83.33Implementation Score after 10 years
Provisions in this Accord
Cease Fire
1992
As agreed, the ceasefire agreement came into force at zero hours on 11 April, 1992. The Ceasefire Commission (CCF) was already in place to monitor the ceasefire agreement between the Malian state and the Azawad Unified Movements and Fronts (MFUA), which had been negotiated earlier on 6 January 1991. The CCF monitoring mechanism was still in place but because of the fall of the dictatorship on January 8, 1991- immediately after the ceasefire agreement- the Malian authorities lacked resources to support the CCF. The donors were not supportive of the CCF’s efforts. As negotiated, the CCF was expected to have 10 units in different parts of the country, yet only four became operational. This disparity was due to a lack of resources. Algerians did provide partial support to the CCF (vehicles and some fuel). Notwithstanding the limited resources, the CCF arrested some agitators for violating the ceasefire agreement. There were no violations of the ceasefire reported in 1992. 1
- Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, A Peace in Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking (United Nations Publication, 1998), 64-65.
1993
The CCF lacked resources, and out of the planned ten units, only four units were created and these were sporadically operational. Nevertheless, the CCF units were able to arrest agitators.2 Though hopes were high, a violation of ceasefire occurred when Malian soldiers apprehended three Tuareg refugees trying to return to Mali from Mauritania and stabbed them to death. Regular Malian troops also killed former Tuareg fighters who had joined the Malian army. 3
- Ibid., 66.
- “Chronology for Tuareg in Mali,” Minorities at Risk Project, 2004, accessed June 15, 2011 ttp://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/469f38bb2.html.
1994
A serious violation of the ceasefire agreement took place in 1994. On February 1994 Mouvement Populaire de lÕAzawad (MPA) Col. Bilal Saloum was killed, allegedly by Armée révolutionnaire de liberation de lÕAzawad (ARLA). This incident incited further violence between these two rebel movements. On June 15, 1994, three Malian Tuareg movements, the Islamic Arab Front of the Azaouad (FIAA), the ARLA, and the PFLA (Front populaire pour la libération de lÕAzawad) called on their already integrated soldiers to quit the army and return to their bases in northern Mali. On June 20, 1994, the MUFA, (the group that had negotiated the National Pact on behalf of the Tuareg movement), said that 176 people had been killed by “forces of order” (police or soldiers) in northern Mali. The MUFA also contested that the deployment of the army in the northern part of the country was a violation of the spirit of the peace pact. The violence continued until October 23 1994, when the Tuaregs and the Malian government agreed to end the conflict within 6 months. 4
1995
Though they had committed in October of 1994 to end the conflict within six months, both sides continued to engage in violence. The Islamic Arab Front of Azawad was the only Tuareg group still thought to be in open conflict with the government. In January of 1995, the government army announced that they had captured the Ti-n-Edemba, headquarters of FIAA (Islamic Arab Front of Azawad). Tuareg rebels also launched three mortar bombs in Timbuktu 4. By the end of the year, however, violence had abated sufficiently. Most of the armed combatants had presented themselves and surrendered weapons in one of the four cantonment sites. 5
1996
After 1995, sporadic violence was reported but these incidents did not undermine the 1992 National Pact.
1997
No ceasefire violation reported.
1998
No ceasefire violation reported.
1999
No ceasefire violation reported.
2000
No ceasefire violation reported.
2001
No ceasefire violation reported.
TITLE II ON THE FINAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND ON THE SETTLEMENT OF QUESTIONS EMERGING FROM THE SITUATION OF ARMED CONFLICT
5. A permanent cease-fire will come into force at zero hour on the day the signature of the Pact.
6. Until the provisions of paragraph 7.A (below) can be put into effect, and under the supervision of the Ceasefire Commission, the forces of the two parties commit themselves to forbid any action or movement that might increase tension or lead to any incident.
7. Within sixty days following the signature of the Pact, a programme will be put into effect comprised of the following measures:
A -Within the framework of measures for restoring confidence, eliminating factors of insecurity, and the installation of a permanent state of security:
-all the combatants of the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad will be integrated into the various uniformed forces of the State, on an individual and voluntary basis and in accordance with criteria for assessing competence,
-special units of the armed forces will be created for one year, composed mainly of integrated combatants from the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad,
-an internal security corps will be instituted {Gendarmerie, Goum Guards, Police} composed of all sections of the local populations including integrated combatants from the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad, which will be provided to local authorities within their police powers,
-special units of the army will be created, open to all sections of the local populations, whose mission will be limited to the preservation of the integrity and external security of the country’s frontiers.
Those dispositions which refer to the integration of all the combatants and members of the Movements and Fronts mentioned above, are contingent upon the return of the latter with their arms. This operation will be carried out in conjunction with the Ceasefire Commission;
The security and physical protection of the re-integrated combatants and members of the Movements and Fronts, as well as that of the repatriated displaced populations, will be entirely guaranteed;
B -In addition, and in the same spirit of restoring confidence, eliminating factors of insecurity and installing an atmosphere of permanent security, there will be a substantial, gradual and appropriate reduction of the armed forces presently in the North, leading to the withdrawal of the majority. This operation will be carried out in accordance with:
-the final ending of hostilities, according to the ceasefire determined in paragraph 5 above,
-the organisation of the security mechanisms and arrangements described in paragraph 7.A above,
-the redefinition of the objectives of the national army charged with future national defence: this implies a broad redeployment programme involving military installations and bases outside the urban areas, pastures and grazing areas as well as the transformation of certain army installations into centres and schools for military or para-military training, and the use of some redundant barrack facilities as centres for professional training.
8. The ceasefire and the various arrangements described in paragraph 7 above, will come into force under the supervision of the Ceasefire Commission, which will be composed and organised as follows:
A -The Ceasefire Commission will be composed of 10 representatives each from the two parties and the Mediator. Its mandate will be to put in place the arrangements defined in paragraph 7 above;
B -The Ceasefire Commission will replace the Truce Commission. It will take up its functions in Gao within 48 hours after the signing of the Pact. It will organise its work and its decentralised sub-Commissions;
C -For the period of sixty days, while putting into effect the application of the measures described in paragraph 7 above, the Ceasefire Commission will be in permanent session under the Chairmanship of the Mediator and with the permanent participation of its representatives. If need be, this period may be extended until all the above-mentioned measures are fully operational;
D -Beyond this period, the Ceasefire Commission will be in permanent session for one year, with the participation of Representatives of the two parties and under the Chairmanship of each in turn alternating by month, the first Chairmanship falling to the Movements and Fronts;
E -At the end of the first and second trimesters and the second semester following the signing of the Pact, the Ceasefire Commission will meet, each time under the Chairmanship of the Mediator. These special sessions will permit the examination and settlement of any possible dispute linked to its mission, with the final session serving to proclaim the dissolution of the Ceasefire Commission;
F -The costs, expenses and means of the Ceasefire Commission will be provided by the Government of the Republic of Mali, including the payment of individual allowances to representatives of the Movements to the said Commission.
Legislative Branch Reform
1992
The Malian government made a reconciliatory concession by offering four seats in the National Assembly to ensure the real participation of the northern population. These seats were allegedly filled through elections in 1992. 6
- African Election Database, accessed August 26, 2011, http://africanelections.tripod.com.
1993
Four seats in the National Assembly to ensure the participation of the northern population via the 1992 elections.
1994
Four seats in the National Assembly to ensure the participation of the northern population via the 1992 elections.
1995
Four seats in the National Assembly to ensure the participation of the northern population via the 1992 elections.
1996
Four seats in the National Assembly to ensure the participation of the northern population via the 1992 elections.
1997
Following the 1992 peace agreement, the first National Assembly elections were held in April 1997. Nevertheless, the results of this election were cancelled by the Constitutional Court due to irregularities on 25 April 1997. The second elections were held again in July and August of 1997. 4 Neither the information regarding by-elections, nor information regarding the persons representing the north, exists. Since this issue was never raised by insurgent groups in the peace process, this provision could be deemed implemented. Furthermore, the Tuareg political organization is fragmented, and has remained defined by traditional clan-based units.
1998
Since representation of the northern population int he legislative branch of the government was never raised by insurgent groups in the peace process, this provision could be deemed implemented.
1999
Since representation of the northern population int he legislative branch of the government was never raised by insurgent groups in the peace process, this provision could be deemed implemented.
2000
Since representation of the northern population int he legislative branch of the government was never raised by insurgent groups in the peace process, this provision could be deemed implemented.
2001
Since representation of the northern population int he legislative branch of the government was never raised by insurgent groups in the peace process, this provision could be deemed implemented.
SUB-TITLE B
MEASURES TO CONSOLIDATE NATIONAL UNITY
54. In order to ensure that they are fully represented within the National Assembly, and with the goal of ensuring a real participation of the northern populations, including the displaced populations, there will be created -as an exception during the first legislature -a total of four seats to be filled by people displaced from the North of Mali.
55. These seats will be filled through elections to be held at the end of the repatriation programme in favour of displaced persons, and in any case no later than 130 days after signature of the present Pact.
56. There will be, furthermore, one or two additional seats to ensure a fair representation of Malian populations essentially from the North but installed outside the country, which will be part of those seats in the National Assembly which have been reserved for Malians living abroad. These seats, to be filled through by-elections, shall be additional to the seats mentioned in paragraph 54 above.
Decentralization/Federalism
1992
Mali adopted a democratic constitution in February 1992 after overthrowing an authoritarian regime. In Chapter XI, the constitution dictates the rules surrounding regional and local government and section 98, it specifies, “municipal governments are [to be] freely administered by their elected councils, within conditions fixed by the law.” The Malian government’s decision to devolve power to the local government units was a response to three influences: external pressure (from the IMF and World Bank), their own initiatives to consolidate political power, and, finally, domestic pressure from the Taureg threat.7 After the signing of the National Pact, President Alpha Oumar Konar visited Northern Mali and inaugurated new administrative structures. The constitutional provision, the provision for special decentralization for the north, and the inauguration of administrative structures in northern Mali can all be considered serious efforts aimed at devolving power.
- Jennifer C. Seely, “A Political Analysis of Decentralisation: Co-opting the Tuareg Threat in Mali.” Journal of Modern African Studies 39, no. 3(2001): 499-524.
1993
In January 1993, the Decentralization Mission (DM) was formed by presidential decree (93-001). This mission was given a mandate to conceive, propose and facilitate decentralization within one year. Ousmane Sy was named director of the twelve-member board. And in February, the first decentralization law (93-008) was passed. The law outlined the rights and responsibilities of territorial collectivities.8 This law devolves power to the national subunits and gives autonomous control over health, education and some infrastructure, within their respective jurisdictions. These units were also allowed to collect revenue in order to facilitate their responsibilities related to health, education and infrastructure.
1994
The DM, originally established in 1993 to facilitate decentralization within one year, was granted an extension to three years by a presidential decree 94-051 in January 1994. The DM was focused on creating new administrative boundaries by giving villages the opportunity to group themselves into their desired communes.
1995
In March 1995, Law 95-022 was passed. This law outlines the role of state functionaries in the administration of the new territorial collectivities. In April, villages began to deliberate on the self-determination of communes. Law 95-034 was passed, which established not only the Territorial Collectivities Code but also the jurisdiction of the new unitsÕ governing bodies at different levels. In May the presidential decree was announced (Decree 95-210) which determined state representation at the level of collectivities.9
The outcome of these decentralization initiatives was the regrouping of the communes into eight regions. Depending on the size of their population, each commune could have a council of 11-15 members popularly elected for five-year terms. Similarly, councils, as provided by the decentralization law (95-034) were to be formed at the circle and regional levels with members drawn from lower collectivity representatives. Though the state was represented through the presence of civil servants at each level, this was a complete transfer of power to the new collectivities.
1996
By 1996, the entire infrastructure related to the devolution of power was finalized through the enactment of various laws and presidential decrees. The DM required all collectivities to be economically viable. And by 1996, 627 rural and 20 urban communes had been self-determined.10 But, elections for decentralized units were yet to be held.
1997
All structures for the collectivities were finalized but the elections for these collectivities were yet to be held. A total of 701 collectivities were finalized.11
- “Mali: Electoral Team Confirms Ruling Party’s Victory in Municipal Elections,” BBC Monitoring Africa, June 28, 1998.
1998
Communal level elections took place in 19 municipalities on June 21, 1998. The voter turnout was low due to the opposition’s boycott of the elections. In the elections, the ruling party, the Alliance for Democracy in Mali, (ADEMA) won 16 out of the 19 municipalities. The elections in other collectivities were scheduled for November.4 But the November elections for the remaining 782 municipalities were postponed again upon requests from 17 parties, asking for extra time to campaign. Elections were rescheduled for May 2 and June 6.12
1999
In May, elections in 492 towns took place in the Kayes, Koulikoro, Sisasso and Segou regions. In these elections, the ruling Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA) won 4,193 of the 7,124 seats. There were 80 parties but only 30 parties took part in the elections.13 In the remaining towns, elections took place as scheduled on June 6. Following these elections, ethnic clashes occurred between Arab and Kounta communities. These communities fought over the control of Tarkint, a town in the Bourem district;38 people were killed and 13 wounded during the conflict.14
- “Ruling Mali Party Wins Over 4,000 Seats,” Pan African News Agency, May 7, 1999.
- “Ethnic Clashes Kill 46 in Mali,” Panafrican News Agency Daily Newswire, July 19, 1999.
2000
Decentralization was successfully implemented in Mali. Instead of just devolving political and economic power to northern Mali, the government adopted and successfully implemented a decentralization program throughout the country.
2001
Decentralization was successfully implemented in Mali. Instead of just devolving political and economic power to northern Mali, the government adopted and successfully implemented a decentralization program throughout the country.
TITLE III SPECIAL STATUS OF THE NORTH OF MALI
Recognising the importance of the organisation and management of the affairs of the populations within the framework of the peaceful and permanent settlement of the armed conflict in the North of Mali, the two parties have agreed on a special status for the North of Mali.
In the spirit of the management by the populations of their inter-regional, regional and local affairs, and with a view to bringing them closer to this management, the two parties are agreed on the principle of a new administrative reorganisation of the territory in the North of Mali, and at every level. This new administrative reorganisation shall be proposed by the appropriate local authorities and confirmed by Law.
15. This statute defines and consecrates the competence of local, regional and inter-regional Assemblies.
These elected Assemblies are competent to:
A -organise the urban and rural life of their communities;
B -determine and promote the economic, social and cultural development programme of their choice. Such specific or general programmes. whether local or regional, may cover activities such as agriculture, livestock, water management, urban development, habitat, protection of the ecosystem, industry, transport, communications, health, education, culture, tourism, research and promotion of local languages, handicrafts, improvement and protection of historic sites, the management of land and land tenure and incentives to explore and exploit natural resources;
C -ensure through their elected officials, the control of local and regional policing forces and actions of law enforcement;
D -participate fully and effectively in the maintenance of security in the region, and defend national frontiers which is a patriotic duty;
E -ensure concertation, cooperation, and coordination of actions between representative bodies of the various council areas at every organisational level, on the horizontal as well as vertical planes, and between differing levels of collective organisation at the grassroots right through to the inter-regional level which covers the whole of Northern Mali;
F -organise and animate exchanges and complementary activities between local and regional councils in the North and those in the other Regions of Mali;
G -Organise exchanges of experience and assistance with the populations of other localities and countries, and through the twinning of localities and regions of Northern Mali with similar entities in other countries, as well as through the coordination of exchanges and initiatives between neighbouring regions in cross-¬frontier areas, as well as seeking assistance from developmental non-governmental organisations (NGO), and gaining advantage from this cooperation in accordance with the legal agreements concerning their activities.
16. In this respect the respective local, regional and inter-regional instances are:
-the inter-regional Assembly,
-the Region,
-the Commune, Arrondissement and Cercle.
17. At the level of each council area there are:
– an elected Assembly,
– an Executive identified from among the elected members of the Commune, Arrondissement, Cercle or Region,
– a representative of the State participates at the Regional level,
– the inter-regional Assembly will have a permanent secretariat.
CHAPTER I: AT INTER-REGIONAL LEVEL
18. In order to respect the unity of the State and the Nation of Mali, and with the goal of encouraging the policy of development within an area of the national territory which shares very similar geographical, climatic, socio-economic and cultural parameters, an inter-regional Assembly shall be created between the Regions of the North of Mali, for the benefit of the populations concerned and of the Republic of Mali as a whole.
19. Membership of this inter-regional Assembly by the Regions of the North of Mali shall be voluntary.
20. The inter -regional Assembly shall be elected by the Regions belonging to it, and for a term of 5 years. Each member Region shall have 5 seats. The inter¬regional Assembly shall elect its own President.
21. The inter-regional Assembly shall have a permanent secretariat, run by a Secretary-General chosen by the President of the Assembly. The elected members of the inter-regional Assembly shall receive a fee paid by the State. Officials in the permanent secretariat and the Secretary-General will be paid by the State.
22. The inter -regional Assembly shall have an annual budget for its functioning costs which will be funded by the member Regions and augmented by the State.
23. The inter-regional Assembly shall have competence in the following areas:
A -elaborating all developmental, socio-economic or cultural activities or programmes with an inter-regional vocation;
B -coordinating any activity or project of mutual interest to the associated Regions;
C -putting in place, in concertation with the Government and on the basis of the expressed wish of the Regions and their local councils, any suggested adjustment of regional boundaries;
D -proposing to the Government any action or proposal for initiatives or developments which go beyond the limits of a single Region;
E -initiating in conjunction with the relevant national authorities, and supervising the execution of, any project in the areas of training and education, health or culture with a dimension which is common to all the Regions involved, and which will improve response to the needs of the populations (e.g. university hospital or faculties, radio or television stations with an inter-regional audience…. );
F -participating in consultation with the relevant national authorities in any programme concerning member Regions of the inter-regional Assembly in matters concerning national or civil defence, and protection against natural disasters;
G -contributing to the promotion and animation of cross-frontier development activities with neighbouring countries.
CHAPTER II: AT REGIONAL LEVEL
24. Each of the Regions in the North shall have an Assembly democratically elected by the local populations. This Assembly shall be elected by indirect suffrage for a period of five years. The number of members will correspond to the number of electoral constituencies, defined with relation to the population density and the geographical extent, with a minimum of one elected member per Cercle.
25. The Assembly shall elect its Bureau and its President.
26. The Bureau of the Assembly shall select the Chief of the Regional Executive, who shall answer to the Assembly. He shall be assisted by a Secretary-General selected by himself.
27. The Government will appoint a Representative of the State in the Region. In his quality as representative of the Government, he will ensure, together with the President of the Regional Assembly that the decisions of the Regional Assembly are not in contradiction with national rules and legislation.
28. Elected members of the Regional Assembly shall enjoy immunity in the exercise of their duties. They will receive a fee paid by the State.
29. The Regional Executive shall be assisted by officials representing the various deconcentrated services of the State, supporting the regional administration. Notwithstanding the unity of the national Administration, particular priority shall be accorded during recruitment to people who were born in the Region.
30. The Regional Assembly is competent to:
A -undertake any action which will promote the development of the Region;
B -promote investment in the Region;
C -offer an informed opinion on any national development programme;
D -manage through the Executive, credits which are allotted by the Government of the Region;
E -define, conduct and carry out the Regional infrastructure programme and supervise its execution;
F -define and promote a policy in favour of rural development, notably in the areas of land tenure use and management, habitat, the fight against desertification, water management, livestock and the preservation of the ecosystem;
G -encourage and promote industrial and craft development in the Region, notably through the creation of industrial zones and the creation or expansion of local handicraft and artisan units, or any other initiatives which may satisfy local needs;
H -take any measures needed to promote tourism and improved transport facilities;
I -contribute to social and cultural development in the Region, through:
*promoting of harmonious educational and health policies in the Region,
*proposing actions to the Government,
*promoting local social and cultural activities which will expand the cultural traditions of the Region, ensuring its distribution across the whole country, and bringing into the Region other riches of the national cultural heritage. In this regard, any possibility for creating decentralised radio or television stations shall be put into operation.
J -encourage the coordination of efforts and actions between local councils inside the country, and between them and their counterparts beyond the frontiers;
K -study and propose, in concertation with local grassroots organisations, any programme for changing the boundaries of local council areas in the Region.
31. Through its President, the Regional Assembly shall ensure that sufficient numbers of people from the Region are made available to the State, to staff the internal security forces. The Assembly shall exercise a power of control over the police forces and the maintenance of civil order at the regional level.
32. The Regional Assembly is competent to promote a policy of cross-frontier development and a programme of cooperation and exchange with equivalent institutions in neighbouring countries, save only respect for national sovereignty and the commitments of the State.
The Regional Assembly votes the Regional budget. The latter is funded from local rates and taxes, by annual or exceptional subsidies from the State, and by donations and legacies. It also votes to authorise borrowing at the national level, decided by the Region in support of regional development.
CHAPTER III: AT THE LOCAL LEVEL
34. With the aim of bringing the populations closer to the management of their local affairs, the Communes, Arrondissements and Cercles shall have an organisation similar to that of the Region:
-a Council elected for five years, the number of seats being determined by the density of the population, taking account also of the geographical extent. Each Council will elect its President and Bureau, and select a local Executive who will answer to the Council.
-the Secretary-General of the local council area will be selected by the President, and he will ensure that the decisions of the Council are consistent with national rules and legislation.
35. The Councils at the level of the Cercle, Arrondissement and Commune shall exercise powers equivalent to those of the Regional Assembly.
36. The budget of the Cercle, Arrondissement and Commune shall be voted by its Council. It will be funded from local rates, by subsidies allocated by the Region on the basis of credits from the State, and by donations and legacies.
37. This policy of bringing the citizen closer to the management of local affairs will be consolidated by a programme to reinforce the network of urban and rural communes in the North of Mali. The new communal boundaries will be determined through studies and proposals to be carried out and elaborated by each of the Regions in consultation with the lower levels (Cercle, Arrondissement and Commune), which proposals shall be submitted to the appropriate national authority for final approval.
38. In addition to these elected civic structures, any group of citizens acting together or any professional association, whether at the local, regional or inter¬regional level is authorised in the North of Mali, consistent with national rules and legislation.
39. Communes, Arrondissements and Cercles shall be able to initiate programmes of exchange or partnership with equivalent organisations in other Regions of Mali.
40. Communes, Arrondissements and Cercles are authorised to initiate programmes of cooperation and exchange with similar organisations in other countries.
Civil Administration Reform
1992
Integration of former combatants into public and semi-public service did not materialize in 1992.
1993
Integration of former combatants into public and semi-public service did not materialize in 1993.
1994
Negotiations between the government and the MUFA took place in April and May of 1994 in Tamanrasset, Algeria. Both sides negotiated a range of issues including the reintegration of former combatants into uniformed forces and the integration of civilians into the civilian administration. Since the Front Islamique Arabe de lÕAzawad (FIAA) demanded that 40% of integrated positions be reserved for itself, the government negotiators found themselves mediating between the demands of the two groups.15 Integration into the administration did not take place in 1994.
- Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, A Peace in Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking (United Nations Publication, 1998).
1995
Integration into the administration did not take place in 1995.
1996
Integration into the public administration took place in 1996. Yet different sources report conflicting data regarding this integration. One source reporting from the president’s office on 19 February 1997 claimed that a total of 120 persons were integrated into the civil services. Among them, 20 were senior officers, 20 were higher mid-level officers, 20 were lower mid-level officers, 30 junior officers, and 30 were lower rank. Also in 1996, 100 people were integrated into the customs service and another 50 into the water and forest.16 Another source claimed that a total of 149 persons were integrated into civilian administration.17 This integration of a portion of the former combatants completes the civil administration reform that was agreed upon in the National Pact of 1992.
- Kalifa Keita, “Conflict And Conflict Resolution in The Sahel: the Tuareg Insurgency in Mali,” Strategic Studies Institute, 1998, accessed June 14, 2011, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub200.pdf.
- Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf., A Peace in Timbuktu, 119.
1997
The integration of a portion of the former combatants into the civil administration took place in 1996, thus the civil administration reform, as agreed upon in the National Pact of 1992, was completed.
1998
The integration of a portion of the former combatants into the civil administration took place in 1996.
1999
The integration of a portion of the former combatants into the civil administration took place in 1996.
2000
The integration of a portion of the former combatants into the civil administration took place in 1996.
2001
The integration of a portion of the former combatants into the civil administration took place in 1996.
SUB-TITLE B
MEASURES TO CONSOLIDATE NATIONAL UNITY
53. Furthermore, and in the same spirit, the Government will make an effort while taking account of the qualifications required – to integrate officials from the Movements and people from among the populations of Northern Mali, into the various organs of the public and semi-public services.
This measure, which shall be executed within two months of the signing of the Pact, is also aimed at consolidating the spirit of reconciliation and reinforcing confidence, and will help to ensure a fair representation of the populations of each Region inside the State apparatus.
Truth or Reconciliation Mechanism
1992
Detailed information regarding the establishment of a commission of inquiry to investigate the deaths on both sides to the conflict remains unavailable. Allegedly, the commission of inquiry was established, but by the end of 1992 the commission had not done any work because consensus was lacking among foreign members. Even if the commission was not functional, the government was said to have been taking action. Yet none of the soldiers involved in the killings in the north were arrested.18
- ” Mali,” accessed June 16, 2011, http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=767.
1993
Not implemented.
1994
Not implemented.
1995
Not implemented.
1996
Not implemented.
1997
Not implemented.
1998
Not implemented.
1999
Not implemented.
2000
Not implemented.
2001
Not implemented.
NATIONAL PACT
12. In accordance with the decision reached between the two parties at the Mopti Conference in December 1991, confirmed in their Algiers meeting of January 1992 and repeated at their meeting in March, the Independent Commission of Enquiry will be set up in Mopti within 15 days after signature of the Pact.
13. In case the two parties should not have been able to agree within the period specified in the previous paragraph, on the full composition of the Independent Commission of Enquiry, the Commission for Supervision of the Pact -whose creation is included in the present document -meeting under the Chairmanship of the Mediator at the end of the first month after the signing of this Pact, will consider the question and will search out ways and means to overcome this difficulty so that the Independent Commission of Enquiry may be able to function within the terms agreed between the two parties and recorded in the paragraph below.
14. The Independent Commission of Enquiry will work according to the arrangements decided by the two parties which are as follows:
MANDATE OF THE COMMISSION:
The Independent Commission of Enquiry will enquire into all the events which have taken place in Mali with relation to the problems of the North, specifically: crimes committed against the civil populations in their physical and moral persons as well as their properties, violations of the environment and destruction of livestock, theft, pillage and every act of vandalism and damage. The Commission will work to define the responsibility for such acts, their consequences, to evaluate the damages and compensations due to victims.
ORGANISATION. OF THE COMMISSION:
A -The Commission shall be composed as follows:
-five (5) representatives of the Government of the Republic of Mali,
-five (5) representatives of the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad,
-a maximum of seven (7) and a minimum of five (5) independent experts, chosen by common accord by the two parties from the following countries, there being just one expert by nationality: Algeria, Burkina-Faso, France, Libya, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal;
B -the two parties will determine the names of the members of this Commission during their next meeting;
C -the Commission will be Chaired by an independent expert elected by his peers;
D -the Commission will begin its work within three weeks after its installation;
E -the functioning’ costs of the Commission will be covered by the Government of the Republic of Mali: the latter ‘will also do everything to facilitate the Commission’s tasks through its full administrative and material cooperation.
The two parties commit themselves to ensure that the necessary conditions of security are achieved to allow the Commission to function.
FUNCTIONING OF THE COMMISSION
A -the Commission will carry out its mandate independently and impartially;
B -the members of the Commission will be granted immunity. This immunity shall be extended to any person the Commission decides to hear, within the framework of their testimony;
C -the Commission will take decisions by simple majority, the President’s vote serving to determine the majority in case of stalemate;
D -the Commission will establish its own rules and will organise its own work;
E -the Commission’s conclusions shall be made known within three months after it begins work. If need be, this deadline may be extended by common accord between the two parties, and at the request of the Commission;
F -the deliberations and the report of the Commission shall be confidential;
G -the report of the Commission shall be addressed to the President of the Republic of Mali, and copies shall be sent to the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad, and to the Mediator.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE COMMISSION
A -the two parties commit themselves to respect the decisions and recommendations of the Commission;
B -the Malian State commits itself to refer to the appropriate judicial and other authorities for execution, the decisions and recommendations of the Commission, within 45 days of the report being submitted to the President of the Republic of Mali.
Dispute Resolution Committee
1992
The commission for the supervision of the National Pact was established on 25 April 1992 at the Ministry of Internal Security. The committee consisted of four representatives from the Malian government, four from the Malians of the Unified Movements and Fronts of the Azaouad, and five Algerians. Mr. Soummana Diallo, the Malian government’s delegate to the north, chaired the commission; the purpose of the commission was to avoid any misunderstanding in the implementation of the National Pact.19 The commission’s first meeting took place on July 11, 1992.20 Active while violence was still taking place, the commission deplored the violence and called for the organization of awareness campaigns on the Pact through radio and television debates.
- “WEST AFRICA IN BRIEF; Mali national pact follow up committee installed,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 29, 1992.
- “Mali President meets Algerian and Tuareg delegates; pact committee meeting ends,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 14, 1992.
1993
The fourth meeting of the National Pact Implementation Commission took place on 13-14 April 1993. The closing ceremony of the commission’s deliberation was presided over by President Konare. During deliberation, the commission reviewed the various phases of the National Pact’s implementation and expressed satisfaction with the progress that had been made.21
- “West AFrica; Mali: Meeting of National Pact Implementation Committee,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 14, 1993.
1994
No information is available regarding the implementation commission’s activities. President Konare claimed that the implementation of the peace deal was blocked in October 1993 because an estimated 80,000 Tuareg refugees stood in the way.22
1995
No further information is available regarding the Implementation Commission actions as they relate to the National Pact. In fact, the commission could be termed “dysfunctional” as of October 1993. Nevertheless, the Implementation Commission did verify the implementation of the pact in 1992 and 1993.
1996
No further developments observed.
1997
No further developments observed.
1998
No further developments observed.
1999
No further developments observed.
2000
No further developments observed.
2001
No further developments observed.
TITLE III: SPECIAL STATUS OF THE NORTH OF MALI
15. In accordance with the decision reached between the two parties at the Mopti Conference in December 1991, confirmed in their Algiers meeting of January 1992 and repeated at their meeting in March, the Independent Commission of Enquiry will be set up in Mopti within 15 days after signature of the Pact.
16. In case the two parties should not have been able to agree within the period specified in the previous paragraph, on the full composition of the Independent Commission of Enquiry, the Commission for Supervision of the Pact -whose creation is included in the present document -meeting under the Chairmanship of the Mediator at the end of the first month after the signing of this Pact, will consider the question and will search out ways and means to overcome this difficulty so that the Independent Commission of Enquiry may be able to function within the terms agreed between the two parties and recorded in the paragraph below.
TITLE VII: ON GUARANTEES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PACT
81. In order to avoid any misunderstanding concerning the sincere and loyal implementation of the present Pact, and in addition to the Ceasefire Commission described under Title II paragraph 8, the two parties have decided to install a Commission for Supervision and Implementation of the Pact.
82. The said Commission shall be installed within 15 days after the signature of the Agreement, and will carry out its task for one year. The Commission for Supervision shall be permanently composed of the representatives of the two parties, in the number of four from each side. The permanent chairmanship shall be held by each of the two parties, alternating monthly, with the first chairmanship falling to the party of the Unified Movements and Fronts of the Azawad.
83. The Commission for Supervision shall hold special sessions in the presence of and under the chairmanship of the Mediator who shall designate representatives to the Commission. These sessions will examine and resolve any problems which may arise, linked to the implementation of the present Pact. They shall be convened at the end of the second and third months following signature of the Agreement, and again at the end of the second trimester, and at the end of the second semester following the signature. These sessions shall give rise to official Minutes and to Press Releases.
83 bis As agreed during their meeting in Algiers, during which the two parties announced their intention to consult with their constituents concerning the Agreement reached, the two parties confirm that these consultations have taken place.
Military Reform
1992
No information is available regarding the integration of the Azaouad movement combatants. Nor is any information available on other military reform. Nevertheless, the government that came into power was entirely civilian. This was possible despite the government’s decision to appoint a civilian defense minister which led to an initial period of mistrust between the government and the military.23
- Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, A Peace in Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking (United Nations Publication, 1998), 88.
1993
Negotiations on reintegration modality took place between the government and the Azaouad movement representatives in 1993. The government of Mali had proposed reintegration be on an individual basis and an optional free choice, while the Tuaregs demanded that this condition be applied to all elements of the Tuaregs who had rebelled against the government. On February 14, 1993, the government of Mali and the Azaouad movement signed an agreement to integrate about 600 Tuaregs into army units.24 Accordingly, a total of 610 Tuaregs combatants were integrated from the following rebel groups:
MPA= Le Mouvement Populaire de l.Azawad (Popular Movement of Azawad) – 120
FPLA = Le Front Populaire de Liberation de l.Azawad (Popular Front for the Liberation of Azawad) – 150
ARLA = LÕArmee Revolutionnaire de Liberation de l.Azawad (Revolutionary Army for the Liberation of Azawad) – 140
FIAA = Le Front Islamique Arabe de l.Azawad (The Islamic Arab Front of Azawad) — 190
Independent units — 10 25
- “Mali: 600 Taureg Rebels Integrated into National Army,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 15, 1993.
- Kalifa Keita, Conflict And Conflict Resolution in The Sahel: the Tuareg Insurgency in Mali,”Strategic Studies Institute, 1998, accessed June 14, 2011, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub200.pdf.
1994
No significant progress was made in terms of integrating further ex-combatants into the army units. After the April and May negotiations in 1994, the MFUA demanded that the 2,360 combatants be integrated into the security forces, yet feelings of discontent emerged within the rebel movements when MUFA demanded 40% for the FIAA combatants and 20% each for other three movementsÕ combatants. The MUFA allegedly had 10,000 combatants and demanded that 3,000 of these be integrated into the armed forces and that 4,000 be re-inserted into society. These figures were largely inflated and were larger than the Malian armed force. The government of Mali had offered to take 1,000 MUFA soldiers into the army.26
1995
No significant progress was reported.
1996
Some very important developments took place in 1996 regarding the integration of armed combatants and the military code of conduct. On the integration side, 664 combatants from the MPA, 253 from the FPLA, 148 from the ARLA and 135 from the FIAA were integrated into the army, national guard and gendarmerie. These integrations took place at the ranks of enlisted men, noncommissioned officers, and officers. Altogether 24 combatants were appointed at the rank of officer.27
With regards to the military code of conduct, the Malian defense minister organized a seminar on civil-military relations in July in the capital city Bamako. The aim for the seminar was, in light of the decades of military dictatorship, to impress the new democratic culture onto the armed forces. These seminars were said to enrich the military curricula during the crucial time of training newly integrated former Tuareg rebels.28
- Kalifa Keita, “Conflict And Conflict Resolution in The Sahel.”
- Robin-Edward Poulton Ibrahim ag Youssouf, A Peace in Timbuktu, 74.
1997
Military reform and integration took place in 1996 as provided in the 1992 National Pact.
1998
Military reform and integration took place in 1996 as provided in the 1992 National Pact. By 1998, Mali had the following security and military strengths: Army – 7,000 persons; Naval Service 70 persons; Air Service 450 persons; Gendarmerie 1,500 person; National Guard of Mali 700 persons; and National Police 1000 persons.27
1999
No further developments observed.
2000
No further developments observed.
2001
No further developments observed.
TITLE II
ON THE FINAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND ON THE SETTLEMENT OF QUESTIONS EMERGING FROM THE SITUATION OF ARMED CONFLICT
7. Within sixty days following the signature of the Pact, a programme will be put into effect comprised of the following measures:
A -Within the framework of measures for restoring confidence, eliminating factors of insecurity, and the installation of a permanent state of security:
-all the combatants of the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad will be integrated into the various uniformed forces of the State, on an individual and voluntary basis and in accordance with criteria for assessing competence,
-special units of the armed forces will be created for one year, composed mainly of integrated combatants from the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad,
-an internal security corps will be instituted {Gendarmerie, Goum Guards, Police} composed of all sections of the local populations including integrated combatants from the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad, which will be provided to local authorities within their police powers,
-special units of the army will be created, open to all sections of the local populations, whose mission will be limited to the preservation of the integrity and external security of the country’s frontiers.
Those dispositions which refer to the integration of all the combatants and members of the Movements and Fronts mentioned above, are contingent upon the return of the latter with their arms. This operation will be carried out in conjunction with the Ceasefire Commission;
The security and physical protection of the re-integrated combatants and members of the Movements and Fronts, as well as that of the repatriated displaced populations, will be entirely guaranteed;
B -In addition, and in the same spirit of restoring confidence, eliminating factors of insecurity and installing an atmosphere of permanent security, there will be a substantial, gradual and appropriate reduction of the armed forces presently in the North, leading to the withdrawal of the majority. This operation will be carried out in accordance with:
-the final ending of hostilities, according to the ceasefire determined in paragraph 5 above,
-the organisation of the security mechanisms and arrangements described in paragraph 7.A above,
-the redefinition of the objectives of the national army charged with future national defence: this implies a broad redeployment programme involving military installations and bases outside the urban areas, pastures and grazing areas as well as the transformation of certain army installations into centres and schools for military or para-military training, and the use of some redundant barrack facilities as centres for professional training.
Police Reform
1992
No reforms took place in terms of integrating former Tuareg rebels.
1993
No developments observed this year.
1994
No developments observed this year.
1995
No developments observed this year.
1996
A police reform took place in 1996 with the integration of 150 former Tuareg rebels into the police force. Among those integrated, two were at the rank of officers, 33 were at the rank of noncommissioned officers, and 115 were agents.29
- Kalifa Keita, “Conflict And Conflict Resolution in The Sahel: the Tuareg Insurgency in Mali,” Strategic Studies Institute, 1998, accessed June 14, 2011, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub200.pdf.
1997
Police reform took place in 1996.
1998
No further developments observed.
1999
No further developments observed.
2000
No further developments observed.
2001
No further developments observed.
OF QUESTIONS EMERGING FROM THE SITUATION OF ARMED CONFLICT
8. Within sixty days following the signature of the Pact, a programme will be put into effect comprised of the following measures:
A -Within the framework of measures for restoring confidence, eliminating factors of insecurity, and the installation of a permanent state of security:
-all the combatants of the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad will be integrated into the various uniformed forces of the State, on an individual and voluntary basis and in accordance with criteria for assessing competence,
-special units of the armed forces will be created for one year, composed mainly of integrated combatants from the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad,
-an internal security corps will be instituted {Gendarmerie, Goum Guards, Police} composed of all sections of the local populations including integrated combatants from the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad, which will be provided to local authorities within their police powers,
Demobilization
1992
The demobilization of Tuareg rebels did not take place.
1993
The demobilization of Tuareg rebels did not take place.
1994
The demobilization of Tuareg rebels did not take place.
1995
The process of encamping former rebels in cantonment sites started in November 1995. The Malian government could not find a donor to fund the cantonment process, and only had encouragement from the UNDP. The initiation of the cantonment process was financially challenging because the cantonment dossier reported that the Ministry of the Armed forces and the Veterans had figures of 9,000 potential candidates for demobilization. This would cost the government about five billion CFA Francs. However, a mission was established to find the candidates for demobilization from armed movements and it found that fewer than 2,000 persons were potential candidates. The ministry subsequently estimated that as many as 3,000 combatants were to be demobilized for a cost of about 900 million CFA Francs.30 The cantonment process started on 15 November 1995.
- Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, A Peace in Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking (United Nations Publications, 1998), 115.
1996
The cantonment process started in November 1995 and closed in January 1996. The Malian government extended the cantonment deadline before starting the integration and the demobilization processes. A total of 2,681 combatants from five different rebel groups were encamped in cantonments in five different locations. Among those encamped, 1,648 were integrated into various uniformed armed forces and civil administration positions. The remainder ex-combatants received a demobilization premium of 55,000 CFA Francs (less than $100), which was significant in poverty stricken Mali.
The demobilization process was financed by the UN Trust Fund. Those 3,000 ex-combatants who surrendered their arms received a $200 premium and the 7,000 more ex-combatants who were identified later and did not go through the cantonment process received $100.31
1997
Tuareg combatants were demobilized in 1996.
(Note: The demobilization of ex-combatants was completed in 1996. The National Pact of 1992 did not specifically provide for the integration of demobilized ex-combatants. But, the reintegration program was carried out by the UNDP. The Support Programme for the Socio-Economic Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Northern Mali (PAREM) was created and funded by the UNDP’s trust fund. In May 1996, 6,000 ex-combatants who did not go through the cantonment process participated in the PAREM programs. In 1997 this number increased to 7,795 with the participation of an additional 1,659 cantoned ex-combatants who were not taken into the army or civil administration. A total of 866 projects were funded benefiting 9,509 ex-combatants. As a pre-condition for the initial funding for a program, each registered ex-combatants was required to develop a viable project.32)
1998
Tuareg combatants were demobilized in 1996.
1999
No further developments observed.
2000
No further developments observed.
2001
No further developments observed.
TITLE II ON THE FINAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND ON THE SETTLEMENT OF QUESTIONS EMERGING FROM THE SITUATION OF ARMED CONFLICT
7. Within sixty days following the signature of the Pact, a programme will be put into effect comprised of the following measures:
A -Within the framework of measures for restoring confidence, eliminating factors of insecurity, and the installation of a permanent state of security:
-all the combatants of the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad will be integrated into the various uniformed forces of the State, on an individual and voluntary basis and in accordance with criteria for assessing competence,
-special units of the armed forces will be created for one year, composed mainly of integrated combatants from the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad,
-an internal security corps will be instituted {Gendarmerie, Goum Guards, Police} composed of all sections of the local populations including integrated combatants from the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad, which will be provided to local authorities within their police powers,
-special units of the army will be created, open to all sections of the local populations, whose mission will be limited to the preservation of the integrity and external security of the country’s frontiers.
Those dispositions which refer to the integration of all the combatants and members of the Movements and Fronts mentioned above, are contingent upon the return of the latter with their arms. This operation will be carried out in conjunction with the Ceasefire Commission;
The security and physical protection of the re-integrated combatants and members of the Movements and Fronts, as well as that of the repatriated displaced populations, will be entirely guaranteed;
Disarmament
1992
Disarmament did not take place.
1993
Disarmament did not take place.
1994
Disarmament did not take place.
1995
Disarmament did not take place.
1996
The peace agreement provided for integration contingent upon the return of arms from combatants. In this process, 3,000 weapons were collected and burned in a ceremony called the “Flame of Peace” which transpired on 27 March, 1996 “in the presence of all rebel groups as well as international community including the United Nations”.33
- Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, A Peace in Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking (United Nations Publications, 1998), 120.
1997
The disarmament process was completed in 1996, when 3,000 weapons were collected and burned.
1998
The disarmament process was completed in 1996.
1999
No further developments observed.
2000
No further developments observed.
2001
No further developments observed.
TITLE II ON THE FINAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND ON THE SETTLEMENT OF QUESTIONS EMERGING FROM THE SITUATION OF ARMED CONFLICT
7. Within sixty days following the signature of the Pact, a programme will be put into effect comprised of the following measures:
A -Within the framework of measures for restoring confidence, eliminating factors of insecurity, and the installation of a permanent state of security:
-all the combatants of the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad will be integrated into the various uniformed forces of the State, on an individual and voluntary basis and in accordance with criteria for assessing competence,
-special units of the armed forces will be created for one year, composed mainly of integrated combatants from the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad,
-an internal security corps will be instituted {Gendarmerie, Goum Guards, Police} composed of all sections of the local populations including integrated combatants from the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad, which will be provided to local authorities within their police powers,
-special units of the army will be created, open to all sections of the local populations, whose mission will be limited to the preservation of the integrity and external security of the country’s frontiers.
Those dispositions which refer to the integration of all the combatants and members of the Movements and Fronts mentioned above, are contingent upon the return of the latter with their arms. This operation will be carried out in conjunction with the Ceasefire Commission;
The security and physical protection of the re-integrated combatants and members of the Movements and Fronts, as well as that of the repatriated displaced populations, will be entirely guaranteed;
Refugees
1992
In the agreement, “displaced” refers to Tuaregs who were displaced in the African region or who were refugees in neighboring states.
Though the National Pact was signed but many remained doubtful of its ability to secure lasting peace, peace persisted among Tuareg rebels. Even after the signing of the accord, troops continued their attacks on civilians.34 Yet the repartitions also started and refugees from Algeria and Mauritania started to return to Mali.
- “MALI NOMADS FLEE ACROSS BORDER; Jacky Rowland in Bassikounou on the refugees who face a bleak future in the camps of Mauritania,” The Guardian (London), April 14, 1992.
1993
The repartition of refugees did not occur in 1993.
1994
The repartition of refugees did not occur in 1994 due to an outbreak of violence, which created 160,000 new refugees in 1994. 35
1995
According to the UNHCR Report, some 39,022 refugees returned to Mali in 1995.36 In the meantime, government launched a reconciliation program in northern Mali.
- “2002 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook,” UNHCR, 2004, accessed April 20, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/414ad5970.html.
1996
According to the UNHCR Report, some 22,000 refugees returned in 1996. 4 Situation in Mali significantly improved with the decentralization process going on and the demobilization, disarmament and integration and reintegration of ex-combatants.
1997
According to the UNHCR Report, some 34,496 refugees returned to Mali in 1997.4
1998
According to the UNHCR Report, some 26,889 refugees returned to northern Mali in 1998.4 By 1998, 131,780 refugees returned from Burkina Faso, Algeria, Niger, Senegal and Mauritania. The UNHCR funded the returnees with an assistance program. The program was implemented with help from the WFP and eleven other NGO partners.37
- Stefan Sperl, “International refugee aid and social change in northern Mali,” (Working Paper No. 22), 2000, http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6a0c68.html.
1999
According to the UNHCR Report, some 5,045 refugees returned to northern Mali between 1999 and 2002.38 The devolution of power to the collectivities also helped to create a friendlier environment for the reintegration of refugees back to the society. However, except for the UNHCR funding, the future of further funding for the reintegration — especially on the governmental level — was unclear.
2000
Refugees returned to northern Mali continued in 2000.4
2001
Refugees returned to northern Mali continued in 2001.4
TITLE II ON THE FINAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND ON THE SETTLEMENT OF QUESTIONS EMERGING FROM THE SITUATION OF ARMED CONFLICT
9. A programme for the repatriation of displaced persons will be prepared before signature of the present Pact. The programme will be started within 60 days of the signing of the Pact, which is to say at the end of the execution of arrangements concerning the ceasefire described in paragraph 7 above, which reads as follows:
Within sixty days following the signature of the Pact, a programme will be put into effect comprised of the following measures:
Every effort will be made to ensure that the repatriation programme will be completed within 60 days after its launch.
10. The repatriation programme will be carried out jointly by the Government and the Movements in collaboration with the authorities of the host countries, together with friendly countries and international humanitarian organisations which will be contacted to this effect.
11. The reinsertion of displaced populations and the assistance to victims of all the consequences of the armed conflict in Northern Mali will give rise to the creation of two Funds:
-a Fund for development and reinsertion, which will support the creation of small and medium-sized industries, and small and medium-sized enterprises, and the insertion of the displaced populations into production systems,
-a Fund for assistance and compensation to civil and military victims of the two parties and their heirs, for all the consequences of the armed conflict. This Fund will compensate as a priority, victims identified by the Independent Commission of Enquiry.
A permanent mechanism will be instituted to assist military victims of the two parties and their heirs.
These two Funds will be created within thirty days of the signature of the present Pact.
TITLE VI: ON THE TIMETABLE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARRANGEMENTS OF THIS NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PACT
67. The programme for voluntary repatriation of Northern populations displaced within the countries of the sub-region, will be launched 60 days after signature of the Pact, with the assistance of the host countries as well as of friendly countries and international humanitarian organisations, and in coordination between the State and the Movements. This programme shall be completed within 60 days with the assistance for reinsertion provided from the Funds cited in paragraph 68 above. During this period, assistance will also be provided to persons displaced within the country and who have suffered because of the conflict.
Reparations
1992
The CPA had a provision to establish a fund for assistance and compensation to civil and military victims of the two parties and their heirs, for all the consequences of the armed conflict. No information was found on the establishment of such a fund.
1993
No information was found on the establishment of a fund for assistance and compensation to civil and military victims.
1994
No information was found on the establishment of a fund for assistance and compensation to civil and military victims.
1995
No information was found on the establishment of a fund for assistance and compensation to civil and military victims.
1996
No information was found on the establishment of a fund for assistance and compensation to civil and military victims.
1997
No information was found on the establishment of a fund for assistance and compensation to civil and military victims.
1998
No information was found on the establishment of a fund for assistance and compensation to civil and military victims.
1999
No information was found on the establishment of a fund for assistance and compensation to civil and military victims.
2000
No information was found on the establishment of a fund for assistance and compensation to civil and military victims.
2001
No information was found on the establishment of a fund for assistance and compensation to civil and military victims.
TITLE II ON THE FINAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND ON THE SETTLEMENT OF QUESTIONS EMERGING FROM THE SITUATION OF ARMED CONFLICT
11. The reinsertion of displaced populations and the assistance to victims of all the consequences of the armed conflict in Northern Mali will give rise to the creation of two Funds:
-a Fund for development and reinsertion, which will support the creation of small and medium-sized industries, and small and medium-sized enterprises, and the insertion of the displaced populations into production systems,
-a Fund for assistance and compensation to civil and military victims of the two parties and their heirs, for all the consequences of the armed conflict. This Fund will compensate as a priority, victims identified by the Independent Commission of Enquiry.
Economic and Social Development
1992
The 1992 National pact called for increased autonomy and development assistance for the north. Though more information on the central government’s involvement in the socio-economic development is not available, the North of Mali was granted a special decentralization status in the country’s constitution. This could be considered an effort to further the development programs provided for in the peace agreement. However, the government was constrained due to the structural reform program.
1993
The decentralization mission was created in 1993. But the local elections were not held in that year. Nevertheless, the Election Commissioner for development, Manuel Marin, appealed to the government to carry out more development projects for the Tuareg populations of Northern Mali.39
1994
Information is not available on development programs. In 1994, an outbreak of violence in northern Mali might have affected development programs.
1995
In 1995, Mali championed the women’s literacy program. The program was funded by organizations such as UNESCO and the UN Development Program. The literacy program in the north faced greater challenges, but the UN Children’s Fund and other organizations had considerable success with women’s literacy programs.40 In July, local government authorities returned to northern Mali. As peace became more prevalent and the area more stable in 1995, development programs began to be implemented for the benefit of northern Mali.41 The promised $200 million donor support for the economic development program in northern Mali was not realized in 1995. Nevertheless, the Timbuktuans were restoring tourism infrastructure.42
- “Mali: championing women’s literacy programs,” African Farmer, May 1995.
- “MALI; Ceremony marks return of local government to northern districts,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 31, 1995.
- “Mali Tuareg War Ends As Foes Burn Weapons,” Africa News, April, 1996.
1996
Hundreds of reintegration programs designed to reintegrate ex-combatants were supported by the UNDP trust fund. At the same time, 27 different donor and development agencies were involved in different development programs worth more than $200 million.43 These donor agencies along with the government of Mali were involved in various development projects related to agriculture, livestock, water, energy, health, education, and infrastructure buildings (roads etc.).
- Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, A Peace in Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking (United Nations Publication, 1998), 293-4.
1997
During this year donor agencies and the government of Mali provided support for the development programs in northern Mali. By 1996, most of the decentralization infrastructures were in place and the local government units had authority to collect taxes and make decisions on issues related to local development.
1998
Economic and social development related provisions were implemented.
1999
Economic and social development related provisions were implemented.
2000
Economic and social development related provisions were implemented.
2001
Economic and social development related provisions were implemented.
TITLE IV ON THE CONSOLIDATION OF SOLIDARITY AND NATIONAL UNITY IN THE NORTH OF MALI
SUB-TITLE A MEASURES TO CONSOLIDATE NATIONAL SOLIDARITY
44. As mentioned in paragraph 11 title II, the reinsertion of displaced populations and assistance to victims of all the consequences of the armed conflict in the North of Mali, will give rise to the creation of two Funds:
-a Fund for development and reinsertion,
-a Fund for assistance and compensation to victims of all the consequences of the armed conflict.
45. These two funds will be created and funded within thirty days of signature of the Pact, and will remain active for a full year. They will be managed by a bilateral commission including representatives of the Government and the Movements.
46. In order to succeed with the running of these funds, the two parties will launch a joint appeal to the generosity of the Malian Nation and an appeal for humanitarian and financial assistance to the international community.
47. A special development programme for the North of Mali will be approved for a period of ten years, and launched with two successive five-year funding tranches.
48. The purpose of this programme will be to redress the economic, social and cultural inequalities between the North of Mali and the rest of the country. It will have the further goal of improving the infrastructure in the North of Mali, in order to render the Region more attractive to investors.
49. The special development programme will be designed, and its financing planned, within six months of signature of the present Pact. The Regional and inter-regional Assemblies will make submissions to the Government on this subject.
50. The special development programme will be approved by the Government. The resources allocated will be announced as five-year amounts. These credits will be allocated in annual tranches to each of the Regional Assemblies, which will be responsible for management and execution of the programme.
51. A preferential fiscal regime will be created for the North of Mali. This will be designed so as to encourage and attract investment. It will be announced within three months of the signing of this Pact, and will remain in place for a period of ten years.
Donor Support
1992
After the fall of the dictatorship, Mali did not have any available resources to support the peace process. While donors such as the United States, Germany, Italy, Belgium and the World Food Program set up a development fund jointly controlled by donors and the Mali government, the government did not get support from donor agencies to set up a sub-division of ceasefire commissions. Algeria remained supportive and provided some vehicle and fuel support to the Ceasefire Commission.44
- Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, A Peace in Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking (United Nations Publication, 1998), 65.
1993
There was not any donor support for the peace process in 1993. However, the UNHCR and other donor agencies supported programs to repatriate refugees.
1994
There was not any donor support for the peace process in 1994. However, the UNHCR and other donor agencies supported programs to repatriate refugees.
1995
Once peacemaking initiatives through civilian participation began in 1995, donor agencies started to show some interest in supporting the peace process. With this in mind, the government of Mali held a two-day meeting with donor agencies in northern Mali in July 1995. Donor agencies promised $200 million development aid to northern Mali.42 A number of recommendations were made during this meeting, and many focused on the rehabilitation of those displaced during the conflict and land issues. In the meeting, donors and development partners allegedly acted expeditiously on the funding requirement under the emergency resettlement program, and thus released the funds available.45 But for the cantonment process, donor agencies did not provide support because they were suspicious of the government’s intentions.46 However, the UNHCR did provide support for the repartition of refugees.
- “MALI; Government-donors Timbuktu meeting issues recommendations,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 20, 1995.
- Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, A Peace in Timbuktu.
1996
After cantoning the Tuareg combatants, donor agencies were interested in providing support for the peace process. The demobilization process was financed by the UN Trust Fund. Those 3,000 ex-combatants who surrendered their arms received a $200 premium and the 7,000 more ex-combatants who were identified later and did not go through the cantonment process received $100.31 Programs to reintegrate ex-combatants were carried out by the UNDP. The Support Program for the Socio-Economic Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Northern Mali (PAREM) was created and funded by the UNDP’s trust fund. In May 1996, 6,000 ex-combatants who did not go through the cantonment process participated in the PAREM programs. In 1997, this number increased to 7,795 with the participation of an additional 1,659 cantoned ex-combatants who were not taken into the army or civil administration. A total of 866 projects were funded benefiting 9,509 ex-combatants. As a pre-condition for the initial funding for a program, each registered ex-combatant was required to develop a viable project.32 27 different donor and development agencies were involved in different development programs worth more than $200 million/47 Donor agencies also contributed to the repartition and rehabilitation of the refugees.
1997
Donor agencies provided support for the rehabilitation of ex-combatants and refugees in 1996.
1998
Donor support provision was implemented by 1996.
1999
No further developments observed.
2000
No further developments observed.
2001
No further developments observed.
TITLE V SUB-REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE SERVICE OF PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT
60. The Republic of Mali commits itself furthermore to request actively the support of relevant international Organisations (UNDP, IFAD, WFP, UNESCO, ADB, IDB …) to help redress the economic, social and cultural disadvantage of the North of Mali.
61. Finally the Republic of Mali will request friendly countries to join it within a framework of intergovernmental cooperation, to train or retrain young people from the displaced populations of Northern Mali who have not had the opportunity to receive training, or who have been obliged to interrupt it, or who have received training abroad.
Detailed Implementation Timeline
1992
The decentralization program started in 1992 but implementation of many provisions were not initiated on time.
1993
The decentralization program started in 1992 but implementation of many provisions were not initiated on time.
1994
The decentralization program, started in 1992, continued in spite of the breakdown of the ceasefire in 1994.
1995
The decentralization program was ongoing. Other provisions of the agreement related to demobalization and disarmament and of refugees was on track to be implemented.
1996
Provisions related to demobalization, diarmament, military reform, police reform, civil administration reform were implemented.
1997
Many provisions were implemented in 1996.
1998
No further developments observed.
1999
No further developments observed.
2000
No further developments observed.
2001
No further developments observed.
TITLE VI ON THE TIMETABLE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARRANGEMENTS OF THIS NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PACT
62. The two parties are committed to respect the inseparable nature of the totality of the clauses in the present Pact. In order to ensure an smooth implementation, free from disagreement or misunderstanding, the two parties have agreed to the following timetable for implementation:
63. 72 hours after its signature on Malian soil by both parties, the present Pact shall be published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Mali by the President of the Transitional Committee for the Salvation of the People (CTSP).
64. The ceasefire shall start at zero hour on the day following the signature.
65. The whole of the arrangements pertaining to the final cessation of hostilities, described under Title II of the present Pact, shall be put into effect at the same time and within 60 days of signature, under the supervision and control of the Ceasefire Commission.
The Independent Commission of Enquiry will be put in place within 15 days after the signature of the Agreement. As agreed, the Commission will submit its findings less than four months after its installation. The appropriate judicial and other authorities will be informed of its conclusions within 45 days after the report reaches the Head of State. In case there should be delays in finalising the composition of the Commission, the arrangements outlined in paragraph 13 of the present Pact will come into effect, in order to allow the Independent Commission of Enquiry to begin its work.
67. Within 60 days after the signing of the Pact, an appointment shall be made, in consultation with the Movements, to the post of Commissioner for the North of Mali, responsible for the implementation of the present Pact for a period of five years.
68. Within 30 days after signature of the Pact, shall be created and financed the Fund for development and reinsertion of displaced populations, and the Fund for assistance and compensation to victims of all the consequences of the armed conflict.
69. The programme for voluntary repatriation of Northern populations displaced within the countries of the sub-region, will be launched 60 days after signature of the Pact, with the assistance of the host countries as well as of friendly countries and international humanitarian organisations, and in coordination between the State and the Movements. This programme shall be completed within 60 days with the assistance for reinsertion provided from the Funds cited in paragraph 68 above. During this period, assistance will also be provided to persons displaced within the country and who have suffered because of the conflict.
70. 130 days after the signing of the Pact, which will be 10 days after the completion of the repatriation programme, by-elections shall be organised for the seats in the National Assembly which have been created ad hoc for the first legislature, in favour of those populations from the North of Mali which have been displaced.
71. The exceptional integration into the National Defence and public and semipublic Administration, of officials from the Movements and populations of the North of Mali, shall be completed two months after signature of the Pact. A period shall be allowed for those selected to take up their posts.
72. Three months after the signing of the present Pact, the appropriate executive and legislative authorities shall begin to prepare the necessary measures for the creation of the Assemblies, and the specific mechanisms pertaining to the Communes, Arrondissements, Cercles, Regions and to the inter-regional Assembly. These measures shall be drafted in accordance with the irrevocable clauses of the present Pact. They shall be prepared in close collaboration with the Commission for Supervision of the Pact and the Commissioner for the North of Mali.
73. Elections shall be organised 6 months after the signature of the present Pact, for the Commune, Arrondissement, Cercle, Regional Assemblies. The interregional Assembly shall be constituted one month after the election for the Regional Assemblies. The installation of the Executives and Permanent Secretariats attached to the Assemblies and described under Title V of the present Pact, shall take place within one month of their respective creations.
74. In the interval between the signing of the present Pact and the coming into effect of the new local institutions for the North of Mali, the Commission for Supervision and the Commissioner for the North will jointly ensure that the arrangements of the present Pact are enforced, in particular insofar as these concern the security of the populations and the territory of the North of Mali, the reinsertion of displaced persons, assistance to victims, and the preparation of measures outlined in the Pact.
75. 6 months after the signing of the present Pact:
A -the special army units will be created which will be open to all sections of the local populations, whose mission will be limited to the preservation of the integrity and external security of the country’s frontiers, and which are described in the last line of paragraph 7.A. above;
B -the special programme for the development of the North of Mali will be launched, in accordance with the arrangements under Title IV paragraph 47 to 50;
C -the preferential fiscal regime to attract investment will be announced and applied in the North of Mali in accordance with the arrangements under Title V paragraph 51;
D -the process of redefining communal and administrative boundaries in the North of Mali will be launched, as described under paragraph 37 above, and shall be completed at the end of the year following the signature of the present Pact.
Withdrawal of Troops
1992
The Malian armies were not immediately removed from combat zones after National Pact was signed. In the initial phase, troops were not withdrawn from the North. Later in the year, some reductions were made.48
- Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, A Peace in Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking (United Nations Publication, 1998), 67.
1993
Violence erupted between the movements and the Malian army and the withdrawal of troops did not take place.49
1994
The withdrawal of troops did not take place and the army was engaged in fighting in the north.4
1995
Civil society became involved in the peace process in 1995. To create an environment suitable for dialogue and reconciliation, the president, in concord with the provisions of the peace agreement, organized the withdrawal of troops from the north. Many of the troops were confined to barracks.50
1996
Information regarding withdrawal of remaining troops not available.
1997
Information regarding withdrawal of remaining troops not available.
1998
Information regarding withdrawal of remaining troops not available.
1999
Information regarding withdrawal of remaining troops not available.
2000
Information regarding withdrawal of remaining troops not available.
2001
Information regarding withdrawal of remaining troops not available.
TITLE II: ON THE FINAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND ON THE SETTLEMENT OF QUESTIONS EMERGING FROM THE SITUATION OF ARMED CONFLICT
66. 7. Within sixty days following the signature of the Pact, a programme will be put into effect comprised of the following measures:
B -In addition, and in the same spirit of restoring confidence, eliminating factors of insecurity and installing an atmosphere of permanent security, there will be a substantial, gradual and appropriate reduction of the armed forces presently in the North, leading to the withdrawal of the majority. This operation will be carried out in accordance with:
-the final ending of hostilities, according to the ceasefire determined in paragraph 5 above.
Please always cite: “Annualized implementation data on comprehensive intrastate peace accords, 1989–2012.” Madhav Joshi, Jason Michael Quinn, and Patrick M. Regan. Journal of Peace Research 52 (2015): 551-562.