Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 1996

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Verification/Monitoring Mechanism – 1996

1996

Intermediate Implementation Intermediate implementation

The High Representative’s office, immediately after the appointment of the representative, established a human rights task force to coordinate civilian human rights work in Bosnia. However, there was concern that the civilian implementation team moved too slow. The establishment of formal structures – committees, commissions, and human rights chambers – in itself would not bring about the successful implementation of the civilian aspect of the accord. These civilian structures would not be effective unless the former rival groups were determined to build a lasting peace.1

The Dayton Accord was on the verge of collapse due to the efforts of accused Bosnian Serb war criminals to block the peace process. It was said that three Muslims were killed while trying to return to visit their former homes in Serb-held territory. Officials involved in the civilian aspect of the peace implementation were concerned about each party’s commitment to supporting the peace process.2

In June 1996, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) for the civilian implementation of the Peace Accord and the Vienna-based organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe started to raise funds to set up an independent radio and television network in Sarajevo to counter TV and radio stations that were feeding Serb propaganda.3

“As the situation on the ground improved, IFOR began providing support to organizations involved in overseeing the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement, including the Office of the High Representative, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the United Nations” (NATO).4 Once post-conflict elections were completed in September 1996, IFOR’s goals were realized in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Because the situation was still unstable, NATO agreed to deploy a new Stabilization Force (SFOR) in December 1996. The SFOR provided support to the civilian aspect of peace implementation.5

  1. “Keeping Bosnia in One Peace; The Military Mission is Going Well, It’s the Civilian Reforms That Need Help,” The Washington Post, March 31, 1996.
  2. “Bosnia Peace Officials Sound Warning Over Crumbling Accords,” Agence France Presse, May 2, 1996.
  3. “In Bosnia, Propaganda is the News,” Charleston Gazette (West Virginia), June 9, 1996.
  4. “Peace support operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), accessed April 19, 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52122.htm.
  5. “NATO Statement on Bosnia and Herzegovina,” M2 PRESSWIRE, December 10, 1996.