Mindanao Final Agreement

1996

Full Implementation

There are no reports of any attacks by the MNLF or any armed clashes between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MNLF following the Final Agreement. Reports show a drastic increase in MILF strength from 8,000 in 1996 to 15,420 in 1999, which suggests that MNLF fighters wishing to continue the fight joined MILF in large numbers.¹

1. Cesar Villanueva and George Aguilar, “The Reintegration of the Moro National Liberation Front in Mindanao,” Centre for International Cooperation and Security (University of Bradford, 2008).

1997

Full Implementation

There are no reports of armed clashes between the GRP and the MNLF in 1997. The New People’s Army (NAP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) are active.¹

1. “Global Terrorism Database [Data file],” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2011, accessed July 24, 2012, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.

1998

Full Implementation

There are no reports of any armed clashes between the GRP and the MNLF in 1998. The New People’s Army (NAP), Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) remain active.¹

1. Ibid.

1999

Full Implementation

There are no reports of any armed clashes between the GRP and the MNLF in 1999. The most frequent perpetrators of attacks were the New People’s Army (NAP), Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).¹

1. Ibid.

2000

Full Implementation

There are no reports of any armed clashes between the GRP and the MNLF in 2000. From January 1 to December 31, the Global Terrorism Database reports 118 attacks in the country by various armed groups. The majority of attacks were perpetrated by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).¹ The Uppsala University Conflict Database reports civil war in 2000 between the GRP and MILF resulting in over one thousand battle-related deaths.²

1. Ibid.
2. “UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia,” Uppsala Conflict Data Program, accessed July 24, 2012, www.ucdp.uu.se/database.

2001

Full Implementation

As stipulated in the peace agreement, a regional plebiscite on the expansion of the four-province Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was held in August. Only one province, the Muslim majority island of Basilan, voted to join the ARMM. Nur Misuari, MNLF founder and ARMM governor, opposed the legitimacy of the plebiscite election. In November, a new faction of MNLF supporters loyal to the original goals or vision of Nur Misuari attacked an AFP installation in Zamboanga and Jolo island which resulted in 140 deaths. Nur Misuari was arrested on entering Sabah, Malaysia and was held by AFP security forces in the Philippines.¹

Though Nur Misuari’s rhetoric may have triggered the violence, and the identity of the new faction is based on allegiance to the original Nur Misuari vision, Misuari denounced the violence and attempted to flee. Hence, this event could be considered a ceasefire violation or a new conflict involving a new splinter group. Fotini, who studies group fragmentation, considers it a new conflict with a new faction, as does UCDP.²

The Uppsala University Conflict Database reports minor armed conflict in 2001 between the GRP and MNLF-NM (a new faction of the original MNLF group) leading to roughly 200 deaths.³

1. “Philippines,” Amnesty International Report, 2002, accessed July 30, 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3cf4bc0f0.html.
2. Fotini Christia, Alliance formation in civil wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
3. “UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia.”

2002

Full Implementation

The Uppsala University Conflict Database reports minor armed conflict in 2002 between the GRP and MNLF-NM (a faction of the original group led by Nur Misuari) that led to roughly 50 deaths.¹

1. Ibid.

2003

Full Implementation

The ceasefire between GRP and MNLF was restored in 2003.

2004

Full Implementation

There are no reports of any armed clashes between the GRP and the MNLF in 2004.

2005

Full Implementation

The ceasefire between GRP and the MNLF continued to hold in 2005.

1996

No Implementation

At least nine of the positions mentioned above were to be filled by appointment. These are special appointments that are to be made in addition to any other government positions that would be held by a Muslim resident from the ARMM under normal hiring practices.

No evidence could be found that any of the specific appointments referenced in the accord were made in 1996. The MNLF report (covering 1996 to 2005) to the verification body (OIC) explicitly states that none of the appointments were made.¹ Although Muslims may hold a number of positions in the government, they are not the positions listed in the accord and the candidates were not recommended by the ARMM.

1. “Report of the OIC Secretary-General on the Question of Muslims in Southern Philippines,” Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC/33-ICFM/2005/MM/SG/REP.2), 2006, accessed June 9, 2010, http://www.oic-oci.org/baku2006/english/SG-report/33ICFM-MM-SG-REP-ENG-P…

1997

No Implementation

No evidence could be found that any of the specific appointments referenced in the accord were made in 1997. The MNLF report (covering 1996 to 2005) to the verification body (OIC) explicitly states that none of the appointments were made.¹

1. Ibid.

1998

No Implementation

No evidence could be found that any of the specific appointments referenced in the accord were made in 1998. The MNLF report (covering 1996 to 2005) to the verification body (OIC) explicitly states that none of the appointments were made.¹

1. Ibid.

1999

No Implementation

No evidence could be found that any of the specific appointments referenced in the accord were made in 1999. The MNLF report (covering 1996 to 2005) to the verification body (OIC) explicitly states that none of the appointments were made.¹

1. Ibid.

2000

No Implementation

No evidence could be found that any of the specific appointments referenced in the accord were made in 2000. The MNLF report (covering 1996 to 2005) to the verification body (OIC) explicitly states that none of the appointments were made.¹

1. Ibid.

2001

No Implementation

No evidence could be found that any of the specific appointments referenced in the accord were made in 2001. The MNLF report (covering 1996 to 2005) to the verification body (OIC) explicitly states that none of the appointments were made.¹

1. Ibid.

2002

No Implementation

No evidence could be found that any of the specific appointments referenced in the accord were made in 2002. The MNLF report (covering 1996 to 2005) to the verification body (OIC) explicitly states that none of the appointments were made.¹

1. Ibid.

2003

No Implementation

No evidence could be found that any of the specific appointments referenced in the accord were made in 2003. The MNLF report (covering 1996 to 2005) to the verification body (OIC) explicitly states that none of the appointments were made.¹

1. Ibid.

2004

No Implementation

No evidence could be found that any of the specific appointments referenced in the accord were made in 2004. The MNLF report (covering 1996 to 2005) to the verification body (OIC) explicitly states that none of the appointments were made.¹

1. Ibid.

2005

No Implementation

The OIC General Secretariat, the third party verification body chosen in the 1996 peace agreement, received an official report by the GRP dated December 2005 which reported on the five chief articles of implementation by the GRP of Phase II of the Peace Agreement.

Regarding “Participation of Muslims in the Executive Council, the Legislative Assembly, the Administrative System, and Representation in National Government,” the GRP report mentioned that recent ARMM elections (18 August 2005) had resulted in the election of Dato Zaldi Uy Ampatuan as the new Regional Governor, 24 new members in the Legislative Assembly, and Hatimil Hassan, leader of the Legislative Assembly. It was also noted that several Muslims were elected to high-ranking positions (Nasser Pangandamam, Department of Agrarian Reform, Mr. Zamzamin Ampatuan, National Anti-Poverty Commission Chairman). The report also mentions two Muslim candidates elected to the Philippine House of Representatives and two Muslim magistrates in the Court of Appeals.

These appointments do not constitute evidence of GRP compliance with the 1996 agreement for several reasons. First, the appointments mentioned by the GRP official report resulted from elections. Second, the number of muslims holding high-ranking positions is not relevant. Third, the individuals mentioned in the GRP report do not hold the specific positions mentioned in the 1996 agreement. The GRP report does not mention any appointments made to the Executive Branch, Major Departments, Security Council, Board of Directors, Sectoral Representative, or the Supreme Court.

The failure to mention any of the specific positions from the 1996 accord in the report to the third party in charge of monitoring the implementation of the accord strongly suggests that no appointments were made. Calling attention to recent election results suggests that the government failed to make any appointment that could be referenced in their report, and this amounted to an attempt to report something rather than nothing. The MNLF report to the OIC explicitly states that no appointments were made based on the recommendations of the Regional Government pursuant to the 1996 agreement.¹

Article 72 is different than the other articles and refers to a general outreach plan to recruit ARMM residents into the civil service. No formal programs of recruitment, affirmative action, training or outreach initiates by the Civil Service Commission of the Philippines intended to increase the number of ARMM residents in civil service could be found or verified. Within the National Civil Service Commission, we contacted the Office of Examination, the Office of Recruitment and Placement and the Office of Public Assistance (via email with attached letterhead) about any relevant programs targeted at ARMM residents. No information or knowledge was received on any specific outreach program aimed at ARMM residents.

1. Ibid.

1996

No Implementation

Article VII, Section 1, of the 1987 Philippine Constitution vests executive power to the President of the Philippines, who functions as the head of state, head of government, commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, and chief executive over all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. Executive Order No. 292, s. 1987, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President of the Philippines authority over “all the executive departments” and their “restructuring, reconfiguring, and appointments of their respective officials.”¹

Article 65 of the Mindanao Final Agreement calls for one Cabinet position in the Executive Branch to be filled by a resident of the ARMM to be recommended by the head of the ARMM. Article 66 calls for one high-ranking position in each Executive Department to be filled by a resident of the ARMM who is recommended by the head of the ARMM.

No evidence could be found that any of these positions were filled in 1996.

1. “The Executive,” The Official Gazette, accessed January 20, 2015, http://www.gov.ph/about/gov/exec/#president.

1997

No Implementation

No evidence could be found that any of these positions were filled in 1997.

1998

No Implementation

No evidence could be found that any of these positions were filled in 1998.

1999

No Implementation

No evidence could be found that any of these positions were filled in 1999.

2000

No Implementation

No evidence could be found that any of these positions were filled in 2000.

2001

No Implementation

No evidence could be found that any of these positions were filled in 2001.

2002

No Implementation

No evidence could be found that any of these positions were filled in 2002.

2003

No Implementation

No evidence could be found that any of these positions were filled in 2003.

2004

No Implementation

No evidence could be found that any of these positions were filled in 2004.

2005

No Implementation

The OIC General Secretariat, the third party verification body chosen in the 1996 peace agreement, received an official report by the GRP dated December 2005 which reported on the five chief articles of implementation by the GRP of Phase II of the Peace Agreement. On the topic of “Participation of Muslims in the Executive Council, the Legislative Assembly, the Administrative System, and Representation in National Government,” the GRP reported that recent ARMM elections (18 August 2005) had resulted in the election of Dato Zaldi Uy Ampatuan as the new Regional Governor, 24 new members to the Legislative Assembly, and Hatimil Hassan, leader of the Legislative Assembly. It was also noted that several Muslims currently held high-ranking positions (Nasser Pangandamam, Department of Agrarian Reform, Mr. Zamzamin Ampatuan, National Anti-Poverty Commission Chairman). The report also mentions two Muslim candidates elected to the Philippine House of Representatives and two Muslim magistrates on the Court of Appeals.

These appointments do not constitute evidence of GRP compliance with Articles 65 and 66 of the 1996 agreement for several reasons. First, the appointments mentioned by the GRP official report resulted from elections. Second, the number of muslims holding positions is not relevant to Articles 65 and 66. Third, the individuals mentioned in the GRP report do not hold the specific positions mentioned in Articles 65 and 66. The GRP report does not mention any appointments made to the Executive Branch or executive departments. The MNLF report to the OIC explicitly states that no appointments were made based on the recommendations of the Regional Government pursuant to the 1996 agreement.¹

1. “Report of the OIC Secretary-General on the Question of Muslims in Southern Philippines,” Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC/33-ICFM/2005/MM/SG/REP.2), accessed August 2012, http://www.oic-oci.org/baku2006/english/SG-report/33ICFM-MM-SG-REP-ENG-P…

1996

No Implementation

The 1996 peace accord calls for the creation of a new Regional Legislative Assembly with 24 representatives to be elected based on the 8 congressional districts located in the 5 ARMM territories. No Regional Legislative Assembly elections were held in 1996.

1997

No Implementation

No Regional Legislative Assembly elections were held in 1997.

1998

No Implementation

No Regional Legislative Assembly elections were held in 1998.

1999

No Implementation

No Regional Legislative Assembly elections were held in 1999.

2000

No Implementation

No Regional Legislative Assembly elections were held in 2000.

2001

Minimum Implementation

The Republic Act 9054 becomes law which formally established the Regional Legislative Assembly, although no representative elections are held for the Regional Legislative Assembly in 2001.¹

1. Astrid S. Tuminez, “This land is our land: Moro ancestral domain and its implications for peace and development in the Southern Philippines,” SAIS Review 27, no. 2 (2007): 77-91.

2002

Minimum Implementation

No representative elections for the Regional Legislative Assembly were held in 2002.

2003

Minimum Implementation

No representative elections for the Regional Legislative Assembly were held in 2003.

2004

Minimum Implementation

No representative elections for the Regional Legislative Assembly were held in 2004.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

On 8 August 2005, gubernatorial and representative elections are held for the ARMM. The MNLF lost the governorship in the autonomous region. According to the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), Commission on Elections there were 24 new members elected to the Regional Legislative Assembly from the five provinces and one city which make up the ARMM.¹

1. “2005 ARMM Elections,” Republic of the Philippines Commission on Elections, accessed July 31, 2012, http://www.comelec.gov.ph/?r=Archives/RegularElections/2005ARMM/Results&…

1996

No Implementation

None of the above-mentioned constitutional changes stipulated by the 1996 peace agreement took place this year.

1997

No Implementation

None of the above-mentioned constitutional changes stipulated by the 1996 peace agreement took place this year.

1998

No Implementation

None of the above-mentioned constitutional changes stipulated by the 1996 peace agreement took place this year.

1999

No Implementation

None of the above-mentioned constitutional changes stipulated by the 1996 peace agreement took place this year.

2000

No Implementation

None of the above-mentioned constitutional changes stipulated by the 1996 peace agreement took place this year.

2001

Full Implementation

The Expanded ARMM Law or Republic Act 9054 was passed in 2001. As called for by the 1996 accord, Republic Act 9054 provided for a new 24 seat Regional Assembly for the ARMM in which current ARMM provinces and new provinces could vote to join the ARMM. For provinces and cities that were to be included in the expanded area of the autonomous region, the voters were asked whether they favored inclusion or opposed it.¹

A plebiscite to expand the ARMM was held on 14 August 2001. Of the 14 provinces and 9 cities in the SZOPAD, one additional province (Basilan) and one city (Marawi) voted to be included in the new expanded ARMM.² About 50 percent of the 4.9 million eligible voters took part in the plebiscite.³

1. “R.A. No. 9054,” Congress of the Philippines, 2001, accessed August 23, 2012, http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/ra_11/RA09054.pdf
2. Official Website of the ARMM, “ARMM History,” accessed on July 30, 2012, http://armm.gov.ph/history/
3. “Two cities set to join a Muslim self-rule area in Philippines,” Agence France Presse, August 15, 2001.

2002

Full Implementation

No further constitutional changes pertaining to the 1996 accord took place.

2003

Full Implementation

No further constitutional changes pertaining to the 1996 accord took place.

2004

Full Implementation

No further constitutional changes pertaining to the 1996 accord took place.

2005

Full Implementation

No further constitutional changes pertaining to the 1996 accord took place.

1996

Full Implementation

President Fidel Ramos gave Executive Order no. 371 creating the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) to help integrate the Moro people into the Filipino nation. The SPCPD was an unelected administrative body under control of the president. It had five members on a main council and an 81-member Consultative Assembly.¹

It was agreed that the five member main council would have a Muslim chairman and at least one other Muslim member and 44 of the 81 seats in the Consultative Assembly would be held by Muslims. The SPCPD was a transitional body to be dissolved after the plebiscite, which was originally scheduled for 1999.²

1. “E.O. 371,” The LawPhil Project, accessed January 21, 2015, http://www.lawphil.net/executive/execord/eo1996/eo_371_1996.html
2. John D. Harber, “Conflict and Compromise in the Southern Philippines: The Case of Moro Identity,” (M.A. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 1998), 65-66.

1997

Full Implementation

The Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) continued to operate in 1997.

1998

Full Implementation

The Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) continued to operate in 1998.

1999

Full Implementation

President Joseph Estrada gives executive order no. 161 on 30 September 1999 extending the term of executive order 371, thereby extending the term of the SPCPD one year.

2000

Full Implementation

President Joseph Estrada gives executive order no. 288 on September 22, 2000 extending the term of executive order 161, thereby, extending the term of the SPCPD to May 2001.

2001

Full Implementation

ARMM president Nur Misuari makes a request to president Estrada to extend the term of the SPCPD for another 3 years and postpone the referendum on expanding the ARMM for 3 years. President Estrada denies the request and formally abolishes the SPCPD effective August 14, 2001 pursuant to Article XVIII, Section 16 of R.A. 9054. The plebiscite election is held on August 14, 2001.

2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

No Implementation

In 1996, the peace agreement was brokered between the MNLF and the Philippine government. Under the peace agreement, there would be a transition phase (Phase I), lasting a couple of years, that would be characterized by intense development and aid projects, followed by another referendum for creating a larger expanded autonomous region. The peace agreement designated the current 4 provinces of the ARMM and 10 other provinces and nine cities to comprise a Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD). After previous democratic rejections, the MNLF hoped that the two phase agreement would pave the way for an expanded ARMM, as provinces would vote for inclusion after seeing the benefits of autonomous rule.¹

1. Astrid S. Tuminez, “This land is our land: Moro ancestral domain and its implications for peace and development in the Southern Philippines,” SAIS Review 27, no. 2 (2007): 77-91.

1997

No Implementation

There were no changes made to the provincial boundaries of the ARMM this year.

1998

No Implementation

There were no changes made to the provincial boundaries of the ARMM this year.

1999

No Implementation

There were no changes made to the provincial boundaries of the ARMM this year.

2000

No Implementation

There were no changes made to the provincial boundaries of the ARMM this year.

2001

Full Implementation

As called for in the 1996 accord, the Filipino legislature passed the Republic Act 9054 or Expanded ARMM Law in 2001 and the plebiscite which was to determine which provinces would join the new ARMM was scheduled for August 2001. Of the 14 provinces and 9 cities in the SZOPAD that voted in the referendum, only one additional province (Basilan) and one city (Marawi) voted for inclusion in the new expanded ARMM. Thus, the new ARMM consisted of Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Tawi-tawi, Sulu, Basilan and Marawi.¹

1. Ibid.

2002

Full Implementation

No further boundary changes took place.

2003

Full Implementation

No further boundary changes took place.

2004

Full Implementation

No further boundary changes took place.

2005

Full Implementation

No further boundary changes took place.

1996

No Implementation

The Mindanao Final Agreement brokered between the MNLF and the Philippine government in 1996 called for further decentralization of power and increased autonomy for the people of the ARMM. Under the peace agreement, there would be a transition phase (Phase I) of several years characterized by intense development and aid projects, followed by another referendum on expanding the autonomous region. The peace agreement designated the current ARMM (4 provinces) along with 10 other provinces and nine cities to be a Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD). The hope of Nur Misuari and the MNLF was that the two phase process would pave the way for an expanded ARMM, as provinces would vote for inclusion after seeing the benefits of autonomous rule.¹

1. Astrid S. Tuminez, “This land is our land: Moro ancestral domain and its implications for peace and development in the Southern Philippines,” SAIS Review 27, no. 2 (2007): 77-91.

1997

No Implementation

There were no changes made to expand the existing provincial boundaries of the ARMM this year.

1998

No Implementation

There were no changes made to expand the existing provincial boundaries of the ARMM this year.

1999

No Implementation

There were no changes made to expand the existing provincial boundaries of the ARMM this year.

2000

No Implementation

There were no changes made to expand the existing provincial boundaries of the ARMM this year.

2001

Full Implementation

As called for in the peace agreement, the Filipino legislature passed the Republic Act 9054 or Expanded ARMM Law in 2001. The plebiscite which was to determine which provinces would join the new ARMM was scheduled for August 2001. Of the 14 provinces and 9 cities in the SZOPAD that voted in the referendum, only one additional province (Basilan) and one city (Marawi) voted for inclusion in the new expanded ARMM. Thus, the new ARMM consisted of Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Tawi-tawi, Sulu, Basilan and Marawi.¹

1. Ibid.

2002

Full Implementation

No further changes were made to the provincial boundaries of the ARMM following the final referendum in August 2001.

2003

Full Implementation

No further changes were made to the provincial boundaries of the ARMM following the final referendum in August 2001.

2004

Full Implementation

No further changes were made to the provincial boundaries of the ARMM following the final referendum in August 2001.

2005

Full Implementation

No further changes were made to the provincial boundaries of the ARMM following the final referendum in August 2001.

1996

No Implementation

The civil service reform stipulation in the 1996 accord was not implemented this year. No formal recruitment efforts, affirmative action programs, or outreach initiates by the Civil Service Commission of the Philippines intended to increase the number of ARMM residents employed in the civil service could be found. Within the GRP Civil Service Commission, the Office of Examination, Recruitment and Placement and the Office of Public Assistance and Information were contacted for information regarding Article 72 and relevant programs targeted at ARMM residents. No information could be obtained on any specific program.¹

A broad report on civil service reform and the role of civil society participation covering the administrations of Ramos (1992-1998), Estrada (1998-2001), and Macapagal-Arroyo (2001-2010) makes no mention of any policy or goal or program aimed at increasing the representation of ARMM residents in the civil service.²

1. “The Phillipine Civil Service Commission,” accessed July 30, 2012, http://excell.csc.gov.ph/cscweb/dir_co.html.
2. Prijono Tjiptoherijanto, “Civil Service Reform in the Philippines: The Role of Civil Society,” 2008, accessed Aug 23, 2012, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNPAN/UNPAN031550….

1997

No Implementation

No formal recruitment efforts, affirmative action programs, or outreach initiates by the Civil Service Commission of the Philippines intended to increase the number of ARMM residents employed in the civil service could be found.¹

1. Ibid.

1998

No Implementation

No formal recruitment efforts, affirmative action programs, or outreach initiates by the Civil Service Commission of the Philippines intended to increase the number of ARMM residents employed in the civil service could be found.¹

1. Ibid.

1999

No Implementation

No formal recruitment efforts, affirmative action programs, or outreach initiates by the Civil Service Commission of the Philippines intended to increase the number of ARMM residents employed in the civil service could be found.¹

1. Ibid.

2000

No Implementation

No formal recruitment efforts, affirmative action programs, or outreach initiates by the Civil Service Commission of the Philippines intended to increase the number of ARMM residents employed in the civil service could be found.¹

1. Ibid.

2001

No Implementation

No formal recruitment efforts, affirmative action programs, or outreach initiates by the Civil Service Commission of the Philippines intended to increase the number of ARMM residents employed in the civil service could be found.¹

1. Ibid.

2002

No Implementation

No formal recruitment efforts, affirmative action programs, or outreach initiates by the Civil Service Commission of the Philippines intended to increase the number of ARMM residents employed in the civil service could be found.¹

1. Ibid.

2003

No Implementation

No formal recruitment efforts, affirmative action programs, or outreach initiates by the Civil Service Commission of the Philippines intended to increase the number of ARMM residents employed in the civil service could be found.¹

1. Ibid.

2004

No Implementation

No formal recruitment efforts, affirmative action programs, or outreach initiates by the Civil Service Commission of the Philippines intended to increase the number of ARMM residents employed in the civil service could be found.¹

1. Ibid.

2005

No Implementation

The official report by the GRP (dated December 2005) which reported on the five chief articles of implementation by the GRP of the Peace Agreement made no mention of any civil service outreach program aimed at the ARMM.

Under the heading “Participation of Muslims in the Executive Council, the Legislative Assembly, the Administrative System, and Representation in National Government,” the GRP report mentioned that recent ARMM elections (18 August 2005) had resulted in the election of Dato Zaldi Uy Ampatuan as the new Regional Governor, 24 new members in the Legislative Assembly, and Hatimil Hassan, leader of the Legislative Assembly. It was also noted that several Muslims were elected to high-ranking positions (Nasser Pangandamam, Department of Agrarian Reform, Mr. Zamzamin Ampatuan, National Anti-Poverty Commission Chairman). The report also mentions two Muslim candidates elected to the Philippine House of Representatives and two Muslim magistrates in the Court of Appeals. Civil Service or Civil Administration is not mentioned in the report on GRP compliance.

The MNLF report to the OIC states that no outreach or training programs concerning civil service were ever implemented.¹

1. “Report of the OIC Secretary-General on the Question of Muslims in Southern Philippines,” Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC/33-ICFM/2005/MM/SG/REP.2), 2006, accessed June 9, 2010, http://www.oic-oci.org/baku2006/english/SG-report/33ICFM-MM-SG-REP-ENG-P…

1996

No Implementation

The 1996 peace accord calls for one Supreme Court justice, two Court of Appeal justices, as well as one member of the Bar Council, to come from the ARMM. In addition, an Office of the Deputy Court Administrator is to be established and headed by a person recommended by the ARMM Governor. None of the aforementioned appointments related to judicial reform were implemented in the year.

1997

No Implementation

None of the aforementioned appointments related to judicial reform were implemented in the year.

1998

No Implementation

None of the aforementioned appointments related to judicial reform were implemented in the year.

1999

No Implementation

None of the aforementioned appointments related to judicial reform were implemented in the year.

2000

No Implementation

None of the aforementioned appointments related to judicial reform were implemented in the year.

2001

No Implementation

In 2001, Republic Act 9054, also called the Extended ARMM Law, is passed by the Congress of the Philippines. The bill contained a section on judicial powers of the ARMM and repeats the language of the 1996 peace agreement, but adds in the additional phrase “whenever feasible.” Article 8, Section 2 (Judges from the Autonomous Region) of RA 9054 reads as follows:
“It shall be the policy of the central government or national government that, whenever feasible, at least one (1) justice in the Supreme Court and two (2) justices in the Court of Appeals shall come from qualified jurists of the autonomous region.”

RA 9054 also repeats the language of the 1996 peace agreement regarding the creation of the Office of Deputy Court Administrator, but the office was not created, and none of the three aforementioned appointments were made¹ The Republic of the Philippines Department of Justice (DOJ) directory of offices does not include any listing for Office of Deputy Court Administrator for the ARMM.²

1. “Republic Act 9054,” Congress of the Philippines, accessed July 31, 2012, http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/ra_11/RA09054.pdf
2. “Department of Justice Website,” Republic of the Philippines, accessed July 31, 2012, http://www.doj.gov.ph/directory-of-officials.html

2002

No Implementation

None of the aforementioned appointments related to judicial reform were implemented in the year.

2003

No Implementation

None of the aforementioned appointments related to judicial reform were implemented in the year.

2004

No Implementation

None of the aforementioned appointments related to judicial reform were implemented in the year.

2005

No Implementation

In 2005, the GRP reported to the OIC that the judicial reform provisions had been fully implemented and they reported that five Sharia district courts and 30 Sharia circuit courts had been established in the ARMM.¹ In a 1994 interview, Judge Alauya, a Sharia Magistrate, indicated that there were at that time five Sharia district courts and 31 Sharia circuit courts in the ARMM, and that judges received their training in Sharia Law in Saudi Arabia.² While it is unclear what the objectives were regarding Sharia courts in the ARMM, what can be established by the two sources is that no change occurred between 1994 and 2005.

1. “Report of the OIC Secretary-General on the Question of Muslims in Southern Philippines,” Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC/33-ICFM/2005/MM/SG/REP.2), 2006, accessed June 9, 2012, http://www.oic-oci.org/baku2006/english/SG-report/33ICFM-MM-SG-REP-ENG-P…
2. Joe Avancena, “Kingdom keen to train Sharia judges for Mindanao,” SAUDI GAZETTE, May 30 1994, accessed August 02, 2012, http://www.lexisnexis.com

1996

Minimum Implementation

The 1996 accord specified a plan to integrate at least 5, 750 MNLF combatants into the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) with another 250 to be drawn into auxiliary units. The agreement called for the eventual integration of the maximum number of remaining MNLF forces into the Special Regional Security Force (SRSF). In November of 1996, screening began for MNLF fighters to be integrated into the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Following the screening process, MNLF officers and soldiers entered a formal training program.¹

1. Macapado A. Muslim, “Sustaining the Constituency for Moro Autonomy, ” in Compromising on Autonomy: Mindanao in Transition, ed. Mara Stankovitch (London: Conciliation Resources, 1999).

1997

Intermediate Implementation

As of April 1,274 applications had been processed. The first batch (1,211) to complete training consisted of 1,106 candidate soldiers and 105 candidate officers to be deployment in SZOPAD areas.¹

1. Miriam Coronel Ferrer, “Integration of MNLF Forces into the PNP and AFP: Integration without Demobilization and Disarmament,” (Paper prepared for the conference The GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement, Phase 1: Pains and Gains, Center for Integrative and Development Studies, University of the Philippines, November 10-11, 1999).

1998

Intermediate Implementation

According to Ferrer’s report, a “second batch” of 1,799 soldiers and 55 officers would have been in training during 1998 and 1999.¹ As of the end of 1998, around 3,802 MNLF ex-combatants are said to have already been successfully integrated into the AFP and the PNP, representing roughly half of the quota. Another source reports 496 integrated into the PNP, which yields a total for the AFP of 3,306 (3,802 – 496) – which is quite close to the sum of batch one and batch two as reported by Ferrer.²

1. Ibid.
2. Macapado A. Muslim, “Sustaining the Constituency for Moro Autonomy, ” in Compromising on Autonomy: Mindanao in Transition, ed. Mara Stankovitch (London: Conciliation Resources, 1999).

1999

Full Implementation

Ferrer reports of a third batch named Alpha that consists of 1,506 MNLF members which passed the physical examination, and a third batch (Bravo) that consists of 1,036 soldiers, 50 officers, and 250 auxiliary service troops to start training in November (1999).¹

Villanueva and Aguilar report that as of September 1999, a total of 4,850 MNLF members had graduated and had been integrated into the AFP: 160 as 2nd Lieutenants and 4,690 at the rank of private. This number comes very close to the sum of Ferrer’s batch one, two, and three (1,211+1,854 = 4,571).²

1. Miriam Coronel Ferrer, “Integration of MNLF Forces into the PNP and AFP.”
2. Cesar Villanueva and George Aguilar, “The Reintegration of the Moro National Liberation Front in Mindanao,” Centre for International Cooperation and Security (University of Bradford, 2008).

2000

Full Implementation

The third Batch (Bravo), consisting of 1,036 CSs, 50 OCs, and 250 auxiliary service troops are enlisted by April and had on-the-job training (OJT) until the end of October.¹

Bertrand writes that 7,500 MNLF fighters were integrated into the AFP and PNP and considered the provision fully implemented.²

1. Miriam Coronel Ferrer, “Integration of MNLF Forces into the PNP and AFP.”
2. Jacques Bertrand, “Peace and Conflict in the Southern Philippines: Why the 1996 Peace Agreement Is Fragile,” Pacific Affairs 73, no. 1 (2000): 37-54.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

No Implementation

As referenced above, the peace agreement refers to police reforms in several different sections. The main stipulations are two fold: (1) Integration of MNLF into the Philippine National Police (PNP); and (2) the creation of a new institution and police force: “the PNP Regional Command for the new Autonomous Region, which shall be the Special Regional Security Forces (SRSF) as referred to in Paragraph 8, Article III of the Tripoli Agreement.”

Integration of MNLF candidates into the Philippine National Police (PNP) did not begin in 1996. Neither the PNP Regional Command for the new Autonomous Region, nor the Special Regional Security Force (SRSF) were established in 1996.

1997

Minimum Implementation

Screening begins for applicants to be integrated into the PNP.¹

Neither the PNP Regional Command for the new Autonomous Region, nor the Special Regional Security Force (SRSF) were established in 1997.

1. Miriam Coronel Ferrer, “Integration of MNLF Forces into the PNP and AFP: Integration without Demobilization and Disarmament,” (Paper presented at the conference The GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement, Phase 1: Pains and Gains, Center for Integrative and Development Studies, University of the Philippines, November 10¬11, 1999).

1998

Minimum Implementation

In July of 1998, 496 out of 500 MNLF candidates completed PNP training. They were then formed into a Special Mobile Group after their graduation.¹

Neither the PNP Regional Command for the new Autonomous Region, nor the Special Regional Security Forces (SRSF) were established in 1998.

1. Ibid.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

A second batch of 479 and a third batch of 500 MNLF candidates are in training or waiting to begin training.¹

Neither the PNP Regional Command for the new Autonomous Region, nor the Special Regional Security Forces (SRSF) were established in 1999.

1. Ibid.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

Bertrand considers the integration of MNLF fighters into the PNP accomplished.¹

Neither the PNP Regional Command for the new Autonomous Region, nor the Special Regional Security Forces (SRSF) were established in 2000.

1. Jacques Bertrand, “Peace and Conflict in the Southern Philippines: Why the 1996 Peace Agreement Is Fragile,” Pacific Affairs 73, no. 1 (2000): 37-54.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

Neither the PNP Regional Command for the new Autonomous Region, nor the Special Regional Security Forces (SRSF) were established in 2001.

2002

Intermediate Implementation

Neither the PNP Regional Command for the new Autonomous Region, nor the Special Regional Security Forces (SRSF) were established in 2002.

2003

Intermediate Implementation

Neither the PNP Regional Command for the new Autonomous Region, nor the Special Regional Security Forces (SRSF) were established in 2003.

2004

Intermediate Implementation

Neither the PNP Regional Command for the new Autonomous Region, nor the Special Regional Security Forces (SRSF) were established in 2004.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

Neither the PNP Regional Command for the new Autonomous Region, nor the Special Regional Security Forces (SRSF) were established in 2005.

***Postscript: On 26 October 2008, the regional assembly of the ARMM passed “RA Bill No. 72”, which finally established the SRSF or the Philippines National Police Force in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao with a provision to incorporate existing PNP units in ARMM, MNLF elements and other residents of the area who may be recruited into the SRSF. The bill was later reaffirmed or updated under MMA Act No. 287 in November 2011.¹

1. “Title V: Public Order and Security, Chapter 1: Philippine National Police Regional Command for the ARMM,” accessed August 24, 2012, http://armm.gov.ph/armm-content/uploads/2013/03/MMA%20Act%20No.%20287.pdf, 19.

1996

Minimum Implementation

Reintegration projects specifically aimed at providing livelihood training for MNLF combatants who were not integrated into the Armed or the National Police were in the planning stages in 1996. USAID was in a good position to assist in reintegration in Mindanao because they have had a presence there since the early 1990’s with projects designed to help alleviate poverty and increase good governance (e.g., GEM and Governance and Local Democracy projects). Among the many programs funded by USAID in Mindanao, the main programs were ELAP, LEAP, and SWIFT.¹

1. “Update: ELAP and GEM in the Philippines,” The Berger Group, 2012, accessed July 24, 2012, http://www.bergergroup.com/?p=open_work&type=work&id=12&t=Update:_ELAP_a…

1997

Intermediate Implementation

In 1997, phase one of the United Nations Multi-Donor Programme (GOP-UNMDP) begins. The GOP-UNMDP program, in collaboration with the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), sponsored a reintegration assistance program aimed at some 70,000 MNLF ex-combatants and their family members. Australia was the largest contributor to the Action for Conflict Transformation (ACT) under the Government of the Philippines — United Nations Multi-Donor Programme (GOP-UNMDP).¹

In August 1997, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) hired the Berger Group to initiate the Emergency Livelihood Assistance Program (ELAP). ELAP was designed to transform 13,000 former MNLF guerillas into productive farmers. ELAP, is a subcomponent of the acclaimed Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM) Program, which the Berger Group has been implementing since 1995 in collaboration with USAID, SPCPD, the National Economic and Development Authority and the Bangsamoro Women’s Foundation for Peace and Development (BMWFPD). GEM/ELAP commenced with funding of $2.15 million to provide three core programs (1) farm inputs and training for corn and seaweed production, (2) participant managed community credit fund, and (3) literacy program for 600 ex-combatants and their female family members. ELAP started with 4000 MNLF beneficiaries in 1997. From August 1997 to December of 1998, 4000 MNLF ex-combatants entered the corn and seaweed programs. ELAP farmers produced roughly twice the amount of corn per hectare than non-ELAP farmers in the same areas and 5 times the amount of seaweed.²

In December 1997, $500 million was pledged in a meeting attended by representatives from the Consultative Group for the Philippines for the development of Mindanao which included livelihood training projects and the formation of mobile teams intended for the integration of the former MNLF members.³

1. “ACT for Peace Project Document,” UNMDP, accessed July 30, 2012, http://aid.dfat.gov.au/countries/eastasia/philippines/Documents/afp-proj…
2. “Update: ELAP and GEM in the Philippines.”
3. “Philippines Gets Us$500 million for Mindanao Development,” AAP Newsfeed, December 23, 1997.

1998

Intermediate Implementation

In order to reintegrate the MNLF rebels back to civilian lives, President Ramos had also approved a program to hire former MNLF combatants to build a total of 163 bridges also called peace bridges in southern Philippines. This happened in January 1998.¹

Phase 2 of GOP-UNMDP commences in 1998. USAID’s GEM/ELAP program also continues through 1998 bringing 320 private investments valued at more than $700 million to Mindanao. The GEM program is credited with creating 57,000 jobs in Mindanao. A literacy program was launched in September 1998 with a grant from World Education, a U.S. NGO. By May 2000, 934 people had completed the functional literacy program.²

1. “Former Muslim rebels to be hired to build southern Philippine bridges,” Associated Press Worldstream, January 18, 1998.
2. “Update: ELAP and GEM in the Philippines.”

1999

Intermediate Implementation

The SWIFT program (Support with Implementing Fast Transitions) commenced in April 1999 with the same objectives as earlier programs (GEM/ELAP), that is, providing farming/livelihood assistance. A major difference in the SWIFT program was that the GRP would be the intermediary between USAID and the MNLF in order to build trust and partnerships. The SWIFT program also sought to build post-harvest processing facilities to improve economies of scale, and build local democratic structures. There appears to be no data on how many farmers interacted with these processing facilities at harvest time.¹

1. John Heard and Lisa Magno, “SWIFT Mindanao Project Evaluation,” 2000, accessed July 23 2012, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdabs708.pdf.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

A USAID fourth quarter progress report on SWIFT shows that 9,945 ex-combatants participated and 16,899 families participated.¹ The SWIFT program is concluded in December and external audits of ELAP/LEAP and SWIFT show moderate successes. Many ex-combatants, when surveyed, credited the programs with keeping them from returning to armed conflict ²

1. “SWIFT Mindanao Quarterly Performance Report 2001,” accessed July 23, 2012, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABX235.pdf.
2. John Heard and Lisa Magno, “SWIFT Mindanao Project Evaluation,” 2000, accessed July 23 2012, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdabs708.pdf.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

While GEM was conceived as a five-year program running from 1995 to 2001, increased terrorism in Mindanao in 2000 and 2001 influences USAID to extend their programs.

Also in 2001, phase three of the United Nations Multi-Donor Programme (GOP-UNMDP) begins. The GOP-UNMDP program, in collaboration with the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), sponsored a reintegration assistance program aimed at some 70,000 MNLF ex-combatants and their family members. Australia was the largest contributor to the Action for Conflict Transformation (ACT) under the Government of the Philippines — United Nations Multi-Donor Programme (GOP-UNMDP).¹

1. “Case Studies in Enterprise Development In Post-Conflict Situations: Bosnia — Philippines — Afghanistan, Technical Brief No.4,” USAID/EGAT/EG, 2008, accesed January 2012, http://www.enterprise-development.org/download.ashx?id=2102.

2002

Intermediate Implementation

In 2002, Gem-2 commences with a plan of running from 2002 to 2007. ELAP is renamed the Livelihood Enhancement and Peace Program (LEAP).

2003

Intermediate Implementation

GEM-2 and LEAP continue to operate in 2003. No updates found on other ongoing programs for this year.

2004

Intermediate Implementation

GEM-2 and LEAP continue to operate in 2004. As of June 2004, the UNDP Program had provided livelihood assistance to 101 cooperatives with 4,388 beneficiaries (3,513 males and 875 females). UNDP provided 57 training courses on agricultural technologies and cooperative financial management to 1,867 beneficiaries (1,553 males and 314 females).

2005

Full Implementation

In 2005, the Action for Conflict Transformation (ACT) is the fourth phase of the Government of the Philippines — United Nations Multi-Donor Programme (GOP-UNMDP) that began in 1997. Funded by Australia, New Zealand and Spain, the final phase is being implemented from June 2005 up to May 2010. It covers 16 provinces and 14 cities of the former Special Zone for Peace and Development (SZOPAD) in Southern Philippines identified in the GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement, and the four provinces and three cities in the Caraga Region. The Mindanao Economic Development Council (MEDCo) serves as the overall implementing agency with the Regional Government of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) as the lead implementing agency for the ARMM areas. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) serves as the managing agent for the entire program.

Also active in 2005 are the GEM-2 and LEAP programs. According to USAID reports, over 28,000 former MNLF combatants were assisted in GEM-2 from 2002 to 2007.¹

1. Ibid.

1996

No Implementation

The 1996 peace agreement calls for efforts to increase respect for human rights by reforming the police and security practices used in the ARMM region. Under the agreement, the ARMM would gain control over the policing of its territory through the creation of a PNP Regional Command for the new Autonomous Region, and the creation of a Special Regional Security Force (SRSF). Neither the PNP Regional Command for the new Autonomous Region, nor the Special Regional Security Force (SRSF) were established this year.

Amnesty International’s 1996 Report on the Philippines mentions at least 200 political prisoners being held by the GRP. Several dozen extra-judicial executions while in custody of the AFP or PNP are reported for the year. Criminal prosecution of security force personnel for human rights violations is virtually non-existent. Public confidence in the judiciary remains extremely low¹

1. “Amnesty International Report 1996 – Philippines,” Amnesty International, January 1, 1996, accessed July 30, 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a9fa60.html.

1997

No Implementation

Amnesty International reports the continued use of torture of detainees and imprisonment for involvement in political activity. Detainees are arrested without warrants, denied legal counsel, and subjected to beatings and torture to extract confessions.¹ Neither the PNP Regional Command for the new Autonomous Region, nor the Special Regional Security Force (SRSF) were established this year.

1. “Amnesty International Report 1997 – Philippines,” Amnesty International, January 1, 1997, accessed July 30, 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a9f834.html.

1998

No Implementation

Amnesty International reports the continued use of torture of detainees and imprisonment for involvement in political activity in 1998. Detainees are arrested without warrants, denied legal counsel, and subjected to beatings and torture to extract confessions. Extrajudicial killings blamed on AFP and PNP security forces are a regularity¹ Neither the PNP Regional Command for the new Autonomous Region, nor the Special Regional Security Force (SRSF) were established this year.

1. “Amnesty International Report 1998 – Philippines,” Amnesty International, January 1, 1998, accessed July 30, 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6aa088.html.

1999

No Implementation

Amnesty International reports that at least 145 political prisoners remain in detention and torture is frequently used during interrogations. At least four disappearances and nine extrajudicial executions were reported for 1999.¹ Neither the PNP Regional Command for the new Autonomous Region, nor the Special Regional Security Force (SRSF) were established this year.

1. “Amnesty International Report 1999 – Philippines,” Amnesty International, January 1, 1999, accessed July 30, 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6aa0a14.html.

2000

No Implementation

As peace talks with MILF break down, violence increases across the southern Philippines. Reports of human rights violations, including extrajudicial executions and the torture of detainees by security personnel are widespread. Amnesty International issues a special report for the year 2000 due to the frequency of pre-trial torture in the Philippines¹ Neither the PNP Regional Command for the new Autonomous Region, nor the Special Regional Security Force (SRSF) were established this year.

1. “Philippines: The Rolando Abadilla murder inquiry – an urgent need for effective investigation of torture,” Amnesty International (ASA 35/008/2000), accessed July 30, 2012, http://amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA35/008/2000/en/7b256765-ddb9-11dd…

2001

Minimum Implementation

Amnesty International reports the continued use of torture against detainees and imprisonment for involvement in political activity. Detainees are arrested without warrants, denied legal counsel, and subjected to beatings and torture to extract confessions. Extrajudicial killings blamed on AFP and PNP security forces are a regularity.¹

On March 31, 2001 the congress of the Philippines passed the Republic Act 9054 which created a Regional Human Rights Commission (section 16) for the ARMM. The chair and two commissioners of the RHRC are to be appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Regional Governor. The composition of the commission should reflect the ethnic distribution of the population of the autonomous region. The chair shall be a lawyer and resident of the autonomous region.² Neither the PNP Regional Command for the new Autonomous Region, nor the Special Regional Security Force (SRSF) were established this year.

1. “Amnesty International Report 2001 – Philippines,” Amnesty International, 2001, accessed July 30, 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b1de37f8.html.
2. “R.A. No. 9054,” Congress of the Philippines, 2001. accessed August 21, 2012, http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/ra_11/RA09054.pdf.

2002

Minimum Implementation

Extrajudicial executions continue throughout Mindanao, many attributed to the so-called “Davao Death Squads.” Arbitrary arrests, torture, extrajudicial executions and disappearances were reported in the context of counterinsurgency operations.¹ Neither the PNP Regional Command for the new Autonomous Region, nor the Special Regional Security Force (SRSF) were established this year.

1. “Amnesty International Report 2003 – The Philippines,” Amnesty International, May 28, 2003, accessed July 30, 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3edb47ddc.html.

2003

Minimum Implementation

A series of bombings by Islamist in Mindanao in March and April, is followed by repressive counterinsurgency campaigns. Amnesty International characterizes the state of human rights in the Philippines in 2003 as a de facto climate of impunity which shields any AFP or PNP perpetrators from being convicted. Indigenous inhabitants involved in land disputes with local landlords are being executed.¹ Neither the PNP Regional Command for the new Autonomous Region, nor the Special Regional Security Force (SRSF) were established this year.

1. “Amnesty International Report 2004 – Philippines,” Amnesty International, accessed August 2, 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/40b5a1fef.html.

2004

Minimum Implementation

In 2004, there were 100 executions in Davao City, alone, according to Amnesty International. No perpetrators have been arrested or convicted for the crimes. The city’s mayor made statements suggesting that extrajudicial executions were an effective means to combat criminality.¹ Neither the PNP Regional Command for the new Autonomous Region, nor the Special Regional Security Force (SRSF) were established this year.

1. “Amnesty International Report 2005 – Philippines,” Amnesty International, accessed July 30, 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/429b27f22.html.

2005

Minimum Implementation

In an 88 page report on extra-judicial killings in Mindanao, Human Rights Watch investigated and interviewed family members from 19 of the hundreds of cases of extrajudicial executions and forced disappearances that occurred between October 2005 and November 2006. Many of the cases show an AFP or PNP connection. For example, on October 25, 2005, the Department of Labor along with 20 armed soldiers went to the house of Ricardo Ramos, the president of the Central Azucarrera Labor Union, regarding a recent strike by the union, but Ramos was not home. Later in the day, 2 soldiers went back to the house again, and family members informed them that Ramos was sleeping. Around 9pm the same day, Ramos was assassinated outside his home by a round from an M14 rifle, the type used by the AFP.

In another case, it can be confirmed that the individuals engaged in the execution were AFP members. After kidnapping Pastor Santa Rosa from his home in front of his wife, one of the soldiers in the group was accidently shot by another agent and the body was found alongside the pastor’s body. The pastor was politically involved in various “agrarian reform” movements.¹ Neither the PNP Regional Command for the new Autonomous Region, nor the Special Regional Security Force (SRSF) were established this year.

1. “Scared Silent: Impunity for Extra-judicial Killings in the Philippines,” Human Rights Watch 19, no. 9 (2007): 1-88, accessed July 30, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/philippines0607webwcover….

1996

Intermediate Implementation

The education articles in the 1996 accord call for ARMM schools to follow the same basic structure as the national Filipino school system in regards to standards and guidelines. The GRP’s primary implementation responsibility is to provide equal opportunity to education in the ARMM. In practical terms, this should mean proportionate funding, or an equitable share of funding, for ARMM schools – relative to the population size of the ARMM. Based on information gathered from the GRP National Statistics Office, the amount of money allocated to the ARMM educational system seems to be equitable relative to the funding of the other provinces, although these statistics do not go back to1996. According to the latest Department of Education Budget, 1.6 billion pesos (38.2 million U.S. dollars) were spent on Kindergarten education, for example. The ARMM received 52.1 million pesos (1.2 million U.S. dollars). The ARMM received 3.14 % of the entire Kindergarten budget for the country.¹ Based on population statistics, the population of the ARMM was 3.15% of the total population. Hence, it appears that the GRP allocates educational funding based closely on population figures.² Based on data from the fiscal yearbooks, we estimate that the GRP contributes an equitable share of funding to ARMM schools relative to the population size of the ARMM.

1. “GRP Office of Budget and Management,” accessed August 6, 2012, http://www.dbm.gov.ph/?page_id=3610.
2. “GRP National Statistics Office,” accessed August 2012, http://www.census.gov.ph/data/sectordata/datapop.html.

1997

Intermediate Implementation

No major developments pertaining to education reform in the ARMM took place this year.

1998

Intermediate Implementation

No major developments pertaining to education reform in the ARMM took place this year.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

No major developments pertaining to education reform in the ARMM took place this year.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

No major developments pertaining to education reform in the ARMM took place this year.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

Article 104 states that “the management and control, and supervision of the entire educational system in the area of autonomy shall be the primary concern of the Regional Autonomous Government.” The Republic Act no. 9155 (also called the Governance of Basic Education Act) was passed in August 2001. Section 13 of the act states that the ARMM is responsible for the educational system in the autonomous region. Republic Act 9155 made primary education compulsory and free for children age 7-13, and secondary education free but not compulsory.¹

King and Guerra report that in 2001 the GRP implemented a decentralized approach to education with respect to the ARMM.²

1. “Philippines: World Data on Education,” UNESCO (2006/2007), accessed August 27, 2012, http://www.ibe.unesco.org.
2. Elizabeth M. King and Susana Cordeiro Guerra, “Education Reforms In East Asia: Policy, Process, and Impact,” in East Asia Decentralizes: Making Local Government Work (World Bank, Washington D.C., 2005), 179-207.

2002

Intermediate Implementation

No major developments pertaining to education reform in the ARMM took place this year.

2003

Intermediate Implementation

No major developments pertaining to education reform in the ARMM took place this year.

2004

Full Implementation

In 2004, the development and institutionalization of madrasa education was approved by the GRP Department of Education under DepED Order No. 51. The ARMM also adopted the national standard curriculum in the same year with Executive Order No. 13-A. These two orders essentially bring Madrasa schools into the national fold for the first time by allowing them to apply for national funding.¹

1. “DepEd Order No. 51,” RGRP Department of Education, accessed August 6, 2012, http://eedncr.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/deped-order-no-51-s-2004.pdf.

2005

Full Implementation

The Arabic language as a medium of teaching in Madrasas was recognized from 2004 onward. Department of Education Order Number 51 and ARMM RG Executive Order No. 13-A helped to upgrade and standardize the Arabic Language and Islamic Studies in madrasas and the teaching of secular subjects in those madrasas that wish to be recognized by Department of Education.¹ As of 2005, the integration program for private Madrasas had not received any GRP funding according to the firm that was contracted with USAID to train teachers in Mindanao:

The recent DepEd Order No. 51 of 2004 orders a Standard Curriculum for Private Madaris that should incorporate basic education subjects into the daily schedule of private madaris. To date, however, the Standard Curriculum is only a policyÉ The Standard Curriculum, and a broader set of proposed guidelines known as a Roadmap for Upgrading Muslim Basic Education, has not yet received any government funding for implementation.²

It is unclear based on the accord and legislation whether the GRP is expected to fund the textbooks associated with the program: Standard Curriculum for Private Madaris. As of 2005, the funding for the printing of textbooks and teaching guides for the subjects ‘Islamic Values’, ‘Arabic Language,’ and ‘Islamic Studies’ for Grades 1 and 2 came from the World Islamic Call Society of Libya. It was also reported that the textbooks and teaching materials for Grades 3 to 6 were being prepared by a publisher for the years 2005 and 2006, but had not been printed.³

1. “Policy Research on Access to Quality Basic Education for Muslim Learners: Final Report,” USAID, 2007, accessed August 27, 2012, http://www.iyfnet.org/sites/default/files/Quality_BasicEd_4_Muslims.pdf.
2. “Madrasah Education 2008,” Creative Associates, accessed August 6, 2012, http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/0.
3. “Policy Research on Access to Quality Basic Education for Muslim Learners: Final Report.”

1996

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1997

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1998

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1999

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2000

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2001

Minimum Implementation

Based on the language of the 1996 peace agreement and RA 9054, implementation requires that the GRP accept the use of Arabic or regional languages in the ARMM region. Article 14, Section (j), of Republic Act 9054, passed in 2001, declares that “the official languages for instruction in the public school system are Filipino and English, even in the ARMM public schools.” The legislation allows Arabic to be used as an auxiliary medium of instruction – if chosen by the student. Section 1 also states that “regional languages may be used as auxiliary official languages in the region where used.”

2002

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2003

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2004

Intermediate Implementation

In 2004, the Department of Education Central Office issued DepED Order Number 51 s. 2004 and the ARMM RG Executive Order No. 13-A, s. 2004 which standardized use of the Arabic Language and the teaching of Islamic Studies in madrasas. Order 51 also called for the teaching of secular subjects in those madrasas that wished to be recognized by the Department of Education.¹ As such, the Arabic language as medium of teaching in Madaris was recognized from 2004.

1. “Policy Research on Access to Quality Basic Education for Muslim Learners: Final Report,” USAID, 2007, accessed August 27, 2012, http://www.iyfnet.org/sites/default/files/Quality_BasicEd_4_Muslims.pdf….

2005

Intermediate Implementation

As of 2005, the integration program had not received any GRP funding according to the firm that was contracted with USAID to train teachers in Mindanao:

The recent DepEd Order No. 51 of 2004 orders a “Standard Curriculum for Private Madaris that should incorporate basic education subjects into the daily schedule of private madaris. To date, however, the Standard Curriculum is only a policyÉ The Standard Curriculum, and a broader set of proposed guidelines known as a Roadmap for Upgrading Muslim Basic Education, has not yet received any government funding for implementation.¹

Funding for the printing of textbooks and teaching guides for the subjects ‘Islamic Values’, ‘Arabic Language,’ and ‘Islamic Studies’ for Grades 1 and 2 did not come from the GRP, but from the World Islamic Call Society of Libya. It was also reported that the textbooks and teaching materials for Grades 3 to 6 were being prepared by a publisher for the years 2005 and 2006, but had not been printed.²

1. “Madrasah Education 2008,” Creative Associates, accessed August 6, 2012, http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/0…
2. “Policy Research on Access to Quality Basic Education for Muslim Learners: Final Report.”

1996

No Implementation

The 1996 accord calls on the ARMM Regional Assembly (not established in 1996) to establish Sharia courts and Islamic schools. Both Sharia courts and Islamic schools already existed in the ARMM prior to the 1996 peace agreement, providing a baseline for increases or decreases in the frequency of both institutions. In a 1994 interview with Judge Alauya, a Sharia Magistrate, he indicated that there were presently five Sharia district courts and 31 Sharia circuit courts in the ARMM, and that judges received their training in Sharia Law in Saudi Arabia.¹

As for Islamic schools, the GRP did not fund Islamic cultural education at the time of the 1996 agreement, although, in principal, they allowed Islamic cultural subject matter to be taught as an optional curriculum in majority Muslim areas.

1. “Kingdom keen to train Sharia judges for Mindanao,” SAUDI GAZETTE, May 30, 1994.

1997

No Implementation

The GRP did not fund Islamic cultural education in 1997, although, they allowed Islamic cultural subject matter to be taught as an optional curriculum in majority Muslim areas.

1998

No Implementation

The GRP did not fund Islamic cultural education in 1998, although, they allowed Islamic cultural subject matter to be taught as an optional curriculum in majority Muslim areas.

1999

No Implementation

The GRP did not fund Islamic cultural education in 1999, although, they allowed Islamic cultural subject matter to be taught as an optional curriculum in majority Muslim areas.

2000

No Implementation

The GRP did not fund Islamic cultural education in 2000, although, they allowed Islamic cultural subject matter to be taught as an optional curriculum in majority Muslim areas.

2001

No Implementation

The GRP did not fund Islamic cultural education in 2001, although, they allowed Islamic cultural subject matter to be taught as an optional curriculum in majority Muslim areas.

In 2001, the Republic Act 9054 becomes law which formally establishes the Regional Legislative Assembly, although no representative elections are held, and no new Sharia courts or Islamic schools are created.

2002

No Implementation

The GRP did not fund Islamic cultural education in 2002, although, they allowed Islamic cultural subject matter to be taught as an optional curriculum in majority Muslim areas.

2003

No Implementation

The GRP did not fund Islamic cultural education in 2003, although, they allowed Islamic cultural subject matter to be taught as an optional curriculum in majority Muslim areas.

2004

Intermediate Implementation

In 2004, the development and institutionalization of madrasah education was approved by the GRP Department of Education under DepED Order No. 51 in 2004. The ARMM also adopted the national standard curriculum in the same year with Executive Order No. 13-A. These two orders essentially bring Madrasah schools into the national fold for the first time by allowing them to apply for national funding.¹

The Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference reported the legal developments of 2004 as positive measures toward promoting a unified Philippine national identity while preserving Islamic cultural heritage.²

1. “DepEd Order No. 51,” GRP Department of Education, accessed August 06, 2012, http://eedncr.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/deped-order-no-51-s-2004.pdf.
2. “Report of the OIC Secretary-General on the Question of Muslims in Southern Philippines,” Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC/33-ICFM/2005/MM/SG/REP.2), 2006, accessed August 2012, http://www.oic-oci.org/baku2006/english/SG-report/33ICFM-MM-SG-REP-ENG-P…8.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

Ten years after the signing of the peace accord, the GRP reports to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) that it has implemented the Sharia provisions and reports that there are five Sharia district courts and 30 Sharia circuit courts within the ARMM. Given the baseline frequency of Sharia courts established in 1996, it appears that no changes to the status quo have taken place over ten years.¹

The institutional requirements for establishing Sharia courts and Islamic Schools, namely, the establishment of the ARMM Regional Assembly, was finally put in place in 2005. On 8 August 2005, gubernatorial and representative elections are held for the ARMM Regional Assembly. According to the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), Commission on Elections there were 24 new members elected to the Regional Legislative Assembly from the five provinces and one city which make up the ARMM.²

1. Ibid.
2. “ARMM Elections,” Republic of the Philippines Commission on Elections, 2005, accessed July 31, 2012, http://www.comelec.gov.ph/?r=Archives/RegularElections/2005ARMM/Results&…

1996

Minimum Implementation

The 1996 peace agreement calls for various provisions such as the ARMM establishing its own Regional Economic and Development Planning Board, tourism promotion, authority to the ARMM to give incentives including tax holidays within its power and resources in the area of autonomy, enact a regional tax code and regional local tax code, encourage the establishment of banks and bank branches along with establishing an Islamic Banking Unit in the ARMM. The ARMM was allowed to accept foreign financial and economic grants, issue its own bonds, treasury bills and debt papers in coordination with the central bank. The peace accord calls for the fiscal autonomy of the ARMM, gives preferential rights over the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources in the autonomy area respecting existing rights on the exploration, exploitation and utilization of the natural resources. The internal revenue tax collected from the ARMM region was to be allocated for the Regional Autonomous Government, for a period of five year, in the Annual General Appropriation Act, which could be extended upon the mutual agreement between the national and regional autonomous government.

Executive Order no. 371 created the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) as a transitional body to be dissolved after the plebiscite scheduled for 1999. The SPCPD however did not lead to the establishment of the institutional frameworks called for in the accord for socio-economic development.¹

The Regional Economic and Development Planning Board was not established. Concerning Islamic banks, there was only one Islamic Bank, Al-Amanah, in the region. The Growth with Equity in Mindanao project sought to get other overseas Islamic Banks to set up branches in the ARMM region.² As provided in the accord, the ARMM was allowed to keep 80 percent of tax revenue for five years, but the amount was miniscule.³ There were no records found of the ARMM issuing treasury bills or debt papers.

1. John D. Harber, “Conflict and Compromise in the Southern Philippines: The Case of Moro Identity,” (M.A. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2008).
2. “Philippines lures foreign Islamic banks,” Agence France Presse, October 25, 1996.
3. “Philippines dangles more autonomy to Moslem rebels,” Agence France Presse, February 2, 1999.

1997

Minimum Implementation

Socioeconomic reform in Mindanao was supposed to be addressed in an institutional fashion after establishing the Regional Economic and Development Planning Board. This did not happen in 1997. In terms of foreign support for socio-economic development, in December 1997, $500 million was pledged in a meeting attended by representatives from the Consultative Group for the Philippines for the development of Mindanao which included programs related to livelihood and eco-tourism among other developmental projects.¹ In respect with establishing the Islamic bank branches, the central bank was in a process to amend the country’s banking regulation to attract foreign Islamic banks.²

1. “Philippines Gets Us$500 m for Mindanao Development,” AAP Newsfeed, December 23, 1997.
2. “Philippines preparing rules to attract Islamic banks,” Associated Press, January 29, 1997.

1998

Minimum Implementation

The Regional Economic and Development Planning Board was not created in 1998. There were no reports of newly established Islamic banks in the region. However, as provided in the accord, however, the ARMM was allowed to keep 80 percent of tax revenue for five years.¹ The ARMM received foreign support and grants for various socio-economic development related projects.

1. “Philippines dangles more autonomy to Moslem rebels,” Agence France Presse, February 2, 1999.

1999

Minimum Implementation

The Regional Economic and Development Planning Board was not created in 1999. There were no reports of newly established Islamic banks in the region. However, as provided in the accord, however, the ARMM was allowed to keep 80 percent of tax revenue for five years.¹ The ARMM received foreign support and grants for various socio-economic development related projects.

1. Ibid.

2000

Minimum Implementation

The Regional Economic and Development Planning Board was not created in 2000. There were no reports of newly established Islamic banks in the region. As called for in the accord, the ARMM was allowed to keep 80 percent of tax revenue for five years.¹ The ARMM received foreign support and grants for various socio-economic development related projects.

1. Ibid.

2001

Minimum Implementation

The Regional Economic and Development Planning Board was not created in 2001. The ARMM was allowed to keep 80 percent of tax revenue for five years.¹

1. Ibid.

2002

Minimum Implementation

The Regional Economic and Development Planning Board was not created in 2002. There were no reports of newly established Islamic banks in the region. The ARMM did receive foreign support and grants for various socio-economic development related projects.

2003

Intermediate Implementation

In 2003 the ARMM Department of Trade and Industry called for the regional legislature to expedite the passage of the Regional Economic Zone Authority (REZA) bill in order to boost local and foreign investment through tax incentives and revenue holidays.¹ On 15 August 2003, the regional assembly passed the RIZA law in accordance with the 1996 accord. The RIZA law provides the legal mechanism for the creation, operation, administration, and coordination of the special economic zones within the region.² This also paved the way for the formulation of policies for various socio-economic development programs including the local tax code, and preferential rights over the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources in the autonomy area.

1. “Mindanao Region Calls for Rapid Passage of Bill to Boost Investment in Philippines,” World Markets Analysis, January 10, 2003.
2. “ARMM ecozone authority gets P13M,” Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao, accessed August 31, 2012, http://www.afrim.org.ph

2004

Intermediate Implementation

Following the establishment of the Regional Economic Zone Authority (REZA) in the ARMM region, there were no clear indications or reports that the organization carried out the specific reforms called for in the accord.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

In 2005, the Al-Amanah Islamic Bank was the only bank in the ARMM.¹ The Regional Economic Zone Authority (REZA) was established, and the ARMM received large amounts of foreign support and grants for various socio-economic development related projects. Most of the broad reforms called for in the 1996 accord did not materialize.

1. “Islamic Banking in East Asia-Growing but not without Challenges,” Moody’s Global Banking 2008.

1996

No Implementation

No referendum was observed this year.

1997

No Implementation

No referendum was observed this year.

1998

No Implementation

No referendum was observed this year.

1999

No Implementation

No referendum was observed this year.

2000

No Implementation

No referendum was observed this year.

2001

Full Implementation

As called for in 1996 peace agreement, a regional plebiscite on the expansion of the four-province Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was held in August of 2001. Only one new province, the Muslim majority island of Basilan, voted to join the ARMM. Faced with a blatant democratic rejection by ARMM voters, even in several Muslim majority provinces, MNLF leader, Nur Misuari protests the timing and legitimacy of the plebiscite election, amid widespread calls for his resignation. In November, MNLF units claiming loyal to Nur Misuari attack AFP installations in Zamboanga and Jolo island that resulted in around 140 deaths. It remains unclear whether Nur Misuari ordered the attacks. He was arrested trying to cross the border into Sabah, Malaysia and was held by AFP security forces in the Philippines. He was later put under house arrest.¹

1. “Amnesty International Report 2002 – Philippines,” Amnesty International, May 2002, accessed July 30, 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3cf4bc0f0.html.

2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

No Implementation

Mindanao has been the recipient or target of an extensive amount of international aid both before and after the 1996. USAID had been working in Mindanao since the early 1990’s with projects designed to help alleviate poverty and increase good governance with programs like GEM, ELAP, LEAP, and SWIFT.¹

Narrowing the focus to international support for the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), there were no reports of activities related to soliciting donor support for the SPCPD in 1996. The accord gives the Organization of Islamic Congress a mandate to help solicit international support until the government of the ARMM is fully in place and operational. Viewed in this manner, the OIC has some mandate in this area until 2001 when the new ARMM Government is voted into office.

1. “Update: ELAP and GEM in the Philippines,” The Berger Group, 2012, accessed July 24, 2012, http://www.bergergroup.com/?p=open_work&type=work&id=12&t=Update:_ELAP_a…

1997

Intermediate Implementation

In 1997, phase one of the United Nations Multi-Donor Programme (GOP-UNMDP) begins. The GOP-UNMDP program, in collaboration with the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), sponsored programs aimed at some 70,000 MNLF ex-combatants and their family members. Australia was the largest contributor to the Action for Conflict Transformation (ACT) under the Government of the Philippines — United Nations Multi-Donor Programme (GOP-UNMDP).¹

In August 1997, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) hired the Berger Group to initiate the Emergency Livelihood Assistance Program (ELAP). ELAP was designed to transform 13,000 former MNLF guerillas into productive farmers. ELAP, is a subcomponent of the Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM) Program, which the Berger Group had been implementing since 1995 in collaboration with USAID, SPCPD, the National Economic and Development Authority and the Bangsamoro Women’s Foundation for Peace and Development (BMWFPD). GEM/ELAP commenced with funding of $2.15 million to provide three core programs (1) farm inputs and training for corn and seaweed production, (2) participant managed community credit fund, and (3) literacy program for 600 ex-combatants and their female family members. ELAP started with 4000 MNLF beneficiaries in 1997. From August 1997 to December of 1998, 4000 MNLF ex-combatants entered the corn and seaweed programs.²

In December 1997, $500 million was pledged in a meeting attended by representatives from the Consultative Group for the Philippines for the development of Mindanao which included livelihood training projects. ³

1. “ACT for Peace Project Document,” UNMDP, accessed July 30, 2012,http://aid.dfat.gov.au/countries/eastasia/philippines/Documents/afp-proj…
2. “Update: ELAP and GEM in the Philippines.”
3. “Philippines Gets Us$500 million for Mindanao Development,” AAP Newsfeed, December 23, 1997.

1998

Intermediate Implementation

In February, Iran pledged its support to the economic development of ARMM and SZOPAD along with more bilateral trade with the Philippines.¹ In March, the World Bank approved a USD 10 million loan to the Philippines for the SZOPAD for poverty-reduction programs.²

Phase 2 of GOP-UNMDP commences in 1998. USAID’s GEM/ELAP program also continues through 1998 bringing 320 private investments valued at more than $700 million to Mindanao. The GEM program is credited with creating 57,000 jobs in Mindanao. A literacy program was launched in September 1998 with a grant from World Education, a U.S. NGO. By May 2000, 934 people had completed the functional literacy program.³

1. Ramos Assured by Iran of More Trade JVS in Philippines, AAP NEWSFEED, 10 February 1998.
2. “World Bank works with the Philippines to promote development and peace,” M2 Presswire, March 25, 1998.
3. “Update: ELAP and GEM in the Philippines.”

1999

Intermediate Implementation

The SWIFT program (Support with Implementing Fast Transitions) commenced in April 1999 with the same objectives as earlier programs (GEM/ELAP), that is, providing farming/livelihood assistance. The SWIFT program also sought to build post-harvest processing facilities to improve economies of scale, and build local democratic structures. There appears to be no data on how many farmers interacted with these processing facilities at harvest time.¹

1. John Heard and Lisa Magno, “SWIFT Mindanao Project Evaluation,” USAID, 2000, accessed July 23 2012, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdabs708.pdf.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

A USAID fourth quarter progress report on SWIFT shows that 16,899 families participated.¹ The SWIFT program is concluded in December and external audits of ELAP/LEAP and SWIFT show moderate successes.²

1. “SWIFT Mindanao Quarterly Performance Report 2001,” accessed July 23, 2012, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABX235.pdf
2. John Heard and Lisa Magno, “SWIFT Mindanao Project Evaluation.”

2001

Full Implementation

While GEM was conceived as a five-year program running from 1995 to 2001, increased terrorism in Mindanao in 2000 and 2001 influences USAID to extend their programs. In 2001, phase three of the United Nations Multi-Donor Programme (GOP-UNMDP) also begins. The GOP-UNMDP program, in collaboration with the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), sponsored a reintegration assistance program aimed at some 70,000 MNLF ex-combatants and their family members. Australia was the largest contributor to the Action for Conflict Transformation (ACT) under the Government of the Philippines — United Nations Multi-Donor Programme (GOP-UNMDP).¹

1. “Case Studies in Enterprise Development In Post-Conflict Situations: Bosnia — Philippines — Afghanistan, Technical Brief No.4,” USAID/EGAT/EG, 2008, accesed January 2012, http://www.enterprise-development.org/download.ashx?id=2102.

2002

Full Implementation

In 2002, Gem-2 commences with a plan of running from 2002 to 2007. ELAP is renamed the Livelihood Enhancement and Peace Program (LEAP).

2003

Full Implementation

GEM-2 and LEAP continue to operate in 2003. No updates found on other ongoing programs for this year.

2004

Full Implementation

GEM-2 and LEAP continue to operate in 2004. As of June 2004, the UNDP Program had provided livelihood assistance to 101 cooperatives with 4,388 beneficiaries (3,513 males and 875 females). UNDP provided 57 training courses on agricultural technologies and cooperative financial management to 1,867 beneficiaries (1,553 males and 314 females).

2005

Full Implementation

In 2005, the Action for Conflict Transformation (ACT) is the fourth phase of the Government of the Philippines — United Nations Multi-Donor Programme (GOP-UNMDP) that began in 1997. Funded by Australia, New Zealand and Spain, the final phase is being implemented from June 2005 up to May 2010. It covers 16 provinces and 14 cities of the former Special Zone for Peace and Development (SZOPAD) in Southern Philippines identified in the GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement, and the four provinces and three cities in the Caraga Region. The Mindanao Economic Development Council (MEDCo) serves as the overall implementing agency with the Regional Government of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) as the lead implementing agency for the ARMM areas. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) serves as the managing agent for the entire program. Also active in 2005 are the GEM-2 and LEAP programs. According to USAID reports, over 28,000 former MNLF combatants were assisted in GEM-2 from 2002 to 2007.¹

1. “Case Studies in Enterprise Development In Post-Conflict Situations: Bosnia — Philippines — Afghanistan.”

1996

No Implementation

The main timeline for implementation in the 1996 agreement concerned amending RA 6734 and allowing for elections to expand the territory included in the ARMM. This was supposed to occurr in Phase I (1996-1997). After this legislation is passed, a referendum should be held in 1998 to determine who joins the ARMM. The legislation to repeal RA 6734 and the associated referendum did not occur in 1996. On 2 October 1996, President Fidel Ramos gives Executive Order no. 371 proclaiming a Special Zone Of Peace and Development in the Southern Philippines and establishing the Southern Philippines Council For Peace And Development and the Consultative Assembly.¹

1. “Executive Order 371,” Chan Robles Virtual Law Library, accessed August 01, 2012, http://www.chanrobles.com/executiveorders/1996/executiveorderno371-1996….

1997

No Implementation

The legislation to repeal RA 6734 and the associated referendum did not occur in the year.

1998

No Implementation

The legislation to repeal RA 6734 and the associated referendum did not occur in the year.

1999

No Implementation

The legislation to repeal RA 6734 and the associated referendum did not occur in the year.

2000

No Implementation

The legislation to repeal RA 6734 and the associated referendum did not occur in the year.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

Five years past the deadlines put forth in the 1996 accord, the Expanded ARMM Law or Republic Act 9054 became law on March 31, 2001 and the government scheduled the plebiscite for August 2001. MNLF leader and Regional Governor Nur Misuari demanded that the plebiscite be postponed for three more years, fearing that the development projects had not had enough time to be successfull and that voters would oust him as leader and not choose to join the expanded ARMM.¹ The referendum was held in August 2001 as planned. Of the 14 provinces and 9 cities in the SZOPAD, only one additional province (Basilan) and one city (Marawi) voted to be included in the new expanded ARMM. Nur Misuari was ousted as Governor and replaced by Parouk Hussin.²

1. “Misuari warned against making more threats to rebel again,” Business World, August 13, 1998.
2. Astrid S.Tuminez, “This land is our land: Moro ancestral domain and its implications for peace and development in the Southern Philippines,” SAIS Review 27, no. 2 (2007): 77-91.

2002

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

No Implementation

A widely acknowledged juxtaposition in the conflict literature on Mindanao is that the area is extremely rich in natural resources, yet the area is the single poorest in all of the Philippines. Articles 134, 143, and 147 are means of putting a greater amount of control over the area’s natural resources in the hands of the inhabitants of the region (ARMM) and, consequently, to increase the benefits enjoyed by ARMM residents from the utilization of these resources by firms. As outlined in article 146 and 147, MNLF leaders and GRP leaders will meet and define strategic minerals at a later date. The peace agreement does not indicate that the GRP retains full control over strategic minerals and all revenues from strategic minerals. The accord states that the ARMM has 100% control over all minerals, except strategic minerals.

To evaluate the degree of implementation for this provision, two streams of information can be used. First, did the GRP and Regional Government meet and collectively agree upon strategic minerals and how to allocate revenues from strategic minerals? Second, does the ARMM budget in its revenue inlays reflect increasing revenue flows from control over natural resources? No developments along these lines were observed this year.

1997

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1998

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1999

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2000

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2001

No Implementation

Republic Act 9054, passed in March 2001 represents the ratification of the 1996 peace agreement. In Article 12 (Economy), section 5, strategic minerals are defined as uranium, petroleum, fossil fuels, mineral oils, all energy, national reserves, aquatic parks, forests, watershed reservations, and “those that may be defined as such by an Act of Congress within one (1) year” of the passing of RA 9054. In theory, the ARMM is given control over minerals not defined as ‘strategic’ minerals.

The MNLF and OIC publically reject RA 9054 and claim that the GRP’s unilateral effort to define strategic minerals and keep 100% of the revenues produced by strategic minerals is a gross violation of the 1996 peace agreement.¹

1. “Report of the OIC Secretary-General on the Question of Muslims in Southern Philippines, 2006,” Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC/33-ICFM/2005/MM/SG/REP.2), accessed August 02, 2012, http://www.oic-oci.org/baku2006/english/SG-report/33ICFM-MM-SG-REP-ENG-P…

2002

No Implementation

The ARMM Regional Government continues to claim that the GRP violated the peace agreement with its unilateral control over natural resources in Mindanao. Examining the ARMM budget for 2002 does not provide any evidence that the ARMM was able to increase its revenue inlays from the utilization of natural resources or from taxing firms operating in the region. The total ARMM budget in 2002 was 14.3 Billion Pesos (around 342 million U.S. dollars). The revenue raised by the ARMM through taxation amounted to 2 million pesos (around 48 thousand U.S. dollars). Hence, 99.985 of the ARMM budget came from the GRP in 2002, while 0.01 came from direct regional taxation.¹

1. “Towards Strengthening the Fiscal Capabilities of ARMM,” INCITEGov (Policy Paper), 2007, accessed August 03, 2012, http://www.scribd.com/doc/38724841/Towards-Strengthening-the-Fiscal-Capa…

2003

No Implementation

There is no budgetary evidence for 2003 that the ARMM increased its revenue inlays from utilization of natural resources or from direct taxation of firms operating in the ARMM. The total ARMM budget in 2003 was 15.7 Billion pesos (around 375 million U.S. dollars). The regional revenues raised by the ARMM amounted to 7 million pesos (around 167,000 U.S. dollars). Hence, 99.955 of the ARMM budget came from the GRP.¹

1. Ibid.

2004

No Implementation

There is no budgetary evidence for 2004 that the ARMM increased its revenue inlays from utilization of natural resources or from direct taxation of firms operating in the ARMM. The total ARMM budget in 2004 was 16.1 Billion pesos (around 385 million U.S. dollars). The regional revenues raised by the ARMM amounted to 11 million pesos (around 263,000 U.S. dollars). Hence, 99.93 of the ARMM budget came from the GRP.¹

1. Ibid.

2005

No Implementation

The total ARMM budget in 2005 was 18.3 Billion pesos (around 437 million U.S. dollars). The regional revenues raised by the ARMM amounted to 6 million pesos (around 143 ,000 U.S. dollars). Hence, 99.96 of the ARMM budget came from the GRP.¹

By all observable counts, the ARMM Regional Government was never able to establish any substantial control over mineral utilization nor derive any substantial income tax base from the firms operating in the ARMM.²

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.

1996

No Implementation

There are no records or reports of the OIC ever meeting with GRP or MNLF officials to review the implementation of the 1996 agreement.

1997

No Implementation

There are no records or reports of the OIC ever meeting with GRP or MNLF officials to review the implementation of the 1996 agreement.

1998

No Implementation

There are no records or reports of the OIC ever meeting with GRP or MNLF officials to review the implementation of the 1996 agreement.

1999

No Implementation

There are no records or reports of the OIC ever meeting with GRP or MNLF officials to review the implementation of the 1996 agreement.

2000

No Implementation

There are no records or reports of the OIC ever meeting with GRP or MNLF officials to review the implementation of the 1996 agreement.

2001

No Implementation

There are no records or reports of the OIC ever meeting with GRP or MNLF officials to review the implementation of the 1996 agreement.

2002

No Implementation

There are no records or reports of the OIC ever meeting with GRP or MNLF officials to review the implementation of the 1996 agreement.

2003

No Implementation

There are no records or reports of the OIC ever meeting with GRP or MNLF officials to review the implementation of the 1996 agreement.

2004

No Implementation

There are no records or reports of the OIC ever meeting with GRP or MNLF officials to review the implementation of the 1996 agreement.

2005

No Implementation

There are no records or reports of the OIC ever meeting with GRP or MNLF officials to review the implementation of the 1996 agreement.

Postscript:

A 2006 report by the OIC Secretary General reviews talking points given to them by the MNLF and GRP regarding the implementation status of key provisions. The OIC makes no independent judgments of its own.

A 2008 report by the Organization of the Islamic Conference describes a “First Session of the Tripartite Meeting” between the GRP, MNLF and the OIC that took place in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in November 2007. Hence the first meeting of the two conflict actors with the external body chosen to review implementation of the 1996 agreement, took place 12 years after the signing of the accord.¹

1. “Istanbul Agreement,” Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, accessed August 14, 2012, http://www.hdcentre.org/files/Istambul%20agreement.pdf.

1996

No Implementation

No international, external, or internal verification mechanism was operational in 1996.

1997

No Implementation

No international, external, or internal verification mechanism was operational in 1997.

1998

No Implementation

No international, external, or internal verification mechanism was operational in 1998.

1999

No Implementation

No international, external, or internal verification mechanism was operational in 1999.

2000

No Implementation

No international, external, or internal verification mechanism was operational in 2000.

2001

No Implementation

No international, external, or internal verification mechanism was operational in 2001.

2002

No Implementation

No international, external, or internal verification mechanism was operational in 2002.

2003

No Implementation

No international, external, or internal verification mechanism was operational in 2003.

2004

No Implementation

No international, external, or internal verification mechanism was operational in 2004.

2005

No Implementation

No international, external, or internal verification mechanism was operational in 2005.

Postscript:

A 2006 report by the OIC Secretary General reviews talking points given to them by the MNLF and GRP regarding the implementation status of key provisions, but the OIC makes no independent judgments of its own based on acts of verification. From 1996 to 2005, there is no evidence of any annual or periodic verification of implementation by the OIC, or their working group, the OIC Peace Committee for Southern Philippines. The OIC did report on competing claims by each side eleven years after the agreement.

A 2008 report by the Organization of the Islamic Conference describes a “First Session of the Tripartite Meeting” between the GRP, MNLF and the OIC that took place in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in November 2007. This represents the first meeting of the two principal actors with the external body chosen to verify and review implementation of the 1996 agreement 12 years after the signing of the accord.¹

1. “Istanbul Agreement,” Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, accessed August 14, 2012, http://www.hdcentre.org/files/Istambul%20agreement.pdf.