members of the National Civil Police shall be require& to serve in any part of the national territory.
d. Members of the National Civil Police shall wear the regulation uniform whenever they are on active duty. In exceptional cases, the Minister, or in his absence, the Vice-Minister or the Director-General may give authorisation for not wearing uniforms for certain tasks.
e. Members of the National Civil Police shall bear firearms when warranted by the needs of the service. They shall use only small arms, which are appropriate to police duties ad cannot be considered war materiel. Special weapons shall be stored in the arsenal of the National Civil Police, to be used by personnel trained for this purpose when, in the opinion of the Minister concerned or, in his absence, of the Vice-Minister or the Director-General, special circumstances exist which require their use.
f. Members of the National Civil Police shall respect the Constitution and the law and shall at all times adjust their conduct to the doctrine of the force, as defined in this Agreement.
g. Members of the National Civil Police shall not normally be required to live in barracks. Such a regime shall be applied only in exceptional circumstances and for the time strictly necessary.
h. The law shall define the regime of labour rights of members of the National Civil Police, bearing in mind the nature of the function they are required to perform.
i. Members of the National Civil Police shall enjoy job security. They may not be dismissed except for specific legal reasons.
j. Members of the National Civil Police shall be entitled to a level of remuneration that ensure8 a decent standard of living for themselves and their families and also accords with their rank and length of service.
k. Vehicles, communications systems, uniforms, facilities and, in general, any equipment used by members of the National Civil Police shall be suited to the requirement of a police force of the type defined in this Agreement.
5. National Public Security Academy
A. The National Public Security Academy shall be responsible for:
a. Basic training, training of middle-ranking and senior officers and specialized training of the National Civil Police.
b. Selecting personnel for the National Civil Police.
c. Investigating, studying and publicizing matters relating to the National Civil Police and public security.
d. Making an annual evaluation of all National Civil Police personnel.
B. National Public Security Academy hall be an autonomous body placed directly under the authority of the Minister concerned.
C. National Public Security Academy shall be run by a Director-General and an Academic Council. The Academic Council shall perform standard-setting and comptrolling functions in its sphere of competence. The Director-General shall be President of the Academic Council and shall exercise the executive and administrative powers of the Academy.
D. The Director-General shall be appointed by the President of the Republic.
E. The Academic Council shall consist of civilians prominent in civilian, cultural, legal, technical, police or academic life, appointed by the President of the Republic on the proposal of the Minister concerned and on the basis of criteria of political pluralism.
F. The admissions system shall be determined by the Academic Council, which shall ensure that it is not discriminatory.
G. The teaching staff of the Academy shall be appointed by the Academic Council. No political tendency shall predominate among that staff. The law shall establish suitable mechanisms for ensuring this last goal.
6. Legal Regime
The National Civil Police and the National Public Security Academy shall each be regulated by special laws. To that en& the Parties express their general agreement with the proposed preliminary legislative drafts included as annexes to this Agreement (annexes II and III), provided that the proposed drafts do not depart from the Agreement. Consequently, in implementation of the New York Agreement, they hereby refer those proposals to COPAZ, along with this Agreement, for it to prepare the corresponding preliminary drafts.
7. Transitional Regime
A. Organization
a. During the transition, the National Civil Police shall not be attached to any Ministry. The Director-General shall be under the direct authority of the President of the Republic.
b. the National Civil Police shall be run by the Director-General, under the terms laid down in this Agreement and in the New York Agreement. Until the establishment of the national Civil Police has been legally formalized, the organizational work shall be done by a Coordinator hosen for his ability to receive wide acceptance.
c. During the transition, the Director-General of the National Civil Police shall be appointed by the President of the Republic from a list of three candidates proposed by the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ).
d. The Coordinator and, subsequently, the Director-General, shall establish appropriate machinery for information and communication with COPAZ or, before the latter’s final formalization, with its transitional body, so that the Commission can perform its function of supervising the organization of the national Civil Police. As part of the normal exercise of its functions, COPAZ shall designate a subcommission to carry out this task, which shall serve as an advisory commission to the Coordinator or to the Director-General for the adoption of relevant decisions or measures concerning the organization of the National Civil Police, the assumption of its functions and, in general, matters relating to the transitional regime which have not been expressly resolved in this chapter.
e. In accordance with the provisions of the New York Agreement, the organization of the National Civil Police shall be determined, on the terms set forth in this Agreement, under close international cooperation and supervision, coordinated by the United Nations.
B. Assumption of functions
a. The National Civil Police shall take up its functions gradually, as contingents graduating from the National Public Security Academy make it possible to staff fully each of the functional and territorial structures provided for in this chapter. The Director-General shall determine the priorities and order according to which this assumption of functions shall take place.
b. The process of replacing the former security forces shall be carried out by geographical department, making sure that there are no gaps in authority. Within 21 months of the launching of this process, all departments must be covered by contingents of the National Civil Police.
c. During the first two years of the formation of the new force, the goal of 5,700 officers at the basic level and 240 at the executive and senior levels must be achieved. Over the following five years, the final figures for the National Civil Police, estimated tentatively at some 10,000 officers at the basic level and about 500 at the executive and senior levels, shall be attained.
d. While the first senior and executive of National Police Force are being trained, the Director-General may order the creation of provisional commands, exclusively for the National Civil Police, which shall act during a predetermined period and shall be supported by experts and advisers, under a programme of close international cooperation and supervision, coordinated by the United Nations, on the terms laid down in this Agreement.
e. While the progressive development of the new force is taking place under the terms laid down in this Agreement, he existing National Police shall continue to perform its current public security functions, with the exception laid down in the next paragraph. The National Police shall be the only one of the current public security forces to retain functions of this nature during the transitional period. The international verification of agreements to be undertaken by the united Nations through ONUSAL shall include the activities of a group of specialists from countries with experience in the organization and operation of civilian police forces. The tasks of those specialists shall include, in addition to cooperating in ensuring a smooth transition and assisting police authorities, that of accompanying officers and members of the National Police in the performance of their duties.
f. During the progressive deployment of the new force to zones which were traditionally conflict zones during the armed conflict, public security in those zones shall be subject to a special regime to be determined by the Director-General of the National Civil Police. That regime shall, in any case, envisage activities by the group of specialists referred to in the preceding paragraph.
g. Personnel of the National Civil Police graduating from the National Public Security Academy shall be subject to the general rule laid down in this chapter that police shall not be required to live in barracks. During the initial period, however, exceptions may be made where this is justified by lack of personnel in the early phases of the deployment of the new force. This exceptional regime may not be extended under any circumstances beyond 31 December 1993.
h. In any case, during the preparatory phase and, in general, during the transitional period until the National Police is completely replaced by the National Civil Police, the role of international advisory services and verification shall be strengthened.
C. National Public Security Academy
a. During the transition, the National Public Security Academy shall not be attached to any Ministry. Its Director shall be under the direct authority of the President of the Republic.
b. During the transition, the Director-General of the National Public Security Academy shall be appointed by the President of the Republic from a list of three candidates proposed by COPAZ.
c. COPAZ shall determine how many members the Academic Council of the National Public Security Academy should have during the transition. In this same period, those members shall be appointed by the President of the Republic from lists of three candidates propose by COPAZ. In any case, the Council shall consist of civilians prominent in civilian, cultural, legal, police or academic life, in accordance with this chapter. The lists proposed by COPAZ and the final appointments made by the President of the Republic must ensure pluralism of the Academic Council.
d. The admissions system shall be determined by the Academic Council, which shall ensure that it is not discriminatory.
e. Admission shall be contingent on passing the entrance examinations provided for in section 4 of this chapter, adapted to the criteria and procedures referred to in the New York Agreement. The examinations shall be prepared on the basis of exclusively technical criteria and the formation of the boards of examiners responsible for administering them must be such as to ensure the juries’ absolute impartiality. To that end, where it is necessary to obtain additional technical resources because there are not enough suitable resources in the country, the support of experts shall be sought through the United Nations under the terms laid down in this Agreement, as indicated in the next paragraph of this section. COPAZ shall pay special attention to monitoring the fulfilment of this provision.
f. In selecting the initial academic personnel, every effort shall he made to find the best human resources available in Salvadorian society so as to provide a group of teachers which is sufficiently broad and pluralistic and of sufficiently high quality to give the new police force a cultural identity in keeping with its nature and doctrine. To that end, assistance shall be sought from university lecturers, expert jurists, doctors and other professionals involved in police matters. COPAZ shall establish appropriate mechanisms to ensure that no political tendency predominates in that academic body. Such mechanisms must be included in the preliminary bill on the National Public Security Academy.
g. In those areas of study where there are not sufficient teachers in the country to meet the initial needs of the Academy, the support of experts shall be sought through the United Nations under the terms laid down in this Agreement, as indicated in the following paragraph.
h. For the purposes of the recruitment, selection, preparation and training of new personnel, the support of experts from countries which are able to provide the assistance required for the needs of this process shall be sought through the United Nations, under the terms laid down in this Agreement.
D. Personnel
a. The criteria and mechanisms for the selection and training of personnel shall accord with the concept of the National Civil Police as a new force, with a new organization, new officers, new education and training mechanisms and a new doctrine. In this context, personnel who did not participate directly in the armed conflict shall be encouraged to join the force, without prejudice to the right of former members of the National Police and former FMLN combatants not to be discriminated against in the selection of such personnel and their right to join the National Civil Police under the terms of the New York Agreement and of this Agreement.
b. A publicity campaign to promote the recruitment of new personnel for the National Civil Police shall be designed and implemented as soon as possible. Special consideration shall be given to the recruitment of women.
c. Former members of the National Police may join the National Civil Police under the terms of this agreement, after an evaluation of their conduct, provided that they meet the admission requirements and go through the new National Public Security Academy. This evaluation shall be made by the Director-General of the National Civil Police, under the supervision of COPAZ, and shall be subject to verification by the United Nations.
d. Former PMLN combatants may join the National Civil police provided that they fulfil the admission criteria and procedures established for them by COPA and go through the new National Public Security Academy. As part of the verification of the cessation of the armed conflict, ONUSAL shall check that applicants who identify themselves in this category have actually and irrevocably abandoned the armed struggle. All this shall be supervised and guaranteed by COPAZ.
e. For the recruitment of personnel referred to in the preceding paragraphs, in the case of the basic level of the National Civil Police, the level of general knowledge and/or the zones in which personnel are to be recruited and serve shall be taken into account. Those who do not have the level of formal education required for admission must pass an aptitude and skills test to evaluate their ability to follow the study programmes of the National Public Security Academy satisfactorily. Special courses shall be organized to prepare for this test, under the auspices of the National Public Security Academy and with support from the Ministry of Education and the country’s universities.
f. For courses at the basic level, 330 recruits shall be selected per month, for a 6-month training course, during the first 24 months of the mass training programme. Candidates shall be selected in such a way as to ensure that most recruits did not participate directly in the armed conflict and that the proportion of former FMLN combatants is no greater than that of former members of the National Police, and vice-versa. COPAZ shall take special care to ensure that these requirements are met.
g. The recruitment of officers for the executive and senior levels of the National Civil Police shall be carried out by means of rigorous selection, in accordance with the criteria and procedures laid down in this Agreement, and shall fully respect the principles of equality of opportunity among applicants and non-discrimination. Courses shall last a year, according to the level and manning table concerned. A total of 120 officers shall be trained each year.
h. Posts at the executive and senior levels shall be allocated to graduates of the National Public Security Academy by the Director-General according to the needs of the service. However, the top five students each year shall be entitled to choose from the various vacant posts corresponding to the level of responsibility of their studies.
i. Without prejudice to the provisions of the preceding paragraph, zones that were traditionally conflict zones during the armed conflict shall be the object of special treatment designed to promote national reconciliation and stability during the transition. Such treatment shall involve the formation of police units comprising personnel of different origins who have graduated from the National Public Security Academy. The chiefs of the corresponding delegations shall be appointed following consultations with the advisory commission of COPAZ.
j. All personnel joining the National Police in accordance with this Agreement shall be considered to be civilians, regardless of their origin.
E. Any other matter relating to the transitional regime which has not been resolved by this Agreement or by other agreements already adopted by the Parties shall be decided by COPAZ, under the terms laid down in the New York Agreement.
Demobilization
1992
The Armed Forces of El Salvador (FAES) carried out the disbandment of civil defense units in April and May 1992, but failed to meet the established deadlines to withdraw all its troops to the agreed-upon locations, citing logistical issues. ONUSAL successfully pressured them to fulfill their agreements (with one exception). Although they were nominally integrated into the FAES on schedule, the Treasury Police and National Guard failed to abandon their barracks by the established deadline. In response, the FMLN, which had been demobilizing on schedule, refused to complete the concentration of its forces to the agreed-upon locations until the FAES upheld the agreement.67 The Parties subsequently reached a negotiated agreement to concentrate forces in the established areas by 25 June 1992, and to present legislation to definitively abolish the National Guard and Treasury Police and establish a “Special Brigade for Military Security” (with no further transfers from military bodies to the National Civil Police) by 30 June 1992.10 The FAES indeed completed its concentration of forces on 26 June 1992, and it disbanded the Territorial Service by 30 July 1992. The FMLN also completed the concentration of combatants according to the agreement by 26 June 1992. Some small groups of armed and uniformed persons in support of “public security committees” remained outside the concentration sites, but with pressure from ONUSAL, these groups also complied with the concentration agreements by 30 August 1992. The second 20% of FMLN ex-combatants were demobilized on 24 September 1992.68 The FNML had 15,009 organized memberships of which 8,552 were combatants (2,485 or 29.06 % female combatants, 2,474 were wounded non-combatants and 3,983 were political personnel.69
However, persisting delays in land transfers led the FMLN to suspend demobilization on 30 September 1992, promising not to resume until new dates were set for starting land transfers.70 The FAES had been progressing on the reduction of forces plan until late October 1992, when it suspended its demobilization in reaction to the FMLN’s suspension.68 With 31 October 1992, the original deadline to formally end the armed conflict, fast approaching, the office of the Secretary-General intervened and convinced the parties to set 15 December 1992 as the new date by which the FMLN would be fully demobilized and reintegrated and the FAES would be fully demobilized, reduced and purified, thus constituting the formal end of the armed conflict.71 The FMLN demobilized the third quintile of ex-combatants by 31 October 1992.68 As of 17 December 1992, a total of 8,876 FMLN combatants and 3,486 war handicapped and injured FMLN members were demobilized. On 23 December 1992, ONUSAL confirmed that the demobilization process reached its conclusion and the armed conflict between the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN formally ended on 15 December 1992.3
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999), May 26, 1992; “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/24833), November 23, 1992.
- United Nations Security Council, (S/24833).
- Ilja A Luciak, After the Revolution: Gender and Democracy in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 4.
- “Letter Dated 19 October 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/24699), October 19, 1992.
- “Letter Dated 11 November 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/24805), November 13, 1992.
1993
The FAES accelerated the process of reduction of its forces, completing the demobilization of its rapid reaction infantry battalions on 6 February 1993 and completing the overall process of reduction of forces on 31 March 1993—nine months ahead of schedule and in higher proportions than originally planned.12 The official date of final demobilization was recognized as 31 December 1993.53
1994
Compensation of demobilized members of the FAES, which began on 15 December 1993, proceeded quickly in early 1994, and it was agreed on 28 January 1994 that the indemnities should be fully distributed by 30 June 1994.53
1995
Demobilization of FMLN combatants as well as El Salvadorian Armed force completed before election in 1994. The FMLN transformed itself into a legitimate party be complying to the demobilization provisos of the accord and the FAES remained loyal to the civilians. Its strength was reduced almost in half by demobilizing its personnel. The estimated strength of the FAES was 22,000 in 1995, which was 38,000 less than its strength in 1991.48
1996
No further developments observed.
1997
No further developments observed.
1998
No further developments observed.
1999
No further developments observed.
2000
No further developments observed.
2001
No further developments observed.
CHAPULTEPEC AGREEMENT (16 January 1992)
Chapter VII: Cessation of the Armed Conflict
Separation of forces
9. The purpose of the separation of forces is to reduce the risk of incidents, to build trust and to allow ONUSAL to verify both parties’ compliance with this Agreement.
10. The separation of forces shall take place in two stages, so that the Salvadorian armed forces (FAES) fall back progressively from their present positions until deployed as they would normally be in peacetime and the FMLN forces are concentrated progressively in designated locations within conflict areas as determined in annex D.
11. During the first stage, which shall coincide with the five days following D-Day, FAES land forces shall go to the barracks, bases, existing semi-permanent facilities and other locations listed in annex A and FMLN forces, except for the combatants mentioned in paragraph 18, shall go to the places listed in annex B. The places listed in annexes A and B generally reflect the present deployment of the two parties’ forces.
12. The movements described in the preceding paragraph shall be made under the supervision of ONUSAL. Neither party shall do anything to prevent or jeopardize the movement of the other party’s forces during this period. ONUSAL military observers shall closely supervise all the places listed in annexes A and B and shall in principle be present 24 hours a day in each of those places as of D-
Day.
13. During the period between D-Day + 6 days and D-Day + 30 days, FAES land forces shall fall back to their peacetime positions as listed in annex C and FMLN forces, except for the combatants mentioned in paragraph 18, shall fall back to the locations indicated in annex D. The precise designation of such locations shall be determined by the ONUSAL Chief Military Observer, in consultation with the two parties, during the informal cease-fire period.
14. The movements described in the preceding paragraph, which shall also be supervised by ONUSAL, shall be carried out according to phased programmes agreed between the ONUSAL Chief Military Observer and the two parties during the informal cease-fire period, through the joint working group to which reference is made in paragraph 32. During this task, the group shall be guided as appropriate by the agreed timetable for the implementation of the agreements reached.
15. As soon as possible after the signing of this Agreement but no later than two weeks before D-Day, the FAES shall transmit to the ONUSAL Chief Military Observer detailed information on the number of their troops and weapons to be concentrated in the places listed in annex A.
16. As soon as possible after the signing of this Agreement but no later than two weeks before D-Day, FMLN shall supply the ONUSAL Chief Military Observer with detailed information on its troop strength and inventories of arms, ammunition, mines, other explosives and military equipment located anywhere within the national territory. These arms, etc. shall be concentrated in the places listed in annex B, with the exception of those of its clandestine forces, which shall be concentrated in the places listed in annex D during the second stage of the separation of forces.
17. Upon completion of the first stage of the separation of forces, that is, as of D-Day + 6, ONUSAL shall verify that all troops and military equipment declared by the parties, other than the arms, etc. referred to in the last sentence of the preceding paragraph, have been concentrated in the locations listed in annexes A and B. ONUSAL shall investigate any report or allegation of the presence of troops or military equipment in any place other than those locations, apart from the movements authorized in paragraphs 20-22.
18. The arrangements just described relate to FAES land forces and FMLN forces as defined in paragraph 11. Although it is not possible, for practical reasons, to arrange a similar separation of clandestine forces, the latter shall remain fully subject to the undertaking to refrain from carrying out any hostile act or operation. As provided in paragraph 6, any alleged violation of this undertaking shall be investigated by ONUSAL.
19. As of D-Day, the naval and air force components of the FAES shall refrain from carrying out any offensive operation. They shall carry out only such non-hostile missions as are necessary for the discharge of their duties unrelated to the armed conflict. ONUSAL shall be advised in advance of all military flight plans. Such flights shall not be carried out over places where FMLN forces have been concentrated.
20. During the CAC period, ONUSAL liaison officers shall be posted in FAES units, bases and barracks to coordinate in advance the movements of FAES forces throughout the national territory and to verify that such movements will neither violate the cease-fire nor jeopardize in any other way the process of implementing this Agreement.
21. With special reference to FAES forces deployed near places where there are FMLN forces, in other words, those listed in appendix 1 to annex A and those listed in appendix 1 to annex C, the Government agrees that such forces shall be authorized to leave their locations only with the consent of ONUSAL and for the following purposes:
a. To carry out troop rotations and relief;
b. To carry out liaison and coordination activities between commands at battalion level and above;
c. To deliver logistical supplies;
d. To take part in programmes for the deactivation, removal and destruction of mines;
e. To go on leave or seek medical care or for other humanitarian reasons, individually, in civilian clothing and unarmed. However, ONUSAL shall not grant permission for any movement, even in the above cases, if it believes that such movement could jeopardize the cease-fire or other aspects of this Agreement or disturb the process of détente and reconciliation. Forces that leave their locations for the purposes listed in paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) shall be accompanied by ONUSAL, which shall verify that such movements are in keeping with this Agreement.
22. Similarly, during the CAC period ONUSAL liaison officers shall be posted in the listed locations where FMLN forces are to be concentrated in order to coordinate movements by those forces. FMLN agrees that its forces may leave the locations in question only with the consent of ONUSAL and for the following purposes:
a. To carry out liaison and coordination activities between its high command and the commands of the forces stationed at the various locations indicated;
b. To supply provisions, clothing or vital necessities;
c. To take part in programmes for the deactivation, removal and destruction of mines;
d. To go on leave or seek medical care or for other humanitarian reasons, individually, in civilian clothing and unarmed. However, ONUSAL shall not grant permission for any movement, even in the above cases, if it believes that such movement could jeopardize the cease-fire or other aspects of this Agreement or disturb the process of détente and reconciliation. Forces that leave their locations for the purposes listed in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) shall be accompanied by ONUSAL, which shall verify that such movements are in keeping with this Agreement.
23. ONUSAL shall verify that the supplies delivered to each party do not include lethal articles. However, the FAES shall be allowed to maintain stocks of ammunition normal for peacetime. The mechanisms for such verification shall be established by the ONUSAL Chief Military Observer in consultation with the two parties.
24. During the cease-fire, COPAZ shall systematically evaluate the progress being made in implementing the Agreements. If it notes that a situation is developing which might result in a crisis, it shall draw such conclusions and make such recommendations as may be necessary to prevent a collapse of the cease-fire or a crisis of public order. It shall transmit its conclusions and recommendations to the Chief of ONUSAL.
25. Should a public order crisis occur despite the above provisions and if the normal means for the maintenance of domestic peace and public security have been exhausted, with the result that the President of the Republic deems it necessary to make use of the exceptional measures provided for in the amendment to article 168 (12) of the Constitution adopted in April 1991, the President shall, before giving the relevant order, inform the Chief of ONUSAL to enable him to make any appropriate remarks. The actions of the FAES under such circumstances shall be monitored closely by ONUSAL to ensure that they are consistent with all the peace Agreements.
Chapter IX: Implementation Timetable
2.7 Rapid deployment infantry battalions (BIRI)
The following statement is made with regard to the rapid deployment infantry battalions in the relevant part of the timetable for implementing the reduction plan mentioned in paragraph 2.4 of this chapter:
“The demobilization of the BIRIs shall begin in the third week of the sixth month and shall last four weeks. Once the demobilization has begun, the battalions shall be considered to have lost their offensive battle capability.
“The BIRIs shall be demobilized as detailed below:
6th month: General Ramón Belloso BIRI
7th month: Atonal BIRI
8th month: Atlacatl BIRI
9th month: General Eusebio Bracamonte BIRI
10th month: General José Manuel Arce BIRI.”
Disarmament
1992
The FMLN submitted its initial reports of personnel and armaments on time, but ONUSAL expressed repeated doubts about the accuracy of these reports. The Armed Forces of El Salvador (FAES) delayed the submission of its initial reports, but they were submitted and verified by ONUSAL.1 The FAES disarmed its civil defense units in April and May 1992.2
The whole Disarmament-Demobilization-Reintegration (DDR) process was then stalled for a period of several months because of grievances stemming from the failure of the Government of El Salvador to abolish the Treasury Police and National Guard as promised and the Government’s involvement in illicit evictions of peasants from farms in disputed territories. The office of the Secretary-General intervened and convinced the parties to set 15 December 1992 as the new date by which the FMLN would be fully demobilized and reintegrated and the FAES would be fully purified, thus constituting the formal end of the armed conflict. In addition, and contingent upon progress toward this agreement on part of the FAES, the FMLN agreed to concentrate its weapons by 30 November 1992 and begin their destruction on 1 December 1992. The Government agreed to resume the dissolution of military units as previously agreed once the FMLN destroys its weapons.71 When the first 20% of FMLN ex-combatants were demobilized on 30 June 1992, ONUSAL was dissatisfied with the amount of weapons turned over and insisted that the FMLN hand over a full 20% of its inventory. The FMLN finally submitted a cache of weapons to appease ONUSAL on 18 August 1992, but the weapons were in poor condition, raising ONUSAL suspicions that the FMLN was not being honest about its inventories. The second 20% of FMLN’s weapons (in reasonable condition) was handed over on 24 September 1992, and the third 20% by 31 October 1992.68The FMLN concentrated the remainder of its declared weapons and submitted the final inventory to ONUSAL on 30 November 1992. ONUSAL was satisfied with the inventory at this point, and destruction of weapons began. The destruction was delayed, however, and the FMLN did not meet the deadline of 15 December 1992 to eliminate the entire stockpile. The weapons were still not destroyed by the end of 1992, but the delay did not undermine the cessation of armed conflict.72
The FAES failed to begin recovering military weapons from private individuals on time, and it continued to postpone the process despite pressure from ONUSAL.73
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations Security Council, (S/25006), December 23, 1992; “Letter Dated 29 January 1993 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council, (S/25200), January 29, 1993.
- United Nations Security Council, (S/24833); United Nations Security Council, (S/25006).
1993
The FMLN continued to delay the destruction of the final stockpile of weapons submitted into the beginning of 1993. It announced that it was conditioning the completion of its disarmament upon the Government’s implementation of the Peace Agreements, and the two parties reached an agreement on 4 February 1993. The FMLN destroyed the remainder of its weapons inside El Salvador on 11 February 1993 and completed the destruction of arms outside El Salvador on 1 April 1992. About 3.5% of the total inventory of weapons was reported lost or stolen and not destroyed.74
The FAES was slow to fulfill its duty to recover military weapons held by private individuals, and ONUSAL expressed doubts that its lists even included the weapons the FAES distributed during the years of conflict.75 The recovery of all weapons held by private citizens was delayed by the Legislative Assembly, which was late to pass laws regulating the use and possession of weapons.76
On 23 May 1993 a large cache of weapons was discovered in Managua, Nicaragua. The FMLN later admitted it had kept this and several other secret stashes of weapons both inside and outside El Salvador under the control of a variety of factions, but maintained that they never intended to return to armed conflict. This constituted a serious violation of the Peace Agreements and threatened to sever all trust in the FMLN by the Government and the UN observers. The Government of El Salvador was outraged, and President Cristiani threatened to revoke the FMLN’s status as a legal political party. The UN Security Council expressed serious concerns for the future of the Peace Agreement. The FMLN cooperated with ONUSAL to locate all remaining weapons and begin destroying them.77 The FMLN did not meet the deadline of 45 days to destroy the newly discovered weapons, claiming that logistical issues forced them to take more time. A total of 114 arms caches were uncovered both inside and outside El Salvador. ONUSAL verified that they were all finally destroyed on 18 August 1993. The FMLN subsequently declared that its military structure was fully eliminated.78
- “Letter Dated 29 January 1993 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/25200) January 29, 1993; “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/25812), May 21, 1993.
- United Nations Security Council, (S/25812).
- “Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/26790), November 23, 1993.
- “Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations Security Council (S/26005), June 29, 1993.
- “Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations Security Council (S/26371), August 30, 1993.
1994
There were no reports to contradict the FMLN’s claim to be disarmed.
The Law for the Control of Weapons, Munitions, Explosives and Related Artifacts took effect on 11 January 1994, after it was approved by the Legislative Assembly on 9 December 1993 The Government initiated a campaign to recover military weapons from private individuals, but very few were actually relinquished to the FAES. The demining process concluded on 30 January 1994, with over 9,500 mines being cleared.53
1995
There were no reports to contradict the FMLN’s claim to be disarmed.
FAES efforts to collect military weapons held by private citizens remained ineffective. A central issue was the large number of unrecorded weapons in circulation. The Government seized about 2,000 weapons during the first few months of 1995, few of which were given voluntarily. Without clear records, the Government would have to rely on voluntary surrender of the weapons, but without incentives, weapons holders were reluctant to take any initiative to return them.36 However, an estimated 300,000 illegal weapons remained among the civilian population.79
1996
There were no reports to contradict the FMLN’s claim to be disarmed.
1997
Reports surfaced that a new cache of weapons belonging to the FMLN was found in Nicaragua. President Calderon Sol accused the FMLN of failing to comply with the Peace Agreement, ordered an investigation and filed a complaint with the UN. However, Nicaraguan officials did not confirm President Calderon Sol’s accusations.80
1998
No new developments were reported.
1999
A private organization, the Patriotic Movement Against Crime, took up the task of reclaiming small arms from the civilian population, offering coupons for basic necessities for each gun relinquished. Over 2000 weapons were collected.81
2000
FMLN was completely disarmed as of provisions of the accord. Nevertheless, it occurred only after the ONUSAL destroyed the arms caches inside and outside El Salvador in 1993. Number of weapons collected in the disarmament process is not available.
2001
No further developments observed.
CHAPULTEPEC AGREEMENT (16 January 1992)
Chapter VII: Cessation of the Armed Conflict
Separation of forces
End of the military structure of FMLN and reintegration of its members, within a framework of full legality, into the civil, institutional and political life of the country.
26. Between D-Day + 6 and D-Day + 30, according to the phased programmes referred to in paragraph 14, FMLN shall concentrate in the 15 designated locations listed in annex D all arms, ammunition, mines, other explosives and military equipment belonging to its forces, both those concentrated during the first stage in the places listed in annex B and those belonging to its clandestine forces, and ONUSAL shall verify that they tally with the information given in the inventories it has received in accordance with paragraph 16.
27. In each of the 15 designated locations, all the arms and equipment mentioned above, save for the personal weapons and equipment of combatants present in the place, shall be kept in locked warehouses. Each warehouse shall have two locks, one key to which shall be kept by ONUSAL and the other by the FMLN commander in the place. ONUSAL shall verify the contents of such warehouses periodically to ensure that there has been no change in them.
28. During the CAC period, FMLN members shall keep their personal weapons and equipment as long as they remain in the designated locations. When they leave those places in order to be reintegrated, within a framework of full legality, into the civil, political and institutional life of the country, their personal weapons shall also be deposited in the locked warehouses referred to in the preceding paragraph. Combatants who are still in the designated locations when the programme for the destruction of arms, etc. provided for in the next paragraph begins, shall deposit their personal weapons and equipment in the locked warehouses, for verification by ONUSAL, immediately prior to their destruction according to a programme agreed with ONUSAL.
29. Between 15 and 31 October 1992, FMLN shall destroy all arms and equipment deposited in designated locations according to the arrangement described above, in the presence and under the sole supervision of ONUSAL and with its technical advice. Such destruction shall be carried out simultaneously in all 15 places designated for FMLN. FMLN shall dispose of the remains of the destroyed weapons.
Reintegration
1992
The FAES began reducing its armed forces on schedule, releasing most ex-combatants into civilian life, but transferring some to non-military service, which was not in strict compliance with the peace agreement.2 The FMLN refused to meet the initial benchmark of reintegrating 20% of its ex-combatants by 1 May 1992, citing as justification failures to facilitate the process on part of the Government of El Salvador.1 The Parties subsequently reached a negotiated agreement to begin the reintegration of former FMLN combatants to civilian life by 30 June 1992 and finish by 31 October 1992, to propose legislation to facilitate the legalization of the FMLN as a political party by 30 June 1992, and to finalize programs to reintegrate former FMLN combatants into civilian life by 15 July 1992.10 The first 20% of FMLN ex-combatants were indeed demobilized by 30 June 1992, restarting its reintegration process.68
However, the whole Disarmament-Demobilization-Reintegration (DDR) process was then stalled for a period of several months because of grievances stemming from the failure of the Government of El Salvador to abolish the Treasury Police and National Guard as promised and the Government’s involvement in illicit evictions of peasants from farms in disputed territories. The office of the Secretary-General intervened and convinced the parties to set 15 December 1992 as the new date by which the FMLN would be fully demobilized and reintegrated and the FAES would be fully purified, thus constituting the formal end of the armed conflict.71 The FAES also disbanded two immediate reaction infantry battalions by November 1992, and after the negotiations agreed to disband a third by 8 December 1992.68 The fourth contingent of FMLN ex-combatants was demobilized after further delays, but the fifth and final contingent was disbanded on time. The FMLN was ultimately legalized as a political party on 14 December 1992, in coordination with the completion of the DDR process and formal cessation of armed conflict on 15 December 1992.3
On 23 January 1992, the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador granted a general amnesty for those responsible for political crimes and offenses through a law on national reconciliation. Notable exceptions are offenses within the purview of the Commission on the Truth and individuals who were already convicted by a jury. The national reconciliation law enabled FMLN leaders to reintegrate into society, and those who joined COPAZ, among others, formally pledged allegiance to the Constitution of El Salvador. The Government provided security for former FMLN combatants and the FMLN formally began the process of becoming a political party on 30 July 1992. Full recognition as a party was delayed by the delays in the DDR process as a whole.82
1993
On 4 February 1993, the parties agreed upon a program to reintegrate former officers and middle-rank commanders of the FMLN. The plan included training, subsistence allowances, and access to credit for 600 ex-combatants.12 The programs lacked a comprehensive, coordinated strategy, however. This resulted in synchronization problems and repeated mistakes in multiple programs.76
1994
UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali strenuously impressed upon the Government of El Salvador to finally phase out the National Police, complete the reintegration process and institute the constitutional reforms recommended by the Commission on the Truth. Despite multiple appeals, President Cristiani and the Government remained reluctant to move on these issues.63
The reintegration of ex-combatants was slowed by credit deficiencies and ineffective technical assistance programs.53
1995
Deficiencies in credit availability persisted, with former FAES combatants being affected more than former FMLN combatants. The Fund for the Protection of the Wounded and War-Disabled as a Consequence of Armed Conflict was particularly hampered by administrative delays and a lack of resources.36
1996
In the words of the Secretary-General in the last MINUSAL report, “The quantifiable targets for the reintegration programmes have been largely achieved.”83
- “Mission of the United Nations in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/50/935), April 23, 1996, Pg. 6, Para. 23.
1997
Former combatants had been reintegrated, and only some support programs remained to be implemented. The Fund for the Protection of the Wounded and War-Disabled was resistant to providing information, making verification of its operations difficult. As of April 1997, the Fund owed back payment for pensions dispersed to over 4,000 relatives of combatants killed during the conflict. A large number of relatives were turned down for benefits because they lacked proper legal documentation. The Legislative Assembly made weak moves to allow special documentation to substitute for what the Fund had been requiring.84
- “Assessment of the Peace Process in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/51/517), July 1, 1997.
1998
Outstanding issues preventing the completion of the programs for land transfer, human settlement transfer and assistance for the wounded and war-disabled were not resolved as of the conclusion of official UN observation on 30 June 1998.85
- “Letter Dated 7 August 1998 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the General Assembly,” United Nations General Assembly (A/52/1008), September 24, 1998.
1999
The reintegration of ex-combatants was achieved. Nevertheless, tens of thousands of demobilized ex-combatants were yet unemployed with no other sources of income.81
2000
Reintegration of ex-combatants back to civilian life was achieved. Nevertheless, many of them remained unemployed.
2001
No further developments observed.
CHAPULTEPEC AGREEMENT (16 January 1992)
Chapter VI: Political Participation by FMLN
The following agreements have been reached concerning political participation by FMLN, and shall be subject to the implementation timetable contained in this Agreement:
1. Adoption of legislative or other measures needed to guarantee former FMLN combatants the full exercise of their civil and political rights, with a view to their reintegration, within a framework of full legality, into the civil, political, and institutional life of the country.
2. Freedom for all political prisoners.
3. Full guarantees and security for the return of exiles, war-wounded and other persons currently outside the country for reasons related to the armed conflict.
4. Granting of licences for FMLN mass media.
5. Cessation of the armed conflict implies the commitment and the right of FMLN to full political participation, without any restrictions other than those deriving from the new institutional and legal framework established by the agreements reached during the negotiations.
6. Legalization of FMLN as a political party, through the adoption of a legislative decree to that end.
7. Guarantee that FMLN will be able to conduct its activities normally when it becomes a political party, meaning:
a. Freedom to canvass for new members;
b. The right to set up an appropriate infrastructure (premises, printing works, etc.);
c. Free exercise of the right of assembly and mobilization for FMLN leaders, activists and members;
d. Freedom for FMLN to purchase and use advertising space in the mass media.
8. Legal solution to the participation of FMLN members in COPAZ, once the latter formalizes its existence.
9. Special security measures Immediately after the signing of this Agreement, special security measures shall be taken to protect any FMLN leaders who may require such protection. The aforesaid measures, which may include their being accompanied by diplomatic personnel and also technical support from friendly Governments, shall offer all the facilities required for FMLN leaders to be able to organize their own security in accordance with the law. COPAZ shall supervise the arrangements agreed to herein and shall, if necessary, promote the adoption of the relevant legislative or other provisions to ensure that such security measures are fully effective and properly established. As part of its responsibility for the security of FMLN leaders, the Government of El Salvador shall provide the necessary facilities for implementing the agreed arrangements. ONUSAL shall verify the adoption of the above measures.
Prisoner Release
1992
On 23 January 1992, the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador granted amnesty for those responsible for political crimes and offenses. The amnesty applied to 50 men and 30 women jailed for their support of the FMLN. Notable exceptions are offenses within the purview of the Commission on the Truth and individuals who were already convicted by a jury. Political detainees covered by the amnesty were released.86
La Esperanza Penitentiary in San Salvador was raided on 27 November 1992 in an apparent prisoner rescue operation. Twenty-eight prisoners escaped through a hole blown in the wall. Reports indicated that the prison was believed to hold 15 political prisoners. President Cristiani denied that the government held any political prisoners, claiming that all were released by the 23 January 1992 amnesty decree. He blamed the FMLN for the attack, but the FMLN denied its involvement.87
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999), May 26, 1992; “El Salvador to grant amnesty to political prisoners,” United Press International, February 12, 1992.
- “International News,” The Associated Press, November 27, 1992.
1993
After the release of the report of the Commission on the Truth, the Government issued a general amnesty to protect those implicated for human rights violations. As a consequence, notorious convicted criminals were freed, such as FAES officers Guillermo Benavides and Yusshy Rene Mendoza, who were convicted for the 1989 murder of six Jesuit priests and sentenced to thirty years in prison.88 This ran counter to the specific recommendations of the Commission on the Truth and betrayed the intentions behind the Peace Agreement provisions on prisoner release, which were to release the political prisoners associated with the FMLN.
1994
Political prisoners detained for their alleged political crimes or support to the FMLN were released in 1992.
1995
No further developments observed.
1996
No further developments observed.
1997
No further developments observed.
1998
No further developments observed.
1999
No further developments observed.
2000
No further developments observed.
2001
No further developments observed.
AGREEMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS (aka San Jose Agreement, 26 July 1990)
I. Respect for and Guarantee of Human Rights
3. In the course of the present negotiations, appropriate legal procedures and timetables shall be determined for the release of individuals who have been imprisoned for political reasons.
CHAPULTEPEC AGREEMENT (16 January 1992)
Chapter VI: Political Participation by FMLN
The following agreements have been reached concerning political participation by FMLN, and shall be subject to the implementation timetable contained in this Agreement: 2. Freedom for all political prisoners.
Chapter IX: Implementation Timetable
7.3 Release of political prisoners: D+30.
Paramilitary Groups
1992
The Armed Forces of El Salvador (FAES) carried out the disbandment of civil defense units in April and May 1992. Although they were nominally integrated into the FAES on schedule, the Treasury Police and National Guard failed to abandon their barracks by the established deadline.67 The Parties subsequently reached a negotiated agreement to concentrate forces in the established areas by 25 June 1992, and to present legislation to definitively abolish the National Guard and Treasury Police and establish a “Special Brigade for Military Security” by 30 June 1992.10 The FAES disbanded the Territorial Service by 30 July 1992. The FMLN also completed the concentration of combatants according to the agreement by 26 June 1992. Some small groups of armed and uniformed persons in support of “public security committees” remained outside the concentration sites, but with pressure from ONUSAL, these groups also complied with the concentration agreements by 30 August 1992.68
The FAES failed to begin recovering military weapons from private individuals on time, and it continued to postpone the process despite pressure from ONUSAL.3
1993
The FAES was slow to fulfill its duty to recover military weapons held by private individuals, and ONUSAL expressed doubts that its lists even included the weapons the FAES distributed during the years of conflict.12 The recovery of all weapons held by private citizens was delayed by the Legislative Assembly, which was late to pass laws regulating the use and possession of weapons.76
ONUSAL verified that the National Intelligence Department was formally dismantled in November 1993, and the new State Intelligence Agency was created. It was not clear whether the FAES were still engaged in intelligence activities outside those permitted by the Peace Agreements.89
1994
Following the worst months of post-conflict violence, President Calderon Sol formed a working group and pledged to bring all politically motivated criminal groups to justice.90 The paramilitary groups that endured morphed into criminal gangs, but were still tied to politically-motivated attacks.91
The Law for the Control of Weapons, Munitions, Explosives and Related Artifacts took effect on 11 January 1994, after it was approved by the Legislative Assembly on 9 December 1993. The Government initiated a campaign to recover military weapons from private individuals, but very few were actually relinquished to the FAES.53
The National Police was formally disbanded on 31 December 1994 as per the provisions in the peace accord.36
- “El Salvador: Calderon Sol promises to eradicate death squads,” Inter-Press Service, April 28, 1994.
- “Death squads tied to Salvadoran crime,” United Press International, July 28, 1994.
1995
FAES efforts to collect military weapons held by private citizens remained ineffective. A central issue was the large number of unrecorded weapons in circulation. The Government seized about 2,000 weapons during the first few months of 1995, few of which were given voluntarily. Without clear records, the Government would have to rely on voluntary surrender of the weapons, but without incentives, weapons holders were reluctant to take any initiative to return them.36
1996
Even after the establishment of the National Civil Police, the Government still had some agents acting in a public security capacity outside the formal structure of the National Civil Police. In March 1996, the Government dissolved one such group, the “analysis unit,” but other personnel continued on.43
1997
No developments observed this year.
1998
High violent crime rates and organized violence remained an issue in post-accord period. Politically mobilized paramilitary groups were either dissolved or disbanded but collecting weapons from civilian population remained a challenging issue. Availability of weapons could also have contributed to increasing rate of organized violence.
1999
No further developments observed.
2000
No further developments observed.
2001
No further developments observed.
CHAPULTEPEC AGREEMENT (16 January 1992)
Chapter I: Armed Forces
10. Paramilitary bodies
A. The Parties recognize the principle that any paramilitary force or group must be proscribed in a State governed by the rule of law.
B. Civil defence. Civil defence units shall be disbanded. This process shall be gradual and shall be subject to the implementation timetable for the peace agreements.
C. System of armed forces reserves. A new system of armed forces reserves shall replace the present system of territorial service, according to the following terms:
a. The system shall be responsible for the organization and functioning of the following aspects: (1) up-to-date registration of citizens in reserve status and citizens fit for military service;(2) updating of the military skills of reserves; (3) when necessary, calling reserves up for active duty to perform the mission entrusted to the armed forces by the Constitution.
b. The new system shall be under the authority of the Ministry of Defence.
c. Armed forces reserves may undertake missions only if assigned to active duty in the armed forces and in conformity with the Constitution, and shall not perform any function related to public security or monitoring of the population or the territory.
d. The laws, regulations and orders in force on this subject shall be made compatible with the terms of this Agreement.
D. Regulation of private security services. The Parties recognize the need to regulate the activities of all those entities, groups or persons who provide security or protection to private individuals, corporations or State institutions, in order to guarantee the transparency of their activities and also their strict subordination to the law and to respect for human rights. To that end:
a. A special law shall regulate the activities of entities, groups or persons who provide security or protection to private individuals, corporations or State institutions. That law shall establish the requirements which must be met in order to offer and provide such services; a system for the public registration of the staff, weapons and offices, if any, of such groups, entities or persons; appropriate oversight mechanisms, including their supervision by the National Civil Police; and, in general, the necessary limitations and prohibitions to ensure that such security services operate exclusively within the framework of the law.
b. The law shall also establish peremptory deadlines for fulfilling the above requirements, where relevant. Once those deadlines have expired, entities which have not fulfilled the above requirements shall be considered illegal and their members and organizers shall be subject to application of the corresponding legal penalties.
c. To that end, the Parties express their agreement with the outline of the preliminary legislative draft included as an annex to this Agreement, which they refer to COPAZ, together with the above considerations, for it to prepare the corresponding preliminary draft.
Human Rights
1992
COPAZ and the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador approved the law establishing the Office of the National Counsel for the Defense of Human Rights. The Counsel was then appointed, but delayed in beginning operations due to financial shortages. When the Counsel began operating, it dealt with cases procedurally, but did not act on them.92
ONUSAL raised concerns about persistent anonymous death threats made against potential witnesses to unsolved violent deaths and the lack of adequate action taken by the Government to address them.2 From January to May 1992 especially, the ONUSAL Human Rights Division received dozens of complaints about arbitrary killings and deadly force perpetrated by persons with FAES escorts and former members of the civil defense. A number of attacks against and attempted murders of ex-combatants and organizations affiliated with the parties to the conflict were also reported. Human rights activists were notable subjects of death threats from clandestine groups, as well.35
The use of torture by police officers was confirmed in a few cases, and abuse of arrested persons was systematic, especially at the time of capture.93 The civil defense and territorial service apparatuses were not dismantled on schedule, and ONUSAL received hundreds of reports of unlawful, arbitrary and/or incommunicado detention by members of these institutions. Municipal police showed little respect for due process laws and detainee/prisoner rights, and the judicial system lacked sufficient capacity to investigate or protect against such violations.94 The penal system was fraught with systemic violations of the rights of prisoners and detainees. In March 1992, 4755 of the total 5286 persons held in penitentiaries and penal centers were still awaiting trial. A lack of judges and court personnel was a significant part of the problem, but more importantly, the penal code did not live up to the standards set by the international conventions El Salvador had ratified.38 Minors were detained together with adults, and the living conditions in prisons and detention centers were deplorable.93
The FAES unlawfully recruited members in over 100 cases in early 1992, and FMLN was found to have children under the age of 15 among its ranks. However, recruitment and membership violations in the armed forces of both sides gradually ceased after the signing of the Peace Agreement.35
In general, freedom of movement was restored and international humanitarian law was upheld after the cease-fire took effect. However, ONUSAL received a large number of complaints from both civilians and the Government of unlawful acts or threats of violence and land occupations perpetrated by the FMLN.95
Gender discrimination remained widespread, with systematic discrimination against women at all levels and in all locations. The leading cause of death among women was complications of pregnancy, due to inequitable access to medical care. Salvadorian women constantly faced domestic violence, street violence and sexual harassment.95
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999), May 26, 1992; “Situation of human rights in El Salvador,” United Nations General Assembly (A/47/596), November 13, 1992.
- “Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division,” United Nations Security Council (S/24375), August 12, 1992.
- United Nations General Assembly, (A/47/596).
- ibid.
1993
The National Counsel for the Defense of Human Rights opened regional offices and established itself as an autonomous protector of the peace agreements and burgeoning democracy.96
On 20 May 1993, Salvadorian riot police opened fire on a group of disabled FMLN war veterans demonstrating in Sal Salvador. At least three persons were killed. It was marked as the worst outbreak of violence since the cease-fire took effect.97
ONUSAL saw the report of the Commission on the Truth as one of the most importation human rights developments during its mission. It was clear that it viewed the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth as mandatory for the parties to the conflict.27
Serious concerns persisted regarding the continued trend of violations of the right to life and the right to integrity of person during the mid-year months.95 At the end of October 1993, two FMLN leaders were assassinated, raising political tension further around the issue of extrajudicial killings.98 Of particular concern was the number of these cases that seemed to involved death squads committing murders and making threats of a political nature.76 UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the Security Council pressed upon ONUSAL and the parties to the Peace Agreement to take decisive action to curb the continuing trend of political murders. A Joint Group consisting of representatives from the Government, the National Counsel for the Defense of Human Rights and the ONUSAL Human Rights Division formed to investigate politically motivated illegal armed groups.99 The Government also created the Inter-institutional Investigation Commission to respond to the many reports of extralegal executions, especially those of FMLN ex-combatants. ONUSAL still criticized the Government for its inability to guarantee proper criminal investigations and due process procedures.39
ONUSAL observed that the overall human rights situation improved at the end of the year, after several tenuous months during the middle months of the year. Concerns about politically motivated violence persisted, as details about the violent acts emerged. The total number of complaints deemed admissible by the Human Rights Division during 1993 was 1618, with the greatest proportions regarding violations of the right to life (23.3%), due process (22.7%) and personal freedom (22%). The persons most responsible (presumably) for the violations were members of the National Police (32.5%), the judiciary (19%) and persons unknown (15.1%).14
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/25812), May 21, 1993; “Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador up to 30 April 1993,” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/47/968 S/26033), July 2, 1993.
- “Killings at demonstration,” Keesing’s Record of World Events Volume 39, El Salvador, p. 39456.
- “Letter Dated 3 November 1993 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/26689), November 3, 1993).
- “Letter Dated 7 December 1993 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/26865), December 11, 1993).
1994
The Office of the National Counsel for the Defense of Human Rights (NCDHR) released a report at the beginning of the year concluding that progress on human rights in El Salvador is hindered by contradictions. Instruments and institutions were forming, but international human rights norms were far from standardized and compliance was lacking in the country.14 Later in the year, the NCDHR joined with the National Counsel to establish a authentication apparatus for reports of human rights violations in the country.21
The overall human rights situation improved after the regression during the middle of 1993, evidenced by lower numbers of complaints to the Human Rights Division of ONUSAL. However, reports of the involvement of FAES and National Police personnel in criminal activity, ongoing organized crime and political violence, and the systemic deficiencies in the rule of law tempered the relative improvements and marred the reputation of the new Government. A survey conducted during March 1994 revealed that crime is of greatest concern among the public, with 25% of persons reporting being a victim of assault during the prior three months. ONUSAL contended that the main source of human rights abuses was impunity, which stems from a weak justice system. The Legislative Assembly passed some constitutional amendments to incorporate some, but not all, of the recommendations from the Human Rights Division and the Commission on the Truth.31
The recommendations from the Commission on the Truth regarding recognition and ratification of international human rights treaties and instruments went on unheeded.100
On 10 November 1994, David Fausto Merino Ramirez, FMLN leader, was murdered along with other former revolutionaries, in an apparently politically motivated attack.101
- United Nations Security Council, (S/1994/1212).
- “Thirteenth Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations Security Council / General Assembly (A/49/888 S/1995/281), April 18, 1995.
1995
The general trend of improvement in human rights since 1993 continued into 1995. Disappearances ceased and murders of a political nature became rare. The Government’s enforcement institutions were improving on a similar trajectory, but still fell short of fulfilling all the recommendations from the Commission on the Truth.36 The office of the National Counsel for Human Rights elected a new ombudswoman in March 1995, and the profile of the Counsel rose thereafter.102
In its final report, the ONUSAL Human Rights Division reiterated that the primary source of human rights violations in the country was impunity. So long as the judiciary and National Civil Police continued to fall short of the ideals established by the Peace Accords and the Commission on the Truth Recommendations, impunity would persist.101
In compliance with the recommendations from the Commission on the Truth, on 30 March 1995, the Legislative Assembly ratified the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Government also formally recognized the authority of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.103
As of 6 October 1995, the Legislative Assembly had not approved most of the legal and constitutional reforms it was required to approve by the Commission on the Truth recommendations and the 18 May 1995 revised work plan. The deadline for these reforms was set for 31 October 1995, but the Legislative Assembly was on track to approve some of them no sooner than the end of November 1995, and others not before mid-1996.102
- “The Situation in Central America: Procedures for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace and Progress in Fashioning a Region of Peace, Freedom, Democracy and Development,” United Nations General Assembly (A/50/517), October 6, 1995.
- ” Thirteenth Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/49/888 S/1995/281), April 18, 1995.
1996
At the conclusion of ONUSAL’s mandate, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali commented that the Government’s emergency actions to fight crime contradicted some components of the Peace Accords and set back improvements in human rights.104
1997
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan proclaimed in 1997, “Massive human rights violations no longer occur [in El Salvador]. The systematic practice of forced disappearances, torture, the holding of prisoners incommunicado, acts of terrorism and summary and arbitrary executions on political grounds is a thing of the past.” The Government still had not ratified some important international treaties recommended by the Commission on the Truth, such as the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. The budget of the National Counsel for the Defense of Human Rights was cut significantly, hindering its ability to fulfill the role given it by the Peace Agreements.105
Despite continued promises by the Government to improve the rule of law, rates of violent crime spiked, with 8,281 homicides—compared to an average of 6,330 annual deaths during the civil war.106
- “Assessment of the Peace Process in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/51/917), July 1, 1997, p. 5, para. 16.
- “C. America violence tarnishes peace,” Associated Press Online, June 13, 1998.
1998
According to a report, the Salvadoran government’s human rights record improved somewhat in 1998. There was no report of political killings. However, there were two cases of suspected extrajudicial killings. There were no confirmed politically motivated disappearances. Torture, other cruel treatment and arbitrary arrests were constitutionally prohibited but the PNC continued to use excessive force and otherwise mistreat detainees as well as arbitrary arrests.107 Organized crimes were on the rise.
- “El Salvador Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998,” US State Department, accessed January 4, 2012, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/elsalvad.html.
1999
According to the U.S. State Department Human Rights Report, the government of El Salvador had some problems on issues related to its human rights record. However, the there was some improvement in the government’s performance. It was reported that there were several extrajudicial killings by police, use of excessive police force, mistreatment, arbitrary detention etc. Nevertheless, the new Civilian National Police was said to be improving its procedures.108 The report also suggests high organized crime, which increased after the signing of the accord in 1992.
- “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- El Salvador 1999,” U.S. State Department, Accessed January 4, 2012, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/386.htm.
2000
Organized crimes continued to rise and had some implication on human rights record of government of El Salvador. According to a report, the Salvadoran government’s human rights record improved somewhat in 2000. There was no report of political killings. However, there were two cases of suspected extrajudicial killings by police officers. There were no confirmed politically motivated disappearances. Torture, other cruel treatment and arbitrary arrests were constitutionally prohibited but the PNC continued to use excessive force and otherwise mistreat detainees as well as arbitrary arrests.109 According to the same report, impunity for the rich and powerful remained a problem.
- “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- El Salvador 2000,” U.S. State Department, Accessed January 4, 2012, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/wha/768.htm.
2001
Organized crimes continued to rise and had some implication on human rights record of government of El Salvador. According to a report, the Salvadoran government’s human rights record improved somewhat in 2001. There was no report of political killings. However, there were two cases of suspected extrajudicial killings by police officers. There were no confirmed politically motivated disappearances. Torture, other cruel treatment and arbitrary arrests were constitutionally prohibited but the PNC continued to use excessive force and otherwise mistreat detainees as well as arbitrary arrests.110 According to the same report, impunity for the rich and powerful remained a problem. Police kidnapped persons for profit.
2012: The Salvadoran government generally respected human rights, but there were some areas of violation. According to the same report, impunity for the rich and powerful remained a problem. Police kidnapped persons for profit. Gender related violence and discrimination remained a serious problem. Some police officers committed killings, and used excessive force and mistreated detainees. Prison conditions remained poor, and overcrowding was a continuing problem.111
- “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- El Salvador 2001,” U.S. State Department, Accessed January 4, 2012, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/wha/8354.htm.
- “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- El Salvador 2002,” U.S. State Department, Accessed 4 January 2012, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18331.htm.
AGREEMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS (aka San Jose Agreement, 26 July 1990)
I. Respect for and Guarantee of Human Rights
The Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (hereinafter referred to as “the Parties”),
Bearing in mind that the legal system of El Salvador provides for the recognition of human rights and the duty of the State to respect and guarantee such rights;
Considering also that the State has assumed obligations of this nature under the many international conventions to which it is a party;
Bearing in mind that the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional has the capacity and the will and assumes the commitment to respect the inherent attributes of the human person;
Reiterating the common purpose, expressed in the Geneva Agreement, to guarantee unrestricted respect for human rights in El Salvador;
Further reiterating their willingness, also expressed in the Geneva Agreement, to submit in this matter to verification by the United Nations;
On the understanding that for the purposes of the present political agreement, “human rights” shall mean those rights recognized by the Salvadorian legal system, including treaties to which El Salvador is a party, and by the declarations and principles on human rights and humanitarian law adopted by the United Nations and the Organization of American States;
Have concluded the following agreement in pursuance of the initial objective of the Geneva Agreement:
1. All necessary steps and measures shall be taken immediately to avoid any act or practice which constitutes an attempt upon the life, integrity, security or freedom of the individual. Similarly, all necessary steps and measures shall be taken to eliminate any practice involving enforced disappearances and abductions. Priority shall be given to the investigation of any cases of this kind which may arise and to the identification and punishment of the persons found guilty.
2. The full guarantee of the freedom and the integrity of the person requires that certain immediate measures be taken in order to ensure the following:
a. No one may be arrested for the lawful exercise of his political rights;
b. An arrest may be made only if ordered by the competent authority in writing and in accordance with the law, and the arrest must be carried out by officers who are properly identified as such;
c. Anyone arrested must be informed while the arrest is being made of the reasons for the arrest and must be apprised without delay of the charge or charges against him;
d. No one shall be placed under arrest as a means of intimidation. In particular, arrests shall not be made at night, except in the case of individuals caught in flagrante delicto;
e. No one in custody shall be held incommunicado. Any person who has been arrested shall have the right to be assisted without delay by legal counsel of his own choosing and the right to communicate freely and privately with such counsel;
f. No one shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
3. In the course of the present negotiations, appropriate legal procedures and timetables shall be determined for the release of individuals who have been imprisoned for political reasons.
4. The fullest possible support shall be given to ensuring the effectiveness of the remedies of amparo and habeas corpus. To this end, the broadest possible publicity shall be given to this Agreement among the public at large and, in particular, among authorities or officers in charge of detention centres. Anyone who hampers the operation of these remedies or provides false information to the judicial authorities shall be punished.
5. The right of all persons to associate freely with others for ideological, religious, political, economic, labour, social, cultural, sporting or other purposes shall be fully guaranteed. Trade union freedom shall be fully respected.
6. Freedom of expression and of the press, the right of reply and the activities of the press shall be fully guaranteed.
7. Displaced persons and returnees shall be provided with the identity documents required by law and shall be guaranteed freedom of movement. They shall also be guaranteed the freedom to carry on their economic activities and to exercise their political and social rights within the framework of the country’s institutions.
8. All persons shall be guaranteed freedom of movement in the areas involved in conflict, and the necessary steps shall be taken to provide the inhabitants of such areas with the identity documents required by law. 9. The Parties recognize the necessity of guaranteeing the effective enjoyment of labour rights. This subject will be considered under the agenda item on economic and social problems.
II. International Verification
10. In accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Agreement and the agenda for the negotiations which was adopted in Caracas, the Parties hereby agree to the terms of reference for the United Nations human rights verification mission (hereinafter referred to as “the Mission”), as set out below.
11. The Mission shall devote special attention to the observance of the rights to life, to the integrity and security of the person, to due process of law, to personal liberty, to freedom of expression and to freedom of association.
In this context, a special effort shall be made to clarify any situation which appears to reveal the systematic practice of human rights violations and, in such cases, to recommend appropriate measures for the elimination of the practice to the Party concerned. The foregoing shall be without prejudice to any powers granted to the Mission to consider individual cases.
12. A Director designated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be in charge of the Mission. The Director shall work in close cooperation with existing human rights organizations and bodies in El Salvador. He shall also be assisted by expert advisers. In addition, the Mission shall include as many verification personnel as may be necessary.
13. The purpose of the Mission shall be to investigate the human rights situation in El Salvador as regards acts committed or situations existing as from the date of its establishment and to take any steps it deems appropriate to promote and defend such rights. Accordingly, it shall perform its functions with a view to promoting respect for human rights and their guarantee in El Salvador and helping to do away with those situations in which such respect and guarantees are not duly observed.
14. The Mission’s mandate shall include the following powers:
a. To verify the observance of human rights in El Salvador;
b. To receive communications from any individual, group of individuals or body in El Salvador, containing reports of human rights violations;
c. To visit any place or establishment freely and without prior notice;
d. To hold its meetings freely anywhere in the national territory;
e. To interview freely and privately any individual, group of individuals or members of bodies or institutions;
f. To collect by any means it deems appropriate such information as it considers relevant;
g. To make recommendations to the Parties on the basis of any conclusions it has reached with respect to cases or situations it may have been called upon to consider;
h. To offer its support to the judicial authorities of El Salvador in order to help improve the judicial procedures for the protection of human rights and increase respect for the rules of due process of law;
i. To consult the Attorney-General of the Republic;
j. To plan and carry out an educational and informational campaign on human rights and on the functions of the Mission itself;
k. To use the media to the extent useful for the fulfilment of its mandate;
l. To report regularly to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and through him to the General Assembly.
15. The Parties undertake to give their full support to the Mission. To that end, they pledge:
a. To grant the Mission whatever facilities it may require for the performance of its functions;
b. To ensure the security of the members of the Mission and of such persons as may have provided it with information, testimony or evidence of any kind;
c. To provide, as expeditiously as possible, whatever information may be required by the Mission;
d. To give their earliest consideration to any recommendations made to them by the Mission;
e. Not to hinder the fulfillment of the Mission’s mandate.
16. Each of the Parties shall appoint a delegate to serve as liaison with the Mission.
17. Should the Mission receive communications referring to acts or situations which occurred prior to its establishment, it may transmit them, if it deems it appropriate, to the competent authorities.
18. The fact that a case or situation has been considered by the Mission shall not preclude the application thereto of international procedures for the promotion and protection of human rights.
19. Subject to any arrangements which must be made prior to its establishment, the Mission shall take up its duties as of the cessation of the armed conflict. The Mission shall be established initially for one year and may be renewed.
MEXICO AGREEMENT (27 April 1991)
II. Judicial system and human rights
1. Agreements on constitutional reforms designed to improve significant aspects of the judicial system and establish mechanisms for safeguarding human rights, such as:
a. Reorganization of the Supreme Court of Justice and a new procedure for the election of Supreme Court judges. Henceforth, a two-thirds majority of deputies elected to the Legislative Assembly shall be required to elect judges to the Supreme Court of Justice.
b. An annual allocation from the State budget to the judiciary amounting to no less than 6 per cent of current income.
c. Creation of the post of a National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights, whose primary function shall be to promote and ensure respect for human rights.
d. Election of the Attorney-General of the Republic, the Chief State Counsel and the National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights by a two-thirds majority of deputies elected to the Legislative Assembly.
NEW YORK AGREEMENT (25 September 1991)
IV. Doctrine of the armed forces
Agreement shall be reached on the redefinition of the doctrine of the armed forces based on the ideas that emerge from the agreements on this subject and from the constitutional reform. It is understood that the function of the armed forces is to defend the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of its territory, and that this doctrine should be based on the principle that the activities and regime of the armed forces shall be consistent with the principles deriving from the concept of the legally-constituted State governed by the rule of law, the primacy of the dignity of the human person and respect for human rights; defence of and respect for the sovereignty of the Salvadorian people; the concept of the armed forces as an institution in the service of the nation, free from all considerations of politics, ideology or social standing, and from all other forms of discrimination; and the subordination of the armed services to the constitutional authorities.
V. Training system for the armed forces
Full effect will be given in its entirety to the agreement reached in Mexico on 27 April 1991 whereby the professional training of personnel serving in the armed forces shall place emphasis on the pre-eminence of human dignity and democratic values, respect for human rights and the subordination of such forces to the constitutional authorities. The agreements reached in this respect shall comprise regulatory provisions guaranteeing the foregoing points as well as the admission and instruction systems.
Chapter II: National Civil Police
2. Doctrine
A. The legal regime, staff training, organizational lines, operational guidelines and, in general, the institutional definition and operation of the National Civil Police shall accord with democratic principles; the concept of public security as a service provided by the State to its citizens, free from all considerations of politics, ideology or social position or any other discrimination; respect for human rights; the effort to prevent crime; and the subordination of the force to the constitutional authorities. Citizens’ exercise of their political rights may not be impaired by police activities.
D. In the performance of their tasks, members of the National Civil Police shall respect and protect human dignity and shall preserve and defend the human rights of all persons.
Refugees
1992
The Government of El Salvador began to coordinate with neighboring countries for the resettlement of Salvadorian refugees.1 Representatives from the UN High Commission for Refugees went to Mexico to facilitate the return of some 250,000 Salvadoran refugees residing there.112 The greater portion of the approximately 7,000 refugees in Honduras and 20,000 in Nicaragua had already returned by the time the Peace Agreement was signed. Around 2,000 of those left in Nicaragua prepared to return as soon as the cease fire took effect.113 Over 250 maimed FMLN combatants returned from Cuba, where they had been receiving medical treatment.114 Some 200,000 Salvadoran refugees remained in the United States. It seemed many either did not wish to return, or were too uncertain about the peace process to return before it was complete.115
The Legislative Assembly passed two decrees to help displaced persons and returnees gain/regain documents for certification and registration with the Government of El Salvador.38
- “U.N. to hasten return of Salvadoran refugees from Mexico,” Xinhua General News Service, February 29, 1992.
- “Salvadoran refugees in Nicaragua hope to return home,” Xinhua General News Service, January 4, 1992; “Last group of Salvadoran refugees in Honduras return home,” Xinhua General News Service, April 1, 1992.
- “Disabled Salvadoran guerrillas leave Cuba for home,” Xinhua General News Service, June 17, 1992.
- “United States: Can Salvadoran refugees stay?” Inter-Press Service, May 13, 1992.
1993
The roughly 200,000 Salvadoran refugees granted safe-haven in the United States were set to have their temporary protected status expire on 30 June 1993, after President Bush had extended it a year past the prior expiration date of 30 June 1992. Advocates for the refugees estimated that another 500,000 Salvadorans were in the US without documentation and argued that conditions were still too unstable in El Salvador to repatriate such large numbers of persons en masse.116 President Clinton extended the temporary protected status for an additional 18 months, setting the new deadline for 31 December 1994.117
A Board of Vigilance composed of representatives of all the political parties was created to advise citizens on problems they encountered in getting voter registration cards.15 This was important because refugees in the process of repatriation faced problems due to a lack of legal documentation.
- “United States will allow Salvadorens to stay,” The Associated Press, May 14, 1992; “El Salvador: U.S. urged to extend safe haven for thousands,” Inter-Press Service, March 20, 1993.
- “U.S. does not extend Salvadoran refugee program,” Deutshe Presse-Agentur, December 2, 1994.
1994
The legal limbo in which many returned refugees found themselves became a more salient issue as the first post-conflict election neared. Despite important improvements made by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, many discrepancies persisted in the registration records. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal did not meet the deadline in early 1994 for issuing registration cards after the push to register as many voters as possible.15 By 16 March 1994, more than 74,000 persons requesting voter registration cards still had not received them due to insufficient documentation.16
In December 1994, the US Government announced it would not extend the temporary protected status of approximately 200,000 Salvadorans sheltered in the US. After their status expired on 31 December 1994, they were to return to El Salvador within nine months.117
1995
The Government of El Salvador feared that if all the refugees in the US returned home en masse the economy would not be able to absorb them. The remittances sent to El Salvador from Salvadoran refugees and immigrants in the US made up a large part of the Salvadoran economy as well. The Government actively assisted Salvadorans in the US on temporary protected status visas to extend their stays by applying for political asylum.118
1996
Salvadoran refugees continued to apply for asylum up until the end of the nine-month grace period. More than 100,000 applied in total. Once their case was received for review, they may be granted permission to stay until it is resolved, but refugee advocates only expected a small fraction of applicants to be granted asylum. The US pledged that there would be no mass-deportations in any case.119
The Supreme Electoral Tribunal made some administrative reforms, but was not advancing very quickly to institute the acts of the Legislative Assembly to improve the voting register. Much work was to be done to implement the ONUSAL and MINUSAL recommendations before the 1997 legislative and municipal elections, but the Tribunal was hampered by a small budget.43
- “Salvadorans face deadline — Today is last day for refugees to apply for political asylum,” San Antonio Express-News, January 31, 1996; “Peace in El Salvador strikes fear in refugees; Time is running out on temporary protected status of 190,000,” Knight-Ridder News Service, via Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, February 18, 1996, National Section, p. A4.
1997
President Calderon Sol criticized the US for not being more lenient with Salvadoran refugees.120 The US Congress made moves to loosen immigration regulations that would require the deportation of all Salvadoran refugees denied political asylum. Under the new rules, refugees would be allowed to stay long enough to apply for residency, but residency would not be guaranteed.121
- “Salvador president hits U.S.; Immigration, drugs are focus of speech,” The Washington Times, June 20, 1997.
- “Congress to loosen immigration rules,” Austin American-Statesman, November 7, 1997.
1998
In 1999, the US government confirmed plans to allow Salvadoran refugees to apply for permanent residence in the US. The plan applied for those who had entered the US before 1990, and was designed to heed concerns that mass deportations would exacerbate El Salvador’s unemployment problems.122
Following two disastrous earthquakes in 2001 (which came after a deadly hurricane in 1998), the US government granted Temporary Protected Status for undocumented Salvadoran immigrants. The move was expected to benefit about 300,000 Salvadorans living in the US.123
Instead of being repatriated and resettled back in El Salvador, more than two-third of the Salvadoran refugees ended up settling in the United States. This happened even when the peace process became a success and no political prosecution and killings took place in the aftermath of the peace accords.
- “Guatemala,” Keesing’s Record of World Events, Vol. 45, (May 1999), p. 42932.
- “El Salvador,” Keesing’s Record of World Events, vol. 47, (March 2001), p. 44046.
1999
No further developments observed.
2000
No further developments observed.
2001
No further developments observed.
AGREEMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS (aka San Jose Agreement, 26 July 1990)
I. Respect for and Guarantee of Human Rights
7. Displaced persons and returnees shall be provided with the identity documents required by law and shall be guaranteed freedom of movement. They shall also be guaranteed the freedom to carry on their economic activities and to exercise their political and social rights within the framework of the country’s institutions
CHAPULTEPEC AGREEMENT (16 January 1992)
Chapter VI: Political Participation by FMLN
3. Full guarantees and security for the return of exiles, war-wounded and other persons currently outside the country for reasons related to the armed conflict.
Internally Displaced Persons
1992
The Legislative Assembly passed two decrees to help displaced persons and returnees gain/regain documents for certification and registration with the Government of El Salvador.38
The Government made an agreement with the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) to share information on displaced persons and analyze the needs of approximately 7,000 former FMLN combatants gathered in designated areas according to the demobilization plan. The World Food Program was also authorized to provide assistance at displaced personsÕ encampments.124
Tensions between peasants and public security bodies continued despite assurances that the current residents of lands in conflict zones could remain where they were after the signing of the Peace Agreement. In some cases, the Armed Forces of El Salvador (FAES) worked with public security forces—without court orders—to evict peasants from disputed lands and occupy the lands for themselves. COPAZ intervened, but did not fully succeed in halting the evictions. ONUSAL subsequently intervened, but also failed to put an end to the evictions for several months.1 The UN Secretary-General’s office then became involved, and after consulting a number of international bodies and UN member states, helped the Parties reach an agreement to proceed with land transfers in late October 1992.70 However, ONUSAL received reports that unsanctioned land occupations continued into November 1992.2
1993
Despite serious financial difficulties, the program for the transfer of lands proceeded, albeit at a slow pace. Both parties contributed to the delays: FMLN was slow to submit complete lists of land transfer recipients and the Government’s Lands Bank maintained slow and complicated procedures for the legal transfer of land. Both parties also relocated landholders on land whose owners were not willing to sell, further complicating the process.12 Progress fell further behind in October 1993.76 After an appeal to move forward by the UN Secretary-General, the parties reached a new agreement to move forward on 13 October 1993, and the Government developed an Acceleration Plan.53
A Board of Vigilance composed of representatives of all the political parties was created to advise citizens on problems they encountered in getting voter registration cards.15 Internally displaced persons often faced problems in getting voter registration cards due to a lack of legal documentation of their displacement as well as resettlement.
1994
The Acceleration Plan brought progress in the land transfer program, but not nearly at the rate it promised and not in the proportions promised to the FMLN beneficiaries in the 13 October 1993 agreement. On 21 April 1994, the Legislative Assembly passed a bill to reform the Labor Code to reflect reforms agreed upon in previous meetings of the Forum for Economic and Social Consultation, but the labor sector criticized the bill.125 The Government submitted a new acceleration plan on 18 August 1994, in which it pledged to strengthen the administrative infrastructure necessary to facilitate land transfers to FMLN ex-combatants. The program was stalled by funding shortfalls, however.19 At the two-year mark after the program began, only one-third of potential beneficiaries had actually received land.21 New progressive strides were made in November and December 1994, including improved administrative measures, shifting of responsibilities to the regional level, and increased personnel to measure land and communicate with potential beneficiaries.36
The legal limbo in which many internally displaced persons found themselves became a more salient issue as the first post-conflict election neared. Despite important improvements made by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, many discrepancies persisted in the registration records. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal did not meet the deadline in early 1994 for issuing registration cards after the push to register as many voters as possible.126 By 16 March 1994, more than 74,000 persons requesting voter registration cards still had not received them due to insufficient documentation.16
1995
The forward momentum in land reform programs created at the end of 1994 was curbed in January 1995, due in large part to personnel turnover in the Lands Bank. As of March 1995, approximately 45% of former combatants eligible for land-transfers had in fact received legal ownership of land. The Government was operating at a pace far too slow to meet the 30 April 1995 deadline for completion of the Acceleration Plan. The delays in land transfer programs, and especially delays in dealing with the relocation of human settlements, was becoming and increasing source of contention. Absent decisive involvement of the Government, lawful landowners and de facto landholders were repeatedly pitted against one another, and confrontations between them threatened to have a broad impact on the Peace Agreement.36 Problems persisted into late 1995. The Government stepped up efforts to get land titles to potential beneficiaries, and indeed the proportion rose to 75% in September, but then it was discovered that only 25% of these had filed with the land registry—a step which was necessary for the title holders to sell the land and complete the transfer process.102
1996
After a number of persons left the program, the total number of potential beneficiaries of land reform fell to 36,550. By 26 March 1996, 32,210 of them had received titles, and about half of those were recorded in the land registry. The program faced an impasse when land-for-sale became scarce and the human settlement relocations left some persons in unsustainable situations.43
By November 1996, nearly 99% of potential beneficiaries had received titles, and 87% of those had filed their deeds in the national registry.127
The Supreme Electoral Tribunal made some administrative reforms, but was not advancing very quickly to institute the acts of the Legislative Assembly to improve the voting register. Much work was to be done to implement the ONUSAL and MINUSAL recommendations before the 1997 legislative and municipal elections, but the Tribunal was hampered by a small budget.43
- “Office of the United Nations Verification in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/51/693), November 25, 1996.
1997
The land transfer programs remained a challenge, but progress was made on many of the most vexing cases. The transfer of human settlements was again the biggest challenge.128
Nearing the completion of the land transfer program, almost 35,000 persons had received titles to a total of over 140,000 manzanas (235,200 acres) of land. Hundreds of persons had not received land titles, however, and the government was still moving rather slowly to resolve the logistical issues preventing the completion of the program.84
- “Letter Dated 15 December 1997 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly,” United Nations General Assembly (A/52/731), December 16, 1997.
1998
Outstanding issues preventing the completion of the programs for land transfer and human settlement transfer were not resolved as of the conclusion of official UN observation on 30 June 1998.85 The IDP resettlement program was relatively successful.
1999
No major developments were reported related to resettlement of conflict related displaced persons.
2000
No further developments observed.
2001
No further developments observed.
AGREEMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS (aka San Jose Agreement, 26 July 1990)
I. Respect for and Guarantee of Human Rights
7. Displaced persons and returnees shall be provided with the identity documents required by law and shall be guaranteed freedom of movement. They shall also be guaranteed the freedom to carry on their economic activities and to exercise their political and social rights within the framework of the country’s institutions.
Media Reform
1992
The Government of El Salvador granted provisional licenses to the FMLN for two radio stations, but not the television station it requested.2
1993
On 8 September 1993, the Government pledged to assign two new television and one short-wave stations to the FMLN, fulfilling the agreements made on 22 December 1992.76 ccording to the US State Department, the Salvadoran government did not control media in El Salvador in 1993.129 This suggests a significant media reform in El Salvador.
- “EL SALVADOR HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES,” US State Department, State Department Dispatch, February 1994.
1994
The FMLN’s primary radio station, “Radio Vencerermos,” operated without interference from the Government, but it struggled to survive in a competitive market after leaving behind its former propaganda.130 According to US State Department, the Salvadoran government did not control media in El Salvador in 1994.131 This suggests a significant media reform in El Salvador.
- “Rebel broadcasting goes mainstream in El Salvador,” The Globe and Mail, March 23, 1994.
- “EL SALVADOR HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES,” US State Department, State Department Dispatch, March 1995.
1995
Media Reform provisions of the accord were implemented by allowing FMLN to open radio and television stations. Also, government did not control media. No setbacks in media reform took place.
1996
No further developments observed.
1997
No further developments observed.
1998
No further developments observed.
1999
No further developments observed.
2000
No further developments observed.
2001
No further developments observed.
CHAPULTEPEC AGREEMENT (16 January 1992)
Chapter VI: Political Participation by FMLN
The following agreements have been reached concerning political participation by FMLN, and shall be subject to the implementation timetable contained in this Agreement:
4. Granting of licenses for FMLN mass media.
Annex F: Use of the mass media to promote reconciliation
For the purpose of assisting the process of détente and reconciliation:
A. Once this Agreement is signed, the Government shall not jam FMLN radio stations.
B. As from D-day, both Parties undertake to:
a. Promote, through the various mass media at their disposal, a national publicity campaign in favour of the reunification and reconciliation of Salvadorian society.
b. Refrain from any propaganda or information policy that is inconsistent with this Agreement or with the process of détente and reconciliation.
C. COPAZ shall monitor the above undertakings and shall transmit to the Parties any recommendations it deems relevant. It may also make suggestions for the participation of the various sectors of civilian society and, in particular, the mass media in the national reconciliation campaign.
D. ONUSAL shall verify fulfillment of these undertakings.
Economic and Social Development
1992
Tensions between peasants and public security bodies continued despite assurances that the current residents of lands in conflict zones could remain where they were after the signing of the Peace Agreement. In some cases, the Armed Forces of El Salvador (FAES) worked with public security forces—without court orders—to evict peasants from disputed lands and occupy the lands for themselves. COPAZ intervened, but did not fully succeed in halting the evictions. ONUSAL subsequently intervened, but also failed to put an end to the evictions for several months.1 The UN Secretary-General’s office then became involved, and after consulting a number of international bodies and UN member states, helped the Parties reach an agreement to proceed with land transfers in late October 1992.70 However, ONUSAL received reports that unsanctioned land occupations continued into November 1992.2
The Government submitted its national reconstruction plan on time and began to implement components of it.132 After some minor delays, the emergency assistance programs were implemented for the majority of demobilized FMLN ex-combatants. Agricultural training and rehabilitation programs for the disabled ex-combatants were also started.68
1993
Despite serious financial difficulties, the program for the transfer of lands proceeded, albeit at a slow pace. Both parties contributed to the delays: FMLN was slow to submit complete lists of land transfer recipients and the Government’s Lands Bank maintained slow and complicated procedures for the legal transfer of land. Both parties also relocated landholders on land whose owners were not willing to sell, further complicating the process.12 Progress fell further behind in October 1993.76 After an appeal to move forward by the UN Secretary-General, the parties reached a new agreement to move forward on 13 October 1993, and the Government developed an Acceleration Plan.53
The distribution of agricultural tools and basic household goods concluded in April 1993, along with the agricultural training program. A lack of available credit hindered the purchase of land and stunted housing and agricultural development.75
Programs for the war-disabled were delayed because the two parties could not agree upon ways to provide long-term rehabilitation. The medical program was likewise delayed over disagreements about personnel and slow delivery of hospital equipment.75
The parties agreed to continuously consult one another on labor issues through a newly created Labor Council in the Ministry of Labor. The business sector, however, pulled out on 20 November 1993.89
1994
The Acceleration Plan brought progress in the land transfer program, but not nearly at the rate it promised and not in the proportions promised to the FMLN beneficiaries in the 13 October 1993 agreement. On 21 April 1994, the Legislative Assembly passed a bill to reform the Labor Code to reflect reforms agreed upon in previous meetings of the Forum for Economic and Social Consultation, but the labor sector criticized the bill.53 The Government submitted a new acceleration plan on 18 August 1994, in which it pledged to strengthen the administrative infrastructure necessary to facilitate land transfers to FMLN ex-combatants. The program was stalled by funding shortfalls, however.19 At the two-year mark after the program began, only one-third of potential beneficiaries had actually received land.21 New progressive strides were made in November and December 1994, including improved administrative measures, shifting of responsibilities to the regional level, and increased personnel to measure land and communicate with potential beneficiaries.36
1995
The forward momentum in land reform programs created at the end of 1994 was curbed in January 1995, due in large part to personnel turnover in the Lands Bank. As of March 1995, approximately 45% of former combatants eligible for land-transfers had in fact received legal ownership of land. The Government was operating at a pace far too slow to meet the 30 April 1995 deadline for completion of the Acceleration Plan. The delays in land transfer programs, and especially delays in dealing with the relocation of human settlements, was becoming an increasing source of contention. Absent decisive involvement of the Government, lawful landowners and de facto landholders were repeatedly pitted against one another, and confrontations between them threatened to have a broad impact on the Peace Agreement.133 Problems persisted into late 1995. The Government stepped up efforts to get land titles to potential beneficiaries, and indeed the proportion rose to 75% in September, but then it was discovered that only 25% of these had filed with the land registry—a step which was necessary for the title holders to sell the land and complete the transfer process.102
1996
After a number of persons left the program, the total number of potential beneficiaries of land reform fell to 36,550. By 26 March 1996, 32,210 of them had received titles, and about half of those were recorded in the land registry. The program faced an impasse when land-for-sale became scarce and the human settlement relocations left some persons in unsustainable situations.43
By November 1996, nearly 99% of potential beneficiaries had received titles, and 87% of those had filed their deeds in the national registry.127
1997
Nearing the completion of the land transfer program, almost 35,000 persons had received titles to a total of over 140,000 manzanas (235,200 acres) of land. Hundreds of persons had not received land titles, however, and the government was still moving rather slowly to resolve the logistical issues preventing the completion of the program.84
1998
Outstanding issues preventing the completion of the programs for land transfer and human settlement transfer were not resolved as of the conclusion of official UN observation on 30 June 1998.85
Hurricane Mitch devastated the whole region, killing thousands and setting development back by twenty years.134 A flurry of monetary aid, loans and debt forgiveness came in from international donors.135
- “The Week’s Top Ten World Stories,” The Guardian, November 7, 1998.
- “Central America,” Keesing’s Record of World Events, November 1998, Vol. 44, p. 42608; “Central America and Caribbean,” Keesing’s Record of World Events, December 1998, Vol. 44, p. 42666.
1999
No developments observed this year.
2000
No developments observed this year.
2001
Progresses were made in terms of redistributing lands and agriculture equipment. El Salvador adopted the US Dollar as its official currency to reduce borrowing costs. Two earthquakes struck in 2001, setting economic development back again.136
2002
No further developments observed.
NEW YORK AGREEMENT (25 September 1991)
VII. Economic and social questions
1. Lands in excess of the constitutional limit of 245 hectares, as well as lands owned by the State which are not currently legally designated forest reserves, shall be used to meet the needs of peasants and small farmers who are without land. To this end, the Government shall also make arrangements to purchase lands offered for sale to the State.
2. The current land-holding situation in the conflict zones shall be respected until a satisfactory legal solution for the definitive land-holding regime is arrived at. The procedures and deadlines for the implementation of this agreement shall be agreed upon in the compressed negotiations.
3. The policies for granting loans to the agriculture and livestock sector shall be revised.
4. The Parties refer to the compressed negotiations, as part of the economic and social subject area, consideration of the following topics:
a. Measures required to alleviate the social cost of structural adjustment programmes;
b. Appropriate procedures for direct external cooperation designed to encourage community assistance and development projects;
c. Establishment of a Forum for economic and social accommodation, with participation by the governmental, labour and business sectors, for the purpose of continuing to resolve economic and social problems. The Forum may be open to participation by other social and political sectors as observers, under terms to be determined by it.
CHAPULTEPEC AGREEMENT (16 January 1992)
Chapter V: Economic and Social Questions
1. Preamble
One of the prerequisites for the democratic reunification of Salvadorian society is the sustained economic and social development of the country. At the same time, reunification of Salvadorian society and a growing degree of social cohesion are indispensable for fostering development. Hence, the set of agreements required to put a definitive end to the armed conflict in El Salvador must include certain minimum commitments to promote development for the benefit of all sectors of the population.
In accordance with the New York Agreement, the issues covered by this instrument are: the agrarian problem, loans to the agricultural sector, measures required to alleviate the social cost of structural adjustment programmes, appropriate procedures for direct external cooperation designed to encourage community development and assistance projects, establishment of a forum for economic and social consultation and the National Reconstruction Plan. Also, although the general philosophy or orientation of the Government’s economic policy, which FMLN does not necessarily share, is not covered by this Agreement, both Parties agree on the need to provide certain basic guidelines so as to ensure the requisite social stability during the transitional period, consolidate peace and make progress towards the reunification of Salvadorian society.
2. The agrarian problem
A. Lands in excess of the constitutional limit of 245 hectares
The Government of El Salvador shall transfer rural farmland that has not yet been transferred under articles 105 and 267 of the Constitution of the Republic. It likewise undertakes to ensure that implementation of the relevant constitutional requirements is not evaded by owners of rural holdings in excess of 245 hectares.
B. State-owned lands which are not currently part of a forestry reserve
The Government of El Salvador shall transfer to beneficiaries of the
agrarian reform, as provided in article 104 of the Constitution, State-owned rural farmland which is not part of a forestry reserve. Under the various land-transfer programmes which the Government of El Salvador is carrying out with State-owned farmland, preference shall be given to former combatants of both Parties who so request voluntarily, are of peasant origin and familiar with farming, and possess no land of any kind. The size of the lots shall be determined by the amount of land available, as mentioned above, and the number of beneficiaries who meet the conditions set out in this section.
C. Lands offered for sale to the State
Making use of the legal, technical and financial resources available to it, the Government of El Salvador shall seek to acquire and transfer through the Land Bank lands voluntarily offered for sale by their owners. Once the said lands are acquired, they shall be transferred to beneficiaries of the agrarian reform.
D. Recipients of lands transferred in accordance with the preceding sections
The lands acquired under sections A, B and C of this chapter shall be used to satisfy the need for land of landless peasants and small farmers. Specifically, title to the land shall be transferred legally to the peasants and small farmers designated by law as beneficiaries of the agrarian reform.
E. Payments for land
The lands referred to in the preceding sections shall be transferred at market prices and on the same credit terms as are granted to beneficiaries of the reformed sector. At the same time, a system of payments may be established on the basis of a fixed price and long-term financing at low, fixed interest rates not subject to interest capitalization. Domestic credit shall be supplemented with financing from international cooperation, for which a special fund, financed from external resources, shall be established for the purchase of land.
F. New legislation
Since the current agrarian legislation is haphazard, contradictory and incomplete, the Parties agree that it must be harmonized and unified into an agrarian code. To this end, the Government shall submit the relevant draft legislation to the Legislative Assembly no later than 12 months after the signing of this Agreement. If it fails to do so, COPAZ shall take on the task of preparing the corresponding preliminary draft.
3. Lands within conflict zones
A. The land-tenure system in conflict zones
In accordance with the New York Agreement, the current land-tenure situation in conflict zones shall be respected until a satisfactory legal solution for the definitive land-tenure system is arrived at. Consequently, landholders shall not be evicted pending agreement on such a solution; moreover, they shall be given financial support to increase agricultural production. In view of the irregularity of the land-tenure system in conflict zones, the Parties agree on the following:
B. Determination as to who are the “current landholders”
“Landholders” shall mean those currently occupying and/or working the land in conflict zones.
C. Inventory of cases covered by this part of the Agreement
Within 30 days from the signing of the Agreement, FMLN shall submit an inventory of land or buildings affected by the Agreement. Upon verification that such land or buildings are in fact subject to the provisions of this Agreement, and in accordance with the procedure set forth in the next section, the Government of El Salvador shall seek to provide a satisfactory legal solution for their final disposal through the voluntary sale of such property by the rightful owners to the current holders, on the terms referred to in section 3 (F) of this chapter. Should a rightful owner not wish to sell his property, the Government of El Salvador shall make use of the legal mechanisms at its disposal to try to resettle the peasants or small farmers on such land as may be available for the purpose and shall, as far as possible, seek to ensure that such land is situated in the same zones.
D. Establishment of a Special Commission
COPAZ shall appoint a special commission whose members shall be of recognized integrity and ability. The special commission, to be formed within 20 days following the signing of this Agreement, shall be entrusted with the following tasks and duties:
a. To verify the inventory of affected land or buildings within conflict zones. Once the inventory has been verified, the special commission shall submit copies to the Government of El Salvador and to COPAZ;
b. Should the need arise, to facilitate the settlement of disputes between current holders and rightful owners;
c. To take any decisions and measures it deems necessary and proper for the prompt and effective fulfilment of the agreements set forth in this chapter.
E. Legalization of land tenure
Except for particularly complex cases, the Government of El Salvador shall legalize the land-tenure situation in conflict zones definitively within six months from the signing of the cease-fire agreement, granting, as appropriate, individual or collective title to the land.
F. Payment for lands
Lands shall be purchased from their former owners at market prices. The sale to the current holders shall be subject to the same conditions as those granted to beneficiaries of the reformed sector. However, special conditions may be agreed to in the interests of the peace process.
G. Verification by COPAZ
COPAZ shall guarantee fulfilment of the agreements set forth in sections 2 and 3.
4. 3 July 1991 agreement on occupied lands
The agreement on occupied lands between the Government of El Salvador and peasant organizations shall be respected.
With regard to lands occupied illegally after the date of that agreement, the Government of El Salvador gives notice that it reserves the right to enforce the relevant legal provisions so as to ensure that the rule of law prevails. FMLN holds that the agrarian problem, including land occupations, should be dealt with through consultation and the channels and mechanisms provided by the peace agreements.
5. Loans to the agricultural sector and to micro- and small-scale enterprise
A. Loans to the sector as a whole
The Government of El Salvador shall see to it that the national financial system has the resources it needs to meet the demand for credit of the agricultural sector in general and of micro- and small-scale enterprise and small-scale peasant production, including cooperatives in the reformed and the non-reformed sector, in particular. It shall also establish rules governing loans for agricultural and industrial production so that such loans are granted in a timely manner and in amounts sufficient to sustain productive capacity and the marketing of the goods produced. To that end, it shall promote an increase in loans by the commercial banking system to small businessmen and small-scale enterprises.
B. Active involvement of target sectors
The Government also undertakes to permit and promote the active involvement of target sectors in both the design and the administration of special credit programmes for those sectors. To that end, the Government undertakes to increase the participation of organizations representing the sectors referred to in the preceding section in developing policies of the Agricultural Guarantee Fund, FIGAPE, FEDECREDITO and BFA, and to ensure that the financial position of these institutions remains sound and that they become conduits for channelling external resources into loans for micro- and small-scale enterprise, small-scale peasant production and cooperatives in both the reformed and the non-reformed sector.
C. Technical assistance
The Government of El Salvador shall design and promote new programmes of technical assistance to help increase the productivity of peasant farmers and smallholders, especially in conflict zones.
D. International cooperation for the agricultural sector
Given the increase in the demand for agricultural credit that will follow the signing of the Peace Agreement, the Government of El Salvador undertakes to seek additional external resources to cover the new needs of the sector. In this connection, the Government shall seek external financial resources to increase the operations of the Agricultural Guarantee Fund as a mechanism for facilitating lending to small- and medium-sized farmers and their cooperatives, without adversely affecting the financial health of lending institutions.
6. Measures to alleviate the social cost of structural adjustment programmes
A. Consumer protection
The Government of El Salvador undertakes to adopt policies and create effective mechanisms for consumer protection in accordance with the requirements set out in the last part of article 101, paragraph 2, of the Constitution. In order to comply with this constitutional requirement, the Government undertakes to submit to the Legislative Assembly, within 60 days from the signing of this Agreement, a consumer protection bill providing for the strengthening of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, which could be a first step towards the establishment of an Office of Consumer Protection Advocate (ProcuradurÃa General de Defensa del Consumidor).
B. Privatization
The policy of privatization shall increase society’s share of ownership by affording workers access to ownership of privatized companies. It shall also avoid monopolistic practices, while guaranteeing business freedom and consumer protection, in accordance with the provisions of article 110 of the Constitution.
C. Social welfare programmes
The Government of El Salvador shall seek to strengthen existing social welfare programmes designed to alleviate extreme poverty. Additional external resources shall be sought for this purpose.
7. Procedures for direct external cooperation for community development and assistance projects
The Government of El Salvador shall facilitate private direct external cooperation for community development and assistance projects, provided that assistance is channelled in accordance with foreign exchange and lending regulations. Official direct external cooperation may also be approved, subject to the provision of the requisite information on the purposes of such cooperation.
The Government shall grant legal and institutional facilities to private sources of direct external cooperation benefiting communities, social organizations and national non-governmental organizations: it shall not discriminate among the latter, provided that it is ascertained that they are engaged in or wish to engage in integrated development projects. Former combatants of both Parties shall have access to external cooperation funds.
8. Forum for economic and social consultation
A. Purpose of the Forum
A forum shall be established in which representatives of the Government, labour and the business community shall participate on an equal footing for the purpose of working out a set of broad agreements on the economic and social development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants. The consultation process shall be a sustained effort and shall be conducted in phases, bearing in mind that the aim is to reach some agreements that are to be implemented immediately to achieve stabilization, others that are designed to tackle the economic and social problems that will ensue from the end of the conflict and still others that are geared specifically to reconstruction. Among other things, the Government shall propose to the Forum for Economic and Social Consultation that existing labour legislation be revised in order to promote and maintain a climate of harmonious labour relations, without prejudice to the unemployed and the public at large. It shall also propose that the situation of disadvantaged urban and outlying urban communities be analysed with a view to proposing solutions to problems resulting from the armed conflict of recent years. In general terms, the Forum shall be the mechanism for agreeing on measures to alleviate the social cost of the structural adjustment programme.
B. Establishment of the Forum
COPAZ shall convene the Forum for Economic and Social Consultation for the first time no later than one month after the signing of this Agreement.
C. Composition of and representation in the Forum
The composition of the Forum and the representation in it of the various sectors and the Government shall be as follows:
a. The Government of El Salvador shall be represented at a high level, its representatives being empowered to take decisions on economic and social matters;
b. The most representative labour and business organizations shall be invited to represent those sectors. In addition, the Forum may invite other social and political sectors to participate in its work as observers, on terms to be determined by it.
D. Powers of the Forum
The Forum shall determine its own operational structure and the issues for discussion and consultations. The sectors represented in the Forum shall have equal rights and shall enjoy equal opportunities for expressing their views. In order to guarantee the effectiveness of the agreements reached by the Forum by consensus, the Government undertakes to issue, amend or repeal decrees or provisions within its sphere of competence and to submit relevant proposals to the other organs of State.
E. Secretariat of the Forum
The Forum shall appoint a secretariat to provide it with technical support and ensure the continuity of its work.
9. National Reconstruction Plan
Within 30 days from the signing of the agreement on the cessation of the armed conflict, the Government of El Salvador shall submit to FMLN the National Reconstruction Plan which it has drawn up, so that the recommendations and suggestions of FMLN, like those of the various sectors of national life, may be taken into account, ensuring that the Plan reflects the country’s collective wishes.
The main objectives of the Plan shall be the integrated development of zones affected by the conflict, satisfaction of the most immediate needs of the population hardest hit by the conflict and of former combatants of both Parties, and the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure. In particular, in the context of the corresponding national programmes, measures shall be taken to facilitate the reintegration of FMLN into the country’s civil, institutional and political life, including fellowship, employment and pension programmes, housing programmes and programmes for starting up new businesses.
The Plan shall pay special attention to the need to promote job creation on a massive scale and to increase the production of basic foodstuffs, which shall be a priority for the State. To that end, the Government shall promote the integrated development of agricultural, stockbreeding, fisheries, forestry and agro-industrial activities, guarantee the provision of basic social services and launch the construction and rehabilitation of economic and social infrastructures. The National Reconstruction Plan shall also include programmes for the war-disabled and the relatives of victims among the civilian population.
Given the magnitude of the additional resources that will be required for the implementation of the Plan, both Parties appeal to the international community to lend its fullest support to the fund-raising effort. To this end, a national reconstruction fund shall be established, to be supported by the United Nations Development Programme.
The role of UNDP shall include advising the Government on all matters relating to the mobilization of external support, assisting in the preparation of projects and programmes likely to attract such support, facilitating
approaches to official bilateral and multilateral agencies, mobilizing technical assistance and cooperating with the Government in harmonizing the Plan with the activities of non-governmental organizations involved in local and regional development activities.
Donor Support
1992
ONUSAL and the office of the Secretary-General began appealing to governments and international/regional organizations to put up funds to carry out land transfers, since the Government of El Salvador was to pay land-owners for lands to be transferred to peasant farmers but did not have nearly the amount of money required to make all the purchases.2
Japan pledged $4.5 million for emergency aid, including about $750,000 for refugee relief, and economic restructuring.137 Canada pledged up to $5 million for poverty alleviation, human rights promotion and democratization.138 The United States pledged to redirect some of its ongoing military aid to the Government of El Salvador toward peaceful programs. The US would put up $250 million over two years to support the peace process. In total, 18 countries and 12 NGOs promised to contribute $800 million for post-conflict reconstruction.139
- “Watanabe pledges emergency aid package to El Salvador,” Japan Economic Newswire, March 5, 1992.
- “Canada contributes to the peace process in Central America,” Canada NewsWire, April 13, 1992.
- “El Salvador: An end to U.S. military aid?,” Inter-Press Service, March 25, 1992.
1993
The Government of El Salvador faced major funding shortfalls for the programs directly related to the peace agreements. Approximately $1.2 billion was needed. The Government committed over $300 million, and the international community less than $300 million, leaving a gap of $600 million. ONUSAL appealed to foreign ministers for additional support, but the donor community did not live up to expectations.12
1994
In March 1994, the Government reported a budget shortfall of $376 million for expenses arising from the Peace Accords. Grants and loans given or committed by international donors amounted to approximately $140 million.53 The land-transfer program was partially financed by the United States Agency for International Development, but still lacked $32 million to be completed. Other reintegration programs lacked a sum total of approximately $50 million.19
When MINUSAL took over for ONUSAL, it teamed up with UNDP to prepare technical assistance programs estimated to cost $9.8 million. As of September 1995, donors had pledged $4.23 million to support the programs.102
1995
International donors promised an additional $1.3 billion to support the programs of the Peace Accords. Approximately $1.8 billion had been spent already. Donors included the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, the US, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, and Switzerland.140
1996
No developments observed this year.
1997
No developments observed this year.
1998
Emergency aid in the wake of Hurricane Mitch became the central focus of international donations in 1998.141
- “World Bank announces major support for Central America to recover from Hurricane Mitch,” M2 Presswire, December 11, 1998.
1999
No developments observed this year.
2000
No developments observed this year.
2001
Two earthquakes in 2001 caused further damage and sparked international donors to provide further assistance.142 Donor support was crucial for the implementation of the peace accord and countries and donor agencies provided much needed financial and technical support to the peace process.
CHAPULTEPEC AGREEMENT (16 January 1992)
Chapter V: Economic and Social Questions
9. National Reconstruction Plan
Given the magnitude of the additional resources that will be required for the implementation of the Plan, both Parties appeal to the international community to lend its fullest support to the fund-raising effort. To this end, a national reconstruction fund shall be established, to be supported by the United Nations Development Programme.
The role of UNDP shall include advising the Government on all matters relating to the mobilization of external support, assisting in the preparation of projects and programmes likely to attract such support, facilitating approaches to official bilateral and multilateral agencies, mobilizing technical assistance and cooperating with the Government in harmonizing the Plan with the activities of non-governmental organizations involved in local and regional development activities.
Detailed Implementation Timeline
1992
The Parties failed to implement several components of the Agreement by the specified dates: both the Government and the FMLN were over three months late in concentrating their forces in the designated areas; the Government was over three months late in establishing the National Public Security Academy; the FMLN was over three months late in returning the first 20% of its combatants to civilian life; the Government was over three months late in promoting legislation to establish the FMLN as a political party.1 The Parties subsequently reached a negotiated agreement to adjust the deadlines as follows: concentrate forces in the established areas by 25 June 1992; begin the reintegration of former FMLN combatants to civilian life by 30 June 1992 and finish by 31 October 1992; commence the first course at the National Public Security Academy within 15 days after June 30 1992; present legislation to definitively abolish the National Guard and Treasury Police and establish a “Special Brigade for Military Security” (with no further transfers from military bodies to the National Civil Police) by 30 June 1992; propose legislation to facilitate the legalization of the FMLN as a political party by 30 June 1992; finalize programs to reintegrate former FMLN combatants into civilian life by 15 July 1992; and complete COPAZ verification of inventories of lands presented by the FMLN by 30 June 1992.[fn]”Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999/Add.1), June 16, 1992.[/efn_note] On 23 December 1992, ONUSAL confirmed that the armed conflict between the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN formally ended on 15 December 1992.3
1993
Both parties were slow to implement multiple aspects of the peace agreement, in violation of the detailed timeline. In late August and early September1993, ONUSAL brought the parties together to agree to a new timetable before the electoral campaigns began on 20 November 1993. The parties reached new agreements on the regulation of private weapons and security services, disbanding the old National Police and building up the new National Civil Police, admitting former FMLN combatants in leadership training at the National Public Security Academy, other reintegration programs, and land transfers.76
1994
On 19 May 1994, the parties agreed to a new “Timetable for the Implementation of the Most Important Agreements Pending.” The contents of this agreement are summarized as follows:
Armed forces: military weapons held by non-military state institutions shall be collected by 20 May 1994, and weapons held by civilians by 30 May 1994.
Public security: the National Civil Police shall complete its replacement of the National Police by 31 March 1995; the new units of the NCP will all be deployed by 31 March 1995, the Government shall appoint an Inspector-General during June 1994 and the General Inspectorate shall be operational by 30 September 1994; the Government shall set up Control and Disciplinary Investigation Units by 31 July 1994; and the Government shall enact new measures to promote recruitment to the National Civil Police, subject to UN verification.
Land transfers: the Government shall fulfill the Acceleration Plan by 30 April 1995.
Reintegration: the Government shall undertake to complete each program for the reintegration of FMLN ex-combatants in a timely manner, with the programs beginning mostly in early 1994 (if not begun already) and concluding mostly in mid-1994 (and the latest, the scholarship program, ending in August 1998).
Recommendations of the Commission on the Truth: the Government shall by 30 May 1994 remove roadblocks preventing the Legislative Assembly from approving all the draft laws necessary to heed the unfulfilled recommendations by the Commission on the Truth.
The parties shall work to reconstitute the Forum for Economic and Social Consultation by 30 June 1994.
The parties shall meet with the UN bi-weekly to follow up on the new timetable.143
Prompted by concerns raised by the UN Security Council, the parties signed a joint declaration of commitment to fully implement the Chapultepec Agreement by 30 April 1995 at the latest.144
- “Letter Dated 24 May 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/612), May 24, 1994.
- “Letter Dated 6 October 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/1144), October 10, 1994.
1995
At the conclusion of the ONUSAL mandate and commencement of the new United Nations Mission in El Salvador (MINUSAL), the parties assented to another revised work plan for the full implementation of the Peace Agreement. The new ultimate deadline set was 31 October 1995—with a few exceptions, including training for personnel transferred into the Criminal Investigation Division and Anti-Narcotics Division of the National Civil Police (31 December 1995), land transfers for rural human settlements (30 April 1996), and some assistance programs for reintegrated ex-combatants (as late as 31 August 1998). Important among the reforms left incomplete at the conclusion of the ONUSAL mission were: amendments to the Code of Military Justice and the army rules and regulations; repeal of the 1886 Police Act; habeas corpus act; Criminal Code; Code of Criminal Procedure; Prison Act; amendments to the Constitutional Procedures Act (amparo); amendments to the Judicial Career Act; amendments to the National Council of the Judiciary Act; and amendments to the Act organizing the judiciary.145
- “Letter Dated 18 May 1995 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (1995.S/1995/407), May 18, 1995.
1996
There was delay in implementing some provisions, but most of the provisions, except for land redistribution and socio-economic development, were implemented.
1997
No developments observed this year.
1998
No developments observed this year.
1999
No developments observed this year.
2000
No developments observed this year.
2001
No developments observed this year.
CHAPULTEPEC AGREEMENT (16 January 1991)
Chapter IX: Implementation Timetable
1. Copaz
1.1 Submission to the Legislative Assembly of the preliminary bill formalizing COPAZ: A+8 at the latest.
1.2 Establishment: D-day.
2. Armed Forces
2.1 Ratification of the constitutional reform
2.1.1 Ratification by the Legislative Assembly: between A- and D-days.
2.1.2 Publication: D + 15 at the latest.
2.2 Educational system
2.2.1 Determination of the number of members and submission by COPAZ of the lists of three candidates for the appointment of civilian members of the Academic Council of the Military College: D+90.
2.2.2 Designation of the Academic Council of the Military College: D+100 at the latest.
2.2.3 Designation of the teaching staff: between D+120 and D+180.
2.2.4 Reforms in the educational system: D+210 at the latest.
2.2.5 Determination of the admissions system by the Academic Council: D+210 at the latest.
2.3 Purification
2.3.1 Issuance of the agreement giving legal form to and formalizing the ad hoc Commission: A+5.
2.3.2 Establishment of the ad hoc Commission: D+105.
2.3.3 Result of the evaluation: D+195.
2.3.4 Corresponding administrative decisions: D+225.
2.3.5 Implementation: D+255.
2.4 Reduction
The Government of El Salvador has submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the timetable for implementing the reduction plan referred to in section 4 of chapter I of this Agreement. The Secretary-General has made the timetable known to FMLN. The United Nations shall verify compliance with that timetable.
2.5 Public security forces: abolition of the Treasury Police and the National Guard as public security forces and transfer of their members to the army: D+30.
2.6 State intelligence
2.6.1 Dissolution of the National Intelligence Department: D+135 at the latest.
2.6.2 Creation of the State Intelligence Agency: D+30 at the latest.
2.6.3 Designation of the Director: D+45 at the latest.
2.6.4 Launching of the evaluation of NID staff: D+60.
2.7 Rapid deployment infantry battalions (BIRI)
The following statement is made with regard to the rapid deployment infantry battalions in the relevant part of the timetable for implementing the reduction plan mentioned in paragraph 2.4 of this chapter:
“The demobilization of the BIRIs shall begin in the third week of the sixth month and shall last four weeks. Once the demobilization has begun, the battalions shall be considered to have lost their offensive battle capability.
“The BIRIs shall be demobilized as detailed below:
6th month: General Ramón Belloso BIRI
7th month: Atonal BIRI
8th month: Atlacatl BIRI
9th month: General Eusebio Bracamonte BIRI
10th month: General José Manuel Arce BIRI.”
2.8 Paramilitary bodies
2.8.1 Civil defence
2.8.1.1 Registration and location: D+60 at the latest.
2.8.1.2 Disarming: D+120 at the latest.
2.8.1.3 Total disbanding: D+150 at the latest.
2.8.2 System of armed forces reserves
2.8.2.1 Submission to the Legislative Assembly of the preliminary bill on military service and armed forces reserves: D+60 at the latest.
2.8.2.2 Promulgation of the law on the new system of military service and armed forces reserves: D+90 at the latest.
2.8.2.3 Replacement of territorial service by a new system of armed forces reserves: D+120 at the latest.
2.8.3 Private security services: Submission of the preliminary bill to the Legislative Assembly: D+45 at the latest.
2.9 Suspension of forcible recruitment
2.9.1 Implementation of the suspension: D-day.
2.9.2 Wide publicity in all the media, especially radio: as of D-day.
2.9.3 Submission to the Legislative Assembly of the preliminary bill on military service and armed forces reserves: D+60 at the latest.
2.9.4 Promulgation of the law: D+90.
2.10 Preventive and promotional measures
2.10.1 Organization of the Armed Forces General Inspectorate: D+90 at the latest.
2.10.2 Functioning of the armed forces court of honour: as of D+255.
2.10.3 Submission to the Legislative Assembly of the preliminary draft amendments to the law on unlawful enrichment: D+90.
2.10.4 Suspension of the issuance of licences to private individuals to bear weapons that are for the exclusive use of the armed forces: A-day.
2.10.5 Cancellation of licences for private individuals to bear weapons that are for the exclusive use of the armed forces: D+30 at the latest.
2.10.6 Recall of such weapons: between D+30 and D+270.
2.10.7 Dissemination of the doctrine of the armed forces: as of D+30.
2.10.8 Adaptation of the legislation on the armed forces: between D-day and D+270.
3. National Civil Police
3.1 Submission to the Legislative Assembly of the preliminary bill organizing the National Civil Police: D+20.
3.2 Submission to the Legislative Assembly of the preliminary bill organizing the National Public Security Academy: between A- and D-days.
3.3 Appointment of the Coordinator: before D-day.
3.4 Submission by COPAZ of the list of three candidates for the post of Director-General of the National Civil Police: D+20 at the latest.
3.5 Appointment of the Director-General of the National Civil Police: D+30 at the latest.
3.6 Submission by COPAZ of the list of three candidates for the post of Director-General of the National Public Security Academy: D+5.
3.7 Determination of the number of members and submission by COPAZ of the lists of three candidates for appointments to the Academic Council of the National Public Security Academy: D+5.
3.8 Appointments of the Director and of the members of the Academic Council of the National Public Security Academy: D + 15.
3.9 Designation of the COPAZ subcommission for the National Civil Police: D-day at the latest.
3.10 Design of the publicity campaign for recruitment: D+10 at the latest.
3.11 Launching of the publicity campaign for recruitment: D+15 at the latest.
3.12 Design of the aptitude test for former members of the National Police and former FMLN combatants: D+30 at the latest.
3.13 Organization of courses for this test: D+45 at the latest.
3.14 Evaluation of former members of the National Police: from D+30 until the end of the transitional period.
3.15 Aptitude and skills test: D+80 at the latest.
3.16 Introduction of the admissions system for the National Public Security Academy: D+80 at the latest.
3.17 Formation of boards of examiners: D+60 at the latest.
3.18 Admission of the first group of candidates: D+90 at the latest.
3.19 Start of courses at the National Public Security Academy: D+90 at the latest.4
3.20 Establishment of the entire functional structure of the National Civil Police: D+240.
3.21 Elimination of structures incompatible with the Finance Division of the National Civil Police: D+240.
3.22 Launching of the territorial deployment of the National Civil Police: D+270 at the latest.
3.23 Completion of the territorial deployment of the National Civil Police: 21 months from the start of territorial deployment.
3.24 End of the transitional regime for the National Civil Police and of the functions of the National Police: 2 years after the start of territorial deployment.
3.25 Expiry of the possible requirement to live in barracks: 31 December 1992.
4. Judicial System
4.1 National Council of the Judiciary:
4.1.1 Submission to the Legislative Assembly of the preliminary draft amendments to the law: D+60 at the latest.
4.1.2 Adoption of the new law: D+90.
4.1.3 Election and establishment: at the latest, +90 after the adoption of the new law.
4.2 Judicial Training School: at the latest, +180 after the establishment of the National Council of the Judiciary.
4.3 Formation of lists of candidates for the National Council of the Judiciary: April 1994.
4.4 Judicial career: submission to the Legislative Assembly of a preliminary draft for legal reform: D+90 at the latest.
4.5 Military jurisdiction: submission to the Legislative Assembly of a preliminary draft for legal reform: D+90 at the latest.
4.6 Office of the National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights:
4.6.1 Submission to the Legislative Assembly of a preliminary draft organic law: D+60 at the latest.
4.6.2 Designation of the National Counsel: D+30 at the latest.
5. Electoral System
5.1 Designation of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal: D+15 at the latest.
5.2 Designation by COPAZ of the Special Commission: D+15 at the latest.
5.3 Legal reform: D+120 at the latest.
5.4 Full implementation of the right of legally registered parties to monitor the preparation, organization, publication and updating of the electoral rolls: one year before the elections, at the latest.
5.5 Publication of the register of electors: at least 20 days before the elections.
6. Economic and Social Questions
6.1 Submission by FMLN of the inventory of affected land or buildings within conflict zones: A+30.
6.2 Designation by COPAZ of a special commission: A+20 at the latest.
6.3 Legalization of land tenure in conflict zones: A+180 at the latest.
6.4 Submission to the Legislative Assembly of the preliminary consumer protection bill: A+60 at the latest.
6.5 Convening by COPAZ of the Economic and Social Forum: A+30 at the latest.
6.6 Submission of the National Reconstruction Plan by the Government of El Salvador to FMLN: A+30 at the latest.
6.7 Establishment of the Reconstruction Fund: D+60 at the latest.
6.8 Start of implementation of the agreements on loans to the agricultural sector and for micro- and small-scale enterprise: as of D+120.
6.9 Start of the transfer of lands in excess of 245 hectares, as of D-day.
6.10 Starting date for requests for State land by former combatants of both Parties: D+60.
6.11 Start of the preferential transfer of land by the State to former combatants of both Parties who have so requested and who are of peasant origin and familiar with farming, and possess no land of any kind: D+90.
6.12 Submission to the Legislative Assembly of the preliminary draft agrarian code: A+12 months at the latest.
6.13 Implementation of agreements on privatization and social welfare: as of A.
6.14 Implementation of agreements on external cooperation: as of D-Day.
6.15 Implementation of programmes to facilitate the integration of former FMLN combatants: before D+60.
7. Political Participation by FMLN
7.1 Adoption of legislative or other measures to guarantee former FMLN combatants the full exercise of their rights: between A and D. 5
7.2 Arrangements for the security of FMLN leaders and FMLN participants in COPAZ and other commissions: between A and D.
7.3 Release of political prisoners: D+30.
7.4 Promotion of the legislative decree for the legalization of FMLN as a political party: as of D+90.
7.5 Granting of licences for mass media: as of D+30.
7.6 Full guarantees and security for returnees: as of D+40.
8. Cessation of the Armed Conflict
8.1 Informal cessation of the armed conflict: between A and D.
8.2 Establishment of the Joint Working Group: A-day.
8.3 Launching of the reconciliation campaign: A+1.
8.4 Transmittal by the Salvadorian armed forces to ONUSAL of detailed information on the number of their troops and weapons to be concentrated in the places listed in annex A: D-7 at the latest.
8.5 Provision by FMLN to ONUSAL of detailed information on its troop strength and inventories of arms, ammunition, mines, other explosives and military equipment located anywhere in the national territory, and its plans for concentrating them in the places listed in annex B: D-7 at the latest.
8.6 Precise designation of the places to which the Salvadorian armed forces and FMLN are to fall back: between A and D.
8.7 First stage of the separation of forces: between D and D+5.
8.8 Second stage of the separation of forces: between D+5 and D+30.
8.9 Concentration by FMLN in each of the 15 designated locations, under ONUSAL supervision, of all FMLN arms, ammunition, mines, explosives and military equipment, including those belonging to its clandestine forces, pursuant to paragraph 26 of chapter VII (Cessation of the Armed Conflict): between D+6 and D+30.
8.10 Monitoring by ONUSAL of all FMLN arms, ammunition, mines, explosives and military equipment, including those belonging to its clandestine forces, pursuant to paragraphs 27 and 28 of chapter VII (Cessation of the Armed Conflict): as of D+30.
8.11 Reintegration of former FMLN combatants, within a framework of full legality, into the civil, political
and institutional life of the country:
8.11.1D+90: No less than 20 per cent.
8.11.2D+120: No less than 40 per cent.
8.11.3 D+180: No less than 60 per cent.
8.11.4 D+240: No less than 80 per cent.
8.11.5 31 October 1992: 100 per cent.
8.12 End of the military structure of FMLN: between 15 October 1992 and 31 October 1992.
Final Provision
The time allotted for implementing any agreements not included in this timetable, and any adjustments to the above timetable that may be required, for any reason, shall be decided by ONUSAL in consultation with the Parties.
Natural Resource Management
1992
After disputes between peasants and FAES soldiers began the land transfer program on a sour note, the UN Secretary-General’s office became involved and helped the Parties reach an agreement to proceed with land transfers in late October 1992.70 However, ONUSAL received reports that unsanctioned land occupations continued into November 1992.2
The Government submitted its national reconstruction plan on time and began to implement components of it.1 Agricultural training and rehabilitation programs for the disabled ex-combatants were started.68
1993
Despite serious financial difficulties, the program for the transfer of lands proceeded, albeit at a slow pace. Both parties contributed to the delays: FMLN was slow to submit complete lists of land transfer recipients and the Government’s Lands Bank maintained slow and complicated procedures for the legal transfer of land. Both parties also relocated landholders on land whose owners were not willing to sell, further complicating the process.12 Progress fell further behind in October 1993.76 After an appeal to move forward by the UN Secretary-General, the parties reached a new agreement to move forward on 13 October 1993, and the Government developed an Acceleration Plan.53
The distribution of agricultural tools and basic household goods concluded in April 1993, along with the agricultural training program. A lack of available credit hindered the purchase of land and stunted housing and agricultural development.75
1994
The Acceleration Plan brought progress in the land transfer program, but not nearly at the rate it promised and not in the proportions promised to the FMLN beneficiaries in the 13 October 1993 agreement.53 The Government submitted a new acceleration plan on 18 August 1994, in which it pledged to strengthen the administrative infrastructure necessary to facilitate land transfers to FMLN ex-combatants. The program was stalled by funding shortfalls, however.19 At the two-year mark after the program began, only one-third of potential beneficiaries had actually received land.21 New progressive strides were made in November and December 1994, including improved administrative measures, shifting of responsibilities to the regional level, and increased personnel to measure land and communicate with potential beneficiaries.36
1995
The forward momentum in land reform programs created at the end of 1994 was curbed in January 1995, due in large part to personnel turnover in the Lands Bank. As of March 1995, approximately 45% of former combatants eligible for land-transfers had in fact received legal ownership of land. The Government was operating at a pace far too slow to meet the 30 April 1995 deadline for completion of the Acceleration Plan. The delays in land transfer programs, and especially delays in dealing with the relocation of human settlements, was becoming and increasing source of contention. Absent decisive involvement of the Government, lawful landowners and de facto landholders were repeatedly pitted against one another, and confrontations between them threatened to have a broad impact on the Peace Agreement.36 Problems persisted into late 1995. The Government stepped up efforts to get land titles to potential beneficiaries, and indeed the proportion rose to 75% in September, but then it was discovered that only 25% of these had filed with the land registry—a step which was necessary for the title holders to sell the land and complete the transfer process.102
1996
After a number of persons left the program, the total number of potential beneficiaries of land reform fell to 36,550. By 26 March 1996, 32,210 of them had received titles, and about half of those were recorded in the land registry. The program faced an impasse when land-for-sale became scarce and the human settlement relocations left some persons in unsustainable situations.43
By November 1996, nearly 99% of potential beneficiaries had received titles, and 87% of those had filed their deeds in the national registry.127
1997
The land transfer programs remained a challenge, but progress was made on many of the most vexing cases.128
Nearing the completion of the land transfer program, almost 35,000 persons had received titles to a total of over 140,000 manzanas (235,200 acres) of land. Hundreds of persons had not received land titles, however, and the government was still moving rather slowly to resolve the logistical issues preventing the completion of the program.84
1998
Outstanding issues preventing the completion of the programs for land transfer and human settlement transfer were not resolved as of the conclusion of official UN observation on 30 June 1998.85
Hurricane Mitch devastated the whole region, killing thousands and setting development back by twenty years.134 A flurry of monetary aid, loans and debt forgiveness came in from international donors.135
1999
No developments observed this year.
2000
No developments observed this year.
2001
Some significant progresses were made in terms of land redistribution. Nevertheless, two earthquakes struck in 2001, setting economic development back again.146
NEW YORK AGREEMENT (25 September 1991)
VII. Economic and social questions
1. Lands in excess of the constitutional limit of 245 hectares, as well as lands owned by the State which are not currently legally designated forest reserves, shall be used to meet the needs of peasants and small farmers who are without land. To this end, the Government shall also make arrangements to purchase lands offered for sale to the State.
CHAPULTEPEC AGREEMENT (16 January 1992)
Chapter V: Economic and Social Questions
2. The agrarian problem
A. Lands in excess of the constitutional limit of 245 hectares
The Government of El Salvador shall transfer rural farmland that has not yet been transferred under articles 105 and 267 of the Constitution of the Republic. It likewise undertakes to ensure that implementation of the relevant constitutional requirements is not evaded by owners of rural holdings in excess of 245 hectares.
B. State-owned lands which are not currently part of a forestry reserve
The Government of El Salvador shall transfer to beneficiaries of the
agrarian reform, as provided in article 104 of the Constitution, State-owned rural farmland which is not part of a forestry reserve. Under the various land-transfer programmes which the Government of El Salvador is carrying out with State-owned farmland, preference shall be given to former combatants of both Parties who so request voluntarily, are of peasant origin and familiar with farming, and possess no land of any kind. The size of the lots shall be determined by the amount of land available, as mentioned above, and the number of beneficiaries who meet the conditions set out in this section.
C. Lands offered for sale to the State
Making use of the legal, technical and financial resources available to it, the Government of El Salvador shall seek to acquire and transfer through the Land Bank lands voluntarily offered for sale by their owners. Once the said lands are acquired, they shall be transferred to beneficiaries of the agrarian reform.
D. Recipients of lands transferred in accordance with the preceding sections
The lands acquired under sections A, B and C of this chapter shall be used to satisfy the need for land of landless peasants and small farmers. Specifically, title to the land shall be transferred legally to the peasants and small farmers designated by law as beneficiaries of the agrarian reform.
E. Payments for land
The lands referred to in the preceding sections shall be transferred at market prices and on the same credit terms as are granted to beneficiaries of the reformed sector. At the same time, a system of payments may be established on the basis of a fixed price and long-term financing at low, fixed interest rates not subject to interest capitalization. Domestic credit shall be supplemented with financing from international cooperation, for which a special fund, financed from external resources, shall be established for the purchase of land.
4. 3 July 1991 agreement on occupied lands
The agreement on occupied lands between the Government of El Salvador and peasant organizations shall be respected.
With regard to lands occupied illegally after the date of that agreement, the Government of El Salvador gives notice that it reserves the right to enforce the relevant legal provisions so as to ensure that the rule of law prevails. FMLN holds that the agrarian problem, including land occupations, should be dealt with through consultation and the channels and mechanisms provided by the peace agreements.
Review of Agreement
1992
COPAZ was established according to the Peace Agreements, but it did not initially play as important a role as envisioned in the agreements.147
COPAZ appointed the Special Commission, and the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador appointed the Special Electoral Tribunal after delays. The Government was over three months late in promoting legislation to establish the FMLN as a political party.148
COPAZ and the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador approved the law establishing the Office of the National Counsel for the Defense of Human Rights. The Counsel was then appointed, but delayed in beginning operations due to financial shortages.149
- “Situation of human rights in El Salvador,” United Nations General Assembly (A/47/596), 13 November 1992.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999), May 26, 1992.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (1992.S/23999) May 26, 1992.
1993
COPAZ worked to seek consensus among its constituent members on various measures related to the Peace Agreement, but met many disagreements over its mandate. It discussed the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth, but moved very slowly and failed to come up with a unified proposal.150
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (993.S/25812), May 21, 1993.
1994
COPAZ continued to operate, and conversations began of it becoming a peace foundation once its mandate was officially fulfilled.151
COPAZ submitted recommendations for a several constitutional reforms to the Legislative Assembly. The recommendations included changes to the functions of the Supreme Court of Justice and protections for individual rights, and they were in line with the Commission on the Truth report. The Assembly passed some constitutional amendments, but did not fulfill the recommendations of COPAZ or the Commission on the Truth.152
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (1994.S/1994/1000), August 26, 1994.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (1994.S/1994/561), May 11,1994.
1995
According to the new timetable for implementation agreed upon on 19 May 1994, COPAZ was set to terminate on 30 April 1995, but it became clear that the Peace Accords would not be fulfilled by that date, and so COPAZ sought an extension on the grounds that its mandate was to ensure the complete implementation of the Peace Accords.36
1996
The mandate of COPAZ expired on 10 January 1996. The Government of El Salvador and the members of COPAZ viewed it as a success, with only a few aspects of the peace process left incomplete—notably the land transfer and rural re-settlement programs. Some of the former members of COPAZ went on to serve in non-governmental organizations, such as Fundapaz, which endeavored to fulfill a similar role as that of COPAZ.153
- “National peace commission closes as its work comes to an end,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 15, 1996 [Originally in La Prensa Grafica, January 11, 1996].
1997
No developments observed this year.
1998
No developments observed this year.
1999
No developments observed this year.
2000
No developments observed this year.
2001
No developments observed this year.
New York Agreement (25 September 1991)
The Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (hereinafter called “the Parties”),
Convinced of the need to give a final impetus to the process of negotiations currently taking place with the active participation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, so that the set of political agreements required to bring a definitive end to the armed conflict in our country can be reached as speedily as possible,
Conscious of the fact that, in order to achieve the aforementioned objective, it is essential to establish a set of conditions and guarantees which will ensure the full implementation of those political agreements by both Parties,
Have reached the following political agreement:
I. Comisión Nacional para la Consolidación de la Paz 1. The Comisión Nacional para la Consolidación de la Paz (National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace) (COPAZ) shall be responsible for overseeing the implementation of all the political agreements reached by the Parties. COPAZ is a mechanism for the monitoring of and the participation of civilian society in the process of the changes resulting from the negotiations, in relation both to the armed forces, in particular, and to the other items on the agenda.
2. Composition
a. COPAZ shall be composed of two representatives of the Government, including a member of the armed forces, two representatives of FMLN and one representative of each of the parties or coalitions represented in the Legislative Assembly.
b. The Archbishop of San Salvador and a delegate of ONUSAL shall have access to the work and deliberations of COPAZ, as observers.
3. Decisions COPAZ shall adopt its decisions by majority vote.
4. Powers
a. COPAZ shall not have executive powers since it is for the Parties, through their internal machinery, to carry out the peace agreements.
b. The Parties shall be obliged to consult COPAZ before adopting decisions or measures relating to relevant aspects of the peace agreements. Similarly, COPAZ may consult the Parties, at the highest level, whenever it deems it appropriate to do so. In the event of a difference of opinion as to whether a matter should be submitted to COPAZ, the question shall be decided by COPAZ.
c. At the request of three or more of its members, COPAZ shall be convened immediately and its opinion heard.
d. COPAZ shall have direct access to the President of the Republic and shall meet with him whenever COPAZ itself or the President deems it appropriate.
e. COPAZ shall have access to and may inspect any activity or site connected with the implementation of the peace agreements.
f. COPAZ shall have the power to issue conclusions and recommendations of any kind relating to the implementation of the peace agreements and to make them public. The Parties undertake to comply with those conclusions and recommendations.
g. COPAZ shall have the power to prepare the preliminary legislative drafts necessary for the development of the agreements which have been reached, both on the subject of the armed forces and on the other items on the agenda.
h. COPAZ shall have the power to oversee the implementation of the agreements reached by the Parties, both on the subject of the armed forces and on the other items on the agenda.
i. COPAZ shall be responsible for the preparation of the preliminary legislative drafts necessary to ensure that all those wounded in the war and, where appropriate, the families of combatants who have died, on both sides, are incorporated into the social security system of the State or receive adequate economic compensation, as provided for by law.
j. In the performance of its functions, COPAZ shall be authorized to address the relevant organs of the United Nations, through the Secretary-General.
k. COPAZ shall have full powers to organize its work in the manner which it deems most appropriate and to appoint any groups or subcommissions which it may deem useful in the discharge of its mission. For that purpose, it shall have its own budget.
5. Form In addition to being the product of this political agreement, COPAZ shall be confirmed by law.
6. Duration
a. Between the date of this agreement and the cessation of the armed conflict, two representatives of the Government, including one member of the armed forces, two representatives of FMLN and one representative of each of the parties or coalitions represented in the Legislative Assembly shall work under a special operational régime of a transitional nature which they themselves shall define.
This work shall include the preparation of the preliminary draft legislation to formalize the establishment of COPAZ.
b. The preliminary draft legislation to formalize the establishment of COPAZ shall be submitted to the Legislative Assembly within eight (8) days following the signing of the cessation of armed conflict. The formal establishment of COPAZ shall take place within eight (8) days following the promulgation of the said law.
c. COPAZ shall be dissolved once the implementation of the peace agreements has been completed. Its dissolution shall be decided upon by COPAZ itself, by means of an agreement receiving a favourable vote from at least two thirds of its members.
Chapultepec Agreement (16 January 1991)
Chapter IX: Implementation Timetable
1. Copaz
1.1 Submission to the Legislative Assembly of the preliminary bill formalizing COPAZ: A+8 at the latest.
1.2 Establishment: D-day.
Verification/Monitoring Mechanism
1992
The United National Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was created by UN Security Council Resolution 693 on 20 May 1991. The original mandate was to oversee the peace process and conduct limited peace-keeping operations. Coinciding with the cease-fire agreement between the AFES and FMLN, the mandate of ONUSAL was transformed to a purely verification operation by UN Security Council Resolution (SC Res.) 729 on 14 January 1992, with three divisions: Human Rights, Military and Police. The horizon of ONUSAL was extended by SC Res. 784 on 30 October 1992. The first ONUSAL report was submitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on 26 May 1992. ONUSAL expressed concern about a number of delays in the implementation of the Peace Agreement, but reported overall progress in the process.1 ONUSAL subsequently facilitated a negotiated agreement between the Parties to adjust several deadlines and renew their efforts to fulfill their obligations in a timely manner.10 Difficult situations such as these caused ONUSAL to take a more proactive role in COPAZ and the implementation of the peace agreements in general.2 Delays and tensions continued into the fall of 1992, so the Security Council granted ONUSAL’s request to extend its mission an additional six months with resolution 791 on 30 November 1992.12 On 23 December 1992, ONUSAL confirmed that the armed conflict between the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN formally ended on 15 December 1992, six weeks late. 3
The ONUSAL Human Rights Division developed robust investigation and verification mechanisms, producing lengthy reports separate from the main series of reports.35 It also organized training, promotion and educational activities regarding human rights.93
The ONUSAL Police Division assumed its role according to the peace agreements, with hundreds of international police observers deployed across the country during the transitional period. The Division assisted in locating illegal arms caches, cooperated with the Military Division in verifying the dissolution of the civil defense units, and supported the Human Rights Division.2
The ONUSAL Military Division began with 290 military observers at the beginning of 1992. It was set to reduce that number by 1 June 1992, but the Chief Military Observer requested and was granted a three-month extension.154 The numbers were reduced upon the formal ending of the armed conflict in December 1992, and the Military Division was restructured.12
- “Letter Dated 15 May 1992 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/23987), May 20, 1992.
1993
In January 1993, the Government of El Salvador requested that the UN monitor the first general elections after the cessation of the armed conflict, set for March 1994.155 The mandate of ONUSAL was then expanded to include an Electoral Division by Security Council Resolution 832 on 27 May 1993.
The Government also requested that the ONUSAL Police Division provide professional assistance to the National Civil Police.12 It performed an evaluation of the police in the field and provided advice and support. The Police Division also continued to supervise and support the Auxiliary Transitory Police. The Division had 277 observers, of which 19 were assigned to the Human Rights and Electoral Divisions, in November 1993.76
In May 1993, the Military Division had 74 military observers from Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Ireland, Spain, Sweden and Venezuela and 7 medical officers from Argentina.12
The Military Division coordinated the destruction of landmines, clearing 425 minefields. As of 1 November 1993, the Military Division had 31 observers and 7 medical officers.50
The ONUSAL mandate was extended another six months on 30 November 1993 by UN Security Council Resolution 888.
- “Letter Dated 26 January 1993 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/25241), February 4, 1993.
1994
On 1 May 1994, the Military Division had 22 observers from Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Ireland, Spain, Sweden and Venezuela and 7 medical officers Argentina and Spain. The Police Division had 268 observers from Austria, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Fracnce, Guyanna, Italy, Mexico, Spain and Sweden 53
On 26 May 1994, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of UNOSAL until 30 November 1994 with Resolution 920. Then on 23 November 1994, at the request of the parties to the agreement, the Security Council extended the mandate for the last time, to 30 April 1994 with Resolution 961.
As ONUSAL prepared for the conclusion of its mandate, it focused on building institutional capacity in El Salvador 156
Prompted by concerns raised by the UN Security Council, the parties signed a joint declaration of commitment to fully implement the Chapultepec Agreement by 30 April 1995 at the latest. The declaration included a request to extend the ONUSAL mandate to the same date 144
As of 24 October 1994, ONUSAL’s revenue was over $23 million short of expenses, owing to unpaid financial commitments on part of backing states 21
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/1000), August 26, 1994; “Twelfth Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) (1 July — 30 September 1994),” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (/49/585; S/1994/1220), October 31, 1994.
1995
In conversations between ONUSAL, the Secretary-General and the Security Council, it was determined that ONUSAL should be formally dissolved on 30 April 1995, even though some aspects of the Peace Accords remained unfulfilled. ONUSAL recommended that a small team of observers remain after its mandate ended, and the Security Council supported the notion.36 The UN General Assembly provided the official initiative for the new “Mission of the United Nations in El Salvador” (MINUSAL) with Resolutions 49/137 (25 January 1995) and 50/7 (6 November 1995).
During the final period of its mandate, ONUSAL scaled back its presence significantly. In March 1995, it had only 3 military observers (from Brazil, Spain and Venezuela), and 32 police observers.36 During its first 6-month period, MINUSAL had as many as 11 international staff and 8 civilian police consultants.102
1996
As the end date for the MINUSAL mandate approached, the parties to the Peace Agreement requested that the UN keep a small group of observers to verify the implementation of the last components of their agreements.157 The Secretary-General agreed that a continued UN presence would be needed after MINUSAL to ensure the final implementation of all components of the Peace Agreements and subsequent binding recommendations. Just before its end, in April 1996, MINUSAL consisted of three police consultants and eight other professional staff members. The idea was to reduce the footprint further, and even move to an intermittent presence.43
On 10 May 1996, the UN General Assembly decided in Resolution 50/226 that MINUSAL would be succeeded by the United Nations Office of Verification (ONUV), consisting of a small team of investigators to verify the final implementation of the Peace Accords. At its outset, ONUV had three police consultants and six international officials.127 The ONUV mandate concluded on 31 December 1996.33
- “Letter Dated 29 April 1996 from the Permanent Representative of El Salvador to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/50/948), April 30, 1996.
1997
ONUV was succeeded by an envoy of the Secretary-General with a small support unit to complete the verification and assessment of the peace process.158 When the support unit began on 1 January 1997, it consisted of one police consultant, three international officials, and two local consultants. The Secretary-General supported terminating the support unit on 30 June 1997, and proposed leaving the task of final verification to a few persons serving with UNDP.159
- “Assessment of the Peace Process in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/51/917), July 1, 1997.
- (Source: . 1997. “Assessment of the Peace Process in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/51/517), July 1, 1997.
1998
Two observers, one international and one local, worked through 30 June 1998, at which time the UN concluded its verification of the Peace Agreement.160
- “Letter Dated 7 August 1998 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the General Assembly,” United Nations General Assembly (A/52/1008), September 24, 1998.
1999
No major developments were reported. The UN completely withdrew its mission from El Salvador in 1996. The Office of the United Nations Verification completed its peace agreement verification in June 1998.
2000
No developments observed this year.
2001
No developments observed this year.
Agreement on Human Rights (San Jose Agreement, 26 July 1990)
II. International Verification 10. In accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Agreement and the agenda for the negotiations which was adopted in Caracas, the Parties hereby agree to the terms of reference for the United Nations human rights verification mission (hereinafter referred to as “the Mission”), as set out below.
11. The Mission shall devote special attention to the observance of the rights to life, to the integrity and security of the person, to due process of law, to personal liberty, to freedom of expression and to freedom of association.
In this context, a special effort shall be made to clarify any situation which appears to reveal the systematic practice of human rights violations and, in such cases, to recommend appropriate measures for the elimination of the practice to the Party concerned. The foregoing shall be without prejudice to any powers granted to the Mission to consider individual cases.
12. A Director designated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be in charge of the Mission. The Director shall work in close cooperation with existing human rights organizations and bodies in El Salvador. He shall also be assisted by expert advisers. In addition, the Mission shall include as many verification personnel as may be necessary.
13. The purpose of the Mission shall be to investigate the human rights situation in El Salvador as regards acts committed or situations existing as from the date of its establishment and to take any steps it deems appropriate to promote and defend such rights. Accordingly, it shall perform its functions with a view to promoting respect for human rights and their guarantee in El Salvador and helping to do away with those situations in which such respect and guarantees are not duly observed.
14. The Mission’s mandate shall include the following powers:
a. To verify the observance of human rights in El Salvador;
b. To receive communications from any individual, group of individuals or body in El Salvador, containing reports of human rights violations;
c. To visit any place or establishment freely and without prior notice;
d. To hold its meetings freely anywhere in the national territory;
e. To interview freely and privately any individual, group of individuals or members of bodies or institutions;
f. To collect by any means it deems appropriate such information as it considers relevant;
g. To make recommendations to the Parties on the basis of any conclusions it has reached with respect to cases or situations it may have been called upon to consider;
h. To offer its support to the judicial authorities of El Salvador in order to help improve the judicial procedures for the protection of human rights and increase respect for the rules of due process of law;
i. To consult the Attorney-General of the Republic;
j. To plan and carry out an educational and informational campaign on human rights and on the functions of the Mission itself;
k. To use the media to the extent useful for the fulfilment of its mandate;
l. To report regularly to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and through him to the General Assembly.
15. The Parties undertake to give their full support to the Mission. To that end, they pledge:
a. To grant the Mission whatever facilities it may require for the performance of its functions;
b. To ensure the security of the members of the Mission and of such persons as may have provided it with information, testimony or evidence of any kind;
c. To provide, as expeditiously as possible, whatever information may be required by the Mission;
d. To give their earliest consideration to any recommendations made to them by the Mission;
e. Not to hinder the fulfilment of the Mission’s mandate.
16. Each of the Parties shall appoint a delegate to serve as liaison with the Mission.
17. Should the Mission receive communications referring to acts or situations which occurred prior to its establishment, it may transmit them, if it deems it appropriate, to the competent authorities.
18. The fact that a case or situation has been considered by the Mission shall not preclude the application thereto of international procedures for the promotion and protection of human rights.
19. Subject to any arrangements which must be made prior to its establishment, the Mission shall take up its duties as of the cessation of the armed conflict. The Mission shall be established initially for one year and may be renewed.
Chapultepec Agreement (16 January 1992)
Chapter VIII: United Nations Verification 1. The United Nations shall verify compliance with this Agreement and with the San José, Mexico City and New York Agreements of 26 July 1990, 27 April 1991 and 25 September 1991, respectively, with the cooperation of the Parties and of the authorities whose duty it is to enforce them.
2. The international cooperation referred to in this Agreement shall be coordinated by the United Nations and shall be subject to a formal application by the Government, compliance with official formalities and the appropriate consultations.
Please always cite: “Annualized implementation data on comprehensive intrastate peace accords, 1989–2012.” Madhav Joshi, Jason Michael Quinn, and Patrick M. Regan. Journal of Peace Research 52 (2015): 551-562.