Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the question of East Timor
Date Signed: 5 May, 1999
Accord Type: Comprehensive Peace Agreement
Country: Timor-Leste (East Timor)
93.94Implementation Score after 10 years
Provisions in this Accord
Constitutional Reform
1999
The peace accord required that Indonesia take “constitutional steps” in order to restore East Timor to its status prior to 1976. In response to the 30 August 1999 independence vote, the Indonesian People’s Consultative Assembly formally recognized East Timor’s independence on 19 October 1999.
2000
Full implementation reached in 1999.
2001
No further developments observed.
2002
No further developments observed.
2003
No further developments observed.
2004
No further developments observed.
2005
No further developments observed.
2006
No further developments observed.
2007
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
ANNEX I, 6:
If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis of the result of the popular consultation and in accordance with this Agreement, that the proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy is not acceptable to the East Timorese people, the Government of Indonesia shall take the constitutional steps necessary to terminate its links with East Timor thus restoring under Indonesian law the status East Timor held prior to 17 July 1976, and the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the Secretary-General shall agree “on arrangements for a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority in East Timor to the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall, subject to the appropriate legislative mandate, initiate the procedure enabling East Timor to begin a process of transition towards independence.
Police Reform
1999
The UNMISET assumed most of the administrative function including internal security once the referendum took place. From 1999 to 2002, the UNMISET assumed most of the activities related to the police force.
2000
The UNMISET assumed most of the administrative function including internal security once the referendum took place. From 1999 to 2002, the UNMISET assumed most of the activities related to the police force.
2001
The UNMISET assumed most of the administrative function including internal security once the referendum took place. From 1999 to 2002, the UNMISET assumed most of the activities related to the police force.
2002
The UNMISET assumed most of the administrative function including internal security once the referendum took place. From 1999 to 2002, the UNMISET assumed most of the activities related to the police force.
2003
The UNMISET Civpol component gradually transferred full policing authority over to the PNTL throughout the year, first at the administrative and management level while retaining operational responsibility and later by relinquishing operational control of policing to the PNTL on a district-by-district basis. By March, 6/13 districts had been completely turned over to the PNTL; this number increased to 12/13 by October with the final district, Dili, to be turned over in January 2004. Civpol trainers continued to provide specialized training to select PNTL contingents, augmenting the crowd control capacity of the PNTL and continuing to focus on human rights training.1
- “Secretary General’s Reports to the UN Security Council,”United Nations Security Council (S/2003/243), March 3, 2003; (S/2003/449), April 21, 2003; (S/2003/944), October 6, 2003.
2004
While UNMISET transferred operational responsibility over policing in the last remaining district to the PNTL in January, it retained executive control over policing until 19 May 2004. By April, 3,021 PNTL personnel had been trained with an additional civilian support staff of 26. The UN mission in East Timor continued to provide training to the PNTL after 19 May with a reduced Civpol presence.2
- “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2004/333), April 29, 2004.
2005
Once UNMISET’s mandate was completed, a new political mission, the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) supported the development of critical State institutions and police training in observance of democratic governance and human rights. UNOTIL was to continue to support the development of critical State institutions by providing up to 45 civilian advisers; to support further development of the police through the provision of up to 40 police advisers; and to bolster the development of the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) by providing up to 35 additional advisers.3“United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT),” http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmiset/background.html….
2006
UNOTIL’s mandate was scheduled to expire in May 2006. On 11 June 2006, the President of Timor-Leste, the President of the National Parliament and the Prime Minister requested that the Secretary-General propose to the Security Council to establish a United Nations police force in Timor-Leste to maintain law and order until the national police could undergo reorganization and restructuring. On 25 August 2006, the Security Council established UNMIT.4
2007
Following the deployment of UNMIT, the overall situation in Timor-Leste improved, although the security situation in the country remained volatile.4
2008
The national police have been responsible for policing throughout the country since March 2011, with no major issues. 4
APPENDIX: PART THREE: POWERS AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE SARET
Article 22
The legislative power of the SARET shall extend to all matters not within the jurisdiction of the Central Government, as defined in Chapter I of Part One. This power shall include, the establishment of political, economic, and social policies in the SARET; cultural and educational matters; designation of a second language or languages in addition to the official language, Bahasa Indonesia; the establishment of courts of first instance pursuant to Article 40; rules of family law and succession; and public order, including the creation of an East Timor police force that shall be responsible for enforcement of all laws and regulations in the SARET, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Republic of Indonesia.
Disarmament
1999
The militias took most of their arsenal to West Timor and INTERFET confiscated all other weapons but permitted Falintil to remain armed within specified cantonments for some time.5 However, the Falinitl were then demobilized and a formal military was created during UNTAET. The role of the military and the veterans were much debated during UNTAET (it was decided that they should not be allowed to play a role in politics as long as they were in the military forces). Politically, it is still quite sensitive. For example, the problems stemming from how the military and police were set up in relation to the political establishment were critical to the renewed violence in 2006.
- Michael G. Smith and Moreen Dee, Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 49-50.
2000
Falintil was not disarmed. According to a senior UN military observer, the bigger role for Falintil “could be a matter for negotiation. The leadership is extremely well-respected. But whether we can allow them to carry arms is another question. The INTERFET mandate specified disarmament of all irregular forces. So Falintil can only carry arms outside their cantonment zone if they are given some de facto regular status.”6
- “Old guard guerrillas give way to new generation in East Timor,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, February 4, 2000.
2001
No further reports on disarmament.
2002
No further reports on disarmament.
2003
No further reports on disarmament.
2004
No further reports on disarmament.
2005
No further reports on disarmament.
2006
No further reports on disarmament.
2007
No further reports on disarmament.
2008
No further reports on disarmament.
ANNEX III, 2:
The Commission on Peace and Stability established in Dili on 21 April 1999 should become operational without delay. The Commission, in cooperation with the United Nations, will elaborate a code of conduct, by which all parties should abide, for the period prior to and following the consultation, ensure the laying down of arms and take the necessary steps to achieve disarmament.
Right of Self-Determination
1999
A popular consultation was held on 30 August 1999. During the consultation, 446,953 East Timorese, or 98.6% of registered voters, cast ballots both within and outside East Timor. 78.5% of voters rejected the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia under a special autonomy agreement. 3“East Timor – UNTAET Chronology,” accessed November 5, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/Untaetchrono.html… the suggested autonomy was rejected in the consultation, Indonesia was expected to pave the way for independence to Timor-Leste.
2000
A popular consultation was held in 1999.
2001
No further developments observed.
2002
No further developments observed.
2003
No further developments observed.
2003
No further developments observed.
2004
No further developments observed.
2005
No further developments observed.
2006
No further developments observed.
2007
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
ANNEX I, 6:
Noting the position of the Government of Portugal that an autonomy regime should be transitional, not requiring recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor or the removal of East Timor from the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the General Assembly, pending a final decision on the status of East Timor by the East Timorese people through an act of self-determination under United Nations auspices.
Donor Support
1999
Prior to the popular consultation, the Secretary General of the UN established a trust fund intended to both help finance the UN presence in East Timor and to finance the popular consultation. In August 1999, shortly before the popular consultation, donations to the trust fund had surpassed $21.7m (USD).7 After the popular consultation the UN trust fund became an organizing vehicle for aid directed at supporting the East Timor government and institutional development. A conference of donor states, the World Bank, and the UN met in Tokyo from 16-17 December 1999 and established a parallel trust fund, administered by the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, to finance reconstruction projects. Attending donor states made a three-year commitment to the funds in the amount of $522.45m. Of this amount, $148.98m was for humanitarian assistance and $373.47m was directed towards supporting the civil administration, reconstruction, and development within East Timor.8
- “UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/53/240,” United Nations General Assembly, August 11, 1999.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2000/53), January 26, 2000; “East Timor donors considering aid package of over 300m dollars,” Kyoda News Service, December 15, 1999.
2000
Subsequent donor meetings were held in Lisbon (June 2000) and Brussels (December 2000). In the October, 2000, meeting the European Union donated another €18.2 to the trust fund.9
- “Belgium; E.U. signs 18.2 euro aid package for East Timor,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, October 5, 2000.
2001
States at the Canberra Donor Conference on the 14-15 June 2001 endorsed the East Timor Transitional Administration’s $65m budget and assumed responsibility for funding the $20m deficit not met by taxation within the territory.10 ] Another donor conference was held in Oslo in December.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2001/719), July 24, 2001.
2002
Additional contributions to the Trust Fund came on 16 May 2002 as an international donor conference in Dili, East Timor, resulted in a donation of an additional $360m intended to support the East Timor government through the first three years of independence.11
- “East Timor; Donors pledge 360m dollars in aid for East Timor,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 16, 2002.
2003
On June 2003, the UK pledged ₤4m in budgetary support for 2004 to East Timor.12 Nevertheless, the monetary support declined as East Timor started to receive economic and trade cooperation, especially in the fields of oil and natural gas development, and agriculture and fishery. A whole range of states provided particular kinds of aid. The Portuguese connection had gotten the Lusophone world involved in the pledge.
2004
International support tapered off after production began from an offshore gas field in 2004, but international donors still contributed $30m in 2004 to cover the East Timor government’s budget deficit for the year.13
2005
Australian government made a commitment to provide a total of 42m dollars [approximately 31m US] to East Timor in 2005-2006 in official development assistance.14
- “Australian foreign minister stresses aid commitment to East Timor,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific — Political, July 7, 2005.
2006
No significant reports on donor activities.
2007
No significant reports on donor activities.
2008
No significant reports on donor activities.
ANNEX II, F:
The Secretary-General will seek the approval of the Security Council for the operation in order to ensure assessed budgetary funding. Voluntary contributions will be channeled through a Trust Fund established for this purpose.
Detailed Implementation Timeline
1999
Several tasks are mentioned in the timeline that are preparatory for voter registration; the election and these preparations were completed or nearly completed on time. Registration of voters inside and outside East Timor faced some delays and began on 16 July 1999. As a result, the popular consultation was postponed until 30 August 1999, instead of 8 August as originally planned.15
- “Secretary General’s Report to the UN General Assembly,” United Nations General Assembly (A/54/654), December 13, 1999.
2000
Implemented in 1999.
2001
No further developments observed.
2002
No further developments observed.
2003
No further developments observed.
2004
No further developments observed.
2005
No further developments observed.
2006
No further developments observed.
2007
No further developments observed.
ANNEX II, A:
The ballot will take place on Sunday, 8 August 1999, both inside and outside East Timor.
Annex II, D: Schedule of the consultation process
The Schedule for the operational stages of the consultation process will be approximately as follows: Operational planning/deployment, 10 May – 15 June; Public information programme / voter education, 10 May – 5 August; Preparation and Registration, 13 June – 17 July; Exhibition of lists and challenges / decisions on challenges and complaints, 18 July – 23 July; Political Campaign, 20 July – 5 August* (*subject to revision); Cooling off period, 6 August – 7 August; Polling Day, 8 August
Independence Referendum
1999
A popular consultation was held on 30 August 1999. During the consultation 446,953 East Timorese, or 98.6% of registered voters, cast ballots both within and outside East Timor. 78.5% of voters rejected the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia under a special autonomy agreement in favor of independence.3“East Timor- UNTAET- Chronology,” accessed November 23, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/Untaetchrono.html… Because the suggested autonomy was rejected in the consultation, Indonesia was expected to pave the way for independence to Timor-Leste.
2000
A popular consultation took place in 1999. East Timor is yet to became an independent state, however.
2001
A popular consultation took place in 1999. East Timor is yet to became an independent state, however.
2002
A popular consultation took place in 1999. East Timor became an independent state on 20 May 2002.
2003
No further developments observed.
2004
No further developments observed.
2005
No further developments observed.
2006
No further developments observed.
2007
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
ANNEX I, 1
[the parties] Request the Secretary-General to put the attached proposed constitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia to the East Timorese people, both inside and outside East Timor, for their consideration and acceptance or rejection through a popular consultation on the basis of a direct, secret and universal ballot.
Annex I, 5
If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis of the result of the popular consultation and in accordance with this Agreement, that, the proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy is acceptable to the East Timorese people, the Government of Indonesia shall initiate the constitutional measures necessary for the implementation of the constitutional framework and the Government of Portugal shall initiate within the United Nations the procedures necessary for the removal of East Timor from the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the General Assembly and the deletion of the question of East Timor from the agendas of the Security Council and the General Assembly.
Annex I, 6
If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis of the result of the popular consultation and in accordance with this Agreement, that the proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy is not acceptable to the East Timorese people, the Government of Indonesia shall take the constitutional steps necessary to terminate its links with East Timor thus restoring under Indonesian law the status East Timor held prior to 17 July 1976, and the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the Secretary-General shall agree on arrangements for a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority in East Timor to the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall, subject to the appropriate legislative mandate, initiate the procedure enabling East Timor to begin a process of transition towards independence.
Annex II, A
The ballot will take place on Sunday, 8 August 1999, both inside and outside East Timor.
Annex II, C: Entitlement to Vote
The following persons, aged 17 years or above, shall be eligible to vote in the popular consultation: (a) persons born in East Timor (b) persons born outside East Timor but with at least one parent having been born in East Timor, and (c) persons whose spouses fall under either of the two categories above.
UN Transitional Authority
1999
After the popular consultation process rejected incorporation within Indonesia as an autonomous province, the UN established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in UN Security Council resolution 1272 on 25 October 1999. UNTAET’s mandate consisted of the following tasks: a) To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor, b) To establish an effective administration, c) To assist in the development of civil and social services, d) To ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance, e) To support capacity-building for self-government, and f) To assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development. UNTAET was authorized to contain up to 9,150 military troops and 1,640 civilian police. However, while authorized in 1999, UNTAET did not assume responsibility from INTERFET until February 2000.
2000
UNTAET was deployed in the first months of 2000 and officially assumed military command of East Timor from INTERFET on 23 February 2000. UNTAET assumed responsibility for civilian administration in the territory until a competent civil administration staffed and administered by East Timorese could be established. Building a civil administration of East Timorese citizens was a challenge because the majority of qualified individuals in the territory fled the country before or during the violence surrounding the August 1999 popular consultation. In December 1999 after assuming responsibility in the territory, UNTAET established a National Consultative Council (NCC) composed of 11 East Timorese political leaders and 4 UNTAET members. The task of the NCC was to consult on and provide consent to regulations necessary to creating a state structure, including establishing a judiciary, setting an official currency, creating border controls, taxation, and other functions. (After critique, NCC was reformed into National Council in July 2000 and increased to 36 members — all Timorese) UNTAET also began a process of reorganizing itself to resemble more closely the future government of East Timor and to increase the direct participation of the East Timorese. Eight portfolios were created: internal administration, infrastructure, economic affairs, social affairs, finance, justice, police and emergency services, and political affairs. The first four were headed by East Timorese and the other four by senior UNTAET officials. The process of transformation and institution building would later lead to the establishment, in August 2000, of the East Timor Transitional Administration (ETTA) headed by the Transitional Administrator.16
The process by which UNTAET established a Timorese-run civil administration was known as “Timorization” and consisted of gradually hiring East Timorese citizens for positions in the government and relinquishing control over the functioning of the administration from the bottom up. By the end of 2000 over 7,000 Timorese had been hired as civil servents by the ETTA out of a projected total of 10,554. The ETTA, with assistance from UNTAET, also trained over 1,500 people in courses on government, public participation, and management.17 This was far from a smooth process and there is much critique against it for not actually entailing “timorization.”
- “United Nations Department of Peacekeeping,”accessed November 6, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/UntaetB.htm.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2001/42), January 16, 2001.
2001
By July, UNTAET had begun devolving decision-making power to Timorese civil administrators at the district level. Hiring of civil servants from the local population continued throughout the year, with 9,633 posts (91.2%) filled by the end of the year. UN volunteers and staff in the ETTA were reduced by 35% from a total of 1148 at the beginning of the year. The East Timor Police Services were staffed with 1,453 officers with 250 more in training, but the UN still maintained operational responsibility for maintaining law and order.18
- “Secretary General’s Reports to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2001/719), July 24, 2001); (S/2001/983), July 18, 2001; (S/2002/80), January 17, 2002.
2002
Recruitment, training, and capacity building activities took longer than expected; by April only 11,000 of 15,000 posts in the transitional government were filled, including the police and defense force of East Timor. Most posts filled were at the lower levels of administration while management posts were hard to staff due to a lack of qualified candidates and high turnover within the ETTA. The role of UNTAET shifted largely to training, advising, and cross-sectoral planning and coordination. Both the police and defense force still reported to the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN through May. Full operational responsibility of the police force was not planned to be transferred to East Timor until 2004.19
While UNTAET did not perform its administrative tasks perfectly due to factors both inside and outside East Timor, the transition to East Timorese rule was completed relatively smoothly and ended when East Timor became formally independent on 20 May 2002. This marked the end of UNTAET’s mandate, but it was replaced by the United Nations Mission in Support of East Timor (UNMISET), which continued to provide assistance in consolidating government institutions and providing security and the rule of law while East Timor’s police and security forces could finish developing.
This completed UNTAET’s transitional authority mandate.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2002/432), April 17, 2002.
2004
UNTAET’s transitional authority mandate completed in 2003.
2005
No further developments observed.
2006
No further developments observed.
2007
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
ANNEX I, 6
If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis of the result of the popular consultation and in accordance with this Agreement, that the proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy is not acceptable to the East Timorese people, the Government of Indonesia shall take the constitutional steps necessary to terminate its links with East Timor thus restoring under Indonesian law the status East Timor held prior to 17 July 1976, and the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the Secretary-General shall agree “on arrangements for a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority in East Timor to the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall, subject to the appropriate legislative mandate, initiate the procedure enabling East Timor to begin a process of transition towards independence.
Annex I, 7
During the interim period between the conclusion of the popular consultation and the start of the implementation of either option, the parties request the Secretary-General to maintain an adequate United Nations presence in East Timor.
Verification/Monitoring Mechanism
1999
The UN had 250 unarmed police deployed alongside Indonesian contingents during the consultation period. This was complemented by an international civilian staff of 600, 400 of which were posted to monitor polling stations across the country during the popular consultation. UN personnel reported a campaign characterized by intimidation from pro-Indonesian militias, supposedly supported by the Indonesian military.20 In addition, over 1,000 independent observers from around the world were present for the poll.21
A popular consultation was held on 30 August 1999. During the consultation 446,953 East Timorese, or 98.6% of registered voters, cast ballots both within and outside East Timor. 78.5% of voters rejected the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia under a special autonomy agreement in favor of independence.[fn]”East Timor- UNTAET- Chronology,” accessed November 23, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/Untaetchrono.html…
This completed the UNAMET verification mandate related to the “consultation of East Timorese people.”
- “United Kingdom; Three UN workers killed on rebel island,” Daily Mail, September 1, 1999.
- “United Kingdom; Violence in East Timor Campaign,” The Times, August 27, 1999.
2000
No further development reported. UNAMET verification mandat related to population consultation completed in 1999.
2001
No further developments observed.
2002
No further developments observed.
2003
No further developments observed.
2004
No further developments observed.
2005
No further developments observed.
2006
No further developments observed.
2007
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
ANNEX I, 2
Request the Secretary-General to establish, immediately after the signing of this Agreement, an appropriate United Nations mission in East Timor to enable him to effectively carry out the popular consultation.
Annex I, 7
During the interim period between the conclusion of the popular consultation and the start of the implementation of either option, the parties request the Secretary-General to maintain an adequate United Nations presence in East Timor.
Annex II, 3
Immediately following the conclusion of the agreement between the two Governments requesting the Secretary-General to consult the East Timorese people on whether they would accept or reject the proposed constitutional framework for autonomy, the Secretary-General will, subject to the appropriate legislative mandate, begin preparations for the popular consultation by deploying in East Timor such personnel as will be adequate for the purpose of executing the various phases of the consultation process. Preparations for the vote outside East Timor will also begin at locations of major East Timorese concentration outside East Timor.
Annex II, E (f): Observers
Indonesia shall be entitled to send an equal number of representatives to observe all the operational phases of the consultation process both inside and outside East Timor. International observers will be able to observe the consultation process under terms to be developed by the United Nations to regulate their presence.
Annex II, G
The Indonesian Authorities will ensure a secure environment for a free and fair popular consultation process and will be responsible for the security of United Nations personnel. A number of United Nations security guards will be deployed to ensure the security and safety of United Nations personnel and property. A number of international civilian police will be available in East Timor to advise the Indonesian Police during the operational phases of the popular consultation and, at the time of the consultation, to supervise the escort of ballot papers and boxes to and from polling sites.
Annex III, 4
The police will be solely responsible for the maintenance of law and order. The Secretary-General, after obtaining the necessary mandate, will make available a number of civilian police officers to act as advisers to the Indonesian Police in the discharge of their duties and, at the time of the consultation, to supervise the escort of ballot papers and boxes to and from the polling sites.
UN Peacekeeping Force
1999
Following the violence carried out by pro-Indonesian militias after the popular consultation, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1264 on 15 September 1999 authorizing a multinational force to act under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter to restore law and order, assist UNAMET, and facilitate humanitarian assistance operations. This force, INTERFET, was led by Australia and was composed of almost 12,000 troops. After additional negotiations with Indonesia to be allowed to deploy on the Timorese island, INTERFET was deployed on the September 20. INTERFET was able to quickly restore order to East Timor and was complemented with (and followed by) the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).
2000
UNTAET was established in resolution 1272 on 25 October 1999 and took over peacekeeping responsibility from INTERFET in February 2000. UNTAET had the mandate to (a) provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor, (b) establish an effective administration, c) To assist in the development of civil and social services, (d) ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance, (e) support capacity-building for self-government, and (f) assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development. UNTAET was authorized to contain up to 9,150 military troops and 1,640 civilian police.
Immediately after the transfer of responsibility from INTERFET to UNTAET, the mission began to recruit Timorese to fill posts within the East Timor Transitional Administration (ETTA) and recruit and train a Timorese police force. While a reduction in the force level of UNTAET by the end of the year was originally planned, it was delayed to cope with the threat of militias along the West Timor border. Most of the mission’s military forces were deployed along the border region, where they worked to disarm militias and destroy confiscated weapons. By the end of the year the strength of the mission was 7,886 all ranks, including 120 military observers, and 1402 civilian police.22
- “Secretary General’s Reports to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2000/1105), November 11, 2000; (S/2001/42), January 16, 2001.
2001
According to Secretary General’s report for October of 2001, the UN peacekeeping mission in East Timor was preparing a transition to the successor mission.23 Subject to the continuation of the prevailing stable security conditions, the military component was expected to be reduced to 5,000 by independence. The civilian police component was also expected to be reduced to 1,259 by independence.4
- “Secretary General’s Reports to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2001/983), October 18, 2001.
2002
UNTAET’s mandate ended with the formal independence of East Timor on 20 May 2002. The mission was largely successful, due to both a conducive external environment and the comparatively high level of resources it received, especially when the small size and population of East Timor is taken into account.24
UNTAET was immediately replaced by the United Nations Mission in Support of East Timor (UNMISET), which was mandated with the following tasks: (a) provide assistance to core administrative structures of the East Timor government, (b) provide interim law enforcement and assist in the development of the East Timor Police Service, and (c) contribute to the maintenance of internal and external security. UNMISET was initially deployed with a strength of 5,000 troops and 1,250 civilian police, which was to be drawn down as rapidly as possible over the duration of the mission. By November, the mission’s police forces had been drawn down from 1,250 to 741 as the delegation of full operational authority to Timorese units had taken place in 4 of 13 districts. The military component of UNMISET remained largely dedicated to maintaining a robust border presence to prevent the influx of militias from West Timor.25
- James Dobbins, Seth G. Gones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, and Anga Timilsina, The UN’s Role In Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq (Santa Monica, C: RAND Corporation, 1990), 162.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2002/1223), November 6, 2002.
2003
UNMISET continued to provide assistance to the new East Timor government with advisors serving in 15 ministries and offices. As local capacity grew, 30 of the 100 civilian advisers serving with UNMISET were withdrawn by November. UNMISET gradually handed authority to the East Timor Police Service, with the last district turned over to local forces in December. 300 UN Civilian Police remained at the end of the year, structured into a 200-member training unit and a 125-member emergency response force. Force levels were drawn down drastically over the year, decreasing from 3,870 troops in March to 3,300 troops in September and 1,750 troops in December. At year end the force was structured into 2 infantry battalions and 7 military observers.26
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2003/944), October 6, 2003; (S/2003/449), April 21, 2003; (S/2003/243), March 3, 2003.
2004
The contingent of 70 civilian advisers continued to assist the government, focusing on making preparations for the sustainability of the East Timor administration by creating manuals and training documents to be used after their withdrawal. After 20 May 2004 the civilian adviser contingent was reduced to 58 personnel. The UN Civilian Police contingent retained the end-of-2003 force structure until 20 May, when it was reduced in size to a contingent of 157 trainers only. These officers remained in training roles and co-deployed alongside the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL) throughout the year. The security component of the mission remained at a level of 1,750 troops until May, at which point the force was reduced to a total of 477 all ranks, including 42 military liaison officers, 310 formed troops, and a 125-strong international response unit. Concurrent with the reduction in force on 20 May 2004, the mandate of UNMISET was also changed to focus on three tasks: (a) providing assistance to the justice system and core administrative structures of the East Timor administration, (b) contribute to the development of the PNTL, and (c) contribute to the maintenance of internal and external security.27
- “Secretary General’s Reports to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2004/333), April 29, 2004; (S/2004/669), Augus 13, 2004; (S/2004/888), November 9, 2004; “UN Security Council Resolution,” United Nations Security Council (S/RES/1543), May 14, 2004.
2005
All components of UNMISET continued their mandated tasks until 20 May 2005, when the mission’s mandate expired. Civilian advisers and UN civilian police advisers continued at their December 2004 levels while the military component was drawn down to 144 troops and 35 military liaison officers.28
The UN Security Council authorized a United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) as a follow-on force designed to support development and training of government officials and police. UNOTIL was composed of 45 civilian advisers, 40 police advisers focused on training the PNTL, 20 police and 15 military advisers to support the development of the East Timor Border Patrol Unit, and 10 human rights officers. 29
- “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2005/99), February 18, 2005.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2005/310), May 12, 2005; “UN Security Council Resolution,”United Nations Security Council (S/RES/1599), April 28, 2005.
2006
UN peacekeeping mission was prolonged due to unrest. A new mission was created in 2006 to deal with the renew violence. Much focus was on the police and military as well as the political developments relating in part to West-East tensions. In 2006 there was serious violence in Dili and some other regions, originating in unresolved political conflicts within the elite and underlying structural tensions within the security sector (among other factors). Bilateral forces returned, as well as army & police forces under the UN.3“United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT),” http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmiset/background.html….
2007
No further development related to peacekeeping mandate of the UN.
2008
In September 2011, the Government and UNMIT signed a Joint Transition Plan (JTP) to guide planning for UNMIT’s expected withdrawal by the end of 2012.4
ANNEX I, 7
During the interim period between the conclusion of the popular consultation and the start of the implementation of either option, the parties request the Secretary-General to maintain an adequate United Nations presence in East Timor.
Annex II, G: Security
The Indonesian authorities will ensure a secure environment for a free and fair popular consultation process and will be responsible for the security of United Nations personnel. A number of United Nations security guards will be deployed to ensure the security and safety of United Nations personnel and property. A number of international civilian police will be available in East Timor to advise the Indonesian Police during the operational phases of the popular consultation and, at the time of the consultation, to supervise the escort of ballot papers and boxes to and from polling sites.
Withdrawal of Troops
1999
Indonesian troops left East Timor after the UN-authorized International Force for East Timor was deployed. The last Indonesian forces departed East Timor on 31 October 1999.30 A large part of the Indonesian forces in Timor Leste were Timorese recruits from Timor Leste — creating a difficult reintegration problem. The same was true for the militia. This contributed to the large refugee population in West Timor including many persons who could not return to Timor.
2000
Indonesian forces withdrew from East Timor in October 1999.
2001
No further developments observed.
2002
No further developments observed.
2003
No further developments observed.
2004
No further developments observed.
2005
No further developments observed.
2006
No further developments observed.
2007
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
ANNEX I, 6
If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis of the result of the popular consultation and in accordance with this Agreement, that the proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy is not acceptable to the East Timorese people, the Government of Indonesia shall take the constitutional steps necessary to terminate its links with East Timor thus restoring under Indonesian law the status East Timor held prior to 17 July 1976, and the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal shall agree on arrangements for a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority in East Timor to the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall, subject to the appropriate legislative mandate, initiate the procedure enabling East Timor to begin a process of transition towards independence.
This provision was only to be activated if the East Timorese people voted to reject the proposed autonomy within the Republic of Indonesia (i.e. for independence) in the popular consultation scheduled for 8 August 1999.
Please always cite: “Annualized implementation data on comprehensive intrastate peace accords, 1989–2012.” Madhav Joshi, Jason Michael Quinn, and Patrick M. Regan. Journal of Peace Research 52 (2015): 551-562.