Chapultepec Peace Agreement

  • 96%
  • Implementation Score 
    after 10 years
Provisions in this Accord
Cease Fire

NEW YORK ACT (31 December 1991)

Implementation History
1992

Full Implementation

The cease-fire between the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN formally began on 1 February 1992, in keeping with the timeline established by the Peace Agreement. ONUSAL verified that the cease-fire agreement was upheld throughout the year and no major incidences occurred. Only one close call was reported, in which tensions over lands in former zones of conflict led the Government to deploy a police contingent consisting of recently demobilized troops from the FAES in late October 1992. ONUSAL and the Archbishop of San Salvador intervened before the incident escalated.123

  • 1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999), May 26, 1992.
  • 2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/24833), November 23, 1992.
  • 3. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations Security Council (S/25006), December 23, 1992.
1993

Full Implementation

The discovery of secret caches of FMLN weapons in Nicaragua in February 1993 raised tensions significantly, but did not lead to renewed armed conflict. The most serious threat to the cease fire agreement came from the resurgence of “death squads” in the latter portion of 1993. Several politically motivated illegal armed groups, some fashioned after groups active during the civil war, emerged. They carried out brazen acts of violence, including assassinations of former FMLN combatants, and threatened more. Fortunately, both parties to the Peace Agreement, in cooperation with the ONUSAL and the office of the UN Secretary-General, decisively condemned the actions of the death squads and took proactive measures to reign them in.4

  • 4. “Ninth report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations General Assembly, Security Council (A/49/59, S/1994/47), January 18, 1994.
1994

Full Implementation

The cease fire was upheld with no major incidents threatening a return to armed conflict.

1995

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Constitutional Reform

MEXICO AGREEMENT (27 April 1991)

The Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (hereinafter referred to as "the Parties"),

Implementation History
1992

Intermediate Implementation

The accord called for three constitutional reforms: reining in the military (civilian control), judicial reforms to protect human rights (2/3 house majority to elect Supreme court judges, and Human Rights Commission), and electoral reform (Supreme Electoral Tribunal).

The constitutional reforms required to enact judiciary reform were made in 1992.1 In January 1992, the Amnesty Law was passed by the legislature.2 El Salvador's legislative assembly approved a series of provisional reforms to the electoral code in July 1992, to pave the way for the FMLN's legalization as a political party. The reforms were approved by 76 of the 84 deputies, despite the fact that the constitution forbids armed groups to form political parties.3

On July 20, 1992, the National Assembly amended El Salvador's constitution, removing police powers from the armed forces and creating a new national civilian police force and police academy.4

  • 1. “Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of ONUSAL,” United Nations Security Council (S/24066), June 5, 1992; “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/24833), November 23, 1992.
  • 2. "El Salvador Amnesty Law Approved by National, Assembly," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 25, 1992.
  • 3. "El Salvador: FMLN Suspends Demobilization," IPS-Inter Press Service, July 31, 1992.
  • 4. Department of Consolidating Peace and Democracy in El Salvador, Statement before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, United States House of Representatives (July 9, 1992) (statement of Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Washington, DC), State Dispatch July 20, 1992.
1993

Full Implementation

A new electoral code proposed by a special commission of the Legislative Assembly was enacted in 1993. Constitutional reforms created the Supreme Electoral Court (TSE) to replace the Central Election Council, and a special body to ensure the impartiality of the TSE and its members, who were to be elected by the Legislative Assembly. This set of changes fulfilled the reforms in the peace accord.5

  • 5. Ricardo Córdova Macías, "Demilitarizing and Democratizing Salvadoran Politics,” in El Salvador: Implementation of the Peace Accords, USIP, ed. Margarita S. Studemeister.
1994

Full Implementation

No further constitutional changes called for by the accord were carried out.

1995

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Electoral/Political Party Reform

MEXICO AGREEMENT (27 April 1991)

The Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (hereinafter referred to as "the Parties"),

Implementation History
1992

Intermediate Implementation

The accord called for several institutional requirements necessary to have free and fair elections. The Legislative Assembly appointed the Special Electoral Tribunal in 1992 after some delays. COPAZ appointed the Special Commission which was governed by the Tribunal. The Government put forth legislation to establish the FMLN as a political party.1 The Parties subsequently reached a negotiated agreement to propose legislation to facilitate the legalization of the FMLN as a political party by 30 June 1992.2 However, the FMLN did not gain permission to formally begin the process of becoming a political party until 30 July 1992. Full recognition as a party was hindered by the delays in the DDR process as a whole.3 The FMLN was ultimately legalized as a political party on 14 December 1992, in coordination with the formal cessation of armed conflict on 15 December 1992.4

  • 1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999), May 26, 1992.
  • 2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999/Add.1), June 16, 1992.
  • 3. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/24833), November 23, 1992; (S/23999), May 26, 1992.
  • 4. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations Security Council (S/25006), December 23, 1992.
1993

Intermediate Implementation

Elections were scheduled for March 1994 and the Government of El Salvador requested UN observers for those first elections. ONUSAL began making preparations shortly after, working in coordination with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal.5

The institutional framework for the election process was established, and parties prepared candidates. The major concern was low levels of voter registration.6 After concerted effort by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, 787,834 Salvadorians registered to vote by the year’s end—a success in the judgment of ONUSAL.7 A Board of Vigilance composed of representatives of all the political parties was created to advise citizens on problems they encountered in getting voter registration cards.8

  • 5. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/25812), May 21, 1993.
  • 6. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/26606), October 20, 1993.
  • 7. “Tenth report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/49/116 S/1994/385), April 5, 1994).
  • 8. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/179), February 16, 1994.
1994

Full Implementation

The deadline for voter registration was extended to 19 January 1994, by which time a total of 2,653,871 persons had been registered. The deadline for registering candidates for lower offices was extended to 31 January 1994. Many discrepancies persisted in the registration records, and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal did not meet the deadline for issuing registration cards after the push to register as many voters as possible. The Attorney-General of the Republic selected an Electoral Counsel in January 1994 to address complaints about the electoral process. 9 By 16 March 1994, more than 74,000 persons requesting voter registration cards still had not received them due to insufficient documentation.10

The elections occurred on 20 March 1994 without any significant scandals or disruptions, and ONUSAL considered them acceptable. Approximately 1.5 million voters participated, amounting to roughly 55% of registered voters, which was lower than expected. No one presidential candidate received a majority, which forced a run-off election.11 The Electoral Division made many corrective recommendations to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to be implemented before the second round of elections on 24 April 1994. The Tribunal made several improvements, satisfying the Electoral Division. The second round, like the first, occurred with nothing more than some minor irregularities. About 1.2 million valid votes were counted, and Armando Calderon Sol, the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) candidate, was elected president with 68% of the votes. While approving of the elections, the Electoral Division still called for “a thorough reform of the electoral system.”12

A new Supreme Electoral Tribunal was elected on 30 July 1994.13

  • 9. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/179), February 16, 1994.
  • 10. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/304), March 16, 1994.
  • 11. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/375), March 31, 1994.
  • 12. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/536), May 4, 1994.
  • 13. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/1000), August 26, 1994.
1995

Full Implementation

No further electoral reforms took place as provided for by the accord.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Civil Administration Reform

CHAPULTEPEC AGREEMENT (16 January 1992)

Chapter VII, Annex E: Restoration of Public Administration in Conflict Zones

With the entry into force of the cease-fire, public administration shall gradually be restored in conflict zones, in accordance with the following principles:

Implementation History
1992

Intermediate Implementation

Efforts were made for the return of judges, mayors and governance to former conflict zones. The FMLN, with the support of some communities and NGOs, blocked the return of some judges and mayors. ONUSAL stepped in to facilitate open dialogue and help the process move forward.1 In May 1992, the El Salvadorian government announced a reconstruction plan aimed to upgrade the country's public services, including drinking water supplies, electricity, health and education, at a cost of more than 1.4 billion dollars.2 Also, an agreement was reached on 16 September 1992 to coordinate the return of all judges by the end of 1992.3

  • 1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999), May 26, 1992.
  • 2. "Cristiani Announces Reconstruction Plan in El Salvador," Agence France Presse, May 19, 1992.
  • 3. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/24833), November 23, 1992.
1993

Intermediate Implementation

The returned mayors organized public town meetings to make plans for reconstruction in their communities and elect representatives to municipal reconstruction and development commissions.4

  • 4. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/25812), May 21, 1993.
1994

Full Implementation

Mayors and judges were nearly 100% restored to former conflict zones. Other basic services, such as education and health care, were still lacking in some places. The Government cited resource scarcity as the reason for rather slow and incomplete action to restore civilian administration.5 After presidential elections in 1994, it can be said that most of the civil administration is restored. Nevertheless, some places still lacked water and electricity.

  • 5. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/1212), October 31, 1994.
1995

Full Implementation

Provisions related to civil administration reform were implemented by the end of 1994.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Truth or Reconciliation Mechanism

MEXICO AGREEMENT (27 April 1991)

IV. Commission on the Truth

Implementation History
1992

Intermediate Implementation

U.N Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali installed the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador on 13 July 1992. The Commission consisted of three members, including former Colombian president Belisario Betancur, former Venezuelan foreign minister Reinaldo Figueredo and former president of the Inter-American Court for Human Rights Thomas Buergenthal. The Commission had a mandate to investigate serious acts of violence that have taken place in El Salvador since 1980 and whose impact on society urgently demanded that the public know the truth.1 The Commission on the Truth began its work on 13 July 1992. Its ability to investigate every report was limited by its six-month mandate, so it maintained an “open-door” policy for hearing testimony throughout its operation, and resolved to only report on complaints which it could confirm. The commissioners were not chosen from El Salvador to maintain impartiality.2

1993

Full Implementation

The commission did not meet its 6-months deadline to submit its final report. The report was handed over on 15 March 1993 in New York, United States. It had received over 22,000 complaints of serious acts of violence occurring between January 1980 and July 1991. Over 60% of the complaints related to extrajudicial killings, over 25% to forced disappearances, and over 20% to torture. The majority of the violations were committed by the FAES and other Government agents. The Commission’s report included a number of recommendations for administrative, legislative and constitutional reform to hold perpetrators of violations accountable and prevent future crimes.3 As the report implicated some generals, the United States asked president Cristiani and gave him one week to purge 15 officers. The Secretary General also asked to get rid of implicated generals.4

The High Command of the FAES, the President of the Supreme Court, some high-ranking government officials and political leaders, and segments of the media rejected the conclusions and recommendations of the Commission. A week after the release of the report, the Legislative Assembly approved a general amnesty, negating the Commission’s recommendations and drawing swift criticism from the FMLN.5 UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali criticized the amnesty law, insisting that the full implementation of the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth was an integral part of the peace process.6

ONUSAL saw the report of the Commission on the Truth as one of the most importation human rights developments during its mission. It was clear that it viewed the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth as mandatory for the parties to the conflict.7

As death squad activity—mainly directed at former FMLN and affiliated combatants—flared up again after the general amnesty, the FMLN leadership complained that the Commission on the Truth failed to adequately investigate the death squad phenomenon and demanded that the Commissioners release the names of all known death squad members still operating in El Salvador. The Commissioners did not release any additional names than those in the report, which included only a few key FAES decision-makers.8 On April 2, 1993, the government agreed to remove 15 high-ranking military officers according to the TRC recommendation.9

  • 3. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/25812), May 21, 1993.
  • 4. "The World this Week: Truth time for the generals in El Salvador," The Independent (London), March 15, 1993.
  • 5. ibid., UNSC (S/25812).
  • 6. “U.N. chief criticized Salvador’s amnesty for war abuses,” United Press International, International Section, March 24, 1993.
  • 7. “Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador up to 30 April 1993,” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/47/968 S/26033), July 2, 1993.
  • 8. Jorge Pina, “El Salvador: FMLN leader demands and end to death squad impunity,” Inter-Press Service, October 26, 1993.
  • 9. "El Salvador: Government Agrees to Dismiss Top Military Officers," IPS-Inter Press Service, April 2, 1993.
1994

Full Implementation

UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali strenuously impressed upon the Government of El Salvador to finally phase out the National Police, complete the reintegration process and institute the constitutional reforms recommended by the Commission on the Truth. Despite multiple appeals, President Cristiani and the Government remained reluctant to move on these issues.10

The Legislative Assembly passed some constitutional amendments to incorporate some, but not all, of the recommendations from the Commission on the Truth.11

  • 10. “Letter Dated 28 March from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (199 S/1994/361), March 30, 1994.
  • 11. “Eleventh Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (1 March – 30 June 1994),” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/49/281 S/1994/886), July 28, 1994.
1995

Full Implementation

The recommendations of the Commission on the Truth were not fully implemented, despite urgings from Salvadoran human rights groups for the Government to at least admit to the crimes detailed in the report.12

  • 12. Juan Jose Dalton, “El Salvador – Human Rights: Army urged to follow Argentina’s lead," Inter-Press Service, April 27, 1995.
1996

Full Implementation

The TRC completed its mandate and submitted its report in 1993. Some recommendations were implemented but issues related to commemorating the victims of the conflict did not happen. Similarly, an ongoing forum for truth and reconciliation was never created.13 Due to the general amnesty issued by the Government following the release of the report of the Commission on the Truth in 1993, no one was ever held accountable for the crimes identified by the Commission.14

  • 13. “Assessment of the Peace Process in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/51/917), July 1, 1997.
  • 14. “El Salvador: 10th anniversary of Peace Accords, still no justice for victims of human rights violations,” Amnesty International (AI Index AMR 29/001/2002), January 16, 2002.
1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Dispute Resolution Committee

NEW YORK AGREEMENT (25 September 1991)

Implementation History
1992

Minimum Implementation

In accordance of the agreement, the National Commission for the Consolidation of the Peace (COPAZ) was formally instituted on 1 February 1992 comprising 10 members--two members each from the FMLN and the government and rest of the members from other political parties. The COPAZ was responsible to arbitrate disagreements that might arise from the implementation of the accord. Nevertheless, the COPAZ did not initially play as important a role as envisioned in the agreements.1

  • 1. “Situation of human rights in El Salvador,” United Nations General Assembly (A/47/596), November 13, 1992.
1993

Intermediate Implementation

COPAZ worked to seek consensus among its constituent members on various measures related to the Peace Agreement, but met many disagreements over its mandate. It discussed the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth, but moved very slowly and failed to come up with a unified proposal.2

  • 2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/25812), May 21, 1993.
1994

Full Implementation

COPAZ continued to operate, and conversations began of it becoming a peace foundation once its mandate was officially fulfilled.3

  • 3. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/1000), August 26, 1994.
1995

Full Implementation

According to the new timetable for implementation agreed upon on 19 May 1994, COPAZ was set to terminate on 30 April 1995, but it became clear that the Peace Accords would not be fulfilled by that date, and so COPAZ sought an extension on the grounds that its mandate was to ensure the complete implementation of the Peace Accords.4

  • 4. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1995/220), March 24, 1995.
1996

Full Implementation

The mandate of COPAZ expired on 10 January 1996. The Government of El Salvador and the members of COPAZ viewed it as a success, with only a few aspects of the peace process left incomplete—notably the land transfer and rural re-settlement programs. Some of the former members of COPAZ went on to serve in non-governmental organizations, such as Fundapaz, which endeavored to fulfill a similar role as that of COPAZ.5

  • 5. “National peace commission closes as its work comes to an end,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 15, 1996.
1997

Full Implementation

The COPAZ was a multi-party mechanism designed to facilitate the implementation of the accord and its completed its mandate of dispute resolutions. The COPAZ was dissolved once its mandate expired on 10 January 1996.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments occurred this year.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments occurred this year.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments occurred this year.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments occurred this year.

Judiciary Reform

MEXICO AGREEMENT (27 April 1991)

II. Judicial system and human rights

1. Agreements on constitutional reforms designed to improve significant aspects of the judicial system and establish mechanisms for safeguarding human rights, such as:

Implementation History
1992

Intermediate Implementation

The majority of constitutional reforms required to enact judiciary reform were made, but delays on secondary legislation prevented the full implementation of the new judicial system.1

 The judiciary began to receive 6% of the State budget and a career judicial service was set up, with measures to ensure stability and independence. Military courts were confined to trying crimes perpetrated by members of the FAES in active duty only.2 The judicial system as a whole remained largely unable to ensure due legal process and hold human rights violators accountable.3 Institutions of Judiciary were in place as required by the accord, but effectiveness of the system was the main concern.

  • 1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador," United Nations Security Council (S/24833), November 23, 1992.
  • 2. “Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of ONUSAL,” United Nations Security Council (S/24066), June 5, 1992.
  • 3. “Situation of human rights in El Salvador,” United Nations General Assembly (A/47/596), November 13, 1992.
1993

Intermediate Implementation

The Ministry of Justice promoted a national legal reform plan to improve the capacity and credibility of the judicial system, but ONUSAL was dissatisfied with the lack of progress in practice. Positive reforms were made in instituting a consistent norm of habeas corpus proceedings, but the remedy remained ineffective overall.4 Multiple legislative initiatives regarding the administration of justice mandated by the Peace Agreements, the Commission on the Truth and the Human Rights Division were not adopted. The Supreme Court of Justice handled some cases of derelict judges, but many of the proceedings did not lead to appropriate corrective action.5

  • 4. “Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador up to 30 April 1993,” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/47/968 S/26033), July 2, 1993.
  • 5. “Ninth report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/49/59 S/1994/47), January 18, 1994.
1994

Intermediate Implementation

The Ministry of Justice submitted a bill to the Legislative Assembly that affords prisoners basic human rights in compliance with international standards.6 ONUSAL contended that the main source of human rights abuses was impunity, which stems from a weak justice system. The Legislative Assembly had the task of appointing new members of the Supreme Court of Justice when the prior court’s term ended on 30 June 1994. The Commission on the Truth had recommended that the Legislative Assembly pass constitutional reforms that would decentralize the judiciary, but it did not do so.7

The ONUSAL Human Rights Division pushed for an overhaul of the penal system, including several high-level reforms to the judiciary, in order to bring the system into conformity with internationally recognized standards.8

  • 6. “Tenth report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/49/116 S/1994/385), April 5, 1994.
  • 7. “Eleventh Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (1 March – 30 June 1994),” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/49/281 S/1994/8861994), July 28, 1994.
  • 8. “Twelfth Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) (1 July – 30 September 1994),” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/49/585 S/1994/1220), October 31, 1994.
1995

Intermediate Implementation

The new Supreme Court of Justice began to modernize and purify the judiciary, as recommended by the Commission on the Truth and ONUSAL. The Court stopped short of complying with the recommendations to decentralize, however. By the time of the last report by the ONUSAL Human Rights Division, the National Council of the Judiciary was not developed into the empowered independent body envisioned in the Peace Agreements and the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth. At the same time, the Judicial Training School had not enacted selection criteria that would adequately implement the Peace Agreements, and reforms had not been made to curtail arbitrary detention, pre-trial detention and punishment.9

MINUSAL later confirmed that the Legislative Assembly failed to pass a number of required reforms by the end of the year, let alone the 31 October 1995 deadline. Stalled reforms included the criminal code, penitentiary law, repeal of the 1996 police law, and guarantees of due process.10

The Supreme Court of Justice contemplated creating special courts with anonymous judges to hear cases of alleged crimes detailed in the report of the Commission on the Truth.11

  • 9. “Thirteenth Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/49/888 S/1995/281), April 18, 1995.
  • 10. “Mission of the United Nations in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/50/935), April 23, 1996.
  • 11. “El Salvador considers special courts,” United Press Internaitonal, February 14, 1995.
1996

Intermediate Implementation

The Supreme Court continued to make improvements in the judiciary. Issues addressed include professional ethics, delays in the judicial process, prison overpopulation, defendants’ legal counsel, and the vetting of lower judges.12

In response to public outcry, the Legislative Assembly passed an emergency crime law, which had the effect of undermining some judicial reforms prescribed by the Peace Agreement and the Commission on the Truth, especially due process.13 In December 1996, the Legislative Assembly approved the Code of Criminal Procedure aimed to improve the judicary.14

  • 12. “Mission of the United Nations in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/50/935), April 23, 1996.
  • 13. “Mission of the United Nations in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/50/935), April 23, 1996.
  • 14. “Assessment of the Peace Process in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/51/917), July 1, 1997.
1997

Intermediate Implementation

Despite the important structural reforms to the judiciary, the system was inefficient and lacked adequate capacity to continuously vet judges and officials.15

  • 15. “Assessment of the Peace Process in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/51/917), July 1, 1997.
1998

Intermediate Implementation

Judiciary reform took place when constitutional revisions were made in 1992. Nevertheless, there were issues related to the judicial reforms recommended by the Commission on the Truth, which was not fully implemented (Source: Amnesty International.16

  • 16. “El Salvador: 10th anniversary of Peace Accords, still no justice for victims of human rights violations,” AI Index AMR (29/001/2002), January 16, 2002.
1999

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

Military Reform

MEXICO AGREEMENT (27 April 1991)

Political agreements elaborating on the constitutional reform

C. Armed forces

The political agreements on the armed forces are being referred for consideration under the corresponding item of the Caracas Agenda. Nevertheless, the Parties agree that those agreements shall include the following points:

Implementation History
1992

Intermediate Implementation

The accord does not require integration of FMLN into El Salvador’s military. The accord intends to reform the military and make it respectful to human rights and under the control of the civilian government and downsize to below 22,000 personnel. In this regard, the Legislative Assembly met the deadlines for passing constitutional reforms regarding military reform, but the Treasury Police and National Guard failed to formally disband and integrate within the Armed Forces of El Salvador (FAES) on time.1 The Parties subsequently reached a negotiated agreement to present legislation to definitively abolish the National Guard and Treasury Police and establish a “Special Brigade for Military Security” (with no further transfers from military bodies to the National Civil Police) by 30 June 1992.2 The Academic Council of the Military College was established more than two months late, with members finally appointed on 31 July 1992.3

The National Intelligence Department was disbanded ahead of schedule, but the new State Intelligence Agency was founded six weeks late and the director was appointed three months late. The FMLN complained that the FAES were still conducting intelligence operations inside El Salvador, but ONUSAL was not able to verify these claims.4

The FAES ceased making arrests after the commencement of the cessation of armed conflict on 1 February 1992.

In conjunction with the negotiations that brought a formal end to the armed conflict on 15 December 1992, the President of the Republic agreed to implement the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission on purification. President Cristiani promptly responded to the decision of the Commission, but failed to heed all of the Commission’s recommendations.5

There were around 60,000 military personnel in El Salvador in 1991, which decreased to the strength of 49,000 personnel.6 The accord called for the reduction in the armed force to 22,000 personnel.

  • 1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999), May 26, 1992.
  • 2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999/Add.1), June 16, 1992.
  • 3. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/24833), November 23, 1992.
  • 4. ibid. United Nations Security Council (S/24833).
  • 5. “Letter Dated 7 January 1993 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/25078), January 9, 1993.
  • 6. Bennett, D. Scott, and Allan Stam, “EUGene: A Conceptual Manual.” International Interactions (2000), 26:179-204.
1993

Intermediate Implementation

Correspondence between President Cristiani and UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali continued regarding the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Commission on purification. The concerns centered around 15 military officers for whom President Cristiani did not follow the recommendations of the Commission at first. On 30 June 1993, the FAES High Command issued an order that removed the officers, bringing the Government into compliance with the Ad Hoc Commission’s recommendations.7

The 22 December 1992 agreement stipulated that the Government of El Salvador should inform the public of the new FAES doctrine, but it was slow to do so.8

As a step towards reform, the military incorporated lessons on the rule of law, international humanitarian law, and respect for human rights into its trainings.9

ONUSAL verified that the National Intelligence Department was formally dismantled in November 1993, and the new State Intelligence Agency was created. It was part of the military reform. It was not clear whether the FAES were still engaged in intelligence activities outside those permitted by the Peace Agreements10

The estimated strength of El Salvadorian armed force remained 49,000 personnel in 1993.11

  • 7. (S/25078), January 9,1993; “Letter Dated 7 July 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/26052), July 8, 1993.
  • 8. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/25812), May 21, 1993; “Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/26790), November 23, 1993.
  • 9. “Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador up to 30 April 1993,” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/47/968 S/26033), July 2, 1993.
  • 10. (S/26790), November 23, 1993.
  • 11. Scott and Stam, “EUGene: A Conceptual Manual,” 26:179-204.
1994

Intermediate Implementation

The ONUSAL Human Rights Division worked with the FAES to develop military training modules in democracy, rule of law, human rights, and the new doctrine of national defense.12 Progress was made in these educational efforts, but evidence of criminal activity by FAES personnel continued to surface.13

Compensation of demobilized members of the FAES, which began on 15 December 1993, proceeded quickly in early 1994, and it was agreed on 28 January 1994 that the indemnities should be fully distributed by 30 June 1994.14

The estimated strength of El Salvadorian armed force reduced to 22,000 personnel in 1994.15

  • 12. “Tenth report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/49/116 S/1994/385), April 5, 1994.
  • 13. “Eleventh Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (1 March – 30 June 1994)," United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/49/281 S/1994/886), July 28, 1994.
  • 14. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/561), May 11, 1994.
  • 15. Scott and Stam, “EUGene: A Conceptual Manual,” 26:179-204.
1995

Intermediate Implementation

ONUSAL reported multiple instances of the FAES conducting public security tasks, despite the transfer of policing responsibilities to the National Civil Police. The Constitution grants the President of the Republic the power to deploy the FAES for public safety in dire cases, and the President indeed authorized the FAES to aid the National Civil Police with law enforcement due to high crime rates.16

The estimated strength of El Salvadorian armed force reduced to 22,000 personnel in 1994.17

  • 16. “Thirteenth Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/49/888 S/1995/281), April 18, 1995.
  • 17. Scott and Stam, “EUGene: A Conceptual Manual,” 26:179-204.
1996

Full Implementation

The FAES stayed out of matters of public security and maintained appropriate numbers for conditions of peace.18 The military was sensitized with human rights education and remained under control of civilian government. As of 2002, the strength of the El Salvadorian military was estimated around 17,000 personnel.19 The military was drastically downsized from 60,000 in 1991 to 17,000 in 2002.

  • 18. “El Salvador: 10th anniversary of Peace Accords, still no justice for victims of human rights violations,” January 16, 2002.
  • 19. Scott and Stam, “EUGene: A Conceptual Manual,” 26:179-204.
1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Police Reform

CHAPULTEPEC AGREEMENT (16 January 1992)

Chapter II: National Civil Police

1. Establishment of the National Civil Police

Implementation History
1992

Intermediate Implementation

The Attorney-General of the Republic gained new powers to investigate crimes.1

The Academic Council of the Military College was established more than two months late, with members finally appointed on 31 July 1992.2

The National Intelligence Department was disbanded ahead of schedule, but the new State Intelligence Agency was founded six weeks late and the director was appointed three months late. The FMLN complained that the FAES were still conducting intelligence operations inside El Salvador, but ONUSAL was not able to verify these claims.3

The FAES ceased making arrests after the commencement of the cessation of armed conflict on 1 February 1992.

In conjunction with the negotiations that brought a formal end to the armed conflict on 15 December 1992, the President of the Republic agreed to implement the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission on purification. President Cristiani promptly responded to the decision of the Commission, but failed to heed all of the Commission’s recommendations.4 The recommendation called for the dissolution of the police force and to establish a new Civilian Police Force. According to the accord, FMLN would recommend 20% personnel to the new police force.

ONUSAL had a Police Division to monitor activities of National Police during the transitional phase as well as maintain public by helping Auxiliary Transitory Police (PAT) maintain civilian order until the new National Civil Police was established.5 This helped the ONUSAL Police division to train the PNC in field.6 The accord established two interrelated institutions. The new National Civil Police and the new civilian police academy (Academia Nacional de Seguridad Publica - ANSP). After the 16 January 1992 Chapultepec (Mexico) Agreement between FMLN and the government, the technical mission was established in March 1992 to work on drafting of the National Academy of Public Security (ANSP). In April 1992, its director was appointed and the institution started its work in May 1992.7

The ANSP started to enroll PNC agents in August 1992.8

  • 1. “Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of ONUSAL,” United Nations Security Council (S/24066), June 5, 1992.
  • 2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/24833), November 23, 1992.
  • 3. ibid.(S/24833).
  • 4. “Letter Dated 7 January 1993 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/25078), January 9, 1993.
  • 5. "El Salvador- ONUSAL Background," accessed January 4, 2012, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onusalbackgr2.html.
  • 6. William Stanley, “Building new police forces in El Salvador and Guatemala: Learning and counter-learning,” International Peacekeeping, (1999), 6(4):113 -134.
  • 7. "Academia Nacional De seguridad Publica El Salvador, C.A.," accessed January 4, 2012, http://www.ansp.gob.sv/index.php.
  • 8. Stanley, "Learning and counter-learning,” pp. 116.
1993

Intermediate Implementation

The 22 December 1992 agreement stipulated that the Government of El Salvador should inform the public of the new FAES doctrine, but it was slow to do so.9

ONUSAL verified that the National Intelligence Department was formally dismantled in November 1993, and the new State Intelligence Agency was created. It was not clear whether the FAES were still engaged in intelligence activities outside those permitted by the Peace Agreements10

In February 1993, 600 PNC agents graduated from ANSP. Subsequent classes graduated approximately 300 agents on a monthly basis. Within two years, the academy was expected to train 5,700 basic police agents and 240 officers.11 According to a report, the new National Civilian Police (PNC) began replacing the old National Police (PN) on a department-by-department schedule in March 1993. And by the end of 1993, the PNC was deployed in 7 of El Salvador's 14 departments.12

  • 9. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/25812), May 21, 1993; “Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/26790), November 23, 1993.
  • 10. ibid. (S/26790).
  • 11. Stanley, "Learning and counter-learning,” 6(4):113 -134.
  • 12. “El Salvador Human Rights Practice, 1993,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, February 1994.
1994

Intermediate Implementation

UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali strenuously impressed upon the Government of El Salvador to finally phase out the National Police and institute the constitutional reforms recommended by the Commission on the Truth. Despite multiple appeals, President Cristiani and the Government remained reluctant to move on these issues.13 The matter was scandalized when a television crew filmed a deadly armed robbery on 22 June 1994 and the Chief of the Investigative Department of the National Police was later arrested for his involvement.14

A Select Review Committee was created to investigate the issue of personnel with military backgrounds being transferred to the National Civil Police. The Government continued to delay the demobilization and reintegration of National Police personnel.15 However, some significant achievements were made in terms of deploying the new National Civil Police force. By the end of October 1994, the National Civil Police was fully deployed in all but 2 of the 14 departments in El Salvador.16 The National Police was redeployed on 31 December 1994.17

  • 13. “Letter Dated 28 March from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/361), March 30, 1994.
  • 14. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/1000), August 26, 1994.
  • 15. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/561), May 11, 1994.
  • 16. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/1212), October 31, 1994.
  • 17. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1995/220) March 24, 1995; "El Salvador Human Rights Practice, 1994," U.S. Department of State Dispatch, March 1995.
1995

Intermediate Implementation

“The Government completed demobilization of the military-dominated National Police in December 1994, and deployed nearly half of the planned 20,000 officers of the new National Civilian Police (PNC) in its place.”18

The FAES conducting public security tasks, despite the transfer of policing responsibilities to the National Civil Police. The Constitution grants the President of the Republic the power to deploy the FAES for public safety in dire cases, and the President indeed authorized the FAES to aid the National Civil Police with law enforcement due to high crime rates.19

1996

Intermediate Implementation

Even after the consolidation of the National Civil Police, the military continued to provide protection for PNC patrols in rural areas, a measure begun in 1995 in response to action by well-armed criminal bands. Then PNC received human rights education but there were reports of human rights abuses by PNC cadres.1

1997

Full Implementation

The old police force was dissolved and the new National Civil Police (PNC) was fully established that was more efficient compared to the National Police. The PNC was more efficient than the old PN, and it was deployed throughout El Salvador in 1995, thereby completing the police reform provisions of the accord.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Demobilization

CHAPULTEPEC AGREEMENT (16 January 1992)

Chapter VII: Cessation of the Armed Conflict

Separation of forces

9. The purpose of the separation of forces is to reduce the risk of incidents, to build trust and to allow ONUSAL to verify both parties' compliance with this Agreement.

Implementation History
1992

Intermediate Implementation

The Armed Forces of El Salvador (FAES) carried out the disbandment of civil defense units in April and May 1992, but failed to meet the established deadlines to withdraw all its troops to the agreed-upon locations, citing logistical issues. ONUSAL successfully pressured them to fulfill their agreements (with one exception). Although they were nominally integrated into the FAES on schedule, the Treasury Police and National Guard failed to abandon their barracks by the established deadline. In response, the FMLN, which had been demobilizing on schedule, refused to complete the concentration of its forces to the agreed-upon locations until the FAES upheld the agreement.1 The Parties subsequently reached a negotiated agreement to concentrate forces in the established areas by 25 June 1992, and to present legislation to definitively abolish the National Guard and Treasury Police and establish a “Special Brigade for Military Security” (with no further transfers from military bodies to the National Civil Police) by 30 June 1992.2 The FAES indeed completed its concentration of forces on 26 June 1992, and it disbanded the Territorial Service by 30 July 1992. The FMLN also completed the concentration of combatants according to the agreement by 26 June 1992. Some small groups of armed and uniformed persons in support of “public security committees” remained outside the concentration sites, but with pressure from ONUSAL, these groups also complied with the concentration agreements by 30 August 1992. The second 20% of FMLN ex-combatants were demobilized on 24 September 1992.3 The FNML had 15,009 organized memberships of which 8,552 were combatants (2,485 or 29.06 % female combatants, 2,474 were wounded non-combatants and 3,983 were political personnel.4

However, persisting delays in land transfers led the FMLN to suspend demobilization on 30 September 1992, promising not to resume until new dates were set for starting land transfers.5 The FAES had been progressing on the reduction of forces plan until late October 1992, when it suspended its demobilization in reaction to the FMLN’s suspension.6 With 31 October 1992, the original deadline to formally end the armed conflict, fast approaching, the office of the Secretary-General intervened and convinced the parties to set 15 December 1992 as the new date by which the FMLN would be fully demobilized and reintegrated and the FAES would be fully demobilized, reduced and purified, thus constituting the formal end of the armed conflict.7 The FMLN demobilized the third quintile of ex-combatants by 31 October 1992.8 As of 17 December 1992, a total of 8,876 FMLN combatants and 3,486 war handicapped and injured FMLN members were demobilized. On 23 December 1992, ONUSAL confirmed that the demobilization process reached its conclusion and the armed conflict between the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN formally ended on 15 December 1992.9

  • 1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999), May 26, 1992; “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/24833), November 23, 1992.
  • 2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999/Add.1), June 16, 1992.
  • 3. United Nations Security Council, (S/24833).
  • 4. Ilja A Luciak, After the Revolution: Gender and Democracy in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 4.
  • 5. “Letter Dated 19 October 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/24699), October 19, 1992.
  • 6. United Nations Security Council, (S/24833).
  • 7. “Letter Dated 11 November 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/24805), November 13, 1992.
  • 8. United Nations Security Council, (S/24833).
  • 9. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations Security Council (S/25006), December 23, 1992.
1993

Full Implementation

The FAES accelerated the process of reduction of its forces, completing the demobilization of its rapid reaction infantry battalions on 6 February 1993 and completing the overall process of reduction of forces on 31 March 1993—nine months ahead of schedule and in higher proportions than originally planned.10 The official date of final demobilization was recognized as 31 December 1993.11

  • 10. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/25812), May 21, 1993.
  • 11. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/561), May 11, 1994.
1994

Full Implementation

Compensation of demobilized members of the FAES, which began on 15 December 1993, proceeded quickly in early 1994, and it was agreed on 28 January 1994 that the indemnities should be fully distributed by 30 June 1994.12

  • 12. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/561), May 11, 1994.
1995

Full Implementation

Demobilization of FMLN combatants as well as El Salvadorian Armed force completed before election in 1994. The FMLN transformed itself into a legitimate party be complying to the demobilization provisos of the accord and the FAES remained loyal to the civilians. Its strength was reduced almost in half by demobilizing its personnel. The estimated strength of the FAES was 22,000 in 1995, which was 38,000 less than its strength in 1991.13

  • 13. Bennett, D. Scott, and Allan Stam, “EUGene: A Conceptual Manual.” International Interactions (2000), 26:179-204.
1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Disarmament

CHAPULTEPEC AGREEMENT (16 January 1992)

Chapter VII: Cessation of the Armed Conflict

Separation of forces

Implementation History
1992

Minimum Implementation

The FMLN submitted its initial reports of personnel and armaments on time, but ONUSAL expressed repeated doubts about the accuracy of these reports. The Armed Forces of El Salvador (FAES) delayed the submission of its initial reports, but they were submitted and verified by ONUSAL.1 The FAES disarmed its civil defense units in April and May 1992.2

The whole Disarmament-Demobilization-Reintegration (DDR) process was then stalled for a period of several months because of grievances stemming from the failure of the Government of El Salvador to abolish the Treasury Police and National Guard as promised and the Government’s involvement in illicit evictions of peasants from farms in disputed territories. The office of the Secretary-General intervened and convinced the parties to set 15 December 1992 as the new date by which the FMLN would be fully demobilized and reintegrated and the FAES would be fully purified, thus constituting the formal end of the armed conflict. In addition, and contingent upon progress toward this agreement on part of the FAES, the FMLN agreed to concentrate its weapons by 30 November 1992 and begin their destruction on 1 December 1992. The Government agreed to resume the dissolution of military units as previously agreed once the FMLN destroys its weapons.3 When the first 20% of FMLN ex-combatants were demobilized on 30 June 1992, ONUSAL was dissatisfied with the amount of weapons turned over and insisted that the FMLN hand over a full 20% of its inventory. The FMLN finally submitted a cache of weapons to appease ONUSAL on 18 August 1992, but the weapons were in poor condition, raising ONUSAL suspicions that the FMLN was not being honest about its inventories. The second 20% of FMLN’s weapons (in reasonable condition) was handed over on 24 September 1992, and the third 20% by 31 October 1992.4The FMLN concentrated the remainder of its declared weapons and submitted the final inventory to ONUSAL on 30 November 1992. ONUSAL was satisfied with the inventory at this point, and destruction of weapons began. The destruction was delayed, however, and the FMLN did not meet the deadline of 15 December 1992 to eliminate the entire stockpile. The weapons were still not destroyed by the end of 1992, but the delay did not undermine the cessation of armed conflict.5

The FAES failed to begin recovering military weapons from private individuals on time, and it continued to postpone the process despite pressure from ONUSAL.6

  • 1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999), May 26, 1992.
  • 2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/24833), November 23, 1992.
  • 3. “Letter Dated 11 November 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/24805), November 13, 1992.
  • 4. United Nations Security Council, (S/24833).
  • 5. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations Security Council, (S/25006), December 23, 1992; “Letter Dated 29 January 1993 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council, (S/25200), January 29, 1993.
  • 6. United Nations Security Council, (S/24833); United Nations Security Council, (S/25006).
1993

Minimum Implementation

The FMLN continued to delay the destruction of the final stockpile of weapons submitted into the beginning of 1993. It announced that it was conditioning the completion of its disarmament upon the Government’s implementation of the Peace Agreements, and the two parties reached an agreement on 4 February 1993. The FMLN destroyed the remainder of its weapons inside El Salvador on 11 February 1993 and completed the destruction of arms outside El Salvador on 1 April 1992. About 3.5% of the total inventory of weapons was reported lost or stolen and not destroyed.7

The FAES was slow to fulfill its duty to recover military weapons held by private individuals, and ONUSAL expressed doubts that its lists even included the weapons the FAES distributed during the years of conflict.8 The recovery of all weapons held by private citizens was delayed by the Legislative Assembly, which was late to pass laws regulating the use and possession of weapons.9

On 23 May 1993 a large cache of weapons was discovered in Managua, Nicaragua. The FMLN later admitted it had kept this and several other secret stashes of weapons both inside and outside El Salvador under the control of a variety of factions, but maintained that they never intended to return to armed conflict. This constituted a serious violation of the Peace Agreements and threatened to sever all trust in the FMLN by the Government and the UN observers. The Government of El Salvador was outraged, and President Cristiani threatened to revoke the FMLN’s status as a legal political party. The UN Security Council expressed serious concerns for the future of the Peace Agreement. The FMLN cooperated with ONUSAL to locate all remaining weapons and begin destroying them.10 The FMLN did not meet the deadline of 45 days to destroy the newly discovered weapons, claiming that logistical issues forced them to take more time. A total of 114 arms caches were uncovered both inside and outside El Salvador. ONUSAL verified that they were all finally destroyed on 18 August 1993. The FMLN subsequently declared that its military structure was fully eliminated.11

  • 7. “Letter Dated 29 January 1993 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/25200) January 29, 1993; “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/25812), May 21, 1993.
  • 8. United Nations Security Council, (S/25812).
  • 9. “Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/26790), November 23, 1993.
  • 10. “Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations Security Council (S/26005), June 29, 1993.
  • 11. “Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations Security Council (S/26371), August 30, 1993.
1994

Intermediate Implementation

There were no reports to contradict the FMLN’s claim to be disarmed.

The Law for the Control of Weapons, Munitions, Explosives and Related Artifacts took effect on 11 January 1994, after it was approved by the Legislative Assembly on 9 December 1993 The Government initiated a campaign to recover military weapons from private individuals, but very few were actually relinquished to the FAES. The demining process concluded on 30 January 1994, with over 9,500 mines being cleared.12

  • 12. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/561), May 11, 1994.
1995

Intermediate Implementation

There were no reports to contradict the FMLN’s claim to be disarmed.

FAES efforts to collect military weapons held by private citizens remained ineffective. A central issue was the large number of unrecorded weapons in circulation. The Government seized about 2,000 weapons during the first few months of 1995, few of which were given voluntarily. Without clear records, the Government would have to rely on voluntary surrender of the weapons, but without incentives, weapons holders were reluctant to take any initiative to return them.13 However, an estimated 300,000 illegal weapons remained among the civilian population.14

  • 13. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1995/220), March 24, 1995.
  • 14. “El Salvador: Thousands of weapons still in civilian hands,” Inter-Press Service, June 22, 1995.
1996

Intermediate Implementation

There were no reports to contradict the FMLN’s claim to be disarmed.

1997

Intermediate Implementation

Reports surfaced that a new cache of weapons belonging to the FMLN was found in Nicaragua. President Calderon Sol accused the FMLN of failing to comply with the Peace Agreement, ordered an investigation and filed a complaint with the UN. However, Nicaraguan officials did not confirm President Calderon Sol’s accusations.15

  • 15. “President says FMLN not surrendering weapons,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 27, 1997.
1998

Intermediate Implementation

No new developments were reported.

1999

Full Implementation

A private organization, the Patriotic Movement Against Crime, took up the task of reclaiming small arms from the civilian population, offering coupons for basic necessities for each gun relinquished. Over 2000 weapons were collected.16

  • 16. “El Salvador: Swapping arms for staple goods,” Inter-Press Service, April 27, 1999.
2000

Full Implementation

FMLN was completely disarmed as of provisions of the accord. Nevertheless, it occurred only after the ONUSAL destroyed the arms caches inside and outside El Salvador in 1993. Number of weapons collected in the disarmament process is not available.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Reintegration

CHAPULTEPEC AGREEMENT (16 January 1992)

Chapter VI: Political Participation by FMLN

The following agreements have been reached concerning political participation by FMLN, and shall be subject to the implementation timetable contained in this Agreement:

Implementation History
1992

Minimum Implementation

The FAES began reducing its armed forces on schedule, releasing most ex-combatants into civilian life, but transferring some to non-military service, which was not in strict compliance with the peace agreement.1 The FMLN refused to meet the initial benchmark of reintegrating 20% of its ex-combatants by 1 May 1992, citing as justification failures to facilitate the process on part of the Government of El Salvador.2 The Parties subsequently reached a negotiated agreement to begin the reintegration of former FMLN combatants to civilian life by 30 June 1992 and finish by 31 October 1992, to propose legislation to facilitate the legalization of the FMLN as a political party by 30 June 1992, and to finalize programs to reintegrate former FMLN combatants into civilian life by 15 July 1992.3 The first 20% of FMLN ex-combatants were indeed demobilized by 30 June 1992, restarting its reintegration process.4

However, the whole Disarmament-Demobilization-Reintegration (DDR) process was then stalled for a period of several months because of grievances stemming from the failure of the Government of El Salvador to abolish the Treasury Police and National Guard as promised and the Government’s involvement in illicit evictions of peasants from farms in disputed territories. The office of the Secretary-General intervened and convinced the parties to set 15 December 1992 as the new date by which the FMLN would be fully demobilized and reintegrated and the FAES would be fully purified, thus constituting the formal end of the armed conflict.5 The FAES also disbanded two immediate reaction infantry battalions by November 1992, and after the negotiations agreed to disband a third by 8 December 1992.6 The fourth contingent of FMLN ex-combatants was demobilized after further delays, but the fifth and final contingent was disbanded on time. The FMLN was ultimately legalized as a political party on 14 December 1992, in coordination with the completion of the DDR process and formal cessation of armed conflict on 15 December 1992.7

On 23 January 1992, the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador granted a general amnesty for those responsible for political crimes and offenses through a law on national reconciliation. Notable exceptions are offenses within the purview of the Commission on the Truth and individuals who were already convicted by a jury. The national reconciliation law enabled FMLN leaders to reintegrate into society, and those who joined COPAZ, among others, formally pledged allegiance to the Constitution of El Salvador. The Government provided security for former FMLN combatants and the FMLN formally began the process of becoming a political party on 30 July 1992. Full recognition as a party was delayed by the delays in the DDR process as a whole.8

  • 1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/24833), November 23, 1992.
  • 2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999), May 26, 1992.
  • 3. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999/Add.1), June 16, 1992.
  • 4. United Nations Security Council, (S/24833).
  • 5. “Letter Dated 11 November 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/24805), November 13, 1992.
  • 6. United Nations Security Council, (S/24833).
  • 7. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations Security Council (S/25006), December 23, 1992.
  • 8. United Nations Security Council, (S/23999); United Nations Security Council, (S/24833).
1993

Minimum Implementation

On 4 February 1993, the parties agreed upon a program to reintegrate former officers and middle-rank commanders of the FMLN. The plan included training, subsistence allowances, and access to credit for 600 ex-combatants.9 The programs lacked a comprehensive, coordinated strategy, however. This resulted in synchronization problems and repeated mistakes in multiple programs.10

  • 9. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/25812), May 21, 1993.
  • 10. “Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/26790), November 23, 1993.
1994

Minimum Implementation

UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali strenuously impressed upon the Government of El Salvador to finally phase out the National Police, complete the reintegration process and institute the constitutional reforms recommended by the Commission on the Truth. Despite multiple appeals, President Cristiani and the Government remained reluctant to move on these issues.11

The reintegration of ex-combatants was slowed by credit deficiencies and ineffective technical assistance programs.12

  • 11. “Letter Dated 28 March from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/361), March 30, 1994.
  • 12. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/561), May 11, 1994.
1995

Minimum Implementation

Deficiencies in credit availability persisted, with former FAES combatants being affected more than former FMLN combatants. The Fund for the Protection of the Wounded and War-Disabled as a Consequence of Armed Conflict was particularly hampered by administrative delays and a lack of resources.12

  • 12. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1995/220), March 24, 1995.
1996

Intermediate Implementation

In the words of the Secretary-General in the last MINUSAL report, “The quantifiable targets for the reintegration programmes have been largely achieved.”13

  • 13. “Mission of the United Nations in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/50/935), April 23, 1996, Pg. 6, Para. 23.
1997

Full Implementation

Former combatants had been reintegrated, and only some support programs remained to be implemented. The Fund for the Protection of the Wounded and War-Disabled was resistant to providing information, making verification of its operations difficult. As of April 1997, the Fund owed back payment for pensions dispersed to over 4,000 relatives of combatants killed during the conflict. A large number of relatives were turned down for benefits because they lacked proper legal documentation. The Legislative Assembly made weak moves to allow special documentation to substitute for what the Fund had been requiring.14

  • 14. “Assessment of the Peace Process in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/51/517), July 1, 1997.
1998

Full Implementation

Outstanding issues preventing the completion of the programs for land transfer, human settlement transfer and assistance for the wounded and war-disabled were not resolved as of the conclusion of official UN observation on 30 June 1998.15

  • 15. “Letter Dated 7 August 1998 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the General Assembly,” United Nations General Assembly (A/52/1008), September 24, 1998.
1999

Full Implementation

The reintegration of ex-combatants was achieved. Nevertheless, tens of thousands of demobilized ex-combatants were yet unemployed with no other sources of income.16

  • 16. “El Salvador: Swapping arms for staple goods,” Inter-Press Service, April 27, 1999.
2000

Full Implementation

Reintegration of ex-combatants back to civilian life was achieved. Nevertheless, many of them remained unemployed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Prisoner Release

AGREEMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS (aka San Jose Agreement, 26 July 1990)

I. Respect for and Guarantee of Human Rights

3. In the course of the present negotiations, appropriate legal procedures and timetables shall be determined for the release of individuals who have been imprisoned for political reasons.

CHAPULTEPEC AGREEMENT (16 January 1992)

Implementation History
1992

Full Implementation

On 23 January 1992, the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador granted amnesty for those responsible for political crimes and offenses. The amnesty applied to 50 men and 30 women jailed for their support of the FMLN. Notable exceptions are offenses within the purview of the Commission on the Truth and individuals who were already convicted by a jury. Political detainees covered by the amnesty were released.1

La Esperanza Penitentiary in San Salvador was raided on 27 November 1992 in an apparent prisoner rescue operation. Twenty-eight prisoners escaped through a hole blown in the wall. Reports indicated that the prison was believed to hold 15 political prisoners. President Cristiani denied that the government held any political prisoners, claiming that all were released by the 23 January 1992 amnesty decree. He blamed the FMLN for the attack, but the FMLN denied its involvement.2

  • 1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999), May 26, 1992; “El Salvador to grant amnesty to political prisoners," United Press International, February 12, 1992.
  • 2. “International News,” The Associated Press, November 27, 1992.
1993

Full Implementation

After the release of the report of the Commission on the Truth, the Government issued a general amnesty to protect those implicated for human rights violations. As a consequence, notorious convicted criminals were freed, such as FAES officers Guillermo Benavides and Yusshy Rene Mendoza, who were convicted for the 1989 murder of six Jesuit priests and sentenced to thirty years in prison.3 This ran counter to the specific recommendations of the Commission on the Truth and betrayed the intentions behind the Peace Agreement provisions on prisoner release, which were to release the political prisoners associated with the FMLN.

  • 3. “International News Briefs,” The Associated Press, April 2, 1993.
1994

Full Implementation

Political prisoners detained for their alleged political crimes or support to the FMLN were released in 1992.

1995

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Paramilitary Groups

CHAPULTEPEC AGREEMENT (16 January 1992)

Chapter I: Armed Forces

10. Paramilitary bodies

A. The Parties recognize the principle that any paramilitary force or group must be proscribed in a State governed by the rule of law.

Implementation History
1992

Minimum Implementation

The Armed Forces of El Salvador (FAES) carried out the disbandment of civil defense units in April and May 1992. Although they were nominally integrated into the FAES on schedule, the Treasury Police and National Guard failed to abandon their barracks by the established deadline.1 The Parties subsequently reached a negotiated agreement to concentrate forces in the established areas by 25 June 1992, and to present legislation to definitively abolish the National Guard and Treasury Police and establish a “Special Brigade for Military Security” by 30 June 1992.2 The FAES disbanded the Territorial Service by 30 July 1992. The FMLN also completed the concentration of combatants according to the agreement by 26 June 1992. Some small groups of armed and uniformed persons in support of “public security committees” remained outside the concentration sites, but with pressure from ONUSAL, these groups also complied with the concentration agreements by 30 August 1992.3

The FAES failed to begin recovering military weapons from private individuals on time, and it continued to postpone the process despite pressure from ONUSAL.4

  • 1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999), May 26, 1992; “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council, (S/24833), November 23, 1992.
  • 2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999/Add.1), June 16, 1992.
  • 3. United Nations Security Council, (S/24833).
  • 4. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations Security Council, (S/25006), December 23, 1992.
1993

Minimum Implementation

The FAES was slow to fulfill its duty to recover military weapons held by private individuals, and ONUSAL expressed doubts that its lists even included the weapons the FAES distributed during the years of conflict.5 The recovery of all weapons held by private citizens was delayed by the Legislative Assembly, which was late to pass laws regulating the use and possession of weapons.6

ONUSAL verified that the National Intelligence Department was formally dismantled in November 1993, and the new State Intelligence Agency was created. It was not clear whether the FAES were still engaged in intelligence activities outside those permitted by the Peace Agreements.7

  • 5. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/25812), May 21, 1993.
  • 6. “Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/26790), November 23, 1993.
  • 7. United Nations Security Council, (S/26790).
1994

Intermediate Implementation

Following the worst months of post-conflict violence, President Calderon Sol formed a working group and pledged to bring all politically motivated criminal groups to justice.8 The paramilitary groups that endured morphed into criminal gangs, but were still tied to politically-motivated attacks.9

The Law for the Control of Weapons, Munitions, Explosives and Related Artifacts took effect on 11 January 1994, after it was approved by the Legislative Assembly on 9 December 1993. The Government initiated a campaign to recover military weapons from private individuals, but very few were actually relinquished to the FAES.10

The National Police was formally disbanded on 31 December 1994 as per the provisions in the peace accord.11

  • 8. “El Salvador: Calderon Sol promises to eradicate death squads,” Inter-Press Service, April 28, 1994.
  • 9. “Death squads tied to Salvadoran crime,” United Press International, July 28, 1994.
  • 10. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/561), May 11, 1994).
  • 11. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1995/220), March 24, 1995.
1995

Intermediate Implementation

FAES efforts to collect military weapons held by private citizens remained ineffective. A central issue was the large number of unrecorded weapons in circulation. The Government seized about 2,000 weapons during the first few months of 1995, few of which were given voluntarily. Without clear records, the Government would have to rely on voluntary surrender of the weapons, but without incentives, weapons holders were reluctant to take any initiative to return them.12

  • 12. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1995/220), March 24, 1995.
1996

Intermediate Implementation

Even after the establishment of the National Civil Police, the Government still had some agents acting in a public security capacity outside the formal structure of the National Civil Police. In March 1996, the Government dissolved one such group, the “analysis unit,” but other personnel continued on.13

  • 13. “Mission of the United Nations in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/50/935), April 23, 1996.
1997

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1998

Intermediate Implementation

High violent crime rates and organized violence remained an issue in post-accord period. Politically mobilized paramilitary groups were either dissolved or disbanded but collecting weapons from civilian population remained a challenging issue. Availability of weapons could also have contributed to increasing rate of organized violence.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

Human Rights

AGREEMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS (aka San Jose Agreement, 26 July 1990)

I. Respect for and Guarantee of Human Rights

Implementation History
1992

Minimum Implementation

COPAZ and the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador approved the law establishing the Office of the National Counsel for the Defense of Human Rights. The Counsel was then appointed, but delayed in beginning operations due to financial shortages. When the Counsel began operating, it dealt with cases procedurally, but did not act on them.1

ONUSAL raised concerns about persistent anonymous death threats made against potential witnesses to unsolved violent deaths and the lack of adequate action taken by the Government to address them.2 From January to May 1992 especially, the ONUSAL Human Rights Division received dozens of complaints about arbitrary killings and deadly force perpetrated by persons with FAES escorts and former members of the civil defense. A number of attacks against and attempted murders of ex-combatants and organizations affiliated with the parties to the conflict were also reported. Human rights activists were notable subjects of death threats from clandestine groups, as well.3

The use of torture by police officers was confirmed in a few cases, and abuse of arrested persons was systematic, especially at the time of capture.4 The civil defense and territorial service apparatuses were not dismantled on schedule, and ONUSAL received hundreds of reports of unlawful, arbitrary and/or incommunicado detention by members of these institutions. Municipal police showed little respect for due process laws and detainee/prisoner rights, and the judicial system lacked sufficient capacity to investigate or protect against such violations.5 The penal system was fraught with systemic violations of the rights of prisoners and detainees. In March 1992, 4755 of the total 5286 persons held in penitentiaries and penal centers were still awaiting trial. A lack of judges and court personnel was a significant part of the problem, but more importantly, the penal code did not live up to the standards set by the international conventions El Salvador had ratified.6 Minors were detained together with adults, and the living conditions in prisons and detention centers were deplorable.7

The FAES unlawfully recruited members in over 100 cases in early 1992, and FMLN was found to have children under the age of 15 among its ranks. However, recruitment and membership violations in the armed forces of both sides gradually ceased after the signing of the Peace Agreement.8

In general, freedom of movement was restored and international humanitarian law was upheld after the cease-fire took effect. However, ONUSAL received a large number of complaints from both civilians and the Government of unlawful acts or threats of violence and land occupations perpetrated by the FMLN.9

Gender discrimination remained widespread, with systematic discrimination against women at all levels and in all locations. The leading cause of death among women was complications of pregnancy, due to inequitable access to medical care. Salvadorian women constantly faced domestic violence, street violence and sexual harassment.10

  • 1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999), May 26, 1992; “Situation of human rights in El Salvador,” United Nations General Assembly (A/47/596), November 13, 1992.
  • 2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/24833), November 23, 1992.
  • 3. “Situation of human rights in El Salvador,” United Nations General Assembly (A/47/596), November 13, 1992.
  • 4. “Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division,” United Nations Security Council (S/24375), August 12, 1992.
  • 5. United Nations General Assembly, (A/47/596).
  • 6. “Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of ONUSAL,” United Nations Security Council (S/24066), June 5, 1992).
  • 7. “Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division,” United Nations Security Council (S/24375), August 12, 1992.
  • 8. “Situation of human rights in El Salvador,” United Nations General Assembly (A/47/596), November 13, 1992.
  • 9. ibid.
  • 10. ibid.
1993

Intermediate Implementation

The National Counsel for the Defense of Human Rights opened regional offices and established itself as an autonomous protector of the peace agreements and burgeoning democracy.11

On 20 May 1993, Salvadorian riot police opened fire on a group of disabled FMLN war veterans demonstrating in Sal Salvador. At least three persons were killed. It was marked as the worst outbreak of violence since the cease-fire took effect.12

ONUSAL saw the report of the Commission on the Truth as one of the most importation human rights developments during its mission. It was clear that it viewed the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth as mandatory for the parties to the conflict.13

Serious concerns persisted regarding the continued trend of violations of the right to life and the right to integrity of person during the mid-year months.14 At the end of October 1993, two FMLN leaders were assassinated, raising political tension further around the issue of extrajudicial killings.15 Of particular concern was the number of these cases that seemed to involved death squads committing murders and making threats of a political nature.16 UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the Security Council pressed upon ONUSAL and the parties to the Peace Agreement to take decisive action to curb the continuing trend of political murders. A Joint Group consisting of representatives from the Government, the National Counsel for the Defense of Human Rights and the ONUSAL Human Rights Division formed to investigate politically motivated illegal armed groups.17 The Government also created the Inter-institutional Investigation Commission to respond to the many reports of extralegal executions, especially those of FMLN ex-combatants. ONUSAL still criticized the Government for its inability to guarantee proper criminal investigations and due process procedures.18

ONUSAL observed that the overall human rights situation improved at the end of the year, after several tenuous months during the middle months of the year. Concerns about politically motivated violence persisted, as details about the violent acts emerged. The total number of complaints deemed admissible by the Human Rights Division during 1993 was 1618, with the greatest proportions regarding violations of the right to life (23.3%), due process (22.7%) and personal freedom (22%). The persons most responsible (presumably) for the violations were members of the National Police (32.5%), the judiciary (19%) and persons unknown (15.1%).19

  • 11. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/25812), May 21, 1993; “Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador up to 30 April 1993,” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/47/968 S/26033), July 2, 1993.
  • 12. “Killings at demonstration,” Keesing’s Record of World Events Volume 39, El Salvador, p. 39456.
  • 13. “Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador up to 30 April 1993,” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/47/968 S/26033), July 2, 1993.
  • 14. ibid.
  • 15. “Letter Dated 3 November 1993 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/26689), November 3, 1993).
  • 16. “Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/26790), November 23, 1993.
  • 17. “Letter Dated 7 December 1993 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/26865), December 11, 1993).
  • 18. “Ninth report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/49/59 S/1994/47), January 18, 1994.
  • 19. “Tenth report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/49/116 S/1994/385), April 5, 1994.
1994

Intermediate Implementation

The Office of the National Counsel for the Defense of Human Rights (NCDHR) released a report at the beginning of the year concluding that progress on human rights in El Salvador is hindered by contradictions. Instruments and institutions were forming, but international human rights norms were far from standardized and compliance was lacking in the country.20 Later in the year, the NCDHR joined with the National Counsel to establish a authentication apparatus for reports of human rights violations in the country.21

The overall human rights situation improved after the regression during the middle of 1993, evidenced by lower numbers of complaints to the Human Rights Division of ONUSAL. However, reports of the involvement of FAES and National Police personnel in criminal activity, ongoing organized crime and political violence, and the systemic deficiencies in the rule of law tempered the relative improvements and marred the reputation of the new Government. A survey conducted during March 1994 revealed that crime is of greatest concern among the public, with 25% of persons reporting being a victim of assault during the prior three months. ONUSAL contended that the main source of human rights abuses was impunity, which stems from a weak justice system. The Legislative Assembly passed some constitutional amendments to incorporate some, but not all, of the recommendations from the Human Rights Division and the Commission on the Truth.22

The recommendations from the Commission on the Truth regarding recognition and ratification of international human rights treaties and instruments went on unheeded.23

On 10 November 1994, David Fausto Merino Ramirez, FMLN leader, was murdered along with other former revolutionaries, in an apparently politically motivated attack.24

  • 20. “Tenth report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/49/116 S/1994/385), April 5, 1994.
  • 21. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/1212), October 31, 1994.
  • 22. “Eleventh Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (1 March – 30 June 1994),” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/49/281 S/1994/886), July 28, 1994.
  • 23. United Nations Security Council, (S/1994/1212).
  • 24. “Thirteenth Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations Security Council / General Assembly (A/49/888 S/1995/281), April 18, 1995.
1995

Intermediate Implementation

The general trend of improvement in human rights since 1993 continued into 1995. Disappearances ceased and murders of a political nature became rare. The Government’s enforcement institutions were improving on a similar trajectory, but still fell short of fulfilling all the recommendations from the Commission on the Truth.25 The office of the National Counsel for Human Rights elected a new ombudswoman in March 1995, and the profile of the Counsel rose thereafter.26

In its final report, the ONUSAL Human Rights Division reiterated that the primary source of human rights violations in the country was impunity. So long as the judiciary and National Civil Police continued to fall short of the ideals established by the Peace Accords and the Commission on the Truth Recommendations, impunity would persist.27

In compliance with the recommendations from the Commission on the Truth, on 30 March 1995, the Legislative Assembly ratified the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Government also formally recognized the authority of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.28

As of 6 October 1995, the Legislative Assembly had not approved most of the legal and constitutional reforms it was required to approve by the Commission on the Truth recommendations and the 18 May 1995 revised work plan. The deadline for these reforms was set for 31 October 1995, but the Legislative Assembly was on track to approve some of them no sooner than the end of November 1995, and others not before mid-1996.29

  • 25. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1995/220), March 24, 1995.
  • 26. “The Situation in Central America: Procedures for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace and Progress in Fashioning a Region of Peace, Freedom, Democracy and Development,” United Nations General Assembly (A/50/517), October 6, 1995.
  • 27. “Thirteenth Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations Security Council / General Assembly (A/49/888 S/1995/281), April 18, 1995.
  • 28. “ Thirteenth Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/49/888 S/1995/281), April 18, 1995.
  • 29. “The Situation in Central America: Procedures for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace and Progress in Fashioning a Region of Peace, Freedom, Democracy and Development,” United Nations General Assembly (A/50/517), October 6, 1995.
1996

Intermediate Implementation

At the conclusion of ONUSAL’s mandate, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali commented that the Government’s emergency actions to fight crime contradicted some components of the Peace Accords and set back improvements in human rights.30

  • 30. “International News, Associated Press Worldstream,” Associated Press, April 30, 1996.
1997

Intermediate Implementation

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan proclaimed in 1997, “Massive human rights violations no longer occur [in El Salvador]. The systematic practice of forced disappearances, torture, the holding of prisoners incommunicado, acts of terrorism and summary and arbitrary executions on political grounds is a thing of the past.” The Government still had not ratified some important international treaties recommended by the Commission on the Truth, such as the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. The budget of the National Counsel for the Defense of Human Rights was cut significantly, hindering its ability to fulfill the role given it by the Peace Agreements.31

Despite continued promises by the Government to improve the rule of law, rates of violent crime spiked, with 8,281 homicides—compared to an average of 6,330 annual deaths during the civil war.32

  • 31. “Assessment of the Peace Process in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General," United Nations General Assembly (A/51/917), July 1, 1997, p. 5, para. 16.
  • 32. “C. America violence tarnishes peace,” Associated Press Online, June 13, 1998.
1998

Intermediate Implementation

According to a report, the Salvadoran government’s human rights record improved somewhat in 1998. There was no report of political killings. However, there were two cases of suspected extrajudicial killings. There were no confirmed politically motivated disappearances. Torture, other cruel treatment and arbitrary arrests were constitutionally prohibited but the PNC continued to use excessive force and otherwise mistreat detainees as well as arbitrary arrests.33 Organized crimes were on the rise.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

According to the U.S. State Department Human Rights Report, the government of El Salvador had some problems on issues related to its human rights record. However, the there was some improvement in the government’s performance. It was reported that there were several extrajudicial killings by police, use of excessive police force, mistreatment, arbitrary detention etc. Nevertheless, the new Civilian National Police was said to be improving its procedures.34 The report also suggests high organized crime, which increased after the signing of the accord in 1992.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

Organized crimes continued to rise and had some implication on human rights record of government of El Salvador. According to a report, the Salvadoran government’s human rights record improved somewhat in 2000. There was no report of political killings. However, there were two cases of suspected extrajudicial killings by police officers. There were no confirmed politically motivated disappearances. Torture, other cruel treatment and arbitrary arrests were constitutionally prohibited but the PNC continued to use excessive force and otherwise mistreat detainees as well as arbitrary arrests.35 According to the same report, impunity for the rich and powerful remained a problem.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

Organized crimes continued to rise and had some implication on human rights record of government of El Salvador. According to a report, the Salvadoran government’s human rights record improved somewhat in 2001. There was no report of political killings. However, there were two cases of suspected extrajudicial killings by police officers. There were no confirmed politically motivated disappearances. Torture, other cruel treatment and arbitrary arrests were constitutionally prohibited but the PNC continued to use excessive force and otherwise mistreat detainees as well as arbitrary arrests.36 According to the same report, impunity for the rich and powerful remained a problem. Police kidnapped persons for profit.

2012: The Salvadoran government generally respected human rights, but there were some areas of violation. According to the same report, impunity for the rich and powerful remained a problem. Police kidnapped persons for profit. Gender related violence and discrimination remained a serious problem. Some police officers committed killings, and used excessive force and mistreated detainees. Prison conditions remained poor, and overcrowding was a continuing problem.37

Refugees

AGREEMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS (aka San Jose Agreement, 26 July 1990)

I. Respect for and Guarantee of Human Rights

Implementation History
1992

Intermediate Implementation

The Government of El Salvador began to coordinate with neighboring countries for the resettlement of Salvadorian refugees.1 Representatives from the UN High Commission for Refugees went to Mexico to facilitate the return of some 250,000 Salvadoran refugees residing there.2 The greater portion of the approximately 7,000 refugees in Honduras and 20,000 in Nicaragua had already returned by the time the Peace Agreement was signed. Around 2,000 of those left in Nicaragua prepared to return as soon as the cease fire took effect.3 Over 250 maimed FMLN combatants returned from Cuba, where they had been receiving medical treatment.4 Some 200,000 Salvadoran refugees remained in the United States. It seemed many either did not wish to return, or were too uncertain about the peace process to return before it was complete.5

The Legislative Assembly passed two decrees to help displaced persons and returnees gain/regain documents for certification and registration with the Government of El Salvador.6

  • 1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999), May 26, 1992.
  • 2. “U.N. to hasten return of Salvadoran refugees from Mexico,” Xinhua General News Service, February 29, 1992.
  • 3. “Salvadoran refugees in Nicaragua hope to return home,” Xinhua General News Service, January 4, 1992; “Last group of Salvadoran refugees in Honduras return home,” Xinhua General News Service, April 1, 1992.
  • 4. “Disabled Salvadoran guerrillas leave Cuba for home,” Xinhua General News Service, June 17, 1992.
  • 5. “United States: Can Salvadoran refugees stay?" Inter-Press Service, May 13, 1992.
  • 6. “Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of ONUSAL,” United Nations Security Council (S/24066), June 5, 1992.
1993

Intermediate Implementation

The roughly 200,000 Salvadoran refugees granted safe-haven in the United States were set to have their temporary protected status expire on 30 June 1993, after President Bush had extended it a year past the prior expiration date of 30 June 1992. Advocates for the refugees estimated that another 500,000 Salvadorans were in the US without documentation and argued that conditions were still too unstable in El Salvador to repatriate such large numbers of persons en masse.7 President Clinton extended the temporary protected status for an additional 18 months, setting the new deadline for 31 December 1994.8

A Board of Vigilance composed of representatives of all the political parties was created to advise citizens on problems they encountered in getting voter registration cards.9 This was important because refugees in the process of repatriation faced problems due to a lack of legal documentation.

  • 7. “United States will allow Salvadorens to stay,” The Associated Press, May 14, 1992; “El Salvador: U.S. urged to extend safe haven for thousands," Inter-Press Service, March 20, 1993.
  • 8. “U.S. does not extend Salvadoran refugee program,” Deutshe Presse-Agentur, December 2, 1994.
  • 9. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/179), February 16, 1994.
1994

Intermediate Implementation

The legal limbo in which many returned refugees found themselves became a more salient issue as the first post-conflict election neared. Despite important improvements made by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, many discrepancies persisted in the registration records. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal did not meet the deadline in early 1994 for issuing registration cards after the push to register as many voters as possible.10 By 16 March 1994, more than 74,000 persons requesting voter registration cards still had not received them due to insufficient documentation.11

In December 1994, the US Government announced it would not extend the temporary protected status of approximately 200,000 Salvadorans sheltered in the US. After their status expired on 31 December 1994, they were to return to El Salvador within nine months.12

  • 10. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/179), February 16, 1994.
  • 11. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/304), March 16, 1994.
  • 12. “U.S. does not extend Salvadoran refugee program,” Deutshe Presse-Agentur, December 2, 1994.
1995

Intermediate Implementation

The Government of El Salvador feared that if all the refugees in the US returned home en masse the economy would not be able to absorb them. The remittances sent to El Salvador from Salvadoran refugees and immigrants in the US made up a large part of the Salvadoran economy as well. The Government actively assisted Salvadorans in the US on temporary protected status visas to extend their stays by applying for political asylum.13

  • 13. “El Salvador lends a hand to keep refugees in U.S.,” The Houston Chronicle, October 27, 1995.
1996

Intermediate Implementation

Salvadoran refugees continued to apply for asylum up until the end of the nine-month grace period. More than 100,000 applied in total. Once their case was received for review, they may be granted permission to stay until it is resolved, but refugee advocates only expected a small fraction of applicants to be granted asylum. The US pledged that there would be no mass-deportations in any case.14

The Supreme Electoral Tribunal made some administrative reforms, but was not advancing very quickly to institute the acts of the Legislative Assembly to improve the voting register. Much work was to be done to implement the ONUSAL and MINUSAL recommendations before the 1997 legislative and municipal elections, but the Tribunal was hampered by a small budget.15

  • 14. “Salvadorans face deadline – Today is last day for refugees to apply for political asylum,” San Antonio Express-News, January 31, 1996; “Peace in El Salvador strikes fear in refugees; Time is running out on temporary protected status of 190,000,” Knight-Ridder News Service, via Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, February 18, 1996, National Section, p. A4.
  • 15. “Mission of the United Nations in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/50/935), April 23, 1996.
1997

Intermediate Implementation

President Calderon Sol criticized the US for not being more lenient with Salvadoran refugees.16 The US Congress made moves to loosen immigration regulations that would require the deportation of all Salvadoran refugees denied political asylum. Under the new rules, refugees would be allowed to stay long enough to apply for residency, but residency would not be guaranteed.17

  • 16. “Salvador president hits U.S.; Immigration, drugs are focus of speech,” The Washington Times, June 20, 1997.
  • 17. “Congress to loosen immigration rules," Austin American-Statesman, November 7, 1997.
1998

Intermediate Implementation

In 1999, the US government confirmed plans to allow Salvadoran refugees to apply for permanent residence in the US. The plan applied for those who had entered the US before 1990, and was designed to heed concerns that mass deportations would exacerbate El Salvador’s unemployment problems.18

Following two disastrous earthquakes in 2001 (which came after a deadly hurricane in 1998), the US government granted Temporary Protected Status for undocumented Salvadoran immigrants. The move was expected to benefit about 300,000 Salvadorans living in the US.19

Instead of being repatriated and resettled back in El Salvador, more than two-third of the Salvadoran refugees ended up settling in the United States. This happened even when the peace process became a success and no political prosecution and killings took place in the aftermath of the peace accords.

  • 18. “Guatemala,” Keesing’s Record of World Events, Vol. 45, (May 1999), p. 42932.
  • 19. “El Salvador,” Keesing’s Record of World Events, vol. 47, (March 2001), p. 44046.
1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Internally Displaced Persons

AGREEMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS (aka San Jose Agreement, 26 July 1990)

I. Respect for and Guarantee of Human Rights

Implementation History
1992

Minimum Implementation

The Legislative Assembly passed two decrees to help displaced persons and returnees gain/regain documents for certification and registration with the Government of El Salvador.1

The Government made an agreement with the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) to share information on displaced persons and analyze the needs of approximately 7,000 former FMLN combatants gathered in designated areas according to the demobilization plan. The World Food Program was also authorized to provide assistance at displaced persons’ encampments.2

Tensions between peasants and public security bodies continued despite assurances that the current residents of lands in conflict zones could remain where they were after the signing of the Peace Agreement. In some cases, the Armed Forces of El Salvador (FAES) worked with public security forces—without court orders—to evict peasants from disputed lands and occupy the lands for themselves. COPAZ intervened, but did not fully succeed in halting the evictions. ONUSAL subsequently intervened, but also failed to put an end to the evictions for several months.3 The UN Secretary-General’s office then became involved, and after consulting a number of international bodies and UN member states, helped the Parties reach an agreement to proceed with land transfers in late October 1992.4 However, ONUSAL received reports that unsanctioned land occupations continued into November 1992.5

  • 1. “Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of ONUSAL,” United Nations Security Council (S/24066), June 5, 1992.
  • 2. “El Salvador: UNFPA to provide aid for displaced communities,” Inter-Press Service, March 12, 1992.
  • 3. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999), May 26, 1992.
  • 4. “Letter Dated 19 October 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/24699), October 19, 1992.
  • 5. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/24833), November 23, 1992.
1993

Minimum Implementation

Despite serious financial difficulties, the program for the transfer of lands proceeded, albeit at a slow pace. Both parties contributed to the delays: FMLN was slow to submit complete lists of land transfer recipients and the Government’s Lands Bank maintained slow and complicated procedures for the legal transfer of land. Both parties also relocated landholders on land whose owners were not willing to sell, further complicating the process.6 Progress fell further behind in October 1993.7 After an appeal to move forward by the UN Secretary-General, the parties reached a new agreement to move forward on 13 October 1993, and the Government developed an Acceleration Plan.8

A Board of Vigilance composed of representatives of all the political parties was created to advise citizens on problems they encountered in getting voter registration cards.9 Internally displaced persons often faced problems in getting voter registration cards due to a lack of legal documentation of their displacement as well as resettlement.

  • 6. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/25812), May 21, 1993.
  • 7. “Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/26790), November 23, 1993.
  • 8. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/561), May 11, 1994.
  • 9. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/179), February 16, 1994.
1994

Minimum Implementation

The Acceleration Plan brought progress in the land transfer program, but not nearly at the rate it promised and not in the proportions promised to the FMLN beneficiaries in the 13 October 1993 agreement. On 21 April 1994, the Legislative Assembly passed a bill to reform the Labor Code to reflect reforms agreed upon in previous meetings of the Forum for Economic and Social Consultation, but the labor sector criticized the bill.10 The Government submitted a new acceleration plan on 18 August 1994, in which it pledged to strengthen the administrative infrastructure necessary to facilitate land transfers to FMLN ex-combatants. The program was stalled by funding shortfalls, however.11 At the two-year mark after the program began, only one-third of potential beneficiaries had actually received land.12 New progressive strides were made in November and December 1994, including improved administrative measures, shifting of responsibilities to the regional level, and increased personnel to measure land and communicate with potential beneficiaries.13

The legal limbo in which many internally displaced persons found themselves became a more salient issue as the first post-conflict election neared. Despite important improvements made by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, many discrepancies persisted in the registration records. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal did not meet the deadline in early 1994 for issuing registration cards after the push to register as many voters as possible.14 By 16 March 1994, more than 74,000 persons requesting voter registration cards still had not received them due to insufficient documentation.15

  • 10. United Nations Security Council, (S/1994/561).
  • 11. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/1000), August 26, 1994.
  • 12. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/1212), October 31, 1994.
  • 13. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1995/220), March 24, 1995.
  • 14. United Nations Security Council, (S/1994/179).
  • 15. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/304), March 16, 1994.
1995

Minimum Implementation

The forward momentum in land reform programs created at the end of 1994 was curbed in January 1995, due in large part to personnel turnover in the Lands Bank. As of March 1995, approximately 45% of former combatants eligible for land-transfers had in fact received legal ownership of land. The Government was operating at a pace far too slow to meet the 30 April 1995 deadline for completion of the Acceleration Plan. The delays in land transfer programs, and especially delays in dealing with the relocation of human settlements, was becoming and increasing source of contention. Absent decisive involvement of the Government, lawful landowners and de facto landholders were repeatedly pitted against one another, and confrontations between them threatened to have a broad impact on the Peace Agreement.16 Problems persisted into late 1995. The Government stepped up efforts to get land titles to potential beneficiaries, and indeed the proportion rose to 75% in September, but then it was discovered that only 25% of these had filed with the land registry—a step which was necessary for the title holders to sell the land and complete the transfer process.17

  • 16. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1995/220), March 24, 1995.
  • 17. “The Situation in Central America: Procedures for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace and Progress in Fashioning a Region of Peace, Freedom, Democracy and Development,” United Nations General Assembly (A/50/517), October 6, 1995.
1996

Intermediate Implementation

After a number of persons left the program, the total number of potential beneficiaries of land reform fell to 36,550. By 26 March 1996, 32,210 of them had received titles, and about half of those were recorded in the land registry. The program faced an impasse when land-for-sale became scarce and the human settlement relocations left some persons in unsustainable situations.18

By November 1996, nearly 99% of potential beneficiaries had received titles, and 87% of those had filed their deeds in the national registry.19

The Supreme Electoral Tribunal made some administrative reforms, but was not advancing very quickly to institute the acts of the Legislative Assembly to improve the voting register. Much work was to be done to implement the ONUSAL and MINUSAL recommendations before the 1997 legislative and municipal elections, but the Tribunal was hampered by a small budget.20

  • 18. “Mission of the United Nations in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/50/935), April 23, 1996.
  • 19. “Office of the United Nations Verification in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/51/693), November 25, 1996.
  • 20. “Mission of the United Nations in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/50/935), April 23, 1996.
1997

Full Implementation

The land transfer programs remained a challenge, but progress was made on many of the most vexing cases. The transfer of human settlements was again the biggest challenge.21

Nearing the completion of the land transfer program, almost 35,000 persons had received titles to a total of over 140,000 manzanas (235,200 acres) of land. Hundreds of persons had not received land titles, however, and the government was still moving rather slowly to resolve the logistical issues preventing the completion of the program.22

  • 21. “Letter Dated 15 December 1997 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly,” United Nations General Assembly (A/52/731), December 16, 1997.
  • 22. “Assessment of the Peace Process in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/51/517), July 1, 1997.
1998

Full Implementation

Outstanding issues preventing the completion of the programs for land transfer and human settlement transfer were not resolved as of the conclusion of official UN observation on 30 June 1998.23 The IDP resettlement program was relatively successful.

  • 23. “Letter Dated 7 August 1998 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the General Assembly,” United Nations General Assembly (A/52/1008), September 24, 1998.
1999

Full Implementation

No major developments were reported related to resettlement of conflict related displaced persons.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Media Reform

CHAPULTEPEC AGREEMENT (16 January 1992)

Chapter VI: Political Participation by FMLN

The following agreements have been reached concerning political participation by FMLN, and shall be subject to the implementation timetable contained in this Agreement:

4. Granting of licenses for FMLN mass media.

Annex F: Use of the mass media to promote reconciliation

Implementation History
1992

Minimum Implementation

The Government of El Salvador granted provisional licenses to the FMLN for two radio stations, but not the television station it requested.1

  • 1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/24833), November 23, 1992.
1993

Intermediate Implementation

On 8 September 1993, the Government pledged to assign two new television and one short-wave stations to the FMLN, fulfilling the agreements made on 22 December 1992.2 ccording to the US State Department, the Salvadoran government did not control media in El Salvador in 1993.3 This suggests a significant media reform in El Salvador.

  • 2. “Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/26790), November 23, 1993.
  • 3. "EL SALVADOR HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES," US State Department, State Department Dispatch, February 1994.
1994

Full Implementation

The FMLN’s primary radio station, “Radio Vencerermos,” operated without interference from the Government, but it struggled to survive in a competitive market after leaving behind its former propaganda.4 According to US State Department, the Salvadoran government did not control media in El Salvador in 1994.5 This suggests a significant media reform in El Salvador.

  • 4. “Rebel broadcasting goes mainstream in El Salvador,” The Globe and Mail, March 23, 1994.
  • 5. "EL SALVADOR HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES," US State Department, State Department Dispatch, March 1995.
1995

Full Implementation

Media Reform provisions of the accord were implemented by allowing FMLN to open radio and television stations. Also, government did not control media. No setbacks in media reform took place.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Economic and Social Development

NEW YORK AGREEMENT (25 September 1991)

VII. Economic and social questions

Implementation History
1992

Intermediate Implementation

Tensions between peasants and public security bodies continued despite assurances that the current residents of lands in conflict zones could remain where they were after the signing of the Peace Agreement. In some cases, the Armed Forces of El Salvador (FAES) worked with public security forces—without court orders—to evict peasants from disputed lands and occupy the lands for themselves. COPAZ intervened, but did not fully succeed in halting the evictions. ONUSAL subsequently intervened, but also failed to put an end to the evictions for several months.1 The UN Secretary-General’s office then became involved, and after consulting a number of international bodies and UN member states, helped the Parties reach an agreement to proceed with land transfers in late October 1992.2 However, ONUSAL received reports that unsanctioned land occupations continued into November 1992.3

The Government submitted its national reconstruction plan on time and began to implement components of it.4 After some minor delays, the emergency assistance programs were implemented for the majority of demobilized FMLN ex-combatants. Agricultural training and rehabilitation programs for the disabled ex-combatants were also started.5

  • 1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999), May 26, 1992.
  • 2. “Letter Dated 19 October 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council," United Nations Security Council (S/24699), October 19, 1992.
  • 3. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/24833), November 23, 1992.
  • 4. United Nations Security Council, (S/23999).
  • 5. (United Nations Security Council, (S/24833).
1993

Intermediate Implementation

Despite serious financial difficulties, the program for the transfer of lands proceeded, albeit at a slow pace. Both parties contributed to the delays: FMLN was slow to submit complete lists of land transfer recipients and the Government’s Lands Bank maintained slow and complicated procedures for the legal transfer of land. Both parties also relocated landholders on land whose owners were not willing to sell, further complicating the process.6 Progress fell further behind in October 1993.7 After an appeal to move forward by the UN Secretary-General, the parties reached a new agreement to move forward on 13 October 1993, and the Government developed an Acceleration Plan.8

The distribution of agricultural tools and basic household goods concluded in April 1993, along with the agricultural training program. A lack of available credit hindered the purchase of land and stunted housing and agricultural development.9

Programs for the war-disabled were delayed because the two parties could not agree upon ways to provide long-term rehabilitation. The medical program was likewise delayed over disagreements about personnel and slow delivery of hospital equipment.10

The parties agreed to continuously consult one another on labor issues through a newly created Labor Council in the Ministry of Labor. The business sector, however, pulled out on 20 November 1993.11

  • 6. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/25812), May 21, 1993.
  • 7. “Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/26790), November 23, 1993.
  • 8. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/561), May 11, 1994.
  • 9. United Nations Security Council, (S/25812).
  • 10. United Nations Security Council, (S/25812).
  • 11. United Nations Security Council, (S/26790).
1994

Intermediate Implementation

The Acceleration Plan brought progress in the land transfer program, but not nearly at the rate it promised and not in the proportions promised to the FMLN beneficiaries in the 13 October 1993 agreement. On 21 April 1994, the Legislative Assembly passed a bill to reform the Labor Code to reflect reforms agreed upon in previous meetings of the Forum for Economic and Social Consultation, but the labor sector criticized the bill.12 The Government submitted a new acceleration plan on 18 August 1994, in which it pledged to strengthen the administrative infrastructure necessary to facilitate land transfers to FMLN ex-combatants. The program was stalled by funding shortfalls, however.13 At the two-year mark after the program began, only one-third of potential beneficiaries had actually received land.14 New progressive strides were made in November and December 1994, including improved administrative measures, shifting of responsibilities to the regional level, and increased personnel to measure land and communicate with potential beneficiaries.15

  • 12. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/561), May 11, 1994.
  • 13. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/1000), August 26, 1994.
  • 14. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/1212), October 31, 1994.
  • 15. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1995/220), March 24, 1995.
1995

Intermediate Implementation

The forward momentum in land reform programs created at the end of 1994 was curbed in January 1995, due in large part to personnel turnover in the Lands Bank. As of March 1995, approximately 45% of former combatants eligible for land-transfers had in fact received legal ownership of land. The Government was operating at a pace far too slow to meet the 30 April 1995 deadline for completion of the Acceleration Plan. The delays in land transfer programs, and especially delays in dealing with the relocation of human settlements, was becoming an increasing source of contention. Absent decisive involvement of the Government, lawful landowners and de facto landholders were repeatedly pitted against one another, and confrontations between them threatened to have a broad impact on the Peace Agreement.16 Problems persisted into late 1995. The Government stepped up efforts to get land titles to potential beneficiaries, and indeed the proportion rose to 75% in September, but then it was discovered that only 25% of these had filed with the land registry—a step which was necessary for the title holders to sell the land and complete the transfer process.17

  • 16. United Nations Security Council, (S/1995/220).
  • 17. “The Situation in Central America: Procedures for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace and Progress in Fashioning a Region of Peace, Freedom, Democracy and Development,” United Nations General Assembly (A/50/517), October 6, 1995.
1996

Intermediate Implementation

After a number of persons left the program, the total number of potential beneficiaries of land reform fell to 36,550. By 26 March 1996, 32,210 of them had received titles, and about half of those were recorded in the land registry. The program faced an impasse when land-for-sale became scarce and the human settlement relocations left some persons in unsustainable situations.18

By November 1996, nearly 99% of potential beneficiaries had received titles, and 87% of those had filed their deeds in the national registry.19

  • 18. “Mission of the United Nations in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/50/935), April 23, 1996.
  • 19. “Office of the United Nations Verification in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/51/693), November 25, 1996.
1997

Full Implementation

Nearing the completion of the land transfer program, almost 35,000 persons had received titles to a total of over 140,000 manzanas (235,200 acres) of land. Hundreds of persons had not received land titles, however, and the government was still moving rather slowly to resolve the logistical issues preventing the completion of the program.20

  • 20.  “Assessment of the Peace Process in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/51/517), July 1, 1997.
1998

Full Implementation

Outstanding issues preventing the completion of the programs for land transfer and human settlement transfer were not resolved as of the conclusion of official UN observation on 30 June 1998.21

 

Hurricane Mitch devastated the whole region, killing thousands and setting development back by twenty years.22 A flurry of monetary aid, loans and debt forgiveness came in from international donors.23

  • 21. “Letter Dated 7 August 1998 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the General Assembly,” United Nations General Assembly (A/52/1008), September 24, 1998.
  • 22. “The Week’s Top Ten World Stories,” The Guardian, November 7, 1998.
  • 23. “Central America,” Keesing’s Record of World Events, November 1998, Vol. 44, p. 42608; “Central America and Caribbean,” Keesing’s Record of World Events, December 1998, Vol. 44, p. 42666.
1999

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2000

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2001

Full Implementation

Progresses were made in terms of redistributing lands and agriculture equipment. El Salvador adopted the US Dollar as its official currency to reduce borrowing costs. Two earthquakes struck in 2001, setting economic development back again.23

  • 23. “El Salvador,” Keesing’s Record of World Events, January 2001, Vol. 47, p. 43940.
2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Donor Support

CHAPULTEPEC AGREEMENT (16 January 1992)

Chapter V: Economic and Social Questions

9. National Reconstruction Plan

Implementation History
1992

Intermediate Implementation

ONUSAL and the office of the Secretary-General began appealing to governments and international/regional organizations to put up funds to carry out land transfers, since the Government of El Salvador was to pay land-owners for lands to be transferred to peasant farmers but did not have nearly the amount of money required to make all the purchases.1

Japan pledged $4.5 million for emergency aid, including about $750,000 for refugee relief, and economic restructuring.2 Canada pledged up to $5 million for poverty alleviation, human rights promotion and democratization.3 The United States pledged to redirect some of its ongoing military aid to the Government of El Salvador toward peaceful programs. The US would put up $250 million over two years to support the peace process. In total, 18 countries and 12 NGOs promised to contribute $800 million for post-conflict reconstruction.4

  • 1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/24833), November 23, 1992.
  • 2. “Watanabe pledges emergency aid package to El Salvador,” Japan Economic Newswire, March 5, 1992.
  • 3. “Canada contributes to the peace process in Central America,” Canada NewsWire, April 13, 1992.
  • 4. “El Salvador: An end to U.S. military aid?,” Inter-Press Service, March 25, 1992.
1993

Intermediate Implementation

The Government of El Salvador faced major funding shortfalls for the programs directly related to the peace agreements. Approximately $1.2 billion was needed. The Government committed over $300 million, and the international community less than $300 million, leaving a gap of $600 million. ONUSAL appealed to foreign ministers for additional support, but the donor community did not live up to expectations.5

  • 5. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/25812), May 21, 1993.
1994

Intermediate Implementation

In March 1994, the Government reported a budget shortfall of $376 million for expenses arising from the Peace Accords. Grants and loans given or committed by international donors amounted to approximately $140 million.6 The land-transfer program was partially financed by the United States Agency for International Development, but still lacked $32 million to be completed. Other reintegration programs lacked a sum total of approximately $50 million.7

When MINUSAL took over for ONUSAL, it teamed up with UNDP to prepare technical assistance programs estimated to cost $9.8 million. As of September 1995, donors had pledged $4.23 million to support the programs.8

  • 6. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/561), May 11, 1994.
  • 7. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/1000), August 26, 1994.
  • 8. “The Situation in Central America: Procedures for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace and Progress in Fashioning a Region of Peace, Freedom, Democracy and Development,” United Nations General Assembly (A/50/517), October 6, 1995.
1995

Full Implementation

International donors promised an additional $1.3 billion to support the programs of the Peace Accords. Approximately $1.8 billion had been spent already. Donors included the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, the US, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, and Switzerland.9

  • 9. “El Salvador-Finance: Donors back peace with new aid pledge." Inter-Press Service, June 22, 1995.
1996

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1997

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1998

Full Implementation

Emergency aid in the wake of Hurricane Mitch became the central focus of international donations in 1998.10

  • 10. “World Bank announces major support for Central America to recover from Hurricane Mitch,” M2 Presswire, December 11, 1998.
1999

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2000

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2001

Full Implementation

Two earthquakes in 2001 caused further damage and sparked international donors to provide further assistance.11 Donor support was crucial for the implementation of the peace accord and countries and donor agencies provided much needed financial and technical support to the peace process.

  • 11. “UN Assembly calls for continued generous response to El Salvador earthquake emergency,” M2 Presswire, January 29, 2001.
Detailed Implementation Timeline

CHAPULTEPEC AGREEMENT (16 January 1991)

Chapter IX: Implementation Timetable

1. Copaz

1.1 Submission to the Legislative Assembly of the preliminary bill formalizing COPAZ: A+8 at the latest.

1.2 Establishment: D-day.

2. Armed Forces

2.1 Ratification of the constitutional reform

2.1.1 Ratification by the Legislative Assembly: between A- and D-days.

Implementation History
1992

Minimum Implementation

The Parties failed to implement several components of the Agreement by the specified dates: both the Government and the FMLN were over three months late in concentrating their forces in the designated areas; the Government was over three months late in establishing the National Public Security Academy; the FMLN was over three months late in returning the first 20% of its combatants to civilian life; the Government was over three months late in promoting legislation to establish the FMLN as a political party.1 The Parties subsequently reached a negotiated agreement to adjust the deadlines as follows: concentrate forces in the established areas by 25 June 1992; begin the reintegration of former FMLN combatants to civilian life by 30 June 1992 and finish by 31 October 1992; commence the first course at the National Public Security Academy within 15 days after June 30 1992; present legislation to definitively abolish the National Guard and Treasury Police and establish a “Special Brigade for Military Security” (with no further transfers from military bodies to the National Civil Police) by 30 June 1992; propose legislation to facilitate the legalization of the FMLN as a political party by 30 June 1992; finalize programs to reintegrate former FMLN combatants into civilian life by 15 July 1992; and complete COPAZ verification of inventories of lands presented by the FMLN by 30 June 1992.2 On 23 December 1992, ONUSAL confirmed that the armed conflict between the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN formally ended on 15 December 1992.3

  • 1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999), May 26, 1992.
  • 2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999/Add.1), June 16, 1992.
  • 3. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations Security Council (S/25006), December 23, 1992.
1993

Minimum Implementation

Both parties were slow to implement multiple aspects of the peace agreement, in violation of the detailed timeline. In late August and early September1993, ONUSAL brought the parties together to agree to a new timetable before the electoral campaigns began on 20 November 1993. The parties reached new agreements on the regulation of private weapons and security services, disbanding the old National Police and building up the new National Civil Police, admitting former FMLN combatants in leadership training at the National Public Security Academy, other reintegration programs, and land transfers.4

  • 4. “Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/26790), November 23, 1993.
1994

Minimum Implementation

On 19 May 1994, the parties agreed to a new “Timetable for the Implementation of the Most Important Agreements Pending.” The contents of this agreement are summarized as follows:
Armed forces: military weapons held by non-military state institutions shall be collected by 20 May 1994, and weapons held by civilians by 30 May 1994.
Public security: the National Civil Police shall complete its replacement of the National Police by 31 March 1995; the new units of the NCP will all be deployed by 31 March 1995, the Government shall appoint an Inspector-General during June 1994 and the General Inspectorate shall be operational by 30 September 1994; the Government shall set up Control and Disciplinary Investigation Units by 31 July 1994; and the Government shall enact new measures to promote recruitment to the National Civil Police, subject to UN verification.
Land transfers: the Government shall fulfill the Acceleration Plan by 30 April 1995.
Reintegration: the Government shall undertake to complete each program for the reintegration of FMLN ex-combatants in a timely manner, with the programs beginning mostly in early 1994 (if not begun already) and concluding mostly in mid-1994 (and the latest, the scholarship program, ending in August 1998).
Recommendations of the Commission on the Truth: the Government shall by 30 May 1994 remove roadblocks preventing the Legislative Assembly from approving all the draft laws necessary to heed the unfulfilled recommendations by the Commission on the Truth.
The parties shall work to reconstitute the Forum for Economic and Social Consultation by 30 June 1994.
The parties shall meet with the UN bi-weekly to follow up on the new timetable.5

Prompted by concerns raised by the UN Security Council, the parties signed a joint declaration of commitment to fully implement the Chapultepec Agreement by 30 April 1995 at the latest.6

  • 5. “Letter Dated 24 May 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/612), May 24, 1994.
  • 6. “Letter Dated 6 October 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/1144), October 10, 1994.
1995

Minimum Implementation

At the conclusion of the ONUSAL mandate and commencement of the new United Nations Mission in El Salvador (MINUSAL), the parties assented to another revised work plan for the full implementation of the Peace Agreement. The new ultimate deadline set was 31 October 1995—with a few exceptions, including training for personnel transferred into the Criminal Investigation Division and Anti-Narcotics Division of the National Civil Police (31 December 1995), land transfers for rural human settlements (30 April 1996), and some assistance programs for reintegrated ex-combatants (as late as 31 August 1998). Important among the reforms left incomplete at the conclusion of the ONUSAL mission were: amendments to the Code of Military Justice and the army rules and regulations; repeal of the 1886 Police Act; habeas corpus act; Criminal Code; Code of Criminal Procedure; Prison Act; amendments to the Constitutional Procedures Act (amparo); amendments to the Judicial Career Act; amendments to the National Council of the Judiciary Act; and amendments to the Act organizing the judiciary.7

  • 7. “Letter Dated 18 May 1995 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (1995.S/1995/407), May 18, 1995.
1996

Full Implementation

There was delay in implementing some provisions, but most of the provisions, except for land redistribution and socio-economic development, were implemented.

1997

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1998

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1999

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2000

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2001

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

Natural Resource Management

NEW YORK AGREEMENT (25 September 1991)

VII. Economic and social questions

Implementation History
1992

Minimum Implementation

After disputes between peasants and FAES soldiers began the land transfer program on a sour note, the UN Secretary-General’s office became involved and helped the Parties reach an agreement to proceed with land transfers in late October 1992.1 However, ONUSAL received reports that unsanctioned land occupations continued into November 1992.2

The Government submitted its national reconstruction plan on time and began to implement components of it.3 Agricultural training and rehabilitation programs for the disabled ex-combatants were started.4

  • 1. “Letter Dated 19 October 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/24699), October 19, 1992.
  • 2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/24833), November 23, 1992.
  • 3. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999), May 26, 1992.
  • 4. United Nations Security Council, (S/24833).
1993

Intermediate Implementation

Despite serious financial difficulties, the program for the transfer of lands proceeded, albeit at a slow pace. Both parties contributed to the delays: FMLN was slow to submit complete lists of land transfer recipients and the Government’s Lands Bank maintained slow and complicated procedures for the legal transfer of land. Both parties also relocated landholders on land whose owners were not willing to sell, further complicating the process.5 Progress fell further behind in October 1993.6 After an appeal to move forward by the UN Secretary-General, the parties reached a new agreement to move forward on 13 October 1993, and the Government developed an Acceleration Plan.7

The distribution of agricultural tools and basic household goods concluded in April 1993, along with the agricultural training program. A lack of available credit hindered the purchase of land and stunted housing and agricultural development.8

  • 5. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/25812), May 21, 1993.
  • 6. “Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/26790), November 23, 1993.
  • 7. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/561), May 11, 1994.
  • 8. United Nations Security Council, (S/25812).
1994

Intermediate Implementation

The Acceleration Plan brought progress in the land transfer program, but not nearly at the rate it promised and not in the proportions promised to the FMLN beneficiaries in the 13 October 1993 agreement.9 The Government submitted a new acceleration plan on 18 August 1994, in which it pledged to strengthen the administrative infrastructure necessary to facilitate land transfers to FMLN ex-combatants. The program was stalled by funding shortfalls, however.10 At the two-year mark after the program began, only one-third of potential beneficiaries had actually received land.11 New progressive strides were made in November and December 1994, including improved administrative measures, shifting of responsibilities to the regional level, and increased personnel to measure land and communicate with potential beneficiaries.12

  • 9. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/561), May 11, 1994.
  • 10. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/1000), August 26, 1994.
  • 11. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/1212), October 31, 1994.
  • 12. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1995/220), March 24, 1995.
1995

Intermediate Implementation

The forward momentum in land reform programs created at the end of 1994 was curbed in January 1995, due in large part to personnel turnover in the Lands Bank. As of March 1995, approximately 45% of former combatants eligible for land-transfers had in fact received legal ownership of land. The Government was operating at a pace far too slow to meet the 30 April 1995 deadline for completion of the Acceleration Plan. The delays in land transfer programs, and especially delays in dealing with the relocation of human settlements, was becoming and increasing source of contention. Absent decisive involvement of the Government, lawful landowners and de facto landholders were repeatedly pitted against one another, and confrontations between them threatened to have a broad impact on the Peace Agreement.13 Problems persisted into late 1995. The Government stepped up efforts to get land titles to potential beneficiaries, and indeed the proportion rose to 75% in September, but then it was discovered that only 25% of these had filed with the land registry—a step which was necessary for the title holders to sell the land and complete the transfer process.14

  • 13. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1995/220), March 24, 1995.
  • 14. “The Situation in Central America: Procedures for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace and Progress in Fashioning a Region of Peace, Freedom, Democracy and Development,” United Nations General Assembly (A/50/517), October 6, 1995.
1996

Full Implementation

After a number of persons left the program, the total number of potential beneficiaries of land reform fell to 36,550. By 26 March 1996, 32,210 of them had received titles, and about half of those were recorded in the land registry. The program faced an impasse when land-for-sale became scarce and the human settlement relocations left some persons in unsustainable situations.15

By November 1996, nearly 99% of potential beneficiaries had received titles, and 87% of those had filed their deeds in the national registry.16

  • 15. “Mission of the United Nations in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/50/935), April 23, 1996.
  • 16. “Office of the United Nations Verification in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/51/693), November 25, 1996.
1997

Full Implementation

The land transfer programs remained a challenge, but progress was made on many of the most vexing cases.17

Nearing the completion of the land transfer program, almost 35,000 persons had received titles to a total of over 140,000 manzanas (235,200 acres) of land. Hundreds of persons had not received land titles, however, and the government was still moving rather slowly to resolve the logistical issues preventing the completion of the program.18

  • 17. “Letter Dated 15 December 1997 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly,” United Nations General Assembly (A/52/731), December 16, 1997.
  • 18. “Assessment of the Peace Process in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/51/517), July 1, 1997.
1998

Full Implementation

Outstanding issues preventing the completion of the programs for land transfer and human settlement transfer were not resolved as of the conclusion of official UN observation on 30 June 1998.19

Hurricane Mitch devastated the whole region, killing thousands and setting development back by twenty years.20 A flurry of monetary aid, loans and debt forgiveness came in from international donors.21

  • 19. “Letter Dated 7 August 1998 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the General Assembly,” United Nations General Assembly (A/52/1008), September 24, 1998.
  • 20. “The Week’s Top Ten World Stories,” The Guardian, November 7, 1998.
  • 21. “Central America,” Keesing’s Record of World Events, November 1998, Vol. 44, p. 42608; “Central America and Caribbean,” Keesing’s Record of World Events, December 1998, Vol. 44, p. 42666.
1999

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2000

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2001

Full Implementation

Some significant progresses were made in terms of land redistribution. Nevertheless, two earthquakes struck in 2001, setting economic development back again.22

  • 22. “El Salvador,” Keesing’s Record of World Events,  January 2001, Vol. 47, p. 43940.
Review of Agreement

New York Agreement (25 September 1991)

The Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (hereinafter called "the Parties"), 

Implementation History
1992

Minimum Implementation

COPAZ was established according to the Peace Agreements, but it did not initially play as important a role as envisioned in the agreements.1

COPAZ appointed the Special Commission, and the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador appointed the Special Electoral Tribunal after delays. The Government was over three months late in promoting legislation to establish the FMLN as a political party.2

COPAZ and the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador approved the law establishing the Office of the National Counsel for the Defense of Human Rights. The Counsel was then appointed, but delayed in beginning operations due to financial shortages.3

  • 1. “Situation of human rights in El Salvador,” United Nations General Assembly (A/47/596), 13 November 1992.
  • 2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council  (S/23999), May 26, 1992.
  • 3. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (1992.S/23999) May 26, 1992.
1993

Intermediate Implementation

COPAZ worked to seek consensus among its constituent members on various measures related to the Peace Agreement, but met many disagreements over its mandate. It discussed the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth, but moved very slowly and failed to come up with a unified proposal.4

  • 4. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council  (993.S/25812),  May 21, 1993.
1994

Intermediate Implementation

COPAZ continued to operate, and conversations began of it becoming a peace foundation once its mandate was officially fulfilled.5

COPAZ submitted recommendations for a several constitutional reforms to the Legislative Assembly. The recommendations included changes to the functions of the Supreme Court of Justice and protections for individual rights, and they were in line with the Commission on the Truth report. The Assembly passed some constitutional amendments, but did not fulfill the recommendations of COPAZ or the Commission on the Truth.6 

  • 5. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,”  United Nations Security Council (1994.S/1994/1000), August 26, 1994.
  • 6. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (1994.S/1994/561), May 11,1994.
1995

Intermediate Implementation

According to the new timetable for implementation agreed upon on 19 May 1994, COPAZ was set to terminate on 30 April 1995, but it became clear that the Peace Accords would not be fulfilled by that date, and so COPAZ sought an extension on the grounds that its mandate was to ensure the complete implementation of the Peace Accords.7

  • 7. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1995/220), March 24, 1995.
1996

Full Implementation

The mandate of COPAZ expired on 10 January 1996. The Government of El Salvador and the members of COPAZ viewed it as a success, with only a few aspects of the peace process left incomplete—notably the land transfer and rural re-settlement programs. Some of the former members of COPAZ went on to serve in non-governmental organizations, such as Fundapaz, which endeavored to fulfill a similar role as that of COPAZ.8 

  • 8. “National peace commission closes as its work comes to an end,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 15, 1996 [Originally in La Prensa Grafica,  January 11, 1996].
1997

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1998

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1999

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2000

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2001

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism

Agreement on Human Rights (San Jose Agreement, 26 July 1990)

Implementation History
1992

Full Implementation

The United National Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was created by UN Security Council Resolution 693 on 20 May 1991. The original mandate was to oversee the peace process and conduct limited peace-keeping operations. Coinciding with the cease-fire agreement between the AFES and FMLN, the mandate of ONUSAL was transformed to a purely verification operation by UN Security Council Resolution (SC Res.) 729 on 14 January 1992, with three divisions: Human Rights, Military and Police. The horizon of ONUSAL was extended by SC Res. 784 on 30 October 1992. The first ONUSAL report was submitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on 26 May 1992. ONUSAL expressed concern about a number of delays in the implementation of the Peace Agreement, but reported overall progress in the process.1 ONUSAL subsequently facilitated a negotiated agreement between the Parties to adjust several deadlines and renew their efforts to fulfill their obligations in a timely manner.2 Difficult situations such as these caused ONUSAL to take a more proactive role in COPAZ and the implementation of the peace agreements in general.3 Delays and tensions continued into the fall of 1992, so the Security Council granted ONUSAL’s request to extend its mission an additional six months with resolution 791 on 30 November 1992.4 On 23 December 1992, ONUSAL confirmed that the armed conflict between the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN formally ended on 15 December 1992, six weeks late. 5

The ONUSAL Human Rights Division developed robust investigation and verification mechanisms, producing lengthy reports separate from the main series of reports.6 It also organized training, promotion and educational activities regarding human rights.7

The ONUSAL Police Division assumed its role according to the peace agreements, with hundreds of international police observers deployed across the country during the transitional period. The Division assisted in locating illegal arms caches, cooperated with the Military Division in verifying the dissolution of the civil defense units, and supported the Human Rights Division.8

The ONUSAL Military Division began with 290 military observers at the beginning of 1992. It was set to reduce that number by 1 June 1992, but the Chief Military Observer requested and was granted a three-month extension.9 The numbers were reduced upon the formal ending of the armed conflict in December 1992, and the Military Division was restructured.10

  • 1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council, (S/23999), May 26, 1992.
  • 2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council, (S/23999/Add.1), June 16, 1992.
  • 3. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/24833), November 23, 1992.
  • 4. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/25812), May 21, 1993.
  • 5. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations Security Council (S/25006), December 23, 1992.
  • 6. “Situation of human rights in El Salvador,” United Nations General Assembly (A/47/596), November 13, 1992.
  • 7. “Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division,” United Nations Security Council (S/24375), August 12, 1992.
  • 8. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/24833), November 23, 1992.
  • 9. “Letter Dated 15 May 1992 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/23987), May 20, 1992.
  • 10. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/25812), May 21, 1993.
1993

Full Implementation

In January 1993, the Government of El Salvador requested that the UN monitor the first general elections after the cessation of the armed conflict, set for March 1994.11 The mandate of ONUSAL was then expanded to include an Electoral Division by Security Council Resolution 832 on 27 May 1993.

The Government also requested that the ONUSAL Police Division provide professional assistance to the National Civil Police.12 It performed an evaluation of the police in the field and provided advice and support. The Police Division also continued to supervise and support the Auxiliary Transitory Police. The Division had 277 observers, of which 19 were assigned to the Human Rights and Electoral Divisions, in November 1993.13

In May 1993, the Military Division had 74 military observers from Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Ireland, Spain, Sweden and Venezuela and 7 medical officers from Argentina.14

The Military Division coordinated the destruction of landmines, clearing 425 minefields. As of 1 November 1993, the Military Division had 31 observers and 7 medical officers.15

The ONUSAL mandate was extended another six months on 30 November 1993 by UN Security Council Resolution 888.

  • 11. “Letter Dated 26 January 1993 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/25241), February 4, 1993.
  • 12. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/25812, May 21, 1993.
  • 13. “Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/26790), November 23, 1993.
  • 14. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/25812), May 21, 1993.
  • 15. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/25812), May 21, 1993; “Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council, (S/26790), November 23, 1993.
1994

Full Implementation

On 1 May 1994, the Military Division had 22 observers from Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Ireland, Spain, Sweden and Venezuela and 7 medical officers Argentina and Spain. The Police Division had 268 observers from Austria, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Fracnce, Guyanna, Italy, Mexico, Spain and Sweden 16

On 26 May 1994, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of UNOSAL until 30 November 1994 with Resolution 920. Then on 23 November 1994, at the request of the parties to the agreement, the Security Council extended the mandate for the last time, to 30 April 1994 with Resolution 961.

As ONUSAL prepared for the conclusion of its mandate, it focused on building institutional capacity in El Salvador 17

Prompted by concerns raised by the UN Security Council, the parties signed a joint declaration of commitment to fully implement the Chapultepec Agreement by 30 April 1995 at the latest. The declaration included a request to extend the ONUSAL mandate to the same date 18

As of 24 October 1994, ONUSAL’s revenue was over $23 million short of expenses, owing to unpaid financial commitments on part of backing states 19

  • 16. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/561), May 11, 1994.
  • 17. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/1000), August 26, 1994; “Twelfth Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) (1 July – 30 September 1994),”  United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (/49/585; S/1994/1220), October 31, 1994.
  • 18. “Letter Dated 6 October 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/1144), October 10, 1994.
  • 19. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/1212), October 31, 1994.
1995

Full Implementation

In conversations between ONUSAL, the Secretary-General and the Security Council, it was determined that ONUSAL should be formally dissolved on 30 April 1995, even though some aspects of the Peace Accords remained unfulfilled. ONUSAL recommended that a small team of observers remain after its mandate ended, and the Security Council supported the notion.20 The UN General Assembly provided the official initiative for the new “Mission of the United Nations in El Salvador” (MINUSAL) with Resolutions 49/137 (25 January 1995) and 50/7 (6 November 1995).

 During the final period of its mandate, ONUSAL scaled back its presence significantly. In March 1995, it had only 3 military observers (from Brazil, Spain and Venezuela), and 32 police observers.21 During its first 6-month period, MINUSAL had as many as 11 international staff and 8 civilian police consultants.22

  • 20. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council, (S/1995/220), March 24, 1995.
  • 21. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1995/220), March 24, 1995.
  • 22. “The Situation in Central America: Procedures for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace and Progress in Fashioning a Region of Peace, Freedom, Democracy and Development,” United Nations General Assembly (A/50/517), October 6, 1995.
1996

Full Implementation

As the end date for the MINUSAL mandate approached, the parties to the Peace Agreement requested that the UN keep a small group of observers to verify the implementation of the last components of their agreements.23 The Secretary-General agreed that a continued UN presence would be needed after MINUSAL to ensure the final implementation of all components of the Peace Agreements and subsequent binding recommendations. Just before its end, in April 1996, MINUSAL consisted of three police consultants and eight other professional staff members. The idea was to reduce the footprint further, and even move to an intermittent presence.24

On 10 May 1996, the UN General Assembly decided in Resolution 50/226 that MINUSAL would be succeeded by the United Nations Office of Verification (ONUV), consisting of a small team of investigators to verify the final implementation of the Peace Accords. At its outset, ONUV had three police consultants and six international officials.25 The ONUV mandate concluded on 31 December 1996.26

  • 23. “Letter Dated 29 April 1996 from the Permanent Representative of El Salvador to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/50/948), April 30, 1996.
  • 24. “Mission of the United Nations in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/50/935), April 23, 1996.
  • 25. “Office of the United Nations Verification in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/51/693), November 25, 1996.
  • 26. “Assessment of the Peace Process in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/51/917), July 1, 1997.
1997

Full Implementation

ONUV was succeeded by an envoy of the Secretary-General with a small support unit to complete the verification and assessment of the peace process.27 When the support unit began on 1 January 1997, it consisted of one police consultant, three international officials, and two local consultants. The Secretary-General supported terminating the support unit on 30 June 1997, and proposed leaving the task of final verification to a few persons serving with UNDP.28 

  • 27. “Assessment of the Peace Process in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/51/917), July 1,  1997.
  • 28. (Source: . 1997. “Assessment of the Peace Process in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary General,” United Nations General Assembly (A/51/517),  July 1, 1997.
1998

Full Implementation

Two observers, one international and one local, worked through 30 June 1998, at which time the UN concluded its verification of the Peace Agreement.29

  • 29. “Letter Dated 7 August 1998 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the General Assembly,”  United Nations General Assembly (A/52/1008), September 24, 1998.
1999

Full Implementation

No major developments were reported. The UN completely withdrew its mission from El Salvador in 1996. The Office of the United Nations Verification completed its peace agreement verification in June 1998.  

2000

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2001

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

Please always cite: Peace Accords Matrix (Date of retrieval: (03/26/2017),
http://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/chapultepec-peace-agreement,
Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame.