Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi
Date Signed: 28 August, 2000
Accord Type: Comprehensive Peace Agreement
Country: Burundi
78.10Implementation Score after 10 years
Provisions in this Accord
Cease Fire
2003
Not all major parties to the conflict signed the agreement until 2003. During this three year gap, implementation of the ceasefire provision did begin.
No serious violations were reported between the Government and the 16 armed movement or political parties that signed the accord in August 2000.1 Three Tutsi political parties – Independent Workers’ Party, National Alliance for Rights and Development, and Rally for Democracy and Economic and Social Development- became part of the agreement on 20 September 2000.2 CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL did not sign the accord. On 2 December 2002, CNDD-FDD the largest Hutu party signed a ceasefire agreement with the transitional government.
In 2003, no serious violations were reported between the Government and the 16 armed movement or political parties that signed the accord.
- “Burundi; Burundi Peace Accord Signatories Gather In Arusha,” Africa News, September 25, 2000.
- “Burundi; Three Tutsi Parties To Sign Arusha Accord On 20 September,” Africa News, September 15, 2000.
2004
No violations of the ceasefire reported in 2004. Military operations had ceased throughout the country aside from some violence between the government and the FNL.1 There was an allegation from Palipehutu-FNL, who did not sign ceasefire accord of ceasefire, of the violation of ceasefire from Forces for the Defense of Burundi and former Hutu rebels.2 On 21 May 2004, the Security Council adopted recommendations of the Secretary General by adopting a resolution 1545 (2004). In its resolution, the Security Council established the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONBU) and authorized 5,650 military personnel, 200 military observers, 125 headquarters and staff officers. And as of 1 June 2004, the African Mission in Burundi troops from Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa, and 29 military observers from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia became ONBU troops. As of November 2004, there were 5,259 ONBU troops deployed in Burundi.3
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2004/210), March 16, 2004.
- “Last Burundi rebels accuse army of breaking UN ceasefire accord,” Agence France Presse, August 2, 2004.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2004/902), November 15, 2004; “Burundi; UN Mission Replaces Sections of South African Peacekeepers,” Africa News, October 25, 2004.
2005
No ceasefire violations occurred in 2005 among the signatories to the accord. On 15 May 2005, National Liberation Forces (FNL) leader Agathon Rwasa and Burundi President Domitien Ndayizeye signed an agreement and called for an immediate cessation of hostilities. The FNL was one of two remaining factions that did not sign the accord.
2006
On 7 September 2006, the last rebel group, Paliphehutu-FNL, signed a ceasefire agreement with the government.1 After the signing of a ceasefire agreement, the FNL was asked to attend the joint mechanism for verification and control of the ceasefire.2
- “Burundi; Nqakula Seeks to Implement Ceasefire Agreement,” Africa News, September 18, 2006.
- “Burundi: Ambassador calls on rebels to attend cease-fire body’s meetings,” BBC Monitoring Africa, October 12, 2006.
2007
No serious violations were reported between the Government and the 18 groups that signed the accord.
2008
The ceasefire generally held among the signatories to the accord. Violations did take place with the FNL in 2008, but negotiations between the FNL and the government were successfull. The ceasefire was restored and an agreement was signed on December 4 in which the Burundian government agreed to give 33 positions to FNL leaders in the government.1
- “Burundi government, rebels agree on cease-fire implementation,” BBC Monitoring Africa, December 4, 2008.
2009
No serious violations were reported.
2010
No serious violations were reported.
2011
No serious violations were reported.
2012
No serious violations were reported.
Protocol III, Chapter III: Article 25: Definitions
1. Ceasefire means the cessation of:
1) All attacks by air, land and lake, as well as all acts of sabotage;
2) Attempts to occupy new ground positions and movements of troops and resources from one location to another;
3) All acts of violence against the civilian population – summary executions, torture, harassment, detention and persecution of civilians on the basis of ethnic origin, religious, beliefs and political affiliations, incitement of ethnic hatred, arming of civilians, use of child soldiers, sexual violence, training of terrorists, genocide and bombing of the civilian population;
4) Supply of ammunitions and weaponry and other war-related stores to the field;
5) All hostile propaganda between the Parties, both within and outside the country;
6) Any other actions that may impede the normal evolution of the ceasefire process.
2. The cessation of hostilities shall involve:
1) Announcement of a cessation of hostilities 48 hours after the signing of the ceasefire agreement, through command channels and print and electronic media;
2) Cessation of hostilities shall be regulated and monitored through the committee to follow up, supervise, monitor and implement the Agreement (Implementation Monitoring Committee);
3) Release of all the political prisoners, closure of all the forced regroupment camps and respect for civil and political rights and freedoms shall take place from the date of signature of the Agreement;
4) Cessation of hostilities brought about by emergency laws, political imprisonment and arbitrary arrests shall take effect from the date of signature of the Agreement;
5) Cessation of defamatory, untruthful or ethnicist statements by the media and publications shall take place from the date of signature of the Agreement.
3. The different types of hostilities are:
1) Political hostilities:
1. Verbal aggression and denigration;
2. Political imprisonment;
3. Forced regroupment camps;
4. Violation of political rights and freedoms;
2) Military hostilities:
1. Armed clashes between the belligerents;
2. Infiltration of armed groups from neighbouring countries;
3. Attacks on the population by the belligerents.
4. The belligerents are:
1) The Government forces;
2) The combatants of the political parties and movements which signed the Declaration of 21 June 1998;
3) The combatants of political parties and movements operating within the country which did not sign the Declaration of 21 June 1998;
4) The political and ethnic militias operating within the country.
Article 26: General principles
1. The following principles are agreed upon:
1) The provisions of article 25.1 (d) above shall not preclude the supply of food, clothing and medical support to forces in the field;
2) Freedom of movement of persons and goods throughout the country shall be guaranteed;
3) All persons detained or taken hostage on account of political belief or activities shall be released and given the latitude to relocate to anywhere within the country;
4) Humanitarian assistance shall be facilitated through humanitarian corridors in order to render assistance to displaced persons, refugees and other sinistrés;
5) The parties shall establish a Joint Commission for Peace and Security, hereinafter referred to as the Ceasefire Commission, which shall be responsible for peace and security functions and shall work in close conjunction with a peacekeeping force following the entry into force of the Agreement;
6) The laying of mines of any type shall be prohibited, and all parties shall be required to undertake to mark and signpost any danger areas to be identified to peacekeeping forces;
7) The forces in areas of direct contact shall proceed to an immediate disengagement;
8) Illicit trafficking of arms and the infiltration of armed groups shall be controlled with the collaboration of neighbouring countries;
9) The parties shall undertake to locate, identify, disarm, and assemble all armed groups in the country;
10) The parties shall ensure that armed groups operating under their command comply with the process;
11) Mechanisms for dismantling and disarming all militias and disarming civilians holding arms illegally shall be established;
12) Amnesty shall be granted to all combatants of the political parties and movements for crimes committed as a result of their involvement in the conflict, but not for acts of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, or for their participation in coups d’état.
2. Disengagement
1) Disengagement shall mean the immediate breaking of contact between the opposing military forces of the Parties to the Agreement at places where they are in direct contact by the effective date and time of the ceasefire.
2) Immediate disengagement at the initiative of all military units shall be limited to the effective range of all weapons. Disengagement to put all weapons out of range shall be conducted under the guidance of the Ceasefire Commission established pursuant to article 27 below.
3) Where disengagement by a party is impossible or impractical, the Ceasefire Commission shall find an alternative solution to render the weapons safe.
Article 27: Verification and supervision
1. Ceasefire Commission
1) The Ceasefire Commission shall consist of representatives of the Government, the combatants of the political parties and movements, the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the Regional Peace Initiative for Burundi.
2) The Ceasefire Commission shall be a decision-making body.
3) The Ceasefire Commission shall take its decisions by consensus.
4) The Ceasefire Commission shall be responsible, among other things, for:
1. Establishing the location of units at the time of the ceasefire;
2. Establishing liaison between the parties for the purpose of the ceasefire;
3. Finding appropriate solutions in the event of difficulty in disengagement;
4. Conducting investigations of any ceasefire violations;
5. Verifying all information, data and activities relating to military forces of the parties;
6. Verifying the disengagement of the military forces of the Parties where they are in direct contact;
7. Monitoring the storage of arms, munitions equipment;
8. Monitoring the quartering of troops and police;
9. Undertaking the disarmament of all illegally armed civilians;
10. Undertaking mine clearance throughout the country.
5) The parties undertake to provide the Ceasefire Commission immediately with all relevant information on the organization, equipment and positions of their forces, on the understanding that such information shall be held in strict confidence.
Article 28: Ceasefire implementation timetable
The ceasefire implementation timetable shall be determined by the Ceasefire Commission.
Pretoria Protocol on Outstanding Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing Issues
Ceasefire Agreement between the Transitional Government of Burundi and the CNDD-FDD (2 December 2002)
1. The questions originally mentioned in the first part of the preamble have been transferred to the annex, with a view to their negotiation at a later stage. However, the negotiations on those questions will not create preconditions for the implementation of the ceasefire.
2. The discussions and clarifications which have been transferred to the annex were provided for under the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi.
Article I
1. This ceasefire shall apply throughout the territory of Burundi, between the belligerents as defined. The ceasefire shall take effect on 30 December 2002. The first 14 days from the date of signature should enable the belligerents to communicate to their troops, throughout thechain of command, their decision to cease hostilities. By 30 December 2002, combatants must have completed their movement to assembly areas.
2. This truce or cessation of hostilities shall enter into force within 72 hours after the signing of a Ceasefire Agreement.
3. This Ceasefire Agreement is the final stage of the peace process, itself the culmination of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, signed on 28 August 2002 after a process of political negotiations.
Powersharing Transitional Government
2003
Not all major parties to the conflict signed the agreement until 2003. During this three year gap, implementation of the powersharing provision began. After the Arusha accord, all sides reached an agreement to accept the leadership of Pierre Buyoya from Union from the National Progress Party (UPRONA) for the initial 18 months of transitional period with Domitien Ndayizeye from Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) as the vice president. After 18 months, Domitien Ndayizeye would become a president and a new Vice-President will be designated by the G-10 group (the Tutsis).1 This decision was made in a regional summit of Implementation Monitoring Committee held in in Lusaka, Zambia on 23 July 2001.2 The transitional government was formally inaugurated on 1 November 2001.3 Out of 26 cabinet portfolios, the Hutu groups got 14 ministries and the Tutsi groups got 12 ministries.4
The Pretoria Protocol I (8 October 2003), however, gives the CNDD-FDD positions in the transitional executive and the legislative branch of the government. The CNDD-FDD had rejected the ceasefire negotiations and was not sharing power in the transitional government. The CNDD-FDD was granted four ministries, 15 seats in the National Assembly, three governorships, two ambassador posts, 30 positions in local council administrators, and 20 percent directorate positions in public enterprises.5 The CNDD-FDD formally joined the government on 23 November 2003 when a new 27-member cabinet was announced.6
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” The United Nations Security Council (S/2001/1076), November 14, 2001.
- “Burundi; Regional Summit Approves Transitional Leadership,” Africa News, July 23, 2001.
- “BURUNDI: New government inaugurated, dawn of a new era,” Irin News, accessed on February 15, 2013, http://www.irinnews.org/fr/node/196978.
- Ibid.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Secuity Council (S/2003/1146), December 4, 2003.
- Ibid.
2004
No developments observed this year.
2005
The transitional government was in power until the elections were held on 19 August 2005. In the elections, the CNDD-FDD leader Pierre Nkurunziza was elected and the inauguration of his term took place on 26 August.
2006
No further developments observed.
2007
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
2009
No further developments observed.
2010
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
2009
No further developments observed.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
2012
No further developments observed.
Protocol II, Chapter II: Article 15: Transitional Institutions
1. There shall be a transitional Legislature made up of a National Assembly and a Senate, a transitional Executive, a Judiciary and other transitional institutions as set forth in the present Protocol.
2. The constitutional provisions governing the powers, duties and functioning of the transitional Executive, the transitional Legislature and the Judiciary, as well as the rights and duties of citizens and of political parties and associations, shall be as set forth hereunder and, where thistext is silent, in the Constitution of the Republic of Burundi of 13 March 1992. When there is any conflict between that Constitution and the Agreement, the provisions of the Agreement shall prevail. To give legal effect to this provision, the terms of the Agreement shall be appropriately adopted and promulgated within Burundi within four weeks of its signature.
3. The composition of the transitional National Assembly shall be as follows:
The National Assembly
(a) The Members of the National Assembly elected in 1993 shall retain or resume their seats. Where vacancies have occurred, the parties whose members occupied the vacant seats before the vacancy occurred shall fill them or allow those who have already filled them to remain;
(b) The transitional National Assembly shall be augmented so that each of the participating parties which are not represented under (a) will be entitled to at least three seats so as to be represented within the transitional National Assembly;
(c) It shall thereafter be augmented by the 28 members representing civil society currently sitting in the National Assembly;
(d) The appointed members of the National Assembly shall retain their seats in the transitional National Assembly regardless of the return from exile of the members of the National Assembly elected in 1993.
The Senate
(a) The Senate shall be put in place by the President of the Republic and the Bureau of the National Assembly, while ensuring respect for the political, regional and ethnic balances;
(b) It shall include inter alia former heads of State, three individuals from the Twa ethnic group and members of the transitional National Assembly coopted by the President of the Republic and the Bureau of the transitional National Assembly;
(c) No provision shall be made for replacement of the members of the transitional National Assembly coopted to sit in the transitional Senate;
(d) The transitional Senate shall perform the functions provided for inter alia in article 6 paragraph 16, and all such other functions and are expressly provided for in the constitutional principles embodied in the Agreement;
(e) The Senate shall draw up its rules of procedure, which shall go into effect following verification by the Constitutional Court of their conformity with the transitional arrangements. Its first session shall be devoted to drawing up its rules of procedure and establishing its bureau. Thissession shall be presided over by the oldest Senator;
(f) Its Bureau shall consist of a Speaker, and a Deputy Speaker, a Secretary-General and a Deputy Secretary-General.
4. The transitional National Assembly and the traditional Senate shall within 18 months adopt in the same terms, by a two-thirds majority, a post-transition Constitution in conformity with the principles set forth in Chapter I of the present Protocol.
5. After such adoption, the text in question shall be submitted to the Constitutional Court for verification of its compliance with the principles set forth in Chapter I. If the text does not so comply, the Court shall indicate which provisions must be amended. If and whenever the Court declines to certify a text submitted to it pursuant to this provision, the transitional National Assembly and the transitional Senate shall within 30 days amend the text and resubmit it to the Court.
6. A text referred to above shall, if certified, be submitted for popular approval by way of referendum. A text which is so approved shall be the post-transition Constitution and shall come into force upon the termination of the transition period.
7. If no duly adopted text has been certified and approved by referendum within 23 months of the commencement of the transition, the Implementation Monitoring Committee may instruct experts – either national or international – to prepare a text in conformity with Chapter I of the present Protocol. The experts shall have regard to any judgements of the Constitutional Court and to any constitutional texts not certified by it. The text prepared by the experts shall be submitted for direct approval by way of referendum. If approved, it shall become the post-transition Constitution. If not approved, it shall serve provisionally as the Constitution for purposes of the Legislature and Executive elected during the transition period under the provisions of article 20 of the present Protocol. Such first elected Legislature shall draft a post-transition Constitution and adopt it in conformity with the procedure for amending the post-transition Constitution set forth in Chapter I of the present Protocol.
8.
(a) The rules of procedure of the transitional National Assembly shall be those of the National Assembly elected in 1993 until they are duly amended.
(b) The President and the Vice-President of the transitional National Assembly shall come from two different political families.
9. During the transition period, the National Assembly shall not pass a vote of no confidence and may not be dissolved.
10. A two-thirds majority shall be required for the adoption of legislation.
11. Any commission required under the present Protocol to be established by the transitional National Assembly shall be established by the Bureau of the transitional National Assembly unless otherwise indicated in the present Protocol.
12. The first transitional President and Vice-President of the Republic shall come from different ethnic groups and political parties. In the event of the death or incapacity of either of them, the new transitional President or Vice-President of the Republic shall be elected by the transitional National Assembly by a resolution which receives the support of two-thirds of the members. Pending the election of a new President, the President of the transitional National Assembly, assisted by the Vice-President of the Republic, shall act as President, The term of the transitional President and Vice-President shall terminate upon the election of the first President under the provisions of this Protocol.
13. During the transition period, there shall be a broad-based transitional Government of national unity. The Government shall include representatives of different parties in a proportion whereby more than half and less than three-fifths of the portfolios are allocated amongst the G-7 group of parties.
14. The precise identity of the members of the transitional Executive shall be decided by the transitional President and Vice-President after consultations with the heads of the parties participating in the transitional National Assembly.
15.
(a) There shall be between 24 and 26 members of the transitional Executive, in addition to the transitional President and Vice-President.
(b) The transitional President and Vice-President shall determine the initial function of each Minister when allocating the ministries to parties. The transitional President and Vice-President shall ensure that the minister in charge of the defence force belongs to a different family of parties from the minister responsible for the police.
16. The transitional Executive shall take its decisions and otherwise function in accordance with the spirit embodied in the concept of a Government of national unity, and shall make or propose appointments to the public administration and to diplomatic positions in the same spirit. It shall strive to take its decisions by consensus. It shall also take into account the need to reflect ethnic, religious, political, and gender balance in its decisions and appointments.
17. Any decision to be taken, by law or in accordance with the present Protocol, by the transitional President shall be taken only after consultation with the transitional Vice-President or the transitional Executive.
18. The transitional Executive shall confirm the appointment of the heads of the police and the defence force.
19. The transitional President, after consultation with the transitional Executive, shall within 30 days prepare for submission to the transitional Senate in accordance with the present Protocol a list of appointments for a period or periods specified by her/him to the offices listed below:
(a) Provincial governors;
(b) Judges of the Constitutional Court;
(c) Commune administrators.
20.
(a) The transitional Government shall within 30 days of the commencement of the transition establish a commission under the chairmanship of a judge to investigate, as a matter of urgency, and to make recommendations on:
i. The conditions in jails, the treatment of prisoners and the training and conditions of service of warders;
ii. The release of prisoners awaiting trial in respect of whom there has been an undue delay in the prosecution of their cases;
iii. The existence of and release of any political prisoners.
(b) The establishment of this commission shall not preclude the transitional Government or the transitional National Assembly dealing with the above matters.
21. The transitional National Assembly and the transitional Executive may establish commissions with or without expert participation to assist in preparing texts or for any other purpose which is part of their respective missions during the transition.
Pretoria Protocol I (8 October 2003)
EXECUTIVE
The CNDD-FDD will have four ministries including a Minister of State. The Presidency will consult the Minister of State on all key matters.
THE LEGISLATURE
National Assembly
1. CNDD-FDD will participate in the Bureau as follows:
Second-Vice President.
Deputy Secretary-General.
The Bureau will be increased to six. Two advisors will be appointed in the Staff of the National Assembly.
2. CNDD-FDD will also have 15 members of the Assembly.
3. Measures will be taken to respect the balance among the political families as reflected in the Arusha Agreement.
Senate
The question of the participation of the CNDD-FDD will be discussed at the next meeting, prior to the Regional Summit. (See Article VII below)
GOVERNORS OF PROVINCES
CNDD-FDD will have:
Three Governors
Five Advisors
DIPLOMATIC CORPS
CNDD-FDD will have:
Two ambassadors
Six secretaries and/or advisors
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CNDD-FDD will have 30 Administrators.
Pretoria Protocol on Outstanding Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing Issues in Burundi:
5. Reconstitution of the Transitional Government of Burundi
The parties agreed that the Transitional Government of Burundi shall be reconstituted to include members of the CNDD-FDD not later than three (3) weeks from the signing of this Protocol.
Executive Branch Reform
2003
Not all major parties to the conflict signed the agreement until 2003. During this three year gap, implementation of the executive branch reform provision began.
The Arusha accord provided for the directly elected president except for the transitional president who would be indirectly elected. President now can serve two five years terms. Agreement also provided for two vice presidents approved separately in the assembly and the senate by a majority of their members. The accords provide one ministerial position to the party or coalition that secured more than one-twentieth of the vote. In Arusha accord, parties also agreed to establish an independent Ombudsperson to hear complaints and conduct inquiries relating to mismanagement and infringements of citizens’ rights committed by members of the public administration and the judiciary. The Ombudsperson was to be appointed by the National assembly with ¾ majority and is responsible to report to the assembly and senate annually.
On 1 November 2001, interim President Pierre Buyoya from Union from National Progress Party(UPRONA) was inaugurated for the initial 18 months of transitional period with Domitien Ndayizeye from Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) as the vice president.1
On 30 April 2003, Domitien Ndayizeye became interim president (Tutsi).2
- “BURUNDI: New government inaugurated, dawn of a new era,” Irin News, accessed February 15, 2013, www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=12636; “Timeline Burundi,” Timelines of World History, accessed February 18, 2013, http://timelines.ws/countries/BURUNDI.HTML.
- Ibid.
2004
No developments observed this year.
2005
The interim presidency continued until the presidential elections on 19 August 2005. As specified in the accord, Burundi’s lawmakers choose Pierre Nkurunziza, a former Hutu rebel leader as Burundi’s new president for five years.1 It was an indirect elections. On 29 August 2005, Burundi’s parliament approved Dr. Martin Nduwimana, first vice-president and Mrs. Alice Nzomukunda, second vice-president with unanimous vote. The first vice president was responsible for political and administrative affairs and the second vice president was in charge of social and economic affairs.2 On 30 August 2005, a 20-member cabinet including seven women cabinet members was formed. In the new cabinet, 60% were Hutu and 40% were Tutsi.3
As of 2005, the legislature did not pass the law for the office of the Ombudsme.4
- “Timeline Burundi.”
- “Burundi parliament approves two vice-presidents,” BBC Monitoring Africa, August 19, 2005.
- “Burundi president forms government,” Agence France Presse, August 30, 2005.
- “Burundi president marks second anniversary in power with address; overview,” BBC Monitoring Africa, August 27, 2007.
2006
The reforms to the executive branch of the government called for the direct election of the president and the creation of an ombudsmen. Both of these developments have yet to take place.
2007
No developments observed this year.
2008
No developments observed this year.
2009
On 11 November 2009, the senate of Burundi approved a bill on the creation, structure and duties of an ombudsman office.1 The ombudsman, however, was not appointed in 2009.
2010
On 25 January 2010, the Office of the Ombudsman was created and the parliament elected Mohamed Rukara, a CNDD-FDD member as the first ombudsman. For his affiliation with political party, there was concern of him being independent and neutral as envisaged in the Arusha agreement and the constitution.1
As agreed in the Arusha accord, the presidential elections took place on 28 June 2010 in which Pierre Nkurunziza, a CNDD-FDD candidate received more than 91% of votes in the direct election.2 On 26 August, the reelected president was sworn in for his second term. A new cabinet was announced on 31 August in which 14 out of the 21 ministers were associated with the ruling party. In new cabinet 9 members were women. Because the constitution does not require political affiliation for 40% share of Tutsi in the cabinet, the new cabinet meets the constitutional requirement of 60% Hutu and 40% Tutsi power-sharing provisions.3
- “2010 Human Rights Report: Burundi,” United States State Department, accessed February 18, 2010, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/af/154334.htm.
- “Elections in Burundi,” African Elections Database, acccessed February 18, 2013, http://africanelections.tripod.com/bi.html#2010_Presidential_Election.
- “Re-Elected President Names New Cabinet Team in Burundi,” Global Insight, August 31, 2010.
2011
With the direct election of president in 2010, the executive branch reforms were complete.
2012
No further developments observed.
Protocol II, Chapter I, Article 7: The Executive
1.(a) The Constitution shall provide that, save for the very first election of a President, the President of the Republic shall be elected by direct universal suffrage in which each elector may vote for only one candidate. The President of the Republic shall be elected by an absolute majority of the votes cast. If this majority is not obtained in the first round, a second round shall follow within 15 days.
(b) Only the two candidates who have received the greatest number of votes during the first round may stand in the second round. The candidate who receives the majority of votes cast in the second round shall be declared the President of the Republic.
(c) For the first election, to be held during the transition period, the President shall be indirectly elected as specified in article 20, paragraph 10 below.
2. The President of the Republic shall exercise regulatory power and shall ensure the proper enforcement and administration of legislation. She/he shall exercise her/his powers by decrees, countersigned, where required, by a Vice-President or a minister concerned.
3. She/he shall be elected for a term of five years, renewable only once. No one may serve more than two presidential terms.
4. In the exercise of her/his functions, the President of the Republic shall be assisted by two Vice-Presidents. They shall be appointed by the President of the Republic, who shall previously have submitted their candidacy for approval by the National Assembly and the Senate, voting separately, by a majority of their members. The President of the Republic may dismiss the Vice-Presidents. They shall belong to different ethnic groups and political parties.
5. The President of the Republic, after consultation with the two Vice-Presidents, shall appoint the members of the Government and terminate their appointments.
6. Parties or coalitions thereof shall be invited, but not obliged, to submit to the President a list of persons to serve as ministers if such parties or coalitions have received more than one-twentieth of the vote. They shall be entitled to at least the same proportion, rounded off downwards, of the total number of ministers as their proportion of members in the National Assembly. If the President dismisses a minister, she/he must choose a replacement from a list submitted by the party or coalition of the minister in question.
7. The President of the Republic shall be the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the defence and security forces. She/he shall declare war and sign armistices following consultation with the Government and the bureaux of the National Assembly and of the Senate.
8. The President of the Republic may be impeached for serious misconduct, impropriety or corruption by resolution of two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly and the Senate sitting together.
9. The President of the Republic may be charged only with the crime of high treason. The case shall be heard by the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court sitting together and presided over by the President of the Supreme Court.
10. The Supreme Court shall receive a written statement of the assets and property of the President, the Vice-Presidents and members of the Government when they assume and relinquish office.
Article 10: The administration
1. The administration shall function in accordance with the democratic values and principles enshrined in the Constitution, and with the law.
2. The administration shall be so structured, and all civil servants shall so perform their duties, as to serve all users of public services with efficiency, courtesy, impartiality and equity. Embezzlement, corruption, extortion and misappropriation of all kinds shall be punishable in accordance with the law. Any state employee convicted of corruption shall be dismissed from the public administration following a disciplinary inquiry.
3. The administration shall be organized in ministries, and every minister in charge of a ministry shall report to the President of the Republic and to the National Assembly on the manner in which the ministry performs its functions and utilizes the funds allocated to it.
4. The administration shall be broadly representative and reflect the diversity of the components of the Burundian nation. The practices with respect to employment shall be based on objective and equitable criteria of aptitude and on the need to correct the imbalances and achieve broad representation.
5. A law shall specify the distinction between posts that are career or technical posts and those that are political posts.
6. No civil servant or member of the Judiciary may be accorded favourable or unfavourable treatment solely on grounds of her/his gender, ethnicity or political affiliation.
7. An independent Ombudsperson shall be created by the Constitution. The organization and functioning of her/his service shall be determined by law.
8. The Ombudsperson shall hear complaints and conduct inquiries relating to mismanagement and infringements of citizens’ rights committed by members of the public administration and the judiciary, and shall make recommendations thereon to the appropriate authorities. She/he shall also mediate between the administration and citizens and between administrative departments, and shall act as an observer of the functioning of the public administration.
9. The Ombudsperson shall possess the powers and resources required to perform her/his duty. She/he shall report annually to the National Assembly and the Senate. Her/his report shall be published in the Official Gazette of Burundi.
10. The Ombudsperson shall be appointed by the National Assembly by a three-quarters majority. The appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the Senate.
Constitutional Reform
2003
Not all major parties to the conflict signed the agreement until 2003. During this three year gap, implementation of the constitutional reform provision began.
An interim constitution was adopted in 2001 for the transitional period until 2005. During debate on the draft constitution, Tutsi lawmakers boycotted constitutional meetings on issues related to power-sharing provisions in the accord.1
2004
On 17 September 2004, the Burundian parliament approved the draft constitution.1 The parliament-approved constitution was approved in referendum that took place on 28 February 2005 in which 92.02% voters approved the new constitution.2
- “Parliament approves draft constitution,” BBC Sumary of World Broadcasts, September 17, 2004.
- “Elections in Burundi,” African Elections Database, accessed February 18, 2013, http://africanelections.tripod.com/bi.html#2010_Presidential_Election.
2005
After approval in the referendum, President Domitien Ndayizeye ratified the constitution on 19 March 2005.1 The constitution came into effect immediately.
- “Burundi constitution becomes law as country continues to heal wounds,” Agence France Presse, March 19, 2005.”
2006
New democratic constitution based on a power sharing formula between the Hutus and Tutsis came into effect in March 2005.
2007
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
2009
No further developments observed.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
2012
No further developments observed.
Protocol I, Chapter II:
Preamble:
1. To ensure that a constitutional text for the people of Burundi is drafted during the transition period that is in conformity with the principles set forth in Chapter I of the present Protocol, and to ensure that such a text is adopted and brought into force in accordance with the time-frames and procedures herein, in conformity with a vision of democracy and good governance and the principles listed hereunder.
Article 5:
General political measures:
1. Institution of a new political, economic, social and judicial order in Burundi, in the context of a new constitution inspired by Burundian realities and founded on the values of justice, the rule of law, democracy, good governance, pluralism, respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, unity, solidarity, equality between women and men, mutual understanding and tolerance among the various political and ethnic components of the Burundian people.
5. Adoption of constitutional provisions embodying the principle of separation of powers (executive, legislative and judicial), pursuant to the provisions of Protocol II to the Agreement.
Electoral/Political Party Reform
2003
The Arusha accord called for the establishment of a multiparty political system for Burundi in which political parties can organize freely and form coalitions. To gurantee free and fair elections, the accord called for the establishment of an Independent National Electoral Commission.
Not all major parties to the conflict signed the agreement until 2003. During this three year gap, no developments were observed concerning electoral/political party reform.
2004
The National Independent Electoral Commission was established by parliament on 31 August 2004 with Paul Ngarambe as its chairman.1
- “United Nations Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2004/902), November 15, 2004.
2005
After constitutional approval in a referendum on 25 February, the transitional national assembly approved new electoral legislation on 12 March 2005.1 The draft bill was approved by the senate on 13 April 2005.2 The parliamentary elections and senate elections were held in July and the presidential election was held in August of 2005.3
- “Election 2005: Legislative Poll on Track as Parliament Approves New Electoral Laws in Burundi,” World Markets Analysis, March 14, 2005.
- “Upper Chamber Endorses New Electoral Laws in Burundi,” World Market Analysis, March 14, 2005.
- “Burundi; Elections Calendar Issued,” Africa News, April 25, 2005.
2006
No further developments observed.
2007
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
2009
No further developments observed.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
2012
No further developments observed.
Protocol I, Chapter II: Article 5:
4. Orientation of political parties’ programmes towards the ideals of unity and national reconciliation and of socio-economic development rather than the protection of a specific component of the Burundian people.
6. Enactment of an electoral law that takes into account the concerns and interests of all components of the nation on the basis of the provisions of Protocol II to the Agreement. Arusha, Protocol II, Chapter I, Article 4: Political parties
1. The multiparty system shall be recognized in the Republic of Burundi.
2. Political parties may be formed freely in conformity with the law.
3. A political party shall be a non-profit association uniting citizens around a democratic blueprint for society founded on national unity, and having a political programme with precise objectives dictated by the desire to serve the public interest and ensure the development of all citizens.
4. Political parties must comply with democratic principles in their organization and functioning, be open to all Burundians and be national in character and leadership, and shall not promote ethnic, regional or religious violence and hatred.
5. Political parties – and coalitions of political parties – shall promote the free expression of suffrage and shall participate in political life by peaceful means.
6. For the purposes of promoting democracy, a national law may authorize the financing of political parties on an equitable basis in proportion to the number of seats they hold in the National Assembly. Such financing may apply both to the functioning of the political parties and to electoral campaigns, and shall be transparent. The law shall define the types of subsidies, benefits and facilities that the State may grant political parties.
7. Registration of political parties shall fall within the competence of the Ministry of the Interior.
8. The law shall guarantee non-interference by the public authorities in the internal functioning of political parties, save for such restrictions as may be necessary for the prevention of ethnic hatred and the maintenance of public order.
9. Political parties may form coalitions during elections in accordance with the electoral law.
Protocol II, Chapter I: Article 5: Elections
1. The right to vote shall be guaranteed.
2. Elections shall be free, fair and regular in accordance with the electoral law and the law governing political parties.
3. Elections shall be organized impartially at the national, commune and colline levels and at other levels prescribed by the Constitution or by law.
4. Until amended in accordance with the post-transition Constitution, the rules relating to the electoral system shall be the same as those governing the elections for institutions at the national, commune and colline levels to be held during the transition period.
5. An Independent National Electoral Commission constituted in conformity with the provisions of article 20 of the present Protocol shall guarantee the freedom, impartiality and independence of the electoral process.
Civil Administration Reform
2003
Not all major parties to the conflict signed the agreement until 2003. During this three year gap, implementation of civil administration reforms began. The accord called for reforms to de-politicize the civil service, reduce corruption, and increase competence. The government conducted a census of public servants throughout the country in 2001. In the result published in February 2002, there were 40,642 people employed by the civil service, but the Civil Service Ministry had been sending paychecks to 41,642 people. Around 1000 people who had been getting paid were unaccounted for.1 In July 2002, the parliament adopted new legislation allowing trade unions for civil servants.2 No initiatives were taken to achieve a balance of ethnic groups in the civil service.
- “Burundi: Census shows 1,007 ghost civil servants employed,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 8, 2002.
- “Burundi: Parliament adopts draft law on civil service trade unions,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 5, 2002.
2004
It was reported that ethnic Tutsis, who had applied for jobs in customs, were taken out of the applicant pool. The director-general of the Civil Service defended the move by suggesting that the Arusha accord sought to bring ethnic balance to the civil service.1
- “Civil service head reportedly rejects ethnic Tutsi job applicants” BBC Sumary of World Broadcasts, January 24, 2004.
2005
At the close of 2005, the legislature had not established an independent Ombudsmen office for civil service employees as called for in the accord.1
- “Burundi president marks second anniversary in power with address; overview,” BBC Monitoring Africa, August 27, 2007.
2006
On 26 May 2006, the government enacted Law no. 1/28 in an effort to reduce corruption in the civil service.1
- “Burundi: A Deepening Corruption Crisis Africa Report,” International Crisis Group (no. 185 — 21), March 2012.
2007
On 29 June 2007, the National Recruitment Commission was finalized through Ministerial order no. 574, which required increased public transparency in the recruitment process.1
2008
No developments observed this year.
2009
No developments observed this year.
2010
On 25 January 2010, the Office of the Ombudsman was created and the parliament elected Mohamed Rukara, a CNDD-FDD member as the first ombudsman. Due to his political affiliations, however, there were objections about him being independent or neutral as intended in the Arusha agreement and the constitution.1
- “2010 Human Rights Report: Burundi,” United States State Department, accessed February 18, 2010, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/af/154334.htm.
2011
No further developments observed.
2012
A special 2012 report by the International Crises Group on Burundi makes a case that corruption is now worse under the total capture of state power under the CNDD than it was under Tutsi minority control. The report claims that “the civil service is now perceived as very politicized, a situation denounced by officials themselves.” In survey based assessments of government corruption in Burundi, between 84 and 91 percent of officials believed that “appointments in their sector were controlled by the executive power.”1
Protocol II, Chapter I: Article 10: The administration
1. The administration shall function in accordance with the democratic values and principles enshrined in the Constitution, and with the law.
2. The administration shall be so structured, and all civil servants shall so perform their duties, as to serve all users of public services with efficiency, courtesy, impartiality and equity. Embezzlement, corruption, extortion and misappropriation of all kinds shall be punishable in accordance with the law. Any state employee convicted of corruption shall be dismissed from the public administration following a disciplinary inquiry.
3. The administration shall be organized in ministries, and every minister in charge of a ministry shall report to the President of the Republic and to the National Assembly on the manner in which the ministry performs its functions and utilizes the funds allocated to it.
4. The administration shall be broadly representative and reflect the diversity of the components of the Burundian nation. The practices with respect to employment shall be based on objective and equitable criteria of aptitude and on the need to correct the imbalances and achieve broad representation.
5. A law shall specify the distinction between posts that are career or technical posts and those that are political posts.
6. No civil servant or member of the Judiciary may be accorded favourable or unfavourable treatment solely on grounds of her/his gender, ethnicity or political affiliation.
7. An independent Ombudsperson shall be created by the Constitution. The organization and functioning of her/his service shall be determined by law.
8. The Ombudsperson shall hear complaints and conduct inquiries relating to mismanagement and infringements of citizen’s rights committed by members of the public administration and the judiciary, and shall make recommendations thereon to the appropriate authorities. She/he shall also mediate between the administration and citizens and between administrative departments, and shall act as an observer of the functioning of the public administration.
9. The Ombudsperson shall possess the powers and resources required to perform her/his duty. She/he shall report annually to the National Assembly and the Senate. Her/his report shall be published in the Official Gazette of Burundi.
10. The Ombudsperson shall be appointed by the National Assembly by a three-quarters majority. The appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the Senate.
Truth or Reconciliation Mechanism
2003
No developments observed this year.
2004
No developments observed this year.
2005
No developments observed this year.
2006
In March of 2006, the UN sent a delegation to the Burundian government urging for the establishment of the Truth Commission and an international inquiry on genocide. The government submitted a memorandum to the UN by detailing its proposals and recommendations.1
- “Burundi; UN Team Arrives for Talks On Truth And Reconciliation Commission,” Africa News, March 27, 2006.
2007
In 2007, the President of Burundi created a commission to begin conducting popular consultations concerning the setting up of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Special International Tribunal.1
2008
No developments observed this year.
2009
No developments observed this year.
2010
No developments observed this year.
2011
In June, the government of Burundi established a Technical Committee to make recommendations on establishing the TRC.1
- “Burundi / Submission to the Technical Committee revising the law for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” African Press Organization, September 8, 2011.
2012
The TRC was not established by the end of 2012.
Postscript: A draft on the establishment of a TRC was made public in December of 2012 and was circulated in 2013.1
Protocol I, Chapter II:
Article 8: Principles and measures relating to national reconciliation
1. A national commission known as the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission shall be established. This Commission shall have the following functions:
(a) Investigation
The Commission shall bring to light and establish the truth regarding the serious acts of violence committed during the cyclical conflicts which cast a tragic shadow over Burundi from independence (1 July 1962) to the date of signature of the Agreement, classify the crimes and establish the responsibilities, as well as the identity of the perpetrators and the victims. However, the Commission shall not be competent to classify acts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes;
(b) Arbitration and reconciliation
The Burundian crisis is a profound one: the task of reconciliation will be long and exacting. There are still gaping wounds which will need to be healed.
To this end the Commission shall, upon completion of its investigations, propose to the competent institutions or adopt measures likely to promote reconciliation and forgiveness, order indemnification or restoration of disputed property, or propose any political, social or other measures it deems appropriate.
In this context, the transitional National Assembly may pass a law or laws providing a framework for granting an amnesty consistent with international law for such political crimes as it or the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission may find appropriate;
(c) Clarification of history
The Commission shall also be responsible for clarifying the entire history of Burundi, going as far back as possible in order to inform Burundians about their past. The purpose of this clarification exercise shall be to rewrite Burundi’s history so that all Burundians can interpret it in the same way.
2. Membership of the commission
(a) Source
Candidates for membership of the Commission shall be put forward by civil society associations, political parties, religious denominations or women’s organizations, or may stand as individual candidates.
(b) Appointing body
Members of the Commission shall be appointed by the transitional Government in consultation with the Bureau of the transitional National Assembly.
(c) Profile and selection of candidates
Members of the Commission must show probity, integrity and ability to rise above divisions of all kinds. In the selection of candidates, balance must be taken into account, and the following criteria shall apply:
i. Age of members: at least 35 years;
ii. Level of education: at least a full secondary education certificate or equivalent.
3. Functioning of the Commission
The Commission must have the leeway to work independently, inter alia through autonomy in managing the material and financial resources to be allocated to it.
The Commission shall, whenever necessary, propose additional reconciliation mechanisms, and shall be free to set up sub-commissions as appropriate.
The public authorities shall have the obligation to do their utmost to enable the Commission to accomplish its mission without hindrance, by providing it with sufficient material, technical and financial resources.
4. Duration
The Commission shall conduct its work over a two-year period. At the end of two years, the appropriate transitional institutions shall assess the work done, and may decide on an extension for one year.
Dispute Resolution Committee
2003
Not all major parties to the conflict signed the agreement until 2003. During this three year gap, implementation of the dispute resolution committee began. A 29-member Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC) was inaugurated on 27 November by former South African President Nelson Mandela. The UN Secretary General appointed Berhanu Dinka, the UN representative to the Great Lakes region to lead the IMC. The committee consisted of representatives from all signatories to the accord except for Parena — a hardline Tutsi party.1 The first meeting of the IMC took place on 30 November 2000,2 The IMC had to reach a settlement on issues related to transitional leadership, a timeline for its implementation, and the proposed peacekeeping force. The second meeting took place on 1 December 2000, and failed to resolve these issues.3 The new round of talks was scheduled in Arusha starting on 15 January 2001.4
In 2001, the IMC considered various issues and the implementation of the Arusha accord. In this regard, an agreement on transitional leadership was reached on 25 July 2001.5 For the serious ceasefire negotiation with rebel groups, the IMC told the transitional government to consider draft legislations on provisional amnesty for returning exiles; genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; and creation of a national commission for the rehabilitation of refugees.6
Throughout 2002, the IMC worked with the government on various laws including on freedom of activities for political parties, provisional immunities, the law against genocide and the establishment of National Committee on Refugees and Sinistrés (CNRS) among others.7 One of the most significant achievements of the IMC was the ceasefire agreement of 2 December 2002, which was a significant peace process achievement.8
The IMC in its role to resolve disputes on implementing the accord, criticized the government for lack of political will to implement the accord as the transitional government did not make progress in releasing political prisoners and improving prison conditions.9 The committee tried to resolve disputes related to the adoption and enhancement of laws on provisional immunity, punishment of crime of genocide among other laws. Nevertheless, the committee was working very closely with the parliament to get the constitution, the electoral code and the reform in defense and security corps. The IMC also worked on the modalities for the establishment of the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation.10 Among other important achievements was the deployment of the African Mission in Burundi
- “Rwanda; Ambassador Dinka To Lead Burundi Monitoring Committee,” Africa News, November 27, 2000.”
- “Burundi; UN Envoy Chairs First Meeting Of Committee On Burundi Peace Accord,” Africa News, November 30, 2000.
- “Burundi peace process in doubt after inconclusive talks end,” Associated Press, December 1, 2000.
- “New round of Burundi peace talks to begin in Arusha on 15 January,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 19, 2000.
- “UN: Installation of Burundi’s transitional government on 1 November ‘turning point’ in peace process says Security Council,” M2 PRESSWIRE, September 27, 2001.
- “Burundi; Create Conditions for Peace, Monitoring Body Tells Government,”Africa News, December 3, 2001.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2002/1259), November 18, 2002.
- “U.N. secretary-general welcomes Burundi cease-fire,” Associated Press, 3 December 2002.
- “Burundi; IMC Slams Detention of Political Prisoners, Poor Prison Conditions,” Africa News, October 7, 2003.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2003/1146), December 4, 2003.
2004
The IMC continued to press the transitional government and the parties involved in the peace process on constitution and the electoral law along with pressing armed political parties and movements to meet the precondition of disarmament and demobilization.1 The committee also pressed the government to set up the Electoral Commission in its nineteenth session in July. As a result the National Independent Electoral Commission was set up on 5 August.2 The IMC requested the transitional government to facilitate the reintegration of former armed parties and formally establish new defense and security forces. The IMC also requested the national assembly to enact a draft electoral code; and the political parties to accept the electoral timetable.3
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2004/682), August 25, 2004.
- Ibid.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2004/902, 15) November 15, 2004.
2005
After holding its final meeting on 8 and 9 August, the IMC concluded its mandate.1
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2005/586), September 14, 2005.
2006
No further developments observed.
2007
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
2009
No further developments observed.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
2012
No further developments observed.
Protocol V: Article 3: Implementation Monitoring Committee
A committee to follow up, monitor, supervise and coordinate the implementation of the Agreement, hereinafter referred to as the Implementation Monitoring Committee, shall be established.
1. Role of the Implementation Monitoring Committee
The functions of the Implementation Monitoring Committee shall be to:
(a) Follow up, monitor, supervise, coordinate and ensure the effective implementation of all the provisions of the Agreement;
(b) Ensure that the implementation timetable is respected;
(c) Ensure the accurate interpretation of the Agreement;
(d) Reconcile points of view;
(e) Arbitrate and rule on any dispute that may arise among the signatories;
(f) Give guidance to and coordinate the activities of all the commissions and sub-commissions set up pursuant to each protocol for the purpose of implementing the Agreement. These commissions and sub-commissions shall include the following:
– The Technical Committee to implement the procedures for the establishment of a national defence force;
– The Technical Committee to implement the procedures for the establishment of the national police;
– The Ceasefire Commission;
– The Reintegration Commission;
– The National Commission for the Rehabilitation of Sinistras;
(g) Assist and support the transitional government in the diplomatic mobilization of the financial, material, technical and human resources required for the implementation of the Agreement;
(h) Decide on the admission of new participating parties in accordance with article 14 of Protocol II to the Agreement;
(i) Perform any other duty specifically allocated to it by the Agreement.
Judiciary Reform
2003
Not all major parties to the conflict signed the agreement until 2003. During this three year gap, implementation of the judiciary reform provision did begin.
In Arusha accord, parties agreed for extensive reform in the judiciary including establishment of a constitutional court. The accord called for the establishment of ethnically balanced Judicial Service Commission along with establishment of a multiparty commission within a transitional national assembly to monitor the administration of justice and to submit recommendations to the assembly. The accord asked for promotion of gender and ethnic balance in the judiciary. According to the accord, transitional president and vice-president in consultation with the Minister of Justice can make appointments in the judiciary but the appointment needs to be approved or confirmed by the national assembly by two-third majority.
On 11 June 2002, the transitional government adopted a draft law on the organization and function of the Constitutional Court. According to the draft law, members of the Constitutional Court would be seven and they would be appointed for a six-year term,1 The law was adopted by the national parliament on 18 July 2002. And, as provided in the accord, the transitional president and vice-presidents were officially sworn into their new positions on 30 April 2003 before members of the constitutional court.2
In June 2003, law regarding the structure and function of the Judicial Service Commission was passed.3 In September 2003, Burundi’s magistrates started open-ended strike over judicial independence and wages, which was unilaterally called off in October 2003. The judiciary was still being dominated by minority Tutsis whereas the Arusha accord called for ethnic balance according to which 60% judiciary jobs had to be allocated to majority Hutu groups.4
- “Burundi: Government adopts draft law on Constitutional Court,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 13, 2002.
- “Burundi: Newly president promises to speed up peace process,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 2, 2003.
- Fabienne Hara, “Human Rights in Negotiating peace Agreements: Burundi,” International Council on Human Rights Policy,(Working Paper, 2005).
- “Burundi govt suspends pay of striking magistrates,” Agence France Presse, September 3, 2003; “Burundi judges call off strike,” Agence France Presse, October 19, 2003.
2004
While some progress was made, establishing ethnic balance in judiciary was not achieved. Notwithstanding all laws adopted on judiciary and its reforms, judiciary was not able to carry out its functions independently. Also, Arusha accord’s provision on establishing ethnic balance in judiciary was not fully implemented as of 2004.1
- “Burundi parties react to new interim constitution,” BBC Sumary of World Broadcasts, November 1, 2004.
2005
Article 208 of Burundi’s constitution came into effect on 19 March 2005 provided for the regional, ethnic and gender balance in recruitment and appointment in judiciary. It was reported that the judicial personnel were predominantly Tutsis.1
2006
The minority ethnic group still dominates the Judiciary. The judiciary lacks resources and cannot function independently and effectively.1
- “Freedom House. Burundi — Freedom in the World 2012,” Freedom House, accessed February 20, 2013, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/burundi.
2007
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
2009
No further developments observed.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
2012
No further developments observed.
Protocol II, Chapter I: Article 9: The Judiciary
1. The judicial authority of the Republic of Burundi shall be vested in the courts.
2. The Judiciary shall be impartial and independent and shall be governed solely by the Constitution and the law. No person may interfere with the Judiciary in the performance of its judicial functions.
3. The Judiciary shall be so structured as to promote the ideal that its composition should reflect that of the population as a whole.
4. The courts and tribunals shall operate in Kirundi and the other official languages. Laws shall be enacted and published in Kirundi and the other official languages.
5. The Constitution shall provide for a Supreme Court of Burundi. Its Rules of Procedure, composition and chambers, and the organization of its chambers, shall be determined by an organic law.
6. The judges of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President from a list of candidates nominated by the Judicial Service Commission and approved by the National Assembly and the Senate.
7. There shall be a National Department of Public Prosecutions attached to the Supreme Court; its members shall be appointed in the same manner as the judges of the Supreme Court.
8. The other courts and tribunals recognized in the Republic of Burundi shall be the Court of Appeal, the High Courts, the Resident Magistrates’ Courts and such other courts and tribunals as are provided for by law. The Ubushingantahe Council shall sit at the level of the colline. It shall administer justice in a conciliatory spirit.
9. The President of the Court of Appeal, the presidents of the High Courts, the public prosecutors and the state counsels shall be appointed by the President of the Republic following nomination by the Judicial Service Commission and confirmation by the Senate.
10. The Government, within the limits of its resources, shall ensure that magistrates possess the desired qualifications and necessary training for the performance of their duties, and that the resources needed by the Judiciary are made available to it.
11. No one shall be denied a post in the magistracy on grounds of ethnic origin or gender.
12. A Judicial Service Commission with an ethnically balanced composition shall be established. It shall be made up of five members nominated by the Executive, three judges of the Supreme Court, two magistrates from the National Department of Public Prosecutions, two judges from the resident magistrates’ courts and three members of the legal profession in private practice. The judges, magistrates and members of the legal profession shall be chosen by their peers. All members of the Commission shall be approved by the Senate.
13. The Commission shall have a secretariat. It shall be chaired by the President of the Republic, assisted by the Minister of Justice. It shall meet on an ad hoc basis. Its members who are not members of the Judiciary shall not be construed as members of the Judiciary solely because they are members of this oversight commission.
14. The Judicial Service Commission shall be the highest disciplinary body of the magistracy. It shall hear complaints by individuals, or by the Ombudsperson, against the professional conduct of magistrates, as well as appeals against disciplinary measures and grievances concerning the career of magistrates. No magistrate may be dismissed other than for professional misconduct or incompetence, and solely on the basis of a finding by the Judicial Service Commission.
15. Trials shall be public except where the interests of justice or a compelling public interest require otherwise. Judgements shall be reasoned and shall be handed down in public.
16. Magistrates shall be appointed by decree of the President on the proposal of the Judicial Service Commission. The presidents of resident magistrates’ courts shall be appointed in the same manner except that the nominees shall be proposed to the President after obtaining the approval of the Senate.
17. The Constitutional Court shall be the highest court for constitutional matters. Its jurisdictions shall be those set forth in the 1992 Constitution. The organization of the Court shall be laid down in an organic law. Reference is made for this purpose to the elements contained in Chapter II of the present Protocol.
18. The members of the Constitutional Court, seven in number, shall be appointed by the President of the Republic and confirmed by the Senate by a two-thirds majority. They shall have a term of office of six years non-renewable. The first Constitutional Court shall be that established under Chapter II of the present Protocol for the transition period. The members shall have the qualifications set forth in Chapter II of the present Protocol.
19. Matters shall be referred to the Constitutional Court by the President of the Republic, the President of the National Assembly or the President of the Senate, by petition by one quarter of the Members of the National Assembly or one quarter of the Members of the Senate, or by the Ombudsperson. In addition, every natural person with a direct interest in the matter, as well as the Public Prosecutor, may request the Constitutional Court to rule on the constitutionality of laws, either directly by means of an action or by an exceptional procedure for claiming unconstitutionality raised in a matter which concerns that person before an authority.
20. The Constitutional Court may sit validly only if at least five of its members are present.
21. Decisions of the Constitutional Court shall be taken by an absolute majority of its members, except that the President of the Court shall have a casting vote if the Court is evenly split on any matter.
22. The Constitutional Court shall be competent to:
(a) Rule on the constitutionality of adopted laws and regulatory acts;
(b) Rule on the constitutionality of executive action;
(c) Interpret the Constitution and rule on vacancies in the posts of President of the Republic and President of the National Assembly if a dispute arises in regard thereto;
(d) Rule on the regularity of presidential and legislative elections;
(e) Administer the oath to the President of the Republic before she/he assumes office;
(f) Verify the constitutionality of organic laws before their promulgation, and of the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly before their application;
(g) Rule on any other matters expressly provided for in the Constitution.
Protocol II, Chapter 2,
Article 17: Judicial and administrative reforms
1. Within 30 days of the commencement of the transition period, a commission of the transitional National Assembly in which all the parties are represented shall be established to monitor the reforms of the public administration and of the administration of justice and to submitrecommendations thereon to the transitional National Assembly and the transitional Executive.
2. The transitional National Assembly may for purposes of reforming the judicial sector amend by two-thirds majority any existing law, including the provisions of the 1992 Constitution, dealing with the structure and functioning of the Supreme Court.
3. For purposes of improving the judicial services in Burundi, the transitional Government shall implement the following reforms:
(a) The promotion of gender and ethnic balances in the Burundian judicial sector shall be undertaken, inter alia through recruitment and appointment;
(b) So as to correct the ethnic and gender imbalances in the Burundian judicial sector during and after the transition period, training colleges for employees of the judicial system shall be created, accelerated training shall be promoted, and the status and the internal promotion of magistrates shall be improved;
(c) Existing legislation relating to the organization of the Judiciary, the codes of criminal and civil procedure and the map of judicial jurisdiction shall be reviewed;
(d) All legislation shall be made available in Kirundi;
(e) Respect for the law shall be promoted;
(f) Steps shall be taken to discourage corruption, to denounce officials guilty of corruption, to enforce all legislation related to corruption, to establish effective oversight bodies, to improve working conditions in the judicial sector and to take necessary measures to require civil servants to reportinstances of corruption;
(g) The necessary measures shall be taken, including those specified in Protocol I to the Agreement, to deal with the problem of impunity and take any other steps required to ensure that any travesties of justice are dealt with or re-opened;
(h) The judicial sector shall be given the necessary resources so as to discharge its responsibilities impartially and independently.
4. Any appointment to the Judiciary required by Chapter I of the present Protocol to be made by the President shall, during the transition, be made by the transitional President and Vice-President in consultation with the Minister of Justice.
5. Any appointment to the Judiciary required by Chapter I of the present Protocol to be submitted for approval or confirmation to the National Assembly or the Senate shall, during the transition period, be required to be approved or confirmed by the transitional National Assembly by two-thirds majority.
6. There shall be a Constitutional Court possessing the jurisdiction and functions set forth in the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Burundi.
7. The Constitutional Court shall be made up of seven members, two of whom shall be permanent (the President and Vice-President). They shall be appointed by the President of the Republic, subject to confirmation by the transitional National Assembly by a majority of two-thirds. Three of these judges shall be appointed for a period of three years only, and shall be replaced in the manner provided for in the post-transition Constitution. The remaining four shall be appointed for six years beginning at the commencement of the transition. The appointments shall be made within one month of the commencement of the transition. Judges of the Constitutional Court shall be persons of moral integrity and shall have legal training or experience. A member of a standing court must be amongst the nominees.
8. The Constitutional Court may sit validly only if at least five of its members, including its President or Vice-President, are present.
9. Decisions of the Constitutional Court shall be taken by an absolute majority of its members, except that the President of the Court shall have a casting vote if the Court is evenly split on any matter.
10. International co-operation and legal assistance will be required by the transitional Government to assist it in improving and reforming the legal system. Foreign jurists, including former Burundian nationals living outside the country, shall be requested to assist in the reform of the judicial system. The transitional Government may appoint any such persons to judicial positions so as to promote confidence in the Judiciary.
11. Members of the public administration, including local government and the diplomatic corps, shall be so appointed by the transitional Executive as to ensure that imbalances observed in these sectors are corrected. The Government may appoint a commission with expert participation to assist it in making appointments.
12. Provincial governors and commune administrators shall be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the transitional National Assembly. They shall be natives of the territorial entity placed under their authority. They shall be civilians.
Military Reform
2003
Not all major parties to the conflict signed the agreement until 2003. During this three year gap, implementation of the military reform provision did begin.
Arusha accord and the Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defense and Security Power Sharing in Burundi provided for extensive reform in Burundi’s armed force. Among other significant reforms, the accord brings the military under civilian control. The accord reorganizes the armed forces by including members of the Burundian armed forces and combatants of the political parties and movements. In doing so, however, the accord excludes those members who were found guilty of acts of genocide, coups d’état, violation of the Constitution and human rights and war crimes.
The accord provided for the establishment of a technical committee consisting representatives from Burundian armed forces, combatants of the political parties and movements and external military advisors. The transitional government was given responsibility to determine the size of the national defense force in consultation with the technical committee. According to the agreement, political, ethnic, regional and gender criteria would be used to determine the imbalances in the defense force but the new force would consist 60% officers from the government army and 40% from the FDD. But, the new force would not consist more than 50% of any of the ethnic groups.1
The national defense force was said to be formed under the supervision of Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC), Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC) and African Mission in Burundi (AIMB). By the end of 2003, AIMB forces were deployed along with the establishment of IMC and JCC.2 As of December 2003, reforms sought through integration of combatants from political parties and movements did not take place.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2003/1146), December 4, 2003.
- Ibid.
2004
For the formation of a new National Defense Forces, the president in consultation with a Technical Forces Agreement signed on 2 November 2003 appointed 33 members of the Joint Military High Command, 20 of which were from the current military and 13 from the rebel movement CNDD-FDD. This decision was made on 6 January 2004 by signing a decree.1 The current chief of staff retained his position and the rebel chief of staff was appointed as deputy chief of staff.
Government also announced the target of an army of 20,000, which would be achieved first by the integration of all combatants from political parties and movements in the initial phase and subsequent demobilization (Source: Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council, S/2004/682, 25 August 2004). Initially, it was estimated the Burundian Armed Forces had 45,000 troops, and total number of combatants from political parties and movement were estimated to be about 35,000 (Source: Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council, S/2004/210, 16 March 2004). But a revised estimated suggested a total of 70,000 combatants of which 13,000 would be transferred to the police force. Estimated 10-15000 combatants were child soldiers or pensioners or wounded and therefore would be demobilized immediately.2
As a way to establish a new National Defense Force, a unit of 1,200 soldiers, 800 from the government and 400 from the CNDD-FDD started their training.3 By the end of 2004, 1,800 soldiers from the army and former rebel combatants went through the training program. On 31 December 2002, president promulgated laws on creation, organization, function and composition of the new National Defense Force and New Police Service.
- “Burundi; Ndayizeye Appoints Members of Joint Military Command,” Africa News, January 7, 2004.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2004/682), August 25, 2004.
- “Burundi; New National Army Takes Shape,” Africa News, March 17, 2004.
2005
As of April 2005, 6,000 personnel were deployed for two brigades and one special protection unit. These personnel were directly integrated (Source: Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council, S/2005/328, 19 May 2005). By December 2005, National Defense Force had some 33000 personnel, which was expected to be downsized to 25,000 by 2007.1
- Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council, United Nations Security Council (S/2005/728), November 21, 2005.
2006
As provided in the accord, military reform provisions were implemented by 2005.
2007
The target of reducing the defense force to 25,000 was not met in 2007 as Burundi had 27,000 personnel in its defense force.1
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2007/682), November 23, 2007.
2008
No developments observed this year.
2009
By end of 2009, estimated 25,000 army personnel in the defense force completed human rights, gender and HIV aids.1
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2009/611), November 30, 2009.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
2012
No further developments observed.
Protocol II, Chapter I: Article 11: Defence and security forces
1. The post-transition Constitution shall contain in full the principles relating to the defence and security forces and principles of organization of those forces set forth respectively in articles 10 and 11 of Protocol III to the Agreement.
2. An organic law shall determine the organization and functioning of the defence and security forces.
3. The military head of the defence force shall be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Senate.
4.
(a) The defence and security forces shall be subordinate to the civil authority of the State, and shall uphold the Constitution and the law.
(b) The defence and security forces shall be professional and non-partisan, and shall not promote or disadvantage any political party or ethnic group.
(c) The defence and security forces shall be trained at all levels to respect international humanitarian law and the supremacy of the Constitution.
(d) For a period to be determined by the Senate, not more than 50% of the national defence force shall be drawn from any one ethnic group, in view of the need to achieve ethnic balance and to prevent acts of genocide and coups d’état.
(e) No civilian shall be subject to a military code of justice or tried by a military court.
5. Only the President may authorize the employment of the defence and security forces:
(a) In defence of the State;
(b) In the restoration of order and public safety;
(c) In the discharge of international obligations and commitments.
If the defence and security forces are employed in any of the capacities set forth above, the President shall promptly inform the National Assembly and the Senate of the nature, extent and reasons for this employment. If the National Assembly is not in session it shall be convened within seven days for the consideration of such matter, as specified in Protocol III to the Agreement.
Protocol III, Chapter II,
Article 11: Principles of organization of the defence and security forces
1. The defence and security forces shall consist of a national defence force, a national police and an intelligence service, all established in conformity with the Constitution.
2. The defence and security forces shall be subordinate to civilian authority in respect for the Constitution, the law and the regulations.
3. The defence and security forces shall be open to all Burundian citizens without discrimination.
4. The defence and security forces shall promote within their services a non-discriminatory, non-ethnicist and non-sexist culture.
5. Organic laws shall determine the creation, organization, training, conditions of service and functioning of the defence and security forces.
6. Within the limits determined by the Constitution and the laws, only the President may authorize the use of armed military force:
(a) In defence of the State;
(b) In the restoration of order and public safety;
(c) In the discharge of international obligations and commitments.
7. When the national defence force is utilized in one of the cases referred to in paragraph 6 above, the President shall officially consult the authorized competent bodies and shall promptly inform the Legislature, in detail, of:
(a) The reason or reasons for the use of the national defence force;
(b) Any location where that force is deployed;
(c) The period for which that force is deployed.
8. If the Legislature is not in session, the President shall convene it in special session within seven days from the use of the national defence force.
9. The defence and security forces shall respect the rights and dignity of their members in the context of the normal constraints of discipline and training.
10. The members of the defence and security forces shall have the right to be informed of the socio-political life of the country and to receive civic education.
Protocol III, Chapter II,
Article 12: Missions of the defence and security forces
1. Missions of the national defence force
The missions of the national defence force shall be:
(a) To ensure the integrity of the national territory and the sovereignty of the country;
(b) To combat any armed aggression against the institutions of the Republic;
(c) To intervene exceptionally in the maintenance of public order at the formal request of the authorized civilian authority;
(d) To participate in assistance activities in case of natural disasters;
(e) To contribute to the development of the country through major works, production and training;
(f) To defend the vital points.
Protocol III, Chapter II,
Article 13: Structure of the defence and security forces
1. Structure of the national defence force
The transitional Government shall be responsible for deciding upon the structure of the national defence force.
Protocol III, Chapter II,
Article 14: Composition of the defence and security forces
1. Composition of the national defence force
(a) There shall be a single defence force composed of all components of the Burundian nation irrespective of ethnic, regional, gender and/or social status.
(b) The national defence force shall include members of the Burundian armed forces and combatants of the political parties and movements in existence at the time of restructuring of the army, as well as other citizens who wish to enlist.
(c) After the signature of the Agreement, the combatants of the political parties and movements, as well as the existing national defence force, shall be placed under the authority of the transitional Government.
(d) A technical committee consisting of representatives of the Burundian armed forces and combatants of the political parties and movements, as well as of an external military advisory and training group, shall be established by decision of the transitional Government to implement the procedures for the establishment of the national defence force.
(e) Members of the Burundian armed forces found guilty of acts of genocide, coups d’etat, violation of the Constitution and human rights and war crimes shall be excluded from the national defence force. Combatants of the political parties and movements found guilty of the same offences shall also not be accepted into the national defence force.
(f) Recruitment into the national defence force shall be conducted in a transparent manner, individually, voluntarily and on the basis of personal merit, physical fitness, moral and professional qualifications and potential.
(g) For a period to be determined by the Senate, not more than 50% of the national defence force shall be drawn from any one ethnic group, in view of the need to achieve ethnic balance and to prevent acts of genocide and coups d’etat.
Protocol III, Chapter II,
Article 15: Size of the defence and security forces
1. Size of the national defence force
(a) The following criteria shall be used to determine the strength of the national defence force:
i. Potential internal and external threats;
ii. The economic and financial resources of the country;
iii. The budget allocated to the defence and security forces;
iv. The defence policy of the country.
(b) The transitional Government, in consultation with the technical committee, shall determine the size of the national defence force.
Protocol III, Chapter II,
Article 16: Balances within the defence and security forces
1. The following criteria shall be used to determine the imbalances in the defence and security forces:
(a) Political;
(b) Ethnic;
(c) Regional;
(d) Gender.
2. Correction of the imbalances in the defence and security forces shall be approached progressively in the spirit of reconciliation and trust in order to reassure all Burundians.
3. Correction of the imbalances shall be achieved during the transition period through the integration into the current defence and security forces of the combatants of the political parties and movements and through the recruitment of other Burundian citizens.
4. For purposes of rapid reduction of the command-level imbalances, accelerated training of commissioned and non-commissioned officers from among the combatants of the political parties and movements shall be conducted in Burundi and abroad as soon as the transition period commences.
Protocol III, Chapter II,
Article 17: Recruitment
1. Recruitment shall be conducted in accordance with the following criteria:
(a) Transparency;
(b) Voluntary service;
(c) Age;
(d) Personal record and level of training;
(e) Medical tests of physical and intellectual aptitude.
2. Recruitment criteria based on educational level shall be determined by the transitional Government.
3. A national commission shall be assigned responsibility for selecting candidates for all levels of the national defence force and national police, taking care to ensure the necessary ethnic balance.
Protocol III, Chapter II,
Article 18: Training
1. The defence and security forces shall have technical, moral and civic training. This training shall include the culture of peace, aspects of conduct relating to the democratic multi-party political system, human rights and humanitarian law.
2. Decentralization of the centres for training police constables, rank and file troops and noncommissioned officers shall be undertaken.
Protocol III, Chapter II,
Article 19: Organic laws, regulatory texts and disciplinary system
For the defence and security forces, organic laws, regulatory texts and disciplinary rules in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Agreement shall be adopted
Protocol III, Chapter II,
Article 20: Names of the defence and security forces
1. The name of the defence force shall be decided upon by the transitional Government.
Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing in Burundi (8 October 2003)
I. The Burundi National Defence Force
1.3 Formation of the Burundi National Defence Force (BNDF)
1.3.1 The integrated General Staff and the Officer Corps, shall be composed of 60% officers selected from the governmental army and 40% officers from the FDD.
1.3.2 The composition of the non commissioned officers and the rank and file shall be determined by the integrated General Staff according to the size of each party and of the agreed balance.
1.3.3 On proposal of the integrated General Staff, the government shall determine;
– The structure of the Burundi National Defence Force
– The size of the army and
– Composition of the officer corps.
1.3.4 The allocation of command posts shall be on the basis of ethnic balance (50-50) as stipulated in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement.
1.3.5 The President of the Republic of Burundi undertakes to give expression to this arrangement through a Presidential decree.
Pretoria Protocol on Outstanding Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing Issues in Burundi, Part I:
2.0 Burundi National Defence Force (BNDF)
2.1 The Name
The new-armed force shall be called The Burundi National Defence Force (BNDF)
2.2 Roles and Principles:
a. Roles
(1) To defend the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of Burundi.
(2) To repulse any armed aggression directed against the institutions of the Republic.
(3) To intervene in exceptional circumstances in the maintenance of public order, on the formal request of the competent civil authority.
(4) To participate in rescue and assistance missions in the event of national disasters.
(5) To contribute towards the development of the country with regard to major production and training activities.
(6) To protect strategic and vital national installations.
(7) To participate in peace support operations under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) or the Regional Organisations when the Government is ready to participate.
b. Principles
(1) The BNDF shall be:
-Governed by the laws and regulations of the country
-At the disposal of the government, subordinate to its authority and accountable to the legislature.
(2) The BNDF shall be non-partisan.
(3) Members of the BNDF shall not be affiliated to political parties or any other organisation of a Political nature. They shall neither take part in activities nor demonstrations of political parties or organisations.
(4) Members of the BNDF may exercise their civil right to vote in elections.
2.3 Command, Control and Supervision
(a) The BNDF shall be placed under the control and supervision of competent civil authority.
(b) The President of the Republic shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the BNDF.
(c) The National Defence Forces shall be placed under the Ministry of National Defence.
(d) The BNDF shall be under the direct command and control of the Chief of General Staff (CGS).
2.4.0 Size, Composition, Structure and Organization
Upon a proposal of the Integrated chief of staff, the Government will determine the structure of the NDF, the total size and composition of the officer corps.
2.4.1 Size
The size of the BNDF shall be determined by:
-Potential internal and external threats.
-Financial and economic means of the country.
-Defence Doctrine/Policy
2.4.2 Composition
During the integration phase the BNDF shall be composed of selected member of:
-The current Burundi Armed Forces (FAB).
-Combatants of the CNDD-FDD Movement.
-The combatants of other armed political parties.
-After integration volunteer Burundian citizens could be recruited.
-The BNDF shall not consist of more than 50% of any of the ethnic groups as per Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (protocol III chapter 2 article 14. 1g).
2.4.3 Structure
The structure of the NDF is determined by the Government upon a proposal of the Integrated Chief of Staff
2.4.4 Organization
The National Defence Force
a. Force Employing
The Supreme Commander (SC) shall be responsible for force employment
b. Functions of the CGS
(1) The CGS shall have the following functions;
-Implement decisions of the government.
-Command, control and administration of the National Defence Force.
-Co-ordiante the activities of the services and lower echelons.
-Liaison at the administrative level, between the BNDF as an institution and the Government through the Minister of National Defence.
c. Force Preparation
The Chief of General Staff assisted by his deputy and service heads shall be in charge of force preparation in accordance with requirements of specified missions.
2.4.5 Military Career
a. Principle
Military career shall be exercised either under contract or permanent terms. Details of terms and conditions of Service to be determined according to the rules and regulations.
b. Rank Structure
FAB rank structure shall be used in the New National Defence Force. In the interim the ranks of members of all signatories shall be recognized until a sub commission of the JCC responsible for the evaluating the ranks of the individuals makes a ruling.
c. Service
The service history of all members from FAB, CNDD-FDD and armed political parties shall be verified.
2.5.0 Training of the BNDF
2.5.1 Policy
-The general training policy aimed at upgrading the professional level of the National Defence Force shall be done according to the doctrine that will be adopted.
-The integrated National Defence Force shall undergo training for the purpose of standardizing skills, techniques, procedures and regulations.
-Leadership and specialist training may be conducted in or outside Burundi.
2.5.2 Training of Immediate Concern
-Training of immediate need to the selected members, will be the ˜Bridging Training”. This will take into account the experience and training already received by individuals from the integrating forces. The training will be carried out in selected training institutions.
-Special emphasis shall be placed on civic and moral education.
Part II: Formation of the Burundi National Defence Force
1.0 The Process
1.1.1 The Burundi National Defence Force shall be formed under the supervision of IMC, AMIB and JCC.
1.1.2 The following steps will be carried out in the formation of the BNDF:
a. Disengagement and separation of forces
This shall be conducted under the supervision of the AMIB and JCC in accordance with the provisions of the CFA of 02 December 2002 in conjunction with the parties concerned (Transitional Government of Burundi and CNDD-FDD).
b. Cantonment and DDRR Process
(1) The cantonment and DDRR processes shall be conducted under the supervision of the AMIB and the JCC in conjunction with all the parties concerned and supporting international organizations. Cantonment should not be an end in itself, but rather a function of verification, military integration and demobilization activities, i.e. a place where these activities are completed as quickly as possible so that the peace process can be consolidated and demobilised soldiers can get back to civilian life.
(2) All necessary data for planning and conducting programmes concerning cantonment and DDRR shall be immediately provided by all the parties to relevant bodies.
(3) All concerned stakeholders shall establish a joint Operational Plan to implement the DDRR programmes according to agreed time frame.
(4) The Movement of forces of all the parties shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the 02 December 2002 CFA, names Article 1.1.6 and 1.1.7 of Annexure 1.
c. Integration Process
(1) Criteria for the selection of Servicemen in the BNDF.
The Selection of servicemen to constitute the BNDF by each party and those to be demobilized shall be carried out in the cantonment sites. Service to constitute the National Defence force should meet the following criteria:
Officers shall:
-Be volunteers
-Service as offices
-Be Burundian Nationals
-Be physically fit
-Have a degree or experience as officer
(2) The war wounded and handicapped shall, however, remain eligible for Army service, according to their specializations, unlike the disable servicemen who shall be demobilized but assisted. This shall apply to all categories of servicemen.
Non-Commissioned officers shall:
-Be volunteers.
-Service as Non-commissioned officers.
-Burundian National
-Physically fit
-Have a high school qualification or experience as non-commissioned officer.
-Soldiers
-Be volunteers.
-Be servicing as Servicemen or combatants.
– Be Burundian National
-Be Physically fit
-Have a primary school qualification or experience as a soldier.
2.0 Power sharing in the Defence and Security Forces
2.1 National Defence Force
2.1.1 The Integrated Chief of Staff and the officer corps will consist of 60% of officers from the government army and 40% of officers from the CNDD-FDD
The sharing of posts will take place on the level of the incumbents and deputies.
The post of Deputy Chief of Staff General will be created.
The sharing of posts take place on the base of the current structure of the Burundi Armed Forces in accordance with the proportions agreed on.
2.1.2 The Integrated Chief of Staff determines the composition of the non-commissioned ranks, taking into account members of each party and the balances agreed on.
2.1.3 The allocation of command posts will also take place on the basis of the principle of ethnic balance (50/50) as stipulated in the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Burundi.
2.1.4 The President of the Republic will confirm and officalise the stipulations of this FTA through a presidential decree.
Police Reform
2003
Not all major parties to the conflict signed the agreement until 2003. During this three year gap, implementation of the police reform provision did begin.
Arusha accord and the Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defense and Security Power Sharing in Burundi provided for reform in Burundi’s police force including change in its name to Burundi National Police (BNP). Similar to military reform, the transitional government would determine the size, of the BNP and the BNP would include the current national police, combatants of the political parties and movements and other citizens who meet the requirements. As provided in the accord, none of the ethnic group would consist more than 50% of the BNP.
2004
No reform took place in 2004. However, on 30 November a decree was adopted on the formation, organization and mandate of the National Burundian Police and it was endorsed by the parliament on 28 October.1
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2004/902), November 15, 2004.
2005
On 3 January 2005, the president signed a law to set up a police force that would include combatants from rebel groups. The new police force would include a force of 20,000 personnel.1 On 28 January, president signed a decree and appointed General Alain Bunyoni, a former rebel officer, as head of the country’s new national police. From the Tutsi minority, Colonel Helmenegilde Nimenya, was appointed as a deputy.2
As of May 2005, 6,896 members from rebel groups were sent to 20 different training centers around the country where they joined with 8,300 former members of the Gendarmerie and 1,400 former internal security forces. In training centers, they will go through integration and harmonization training.3
In 2005, in coordination with the non-governmental organization the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) trained 135 judicial police. The government of Belgium was providing training of 20,000 police personnel over three years.4 By the end of 2005, a new integrated police force was in place.
- “New army, police force for Burundi,” Agence France Presse, January 3, 2005.
- “Ex-rebel officer appointing head of Burundi’s national police,” Agence France Presse, January 18, 2005.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2005/328), May 19, 2005.
- “Burundi; Belgium Grants Government US $4.5 Million for Police Training,” Africa News, November 10, 2005; “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2005/586), September 14, 2005.
2006
No developments observed this year.
2007
No developments observed this year.
2008
On 11 April 2008, Burundi launched national police census to identify police officers.1 On 15 April, over 750 police personnel were demobilized as the government sought to downsize the National Police Force below 15,000 personnel.
- “Burundi: Security minister launches national police census,” BBC Monitoring Africa, April 11, 2008.
2009
No further developments observed.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
2012
No further developments observed.
Protocol III, Chapter II: Article 12:
2. Missions of the national police
The missions of the national police shall be:
a. To maintain and restore public order;
b. To prevent offences provided for by law, investigate and prosecute their perpetrators and make arrests in accordance with the law;
c. To ensure respect for the laws and other regulations for whose enforcement they are directly responsible;
d. To ensure the physical protection of persons and their property;
e. To ensure the protection of infrastructures and public property;
f. To relieve and assist persons in danger or in distress;
g. To intervene in case of catastrophe or disaster;
h. To develop various civil defence scenarios;
i. To ensure road safety throughout the national territory;
j. To ensure protection of public gatherings at the request of those involved, on orders from the administrative authorities, or on their own initiative;
k. To ensure the missions of the judicial and administrative police;
l. To ensure protection of the courts and tribunals;
m. To deal with criminal cases of major importance, such as economic crimes and cases attributable to roving delinquents or groups organized at the national or international level;
n. To produce and make use of crime statistics;
o. To deal with the policing of immigration and emigration and the status of aliens;
p. To monitor the movements of aliens throughout the national territory;
q. To keep watch on the land, lake and air borders;
r. To issue travel documents and residence permits;
s. To ensure protection of the institutions.
Protocol III, Chapter II: Article 13
2. Structure of the national Police
a. The national police shall be coordinated within one Ministry, i.e., the one responsible for public security.
b. Its structure shall be:
(i) First level: Since the Ministry is responsible for public security, the head shall be a member of the Government;
(ii) Second level: A national police headquarters responsible for coordinating all the police forces. It shall be headed by a director-general with administrative skills and knowledge of police techniques;
(iii) Third level: Departments: each department shall represent a specialized area of police work.
This structure is illustrated in Annex II to the Agreement.
Protocol III, Chapter II,
Article 14
2. Composition of the national police
a. There shall be a single national police composed of all citizens of the Burundian nation wishing to form part of it, irrespective of ethnic, regional, gender and social status.
b. The national police shall include members of the current national police, combatants of the political parties and movements and other citizens who meet the requirements.
c. A technical committee comprising representatives of the existing police force and the political parties and movements and of external advisors and instructors on police issues shall be established by decision of the transitional Government to implement the procedures for the establishment of the national police.
d. All persons, including current members of the police force and combatants of the political parties and movements, found guilty of genocide, the coup d’état of 21 October 1993, human rights violations or war crimes shall be excluded from the national police.
e. Not more than 50% of the members of the national police shall be drawn from any one particular ethnic group, with a view to achieving the necessary balances and preventing acts of genocide or of coup d’état.
Protocol III, Chapter II: Article 15
2. Size of the national police
(a) The following criteria shall be used to determine the strength of the national police:
i. Surface area of the country;
ii. Population;
iii. Population density;
iv. Urbanization level;
v. Economic resources;
vi. Crime level;
vii. Budgetary allocation.
(b) The transitional Government, in consultation with the technical committee, shall determine the size of the national police.
Protocol III, Chapter II: Article 18: Training
2. Decentralization of the centres for training police constables, rank and file troops and non-commissioned officers shall be undertaken.
Pretoria Protocol on Outstanding Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing Issues in Burundi (8 October 2003)
Part I: 3.0 Burundi National Police (BNP):
3.1 Name
The Burundi Police Force shall be called the ‘Burundi National Police (BNP)’
3.2 Roles and Functions
a. The Public Security Police
(1) Ensure respect for laws and regulations.
(2) Ensure physical protection of people and their property.
(3) Help and provide assistance to people in danger or distress.
(4) Intervene in the case of tragedies or calamities.
(5) Foresee various scenarios for civil protection.
(6) Maintaining and re-establishing public order.
(7) Ensure the protection of public infrastructure and property.
(8) Ensure road security over the whole territory.
(9) Ensure the protection of public meetings upon the request of the parties concerned, upon instruction of the administrative authorities or on each own initiative when there is need.
(10) Ensure the protection of the institutions.
b. The Judicial Police (JP)
(1) Prevent crimes, search and prosecute their perpetrators and carry out arrests in accordance with the law.
(2) Ensure the missions of the judicial and administrative police.
(3) Ensure the protection of the courts and tribunals.
(4) Handling criminal affairs of great importance, like economic crimes, crimes by itinerant criminals or groups organized on a national or international level.
(5) Establish statistics on crime and use them.
(6) Ensure the Interpol service.
c. The Police of the Air, Borders and Foreigners (PAFE)
(1) Handling immigration, emigration and the status of foreigners;
(2) Controlling the movements of foreigners on the whole national territory.
(3) Guarding land, lake and air boarders.
(4) Providing traveling documents and residential permits.
d. The Prison Police (PP)
(1) Ensure the security of the prison and detainees.
(2) Ensure the safety of the police camp
(3) Ensure the escorting of the detainees going to court and the various jurisdictions.
(4) Provide security of detainees during the production work.
(8) Ensure escorting of prisoners during transfers.
(9) Ensuring the guarding of hospitalized prisoners.
(10) Ensuring the escorting of detainees during medical care or when leaving the prison with permission.
3.3 Principles
a. The Burundi National Police shall be:
-Governed by the laws and regulations of the country.
-At the disposal of the government, subordinate to its authority and accountable before the law.
b. The Burundi National Police shall be non-partisan.
c. Members of the Burundi National Police shall not be affiliated to political parties or any other organisation of a political nature. They shall neither take part in activities nor demonstrations of political parties or organisations.
d. Members of the Burundi National Police may exercise their civil right to vote.
3.4 Command, Control and Supervision
a. The National Police Force shall be placed under the supervision of the competent civil authorities.
c. The National Police Fore shall be placed under a Ministry charged with responsibility of Public Security.
d. The National Police Force shall be under the direct command and control of the Director General of Police.
3.5 Size, Composition, Structure and Organization
3.5.1 Size
a. The size of the Burundi National Police shall be determined by the following factors:
(1) The Internal Security situation
(2) The different roles and functions to be carried out
(3) The Burundi population
(4) The economic and financial means
(5) The budget allocated to the National Police.
(6) The permeability of the borders.
3.5.2 Composition
a. The Burundi National Police Force shall be composed of:
(1) Members of the current Burundi Police Force.
(2) Selected combatants from the CNDD-FDD Movement and other armed political parties.
(3) Volunteer Burundian citizens recruited on the basis of their competence.
b. The National Police Force will not consist of more than 50% of members from any of the ethnic groups. This is in accordance with Arusha Peace and Reconciliation for Burundi (Protocol III, Chapter 2 art 14 para 2 (e)).
3.5.3 Structure
The structure of the National Police is determined by the Government of Burundi upon a proposal of the Integrated Chief of Staff of the NP.
3.5.4 Police Service
a. Principle
Police service shall be exercised either under contract or permanent terms. Details of terms and conditions of service will be set in accordance with rules and regulations.
b. Rank Structure
(1) The current Police rank structure shall be used in the National Police Force.
(2) Entry point and the equating of ranks for members of FAB, CNDD-FDD and other armed political groups to be integrated into police shall be decided by a sub-committee of the JCC.
3.5.5 Training of the National Police Force
a. Policy
(1) The general training policy aimed at upgrading the National Police shall be based on the police doctrine.
(2) Each element of the force selected to constitute the Police Force shall undergo training for the purpose of:
-Acquiring and standardizing skills, techniques, aptitudes, procedures and regulations
-Achieving harmonious integration of servicemen.
b. Training of Immediate Concern
-Members selected to join the police from FAB, FDD and other political parties will receive accelerated training to enable them [to] work together.
Demobilization
2003
After signing of an agreement with CNDD-FDD on 2 November 2003, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration process in Burundi was scheduled to begin within 30 days. No significant achievement was made except for the announcement of commencement of demobilization of child combatants in January 2004 in sponsorship of the UNICEF.1
- “Demobilization scheduled for January 2004 in northwest Burundi,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 23, 2003.
2004
The transitional government and the ONUB finalized the DDR plan in September according to which combatants from armed political parties and movement would assemble in 12 pre-disarmament assembly area. These area were closely monitored by the ONUB monitors prevent new recruits. As of 18 October, 20,979 combatants had reported to the assembly area.1
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2004/902), November 15, 2004.
2005
By mid-October, 17,459 combatants from the state armed force and the political parties and movement were demobilized. Among demobilized combatants, 3007 were children and 482 were female combatants.1
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nation Security Council (S/2005/728,) November 21, 2005.
2006
As of November 2006, 21,769 former combatants and soldiers were demobilized.1
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2006/994), December 18, 2006.
2007
Including 3,779 members from the National Defense Force, 24,105 combatants were demobilized by mid-November.1 By December, 24,504 combatants were demobilized.2
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2007/682), November 23, 2007.
- “Quarterly Progress Report,” Multicountry Demobilization and Reintigration Program (October — December 2007), accessed February 21, 2013, http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/2007-Q4-QPR-MDRP.pdf.
2008
According to MDRP report, 26,283 combatants were demobilized.1
2009
For demobilization process to continue, the World Bank approved $15 million grant. The Technical Coordination Team, then, was able to precede 4,950 FNL ex-combatants and 1,556 FNL dissidents at the Gitega demobilization center.1 In August, over 11,000 FNL combatants assembled in pre-assembly areas and they received return kits and first installment of assistance and transportation support to return to their communities.2
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2009/611), November 30, 2009.
- Ibid.
2010
No further information available on demobilization. The demobilization program in Burundi, however, was lauded as effected by the United Nations Secretary General.1
- “Citing progress, Ban urges further support for Burundi’s peace process,” Web newswire, February 12, 2012.
2011
No further developments observed.
2012
No further developments observed.
Protocol III, Chapter II: Article 21: Demobilization
1. Demobilization shall begin after the signature of the Agreement in accordance with the implementation timetable (see Annex V).
2. To move from war to peace requires demobilization within the defence and security forces as well as for the combatants of the political parties and movements.
3. Demobilization shall involve both the members of the Burundian armed forces and the combatants of the political parties and movements.
4. Lists of people to be demobilized shall be compiled.
5. Members to be demobilized shall be provided with some form of appropriate identification.
6. Demobilization criteria and a demobilization package shall be drawn up.
7. The categories of people to be demobilized shall be:
(a) Volunteers;
(b) Those members who are handicapped or disabled;
(c) Those who do not meet the age criteria;
(d) Those whose discipline is such that they cannot be retained within the new defence and security forces;
(e) Individuals whose educational level is such that they would not be able to undergo military or police training;
(f) Members of the Burundian armed forces and combatants of the political parties and movements who will be rationalized to yield efficient and affordable defence and security forces.
8. An organ to deal with the socio-professional reintegration of demobilized troops shall be established.
9. A technical committee to work out the programme and modalities of demobilization shall be set up.
10. The international community shall be requested to assist in the process of demobilization.
11. Following the demobilization process, a certificate shall be issued to demobilized troops.
12. Each demobilized person shall receive a demobilization allowance.
Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing in Burundi (2 November 2003)
1.4. Demobilisation
1.4.1 Combatants of the CNDD-FDD or FAB who have been found not to be eligible to join the Burundi National Defence Force terms of the Forces Technical Agreement, will be demobilized, taking into consideration paragraph 1.1.14 of the December 2002 Ceasefire Agreement.
1.4.2 The demobilization and integration of these combatants will be progressive, bearing In mind social stability and affordability. The Government shall oversee this process through the Minister of State and the Minister of Defence.
1.4.3 The final phase of demobilization will take place once the elected government is in place, guided by the required size of the Burundi National Defence Force and taking into consideration the work undertaken by the Transitional Government of Burundi. The Government of Burundi shall oversee this process
Disarmament
2003
After signing of an agreement with CNDD-FDD on 2 November 2003, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration process in Burundi was scheduled to begin within 30 days. No significant achievement was made except for the announcement of commencement of demobilization of child combatants in January 2004 in sponsorship of the UNICEF.1
- “Demobilization scheduled for January 2004 in northwest Burundi,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 23, 2003.
2004
The disarmament process did not start in 2004 even after all institutional framework was in place.
2005
As reported in early October, 2,849 members of the Gardiens de la paix and 1,704 Combatants militants were disarmed.1 Exact number of weapons collected, however, is not available. So far as the disarming civilian is concerned, the government had established a National Commission for Civilian Disarmament. The civilian disarmament process, however, did not make significant progress in 2005.2
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2005/728), November 21, 2005.
- Ibid.
2006
Civilian disarmament program received assistance from the UNDP for developing a national strategy to combat the proliferation of light weapons. Nevertheless, the success of this process was not very clear. Also, it was reported that ONBU continued to work with the government on collection and destruction of weapons through a program, which was expected to resume in December demobilized.1
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2006/994), December 18, 2006.
2007
No significant achievement was made in terms of reducing light weapons or civilian disarmament.1
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2007/682), November 23, 2007.
2008
By November 2008, approximately 6,000 light weapons were destroyed. To stop the proliferation of light weapons, Commission on Civilian Disarmament and Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms was established by a presidential decree that included a provision on a general prohibition on arms.1
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2008/745), November 28, 2008.
2009
The Commission on Civilian Disarmament and Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms continued its effort to collect weapons. It launched a final program of voluntary civilian disarmament program.1
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2009/611), November 30, 2009.
2010
No further information available on disarmament of former combatants and civilian disarmament programs. However, before 2010 elections, it was suggested that the last rebel group to join the peace process the National Liberation Forces (FNL) was said disarmed in 2009.1
- “Burundi; Ensure Zero Tolerance for Election Violence – Authorities Should Demonstrate That No Political Actors Are Above the Law,” Africa News, May 14, 2010.
2011
No further developments observed.
2012
No further developments observed.
Protocol II, Chapter II: Article 22: Interim period
15. The participating parties shall do all in their power to ensure that their members observe the provisions of the Agreement, including, but not limited to, the prompt full and wide dissemination of the provisions of the Agreement relating to the ceasefire, disarmament, and reporting to quartering locations.
Protocol III, Chapter III: Article 26: General principles
1. The following principles are agreed upon:
(i) The parties shall undertake to locate, identify, disarm, and assemble all armed groups in the country;
(k) Mechanisms for dismantling and disarming all militias and disarming civilians holding arms illegally shall be established;
Protocol III, Chapter III,
Article 27: Verification and supervision
1. Ceasefire Commission
(d) The Ceasefire Commission shall be responsible, among other things, for:
(ix) Undertaking the disarmament of all illegally armed civilians;
4. Peace and security functions
(a) The peace and security functions of the Ceasefire Commission shall be:
(iii) To ensure the search for and recovery of all arms, the neutralization of militias throughout the country and the disarming of the civilian population;
The Pretoria Protocol on Outstanding Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing Issues in Burundi (2 November 2003)
Part II: Formation of the Burundi National Defence Force
1.0 The Process
1.1.2 b. Cantonment and DDRR Process
(1) The cantonment and DDRR processes shall be conducted under the supervision of the AMIB and the JCC in conjunction with all the parties concerned and supporting international organizations. Cantonment should not be an end in itself, but rather a function of verification, military integration and demobilization activities, i.e. a place where these activities are completed as quickly as possible so that the peace process can be consolidated and demobilised soldiers can get back to civilian life.
(2) All necessary data for planning and conducting programmes concerning cantonment and DDRR shall be immediately provided by all the parties to relevant bodies.
(3) All concerned stakeholders shall establish a joint Operational Plan to implement the DDRR programmes according to agreed time frame.
(4) The movement of forces of all the parties shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the 02 December 2002 CFA, namely Article 1.1.6 and 1.1.7 of Annexure 1.
Indicative Time-table for the Implemenation of the Global Ceasefire Agreement:
Disarming of the militia is a responsibility of the Transitional Government of Burundi AMIB Time-table D Day +18
Reintegration
2003
After signing of an agreement with CNDD-FDD on 2 November 2003, the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration process in Burundi was scheduled to begin within 30 days. No significant achievement was made except for the announcement of commencement of demobilization of child combatants in January 2004 in sponsorship of the UNICEF.1
- “Demobilization scheduled for January 2004 in northwest Burundi,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 23, 2003.
2004
Transitional government had established National Commission for demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (CNDRR) with the assistance from the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) — a program sponsored by various partner countries, donor agencies and international institutions including World Bank. This MDRP program was expected to demobilize and reintegrate estimated 300,000 combatants from countries in the Great Lake region.1
In March, it was estimated that the Burundian Armed Force had 45,000 troops, and total number of combatants from political parties and movement were estimated to be about 35,000.2 In August, the government announced to integrate all combatants into state defense force and initiate demobilization estimated 55,000 that would leave the army of 20,000 personnel.3 In early November, the NCDRR confirmed the DDR process to begin on 29 November. The Process, however, was officially started on 2 December. In the function attended by the country’s president and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, 100 assault rifles were burned. In the first phase of the program, 14,000 combatants were expected to be demobilized and receive reintegration support from MDRP trust fund.4
- “MDRP Progress Report,” Multicountry Demobilization and Reintigration Program, accessed February 21, 2013, http://www.mdrp.org/doc_rep_main.htm#Progress_Reports.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2004/210), March 16, 2004.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2004/682), August 25, 2004; “MDRP Supported Activities in Burundi,” Multicountry Demobilization and Reintigration Program, accessed February 21, 2013, http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/MDRP_BUR_FS_1208.pdf.
- “Burundi; Demobilization Starts in Burundi,” Africa News, December 9, 2004.
2005
By mid-October, 17,459 combatants from the state armed force and the political parties and movement were demobilized. Among demobilized combatants, 3007 were children and 482 were female combatants.1 The demobilized combatants were given allowances.
Financed from the MDRP Trust Fund, transitional reinsertion payments to demobilized combatants was started. For the reintegration of ex-combatants, various projects such as vocational training, small enterprise development, income-generating activities, access to secondary and tertiary education and employment referral were planned but implementation of those projects was very slow.2
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2005/728), November 21, 2005.
- Ibid.
2006
According to Secretary General’s Report, 18,642 former combatants from all sides received cash reinsertion benefits, 5,412 received benefits from integration projects such as vocational trainings. Of 3,015 child combatants demobilized, 599 were enrolled in schools and 896 were receiving vocational trainings demobilized.1
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2006/994), December 18, 2006.
2007
By the end of December, 21,463 ex-combatants benefited from the reintegration/reinsertion programs.1
- “Quarterly Progress Report,” Multicountry Demobilization and Reintigration Program (October — December 2007), accessed February 21, 2013, http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/2007-Q4-QPR-MDRP.pdf.
2008
As of December 2008, only 23,022 demobilized combatants received reintegration support from the MDRP program.1 Because the MDRP program ended by 31 December 2008, the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi was coordinating with the government and the World Bank to develop a new strategy for the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of combatants.2
- Ibid.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2008/745), November 28, 2008.
2009
In august, over 11,000 FNL combatants assembled in pre-assembly areas and they received return kits and first installment of assistance and transportation support to return to their communities.1 Various projects and opportunities such as reconstructing community infrastructures (roads, bridges, health centers, schools) and other programs were launched by UNDP in coordination with the government, international donor agencies and Peacebuilding Trust. The BINUB and UNDP also worked on finalizing sustainable economic incentives for ex-combatants Fund.2 In fact, ex-combatants were given on average $600 of cash allowances in 10 installments.3
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” The United Nations Security Council (S/2009/611), November 30, 2009.
- Ibid.
- A. Caramés, “Burundi (PNDDR, 2004-2008),” in A. Caramés and E. Sanz, Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes in the World during 2008, ed. A. Carmés and E. Sanz (Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace, 2009), 31-38.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
2012
No further developments observed.
Protocol V: Guarantees on Implementation of the Agreement
8. Reintegration Commission
(a) The organ provided for in article 21, paragraph 8 of Protocol III to the Agreement, hereinafter referred to as the Reintegration Commission shall have the role of organizing, supervising, monitoring and ensuring the effective economic and social reintegration of the troops and combatants who, as a result of the demobilization process carried out in conformity with article 21 of Protocol III to the Agreement, have become civilians.
(b) The Reintegration Commission shall consist of representatives of the Government, the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. It shall be chaired by the Government.
(c) The Reintegration Commission shall commence its activities on the day of its establishment. These activities must be completed before the commencement of the electoral process.
Prisoner Release
2003
Not all major parties to the conflict signed the agreement until 2003. During this three year gap, implementation of the prisoner release provision did begin.
The accord requires the release of all political prisoners within 30 days of the establishment of the transitional period. The accord provided for the establishment of a commission under the chairmanship of a judge to make recommendations on the existence and release of political prisoners.
In March 2001, Burundi’s government approached to the United Nations and asked to send experts for the commission on political prisoners.1 The government had formed a commission comprised of four Hutu and four Tutsi lawyers. Also, 10 foreign lawyers arrived to Burundi to examine case files of detainees.2
The prisoners were not released in 2002. The Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC), the body responsible for monitoring the implementation and verification of the implementation, suggested the lack of political will in transitional government and called for an immediate release of political prisoners.3
- “Burundi government to set up commission on political prisoners,” Agence France Presse, March 25, 2001.
- “Burundi: Some 10 foreign lawyers arrive in country,” BBC Monitoring Africa, November 23, 2001.
- “Burundi: Arusha accord committee calls for release of all political prisoners,” BBC Sumary of World Broadcasts, October 9, 2003.
2004
In July 2004, those who considered themselves political prisoners called for their immediate and unconditional release in various prisons in Burundi. According to Burundi Association for the Protection of Human Rights and Detained Persons (APRODEH), “Of the 7,530 prisoners in Burundi, only 1,500 are behind bars for common law offences” (Source: Five thousand prisoners demand release in Burundi, Agence France Presse, 20 July 2004). Protest activities in prisons spread out throughout the country and in August government considered demands by more than 2,000 jailed soldiers, former rebels and militiamen to be released as provided in the Arusha accord.1 There was no report of release of political prisoners.
- “Burundi’s government considers demands for release by more than 2,000 inmates who seized control of two prisons,” Associated Press, August 4, 2004.
2005
In November 2005, the government established the 21-member commission to identify political prisoners held throughout the country and determines who were political prisoners and provide a list. The commission started to work immediately after its establishment. In fact, some political prisoners identified by the commission were released.1
- “Burundi; Commission Starts Work of Identifying Political Prisoners,” Africa News, November 16, 2005.
2006
On 3 January 2006, the Burundian President signed a decree on provisional immunity of political prisoners.1 On 10 January, 673 prisoners that the commission identified as political prisoners were released.2 On 14 March 2006, the final batch of 1,846 political prisoners were released. A total of 3,299 political prisoners were released.3
- “Burundi’s president signs decree on provisional immunity for political prisoners,” BBC Monitoring Africa, January 5, 2006.
- “Burundi conditionally releases 673 political prisoners,” Associated Press, January 10, 2006.
- “Last Batch of Political Prisoners Freed in Burundi as Part of Ongoing Reconciliation Drive,” World Markets Analysis, March 15, 2006.
2007
Political prisoners were released in 2006.
2008
No further developments observed.
2009
No further developments observed.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
2012
No further developments observed.
Protocol II, Chapter II: Article 15:
20.(a) The transitional Government shall within 30 days of the commencement of the transition establish a commission under the chairmanship of a judge to investigate, as a matter of urgency, and to make recommendations on:
(ii) The release of prisoners awaiting trial in respect of whom there has been an undue delay in the prosecution of their cases;
(iii) The existence of and release of any political prisoners.
Protocol III, Chapter III: Article 25:
2. (c) Release of all the political prisoners, closure of all the forced regroupment camps and respect for civil and political rights and freedoms shall take place from the date of signature of the Agreement
Paramilitary Groups
2003
Arusha Accord prohibits militia groups or organization and requires such groups to be dismantled and disarmed. In the Pretoria Protocol (2 November 2003), parties agreed to begin disarmament of such militia groups within 18 days. There was no report of disarmament of militia groups in 2003.
2004
It was reported that the demobilization of government’s civilian militia was stared in January 20041 but no further information is available.
2005
It was reported that the civilian militia groups, the Gardiens de la paix and the Combattants militants, were scheduled to be disarmed starting 6 July.1
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nation Security Council (S/2005/586), September 14, 2005.
2006
Notwithstanding initial delays in dismantling and disarming militia groups, significant progress was made in 2005. As reported in the United Nations Secretary General’s report, civilian militia groups were dismantled and disarmed. According to the report, 28,379 militias belonging to the Gardiens de la paix and the Combatants militants were disarmed and demobilized.1
Disarmament of civilians, however, moved very slowly
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2006/842), October 25, 2006.
2007
No developments observed this year.
2008
Militia groups were disbanded and disarmed in 2006. For civilian disarmament, the Commission on Civilian Disarmament and Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms was established by a presidential decree that included a provision of a general prohibition on arms.1
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2008/745), November 28, 2008.
2009
The commission continued its work and in 2009, it launched a final program of voluntary civilian disarmament.1
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2009/611), November 30, 2009.
2010
Militia groups were disarmed back in 2006. A final program on civilian disarmament was initiated in 2009. No further developments occurred this year.
2011
No further developments observed.
2012
No further developments observed.
Protocol II: Article 19: Democracy and Good Governance
Defence and security forces
1. Associations having the character of militias shall be prohibited.
Protocol III: Article 26: Peace and Security for All
General principles
1. The following principles are agreed upon:
(k) Mechanisms for dismantling and disarming all militias and disarming civilians holding arms illegally shall be established;
Human Rights
2003
In Arusha accord parties committed to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Burundi had ratified Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990.1 On 4 April 1991, Burundi ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women by Decree — Law No. 1/006, without any reservation.2 The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights was ratified by Burundi on 28 July 1989.3 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was ratified by Burundi on 9 May 1990.4
After the Arusha Agreement, in July 2002, the parliament adopted a draft law on trade union and strike rights for the civil servants.5Despite commitment to international human rights treaty, Burundi’s commitment to human rights as provided in the Arusha Accord did not materialize. In fact, there were reports of security forces being involved in political killings, frequent repots of kidnaping and disappearances, continued practice of torture. Excessive forces were used during demonstrations. Domestic violence against women was common.6
- “In Burundi, guaranteeing children’s rights to protection and play,” UNICEF, accessed February 19, 2013, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/burundi_61851.html.
- United Nations (CEDAW/C/BDI/1), July 3, 2000.
- “African Charter of Human Rights,” African Union, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/African%20Charter%20on%20Human%…‘%20Rights.pdf.
- “United Nations Treaty Collection, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” United Nations, accessed February 19, 2013, http://treaties.un.org/.
- “Burundi: Parliament adopts draft law on civil service trade unions,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 5, 2002.
- “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- Burundi 2003,” United States State Department, accessed February 19, 2013, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27715.htm.
2004
The United States State Department in its human rights report suggested no arbitrary or political killings involving security forces took place in 2004. There was no report of politically motivated kidnappings. But torture was practiced by CNDD-FDD throughout the year.1
- “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- Burundi 2004 & 2005,” United States State Department, accessed February 19, 2013, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/.
2005
There was no report of politically motivated kidnappings. But torture was practiced by CNDD-FDD throughout the year. Similarly, there were reports of arbitrary and politically motivated arrests.1
2006
While reduced from the days of the conflict, human rights violations including arbitrary arrest, collective punishment, sexually based violence and extra-judicial killings have continued. Both the military and police forces have been repeatedly implicated by human rights groups. The rates of violation have reduced since the signing of a cease-fire with the FNL, but they are far from over.
While Burundi remains normatively committed various human rights provisions as stipulated in the accord, Burundi’s human rights practice did not improve even after the transitional period was over in 2005.1
- “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- Burundi,” United States State Department (2007-2012), accessed February 19, 2013, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/.
2007
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
2009
No further developments observed.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
2012
No further developments observed.
Protocol I, Chapter II: Article 6:
2. Prevention, suppression and eradication of acts of genocide, war crimes and other crimes against humanity, as well as violations of human rights, including those which are gender-based.
Protocol II, Chapter 1,
Article 3: Charter of Fundamental Rights
1. The rights and duties proclaimed and guaranteed inter alia by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child shall form an integral part of the Constitution of the Republic of Burundi. These fundamental rights shall not be limited or derogated from, except in justifiable circumstances acceptable in international law and set forth in the Constitution.
2. All citizens shall have rights and obligations.
3. Human dignity shall be respected and protected.
4. All women and men shall be equal. No one may be discriminated against, inter alia, on grounds of origin, race, ethnicity, gender, colour, language, social situation, or religious, philosophical or political convictions, or by reason of a physical or mental handicap. All citizens shall enjoy equal protection of the law, as well as equal treatment under the law.
5. No person shall be arbitrarily dealt with by the State or its organs.
6. All women and men shall have the right to life.
7. All women and men shall have the right to personal freedom, including to physical and mental integrity, and to freedom of movement. Torture and any other kind of cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment shall be prohibited. Everyone shall have the right to be free from violence from either public or private sources.
8. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude. Slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.
9. The State shall to the extent possible ensure that all citizens have the means to lead an existence consistent with human dignity.
10. All women and men shall have the right to respect for their private and family life, residence and personal communications.
11. There shall be freedom of marriage, including the right to choose one’s partner. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.
12. The family, as the fundamental unit of society, shall be entitled to protection by society and the State.
13. Freedom of expression and of the media shall be guaranteed. The State shall respect freedom of religion, belief, conscience and opinion.
14. Freedom of assembly and association shall be guaranteed, as shall freedom to form non-profit-making associations or organizations in conformity with the law.
15. All Burundian citizens shall have the right to move and settle freely anywhere in the national territory, as well as to leave it and return to it.
16. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of her/his nationality or denied the right to change it.
17. No one may be denied access to basic education. The State shall organize public education, and shall develop and promote access to secondary and post-secondary education.
18. The State shall ensure the good management and utilization of the nation’s natural resources on a sustainable basis, conserving such resources for future generations.
19. Property rights shall be guaranteed for all women and men. Compensation that is fair and equitable under the circumstances shall be payable in case of expropriation, which shall be allowed only in the public interest and in accordance with a law which shall also set forth the basis of compensation.
20. The right to form and join trade unions and to strike shall be recognized. The law may regulate the exercise of these rights and prohibit certain categories of persons from going on strike.
21. Everyone shall have the right, in judicial or administrative proceedings, for her/his case to be dealt with equitably and decided within a reasonable time limit. Everyone shall have the right to due process and a fair trial.
22. No one may be deprived of her/his liberty other than in conformity with the law.
23. The State shall be under an obligation to promote the development of the country, especially rural development.
24. Each individual shall have the duty to respect and show consideration for her/his fellow citizens without any discrimination.
25. All citizens shall be required to discharge their civic obligations, and to defend their homeland.
26. Every child shall have the right to special measures to protect or promote her/his care, welfare, health and physical security, and to be protected from maltreatment, abuse or exploitation.
27. No child shall be used directly in armed conflict, and children shall be protected in times of armed conflict.
28. No child shall be detained except as a measure of last resort, in which case the child may be detained only for the shortest appropriate period of time and shall have the right to be kept separately from detained persons over the age of 16 years and to be treated in a manner, and kept in conditions, that take account of her/his age.
29. Any restriction of a fundamental right must have a legal basis; it must be justified by the public interest or by the protection of another person’s fundamental right; it must be proportional to the objective pursued.
30. Fundamental rights must be respected throughout the legal, administrative and institutional order. The Constitution shall be the supreme law and must be upheld by the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary. Any law that is not in conformity with the Constitution shall be invalid.
Protocol III, Chapter I,
Article 8: Protection of the inalienable rights of the human person
It is the duty of the State:
1. To protect the inalienable rights of the human person, starting with the right to life and including the rights to freedom, security, work, education and freedom of expression, and all other rights embodied inter alia in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the international conventions to which Burundi is a party;
2. To prohibit and punish violations of the inalienable rights of the human person;
3. To institute a proactive policy aimed at promoting human rights through education and training of the population, including all political and technical officials.
Amnesty
2003
Not all major parties to the conflict signed the agreement until 2003. During this three year gap, implementation of the amnesty provision did begin.
While Arusha accord had amnesty provision for crimes related to conflict, the accord excluded genocidal crimes, crimes against humanity or war crimes or participation in coups. Nevertheless, in several rounds of negotiations after the accord parties could not decide on what constitutes political crime.1
In peace talks organized in Pretoria between 30-31 October 2003, it was suggested that the president and the rebel leaders need to make a decision on whether to declare a general amnesty or grant temporary immunity to the combatants.2 Because political leaders returning from exile received temporary immunity, they could not be tried for political crimes.
- “Burundi: Controversial question of amnesty on political crimes unsolved,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, March 30, 2001.
- “Burundi peace talks start in Pretoria as summit postponed,” Agence France Presse, October 30, 2003.
2004
No developments observed this year.
2005
No developments observed this year.
2006
No developments observed this year.
2007
No developments observed this year.
2008
No developments observed this year.
2009
In 2009, government officials publically supported for general amnesty but no initiatives were taken in this regard.1
- “Seek Justice for War Crimes Victims – Gatumba Massacre Anniversary Marked by Ongoing Impunity,” Africa News, August 14, 2009.
2010
No developments observed this year.
2011
No developments observed this year.
2012
As of December 2012, a general amnesty has not been issued for political crimes committed during the Burundian civil war. Only temporary immunity was granted.
Protocol III, Chapter III: Article 26:
1. (l) Amnesty shall be granted to all combatants of the political parties and movements for crimes committed as a result of their involvement in the conflict, but not for acts of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, or for their participation in coups d’etat.
Refugees
2003
Not all major parties to the conflict signed the agreement until 2003. During this three year gap, implementation of the refugees provision did begin.
In Arusha accord, parties agreed the government should take institutional measures for the return, resettlement and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons. In this regard, the accord called for the establishment of National Commission for the Rehabilitation of Sinistrés (CNRS) for return, resettlement and reintegration of refugees and displaced persons. Within CNRS a sub-commission was formed to deal with the issue of land belonging to the displaced or refugees but being occupied by others. Parties also agreed to provide food aid, health, education, agriculture and reconstruction support for returned refugees and IDPS. In terms of return of refugees, 6,843 returned in 2000, another 27,885 returned in 2001 and 53,287 in 2002.1 According to an estimate, about 839,000 Burundian refugees were in neighboring countries including an estimated 200,000 in Tanzania.2
To facilitate the return of refugees especially from Tanzania, the UNHCR, Tanzania and the Burundian government reach an agreement in early May 2001 on the voluntary repatriation.3 In September, Burundian officials visited refugee camps in northwestern Tanzania.4
So far as the setting up institutional mechanism for the return of refugees and IDPs is concerned, the transitional government, the Burundian parliament adopted a bill to establish the National Commission for the Rehabilitation of Displaced Persons (CNRS) on 8 August 2002.5 But the sub-commission on land was not established.
Another 82,409 refugees returned in 2003.6
- “2004 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook — Burundi,” UNHCR , accesssed February 22, 2013, http://www.unhcr.org/414ad56b0.html.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2002/1259), November 18, 2002.
- “Burundi; Refugee Agreement Signed,” Africa News, May 14, 2001.
- “Burundi: Officials visit refugee camps in northwestern Tanzania,” BBC Monitoring Africa, September 15, 2001.
- “Burundi: Parliament adopts bill on commission for displaced persons,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 10, 2002.
- “2005 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook — Burundi,” UNHCR , accesssed February 22, 2013, http://www.unhcr.org/464183620.html.
2004
While CNRS was working on return, resettlement and reintegration of refugees, the sub-commission on land was not established which hindered the reintegration and resettlement of refugees.
Notwithstanding the establishment of CNRS, the land related issue was not prioritized, which hindered the peace process. In fact, a submission for land issues with rebel representation had not been established.1 Nevertheless, 90,321 refugees returned to Burundi in 2004 from Tanzania and other neighboring countries.2. The UNHCR and ONUB provided support in the repatriation process.
- “Burundi: Homeless refugees suffering from lack of basic needs,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 6, 2004.
- “2005 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook — Burundi.”
2005
The repatriation of refugees continued in 2005 with 68,248 refugees returning to Burundi from neighboring countries.1 For the reintegration and settlement of returned refugees, land issue proved to be an obstacle as properties belonged to refugees or displaced families were occupied by others. In fact, the rightful owner lacked documents to prove their ownership of land. The rightful owner land issue remains contentious.2 Returned refugees received basic needs such as foods, shelter, education and health services from the UNHCR, World Food Program and other UN agencies.3
- Ibid.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2005/586), September 14, 2005.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2005/728), November 21, 2005.
2006
In March 2006, the Burundian government adopted a bill to establish the national commission on land and other properties with some of the responsibilities of the former land sub-commission established under the CNRS.1 In October, the government prohibited farming on disputed land.2 While the government established land commission was working to resolve land conflict and was providing alternative solutions to land related disputes, land issues hindered the reintegration of returnees. Nevertheless, the establishment of the national commission on land suggested the serious nature of the problem. By November 2006, an additional 38,181 Burundian refugees returned to Burundi.3
- “Burundi parliamentarians ratify bill establishing national land commission,” BBC Monitoring Africa, March 30, 2006.
- “Burundi: Authorities in northwest forbid farming on disputed land,” BBC Monitoring Africa, October 18, 2006.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2006/994), December 18, 2006.
2007
Refugee repatriation continued in 2007. For better reintegration and rehabilitation of returnees, the government established the Steering Commission for the Repatriation and Reintegration of Returnees comprising representatives from government agencies, UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, donor agencies and the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB). As reported in Secretary GeneralsÕ Report, more than 33,000 refugees returned to Burundi until November 2007.1
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2007/682), November 23, 2007.
2008
In 2008 alone, more than 64,000 refugees returned to Burundi.1 Since 172,000 Burundian refugees who fled Burundi in 1972 wanted to settle in Tanzania, the UNHCR in collaboration of the European Commission supported naturalization of 76,000 Burundian living in Tanzania.2
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2008/330), May 15, 2008; “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2008/745), November 28, 2008.
- Ibid.
2009
The refugee return process continued. By end of October 2009, 31,562 refugees return to Burundi.1 Given the low socio-economic reintegration prospects and security vulnerability, number of returnees had declined in 2009.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2009/611), November 30, 2009.
2010
The Refugee repatriation program continued in 2010. While significant progress was made as more than 500,000 Burundians returned from Tanzania, the program continued in 2010 with more than 200,000 Burundians still in Tanzania. Also, Burundian refugees were still in DRC and the government had initiated a program for their return.1
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2010/608), November 3, 2010.
2011
No developments observed this year.
2012
In 2012, it was reported that over 34,000 Burundian refugees returned to Burundi from Tanzania.1
According to UNHCR, about 40,000 estimated Burundians in Tanzania and DRC are expected to return to Burundi in 2013.2
- “Over 34,000 Burundi refugees return home from Tanzania,” BBC Monitoring Africa, December 14, 2012.
- “2013 UNHCR country operations profile — Burundi,” UNHCR, accessed February 22, 2013, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45c056.html.
Protocol IV, Chapter I, Article 1: Definitions
1. For the definition of the term “refugee”, reference is made to international conventions, including the 1951 Geneva Convention Relative to the Status of Refugees, the 1966 Protocol Relative to the Status of Refugees and the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.
2. The term “sinistras” designates all displaced, regrouped and dispersed persons and returnees.
Protocol IV, Chapter I, Article 2: Principles governing return, resettlement and reintegration
1. The Government of Burundi shall encourage the return of refugees and sinistras and resettle and reintegrate them. It shall seek the support of other countries and international and non-governmental organizations in carrying out this responsibility.
2. It shall respect the following principles:
(a) All Burundian refugees must be able to return to their country;
(b) Refugees no longer in their first country of asylum are entitled to the same treatment as other returning Burundian refugees;
(c) Return must be voluntary and must take place in dignity with guaranteed security, and taking into account the particular vulnerability of women and children;
(d) The reception mechanisms must be put in place in advance of the return;
(e) Returnees must have their rights as citizens and their property restored to them in accordance with the laws and regulations in force in Burundi after the entry into force of the Agreement;
(f) All sinistras wishing to do so must be able to return to their homes;
(g) Specific conditions must be provided for sinistras who believe that they can no longer return to their property, so as to enable them to return to normal socio-professional life;
(h) In the return of the refugees and the resettlement and reintegration of the returnees and displaced and regrouped persons, the principle of equity, including gender equity, must be strictly applied in order to avoid any measure or treatment that discriminates against or favours any one among these categories.
Protocol IV, Chapter I, Article 3: Preparatory activities
The Government shall undertake the following preparatory activities:
1. Establishing and constituting a National Commission for the Rehabilitation of Sinistras (CNRS), which shall have the mandate of organizing and coordinating, together with international organizations and countries of asylum, the return of refugees and sinistras, assisting in their resettlement and reintegration, and dealing with all the other issues listed in the report of Committee IV. To this end, it shall draw up a plan of priorities. The members of the CNRS shall be drawn inter alia from the participating parties and the Government of Burundi, and shall elect the Commission’s chairperson;
2. Establishing and constituting a Sub-Commission of the CNRS with the specific mandate of dealing with issues related to land as set out in article 8 (j) of the present Protocol;
3. Convening, in collaboration with the countries of asylum and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Tripartite Commissioner, involving in it representatives of the refugees and international observers;
4. Requesting international organizations and the host countries concerned to conduct a gender and ago disaggregated census of the refugees, including the old caseload refugees (1972);
5. Conducting a multi-dimensional census of the sinistras;
6. Organizing information and awareness campaigns for refugees and sinistras as well as visits to their places of origin;
7. Undertaking information and awareness campaigns on the mechanisms for peaceful coexistence and return to collines of origin;
8. Setting up reception committees where they do not yet exist. The role of these committees shall be to receive and provide support services for all the sinistrés returning to their homes, ensure their security and assist them in organizing their socio-economic reintegration.
Protocol IV, Chapter I, Article 4: Guidelines governing resettlement and integration
The CNRS shall decide on the activities for the resettlement and integration of refugees and sinistras in accordance with the priority plan taking into account the availability of resources, in order to achieve the following aims and objectives:
1. To ensure the socio-economic and administrative reintegration of the sinistras;
2. To give all returning families, including female- and child-headed families, food aid, material support and assistance with health, education, agriculture and reconstruction until they become self-sufficient;
3. To provide communes, villages and collines with assistance in the reconstruction of community infrastructures and with support for income-generating activities, paying special attention to women and enhancing their roles in building and sustaining families and communities;
4. To settle all those who believe that they cannot yet return on sites close to home, in order to enable them to go and till their fields initially and return to their land later on;
5. To encourage, to the extent possible, grouped housing in the reconstruction policy in order to free cultivable land;
6. To ensure equity in the distribution of resources between the ethnic groups on the one hand and the provinces on the other, and to avoid overlap between the various parties involved;
7. To promote the participation of the population in the resettlement activities;
8. To help returnees to recover the property and bank accounts left in Burundi before their exile and whose existence has been duly proven;
9. To offer intensive language courses for returnees to mitigate the language problems;
10. To assist returnees in other areas such as medical services, psycho-social support, social security and retirement, education of children and the equivalency of diplomas awarded outside Burundi.
Protocol IV, Chapter I, Article 6: Other actions
Any other action decided upon by the CNRS in accordance with the priority plan and in the light of available resources may be taken.
Protocol IV, Chapter I, Article 7: Access and safety of international personnel
The Government shall allow international organizations and international and local non-governmental organizations unrestricted access to returnees and other sinistras for purposes of the delivery of humanitarian assistance. It must guarantee the safety of the staff of such organizations and must also facilitate the provision of short-term aid for repatriation, appropriately supervised and without discrimination.
Protocol IV, Chapter I, Article 8: Issues relating to land and other property
To resolve all issues relating to land and other property, the following principles and mechanisms shall be applied:
1. Property rights shall be guaranteed for all men, women and children. Compensation which is fair and equitable under the circumstances shall be payable in case of expropriation, which shall be allowed only in the public interest and in accordance with the law, which shall also set out the basis of compensation;
2. All refugees and/or sinistras must be able to recover their property, especially their land;
3. If recovery proves impossible, everyone with an entitlement must receive fair compensation and/or indemnification;
4. Refugees who do not return may receive a just and equitable indemnification if their land had been expropriated without prior indemnification and in contravention of the principle set out in sub-paragraph (a) of the present article;
5. The policy with respect to distribution of State-owned land shall be reviewed so that priority can be given to the resettlement of sinistras;
6. An inventory of destroyed urban property shall be drawn up with a view to making it habitable in order to redistribute it or return it as a priority to the original owners;
7. A series of measures shall be taken in order to avoid subsequent disputes over land, including the establishment of a register of rural land, the promulgation of a law on succession and, in the longer term, the conduct of a cadastral survey of rural land;
8. The policy of distribution or allocation of new lands shall take account of the need for environmental protection and management of the country’s water system through protection of forests;
9. Burundi’s Land Act must be revised in order to adjust it to the current problems with respect to land management;
10. The Sub-Commission on Land established in accordance with article 3 (b) of the present Protocol shall have the specific mandate of:
(a) Examining all cases of land owned by old caseload refugees and state-owned land;
(b) Examining disputed issues and allegations of abuse in the (re)distribution of land and ruling on each case in accordance with the above principles;
Internally Displaced Persons
2003
Not all major parties to the conflict signed the agreement until 2003. During this three year gap, implementation of the internally displaced persons provision did begin.
In Arusha accord, parties agreed the government should take institutional measures for the return, resettlement and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons. In this regard, the accord called for the establishment of National Commission for the Rehabilitation of Sinistrés (CNRS) for return, resettlement and reintegration of refugees and displaced persons. Within CNRS a sub-commission was formed to deal with the issue of land belonging to the displaced or refugees but being occupied by others. Parties also agreed to provide food aid, health, education, agriculture and reconstruction support for returned refugees and IDPS. According to an estimate, there were 325,000 IDPs in Burundi as of November 2000.1 The number of IDPs increased to 633,000 as of July 2001.2
The number of IDPs declined to an estimated 487,500 in 2002.3 So far, the transitional government and the Burundian parliament have set up institutional mechanisms like adopting a bill to establish the National Commission for the Rehabilitation of Displaced Persons (CNRS) on 8 August 2002.4 But the sub-commission on land was not established.
As of November 2003, it was reported that estimated 281,000 IDPs were in 230 camps throughout the country.5
- “Profile of Internal Displacement: Burundi,” Global IDP (2000-2002), accessed February 22, 2013, http://www.idpproject.org.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- “Burundi: Parliament adopts bill on commission for displaced persons,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 10, 2002.
- “Secretary GeneralsÕ Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2003/1146), December 4, 2003.
2004
While CNRS was working on return, resettlement and reintegration of refugees and IDPs, the sub-commission on land was not established which hindered the reintegration and resettlement of displaced persons.
Notwithstanding the establishment of CNRS, the land related issue was not prioritized, which hindered the peace process. In fact, a submission for land issues with rebel representation had not been established.1 No further information available on return of IDPs. In fact, it was reported that 35,000 civilians were displaced in 2004.2
- “Burundi: Homeless refugees suffering from lack of basic needs,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 6, 2004.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2004/902), November 15, 2004.
2005
Because of improved security situation, it was reported that estimated 165,000 returned to their communities without any assistance. Nevertheless, it was reported that the Burundian government and the United Nations conducted survey of IDPs in 2004 and 2005 to assess their needs and vulnerabilities for better resettlement in their origin places. In this regard, the government had initiated a program for the rehabilitation of IDPs and refugees, which the Ministry of Resettlement and Repatriates was responsible to implement in coordination with CNRS. Various international organizations and voluntary groups were also involved in providing needs of IDPs.1
- “Burundi: Improving Political and Security Situation Encourages IDP Return,” Global IDPs (2005), accessed February 22, 2013, http://www.idpproject.org.
2006
By October 2006, it was reported that Burundi’s IDPs fell a to record low of 100,000.1 Land issue was the main problem for the successful resettlement and reintegration of returnees (refugees and IDPs). To solve land related issues, the government took initiatives and established the national commission on land and other properties with some of the responsibilities of the former land sub-commission established under the CNRS.2
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council, (S/2006/842), October 25, 2006.
- “Burundi parliamentarians ratify bill establishing national land commission,” BBC Monitoring Africa, March 30, 2006.
2007
No developments observed this year.
2008
As the Hutus and Tutsi skirmishes took place in May and June, thousands of civilians were displaced in 2008.1
2009
As of 2009, estimated 100,000 were internally displaced in Burundi. It was reported that majority of them do not own their own house or land.1
- “Long-term IDPs need land security,” Global IDP (2009), accessed February 22, 2013, http://www.idpproject.org.
2010
According to a report, an estimated 100,000 were internally displaced by the end of November 2010.1
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2010/608), November 30, 2010.
2011
As of November 2011, the IDP number increased to 157,000.1
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2011/751), November 30, 2011.
2012
No further developments observed.
Protocol IV, Chapter I, Article 1: Definitions
1. For the definition of the term “refugee”, reference is made to international conventions, including the 1951 Geneva Convention Relative to the Status of Refugees, the 1966 Protocol Relative to the Status of Refugees and the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.
2. The term “sinistras” designates all displaced, regrouped and dispersed persons and returnees.
Protocol IV, Chapter I, Article 2: Principles governing return, resettlement and reintegration
1. The Government of Burundi shall encourage the return of refugees and sinistras and resettle and reintegrate them. It shall seek the support of other countries and international and non-governmental organizations in carrying out this responsibility.
2. It shall respect the following principles:
(a) All Burundian refugees must be able to return to their country;
(b) Refugees no longer in their first country of asylum are entitled to the same treatment as other returning Burundian refugees;
(c) Return must be voluntary and must take place in dignity with guaranteed security, and taking into account the particular vulnerability of women and children;
(d) The reception mechanisms must be put in place in advance of the return;
(e) Returnees must have their rights as citizens and their property restored to them in accordance with the laws and regulations in force in Burundi after the entry into force of the Agreement;
(f) All sinistras wishing to do so must be able to return to their homes;
(g) Specific conditions must be provided for sinistras who believe that they can no longer return to their property, so as to enable them to return to normal socio-professional life;
(h) In the return of the refugees and the resettlement and reintegration of the returnees and displaced and regrouped persons, the principle of equity, including gender equity, must be strictly applied in order to avoid any measure or treatment that discriminates against or favours any one among these categories.
Protocol IV, Chapter I, Article 3: Preparatory activities
The Government shall undertake the following preparatory activities:
1. Establishing and constituting a National Commission for the Rehabilitation of Sinistras (CNRS), which shall have the mandate of organizing and coordinating, together with international organizations and countries of asylum, the return of refugees and sinistrés, assisting in their resettlement and reintegration, and dealing with all the other issues listed in the report of Committee IV. To this end, it shall draw up a plan of priorities. The members of the CNRS shall be drawn inter alia from the participating parties and the Government of Burundi, and shall elect the Commission’s chairperson;
2. Establishing and constituting a Sub-Commission of the CNRS with the specific mandate of dealing with issues related to land as set out in article 8 (j) of the present Protocol;
3. Convening, in collaboration with the countries of asylum and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Tripartite Commissioner, involving in it representatives of the refugees and international observers;
4. Requesting international organizations and the host countries concerned to conduct a gender and ago disaggregated census of the refugees, including the old caseload refugees (1972);
5. Conducting a multi-dimensional census of the sinistras;
6. Organizing information and awareness campaigns for refugees and sinistras as well as visits to their places of origin;
7. Undertaking information and awareness campaigns on the mechanisms for peaceful coexistence and return to collines of origin;
8. Setting up reception committees where they do not yet exist. The role of these committees shall be to receive and provide support services for all the sinistrés returning to their homes, ensure their security and assist them in organizing their socio-economic reintegration.
Women's Rights
2003
The accord eliminates all forms of discrimination against women and gives women property rights. The accord sought to promote women in development. No significant programs were found.
2004
No developments observed this year.
2005
Article 19 of the constitution that went into effect in March 2005 contained a section named “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women”. Moreover, it was recognized as an integral part of the constitution. Article 129 and Article 164 guarantee 30% of positions to women in the government and in national assembly. These changes are reflected in human rights indicators such as the CIRI Human Rights Data Project. Programs aimed at economic and social rights of women, however, could not be found at the national level.1
- David L. Cingranelli and David L. Richards, The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset (v. 2011.12.09), accessed February 21, 2013, http://www.humanrightsdata.org.
2006
No further developments observed.
2007
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
2009
No further developments observed.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
2012
No further developments observed.
Protocol II, Chapter I, Article 3:
1. The rights and duties proclaimed and guaranteed inter alia by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child shall form an integral part of the Constitution of the Republic of Burundi. These fundamental rights shall not be limited or derogated from, except in justifiable circumstances acceptable in international law and set forth in the Constitution.
4. All women and men shall be equal. No one may be discriminated against, inter alia, on grounds of origin, race, ethnicity, gender, colour, language, social situation, or religious, philosophical or political convictions, or by reason of a physical or mental handicap. All citizens shall enjoy equal protection of the law, as well as equal treatment under the law.
6. All women and men shall have the right to life.
7. All women and men shall have the right to personal freedom, including mental integrity, and to freedom of movement. Torture and any other inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment shall be prohibited. Everyone right to be free from violence from either public or private sources.
10. All women and men shall have the right to respect for their private and family life, residence and personal communications.
11. There shall be freedom of marriage, including the right to choose one’s partner. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.
19. Property rights shall be guaranteed for all women and men. Compensation that is fair and equitable under the circumstances shall be payable in case of expropriation, which shall be allowed only in the public interest and in accordance with a law which shall also set forth the basis of compensation.
Protocol IV, Chapter II, Article 13:
(d) Initiation of tangible actions for the advancement of women;
Protocol IV, Chapter III, Article 16:
(i) Promotion of the role of women and youth in development, with the aid of specific measures to benefit them;
Children's Rights
2003
Arusha accord prohibits recruitment of child soldiers and therefore prohibited to be used in armed conflict. Therefore, the transitional government along with coordination with the UNICEF started demobilization of child soldiers and their reintegration.
2004
As of December 2004, 2,261 children have been demobilized and reintegrated with their families and communities by the National Structure for the Demobilization and Reintegration of Child Soldiers.[fn]”Burundi; More Child Soldiers to Be Demobilized,” Africa News, December 7, 2004.[/efn_note]
2005
Article 45 of the constitution protects children from being used in armed conflict. Also, in 2005 the president pledged to provide free primary education to all children.1
- “Burundi; President Pledges to Provide Free Primary Schooling for All Children,” Africa News, September 8, 2008.
2006
The practice of children’s rights, however, was not vigorously enforced. In fact, the UN Secretary General asked the Burundian government to immediately work towards ending persistent rapes, killings, detainment and recruitment of children in Burundi.1 According to a Human Rights Watch Report, children were tortured to extract confessions and locked up along with adults in prisons.2
- “Burundi; Annan Calls On Country to Make Children a Post-War Priority,” Africa News, November 2, 2006.
- “Burundi; Children Behind Bars Suffer Abuse,” Africa News, March 14, 2007.
2007
No developments observed this year.
2008
No developments observed this year.
2009
In 2009, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon suggested impunity for violations of children’s rights persisted in Burundi even though children involved in conflict were released and returned to their families.1
- “Burundi;Tackling Impunity for Violators of Child Rights Next Step for Burundi,Says Ban,” Africa News, September 18, 2009.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
2012
No further developments observed.
Protocol II, Chapter I, Article 3:
1. The rights and duties proclaimed and guaranteed inter alia by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child shall form an integral part of the Constitution of the Republic of Burundi. These fundamental rights shall not be limited or derogated from, except in justifiable circumstances acceptable in international law and set forth in the Constitution.
26. Every child shall have the right to special measures to protect or promote her/his care, welfare, health and physical security, and to be protected from maltreatment, abuse or exploitation.
27. No child shall be used directly in armed conflict, and children shall be protected in times of armed conflict.
28. No child shall be detained except as a measure of last resort, in which case the child may be detained only for the shortest appropriate period of time and shall have the right to be kept separately from detained persons over the age of 16 years and to be treated in a manner, and kept in conditions, that take account of her/his age.
Education Reform
2003
Not all major parties to the conflict signed the agreement until 2003. During this three year gap, implementation of the education reform provision did begin.
In Arusha Accord, parties had identified one of the main causes of armed conflict in Burundi was also related to lack of equitable distribution education opportunities, which parties tried to address in principles and measures related to education. Most importantly, parties were committed to provide free primary and secondary education until the age of 16.
As of 2000, an estimated 70,4785 were enrolled in primary education of which 44.42% were female.[fn]”World Development Indicators,” World Bank, 2013, http://databank.worldbank.org.[/efn_note] So far as the government’s initiatives is concerned, the Burundian government also had prioritized education as one of long-term policy priorities in donors conference in December 2000.1
- “WORLD BANK: Burundi Donor Conference pledges $440 million in urgent aid,” M2 PRESSWIRE, December 13, 2000.
2004
No information is available regarding government policy and programs regarding equitable distribution of education opportunities. In fact, there was a lot of chaos in the educational sector in 2004. After students across Burundi’s university called for an open-ended strike to protest the police shooting of one of their classmates, the Education minister gave approval for the school’s shutdown.1 Burundi’s teachers also went on strike asking for increase in their salaries.2 As teachers continued to protest, the government in early March 2004 suspended three teachersÕ unions.3 On 14 March, Burundi’s 20,000 public elementary and high-school teacher called off their protest activities and returned to work.4
- “Burundi university shuts down to punish striking students,” Agence France Presse, January 18, 2004.
- “Burundi: President calls on teachers to resume work,” BBC Sumary of World Broadcasts, January 23, 2004.
- “Burundi government suspends three teachers’ unions,” Agence France Presse, March 5, 2004.
- “Burundi teachers end strike,” Agence France Presse, March 14, 2004.
2005
No substantive reform took place except for the former rebel leader and the presidential candidate Pierre Nkurunziza’s emphasis on improving health and education services.1 In November 2005, the IMF urged the Burundian government to prioritize healthcare and education and direct funding to support these two sectors.2
- “Peace, reforms are priorities for Burundi’s next government, former rebel chief says,” AP Worldstream, August 17, 2005.
- “MF Urges Burundi Government to Prioritise Social Expenditures,” World Markets Analysis, November 17, 2005.
2006
In May 2006, Burundi adopted a policy to offer free primary education. As the policy went into effect, primary enrollment increased by 30%. Along with offering a free primary education, the government also initiated recruitment of 5,000 teachers on top of the existing 21,000 teachers, increased the education budget by $1.5 million and purchased thousands of benches and blackboards.1 As a result, the net primary enrollment increased from 1,036,859 to 1,324,937. The secondary enrollment also increased from 159,240 to 180,384.2
- “Burundi Struggles To Implement Free Primary Education,” Voice of America News, May 16, 2006
- “World Development Indicators,” World Bank, 2013, http://databank.worldbank.org.
2007
Burundi received UD$20 million from the World Bank to support the reconstruction of its education sector. The project sought to improve capacity and infrastructure in the school system.1 In March, deputies (members of parliament) were deployed throughout the country to distribute education materials.2 Along with opening new primary schools, Burundi also took initiatives to train 4,203 English, Swahili, and general education teachers.3
- “Burundi Receives Assistance for Reconstruction Of Education Sector,” States News Service, February 20, 2007.
- “Burundi: Deputies sent to constituencies to distribute school materials,” BBC Monitoring Africa, March 2, 2007.
- “Burundi; Primary Schools Inaugurated in Muyinga,” Africa News, Marcy 30, 2007.
2008
Primary and secondary enrollment constantly increased year over year. In 2008, almost 9% more primary students were enrolled compared to 2007. The secondary enrollment increased by more than 19% between 2008 and 2009.1
- “World Development Indicators,” World Bank, 2013, http://databank.worldbank.org.
2009
Primary and secondary school enrollment continued to increase.
2010
Primary and secondary school enrollment continued to increase.
2011
There was more than a 5% increase in an primary student enrollment between 2010 and 2011. Secondary enrollment increased by more than 12% between 2010 and 2011. Along with increase in student enrollments, primary teachers increased by almost 300% from 12,731 in 2000 to 40,288 in 2011 and secondary teachers from 6,855 in 2003 to 12,968 in 2011.1
- “World Development Indicators,” World Bank, 2013, http://databank.worldbank.org.
2012
In 2012, the Burundian government announce the universal education program.1
Protocol I
Nature of the Burundi Conflict, Problems Of Genocide And Exclusion And Their Solutions
Principles and measures relating to education
11. Equitable regional distribution of school buildings, equipment and textbooks throughout the national territory, in such a way as to benefit girls and boys equally.
12. Deliberate promotion of compulsory primary education that ensures gender parity through joint financial support from the State and the communes.
13. Transparency and fairness in non-competitive and competitive examinations.
14. Restoration of the rights of girls and boys whose education has been interrupted as a result of the Burundi conflict or of exclusion, by effectively reintegrating them into the school system and later into working life.
Protocol IV Reconstruction and Development Chapter III
Economic and Social Development
Article 15: Principal objectives
The Government shall endeavour to correct the imbalances in distribution of the country’s limited resources and to embark on the path of sustainable growth with equity. It shall set itself the following principal objectives:
(b) Providing all children with primary and secondary education at least to the age of 16;
Media Reform
2003
Arusha accord had provisions for government support for independent media. However, the accord also prohibits printing and broadcasting media for spreading inflammatory information that would cause ethnic violence or conflict.
In terms of implementing provision of the accord, not much happened between 2000 and 2003 except for the establishment of an independent radio station to promote Hutus and Tutsi reconciliations.1 Journalists were arrested for inciting ethnic hatred.2 As a matter of fact, the government did not support independent media as journalists were constantly targeted.3 In November 2003, government passed a new media law with provisions for fines and criminal penalties for insults directed at the President as well as for writings that are offensive to public or private individuals.4
- “Burundi: New independent radio station with Hutus, Tutsis working together,” BBC Monitoring Africa, August 22, 2001.
- “Burundi: Police arrest independent news agency director,” BBC Monitoring Africa, December 21, 2001; “Burundi arrests editor of Tutsi news agency for inciting hatred,” Agence France Presse, July 6, 2003.
- “Burundi; Journalists subjected to constant attacks,” Africa News, February 21, 2003.
- “2004 County Reports on Human Rights Practices- Burundi,” State Department, 2005, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41591.htm.
2004
While security forces harassing journalists declined, government did not promote independent media by controlling the major media. Nevertheless, the passage of Media law in November 2003 did not require journalists to have their articles reviewed before their publications.1
- “2004 County Reports on Human Rights Practices- Burundi,” State Department, 2005, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41591.htm.
2005
Media reform did not reflect in practice. Government censorship and suspensions of media publication increased in 2005.1
- “2005 County Reports on Human Rights Practices- Burundi,” State Department, 2006, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61557.htm.
2006
Government still controlled media even though government censorship and suspension of publication were not reported in 2006. Media outlets were required to pay heavy licensing fees.1
- “2006 County Reports on Human Rights Practices- Burundi,” State Department, 2007, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78722.htm.
2007
Government still controlled media even though government censorship and suspension of publication were not reported in 2007.1
- “2007 County Reports on Human Rights Practices- Burundi,” State Department, 2008, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100469.htm.
2008
Government continued to control major media outlets but did not censor or force media outlets to suspend operations. Nevertheless, government threatened Africa Public Radio (RPA) with closure for criticizing the government. Also, journalists were arrested several times on charges of defaming and disseminating false information 2007.1
- “2008 County Reports on Human Rights Practices- Burundi,” State Department, 2009, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/118989.htm.
2009
While government continued to control operations of major media outlets and did not use censorship or force media outlets to suspend its operation, journalist were arrested on allegation of spreading false information.1
- “2009 County Reports on Human Rights Practices- Burundi,” State Department, 2010, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135941.htm.
2010
Government continued to control media outlets and did not tolerate its criticisms in the media. Journalists were arrested. Burundi had elections in 2010 but political debates were not allowed to broadcast.1
- “2010 County Reports on Human Rights Practices- Burundi,” State Department, 2011, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/af/154334.htm.
2011
Notwithstanding government’s commitment to promote independent media, government restriction on media continued.1“2011 County Reports on Human Rights Practices- Burundi,” State Department, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper…
2012
Human Rights Watch reported the Burundian government tried to restrict independent media in Burundi in 2012.1 In fact a court in June sentenced a journalist to life imprisonment for “participating in a terrorist attack”, which was said politically motivated and criticized by Eastern African Journalists Association among others. It was also reported a reporter was beaten up in June.2
Protocol II, Chapter l, Article 3:
13. Freedom of expression and of the media shall be guaranteed. The State shall respect freedom of religion, belief, conscience and opinion.
Protocol IV, Chapter ll, Article 13:
Physical reconstruction and political reconstruction must be mutually supportive. Political reconstruction is aimed at making national reconciliation and peaceful coexistence possible, and must be directed towards the establishment of the rule of law. In this context, the following programmes and measures shall be undertaken:
(h) Provision of support for independent media.
Minority Rights
2003
Arusha Accord and the subsequent Pretoria Protocol II provide some guidelines on division state power (in executive, legislative and judiciary administration) based on ethnicity. The accord also provided that the Burundi’s Armed Forces and National Police Force to be composed in a way that would not consist more than 50% of members from any of the ethnic groups. Transitional governments formed in 2001 and 2003 followed these provisions such that Hutus or G-10 groups had more positions compared to G-7 or Tutsi groups.
2004
No developments observed this year.
2005
In the constitution approved and promulgated on 19 March 2005, Hutus were given 60% position in the executive branch of government, legislative branch of the government, and administration whereas Tutsis were given 40%. This division of state power based on ethnicity was irrespective of political party affiliation.[fn]”Burundi constitution becomes law as country continues to heal wounds,” Agence France Presse, March 19, 2005; Constitution of Burundi 2004.[/efn_note] Given that the Tutsis, who are minority with less than 15% population had dominated state institutions in Burundi, the accord and the constitution secured access to power for the majority Hutus, who comprised about 85% of the population.
2006
No further developments observed.
2007
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
2009
No further developments observed.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
2012
No further developments observed.
Protocol II: Democracy and Good Governance
12. The first transitional President and Vice-President of the Republic shall come from different ethnic groups and political parties. In the event of the death or incapacity of either of them, the new transitional President or Vice-President of the Republic shall be elected by the transitional National Assembly by a resolution which receives the support of two-thirds of the members. Pending the election of a new President, the President of the transitional National Assembly, assisted by the Vice-President of the Republic, shall act as President. The term of the transitional President and Vice-President shall terminate upon the election of the first President under the provisions of this Protocol.
13. During the transition period, there shall be a broad-based transitional Government of national unity. The Government shall include representatives of different parties in a proportion whereby more than half and less than three-fifths of the portfolios are allocated amongst the G-7 group of parties.
Protocol III, Chapter II, Article 16: Balances within the defence and security forces
1. The following criteria shall be used to determine the imbalances in the defence and security forces:
(a) Political;
(b) Ethnic;
(c) Regional;
(d) Gender.
Pretoria Protocol on Outstanding Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing Issues in Burundi (2 November 2003)
2.4.2 Composition
During the integration phase the BNDF shall be composed of selected member of:
- The current Burundi Armed Forces (FAB).
- Combatants of the CNDD-FDD Movement.
- The combatants of other armed political parties.
- After integration volunteer Burundian citizens could be recruited.
- The BNDF shall not consist of more than 50% of any of the ethnic groups as per Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (protocol III chapter 2 article 14. 1g).
3.5.2 Composition
a. The Burundi National Police Force shall be composed of:
(1) Members of the current Burundi Police Force.
(2) Selected combatants from the CNDD-FDD Movement and other armed political parties.
(3) Volunteer Burundian citizens recruited on the basis of their competence.
b. The National Police Force will not consist of more than 50% of members from any of the ethnic groups. This is in accordance with Arusha Peace and Reconciliation for Burundi (Protocol III, Chapter 2 art 14 para 2 (e)).
Economic and Social Development
2003
Arusha Accord provided for several socio-economic reform issues. The accord asked for the equitable distribution of resources throughout the country, implementation of economic recovery program such as reconstruction of economic infrastructure, legislation to fight against financial crimes and corruption by enacting tax, custom and public market legislations, develop the private sector, initiate structural reforms, establish Sub-Commission of the CNRS and revise Burundi’s Land Act among other reforms.
Land Reform:
On 8 August 2002, the Burundian parliament adopted a bill to establish the National Commission for the Rehabilitation of Displaced Persons (CNRS) under the Ministry of Reintegration and Resettlement of Displaced Persons and Repatriates. The CNRS, however, would be financially and administratively autonomous.1 But the land related issues were not resolved. Other economic and social issues including economic recovery and infrastructure reconstruction were not addressed. In fact, Burundi was under financial shortfall in 2003.2
Private Sector and Structural Reform:
Starting in 2002, Burundi started to receive the World Bank and the International Monitory Fund support for structural programs that involved privatization of public enterprises among other things.3
- “Burundi: Parliament adopts bill on commission for displaced persons,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 10, 2002.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2003/1146), December 4, 2003.
- “Burundi; World Bank Loan for Economic Rehabilitation,” Africa News, September 3, 2002.
2004
No developments observed this year.
2005
No developments observed this year.
2006
The socio-economic reconstruction started in 2006 when the government and the United Nations jointly identified priority areas for the reconstruction of socio-economic development.1
Land Reform: In March 2006, the Burundian government adopted a bill to establish the national commission on land and other properties with some of the responsibilities of the former land sub-commission established under the CNRS.2 In July 2006, government set up the Commission Nationale des Terres et Autre Bien (CNTB) to deal with land issues.3 In October 2006, the government prohibited farming on disputed land.4 While the government established land commission was working to resolve land conflict and was providing alternative solutions to land related disputes, land disputes and allegations are not yet resolved. Land reform has not been implemented and therefore effective redistribution of state resources has not been carried out.
Tax, corruption and custom legislations:
The anti-corruption law was passed in 2006.5 The anti-corruption bodies were set up in May 2006.6 Despite these initiatives, corruption is rampant in Burundi that required a broad based institutional reforms.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2006/429/Add.1), August 14, 2006.
- “Burundi parliamentarians ratify bill establishing national land commission,” BBC Monitoring Africa, March 30, 2006.
- “Burundi; Huge Challenges in Solving Land Crisis,” Africa News, November 23, 2006.
- “Burundi: Authorities in northwest forbid farming on disputed land,” BBC Monitoring Africa, October 18, 2006.
- “The President of Burundi Takes Steps to Rebuild His War-Torn Nation, Including Demand for Accountability of NGOs and Burundian Government,” Business Wire, April 6, 2006.
- “Burundi; President Announces Free Maternal Healthcare, Pay Rise for Workers,” Africa News, May 1, 2006.
2007
No developments observed this year.
2008
No developments observed this year.
2009
Tax, corruption and custom legislations:
Some progress was made in terms of tax reform and legislation in 2009. On 1 July 2009, Burundian government enacted law n° 1/02 on Value Added Tax (VAT) system and replaced the transactional tax system. Similarly, on 14 July 2009, law n° 1/11 was passed came into force that created the Burundi Revenue Authority (OBR).
2010
Tax, corruption and custom legislations:
In 2010, to became a part of the East African Common Market (EAC), which was an organization of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, Burundi ratified the East African Common Market protocol that deals with the custom issues.1
2011
No developments observed this year.
2012
Private Sector and Structural Reform:
The World Bank and the International Monitory Fund support for structural programs that involved privatization of public enterprises among other things was still ongoing as of 2013. Under this structural reform program, the government sold Coffee Factories to the private sector among sell off of other public enterprises.1
Protocol I: Chapter II: Article 7:
Principles and measures relating to the economy
19. Equitable apportionment and redistribution of national resources throughout the country.
20. Urgent implementation of an economic recovery programme with a view to combating poverty and raising the income of the people and of a programme for the reconstruction of destroyed economic infrastructures.
21. Legislation and structures for combating financial crime and corruption (tax legislation, customs legislation, legislation on public markets, etc.).
22. Recovery of State property plundered by some citizens.
23. Introduction of incentives for economic development in the context of fairness and harmony.
24. Development of the private sector by means of incentives with a view to creating new jobs and reducing the burden and pressures on the public sector.
Protocol IV, Chapter I, Article 3:
(b) Establishing and constituting a Sub-Commission of the CNRS with the specific mandate of dealing with issues related to land.
Protocol IV, Chapter III, Article 8:
(c) If recovery proves impossible, everyone with an entitlement must receive fair compensation and/or indemnification.
(e) The policy with respect to distribution of State-owned land shall be reviewed so that priority can be given to the resettlement of sinistres.
(g) A series of measures shall be taken in order to avoid subsequent disputes over land, including the establishment of a register of rural land, the promulgation of a law on succession and, in the longer term, the conduct of a cadastral survey of rural land;
(h) The policy of distribution or allocation of new lands shall take account of the need for environmental protection and management of the country’s water system through protection of forests;
(i) Burundi’s Land Act must be revised in order to adjust it to the current problems with respect to land management;
(j) The Sub-Commission on Land established in accordance with article 3 (b) of the present Protocol shall have the specific mandate of:
(i) Examining all cases of land owned by old caseload refugees and state-owned land;
(ii) Examining disputed issues and allegations of abuse in the (re)distribution of land and ruling on each case in accordance with the above principles;
(k) The Sub-Commission on Land must, in the performance of its functions, ensure the equity, transparency and good sense of all its decisions. It must always remain aware of the fact that the objective is not only restoration of their property to returnees, but also reconciliation between the groups as well as peace in the country.
Protocol IV, Chapter III, Article 14: Development programme
The transitional Government shall launch a long-term economic and social development programme. With the support of international agencies, it shall begin work on remedying the economic situation, reversing the trends resulting from the crisis, particularly the intensification of poverty, and taking up the challenges that impede economic development.
Protocol IV, Chapter III, Article 15: Principal objectives
The Government shall endeavour to correct the imbalances in distribution of the country’s limited resources and to embark on the path of sustainable growth with equity. It shall set itself the following principal objectives:
(a) Increasing rural and urban household income;
(b) Providing all children with primary and secondary education at least to the age of 16;
(c) Reducing the infant mortality rate by at least half;
(d) Giving the entire population access to health care;
(e) Improving the well-being of the population in all areas.
Protocol IV, Chapter III, Article 16: Guidelines governing development
In pursuit of these objectives, the Government shall follow the guidelines set out hereunder on the basis of the measures specified in the report of Committee IV (see Annex IV):
(a) Working towards macro-economic and financial stabilization;
(b) Attempting to solve the problem of external and domestic public debt;
(c) Initiation of structural reforms in the social sectors;
(d) Creation of an environment conducive to the expansion of the private sector;
(e) Efforts to create new jobs and compliance with the criteria of equity and transparency in employment;
(f) Ensuring good governance in the management of public affairs;
(g) Rendering operational the Court of Audit established under the provisions of Chapter I of Protocol II to the Agreement;
(h) Transformation of the communes into focal points for development and promotion of greater public access to State services by means of a decentralization policy;
(i) Promotion of the role of women and youth in development, with the aid of specific measures to benefit them;
(j) Initiation of Burundi’s integration into the region;
(k) Equitable apportionment of the benefits of development.
Protocol IV, Chapter III, Article 17: Implementation
1. For the implementation of the reconstruction and development measures, an Inter-Ministerial Reconstruction and Development Unit shall be created to which the Ministries of Planning, Finance and Reintegration shall second personnel. Support for this Unit shall be sought from the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the European Commission and others. It shall have the following mandate:
(a) Preparation, within six weeks of the signing of the peace agreement, of an emergency reconstruction plan that will set the priorities for reconstruction and provide an initial estimate of costs. In preparing this plan, the National Commission for the Rehabilitation of Sinistres shall be consulted and invited to submit proposals. This emergency plan shall also serve as the basis for discussion at a donor conference;
(b) Subsequently, preparation of a detailed reconstruction plan covering the transition period as set forth in Chapter II of Protocol II to the Agreement;
(c) At the same time, preparation of a medium- and long-term development plan.
2. The three plans shall be submitted to the National Assembly for approval. They will be guided by the measures proposed by Committee IV (see Annex IV, chapters II and III) while adapting the priorities in response to developments in the situation and bearing in mind opportunities for financing.
3. Donors will be involved in the work of the Unit, and may request an international auditing company to monitor all financial operations and accounts that may be established.
Ratification Mechanism
2003
Once the accord was signed on 28 August 2000, was not ratified in the parliamentary session in October for disagreement among deputies over dates of implementation of the accord. Nevertheless, on 30 November 2000, the transitional parliament ratified the accord.[fn]”Burundi national assembly ratifies Arusha peace accord,” Agence France Presse, November 30, 2000.[/efn_note]
The accord was ratified in 2002 but came to full implementation only after the largest rebel group CNDD-FDD signed a protocol agreement in 2003.
2004
The accord was ratified. No further developments occurred this year.
2005
No further developments observed.
2006
No further developments observed.
2007
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
2009
No further developments observed.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
2012
No further developments observed.
Protocol II, Chapter II, Article 21:
Changes may be made to the transitional arrangements and the text of the Agreement with the consent of nine-tenths of the members of the transitional National Assembly.
Protocol II, Chapter II, Article 22:
2. By its signature the National Assembly agrees, within four weeks, to:
(a) Adopt the present Protocol as the supreme law without any amendments to the substance of the Agreement;
(b) Repeal the provisions of any legislation which prevent free political activity, or which would hinder the implementation of the present Protocol;
(c) Pending the installation of a transitional Government adopt such legislation as is necessary for the granting of temporary immunity against prosecution for politically motivated crimes committed prior to the signature of the Agreement.
Donor Support
2003
Immediately after the signing of the Arusha Accord, mediator and former president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela called for a donor conference to collect funds for rebuilding Burundi.[fn]”Burundi: Mandela calls for Donor conference on Burundi,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, October 28, 2000.[/efn_note] The donorsÕ conference was scheduled for 11 and 12 December. The largest rebel group CNDD-FDD, which was yet to sign the Arusha accord protested the conference by writing a letter to the UN Secretary General.1 Nevertheless, donor conference took place as scheduled and in the conference donors and development agencies pledged $440 million.2
In 2002, a two day donor conference was organized in Geneva on 27 and 28 November in which Burundi Ministry of Planning asked for 1.2 Billion US Dollars for its social programs including rehabilitation and reconstruction. In the conference Donors promised 905 Million US Dollars.3
- “Burundi: Rebel group writes to UN to protest against donor conference,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, December 8, 2000.
- “Paris conference on Burundi successful beyond expectations – President Buyoya,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, December 12, 2000.
- “Burundi: Donor conference pledges 905m US dollars to support recovery,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 2, 2002.
2004
On 13 and 14 January 2004, donor conference was held in Brussels in initiatives of Belgium in which participants pleaded 1.032 Billion US Dollar support to Burundi.1
- “ECOSOC Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Burundi,” UN Economic and Social Council, accessed March 5, 2013, http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/adhocmech/cronology_burundi.shtml.
2005
No donor conference was organized in 2005.
2006
A donor conference was held on 28 February 2006 in which donors and international development agencies pleaded $170 million.1 In 2006, the Secretary General declared Burundi eligible to receive support from United Nations Peacebuilding Fund.
2007
No developments observed this year.
2008
No developments observed this year.
2009
No developments observed this year.
2010
No developments observed this year.
2011
No developments observed this year.
2012
Between 2006 and 2013, Burundi received 49.2 Million USD for various peacebuilding priority including security sector reform, property or land issues.1 In a donor conference organized on 28 and 29 December 2012, Burundi asked for over 1 Billion USD for its development programs between 2012 and 2016. In a conference organized in Geneva, donor countries and development agencies pleaded more than 2 Billion USD in financial assistance to support its development programs between 2012 and 2015.2
- “Burundi Overview,” UN Peacebuilding Fund, accessed March 5, 2013 http://www.unpbf.org/countries/burundi/.
- “International donors pledge USD2 bil. in aid to Burundi,” Global Insight, October 31, 2012.
Protocol V, Chapter 1, Article 9: Financial guarantees
Implementation of all the reforms and programmes contained in the Agreement will require financial support from donors. In this context, the Facilitator, in coordination with the Implementation Monitoring Committee and the transitional Government, shall take the necessary steps for a donors’ conference to be convened to raise funds for the reconstruction of Burundi.
Detailed Implementation Timeline
2003
The Timeline related to implementing ceasefire provisions, establishing a transitional government and a new transitional government with CNDD-FDD were followed. Establishment of transitional national assembly, deployment of AMIB and the UN peacekeepers happened on timely manner. Other provisions, such as rehabilitation of displaced and refugees, establishment of the TRC and judiciary reforms could not take place as expeditiously as aspired in the Arusha Accord.
2004
No developments observed this year.
2004
No developments observed this year.
2005
No developments observed this year.
2006
No developments observed this year.
2007
No developments observed this year.
2008
No developments observed this year.
2009
No developments observed this year.
2010
No developments observed this year.
2011
No developments observed this year.
2012
No developments observed this year.
Protocol II, Chapter II, Article 13: Duration of the transition
1. The transition period shall commence from the time that the conditions necessary for installing the transitional Government in accordance with the applicable instruments have been met, which shall be as soon as possible after three months, and in any event not later than six months, from the date of signature of the Agreement. The Implementation Monitoring Committee alone shall determine this date, and may bring it forward if it decides that the necessary conditions exist. Until the transition period commences, all parties shall meet their obligations under the Agreement to establish or co-operate in establishing the agreed legal and institutional framework. The implementation Monitoring Committee, established as set forth in Protocol V, shall be the mechanism for guaranteeing compliance with the Agreement.
2. The transition period shall culminate upon the election of the new President. The presidential election shall take place after the first democratic election of the National Assembly. Both elections shall take place within 30 months of the commencement of the transition period.
Protocol II, Chapter II, Article 14: Political parties during the transition
1. The transitional National Assembly shall within twelve months of its installation adopt a law setting forth the qualifications and procedure for registration of political parties.
Protocol II, Chapter II, Article 15: Transitional institutions
4. The transitional National Assembly and the traditional Senate shall within 18 months adopt in the same terms, by a two-thirds majority, a post-transition Constitution in conformity with the principles set forth in Chapter I of the present Protocol.
Protocol II, Chapter II, Article 17: Judicial and administrative reforms
1. Within 30 days of the commencement of the transition period, a commission of the transitional National Assembly in which all the parties are represented shall be established to monitor the reforms of the public administration and of the administration of justice and to submit recommendations thereon to the transitional National Assembly and the transitional Executive.
Protocol II, Chapter II, Article 20: Elections
1. Elections at the commune level and at the national level shall be held during the transition period in accordance with the provisions and within the time-frames set forth in the present Protocol.
5. The transitional National Assembly shall within 12 months and by a two-thirds majority adopt a law regarding electoral rules.
Arusha, Protocol II, Chapter II, Article 22: Interim period
(b) Within 60 days of signature, a document nominating the members representing the participating party in the transitional National Assembly.
4. The transitional President and Vice-President shall within 60 days of the signature of the Agreement submit to the Implementation Monitoring Committee a list identifying the members of the Cabinet.
5. Starting one month after the signature of the Agreement, the Implementation Monitoring Committee shall continuously review whether the conditions for the installation of a transitional Government have been met, and may direct the Government or any Party or participating party to undertake any steps which would enable those conditions to be met. It alone shall fix the date on which the transitional National Assembly and transitional Government shall be installed, and may postpone such date, provided the final date is not later than six months after the signature of the Agreement.
Indicative Timetable for the Implementation of the Global
Signing of the FTA
The parties, The Facilitation, The Regional, Initiative, African Union, United Nations (D Day = 2, November 2003)
Effective ceasefire
The parties (D Day + 7)
Implementation of the JCC and Joint Military Units
The parties (TGoB & CNDD-FDD), United Nations (D Day + 7)
Deployment of observers of the African Mission on the Burundi territory
AMIB, JCC (D Day + 7)
Disengagement of forces
The parties, AMIB, JCC (D Day + 7)
Establishment of the new Transitional Government of Burundi
Current Transitional Government of Burundi and the CNDD-FDD (D Day +21)
Confinement and cantonment to barracks
The new Government, AMIB and JCC (D Day +18)
Disarming of the militia
The Transitional Government of Burundi, AMIB (D Day +18)
Control of heavy weapons by AMIB
AMIB (D Day+18)
Establishment of Integrated Chiefs of Staff (NDF, PN, SNR)
The new Transitional Government of Burundi (Day D +21)
Beginning of training of the first Joint Military Units
The new Transitional Government of Burundi, AMIB, JCC (D Day +25)
Beginning of integration and DDRR
The new Transitional Government of Burundi, AMIB, JCC (D Day +30)
Beginning of training of the other units to constitute the NDF, NP and NIS
The new Transitional Government of Burundi, AMIB, JCC (D Day + 80)
Completion of the establishment of the NDF, NP and NIS
The parties, AMIB, Facilitation Regional Initiative (D Day +365)
Natural Resource Management
2003
Not much happened in terms of natural resource utilization and management. Burundi has very limited natural resources. The only natural resource available was land.
2004
No developments observed this year.
2005
No developments observed this year.
2006
To deal with the land related issues, a bill was adopted in 2006 to establish the national commission on land and other properties with some of the responsibilities of the former land sub-commission established under the CNRS.1 In July 2006, the government set up a the Commission Nationale des Terres et Autre Bien (CNTB) to deal with land issues.2 In October 2006, the government prohibited farming on disputed land.3 While the government-established land commission was working to resolve land conflict and was providing alternative solutions to land related disputes, good management of land and its utilization was not achieved for the customary and legal land tenure system in place.
However, efforts have been made with concern to climate change and land degradation.4
- “Burundi parliamentarians ratify bill establishing national land commission,” BBC Monitoring Africa, March 30, 2006.
- “Burundi; Huge Challenges in Solving Land Crisis,” Africa News, November 23, 2006.
- “Burundi: Authorities in northwest forbid farming on disputed land,” BBC Monitoring Africa, October 18, 2006.
- “UNEP Projects in Burundi.” UNEP, 2008, accessed June 5, 2010, ttp://gridnairobi.unep.org/chm/roa/project_profiles/BurundiUNEPProjects.pdf.
2007
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
2009
No further developments observed.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
Protocol II, Chapter I, Article 3:
18. The State shall ensure the good management and utilization of the nation’s natural resources on a sustainable basis, conserving such resources for future generations.
Review of Agreement
2003
No amendments were made in the transitional arrangement.
2004
No amendments were made in the transitional arrangement.
2005
No amendments were made in the transitional arrangement.
2006
No amendments were made in the transitional arrangement.
2007
No amendments were made in the transitional arrangement.
2008
No amendments were made in the transitional arrangement.
2009
No amendments were made in the transitional arrangement.
2010
No amendments were made in the transitional arrangement.
2011
No amendments were made in the transitional arrangement.
2012
No amendments were made in the transitional arrangement.
Protocol II, Chapter II, Article 21: Amendment of the transitional arrangements
Changes may be made to the transitional arrangements and the text of the Agreement with the consent of nine-tenths of the members of the transitional National Assembly.
Verification/Monitoring Mechanism
2003
Arusha Accord provides for the establishment of the Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC) with representatives from the government, the representatives from the rebel movements, the UN, the African Union and the regional peace initiatives for Burundi. Among other responsibilities, the IMC was responsible to monitor, supervise, coordinate and ensure the effective implementation of all the provisions of the Agreement. The IMC was also said to provide guidance to the establishment of other commissions and sub-commission as provided in the accord.
A 29-member IMC was inaugurated on 27 November by former South African President Nelson Mandela. The UN Secretary General appointed Berhanu Dinka, the UN representative to the Great Lakes region to lead the IMC. The committee consisted representatives from all signatories to the accord except for Parena — a hardline Tutsi party.1
The party representatives were Mr. Jean-Baptiste Mukuri (ABASA), Ambassador Alphonso Barancira( Annade), Professor Andre Nkundikije (Av-Intwari),Mr. Festus Ntanyungu (CNDD), Mr. Pierre-Claver Nahimana (Frodebu),Mr. Diallo Barumbanze (Frolina) ), Dr Alphonse Rugambarara (Inkizo-MSP), Mr. Andre Biha (The National Aseembly), Mr. Deo Nyabenda (Palipehutu), Professor Nicephore Ndimurukundo (PIT), Mrs. Marguerite Rukohoza (PL), Mr. Schadrack Niyonkuru (PP), Mr. Mathias Hitima (PRP), Mr. Godfrey Hakizimana (PSD), Mr. Syvestre Ntambutso (Raddes), Mr. Balthazar Bigirima (RPB) and Mr. Libere Bararunyeretse (Uprona).
The government was represented by Mr. Ambroise Niyonsaba.
The six eminent Burudians designated to the Committee were Mr. Charles Bitariho, Mr. Elie Buconyori, Mrs Ruth Gakima, Mrs Liberate Kiburago, Mr. Gerard Niyungeko and Mr. Jean-Berchmans Nterere. The OAU appointed Mr. Mamdou Bah.2 The Great Lake region and the Donors were yet to appoint their representatives. The first meeting of the IMC took place on 30 November 2000.3 The IMC had to reach to a settlement on issues related to transitional leadership, a timeline for its implementation and the proposed peacekeeping force. The second meeting that took place on 1 December 2000, however, failed to resolve these issues.4 The new round of talks were scheduled in Arusha starting on 15 January 2001.5
In 2001, the IMC considered various contentious issues and the implementation of the Arusha accord. In this regard, an agreement on transitional leadership was reached on 25 July 2001.6 The multi-ethnic transitional government was installed on 1 November 2001.7 For the serious ceasefire negotiation with rebel groups, the IMC told the transitional government to consider draft legislations on provisional amnesty for returning exiles; genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; and creation of a national commission for the rehabilitation of refugees.8
Throughout 2002, the IMC continuously worked to meet its responsibility of monitoring, supervising, coordinating and ensuring the effective implementation of all the provisions of the Agreement. The IMC worked with the government on various laws including on freedom of activities for political parties, provisional immunities, the law against genocide and the establishment of National Committee on Refugees and Sinistres (CNRS) among others.9 The IMC in cooperation with the Ministry for the Mobilization for Peace also publicized the accord for the grass-root support for the peace process.10 One of the most significant achievements of the IMC was the ceasefire agreement of 2 December 2002, which was significant peace process achievement.11
The IMC for its monitoring and verification role, criticized the government for lack of political will to implement the accord as the transitional government did not make progress in releasing political prisoners and improving prison conditions.12 The committee tried to resolve disputes related to the adoption and enhancement of laws on provisional immunity, punishment of crime of genocide among other laws. Nevertheless, the committee was working very closely with the parliament to get the constitution, the electoral code and the reform in the defense and security corps. The IMC also worked on the modalities for the establishment of the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation.13 Among other important achievement was the deployment of the African Mission in Burundi.
- “Rwanda; Ambassador Dinka To Lead Burundi Monitoring Committee,” Africa News, November 27, 2000.
- “Rwanda; Ambassador Dinka To Lead Burundi Monitoring Committee,” Africa News, November 27, 2000.
- “Burundi; UN Envoy Chairs First Meeting Of Committee On Burundi Peace Accord,” Africa News, November 30, 2000.
- “Burundi peace process in doubt after inconclusive talks end,” Associated Press, December 1, 2000.
- “New round of Burundi peace talks to begin in Arusha on 15 January,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 19, 2000.
- “UN: Installation of Burundi’s transitional government on 1 November ‘turning point’ in peace process says Security Council,” M2 PRESSWIRE, September 27, 2001.
- “Roundup: Milestone Erected on Burundi Peace Road,” XInhua General News Service, November 2, 2001.
- “Burundi; Create Conditions for Peace, Monitoring Body Tells Government,” Africa News, December 3, 2001.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2002/1259), November 18, 2002.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2002/1259), November 18, 2002.
- “U.N. secretary-general welcomes Burundi cease-fire,” Associated Press, December 3, 2002.
- “Burundi; IMC Slams Detention of Political Prisoners, Poor Prison Conditions,” Africa News, October 7, 2003.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2003/1146), December 4, 2003.
2004
The IMC continued to press the transitional government and the parties involved in the peace process on the constitution and the electoral law along with pressing armed political parties and movements to meet the precondition of disarmament and demobilization.1 The committee also pressed the government to set up the Electoral Commission in its nineteenth session in July. As a result the National Independent Electoral Commission was set up on 5 August.2 The IMC requested the transitional government to facilitate the reintegration of former armed parties and formally establish the new defense and security forces. The IMC also requested the national assembly to enact a draft electoral code; and the political parties to accept the electoral timetable.3
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2004/682), August 25, 2004.
- Ibid.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2004/902), November15, 2004.
2005
After holding its final meeting on 8 and 9 August, the IMC concluded its mandate. The IMC proved itself instrumental in monitoring and ensuring the implementation of the Arusha accord and its provisions. Under the IMC, successful communals were held on 3 June and the National assembly on 4 July followed by a direct election of the senate on 29 July. The presidential elections took place on 19 August in which the CNDD-FDD leader Pierre Nkurunziza was elected and the inauguration of his term took place on 26 August.
The IMC proved instrumental in the peace process for its monitoring and verification role. Nevertheless, contentious provisions of the accord were not implemented in a timely manner and therefore the IMC in its last meeting called on the government to implement provisions related to the repatriation of refugees and the rehabilitation of those affected by the conflict, socio economic development, reform in security and judicial system and the release of political prisoners.1
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2005/586), September 14, 2005.
2006
The verification mechanism, IMC, completed its mandate in 2005.
2007
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
2009
No further developments observed.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
2012
No further developments observed.
Protocol V: Article 3: Implementation Monitoring Committee
A committee to follow up, monitor, supervise and coordinate the implementation of the Agreement, hereinafter referred to as the Implementation Monitoring Committee, shall be established.
1. Role of the Implementation Monitoring Committee
The functions of the Implementation Monitoring Committee shall be to:
(a) Follow up, monitor, supervise, coordinate and ensure the effective implementation of all the provisions of the Agreement;
(b) Ensure that the implementation timetable is respected;
(c) Ensure the accurate interpretation of the Agreement;
(d) Reconcile points of view;
(e) Arbitrate and rule on any dispute that may arise among the signatories;
(f) Give guidance to and coordinate the activities of all the commissions and sub-commissions set up pursuant to each protocol for the purpose of implementing the Agreement. These commissions and sub-commissions shall include the following:
– The Technical Committee to implement the procedures for the establishment of a national defence force;
– The Technical Committee to implement the procedures for the establishment of the national police;
– The Ceasefire Commission;
– The Reintegration Commission;
– The National Commission for the Rehabilitation of Sinistrés;
(g) Assist and support the transitional government in the diplomatic mobilization of the financial, material, technical and human resources required for the implementation of the Agreement;
(h) Decide on the admission of new participating parties in accordance with article 14 of Protocol II to the Agreement;
(i) Perform any other duty specifically allocated to it by the Agreement.
2. Composition and structure of the Implementation Monitoring Committee
(a) The Implementation Monitoring Committee shall have the following composition:
(i) Two representatives of the Parties;
(ii) One representatives of the Government;
(iii) Six Burundians designated for their moral integrity;
(iv) Representatives of:
– The United Nations;
– The Organization of African Unity;
– The regional Peace Initiative on Burundi;
(b) The Implementation Monitoring Committee shall be chaired by the representative of the United Nations, who shall act in consultation with the Government, the Organization of African Unity and the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi; (c) The Implementation Monitoring Committee shall be based in Bujumbura and shall have an Executive Council, to which it may delegate such of its powers as it deems appropriate;
(d) There shall be a secretariat to service the Implementation Monitoring Committee and the Executive Council.
3. Functioning and powers of the Implementation Monitoring Committee
(a) The Implementation Monitoring Committee shall begin its operations upon the appointment of its chairperson, and its mandate shall end when the Government elected during the transition period takes office. It shall draw up its own rules of procedure and work programme.
(b) The Implementation Monitoring Committee shall possess the requisite authority
and decision-making powers to perform its functions impartially, neutrally and effectively.
(c) Decisions of the Implementation Monitoring Committee shall be taken by the Parties, by consensus or failing that by a four-fifths majority.
Article 4: The Facilitator
The Facilitator shall continue in his role as moral guarantor, recourse authority and conciliation agent.
Article 5: Commissions
1. The Implementation Monitoring Committee, in collaboration with the Government, shall establish commissions and sub-commissions responsible for sectoral activities as provided for in paragraph 1 (g) of article 3. Their activities shall be coordinated by the
Implementation Monitoring Committee, to which they shall report.
2. The Implementation Monitoring Committee shall, when setting up commissions and sub-commissions, specify their composition, functions, structures, location, decision making process and leadership, as well as the timetable for the completion of their activities.
UN Peacekeeping Force
2003
The international peacekeeping mission was not deployed in 2003. In fact, the Arusha requires the establishment of the regional peacekeeping mission by the African Union and create condition for the deployment of the UN peacekeeping in Burundi.
2004
In February 2003, an assessment mission evaluated the security situation and overall peace process in Burundi and based on its evaluation, the UN Secretary General proposed the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Burundi (MINUB). On 21 May 2004, the Security Council adopted recommendations of the Secretary General by adopting a resolution 1545 (2004). In its resolution, the Security Council established the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONBU) and authorized 5,650 military personnel, 200 military observers, 125 headquarters and staff officers. And as of 1 June 2004, the African Mission in Burundi troops from Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa, and 29 military observers from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia became ONBU troops. As of November 2004, there were 5,259 ONBU troops deployed in Burundi.1
The mission was authorized for six months, which was extended until 1 June 2005 by Security Council from its resolution 1577 (2004) on 1 December 2004.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2004/902), November 15, 2004; “Burundi; UN Mission Replaces Sections of South African Peacekeepers,” Africa News, October 25, 2004.
2005
The ONBU continued its mission in Burundi in 2005. Security Council resolution 1602 (2005) of 31 May 2005 extended the mandate of ONBU for additional six months until 1 December 2005. Again on November the ONBU was extended until 15 January 2005 (SEC/RES/ 1641 (2005) on 30 November 2005. The ONBU mandate was extended until 1 July 2006 (SEC/RES/1650 (2005) on 21 December 2005.
2006
The ONBU continued its mission in Burundi in 2006. The ONBU mandate was extended until 31 December 2006 (S/RES/1692 (2006) on 30 June 2006. The UN Security Council on 25 October 2006 adopted a resolution S/RES/1719 (2006) authorized the establishment of the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINBU) and the withdrawal of ONBU. The BINBU was set to be operation on 1 January 2007. By the time of its drawdown, the ONBU had 1,522 troops (including 77 military observers and 51 staff.1 The ONBU completed its mandate specified in the Arusha accord.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2006/994), December 18, 2006.
2007
The peacekeeping role of the ONBU was completed in 2006. However, the UN Security council established the BINBU to support the consolidation of peace and democratic governance, to protect and promote human rights and coordinate between donor and the UN agencies. The mandate of the BINBU was extended until the end of December 2010.
2008
No developments observed this year.
2009
No developments observed this year.
2010
The UN Security Council adopted a resolution S/RES/1959 (2010) on 16 December 2010 and replaced the BINBU by establishing the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB) for a year starting 1 January 2011.
2011
The UN Office Burundi (BNUB) began January 1, 2011. The mission was extended until 15 February 2013 on 20 December 2011 (S/RES/2027/2011).
2012
No further developments observed.
Protocol III, Chapter III: Article 27:
5. International peacekeeping force
The mandate of the peacekeeping force referred to in article 8 of Protocol V to the Agreement shall be to verify implementation of the provisions contained in this Chapter. In addition to its verification function, the force may be requested by the Ceasefire Commission to provide assistance and support to the implementation process, as appropriate.
Protocol V: Chapter I: Article 8: Peacekeeping
Immediately following the signature of the Agreement, the Burundian Government shall submit to the United Nations a request for an international peacekeeping force in conformity with and for the purposes set forth in article 27, paragraph 5 of Protocol III to the Agreement. Account must be taken of United Nations practice in this respect. This force shall be responsible inter alia for:
(a) Ensuring respect for the ceasefire;
(b) Supervising integration;
(c) Providing technical support for demobilization aid and training;
(d) Ensuring protection of the institutions and of any public figure who so wishes;
(e) Assisting in the establishment and training of an ethnically balanced special unit for the protection of the institutions.
Pretoria Protocol II (2 November 2003)
2.2. 2.2 Roles and Principles
a.7. To participate in peace support operations under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) or the Regional Organisations when the Government is ready to participate.
Regional Peacekeeping Force
2003
A formal decision of deploying African Mission was made in February 2002, which led to the African Union’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution’s mandate on 2 April 2003 to deploy some 3,500 troops from Mozambique, South Africa and Ethiopia.1 In fact, African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) had 3,000 strong force deployed in Burundi by the end of April 2003.2 The Mission had received support from the transitional government from its European Development Fund as well as bilateral support from the US, UK, Italy and Germany among other countries.3
As specified in the accord, the main responsibility of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) were to supervise the implementation of ceasefire accord, support the DDR initiatives, and create favorable condition for the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces. By its presence, the troops from the African Mission in Burundi deterred or discouraged the ceasefire violations. They also supported the DDR process.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2003/1146), December 4, 2003.
- “African peacekeeping force deploys in Burundi,” Xinhua General News Service, April 28, 2003.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2003/1146), December 4, 2003.
2004
To evaluate whether the condition improved on the ground, the United Nations Secretary General sent an assessment mission to Burundi in February 2003. As the assessment mission indicated improvement in the security situation in Burundi, the UN Secretary General proposed United Nations Mission in Burundi (MINUB) to take over and reinforce the role of AIMB In his report, he proposed a minimum strength of some 5,650 military personnel, 200 military observers, 125 headquarters and staff officers.1 On 21 May 2004, the Security Council adopted a recommendation of the Secretary General by adopting a resolution 1545 (2004). This resolution established the United Nations Operation in Burundi. And as of 1 June 2004, the AMIB troops from Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa, and 29 military observers from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia became ONBU troops. As of November 2004, there were 5,259 ONBU troops deployed in Burundi.2
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2004/210), March 16, 2004.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2004/902), November 15, 2004; “Burundi; UN Mission Replaces Sections of South African Peacekeepers,” Africa News, October 25, 2004.
2005
Regional peacekeeping provision of the accord was successfully implemented in 2003.
2006
No further developments observed.
2007
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
2009
No further developments observed.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
2012
No further developments observed.
Protocol V, Article 3:
Functioning and powers of the Implementation Monitoring Committee
(b) Implementation Monitoring Committee shall be chaired by the representative of the United Nations, who shall act in consultation with the Government, the Organization of African Unity and the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi.
Ceasefire Agreement, Annex I, Article III:
1. The African mission shall be responsible for monitoring and verifying the ceasefire. Prior to this process, joint liaison teams shall be set up which shall function at the national, provincial and local levels.
2. The African mission shall create the organs and mechanisms for monitoring and verifying the ceasefire. It shall draw up its own rules of procedure.
Annex 1 to the Burundi Ceasefire Agreement (2 December 2002)
A. Stages of the ceasefire
1.1 Phase I
1.1.4 Deployment of the African mission.
Withdrawal of Troops
2003
Foreign troops were present within the rebel and the government armed forces and therefore the Ceasefire Agreement of December 2002, which was a part of the 2003 CPA requires withdrawal of all foreign troops. Nevertheless, foreign troops were not withdrawn from Burundi.
2004
In April 2004, Burundian army chief of staff Brig-Gen Germain Niyoyankana said that the Rwandan military had ordered the immediate withdrawal of Rwandan troops from Burundi.[fn]”Rwanda Deploys Troops Along Border With Burundi, DRC,” Africa News, April 26, 2004.[/efn_note] Exact withdrawal date is not available.
2005
Foreign troops, particularly the Rwandan troops, were withdrawn from Burundi in 2004.
2006
No further developments observed.
2007
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
2009
No further developments observed.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
2012
No further developments observed.
Ceasefire Agreement (2 December 2002)
Article II
1.4 The withdrawal of all foreign troops after the findings of the Commission of Inquiry which will investigate their presence within both the Burundian armed forces and the ranks of CNDD-FDD.
Please always cite: “Annualized implementation data on comprehensive intrastate peace accords, 1989–2012.” Madhav Joshi, Jason Michael Quinn, and Patrick M. Regan. Journal of Peace Research 52 (2015): 551-562.