Agreement Between the Republic Niger Government and the ORA

Several acts of spoiler violence took place following the April accord, but they received due attention. On 26 June 1995, 13 people died in an ambush attack on a meeting site in Arlit in northern Niger, attended by the Tuareg representatives of the ORA, the Organization of the Armed Resistance, and a special mission led by the French and Burkinabe mediators. The high commissioner for the restoration of peace in Niger also attended the meeting. In the meeting the ORA demanded the disarmament of the Arab militia, officially known as the Tassara Self-Defense Group. The ORA wanted to distance itself from the residual banditry, which was increasing in the north. This suggests a strong commitment to the ceasefire.¹

Some clashes occurred in the north of the country on 22 November between the Niger armed forces and members of the former armed Tuareg rebel movement, which led to a protest from the ORA. The ORA decided to withdraw from the Special Peace Committee, accusing the government of violating the provisions of the peace accord signed in Niamey in April 1995. The government blamed the ORA for violating the cease-fire. The government specifically accused the ORA of not respecting the commitments made in Niamey regarding the joint patrol to be stationed in the north of the country.² At least one ORA fighter was killed in the clash.³ As such, violations of ceasefire occurred in the transitional phase but both sides were making progress in the peace process.

1. “Niger; Tuareg group demands inquiry into attack at meeting with mediators,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 10, 1995.
2. “Niger; Government and Tuareg rebels resume peace talks in Niamey,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 15, 1995.
3. BBC Monitoring Service: Africa, November 30 1995.

No violations of the ceasefire reported. The Armed Resistance Organization (ORA) and the Coordination of the Armed Resistance (CRA) met for four days in Niamey on 29 May 1996 and decided to “close ranks.” In a statement signed by chairmen from both movements, both sides agreed to form a technical negotiating committee which would also conduct the forthcoming negotiations with the government on the implementation of the 2 April 1995 agreement between the Niger government and Tuareg rebels. The armed resistance urged the government to implement strictly the clauses of the peace agreement.¹

1. “Niger; Two Tuareg movements decide to “close ranks”,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 30, 1996.

The ceasefire between the ORA and the Niger government was upheld in 1997. The Union of Armed Resistance Force (UARF), which was another faction of the Tuareg movement in the wake of 1994 peace agreement, started a conflict in 1997. The UARF signed a peace agreement on 28 November 1997 under the auspice of the Algerian government.¹

1. “Niger government and armed opposition sign peace accord in Algiers,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 1, 1997.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

The April 1995 peace agreements provided for the decentralization of the government so that the Niger Tuareg community could manage the northern areas of the country, where it constituted the majority, in a more autonomous way.

Tuareg delegates did not attend an important meeting with the commission for administrative decentralization on 4 July 1995. Official sources gave no explanation, but there were difficulties in implementing the agreement signed a few weeks earlier between the government and the former rebels.¹ According to the news report, contact was resumed with all the movements which signed the peace agreement in April 1995.

On 15 August 1995, the president called a cabinet meeting to discuss a bill determining the functions of the high commissioner for administrative reform and decentralization, and the organization of his units.²

On 14 December 1995, the Special Peace Committee met and one of the issues discussed was the implementation of decentralization law.³

1. “Niger; Tuareg delegates boycott meeting on decentralization,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 6, 1995.
2. “Niger; President convenes cabinet meeting for 15th August,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 12, 1995).
3. “Niger; Special Peace Committee holds fourth session in Niamey,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 15, 1995.

The chairman of Niger’s National Salvation Council (CNS), Col Ibrahim Barre Mainassara, who toppled President Mahmane Ousmane on 27 January 1996, gave a speech to a “meeting for the national forum on Niger’s future” on 31 Jan and said that the forum should not fail to discuss important issues such as decentralization.¹ According tot he UNHCR, the new regime took some steps incluidng autonomy “as part of a decentralization program.”²

1. “Niger; Coup leader opens forum on country’s future,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 1, 1996.
2. “UNHCR Review of the Mali/Niger repatriation and reintegration programme,” http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6bd488.html.

The monitoring committee for the implementation of the peace accord in Niger met from 3—5 September 1997 to discuss issues related to decentralization.¹

1. “Peace committee reaches agreements on reintegration of “rebels”,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 8, 1997.

As of 4 October 1998, the decentralization bill had not yet passed by the National Assembly. For this reason, the local election was postponed to the 7 Feb. 1999.¹

1. “Niger: Government Postpones Local Elections to 7th February 1999,” BBC Monitoring Africa — Political, October 6, 1998.

On 7 February 1999, local elections were held, which the US State Department praised as a significant step in an ambitious program of decentralization.¹ The National Assembly has not passed the decentralization bill. The Tuareg leaders demanded “the introduction of a federal system before evolving towards autonomy” in regions with Tuareg majority.²

1. “Niger; U.S. Commends Niger On Recent Elections,” Africa News, February 17, 1999.
2. “Niger; Niger Peace Agreements Under Threat,” Africa News, April 17, 1999.

The bill on decentralization was not passed in the year 2000.

The main bill related to decentralization discussed in previous years, was not passed in year 2001. However, other significant decentralization programs and laws were passed in 2001. “The administration made restructuring government a priority through a policy of decentralization with the introduction of new local authorities. By April 2001, the government had set up 229 new councils, 178 of them in rural areas, with devolved power at regional, district and commune levels.”¹

1. “Africa Review World of Information,” Niger – Review, July 9, 2001.

Further bills were passed in 2002. “The National Assembly passed in June 2002 a series of decentralization bills. As a first step, administrative powers have been distributed among 265 communes (local councils); in later stages, regions and departments will be established as decentralized entities. A new electoral code was adopted to reflect the decentralization context. The country is currently divided into 8 regions, which are subdivided into 36 districts (departments). The chief administrators in each region (Governor) and department (Prefect) are appointed by the government and function primarily as the local agents of the central authorities.”¹“Municipal & Community Development Project: Pre-Departure Country & Technical Training 2007,” Peace Crops-Niger, 2007, accessed August 18, 2010, http://niger.peacecorps.gov/pdfs/pre-departure_training_mcd_final.pdf.[/…

No developments observed this year.

After the passage of the decentralization bill in 2002, Niger had municipal elections in July 2004. “Some 3,700 people were elected to new local governments in 265 newly established communes.” While the ruling MNSD party won more positions in the elections, opposition parties also made significant gains.¹

1. “Background Note: Niger,” US State Department, 2010, accessed August 18, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5474.htm.

As agreed in the peace agreement, the Special Peace Committee (SPC) was formed with representatives from the government and ORA. The SPC began its deliberation in Niamey under the chairmanship of Mai Meigana, the high commissioner for peace restoration, and in the presence of the representatives of mediating countries, the Armed Resistance Organization [ORA] and the government. The committee’s main role was to see to the implementation of the peace accord signed in Niamey on 15th April and the schedule it drew up. According to Mr. Meigana, the committee’s role is essential in completing the peace process.¹

The SPC was instrumental in resolving disputes related to the implementation of the peace agreement. The peace process was stalled for some time after the clashes between the ORA and the Niger armed force on 22 November 1995, but a three-day extraordinary session of the SPC began in Niamey on 3 December 1995. In the session, participants focused on the only topic on the agenda, which was the Akokou phonetic incidents and on how to safeguard the positive results of the peace process.² As such, the committee was working towards resolving the disputes.

1. “Niger: Niger-Tuareg Special Peace Committee begins meeting,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 25, 1995.
2. “Niger; Government and rebel group issue communiqué on continuing peace talks,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 10, 1995.

The SPC was operational. Political instability ensued in Niger after the February 1996 Military coup; no information is available on disputes related to the implementation of the peace agreement as well as the work of the SPC.

The president received the rebel leader Rhissa Boula, and the rebel leader spoke on the purpose of his meeting with the head of the state. The leader mentioned a number of complaints against the implementation of the peace process. He said the purpose of the contact with the authorities was to give a new lease of life to the peace process. At the end of the day, it was stated that the president and the rebel leader reached a common ground and decided to continue their work with the technical committee which was in charge of the peace process.¹

1. BBC Monitoring Service: Africa, January 8, 1997.

The monitoring and implementation committee, as established by the April 1995 peace agreement as well as the 1997 protocol agreement with the UARF, held its fourth meeting on 22 April 1998. The meeting, chaired by the prime minister, was attended by members of the government and leaders of the former rebels. According to the prime minister, the meeting was in line with the process set in motion after the 24 April 1995 agreement was concluded. In the meeting, Prime Minister Ibrahim Hassane Maiyaki remarked that a lot of efforts had been made by both the government and the former rebels to strengthen peace and confidence among brothers. He also reported that the encampment and integration exercise went on satisfactorily. Disarmament was officially celebrated on 28 October last year (1997) at Tchin-Tabaradene. ¹

1. “Niger: Peace accord committee meeting opens in Niamey,” BBC Monitoring Africa — Political, April 24, 1998.

A military coup took place on 9 April 1999 in Niger. The President, Ibrahim Bare Mainassara, was shot dead by members of his personal guard¹. The new military leadership met with all the former rebel groups in the week of 17 April 1999 to reaffirm “commitment to the peace process and their goodwill.”² The coup, therefore, did not hinder the peace process.

1. Niger: Niamey “seems” calm but future unclear after assassination of president, BBC Monitoring Africa — Political, 10 April 1999.
2. “Niger; Niger Peace Agreements Under Threat,” Africa News, April 17, 1999.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

As agreed in the peace agreement, the Special Peace Committee (SPC) was formed with representatives from the government and ORA. The first meeting of SPC took place on 23rd May 1995. One of the urgent tasks of the SPC, as discussed in the meeting, was to come up with a name list of ORA demobilized elements. This list was particularly important for the implementation of the provisions of the accord relating to integration, reintegration, and recruitment into the army, paramilitary forces, state-owned corporations, high schools, university, public administration and development projects. Another urgent task was said to draw up the list of arms, ammunition and war materiel – to be returned to the authorities – so that their recovery and storage could be effectively controlled.¹ However, problems arose in 1995 with regards to military reform. Rhissa Ag Boula, the chairman of the Organisation of the Armed Resistance, said the government was breaking the peace accord by putting special military units of former Tuareg gunmen and northern civilians under the control of the interior ministry rather than the defense ministry.²

1. “Niger: Niger-Tuareg Special Peace Committee begins meeting,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 25, 1995.
2. “Niger Tuareg leader threatens return to rebellion,” Reuters, September 9, 1995.

A serious blow was dealt to military reform as the elected government was ousted in a military coup on 27 January 1996. Nevertheless, Mohamed Ekiji, the leader of the Coordinating Body of the Armed Resistance (CRA), which was one of the parties to sign the 1995 peace agreement, said that the coup could represent “an opportunity”. According to the news report, the rebel leader believed that the military was in the best position to achieve a lasting peace and the government had been a mere interlocutor between the rebel and the army.¹

Mixed security patrols were introduced in 1996. Furthermore, in December a protocol was concluded covering the integration of ex-combatants into the regular armed forces.²

1. “Tuareg leader welcomes coup as chance for peace; French intervention ruled out,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 31, 1996.
2. “Review of the Mali/Niger Repatriation and Reintegration Programme,” UNHCR, 1998, accessed January 10, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6bd488.html.

The monitoring committee for the implementation of the peace accord in Niger met from 3 to 5 September 1997 to discuss issues related to the reintegration of former armed rebels into the Niger’s national army and gendarmerie, into socioeconomic life, disarmament and decentralization.

Agreement was reached on the following (ORIGINAL TEXT):¹

First, integration into the Niger armed forces and the problem of ranks. Here are the modalities for entry into the national army: One must be a Niger citizen, be between the ages of 18 and 35, be declared medically fit and be a bachelor without children. Marriage can be contracted only after five statutory years. All married soldiers will be joined by their families only after their training, after which the appropriate administrative formalities will be carried out.

Here are the conditions for admission into the national gendarmerie: One must be a Niger citizen, aged between 20 and 30, and have at least a primary school certificate. One must be declared medically fit, be 1.65m tall and have a clean record. One must be a bachelor without children, and shall not marry within a stipulated period of three years. All married soldiers will be joined by their families only after their training. After the training, candidates will go through the necessary administrative formalities.

First, the form of integration and ranks: In accordance with Item B of Article 17 of the agreement establishing definitive peace between the government of the Republic of Niger and the Organization of the Armed Resistance dated 24th April 1995, appropriate training will be given to all the 250 CAD and TVT fighters of the armed resistance that are to be enlisted into the national army and the national gendarmerie. After the training, a selection will be made and 12 officers, 24 NCOs and 36 other ranks will forthwith be given further training from the selected group. Exceptionally, those selected for officers training, both in the army and the gendarmerie, will not have to pass the entry examination for the military schools or academies. The officers, NCOs and other ranks will be equally shared.

Second, the integration into other state security services — customs, police, republican guard, (environmental protection) — and quota sharing: It has been agreed that the integration of fighters must be terminated before the end of the (seventh) month in line with the 1997 budget. The quotas are as follows: republican guard, 50; customs, 45; national education, 50; and health, 30. Integration of soldiers into other state institutions will be effected at a pro rata basis of 30 per cent for the conventional group and 70 per cent for the army. The integration of the remaining number of soldiers, a total of 255, will be covered by the 1998-99 budget.

Third, Saharan security units: Out of a total of 1,100 demobilized fighters, a first batch of 305 former fighters and 50 youths from the border regions shall be integrated under the 1997-98 budget. The remaining will be integrated during 1998 depending on the availability of funds to the government and with the assistance of financial backers.

Fourth, reintegration into socioeconomic life: In collaboration with some creditors, efforts are being made to determine the chances of employment, the socioeconomic potential of the affected areas and the real needs for the reintegration of demobilized fighters. Africare plans to train 504 former demobilized soldiers according to the following quotas per professional activity: drivers, 96; fitters, 72; [word indistinct], 60; masons, 60; auto mechanics, 48; electricians, 24; welders, 24; metal worker, 24; radio and television technicians, 24; plumbers, 24; artisans, 12; tailors, 38.

Issued in Niamey on 5th September 1997 and signed on the same day by the Front for the Liberation of Tamoust, the Front for the Liberation of Air and Azaouak, MRLN [Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Niger], FSN, CAD, PGT, FCLN, Revolutionary Army for the Liberation of Northern Niger and the People’s Army for the Liberation of the North.

According to a news report, the ex-rebels encamped for several months in their base will be disarmed on 21 October, a month later than planned, and the encampment will end two days later. Then the most delicate phase – the integration of ex-rebel combatants within government structures – will commence. Nearly 200 combatants had already joined the army and were currently under training. In early November (1997), 600 others were expected to join the Saharan security unit, the Republican Guard, the customs service, the forestry department and the police.

The state had promised to integrate others in 1998, but before then there is a need to occupy the demobilized rebels and find work for those who will not become public servants. Several factions of the rebellion, tired of the slow pace of the peace implementation process, had taken up arms again. The insecurity which still reigned in the region, albeit residual, did not augur well for foreign investment. To reintegrate the rebels into the society, the government was appealing for development projects.²

1. “Peace committee reaches agreements on reintegration of “rebels”,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 8, 1997.
2. “New timetable for peace implementation process in north announced,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 15, 1997.

Monitoring committee for the implementation of the peace accord met for the fourth time in Niger on 22 April 1998. The meeting, chaired by the prime minister, was attended by members of government and leaders of the former rebels. As discussed in the meeting, a lot of efforts had been made by both the government and the former rebels to strengthen peace and confidence among themselves and the demobilization (encampment) and integration exercise went on satisfactorily. Disarmament was officially celebrated on 28 October last year at Tchin-Tabaradene.¹

1. “Niger: Peace accord committee meeting opens in Niamey,” BBC Monitoring Africa — Political, April 24, 1998.

According to a news report “1,400 former combatants have been integrated into the army”, but the 14 fronts of the former Tuareg rebel movement – Arabs and Toubous – signed a declaration to denounce the government’s poor political disposition and laxity.¹

The military coup of 9 April 1999, however, suggested that the military was constantly posing a threat to civilian supremacy. The rebel had concerns regarding the military take over would affect the military reforms. Nevertheless, the integration of former combatants was still going on and moving in the right direction.

1. “Tuareg rebels criticize government’s “poor political disposition”,” BBC Monitoring Africa — Political, March 24, 1999.

In June 2000, Sia Katou, commander in chief of the Union of Armed Resistance Fronts (Union des Fronts de la Résistance Armée – UFRA), complained that 3,500 ex-combatants were still waiting to be integrated.¹ However, a gradual progress was made. According to a news report, the integration of former combatants was still an ongoing process as of 2000. In a ceremony organized to witness the disarmament and integration of the last wave of armed resistance group members near Agadez on 5 June 2000, it was informed that the MUR expansion untraced. Nevertheless, the Patriotic Front for the Liberation of the Sahara; and the Revolutionary Armed Forces-UFRA were in encampment site. The first wave of integration, after the Algiers supplementary accord of 1997, started to integrate the MUR expansion untraced; the Patriotic Front for the Liberation of the Sahara; and the Revolutionary Armed Forces (UFRA) into the Saharan security units and the Niger Armed Forces. According to an official count, 79 UFRA ex-combatants would be incorporated into the different military and paramilitary corps. A similar operation would also be carried out simultaneously for 64 members of the Front for the Liberation of Air and Azaouak-SLT expansion untraced -Saharan Revolutionary Armed Front-Armed Resistance Organization Coalition. Recruitment into the defense and security forces had already started at the Agadez youth and cultural centre.²

1. “Niger: Disarmament of armed groups reaches final stage, quoting La Voix du Sahel,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 6, 2000.
2. “Niger: Disarmament of armed groups reaches final stage,” BBC Monitoring Africa — Political, June 7, 2000.

No further information is available on military reform. The integration of former combatants is ongoing.

Although the integration of former combatants from several armed groups was ongoing, reform within the military organization was a serious issue. On 1 August 2002, “army mutineers in Diffa, 1500 km east of the Niger capital, Niamey, were on Thursday reported to have detained various defense, security and civilian officials, including the prefect of the region, a parliamentarian and the town’s mayor”. Niger often had mutinies by soldiers demanding better living conditions and the dismissal of their officers. Such movements usually started in barracks in the north or east before spreading to the rest of the country. In some cases, the demands end up becoming political.¹ On 4 August 2002, the loyal government army was sent to recapture the Diffa region from mutinous soldiers. Negotiations between the government and the mutinous soldiers failed. The Mutinous soldiers fled to the northern mountain to fight against the government.²

1. “Niger; Mutineers Detain Prefect, Mayor And Other Dignitaries,” Africa News, August 1, 2002.
2. “Niger: Army reportedly recaptures Diffa Region from mutinous soldiers,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 4, 2002.

The Niger government integrates former Tuareg rebels into the police and military. As an example of the government reintegration plan, in 2003, many of the Republican Guard members were former Tuareg rebels.¹ Exact numbers for integration, however, are not available.

1. “Minorities at Risk Project, Assessment for Tuareg in Niger,” December 31, 2003, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/.

A news article reported that the UN had imposed tighter restrictions on staff movements in northern Niger given the growing insecurity in Northern Niger. It also reported that the peace processes that began after the signing of the agreement in 1995 provided for the disarmament of the rebels and the integration of many of them into the army. However, some Tuaregs accused President Mamadou Tandja of failing to respect the terms of the deal.¹ It was not clear how many former rebel combatants were integrated into the Niger armed force.

2005: Of the 7,014 ex-combatants registered to be demobilized and integrated and reintegrated, 2,074 ex-combatants were integrated in the Unités sahariennes de sécurité (Saharan Security Units).²

2006: A total of 2,074 rebel combatants were integrated into the security units, 3,960 former combatants were reintegrated back to socio-economic life, and integration/reintegration status of about 980 former rebel combatants is unknown.

1. “Niger; UN Responds to Growing Insecurity in the North,” Africa News, June 10, 2004.
2. “Niger (PCPAA, 2006 — 2007),” School for a Culture of Peace, 2008, accessed August 1, 2010, http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/mapa/niger08i.pdf.

The first meeting of SPC took place on 23 May 1995. One of the urgent tasks of the SPC, as discussed in the meeting was to come up with a list of names of ORA demobilized elements. This list was particularly important for the implementation of the provisions of the accord relating to integration, reintegration, and recruitment into the army, paramilitary forces, state-owned corporations, high schools, university, public administration and development projects. Another urgent task was said to draw up the list of arms, ammunition and war materiel – to be returned to the authorities – so that their recovery and storage could be effectively controlled.¹

1. “Niger-Tuareg Special Peace Committee begins meeting,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 25, 1995.

Problems arose in 1995 with regards to demobilization. The rebel leader Rhissa Ag Boula, the chairman of the Organization of the Armed Resistance, said that there would be no disarmament in the absence of the conditions for demobilization.¹

1. “Niger Tuareg leader threatens return to rebellion,” Reuters, September 9, 1995.

The monitoring committee for the implementation of the peace accord in Niger met from 3-5 September 1997 to discuss issues related to the reintegration of former armed rebels into Niger’s national army and gendarmerie, into socioeconomic life, disarmament, decentralization. In the meeting parties agreed that “Out of a total of 1,100 demobilized fighters, a first batch of 305 former fighters and 50 youths from the border regions shall be integrated under the 1997-98 budget. The remaining will be integrated during 1998 depending on the availability of funds to the government and with the assistance of financial backers.”¹ This suggests that there were 1,100 demobilized rebel combatants. The agreement was signed on the same day by the Front for the Liberation of Tamoust, the Front for the Liberation of Air and Azaouak, MRLN [Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Niger], FSN, CAD, PGT, FCLN [expansions untraced], Revolutionary Army for the Liberation of Northern Niger and the People’s Army for the Liberation of the North.

1. “Peace committee reaches agreements on reintegration of “rebels”,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 8, 1997.

The monitoring committee for the implementation of the peace accord met for the fourth time in Niger on 22 April 1998. The meeting, chaired by the prime minister, was attended by members of the government and leaders of the former rebels. As discussed in the meeting, a lot of efforts have been made by both the government and the former rebels to strengthen peace and confidence among themselves. Both parties were in concord that the demobilization (encampment) and integration exercise went on satisfactorily. Disarmament was officially celebrated on 28 October last year at Tchin-Tabaradene.¹

1. “Niger: Peace accord committee meeting opens in Niamey,” BBC Monitoring Africa — Political, April 24, 1998.

No developments observed this year.

No developments observed this year.

A news report on the former combatants suggested that 3,750 former fighters from different rebel movements were registered by Niger’s Commission on Peace Restoration. United Nations Volunteers (UNV) began a two-year training program in March 2001 to promote peace in the southeastern Diffa region and the socio-economic reintegration of former anti-government rebels in the area.¹ Similarly, France also provided financial support of US $130,000 to Niger as part of its ongoing support for the reintegration into civilian life of former fighters who participated in an armed rebellion in the southeastern region of Diffa.²

1. “Niger; Ex-Fighters In Reintegration Programme,” Africa News, March 16, 2001.
2. “Niger; France Supports Programme for Ex-Fighters,” Africa News, July 4, 2001.

No developments observed this year.

No developments observed this year.

As of 2005, it was reported that 7,014 combatants were registered. Out of which, 3,160 former rebel combatants were still waiting for assistance because of a lack of funding.¹

1. “Niger (PCPAA, 2006 — 2007),” School for a Culture of Peace, 2008, accessed August 1, 2010, http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/mapa/niger08i.pdf.

In October 2005, the Niger government finally came up with an economic assistance plan for the Tuareg rebel combatants. Under the project, 3,160 former combatants were granted around US $300 each in the form of micro-loans.¹

1. “Niger; Tuareg Ex-Combatants to Get Promised Assistance a Decade After Peace Accord,” Africa News, October 14, 2005.

As agreed in the peace agreement, the Special Peace Committee (SPC) was formed with representatives from the government and ORA. The first meeting of SPC took place on 23 May 1995. One of the urgent tasks of the SPC, as discussed in the meeting, was to come up with the name list of ORA demobilized elements. This list was particularly important for the implementation of the provisions of the accord relating to integration, reintegration, and recruitment into the army, paramilitary forces, state-owned corporations, high schools, university, public administration and development projects. Another urgent task was said to draw up the list of arms, ammunition and war materiel – to be returned to the authorities – so that their recovery and storage could be effectively controlled.¹

However, problems arose in 1995 with regards to demobilization and the rebel leader Rhissa Ag Boula, the chairman of the Organization of the Armed Resistance, said that there would be no disarmament in the absence of the conditions for demobilization.²

1. “Niger: Niger-Tuareg Special Peace Committee begins meeting,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 25, 1995.
2. “Niger Tuareg leader threatens return to rebellion,” Reuters, September 9, 1995.

No developments observed this year.

The monitoring committee for the implementation of the peace accord in Niger met from 3rd – 5th September 1997 to discuss issues related to the reintegration of former armed rebels into Niger’s national army including disarmament.

On disarmament, parties agreed that “the date for the end of the encampment is scheduled for 30th September 1997. On that day, the signatory parties will take all the necessary steps to ensure that disarmament is complete and definitive, and this is to be confirmed by mediators and financial backers. There will be an evaluation of the exercise on 25 September 1997.”¹
“The ex- rebels encamped for several months in their base will be disarmed on 21 October, a month later than planned, and the encampment will end two days later.”²

1. “Peace committee reaches agreements on reintegration of “rebels”,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 8, 1997.
2. “Review of the Mali/Niger Repatriation and Reintegration Programme,” UNHCR, 1998, accessed January 10, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6bd488.html.

The monitoring committee for the implementation of the peace accord met for the fourth time in Niger on 22 April 1998. The meeting, chaired by the prime minister, was attended by members of the government and leaders of the former rebels. As discussed in the meeting, a lot of efforts have been made by both the government and the former rebels to strengthen peace and confidence among themselves and the demobilization (encampment) and integration exercise went on satisfactorily. Disarmament was officially celebrated on 28 October last year at Tchin-Tabaradene.¹ But, it was not clear how many arms were collected or destroyed.

1. “Peace accord committee meeting opens in Niamey,” BBC Monitoring Africa — Political, April 24, 1998.

No information is available on disarmament. It was not clear how many arms were collected or destroyed.

The 1,243 weapons surrendered as part of the peace agreements were subsequently destroyed at a Flame of Peace ceremony on 25 September 2000 in Agadez.¹ However, the disarmament process, carried out after the signing of the 1995 peace agreement, was not very successful as weapons still existed.

On August 11, 2000, the President Mamadou Tandja received the UN disarmament mission. Mission head Joao Bernardo told reporters that “First, we have observed the seriousness of the problem of weapons proliferation in Niger, and we know very well the nature and origin of the problem. Second, there is a strong political determination by all the partners involved in the peace process to address seriously the problem of weapons proliferation. This was evident in our discussions with members of the government, national weapons commission members, representatives of the former rebels and community representatives. That, for us, is the most encouraging element of our visit.”

“This political will is clearly expressed through the creation of structures and the adoption of measures to combat the proliferation of illicit weapons in the country. We have also drawn the conclusion that these structures need support and aid from the international community in general and the UN system in particular. It must be stressed that this visit is only the first step in a process of engagement of the United Nations and the international community in support of the Niger government in order to help resolve the problem of weapons proliferation.”² Though the disarmament of the rebel groups began much earlier, the establishment of the UN disarmament mission suggests that a new step was taken complete the disarmament process.

1. Florquin, N. and E.G. Berman, eds., “Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region,” Geneva: Small Arms Survey (2005): 321.
2. “Niger: President Tandja, UN team discuss disarmament,” BBC Monitoring Africa — Political, August 13, 2000.

A mission of the national commission for the collection of illegal weapons was in Diffa on 1 December 2001. The president of the national commission and the project coordinator interacted with the community members about the project. The mission was an initiation to implement the moratorium signed by UN member states in Abuja on light weapons. In the specific case of Niger, beyond the collection and destruction of the weapons, the project was meant to provide further security to the people and to start development activities. Thus, the communities which would turn in their weapons to the project would in exchange receive funding for the micro-projects they develop. For this phase, which was to last almost two years, the project was to be allocated $1 Million from the United Nations Development Program. Already, 50 per cent of the funds had been secured, and the activities of the project might start in January 2002. Therefore, the members of the mission asked everyone to give their advice so as to make this phase successful. This type of project was supposed to continue and would be extended to other regions, where the proliferation of firearms was a threat to development.¹

1. “Niger: Weapons collection body arrives in Diffa to launch pilot project,” BBC Monitoring Africa — Political, December 26, 2001.

In September 2002, more than 1,200 arms were destroyed.¹

1. “Niger (PCPAA, 2006 — 2007),” School for a Culture of Peace, 2008, accessed August 1, 2010, http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/mapa/niger08i.pdf.

As of September 2003, a total of 1,188 weapons had either been surrendered voluntarily to the National Commission on Small Arms or seized by the authorities.¹

1. Florquin, N. and E.G. Berman, eds., “Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region,” 321.

No exact figure is available on the number of combatants disarmed. However, it was reported that 100 weapons were destroyed each on 5 March and 24 August 2004 in Agadez.¹ The UNDP project designed to encourage disarmament was terminated in 2004 as scheduled. It was expected to collect 5000 weapons from July 2001 to August 2004. Whether this target was met or not is not clear.

1. Florquin, N. and E.G. Berman, eds.,”Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region,” 321.

As agreed in the peace agreement, the Special Peace Committee (SPC) was formed with representatives from the government and ORA. The first meeting of SPC took place on 23 May 1995. One of the urgent tasks of the SPC, as informed in the meeting was to come up with the name list of ORA demobilized elements. This list was particularly important for the implementation of the provisions of the accord relating to integration, reintegration, and recruitment into the army, paramilitary forces, state-owned corporations, high schools, university, public administration and development projects. Another urgent task was said to draw up the list of arms, ammunition and war materiel – to be returned to the authorities – so that their recovery and storage could be effectively controlled.¹

1. “Niger-Tuareg Special Peace Committee begins meeting,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 25, 1995.

Further information on progress made on issues related to reintegration not available.

The monitoring committee for the implementation of the peace accord in Niger met from 3rd – 5th September, 1997 to discuss issues related to the reintegration of former armed rebels into Niger’s national army and gendarmerie, into socioeconomic life, disarmament, decentralization. On reintegration into socioeconomic life, parties agreed that “in collaboration with some creditors, efforts are being made to determine the chances of employment, the socioeconomic potential of the affected areas and the real needs for the reintegration of demobilized fighters. Africare plans to train 504 former demobilized soldiers according to the following quotas per professional activity: drivers, 96; fitters, 72; [word indistinct], 60; masons, 60; auto mechanics, 48; electricians, 24; welders, 24; metal worker, 24; radio and television technicians, 24; plumbers, 24; artisans, 12; tailors, 38.”¹ To reintegrate the rebels into the society, the government was appealing for development projects.²

1. “Peace committee reaches agreements on reintegration of “rebels”,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 8, 1997.
2. “New timetable for peace implementation process in north announced,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 15, 1997.

The monitoring committee for the implementation of the peace accord met for the fourth time in Niger on 22nd April 1998. The meeting, chaired by the prime minister, was attended by members of government and leaders of the former rebels. As discussed in the meeting, a lot of efforts have been made by both the government and the former rebels to strengthen peace and confidence among themselves and the demobilization (encampment) and integration exercise went on satisfactorily. Disarmament was officially celebrated on 28th October last year at Tchin-Tabaradene.¹ It can be assumed that the number of former combatants to be reintegrated into the society as agreed in 1997 were reintegrated.

1. “Niger: Peace Accord Committee Meeting Opens In Niamey,” BBC Monitoring Africa — Political, April 24, 1998.

The 14 fronts of the former Tuareg rebel movement — Arabs and Toubous — signed a declaration to denounce the government’s poor political disposition and laxity.¹ However, in the same news report it was suggested that the Ag Rhissa Boula, then current minister of tourism and historical leader of the Tuareg rebellion, said that the reintegration of former combatants was a very important step forward. However, he recognized that there might be some portions of the peace agreement whose implementation was being delayed, for example, the reintegration process. This suggests that the reintegration process was still under way in 1999.

1. “Tuareg rebels criticize government’s “poor political disposition”,” BBC Monitoring Africa — Political, March 24, 1999.

At least 50 leaders from the Tuareg rebellion fronts were attending reintegration seminars, which were part of the social reinsertion of the former combatants, as envisaged under the April 1995 peace agreement and the 1997 agreement.¹

According to a news report, the reintegration process was still an ongoing process. In a ceremony organized to witness the disarmament and integration of the last wave of armed resistance group members near Agadez on June 5, 2000, Sia Katou, chief of staff of UFRA-SPLS informed that there were 3,500 former combatants, and out of this number 2,240 of them were waiting for France to honour a promise within the shortest possible time so that they can be reintegrated. The ceremony was attended by the representatives of the French government, Niger government, and rebel movements.²

1. “Niger: Former Tuareg rebels attend training workshop on social reintegration,” BBC Monitoring Africa — Political, February 9, 2000.
2. “Niger: Disarmament of armed groups reaches final stage,” BBC Monitoring Africa — Political, June 7, 2000.

Reintegration of former combatants continued. In March 2001, United Nations Volunteers (UNV) began a two-year training program to promote peace in the southeastern Diffa region and the socio-economic reintegration of former anti-government rebels in the area. It was reported that the international volunteers would train and support 660 former guerrillas in agricultural micro-projects so they could be self-reliant. The participants were drawn from the 3,750 former fighters registered by Niger’s Commission on Peace Restoration. The US $695,661 program came from the UNV’s Special Voluntary Fund.¹

In a separate report, it was reported that the France provided US $130,000 to Niger as part of its ongoing support for the reintegration into civilian life of former fighters who participated in an armed rebellion in the southeastern region of Diffa between 1994 and 1998. The program, which started in 1998, now includes some 660 demobilized fighters.²

1. “Niger; Ex-Fighters In Reintegration Programme,” Africa News, March 16, 2001.
2. “Niger; France Supports Programme for Ex-Fighters,” Africa News, July 4, 2001.

No further information is available except for the continuation of the UN and the French support to reintegrate the ex-combatants into society.

The reintegration program had been continuously delayed because of lack of funding. It was reported that the rebels criticized the government for not applying the peace agreement it had signed, especially concerning reintegration of the rebels into mainstream society.¹ As of 2003, the UNDP and the French supported the reintegration program. However, the exact number of combatants reintegrated into the socio-economic life is not available.

1. “Niger: Government closes Nomade FM for inciting rebellion,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 18, 2003.

In a news article, it was reported that the UN had imposed tighter restrictions on staff movements in northern Niger given the growing insecurity in the region. It was also reported that the peace processes that began after the signing of the agreement in 1995 provided for the disarmament of the rebels and the integration of many of them into the army. However, some Tuaregs accused President Mamadou Tandja of failing to respect the terms of the deal, especially the reintegration of the former rebels into the socio-economic life.¹ It was not clear on how many former rebel combatants were reintegrated back to socio-economic life. Of the 7,014 ex-combatants registered, 3,160 remained to be demobilized and reintegrated due to a lack of funding.²

2005: After a decade of peace agreement, the Niger government finally came up with an economic assistance plan to reintegrate the Tuareg rebel combatants into socio-economic life. Under the project, 3,160 former combatants will be granted around US $300 each in the form of micro-loans for projects in animal husbandry, the craft industry and vegetable gardening. Before this plan was announced, around 800 former combatants were integrated into the public services, but the socio-economic reintegration of the largest chunk of the ex-rebels had yet to be achieved.³ As such, a total of 3,960 former combatants were reintegrated back to socio-economic life.

1. “Niger; UN Responds to Growing Insecurity in the North,” Africa News, June 10, 2004.
2. Florquin, N. and E.G. Berman, eds., “Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region,” Geneva: Small Arms Survey (2005): 321.
3. “Niger; Tuareg Ex-Combatants to Get Promised Assistance a Decade After Peace Accord,” Africa News, October 14, 2005;”Niger (PCPAA, 2006 — 2007),” School for a Culture of Peace, 2008, accessed August 1, 2010, http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/mapa/niger08i.pdf.

After signing the peace agreement in April 1995, the government adopted an amnesty law in June 1995. On 25 July 1995, the Niger government released all former members of the Tuareg rebel movement. The release was in accordance of the amnesty law. Coordinator of the umbrella Armed Resistance Organization (ORA), Mohamed Abdoulmoumine today expressed full satisfaction with the measure.¹ Number of prisoners released not available.

1. “Niger; Government reported to have released “all” former Tuareg rebels,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 27, 1995.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

As agreed in the April 1995 peace agreement with the Organization of the Armed Resistance (ORA), the Council of Ministers of the government of Niger on 1 June 1995 adopted a draft law decreeing a general amnesty for the ORA, the coordinating body of the Tuareg rebels, and the defense and security forces.¹ Under the bill, a general amnesty was granted to people belonging to the various movements of the Tuareg Armed Resistance Organization, the defense and security forces, and to government employees, as well as people who acted for self-defense organizations. The general amnesty was granted for all the acts they carried out as part of the armed conflict and which would have been punishable under the law had it not been for the signing of the peace accord on 24 April.² The ORA, however, had protested against the general amnesty law, which applied to the army as well as to Tuareg rebels.³

The National Assembly unanimously adopted the draft amnesty bill on 12 June 1995.⁴ On 25 July, the Niger government released all former members of the Tuareg rebel movement. The release was in accordance with the amnesty law. Coordinator of the umbrella ORA, Mohamed Abdoulmoumine expressed full satisfaction with the measure.⁵ Number of prisoners released not available.

1. “Niger; Government adopts draft law on amnesty for Tuareg rebels,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 3, 1995.
2. “Niger; Government grants amnesty to Tuaregs, rebel forces and officials,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 5, 1995.
3. “Niger; Tuaregs criticize inclusion of self-defense groups in amnesty law,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 6, 1995.
4. “Niger; Parliament adopts bill granting amnesty to Tuareg rebels,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 15, 1995.
5. “Niger; Government reported to have released “all” former Tuareg rebels,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 27, 1995.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

Around 20,000 Tuaregs fled Niger.¹ According to UNHCR country data sheets, 200 refugees returned to Niger in 1995.²

1. “U.N. appeals for cash to repatriate refugees from Mali, Niger,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 18, 1996.
2. “2002 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook Country Data Sheet — Niger,” UNHCR, 2004, http://www.unhcr.org.

On 6 March 1996, two tripartite agreements were signed at the Ministry of External Relations. The first agreement was signed between Niger, Burkina Faso and the UNHCR on the repatriation of Niger refugees from Burkina Faso. Speaking at the occasion, Burkina Faso Security Minister Yero Boli said the signing ceremony was part of the traditional exchange and consultations between the two countries to strengthen cooperation in the management of displaced persons under the best conditions. He then defined the guidelines of the repatriation operation insisting on the commitment of all the parties involved.¹

1. “Niger; Agreements signed to repatriate Niger refugees,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 7, 1996.

On 10 March 1997, the president of the Algerian Red Crescent, Said Ayachi, and the president of the Niger Red Cross signed an agreement concerning the return of Niger refugees on the Algerian border to their country, whilst the other was related to the drawing up of a cooperation program between the two bodies for a renewable period of five years.¹

According to UNHCR country data sheets, 403 refugees returned to Niger in 1997.²

1. “Agreement signed on return of Niger refugees from Algeria,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 12, 1997.
2. “2002 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook Country Data Sheet — Niger,” UNHCR, 2004, http://www.unhcr.org.

According to UNHCR country data sheets, 3,830 refugees returned to Niger in 1998.¹

While repatriation took place in 1998 this was very much delayed as compared to what had been envisioned in the accord. “In Niger there was also a delay in the repatriation process as envisaged in the 1995 peace accords because of the lack of internal political security across the country and the boycott by certain donor governments following the military coup in January 1996 led by Colonel Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara. The repatriation did not actually start until 1997 but internal difficulties in Niger made the situation worse. The February 1998 mutiny by soldiers in Agadez, who were demanding payment of several monthsÕ salary arrears, delayed the departure of the first convoy sent to Algeria to assist the voluntary repatriation of 10,000 Tuaregs.”²

Repatriation of Niger refugees from Algeria started on March 10, 1998. In the first group, 130 Niger refugees who have been living in designated camps in Guezzam and Djanet in southern Algeria returned to Niger. UNHCR and the Algerian Red Crescent supervised the first voluntary repatriation.³

On 31 March 1998, the UNHCR-Algeria, had said that 258 refugees from Niger were repatriated.⁴

According to a news report, 400 more refugees left Algeria on April 14, 1998.⁵ About 360 refugees, who were at the reception centre of Ain Gazzam, Tamanrasset Province, returned to Niger voluntarily on April 30, 1998). The office added that nearly 1,000 other refugees are still at the same centre. They will return to their country voluntarily in two groups on 15 and 25 May 1998. This operation was the fourth of its kind after nearly 860 refugees returned to their country in similar operations.⁶Within the framework of the voluntary return, about 500 Nigerois refugees returned for their original country, Niger on 15 May 1998.⁷ The last group of about 500 refugees (120 families) returned to Niger on 25 May 1998. They moved from El Hayat center in Ain Gazam. The operation was overseen by the Algerian Red Crescent in coordination with the UNHCR who provided all the means to transport these families to the Niger border.⁸ On 6 June 1998, some 400 refugees from Niger, representing 100 families who were based in the southeastern province of Tamanrasset 1,900 km from Algiers and Ain Guezzam returned to Niger.⁹

1. “2002 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook Country Data Sheet — Niger.”
2. “Niger: les réfugiés attendront…,” Jeune Afrique, March 3-9, 1998.
3. “Algeria: Repatriation Of Niger Refugees to Begin on 11th March,” BBC Monitoring Middle East — Political, March 10, 1998.
4. “Algerian daily reports repatriation of 256 refugees to Niger,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 2, 1998.
5. “Algeria: More Niger Refugees Return Home,” BBC Monitoring Middle East — Political, April 14, 1998.
6. “Algeria: About 360 Refugees Repatriated to Niger, More To Follow,” BBC Monitoring Middle East — Political, May 1, 1998.
7. “Some 500 Niger refugees return home from Algeria,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 18, 1998.
8. “Algeria: Unhcr Operation to Repatriate Refugees to Niger Nears Completion,” BBC Monitoring Middle East — Political, May 24, 1998.
9. “Niger: Some 400 Refugees Return From Algeria,” BBC Monitoring Africa — Political, June 8, 1998.

According to UNHCR country data sheets, 14 refugees returned to Niger in 1999.¹

It was reported that the European Union gave Niger 285,000 euro worth of humanitarian aid, which was is expected to directly benefit some 70,000 people and 150,000 others indirectly, particularly in Tahoua and Agadez, which hosted the largest population of refugees, displaced people and people whose villages were destroyed.²

1. “2002 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook Country Data Sheet — Niger.”
2. “Niger; Niger Gets EU Humanitarian Aid,” Africa News, September 2, 1999.

According to UNHCR country data sheets, 1 refugee returned to Niger in 2000.¹ Perhaps most of the refugees who were interested to return to Niger voluntarily repatriated in 1998.

1. “2002 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook Country Data Sheet — Niger.”

No information on refugees available. Perhaps most of the refugees who were interested to return to Niger voluntarily repatriated in 1998.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) map published in 2002 suggests that 15,000 Niger nationals were evacuated and returned to Niger.¹

1. “Populations évacuées et populations retournées,” ReliefWeb, 2002, http://www.reliefweb.int.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

The 1995 peace agreement outlined some broad education reform agendas.

According to the US State Department’s 1995 Human Rights report, the Niger government had supported greater minority representation in the National Assembly and increased education and health care targeted towards them. However, nomadic peoples, such as many Tuaregs and Fulani, had less access to government services. According to the report, the Niger government required 6 years of compulsory education, but fewer than half of school-age children completed 6 years of education.¹

1. “Niger Human Rights Practices, 1995,” U.S. Department of State, 1996.

According to US State Department’s 1995 Human Rights report the Niger government supported minority representation in the legislature as well as increased access to education and health care.¹

The Niger government, by recognizing the importance of capital development as a key to the country’s growth potential, targeted to increase the primary school enrollment rate to 35% by 1999, which stood at 29% in 1994. To that end, some 2,600 teachers were to
be recruited over the next five years, and the budgetary allocation for primary education would rise in real terms.² After the presidential poll the World Bank gave 40 million dollars towards education in Niger.³

1. “Niger Human Rights Practices, 1996,” U.S. Department of State, 1997.
2. “IMF Approves three-year loan for Niger under ESAF,” PR Newswire, June 12, 1996.
3. “Niger’s aid lifeline on stream again,” Agence France Presse, November 21, 1996.

No further information available on education reform as suggested in the 1995 peace agreement.

The World Bank, on September 16, 1998, approved US$ 18.6 million to support Niger’s efforts to improve the efficiency of the public sector and selected utilities. It was reported that the financial support would provide the Niger government with fiscal headroom, which would allow more time and money to be devoted to essential social services, such as health and education.¹ Further information on education reform not available.

1. “Niger receives $18.6 million for public enterprise reform,” M2 Presswire, September 16, 1998.

The Niger government, in January 1999, reformed the civil service, bringing in changes that would lead to the retirement of 1,853 civil servants by October 1999. The decision affected those who had reached 55 years of age and had served for 30 years in the public service. The move, however, would exempt essential sectors like health and education where some civil servants may have a five-year extension if there is a need to do so.

In 1999 Niger was embroiled in political instability because of the military coup. In the process of getting back to political normality, the presidential aspirants had also promised, among other things, to consolidate national unity, improve security and education as well as help reduce poverty and protection of the environment.¹

Developments in 1999 suggest no serious efforts aimed at education reform.

1. “Niger; Seven Presidential Candidates Promise To Save Niger,” Africa News, September 30, 1999.

According to the US State Department Human Rights Report, “The Government increased education for ethnic minorities; health care for minorities was at the same level as the rest of the population. It supported the 1995 peace accord calling for special development efforts in the north where the Tuareg population is dominant. However, nomadic people, such as Tuaregs and many Peul, continued to have less access to government services, and the temporary suspension of foreign assistance in 1999 limited the Government’s ability to fulfill its commitments to former rebel areas. During the year, foreign assistance resumed, and the region is receiving assistance again.”¹

1. “Niger Human Rights Practices, 2000,” U.S. Department of State, 2001.

“Positive developments noted by the World Bank in Niger include the Improvement Of The Country’s School Enrolment Rate, Which Rose from 27 percent in 1995 to 34 percent in 1999-2000, mainly due to the recruitment of contract teachers and efforts in the education sector, the building of classrooms, teacher training and the acquisition of teaching materials.”¹

1. “Niger Records Economic Upturn In Two Years,” Panafrican News Agency (PANA) Daily Newswire, November 29, 2001.

No further information available on education reform except for a report on student protests against falling educational standards, grant reductions and exam reforms.¹

1. “Niger students protest over continuing campus closure,” Agence France Presse, January 17, 2002.

The US State Department Human Rights Annual report highlighted that the Government increased education for ethnic minorities.¹

1. “Niger Human Rights Practices, 2003,” U.S. Department of State, 2004.

Substantial progress was made in terms of education reform this year. “The policy reforms to improve access to basic education were successfully implemented through construction of 2,433 new classrooms over 2001/2002, of which 86 percent were in the rural areas, as well as the recruitment of 3,701 teachers for the school year 2003/2004, with 77 percent employed in the rural areas.”¹

2005: Substantial progress was made in education reform the previous year. However, the government continuously worked with international partners to provide economically relevant education as an inducement to parents to keep their children in school. “The Ministry of Basic Education conducted training sessions to help educators meet the special needs of child laborers. During the year the government also created a special child labor division within the Ministry of Labor to coordinate government initiatives in the area.”²

1. “Niger Reaches Completion Point in HIPC Initiative,” Liquid Africa, October 15, 2004.
2. “Niger Human Rights Practices, 2005,” U.S. Department of State, 2006.

French is the official language, and the universal language for documentation; other languages in daily use include Hausa, Djerma, Tamacheq, Fulani, Arabic, Kanauri, Courmantche and Toubou. The government operates La Voix du Sahel radio service in French and several Niger languages.¹

Tamacheq and Tifinar languages had the status of national languages, but it remains unclear whether the government will promote the use of these languages as agreed in the peace agreement.

1. “Country Profile; Comment & Analysis; Statistics; Tables,” in Niger: Review 1996, Africa Review World of Information, September 1995, 147.

Tamacheq and Tifinar languages were recognized as national languages by the government.

No information is available on the promotion of the Tamacheq and Tifinar languages.

According to the U.S. State department human rights reports, the government owned “radio Voix du Sahel transmits 14 hours per day, providing news and other programs in French, Hausa, Zarma, Tamashek, Fulfulde (also known as Fulani or Peuhl), Kanouri and several other local languages.” Several other private radio stations also featured news programs in local languages including Zarma and Hausa.¹

There are no reports of publications in these languages by the government or in support of the government. The Niger government published a daily newspaper in French.

1. “Niger Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998,” US State Department, 1999.

No further information is available except that the government owned radio station was reported as providing news and other programs in several national languages.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

A news story reported that President Ousmane reiterated his commitment to the peace agreement to the Tuareg leader and added both the importance of the diverse traditions of the Niger state and intercultural exchange.¹

No information is available on whether the government planned for cultural centers and regional museums.

1. “NIGER; President Ousmane reiterates commitment to peace agreement to Tuareg leader,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 11, 1995.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

Government granted a license to one independent television station in 1995 that is not yet operational.¹

1. “Niger Human Rights Practices, 1995,” U.S. Department of State,1996.

No information is available on the creation of radio stations. The government violated freedom of speech by intimidating the private press and radio, arresting and mistreating journalists and publishers, and temporarily closing two private radio stations.¹ No substantive reform was yet to be made.

1. “Niger Human Rights Practices, 1996,” U.S. Department of State, 1997.

No information is available on the creation of radio stations.

No information is available on the creation of radio stations or the distribution of new licenses.

The government had maintained a multilingual national radio service and provided time for all political parties once the transitional government assumed power. There were reports that the private newspapers, which were more critical of government actions than the private radio stations were under threat of government actions.¹

1. “Niger Human Rights Practices, 1999,” U.S. Department of State, 2000.

The National Communications Observatory (ONC) of Niger had approved a private television channel and two radio stations – one in Niamey and the other in Dosso.¹

1. “Niger: TV channel, two FM radio stations given provisional operating licenses,” BBC Monitoring Africa — Economic, February 5, 2000.

It was reported that the UNDP sponsored projects donated thousands of radios for a project to help secure peace and reduce poverty in Niger. It was said that the radios would boost a vibrant network of community radio stations, the Rural Radio Network and Information Centers for Development. Almost 20 solar powered stations were on the air, and the network expects to grow to 160 stations within a few years.¹

1. “Niger’s Radio Project To Help Turn In Guns For Peace,” Panafrican News Agency (PANA) Daily Newswire, December 24, 2001.

As the Niger government had opted for the decentralization of infrastructures, the number of community radio stations increased in Niger. Rural radio stations were inaugurated in Tera District on 12 April 2002¹; in Simiri on July 7, 2002²; and in Zinder region on 12 July 2002.³

1. “Community radio station inaugurated in Dolbel – Tera District,” BBC Sumary of World Broadcasts, April 14, 2002.
2. “Minister inaugurates community radio station in Simiri,” BBC Sumary of World Broadcasts, July 9, 2002.
3. “Niger: Community radio station inaugurated in Zinder region,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 13, 2002.

On 30 Sept. 2003, Niger’s Higher Council for Communications (Conseil superieur de la Communication, CSC) withdrew the broadcasting licenses of 15 private radio stations, saying their owners had failed to comply with Niger’s laws.¹ According to a report, the CSC “had issued permanent licenses to the 4 stations, which began broadcasting; the 11 other stations still had not received licenses.”²

1. “Niger: Communications council suspends 15 radio stations,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 2, 2003.
2. “Niger Human Rights Practices, 2003,” U.S. Department of State, 2004.

Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that the Government closed down radio stations.¹

2005: In March, government ordered the police to close a private radio stations without informing the CSC on issue related to VAT increase. After a court ruling, however, the closed station reopened in May.²

1. “Niger Human Rights Practices, 2004,” U.S. Department of State, 2005.
2. “Niger Human Rights Practices, 2005,” U.S. Department of State, 2006.

The 1995 peace agreement covers issues related to social and economic development. Notwithstanding such provisions, Niger remained in the grip of an economic and social crisis without precedent in its history. The economy continued to decline as it has done regularly since the 1980s. The state coffers were empty and Niger remained one of the poorest countries in the world.¹ The country’s economy was largely dependent on the rural sector, which employed 80% of the active population.

Irrigated land remained 320 sq km (1989 estimate). “The economy is centered on subsistence agriculture, animal husbandry, and re-export trade, and increasingly less on uranium, its major export throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Uranium revenues dropped by almost 50% between 1983 and 1990 with the end of the uranium boom. Terms of trade with Nigeria, Niger’s largest regional trade partner, have improved dramatically since the 50% devaluation of the African franc in January 1994; this devaluation boosted exports of livestock, peas, onions, and the products of Niger’s small cotton industry. The government relies on bilateral and multilateral aid for operating expenses and public investment and is strongly induced to adhere to structural adjustment programs designed by the IMF and the World Bank.”²

1. “Niger’s forced political marriage is no honeymoon,” Agence France Presse, July 20, 1995.
2. “CIA Factbook, Niger,” 1996.

No substantive socio-economic reforms took place as agreed in the peace agreement.

No substantive socio-economic reforms took place. However, “terms of trade with Nigeria, Niger’s largest regional trade partner, have improved dramatically since the 50% devaluation of the African franc in January 1994; this devaluation boosted exports of livestock, peas, onions, and the products of Niger’s small cotton industry. The government relies on bilateral and multilateral aid for operating expenses and public investment and is strongly induced to adhere to structural adjustment programs designed by the IMF and the World Bank. The US terminated bilateral assistance to Niger after the coup of 1996. Other donors have reduced their aid.” Irrigated land increased to 660 sq km (1993 est.).¹

1. “CIA Factbook, Niger,” 1997.

No substantive socio-economic reforms took place. “The government relied on bilateral and multilateral aid for operating expenses and public investment and is strongly induced to adhere to structural adjustment programs designed by the IMF and the World Bank.”¹ Industrial development was handicapped by the shortage of capital and skilled labor and by the country’s weak infrastructure.²

1. “CIA Factbook, Niger,” 1998.
2. “Niger: Africa review 1998,” Africa Review World of Information, March 1998.

No substantive socio-economic reform took place as agreed in the peace agreement. As Niger Prime Minister said, “80 per cent of Niger is illiterate, 63 per cent live below official poverty level, life expectancy is 47. Moreover, the financial crisis that has severely crippled Niger’s economic development resulted in a further reduction in public investments, thus depriving most people of basic social services.”¹

It was reported that “the decentralization and development of Tuareg regions as demanded by the rebels, has not yet started, fueling the frustration of people in the area, Akotey said. É However, the Tuareg leaders are aware of the complexity of the problem and the fragile nature of the peace process.” “The Niger state as a whole is fragile. The implementation of the agreements implies enormous financial means which Niger does not have,” Akotey noted, adding that “there is still a threat hovering over the peace agreements.”²

1. “Niger; Public Aid For Development Is At 50-Year Low In Niger — PM,” Africa News, October 1, 1999.
2. “Niger-Rebellion Niger Peace Agreements Under Threat,” All Africa, April 17, 1999

No substantive socio-economic reform took place.

Some improvement in economic and social development was recorded in 2001. The national economy steadily improved after 10 years of political, social and economic instability. The World Bank noted positive development in overall education sector.¹

Niger’s recent eligibility to the enhanced HIPC initiative (Highly Indebted Poor Countries) would enable the country to alleviate its debt burden, reduce poverty and achieve sustainable development. The World Bank also approved $70 million loan, which would support the implementation of major social and structural reforms in order to improve basic public services and promote more sustainable programs conducive for economic growth.²

1. “Niger Records Economic Upturn In Two Years,” Panafrican News Agency (PANA) Daily Newswire, November 29, 2001.
2. Ibid.

The Niger economy continued to see sustained economic growth. The government of Niger successfully enacted the decentralization law, which empowered local entities on issues related to local governance. This can be taken as a step toward socio-economic development.

Notwithstanding sustained economic growth, as well as many reform initiatives, including decentralization, the level of socio-economic development remained slow in year 2003. “Nearly two thirds of the people did not have sufficient income for their basic needs, including food, clothing, clean water and shelter. It is estimated that 42-50 percent live on about US $124 a year. The rest live on $71-$89. Those who have jobs are mainly employed by the government which has about 40,000 civil servants. However they earn an average of US $100 a month. With this meager salary, they cater to 10-15 extended family members each, a government official told IRIN”.

The UNDP had been working closely with the government and has managed since 2000, to assist thousands of farmers, mainly women to start and manage vegetable gardens. Thousands of others were trained on livestock care. The program improved food security through the reinforcement of population capacity for self-help and self-management of community development.¹

1. “Niger; Urgent Need to Confront Widespread Poverty,” Africa News, October 2, 2003.

Social and economic development continued to be an issue in Niger, notwithstanding sustained growth from uranium mining. According to Ibrahim, an economist at the World Bank in Niamy, “Leaders were not just banking on uranium. In their speeches, agriculture and livestock were presented as the lifeblood of Niger’s economy. Unfortunately, there has never been clear economic policy on these two sectors”.

“According to the United Nations Development Program, 63 percent of Niger’s citizens lived below the poverty line of a dollar a day. Food insecurity and a lack of proper housing pose acute problems. In response to this situation, government – in association with donors – adopted a poverty reduction strategy in January 2002. The program aimed to encourage sustainable economic growth through developing agriculture and other sectors, and to ensure that basic social services were provided to the population. It also promoted good governance. The strategy also included initiatives for building 1,000 new classrooms, 1,000 clinics and several dams and water points. The initiative also deals with job creation.”¹

The northern population felt a sense of frustration, which stemmed from their political, economic and social marginalization. They complained there was not “much investment in development, in infrastructure, whereas it is in their area that uranium is produced.”²

2005: “The World Bank Board of Executive Directors today approved an International Development Association (IDA) financing of US$40 million to support the implementation of the economic reform program during 2005-2006 and the Poverty Reduction Strategy in Niger. The Public Expenditure Reform Financing (PERF) will help deepen the reforms in public expenditure management, increase the impact on the poor of public spending in key priority areas, including public service delivery in education and health, and investments for agricultural growth and rural development”.

“Economic management performance as well as social indicators improved substantially since 2000 in Niger. Together with good economic growth prospects, the PERF is expected to have a significant and sustainable impact on governance and poverty reduction.”³

In 2005, the government also came up with an economic assistance plan to reintegrate the Tuareg rebel combatants into socio-economic life with $300 grants to each combatant in the form of micro-loans for projects in animal husbandry, the craft industry and vegetable gardening.⁴

Overall, while still ranking as the world’s poorest country, Niger achieved some remarkable success in terms of economic and social development. “Farmers had diversified their revenues and are now in control of their financial situation,” said Germaine Ibro, an IRAN researcher who surveyed the economic and social impact of the rehabilitation process in the Tahoua and Zinder regions. Women benefited a lot from the rehabilitation project. It was reported that women could spend more time developing crops, they had more money, and then they could attend to other businesses such as livestock and forestry. This means their children could go to school.⁵

1. “Niger; Fight Against Poverty Gets Mixed Reviews,” Africa News, August 3, 2004.
2. “Niger; Social Issues Take Centre Stage Ahead of Presidential Poll,” Africa News, November 12, 2004.
3. “Niger; World Bank Supports Economic Reforms in Niger,” Africa News, May 24, 2005.
4. “Niger; Tuareg Ex-Combatants to Get Promised Assistance a Decade After Peace Accord,” Africa News, October 14, 2005; “Niger (PCPAA, 2006 — 2007),” School for a Culture of Peace, 2008, accessed August 1, 2010, http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/mapa/niger08i.pdf.
5. “Niger; Tide Turning On Desertification,” Africa News, October 11, 2006.

Niger’s economy is on the verge of collapse. Therefore, Niger makes an agreement with the World Bank and IMF to implement structural reform programs, which was designed to downsize the state’s involvement in the economic issues and promote privatization. For this project, Niger received a loan of 102 million dollars under the bank’s Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF).¹ This loan, however, cannot be coded as donor support to the peace process. The roundtable of donors as agreed in the peace agreement did not take place.

1. “Niger Niamey Resumes Relations IMF And World Bank,” Africa News, December, 1995.

No report of donor support to the peace process. After the military coup in 1996, Niger’s main aid donors, including the former colonial power, France, and the United States, suspended badly needed aid after the coup.¹

1. “World News Briefs; Niger’s Military Rulers Set Election Timetable,” The New York Times, February 13, 1996.

No report of donor support to the peace process.

No report of donor support to the peace process.

France, which was the major donor providing resources to implement the peace process suspended cooperation.

No report of donor support to the peace process.

Niger received US $695,000, from the UNV’s Special Voluntary Fund to train and support
660 former guerrillas in agricultural micro-projects so they could be self-reliant.¹

In a separate report, it was reported that the France provided US $130,000 to Niger as part of its ongoing support for the reintegration into civilian life of former fighters who participated in an armed rebellion in the southeastern region of Diffa between 1994 and 1998.²

1. “Niger; Ex-Fighters In Reintegration Programme,” Africa News, March 16, 2001.
2. “Niger; France Supports Programme for Ex-Fighters,” Africa News, July 4, 2001.

No further information available except for the continuation of the UN and French support to reintegrate ex-combatants into society.

No further information available except for the continuation of the UN and French support to reintegrate ex-combatants into society.

No further information available except for the continuation of the UN and French support to reintegrate ex-combatants into society.

2005: UNDP/BCPR, France, Libya, Niger and the US provided financial support of $1.7 million to support the reintegration program for 2005 and 2006. In 2005, the government gave economic assistance to reintegrate the Tuareg rebel combatants into socio-economic life with $300 grants to each combatant in the form of micro-loans for projects in animal husbandry, the craft industry and vegetable gardening.¹

1. “Niger; Tuareg Ex-Combatants to Get Promised Assistance a Decade After Peace Accord,” Africa News, October 14, 2005;”Niger (PCPAA, 2006 — 2007),” School for a Culture of Peace, 2008, accessed August 1, 2010, http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/mapa/niger08i.pdf.