Lomé Peace Agreement

1999

Minimum Implementation

A number of allegations of ceasefire violations were made in 1999. The rebel leader, Foday Sankoh, argued that the pro-government Kamajor militia violated the ceasefire by attacking Revolutionary United Front (RUF) positions in the villages of Masingbi and Gold Town. The government denied the alleged report of a ceasefire violation. These villages are located between the northern town of Makeni and the town of Kono in the east. UNOMSIL’s military spokesperson in Freetown, Major Jim Gray, told IRIN news that he could not give any information as there were no UN military observers in the area where the attacks allegedly occurred.¹

The pro-government Kamajors militia claimed, on July 28, 1999, that the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) fighters attacked their positions. The Attorney-General, Solomon Berewa, denied claims of the violations, saying, “there hasn’t been any instance of a clash [on] the July 7 Lomé peace agreement”²

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Francis Okelo, reported that:

“[T]he UN, as one of the moral Guarantors of the Lomé Peace Agreement, was alarmed by a significant increase in a wide range of violations. The statement pointed to such breaches as active combat, movement of troops and weaponry, human abuses against civilians, systematic assault on humanitarian personnel, and continued detention of abductees, particularly women and children.” The statement clearly mentioned that the, “RUF/AFRC leadership was not complying with the provisions of the Lomé Peace Agreement or could not control its field commanders or combatants.”³

1. “Sierra Leone; Government denies RUF claim of cease-fire violations,” Africa News, July 21, 1999.
2. “Government claims rebels violate cease-fire in Sierra Leone,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, July 28, 1999.
3. “Sierra Leone; UN concerned about ceasefire violations in Sierra Leone,” Africa News, November 3, 1999.

2000

Minimum Implementation

On May 15, 2000, government forces were reportedly pushing toward a traditional stronghold of the Revolutionary United Front rebels. The troops were moving 35 miles east of the capital to secure key bridges and towns the troops had lost to the rebels the previous week. At the same time, the rebels held 340 UN peacekeepers hostage and the UN was working to arrange a ceasefire and negotiate the release of its peacekeepers. On May 14, 2000, the rebels reportedly released 139 U.N. troops to Liberian President Charles Taylor after having turned over 18 others to Indian peacekeepers inside Sierra Leone earlier in the day.⁴

In June 2000 there was an unsuccessful effort to restore the ceasefire. “A six-member ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States delegation arrived in Sierra Leone late Wednesday 14th June, where they will attempt to bring about a cease-fire between government and rebel forces and to put the peace process back on track.”⁵ The recent surge in violence by both the rebels and the Government caused the UN Mission to Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, to call for a ceasefire.⁶

On November 10, 2000, during a one-day conference at the Nigerian administrative capital of Abuja, Government and rebel negotiators agreed to a 30-day unconditional cease-fire agreement. The ceasefire went into effect at midnight. State radio stated that a cease-fire deal had been reached with rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and that the cease-fire is to take effect on midnight of the same day (Friday). In the agreement, both sides agreed to “allow unhindered access to all areas in the country by both local and international charities as well as allow the full deployment of the UN force in Sierra Leone to all areas in the country including the rebel-held diamond rich Kono District and Tongo Fields. Calls by the rebels for the release of their detained leader and senior comrades were turned down.”⁷

1. “Army Presses Sierra Leone Rebels; Troops Advance Despite U.N. Push For a Cease-Fire,” The Washington Post, May 16, 2000, Pg. A14.
2. “Sierra Leone: ECOWAS delegation arrives to attempt cease-fire agreement,” BBC Monitoring Africa — Political, June 16, 2000.
3. “Sierra Leone; UN Mission Calls For Cease-Fire,” Africa News, July 15, 2000.
4. “Sierra Leone; Government/Rebels Agreed To Cease-Fire,” Africa News, November 11, 2000.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

The restored ceasefire was upheld as violations declined throughout the year. “The interim leader of the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone has reaffirmed his group’s commitment to the Abuja cease-fire agreement and pledged to continue to return weapons and equipment stolen from United Nations peacekeepers, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) said.”⁸ The rebels reportedly would also open access to several major roads (Makeni-Lunsar-Freetown, Makeni-Kambia and Bumbuna- Magburaka). According to the UN Mission, UN military observers would be sent to verify the road openings. “According to the UN Mission, General Opande and Mr. Sesay also agreed in principle to establish contact groups of senior UN and RUF officials to facilitate the implementation of the Abuja agreement.”⁸

On May 15, 2001, “rival forces in Sierra Leone’s long-running war agreed to stop fighting and allow the UN mission in the country, UNAMSIL, to guarantee the free movement of people and goods nationwide.”⁹

There were sporadic reports of ceasefire violations by the civil defense force (CDF) in 2001. On May 16, 2001, “Rebels and a civil militia agreed to a cease-fire during peace talks aimed at ending the country’s decade-old civil war. A communique said the rebel Revolutionary United Front and the government-backed Civil Defense Force, also known as the Kamajors, have agreed to cease all hostilities.”¹⁰

1. “Sierra Leone Rebel Group Reaffirms Commitment To Cease- Fire,” Africa News, January 8, 2001.
2. “Sierra Leone; RUF, CDF Agree to Ceasefire,” Africa News, May 17, 2001.
3. “Sierra Leone: A Cease-Fire,” New York Times, May 16, 2001.

2002

Full Implementation

No serious violations were reported this year.

2003

Full Implementation

No serious violations were reported this year.

2004

Full Implementation

No serious violations were reported this year.

2005

Full Implementation

No serious violations were reported this year.

2006

Full Implementation

No serious violations were reported this year.

2007

Full Implementation

No serious violations were reported this year.

2008

Full Implementation

No serious violations were reported this year.

1999

Full Implementation

As disclosed by a senior aid to the Sierra Leone government on November 6, 1999, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) delivered their list of cabinet appointees to be included in the Government of National Unity. The former military ruler of the ousted military junta, Major Johnny Paul Koroma, and at least three of his ousted executives: Alimamy Paolo Bangura, Sahr Kaiagbanja and Eddie Kanneh, were on the list. Also included in the list of cabinet appointees were the rebels’ War Council Chief and chief negotiator of the Lomé Accord, Solomon Rogers, battlefield commanders Sam Bockarie and Denise Mingo, and the rebelsÕ legal adviser and spokesman, Omrie Golley. Following the presidential approval of the names, the list would go to the parliament for ratification.¹¹ The following positions were allocated to the RUF: the Ministry of Trade and Industry; the Ministry of Land, Housing and Central Planning; the Ministry of Energy and Power; and the Ministry of Tourism and Culture. Koroma was appointed to head the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace and Sankoh the CMRRD.

On November 21, 1999, the Government of National Unity was announced and it saw the former cabinet being expanded from its original 15-member to 21. The agreed upon cabinet size during the lome negotiation was 18, but Kabbah expanded it to 21. “At least 7 cabinet positions were given to rebels of the Revolutionary United Front, RUF, 3 of which are senior cabinet positions. The RUF are to occupy the ministries of Energy and Works, Lands and the Environment, and Trade and Industry. The rebel’s appointees are Mr. Alimamy Pallo Bangura for Energy and Works, Peter Vandy for Lands and the Environment and Mr. Mike Lamin for Trade and Industry. The RUF were also given 3 deputy ministries while a former soldier of the national army was given a deputy minister position.”¹²

Typical of powersharing arrangements, Binningsbo and Dupuy (2009), who interviewed RUF/AFRC ministers, report that, “the RUF and AFRC representatives in the Cabinet were hindered in influencing high politics and were even excluded from Cabinet meetings.”¹³

1. “Sierra Leone; Rebel Send List Of Cabinet Appointees,” Africa News, August 6, 1999.
2. “Sierra Leone; Government Of National Unity Officially Announced,” Africa News, October 21, 1999; Helga Malmin Binningsbø and Kendra Dupuy, “Using Power-Sharing to Win a War: The Implementation of the Lomé Agreement in Sierra Leone,” Africa Spectrum 44, no. 3 (2009): 96-7.
3. Ibid., 97.

2000

Minimum Implementation

With the increased violence in May 2000, the government revoked the RUF’s seats in the cabinet and ending the power-sharing arrangement (some of the RUF ministers were even arrested and detained). When the hostilities ceased in November 2000/May 2001, the government refused to re-install the RUF ministers. After mid 2000, there was no longer any power-sharing arrangement between the RUF and the government. The situation was somewhat different with the AFRC. In late 1999, the AFRC had received one post in the government, when Jomo-Jalloh was made Minister of Tourism and Culture. Jomoh-Jalloh was able to retain this position until the May 2002 national elections.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

Power-sharing for RUF ended in May 2000. AFRC retained at least one position.

2002

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

Several constitutional changes and legal provisions were made to facilitate the implementation of the Lomé Agreement. The agreement itself did not require ratification, though the Sierra Leone Parliament ratified the agreement on July 18, 1999 (No. 3 of 1999).

On July 23, 1999, Parliament passed the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (Participation in Political and Democratic Process) Act, 1999 (No. 4 of 1999). The Act facilitated the transformation of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone into a political movement and the assumption by members of the Front of any public offices assigned to them pursuant to the Lomé Peace Agreement.¹⁴

1. “Laws of Sierra Leone,” accessed October 14, 2010, http://www.sierra-leone.org/laws.html.

2000

Full Implementation

Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (Participation in Political and Democratic Process) Act, 1999 allowed RUF to participate in the political process.

2001

Full Implementation

Parliament also passed the Constitution of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Act, 2001 (No. 15, 2001), which covered issues related to electoral law.¹⁵

The constitutional changes called for in the accord were passed.

1. Ibid.

2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

On July 23, 1999, Parliament passed the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone Participation in Political and Democratic Process Act, 1999 (No. 4 of 1999). The Act facilitated the transformation of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone into a political movement and the assumption by members of the Front of any public offices assigned to them pursuant to the Lomé Peace Agreement. On the same day, Parliament also passed the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and development Act, 1999 (No. 5 of 1999), as provided for under Article XXVIII of the Lomé Peace Agreement.¹⁴ This Act allowed the RUF to participate in the transitional government.

A fund was to be established to assist the RUF in its transformation into a political party, but this fund did not materialized.¹⁶

1. Anders Nilsson, “Dangerous Liaisons: Why Ex-Combatants Return to Violence” (PhD diss., Uppsala University, 2008).

2000

Intermediate Implementation

No efforts were made to reform the electoral system, though the People’s Democratic Party demanded the improvement of the Electoral Commission’s capacity.¹⁷

1. “Sierra Leone; Improve The Electoral Commission, Pleads Osman Kamara,” Africa News, March 23, 2000.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

Twenty-one political parties met on August 9, 2001 to map out the type of electoral system for the forthcoming elections. The various parties met with the National Election Commissioner, who earlier wrote to the Attorney General, Mr Solomon Berewa, notifying him that the various parties had denounced the current proportional representation system in Parliament.¹⁸

The letter read as follows:

“The National Electoral Commission (NEC) has apparently discarded the Proportional Representation (PR) and constituency- based systems of elections. In a letter dated 20 July written by the NEC Chairman, Mr.Walter Nicol to the Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Solomon Berewa, it was stated that the PR system used in the 1996 elections be discarded. Nicol noted that the overwhelming majority of people were dissatisfied with the National List Proportional Representation (NLPR) system used for the 1996 parliamentary elections and would prefer constituency-based elections. “However, extant conditions are not favourable for realistically dividing present-day Sierra Leone into equitable single member constituencies,” the seven- page letter stated. The letter went on, “it would be absolutely necessary to get as close as practicable to constituency-based elections, preferably without having to actually draw constituency boundaries. For this purpose, it may be possible to regard the existing 14 electoral district as big constituencies, each of which would then elect a number of MPs en-block. This system could be called the District Block Representation (DBR) system. NEC says that in this system, a district would not be further sub-divided into constituencies. “All parties contesting the elections in the district would compete for the block of seats allocated to the particular district by parliament. The contesting parties would be allocated seats from the district’s number of MPs on the basis of their proportional share of the total district vote.” NEC is recommending six parliamentary seats for each district in the Northern, Eastern, and Southern Provinces, and seven seats for each of the two electoral districts in the Western Area. The increased number of seats in the Western Area is, “to make up for the fact that these two districts would not elect Paramount Chief Members of Parliament under the proposed system. “In all, there would be a total of 98 MPs, consisting of 86 ordinary Members and 12 Paramount Chiefs Members. The regional distribution of the 86 seats would be: Northern – 30; Eastern – 18; Western – 14, and Southern 24.” Political parties, including the ruling SLPP, have disapproved of the NEC’s proposal. “We don’t understand what NEC is up to, their business is to conduct elections not recommend what the people do not want,” the interim NUP leader, John Benjamin, remarked.”¹⁹

The All Political Parties Association (APPA), a body representing some registered political parties in Sierra Leone, expressed its dissatisfaction with the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and said it must be dissolved before elections take place in 2002.²⁰

Parliamentary and Presidential elections were scheduled for May 2002. However, on October 4, 2001, Sierra Leone’s National Electoral Commission announced the suspension of the registration of voters for the forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. “The commission’s acting chairman, Alhaji Musa King, told journalists that the suspension was due to the low speed of taking arms away from different groups in many parts of the country.” ²¹

Parliament passed the Constitution of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Act, 2001 (No. 15, 2001) on issues related to electoral law.²²

1. “Sierra Leone: Political parties meet to “map” electoral system for next election,” BBC Monitoring Africa, August 9, 2001.
2. “Sierra Leone; National Electoral Commission Discards PR, Constituency-Based Election,” Africa News, August 11, 2001.
3. “Sierra Leone; Political Parties Want Electoral Commission Dissolved,” Africa News, September 21, 2001.
4. “Sierra Leone: National Electoral Commission suspends voter registration,” BBC Monitoring Africa, October 5, 2001.
5. “Laws of Sierra Leone.”

2002

Full Implementation

On February 7, 2002, the Parliament adopted the first-past-the-post electoral system by adopting The Electoral Laws Act, 2002 [No. 2 of 2002]. On the same day, February 7, 2002, Parliament adopted the National Electoral Commission Act, 2002 [No. 1 of 2002].

On February 21, 2002, the Sierra Leone Parliament adopted The Political Parties Act, 2002 [No. 3 of 2002]. The Act established the Political Parties Registration Commission for the registration and regulation of the conduct of political parties in accordance with sections 34 and 35 of the Constitution and provided for related matters. This act repealed the Political Parties Act, 1995 and the Political Parties (Regulation of Conduct) Act, 1995. Amended 2002 (No. 6 of 2002).²²

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

No Implementation

The Lomé Agreement of July 7, 1999 included a provision for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

On July 19, 1999, the European Commission urged the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in order to support a fair and equitable justice system in the country.²³

Nothing concrete took place in 1999 in terms of establishing such a Commission.

1. “Sierra Leone; E.U. Welcomes the Establishment of truth and reconciliation commission,” Africa News, July 20, 1999.

2000

Minimum Implementation

The Parliament of Sierra Leone approved the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 on February 10, 2000. The Act provided an institutional means of establishing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in line with Article
XXVI of the Lomé Peace Agreement.²⁴

1. Paul James-Allen, Sheku B. S. Lahai, and Jamie OÕConnel, “Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Special Court: A Citizen’s Handbook,” National Forum for Human Rights and International Centre for Transitional Justice, March 2003, accessed January 20, 2015, https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-SierraLeone-Handbook-TRC-2….

2001

Intermediate Implementation

As of the end of 2001, the TRC was not established.

2002

Intermediate Implementation

The inauguration ceremony of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the swearing-in of its commissioners took place on July 5, 2002. Seven commissioners (four nationals and three internationals) were sworn in. The Commission was expected to submit its report in one year, or, at most, eighteen months, from the day of its establishment. As outlined by the TRC Act of 2000, its objectives were to (a) create an impartial historical record of the violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict from the beginning of the conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement in July 1999; (b) to address impunity; (c) to respond to the needs of the victims; (d) to promote healing and reconciliation; and, (e) to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered.²⁵

The commission started its work promptly after its establishment.

1. “Sierra Leone; Truth And Reconciliation Commission Inaugurated Today,” Africa News, July 5, 2002.

2003

Intermediate Implementation

The TRC hearings held two weeks of public hearings with individual witnesses in Freetown, starting on April 14, 2003. The TRC also started both public and closed hearings in the districts. There was one week of hearings in each district.

Victims of sexual violence who did not want to testify in public, all children below the age of 18, and perpetrators or ex-combatants who did not want to talk openly gave testimonies during closed hearings. The Commission guaranteed the anonymity of those witnesses. For those who testified on sexual violence, the Commission was composed of female commissioners and female staff members only.

A counselor assisted every witness before, during, and after the hearing.²⁶

1. “Sierra Leone; The Truth And Reconciliation Commission Hearings Summary,” Africa News, July 1, 2003).

2004

Intermediate Implementation

The TRC was unable to finish its task within the prescribed eighteen months. The final report of the Commission was given to the President of Sierra Leone on October 5, 2004 and presented to the United Nations Security Council on October 27, 2004. Howard Varney, Chief Investigator for the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, produced an overview, findings, and recommendations of the report, which was released on November 12, 2004. The final report is over 5,000 pages long and includes the names of responsible persons. Versions for secondary schools and children were also published.

Findings:

The Commission found that the central causes of the war in Sierra Leone were corruption and overwhelming executive control. Colonialism and the subversion of traditional systems also had an effect.
While the majority of victims were adult males, perpetrators also singled out women and children. Forced displacements, abductions, arbitrary detentions, killings, plundering, and looting were the most common violations.

The leadership of the RUF, the AFRC, the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and the Civil Defense Force (CDF) were responsible for human rights violations against civilians. The leaders of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and the RUF, Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh, respectively, played pivotal roles in the conflict. The RUF was responsible for the highest count of human rights violations in the conflict, followed by the AFRC, the SLA, and the CDF. Successive governments abused the death penalty and misused emergency powers against dissidents.

Recommendations:

The Commission’s recommendations are legally binding. The Commission’s main recommendations concerned the fight against corruption, the creation of a new Bill of Rights developed in a participatory constitutional process, the independence of the judiciary, strengthening the role of Parliament, stricter control over the security forces, decentralization and enhanced economic autonomy for the provinces, a governmental commitment to deliver basic public services, and the inclusion of youth and women in political decision-making.

The Commission recommended the establishment of a reparations program and an implementing agency, in line with an existing suggestion in the Lomé Agreement.

Subsequent Developments:

Reforms:

In November 2007 the United Nations and Sierra Leone’s Human Rights Commission urged the government to produce a completion strategy for the implementation of the TRC’s recommendations without further delay.
In August 2004, following the recommendation in both the 1999 Lomé agreement and the TRC’s final report, the parliament enacted the National Human Rights Commission Act (PDF-44KB).. It has de facto taken on the role as the Follow-up Committee.

Prosecutions:

The TRC co-existed with the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which had a responsibility to try “those with the greatest responsibility” for international crimes during the conflict.

Reparations:

The National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA) was designated by the government to implement the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Beginning in August 2008, the government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations implemented a one-year project aimed at building the institutional capacity to implement the TRC recommendations related to reparations. This project received $3 million USD from the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund. A total of 29,733 victims have been registered. As of early 2010, amputees, war wounded and victims of sexual violence received a $100 USD interim payment. The NaCSA has started partial implementation of other reparative measures, such as educational support and health care. In 2009,the government launched the VictimsÕ Trust Fund, which is provided for in the Lomé Peace Agreement of 1999 and the TRC Act of 2000.²⁷

1. “Truth Commission: Sierra Leone,” United States Peace Institute, accessed Oct. 25, 2010, http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-sierra-leone.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Minimum Implementation

On October 23, 1999, rebel leader Johnny Paul Koroma was named chairman of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP) in Sierra Leone. At the same time President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah slowly completed his cabinet under a July peace agreement signed with the rebels. State radio said the Commission would comprise two representatives from civil society, one each from the Government and Revolutionary United Front (RUF), and a Parliamentarian. The Commission had the responsibility of supervising and observing the implementation of the peace agreement. The Commission also ensures that the process of national reconciliation is pursued. The position of Koroma, chairman of the ousted Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), had remained vague under the Lomé peace agreement (Source: Koroma named to head Sierra Leone peace commission, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, October 24, 1999).

According to a report:

“Initially, with Koroma as its chair, the CCP was politically and financially marginalized by both the government and the international community. While its original plan of action identified fundamental issues underlying the conflict and proposed practical solutions to ensure the security and welfare of the people, it eventually pared down its scope to focus on confidence-building at all levels as a strategy for enhancing the peace process. With its broad membership it enjoyed the relative confidence of all parties. As Koroma’s public and political rehabilitation outpaced Sankoh’s and with growing recognition that multi-level confidence-building was crucial to the peace process, the commission began to attract greater attention and financial support”²⁸

According to a report:

“The serious disagreements that arose during the first ten months of the life of the agreement, and the disastrous effect they were to have, point to fundamental negligence on the part of the government to provide for an effective dispute resolution mechanism. Under the agreement, a Council of Elders and Religious Leaders was to be established to settle differences arising from conflicting interpretations of how it should be implemented. One would assume that potentially explosive misunderstandings could have received special attention from this mediating body. Unfortunately, the government never set up the Council of Elders, even though its establishment would not have been costly”¹⁵

1. “Implementing the Lomé Peace Agreement,” Conciliation Resources, http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sierra-leone/implementing-Lomé.php, accessed October 25, 2010).

2000

Intermediate Implementation

The Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP), led by Chairman Johnny Paul Koroma, organized a conference in Bo for ground/battalion commanders of all former warring factions. The five day conference, held from April 18-22, 2000, was an information sharing and confidence-building event which, it was hoped, would end with commanders making commitments to disarm²⁹The conference was a major success. The conference provoked deep reflections by young combatants from all the factions on the catastrophic effects of the war on the country and their own future.

1. “Sierra Leone; Mr. Achodo Comments On The Idea Of Fast Tracking DDR,” Africa News, April 21, 2000.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

In January 2001, “the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, headed by former AFRC junta strongman, Johnny Paul Koroma, organised a three-day Youth symposium in the RUF headquarters of Makeni. Jointly organised with the National Forum for Reconciliation, the symposium, which was part of the CCP’s strategy to use youths to persuade their colleagues to drop their guns and embrace peace, attracted hundreds of people, including the RUF”³⁰

CCP was involved in various activities throughout the year.

1. “Sierra Leone; Johnny Paul’s Commission Ends Symposium in Makeni,” Africa News, January 5, 2001).

2002

Intermediate Implementation

According to a report:

“A high power delegation from the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP) returned from Kono after successfully completing a fact finding mission. According to a member of the delegation, they investigated the causes of the recent clash between the RUF and Kono residents which led to the death of the notorious RUF Commander Demba Marah and also identified practical problems facing the people of the district”. The quarrel, started over the date for the termination of illicit mining, caused the death of over fifty former RUF and CDF combatants. “The CCP representative further disclosed that the government and the international community should take the issue of Kono seriously as about 95% of the population are involved in active mining.³¹

In early 2002, Koroma resigned from his position as head of the CCP in order to launch a political career and take part in the 2002 national elections.

No further information found. On May 14, 2002, multiparty elections took place for the President and the Parliament.

1. “Sierra Leone; CCP On Fact Finding Mission in Kono,” Africa News, January 9, 2002.

2003

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

Military reform in Sierra Leone started well before the Lomé Agreement. “By September 1998, the government’s plans for reform of the army and police had taken shape. They involved an army of 5,000 (the army under the AFRC was at least twice as large) and rigorous screening of members of the old armed forces before they could be allowed to join. The government had also accepted advice from the Commonwealth Police Development Task Force (mainly funded by DFID) on radical reform of the police. At the same time the President made it clear that the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) would continue to play a key role in security.³²

“The Sierra Leone government had explored many options in its drive to restructure and reform the armed forces. At one point, it considered the Costa Rica model — no army, but a well-trained and equipped police force. This option was not popular, in view of the security threat posed to Sierra Leone by the Liberian conflict and the then volatile Guinean security situation in the Mano River sub-region.³³

“The UK developed various programmes to increase the effectiveness and accountability of the Sierra Leonean forces, including military training assistance, reintegration, and specific SSR measures designed to ensure that the security institutions had a sufficient legal basis. Though the greatest slice of these funds was devoted to the military training and assistance programmes, there was also a specific effort to implement legal and structural reforms. MOD-UK, MODAT and IMATT have also been involved in the training of future trainers of the AFRSL — platoon commanders and sergeants under the Short Term Training Teams (STTT). The 12-week training course focused on such key areas as international humanitarian law, civil—military relations, the rights of the child, budget management, and regional and sub-regional security” (Gbla 2006, 83).

1. Brian Thomson, “Sierra Leone: Reform or Relapse? Conflict and Governance Reform.” Chatham House Report, 2007, accessed October 26, 2010, page 6, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/9207_reportsierraleone0607.pdf.
2. Gbla Osman, “Security sector reform under international tutelage in Sierra Leone,” International Peacekeeping 13, no.1 (2006): 83.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

In 2000, the British helped establish a new Sierra Leonean Ministry of Defense with a mission to “formulate, implement, monitor and evaluate a strategic defence policy for the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces that is effective and fostered within a framework of democratic governance.³⁴The new ministry provides a framework for a closer and more efficient working relationship between civilians and the military. Unlike in the past, civilians now occupy senior positions in the military administration. The Deputy Minister of Defence and the Director General of the MOD, the equivalent of a UK Permanent Secretary, are civilians. The Director General is the government’s principal adviser on defense matters and holds primary responsibility for policy, finance, procurement and administration. The Director General is also the Principal Accounting Officer responsible to the Minister of Defence for the overall organization, management and staffing of the department. The Director is personally responsible to Parliament for the expenditure of all public money allocated for defense ³⁵

“On 28 January 2000, Mr. Koroma submitted his resignation to President Kabbah from the Sierra Leone Army. While he would remain the leader of the AFRC, his faction would be dissolved with the impeding reinstatement of ex-sierra Leone Army elements into the current armed forces.”³⁶

1,148 ex-armed combatants have been encamped and are waiting the screening process in order to be reinstated, if qualified.³⁷

In his latest report to the Security Council (December 2000), the UN Secretary General informed that the newly trained Sierra Leone Army began security responsibilities in several strategic areas of the country. The United Kingdom Military trained approximately 3,000 Sierra Leonean Army personnel, with 1,000 more expected to undergo training in late December.³⁸

Note: Though the screening process was rigorous, government reinstated thousands of ex-AFRC soldiers, who committed terrible atrocities during the war, into the army during the summer of 2000 in order to repulse the RUF’s attack towards Freetown.

1. “Time for a New Political and Military Strategy,” International Crisis Group, Sierra Leone, ICG Africa Report No.28, Freetown/London/Brussels, 11 April 2001, p.7.
2. Gbla Osman, “Security sector reform under international tutelage in Sierra Leone,” International Peacekeeping, 2006, 13 (1): 83.
3. “Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone,” (S/2000/186), March 7, 2000, page 1-2.
4. “Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone,” (S/2000/186), March 7, 2000.
5. “Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone,” (S/2000/1199), December 15, 2000.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

The British continued supporting security sector reform in Sierra Leone through its training of the armed forces. As of September 2001, there were 600 British trainers, which was expected to drop to 300-400 once the government expanded its control of the country.³⁹

Through the Military Reintegration Programme (MRP), the UK-led International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) undertook a series of training programs and assisted the Sierra Leone Armed ForcesÕ instructors at the Armed Force Training Center. MRP was “designed to integrate former RUF and CDF combatants who have been through the disarmament and demobilisation process, into the new RSLAF.¹⁵.The size of RUF and CDF combatants to be integrated was said to be fairly modest, but the actual numbers are unavailable.

1. Mark Malan, Security and Military Reform, 2003. In eds. Malan, Mark, Sarah Meek, Thokozani Thusi, Jeremy Ginifer, Patrick Coker, “Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery,” Institute for Security Studies, 2003,Monograph 80, http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/No80/content.html, page 97.

2002

Intermediate Implementation

Support from Britain to train the Sierra Leone Armed Force continued. According to the Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL, some 1,723 ex-combatants (1,028 from RUF, 632 CDF and 63 AFRC/ex-SLA) were selected for reintegration into the Sierra Leone Army.⁴⁰

According to the Secretary General’s June 2002 report on UNAMSIL, up to 7,000 ex-combatants would be recruited for reintegration projects every six months. The composition of the reintegration is not available.⁴¹ In the mean time, the Sierra Leone Armed Forces continuously received training and restructuring support from UK-led International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT). The restructuring process was expected to result in the reduction of the size of the armed forces from the current strength of approximately 14,000 to 10,500.⁴²

1. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2002/267, March 14, 2002.
2. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2002/679, June 19, 2002.
3. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2002/1417, December 24, 2002.

2003

Intermediate Implementation

According to the Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL, the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed ForcesÕ effectiveness improved gradually as a result of training and restructuring support from IMATT, led by the UK.⁴³ The restructuring, which should result in the reduction of the armed force to 10,500 from 14,000, began in March 2003. The goal was expected to be met by 2007.

According to the Secretary General’s September 5, 2003 report on UNAMSIL, the army, in addition to downsizing, began reorganizing its structure in order to focus on border operations and timely deployment of reserves.⁴⁴ The expected discharge date for the first group of 1,000 soldiers was January 31, 2004.⁴⁵

1. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2003/321, March 17, 2003.
2. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2003/863, September 5, 2003.
3. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2003/1201, December 23, 2003.

2004

Intermediate Implementation

According to the Secretary General’s March 19, 2004 Report on UNAMSIL, there was, “no funding available for the next phase of the restructuring exercise, under which some 1,000 soldiers are expected to go into voluntary retirement after receiving a financial and training package.”⁴⁶ The funding was essential to give former soldiers job training and an economic package. Nevertheless, plans to downsize the armed forces were on track.

The recently established new military academy represents a significant step towards making RSLAF a modern military institution; and the academy’s training programs include courses for company commanders, commanding officers and senior officers. The Government is also making efforts to improve the operational focus of RSLAF.”⁴⁷ In spite of financial challenges, “a further reduction of 1,000 military personnel from RSLAF will commence on 1 January 2005, towards the planned goal of a strength of 10,500 personnel by 2007. There have been some public protests among military personnel against the expected downsizing. In collaboration with IMATT, UNAMSIL will continue its efforts to strengthen the capacity of RSLAF and will play an advisory role and provide training assistance to the armed forces in selected areas.”⁴⁸

1. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2004/228, March 19, 2004, p. 4.
2. “Report of the Secretary General on UNAMSIL,” S/2004/536, July 6, 2004, p. 6.
3. “Report of the Secretary General on UNAMSIL,” S/2004/724, September 9, 2004, pp. 6-7.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

According to the Secretary General’s April 2005 Report, troop reductions were on target to reduce the number from 13,000 to 10,500 personnel by 2007.⁴⁹ The program’s heavy reliance on international support slowed the progress to restructure and reduce the size of military considerably.⁵⁰

1. “Report of the Secretary General on UNAMSIL,” S/2005/273, April 26, 2005.
2. “Report of the Secretary General on UNAMSIL,” S/2005/777, December 12, 2005.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

Sierra Leone continuously pursued programs to reform and downsize the armed forces. “The International Military Advisory and Training Team continues to restructure and train the Sierra Leone armed forces, focusing on low-level training and reducing the troop strength to the level of 10,500, as was initially approved by the Government. As of February 2006, the armed forcesÕ strength stood at some
10,600 military personnel. The International Military Advisory and Training Team has proposed, however, a further reduction in strength, to 8,500, which is currently under consideration by the Government.”⁵¹

At the time of the Secretary General’s August 2006 Report, the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed ForcesÕ strength stood at approximately 10,300 military personnel. “The Ministry of Defence, with the support of the United Kingdom-led International Military Advisory and Training Team, was conducting a review of the overall structures of the armed forces to achieve cost effectiveness and sustainability, without compromising the capacity to carry out its constitutionally mandated tasks and responsibilities.”⁵²

1. “First report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone,” S/2006/269, April 28, 2006, p. 5.
2. “Report of the Secretary General on UNAMSIL,” S/2006/695, August 29, 2006, p. 5.

2007

Full Implementation

The International Military Advisory and Training Team, supported by DFID, worked with UNIOSIL and the armed forces to decrease the strength of the armed forces from 10,500 to 8,500.⁵³

It was not clear whether the number of ex-combatants integrated into the military from the RUF, CDF and ex-SLA increased from the original 1,723 ex-combatants (1,028 from RUF, 632 CDF and 63 AFRC/ex-SLA).¹⁵

1. “Report of the Secretary General on UNAMSIL,” S/2007/704, December 4, 2007.

2008

Full Implementation

Though the reform of the armed forces was already achieved, there was an extra effort to downsize the number of forces to 8,500 personnel. Recognizing the potential difficulty of reducing troop numbers to 8,500, the Government also enacted compulsory retirement plan should the goal not be met.⁵⁴

The size of the Armed Forces was 10,000 with continued efforts to further reduce the size to 8,500 personnel.⁵⁵ Military reform took place and former ex-combatants were integrated. Military strength was downsized to 8,500 and the Sierra Leone Military successfully deployed its first ever peacekeeping force on a UN mission (UNAMID).⁵⁶

1. “Report of the Secretary General on UNAMSIL,” S/2008/281, April 29, 2008.
2. “Report of the Secretary General on UNAMSIL,” S/2009/59, January 30, 2009.
3. “Africa Conflict Prevention Programme Annual report 2009/10,” DFID, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/afr-cnflt-prev-prog-ann-r…, accessed October 26, 2010, p. 4.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process was conceived as critical to sustaining peace in Sierra Leone. The National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation (NCRRR), which was responsible for disarming the various fighting groups was reconstituted as the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR). The DDR process started in October 1998 and was run by UNASMIL in coordination with NCDDR. The process was comprised of four different phases: (1) Phase I- September — December 1998; (2) Phase II- October 1999-April 2000; (3) Interim Phase – May 2000-May 17, 2001; (4) Phase III- May 18, 2001-January 2002.⁵⁷

According to the eighth report of Secretary General on UNOMSIL (S/1999/1003, September 28, 1999), “the Government of Sierra Leone, working in close cooperation with the World Bank, the United Kingdom and UNOMSIL, developed an operational plan for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration into society of an estimated 45,000 fighters in Sierra Leone” (page 6). “The strength of the RUF is estimated at some 15,000, approximately the same size as the Civil Defence Force. The AFRC comprises some 6,000 men, slightly fewer than the current armed forces of Sierra Leone, which have a nominal roll of 7,000. Some 2,000 fighters are thought to belong to various paramilitary groups. UNICEF estimates that about 12 per cent of all combatants are children” (page 7).

“Under the programme, UNOMSIL would verify the eligibility of fighters arriving with their weapons at reception centres. ECOMOG, under United Nations supervision, would then collect, register, disable and destroy the weapons, either in situ, which is the preferred course of action, or at designated locations” (S/1999/1003, September 28, 1999, page 7). During the first phase, pre-discharge orientation, held between September and December 1998, combatants would receive basic necessities. They would also receive an allowance before being returned to their communities. The process was expected to take 90 days.

The implementation was designed to take place in phases (see above).

After signing the Lomé agreement and returning to Freetown on October 3, 1999, RUF leader Foday Sankoh and AFRC leader Johnny Paul Koroma met with combatants across the country in order to sensitize them to the Lomé Agreement and the DDR programme (S/1999/1223, December 6, 1999). The demobilization program officially started on October 20, 1999, and the second phase of the DDR began on November 4, 1999 with the opening of demobilization centers at Port Loko (center for RUF/AFRC and CDF), Daru (RUF/AFRC), Kenema (CDF), and at the camp in Lungi.

As of November 30, 1999, out of an estimated 45,000 combatants to be demobilized and disarmed, only 4,217 ex-combatants were registered. Those registered at demobilization centers were comprised of 658 AFRC/ex-SLA, 1,469 RUF and 518 CDF ex-combatants, with an additional 1,572 registered at Lungi (S/1999/1223, December 6, 1999, 4). The weapon to surrender ratio was about 1:4.

1. Thusi, Thokozani and Sarah Meek,”Disarmament and Demobilization”, In eds. Mark Malan et al, “Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery,” Institute for Security Studies, 2003, Monograph 80, http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/No80/content.html, pages 24-25.

2000

Minimum Implementation

The DDR process was disrupted by the outbreak of violent conflict in May and June. Once the parties to the conflict reached a ceasefire agreement, on November 10, 2000, the DDR process resumed. “[T]he Executive Secretary of the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, in cooperation with UNAMSIL and other key partners, has developed a draft revised joint operation plan for phase III of the programme, which was introduced to the Technical Coordination Committee of the Commission on 8 December (2001).”⁵⁸

1. “Secretary General Report, UNAMSIL,” (S/2000/1199), December 15, 2000, 5.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

In keeping with the decision taken at the meeting of the joint committee on May 15, 2001, the DDR program was re-launched on May 18, 2001. In the meeting, the parties agreed to set up additional DDR camps, including UNAMSIL’s mobile disarmament unit. It was agreed that the RUF ex-combatants would be encamped for a period of up to four weeks, while CDF ex-combatants would stay for a shorter period. They would receive orientation briefings, as well as learn about opportunities available to them during the reintegration stage. The process was monitored by a mechanism that included CDF and RUF representatives. During the May 15, 2001 meeting, the RUF declared that it had a total of 10,000 combatants. The CDF declared a total of 15,000 combatants, a number that could increase up to 20,000, as many are not listed as combatants.⁵⁹

As of the December 9, 2001 report of the Secretary General on UNAMSIL (S/2001/1195, December 13, 2001), 36,741 combatants were demobilized and disarmed (12,087 RUF, 24,456 CDF and 196 AFRC/Ex-SLA). A total of 13,500 weapons and 2.8 million of assorted pieces of ammunition were collected during the process. The demobilization and disarmament process was completed in the Kambia, Port Loko, Kono, Bonthe, Bombali, Moyamba, Koinadugu, Tonkolili, Bo and Pujehun districts, as well as in the western area. In the remaining two districts, Kailahun and Kenema, the process was expected to begin during the last DDR phase.

1. “Secretary General report on UNAMSIL,” (S/2001/627), June 25, 2001.

2002

Full Implementation

A joint committee on DDR, comprised of the Government of Sierra Leone, the RUF and UNAMSIL, met on January 17, 2002 and declared the completion of the demobilization and disarmament process. A total of 47,076 combatants (19,183 RUF, 27,695 CDF and 198 AFRC/ex-SLA) were demobilized and disarmed. The actual number could be slightly higher. The higher estimate is 47,781, with the RUF accounting for 19,267, the CDF for 28,051, and others for 463.⁶⁰As reported in Thusi and Meek, 2003, 7,785 hand weapons, 17,180 assault weapons, 1,036 group weapons, and 935,495 ammunitions were collected. UNAMSIL had destroyed a total of 24,944 weapons as of the March 14, 2002 report of the Secretary General on UNAMSIL (S/2002/267).

Citing the NCDDA’s August report (August 2002), Thusi and Meek, 2003, report that Sierra Leone disarmed and demobilized 72,490 combatants (24,352 RUF, 2,574 AFRC, 5,953 ex-SLA, 37,377 CDF, and 2,234 others, including paramilitaries). By phase, the disarmed and demobilized include 3,183 in the first phase, 18,898 in the second phase, 628 in the interim phase, and 47,781 in the third phase. Among the demobilized, 6,845 were children. In the process, 42,300 weapons and 1.2 million pieces of ammunition were collected and destroyed.⁶¹

1. Thusi, Thokozani and Sarah Meek, “Disarmament and Demobilization”. In eds. Malan, et al., Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery, Institute for Security Studies, Monograph 80, http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/No80/content.html, 28).
2. Thusi, Thokozani and Sarah Meek, “Disarmament and Demobilization”, Malan, et al., Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery, Institute for Security Studies, 2003, Monograph 80, http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/No80/content.html, 33-34).

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Minimum Implementation

The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process was conceived as cardinal to the sustainable peace in Sierra Leone. The process actually began in 1996 when the Sierra Leone Government set up the Ministry of Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation, later renamed the National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation (NCRRR), which was responsible for disarming the various fighting groups. In July 1998, the NCRRR was reconstituted as the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR). The DDR process started in October 1998 and was run by UNASMIL in coordination with NCDDR. The process was comprised of four different phases: (1) Phase I- September — December 1998; (2) Phase II- October 1999-April 2000; (3) Interim Phase – May 2000-May 17, 2001; (4) Phase III- May 18, 2001-January 2002.⁶²

According to the eighth report of Secretary General on UNOMSIL, “the Government of Sierra Leone, working in close cooperation with the World Bank, the United Kingdom and UNOMSIL, developed an operational plan for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration into society of an estimated 45,000 fighters in Sierra Leone.”⁶³ “The strength of the RUF is estimated at some 15,000, approximately the same size as the Civil Defence Force. The AFRC comprises some 6,000 men, slightly fewer than the current armed forces of Sierra Leone, which have a nominal roll of 7,000. Some 2,000 fighters are thought to belong to various paramilitary groups. UNICEF estimates that about 12 per cent of all combatants are children.”⁶⁴

“Under the programme, UNOMSIL would verify the eligibility of fighters arriving with their weapons at reception centres. ECOMOG, under United Nations supervision, would then collect, register, disable and destroy the weapons, either in situ, which is the preferred course of action, or at designated locations.”¹⁵ During the first phase, pre-discharge orientation, held between September and December 1998, combatants would receive basic necessities. They would also receive an allowance before being returned to their communities. The process was expected to take 90 days.

The implementation was designed to take place in phases (see above).

After signing the Lomé agreement and returning to Freetown on October 3, 1999, RUF leader Foday Sankoh and AFRC leader Johnny Paul Koroma met with combatants across the country in order to sensitize them to the Lomé Agreement and the DDR programme.⁶⁵ The demobilization program officially started on October 20, 1999, and the second phase of the DDR began on November 4, 1999 with the opening of demobilization centers at Port Loko (center for RUF/AFRC and CDF), Daru (RUF/AFRC), Kenema (CDF), and at the camp in Lungi.

As of November 30, 1999, out of an estimated 45,000 combatants to be demobilized and disarmed, only 4,217 ex-combatants were registered. Those registered at demobilization centers were comprised of 658 AFRC/ex-SLA, 1,469 RUF and 518 CDF ex-combatants, with an additional 1,572 registered at Lungi.⁶⁶The weapon to surrender ratio was about 1:4.

1. Thokozani Thusi and Sarah Meek, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” 2003. In eds. Mark Malan, Sarah Meek, Thokozani Thusi, Jeremy Ginifer, Patrick Coker, Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery. Institute for Security Studies, http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/No80/content.html, pp. 24-25.
2. “Eighth Report of the Secretary General on UNOMSIL, S/1999/1003, September 28, 1999, p. 6.
3. S/1999/1003, p. 7.
4. S/1999/1223, December 6, 1999.
5. S/1999/1223, p. 4.

2000

Minimum Implementation

The DDR process was disrupted by the outbreak of violent conflict in May and June. Once the parties to the conflict reached a ceasefire agreement, on November 10, 2000, the DDR process resumed. “[T]he Executive Secretary of the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, in cooperation with UNAMSIL and other key partners, has developed a draft revised joint operation plan for phase III of the programme, which was introduced to the Technical Coordination Committee of the Commission on 8 December (2001).”⁶⁷

1. “Secretary General Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2000/1199, December 15, 2000, p. 5.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

In keeping with the decision taken at the meeting of the joint committee on May 15, 2001, the DDR program was re-launched on May 18, 2001. In the meeting, the parties agreed to set up additional DDR camps, including UNAMSIL’s mobile disarmament unit. It was agreed that the RUF ex-combatants would be encamped for a period of up to four weeks, while CDF ex-combatants would stay for a shorter period. They would receive orientation briefings, as well as learn about opportunities available to them during the reintegration stage. The process was monitored by a mechanism that included CDF and RUF representatives.

During the May 15, 2001 meeting, the RUF declared that it had a total of 10,000 combatants. The CDF declared a total of 15,000 combatants, a number that could increase up to 20,000, as many are not listed as combatants.⁶⁸

As of the December 9, 2001 report of the Secretary General on UNAMSIL, 36,741 combatants were demobilized and disarmed (12,087 RUF, 24,456 CDF and 196 AFRC/Ex-SLA).⁶⁹ A total of 13,500 weapons and 2.8 million of assorted pieces of ammunition were collected during the process. The demobilization and disarmament process was completed in the Kambia, Port Loko, Kono, Bonthe, Bombali, Moyamba, Koinadugu, Tonkolili, Bo and Pujehun districts, as well as in the western area. In the remaining two districts, Kailahun and Kenema, the process was expected to begin during the last DDR phase.

1. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2001/627, June 25, 2001.
2. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2001/1195, December 13, 2001.

2002

Full Implementation

A joint committee on DDR, comprised of the Government of Sierra Leone, the RUF and UNAMSIL, met on January 17, 2002 and declared the completion of the demobilization and disarmament process. A total of 47,076 combatants (19,183 RUF, 27,695 CDF and 198 AFRC/ex-SLA) were demobilized and disarmed. The actual number could be slightly higher. The higher estimate is 47,781, with the RUF accounting for 19,267, the CDF for 28,051, and others for 463.⁷⁰ As reported in Thusi and Meek (2003), 7,785 hand weapons, 17,180 assault weapons, 1,036 group weapons, and 935,495 ammunitions were collected. UNAMSIL had destroyed a total of 24,944 weapons as of the March 14, 2002 report of the Secretary General on UNAMSIL (S/2002/267).

Citing the NCDDA’s August report (August 2002), Thusi and Meek (2003) report that Sierra Leone disarmed and demobilized 72,490 combatants (24,352 RUF, 2,574 AFRC, 5,953 ex-SLA, 37,377 CDF, and 2,234 others, including paramilitaries). By phase, the disarmed and demobilized include 3,183 in the first phase, 18,898 in the second phase, 628 in the interim phase, and 47,781 in the third phase. Among the demobilized, 6,845 were children. In the process, 42,300 weapons and 1.2 million pieces of ammunition were collected and destroyed pages 33-34).⁷¹

1. Thokozani, Thusi and Sarah Meek, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” p.28.
2. Thokozani Thusi and Sarah Meek, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” pp. 33-34.

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

The DDR process started in October 1998 and was run by UNASMIL in coordination with NCDDR. The process was comprised of four different phases: (1) Phase I- September — December 1998; (2) Phase II- October 1999-April 2000; (3) Interim Phase – May 2000-May 17, 2001; (4) Phase III- May 18, 2001-January 2002.⁷²

According to the eighth report of Secretary General on UNOMSIL, “the Government of Sierra Leone, working in close cooperation with the World Bank, the United Kingdom and UNOMSIL, developed an operational plan for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration into society of an estimated 45,000 fighters in Sierra Leone.”⁷³ “The strength of the RUF is estimated at some 15,000, approximately the same size as the Civil Defence Force. The AFRC comprises some 6,000 men, slightly fewer than the current armed forces of Sierra Leone, which have a nominal roll of 7,000. Some 2,000 fighters are thought to belong to various paramilitary groups. UNICEF estimates that about 12 per cent of all combatants are children.”⁶⁴

During the first phase, pre-discharge orientation, held between September and December 1998, combatants would receive basic necessities. They would also receive an allowance before being returned to their communities. The process was expected to take 90 days.¹⁵ The implementation was designed to take place in phases (see above).

The demobilization program officially started on October 20, 1999, and the second phase of the DDR began on November 4, 1999 with the opening of demobilization centers at Port Loko (center for RUF/AFRC and CDF), Daru (RUF/AFRC), Kenema (CDF), and at the camp in Lungi.

As of November 30, 1999, out of an estimated 45,000 combatants, only 4,217 ex-combatants were registered.⁷⁴ The weapon to surrender ratio was about 1:4.

1. Thokozani Thusi and Sarah Meek, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” 2003, In eds. Mark Malan, Sarah Meek, Thokozani Thusi, Jeremy Ginifer, Patrick Coker, “Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery,” Institute for Security Studies, Monograph 80, http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/No80/content.html, pp. 24-25.
2. “Eighth Report of the Secretary General on UNOMSIL,” S/1999/1003, September 28, 1999, p.6.
3. “Report of the Secretary General on UNOMSIL,” S/1999/1223, December 6, 1999, p. 4.

2000

Minimum Implementation

The DDR process was disrupted by the outbreak of violent conflict in May and June. Once the parties to the conflict reached a ceasefire agreement, on November 10, 2000, the DDR process resumed. “[T]he Executive Secretary of the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, in cooperation with UNAMSIL and other key partners, has developed a draft revised joint operation plan for phase III of the programme, which was introduced to the Technical Coordination Committee of the Commission on 8 December (2001).”⁷⁵

1. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2000/1199, December 15, 2000, p. 5.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

In keeping with the decision taken at the meeting of the joint committee on May 15, 2001, the DDR program was re-launched on May 18, 2001. In the meeting, the parties agreed to set up additional DDR camps, including UNAMSIL’s mobile disarmament unit. It was agreed that the RUF ex-combatants would be encamped for a period of up to four weeks, while CDF ex-combatants would stay for a shorter period. They would receive orientation briefings, as well as learn about opportunities available to them during the reintegration stage. The process was monitored by a mechanism that included CDF and RUF representatives.

During the May 15, 2001 meeting, the RUF declared that it had a total of 10,000 combatants. The CDF declared a total of 15,000 combatants, a number that could increase up to 20,000, as many are not listed as combatants.⁶⁸

The disarmed and demobilized combatants received their initial payments. As of the December 9, 2001 report of the Secretary General on UNAMSIL, 36,741 combatants were demobilized and disarmed (12,087 RUF, 24,456 CDF and 196 AFRC/Ex-SLA).⁶⁹ A total of 13,500 weapons and 2.8 million of assorted pieces of ammunition were collected during the process. The demobilization and disarmament process was completed in the Kambia, Port Loko, Kono, Bonthe, Bombali, Moyamba, Koinadugu, Tonkolili, Bo and Pujehun districts, as well as in the western area. In the remaining two districts, Kailahun and Kenema, the process was expected to begin during the last DDR phase.

2002

Intermediate Implementation

The reintegration program continued to experience a shortage of resources. Nevertheless, disarmed and demobilized combatants received their initial payments. As of the March 14, 2002 report of the Secretary General on UNAMSIL, “17,951 ex-combatants have been absorbed in various short-term reintegration projects.⁴⁰ These include 4,552 in agriculture, 5,331 in vocational training, 3,871 in formal education, 3,240 in apprenticeships in various trades, 589 in public works and 368 in child reintegration projects” (page 3).

The number of ex-combatants participating in reintegration projects increased to 20,628 by the June 19, 2002 report of Secretary General on UNAMSIL.⁴¹

By September 2002, approximately 55,000 ex-combatants were registered for reintegration. Of those, 31,000 were already participating in projects. The remaining 24,000 waited for projects, a process that was hindered due to financial limitations.⁷⁶ The reintegration project later received multi donor funding managed by the World Bank ($36.5 Million) as well as from USA ($5.7 Million) and Japan ($3 Million).⁷⁷ This funding helped to accelerate the reintegration process. By December 2002, 38,850 ex-combatants were benefitting from the programs.⁴²

A good number of ex-combatants, however, did not receive reintegration assistance. Some were excluded from participating in the DDR program — or only received parts of the reinsertion money they were entitled to – due to corrupt commanders or DDR officials. Yet others (especially in eastern Sierra Leone) did not receive the tool-kits they had been promised, and had to wait several months before they were given access to vocational training. See Nilsson, Anders. 2008. Dangerous Liaisons: Why Ex-Combatants Return to Violence. Doctoral Dissertation, Uppsala University.

1. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2002/987, September 5, 2002.
2. “Sierra Leone,” Aecid, http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/mapa/sierrai.pdf, accessed October 28, 2010.

2003

Intermediate Implementation

According to the Secretary General’s December 2003 Report on UNAMSIL, 56,751 ex-combatants had registered for reintegration programs. Among those registered, “32,892 had completed their training and 15,322 were still in programmes. Of the other 8,537, the National Committed estimated the remaining caseload to be 4,500.”⁷⁸ With the DDR program drawing to a close, the National Committee planned to complete its work by March 2004.¹⁵

1. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2003/1201, December 23, 2003, p. 6.

2004

Full Implementation

According to the Secretary General’s July 2004 Report on UNAMSIL, a total of 54,000 ex-combatants have received reintegration benefits over the past four years.⁷⁹ The Liberian and Sierra Leone governments, UNAMSIL, and UN mission in Liberia agreed, in principle, to demobilize, disarm and reintegrate ex-combatants from Sierra Leone in Liberia, who might number between 500 and 2,000.¹⁵

The number of ex-combatants to be reintegrated back to their communities that was cited by the Secretary General’s report is significantly lower than the progress report from World Bank on the Multi Donor Trust Fund. According to the World Bank report, “Of the 72,490 combatants who were disarmed, 95 percent or 69,000 were demobilized and 56,751 or 81 percent registered with NCDDR for reintegration training. As of mid-September of 2003, 48,240 or 85 percent of the registered ex-combatants had benefited from reintegration services.”⁸⁰

1. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2004/536, July 6, 2004.
2. “Community Reintegration and Rehabilitation, Implementation Completion Report,” World Bank, 2003, Report No. 27263, p. 9.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

Immediately after signing the Lomé Agreement, the Government freed 98 political prisoners and detainees from the Pademba Road Security Prisons. The release came as part of the presidential amnesty. “Among those released were the former Secretary to the ousted military ruler Mr. Hamid Kamara, the junta’s Attorney General Agibola Manely Spaine, former Deputy Secretary of State in the Department of Health, Dr. Matilda King and others. Their release followed the withdrawal of their appeals in a Freetown High Court.”⁸¹ Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary Front (RUF) rebels released 190 civilians, 111 of them were children.⁸²

1. “Sierra Leone; All Political Prisoners Freed,” Africa News, July 26, 1999.
2. “Sierra Leone; Combatants Start Freeing Children From Captivity,” Africa News, July 26, 1999.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

Even though some political prisoners were released within weeks of signing of the Lomé Agreement, the RUF demanded the release of political prisoners as a condition for peace. The RUF demanded that the Government release all RUFP/Sierra Leone political prisoners presently held, including the RUF leader, Foday Saybana Sankoh.⁸³

1. “Sierra Leone; RUFP Sets Conditions For Peace In Sierra Leone,” Africa News, December 5, 2000.

2001

Minimum Implementation

When the conflict restarted, the Government took many prisoners. It was reported that, “all of the RUF and AFRC prisoners at Pademba Road Prison rioted using their feces and urine to attack prison officials and police.” The prisoners then were moved to different locations.⁸⁴

The Government reported releasing 41 former RUF prisoners on August 10, 2002. The RUF disputed the number of prisoners released, stating only 17 were released.⁸⁵ According to a Human Rights Watch report, at least 10 RUF political prisoners died in prison.⁸⁶

1. “Sierra Leone; Political Prisoners Moved to Jui, Banana Island and Lungi,” Africa News, May 3, 2001.
2. “Sierra Leone; RUF Disputes Number of Released Prisoners,” Africa News, August 15, 2001.
3. “Human Rights Report 2001- Sierra Leone,” Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/africa10.html, accessed October 28, 2010.

2002

Minimum Implementation

There were – according to Human Rights Watch – dozens of imprisoned RUF and AFRC combatants and commanders in prison during 2000 to 2005.⁸⁷

1. “Human Rights Report 2006 – Sierra Leone,” Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/11/sierra14713.htm, accessed Feb. 18, 2011.

2003

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2004

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2005

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2006

Full Implementation

In early 2006, many of these (e.g. the well-known RUF commander “Leatherboot”) were released. It is unclear if there were any wartime prisoners after this date.¹⁵

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Minimum Implementation

The Civil Defence Forces (CDF) continued to play a key role in managing the security situation, as suggested by the president.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, CDF members also participated in the DDR process.

1. Brian Thomson, “Sierra Leone: Reform or Relapse?” Chatham House Report, 2007, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/9207_reportsierraleone0607.pdf, accessed October 26, 2010, p. 6.

2000

Minimum Implementation

The provisions on paramilitaries outlined in the ceasefire agreement were not implemented due to the breakdown of the ceasefire. Nevertheless, security sector reform programs were functional to some extent.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

Through the Military Reintegration Programme (MRP), the UK-led International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) undertook a series of training programs and assisted the Sierra Leone Armed ForcesÕ instructors at the Armed Force Training Center. MRP was “designed to integrate former RUF and CDF combatants who have been through the disarmament and demobilisation process, into the new RSLAF.”⁸⁹ The numbers of RUF and CDF combatants to be integrated was said to be fairly modest, though exact numbers are not available.

1. Mark Malan, “Security and Military Reform,” In eds. Mark Malan, Sarah Meek, Thokozani Thusi, Jeremy Ginifer, Patrick Coker. “Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery,” Institute for Security Studies, Monograph 80, http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/No80/content.html, p. 97.

2002

Full Implementation

According to the Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL, 1,723 ex-combatants (1,028 from RUF, 632 from CDF and 63 AFRC/ex-SLA) were selected for reintegration into the Sierra Leone Army.⁴⁰

A joint committee on DDR, comprised of the Government of Sierra Leone, the RUF and UNAMSIL, met on January 17, 2002 and declared the completion of the demobilization and disarmament process. A total of 47,076 combatants (19,183 RUF, 27,695 CDF and 198 AFRC/ex-SLA) were demobilized and disarmed. The actual number could be slightly higher. The higher estimate is 47,781, with the RUF accounting for 19,267, the CDF for 28,051, and others for 463.⁹⁰ As reported in Thusi and Meek (2003), 7,785 hand weapons, 17,180 assault weapons, 1,036 group weapons, and 935,495 ammunitions were collected. UNAMSIL had destroyed a total of 24,944 weapons as of the March 14, 2002 report of Secretary General on UNAMSIL.⁹¹

Citing the NCDDA’s August report (August 2002), Thusi and Meek (2003) report that Sierra Leone disarmed and demobilized 72,490 combatants (24,352 RUF, 2,574 AFRC, 5,953 ex-SLA, 37,377 CDF, and 2,234 others, including paramilitaries). By phase, the disarmed and demobilized include 3,183 in the first phase, 18,898 in the second phase, 628 in the interim phase, and 47,781 in the third phase. Among the demobilized, 6,845 were children. In the process, 42,300 weapons and 1.2 million pieces of ammunition were collected and destroyed.⁹²

The Civil Defense Force, a paramilitary organization, was demobilized and disarmed. Members of the organization participated in the reintegration program.

1. Thokozani Thusi and Sarah Meek, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” 2003, In eds. Mark Malan, Sarah Meek, Thokozani Thusi, Jeremy Ginifer, Patrick Coker, “Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery,” Institute for Security Studies, Monograph 80, http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/No80/content.html, p. 28.
2. S/2002/267, March 14, 2002.
3. Thusi and Meek, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” pp. 33-34.

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Minimum Implementation

Neither the Human Rights Commission nor the Truth and Reconciliation Commission were established in 1999. According to the Secretary General’s report on UNAMISL, the Government of Sierra Leone asked the office of UNHCR for developing draft statues for these commissions.⁹³

1. Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL, S/1999/1223, December 6, 1999.

2000

Minimum Implementation

According to the Secretary General’s December 2000 report on UNAMSIL, UNHCR and UNAMSIL assisted the Sierra Leone Government “to draft necessary legislation to establish the Human Rights Commission.” Introduction of the legislation in Parliament was expected following a consultative conference on the Commission to be held on December 15 and 16. The main problem was gaining sufficient financial support for the establishment of the Commission.⁹⁴ On December 16 and 17, 2000, UNAMSIL organized a consultative workshop on the proposed national Human Rights Commission.⁹⁵

1. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2000/1999, December 15, 2000.
2. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2001/228, March 14, 2001.

2001

Minimum Implementation

Even after consultative support from UNHCR and UNAMSIL on the proposed legislation on establishing national Human Rights Commission, the Government did not introduce a bill in Parliament.

2002

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2003

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2004

Intermediate Implementation

Finally, in May 2004, “the Parliament gave the green light to the creation of a human rights commission, mandated under a peace pact signed in 1999 to end the decade-long civil war. The five-member human rights commission is to include two women and a delegate representing various civil groups.”⁹⁶ President Kabbah signed the law on August 20, 2004.⁹⁷ (For information on Truth and Reconciliation, see the Truth and Reconciliation section.)

1. “Sierra Leone: Human Rights Panel Approved,” The New York Times, Section A; Column 5; Foreign Desk; p. 10, May 6, 2004.
2. http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/2004-9p.pdf, accessed November 1, 2010)

2005

Intermediate Implementation

“Progress has been made towards the establishment of a national human rights commission. The Government has authorized the Ministry of Justice to proceed with the establishment of the commission and requested technical assistance from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). UNAMSIL, supported by OHCHR, is collaborating with the Ministry in this regard to select and appoint commissioners in accordance with the Human Rights Commission Act. In response to a request from the Government, OHCHR has contracted a consultant, who arrived on 24 November, to facilitate consultations and provide advisory services for the establishment of the commission.”⁹⁸

1. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2005/777, December 12, 2005, p. 9.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

According to a UN report: “On 3 October 2006, the Parliament confirmed the nomination by the President of five commissioners to serve as members of the commission. When fully operational, the commission is expected, among other activities, to act upon individual complaints concerning human rights violations, encourage ratification and implementation of international human rights instruments and promote awareness of human rights through information, education and research.”⁹⁹

1. “Secretary General’s Report on the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone,” S/2006/922, November 28, 2006, p. 9.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

According to a UN report: “A National Human Rights Commission was established and efforts are under way to build its capacity. The national action plan for human rights is still being developed. Four bills relating to women’s and children’s rights, including the Registration of Customary Marriages and Divorces Bill, the Intestate Succession Bill, the Domestic Violence Bill and the Children’s Rights Bill, which were recommended by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, have been enacted. In addition, progress has been made in mainstreaming human rights in civil society organizations, local district councils and Government institutions.”¹⁰⁰

1. “Secretary General’s Report on the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone, S/2007/704, December 4, 2007, p. 6.

2008

Full Implementation

According to a UN report: “Considerable progress has been made in promoting respect for human rights, particularly in building the capacity of the national Human Rights Commission to monitor, protect and promote human rights and to review the status of implementation of the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. With support from UNIOSIL and UNDP, the Human Rights Commission has established fully functioning offices, recruited some core staff, completed a brainstorming retreat for the development of a five-year strategic plan, developed rules of procedure for the handling of complaints and created a framework for the production of its first human rights report. It is also in the process of finalizing its administrative and human resource manual, as well as its financial policies. During the reporting period, the Commission received and investigated 70 complaints with the support of the United Nations.”¹⁰¹

1. “Secretary General’s Report on the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone,” S/2008/281, April 29, 2008, p. 8.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

Immediately after signing the Lomé Agreement, President Ahmad Kabbah addressed the House of Parliament on the signing of the Lomé peace deal, which included an amnesty provision. He granted a blanket amnesty to rebels, as well as the release of more than 65 political prisoners, including RUF leader Foday Sankoh. “The prisoners were among a group of civilians and military officers held in detention for their role in the ousted military junta which rule the country in 1997… The President told Parliamentarians that such a move in granting amnesty to the political prisoners was a difficult one but that in the interest of peace it was worth making.”¹⁰²

Troops received a complete amnesty for any crimes committed from March 1991 up until the date of the signing of the agreement.

There was widespread criticism of granting a blanket amnesty. The United Nations, serving as one guarantor of the agreement, signed the agreement, “with the explicit proviso that the United Nations holds the understanding that the amnesty and pardon in article IX of the agreement shall not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.”¹⁰³

1. “Sierra Leone; President Orders Release Of Political Prisoners,” Africa News, July 9, 1999.
2. “Report of the Secretary General on UNAMIN,” S/1999/836, July 30, 1999, p. 2.

2000

Minimum Implementation

Amnesty to rebels was granted and political prisoners were released in 1999. After the resumption of fighting, however, it was said that, “it would be possible to prosecute people who have committed crimes since that date, including Foday Sankoh. Moreover, it is sometimes argued that RUF failure to respect Lomé terms has rendered the amnesty null and void, thus enabling prosecution also of earlier crimes.”¹⁰⁴

Human Rights Watch pressed that crimes committed since July 7, 1999 not be covered under blanket amnesty.¹⁰⁵

On August 14, 2000, the Security Council voted unanimously, “to create a special court to prosecute rebel leaders responsible for killing and maiming tens of thousands of people during Sierra Leone’s civil war.”¹⁰⁶ The government of Sierra Leone welcomed the “decision by the UN Security Council to set up a special court to try violators of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean criminal law.”¹⁰⁷

1. “Sierra Leone: Time for a New Political and Military Strategy,” International Crisis Group, ICG Africa Report No.28, Freetown/London/Brussels, April 11, 2001, p.21.
2. “Sierra Leone; Sankoh, JP urged to deal with cease-fire violators,” Africa News, January 26, 2000.
3. “U.N. to Create Genocide Tribunal; Court Will Prosecute Rebel Leaders Who Led Violence in Sierra Leone,” The Washington Post, August 15, 2000, Section A, p. A06.
4. “Sierra Leone; Government Welcomes War Crimes Court,” Africa News, August 16, 2000.

2001

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2002

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Minimum Implementation

The specific date of the establishment of National Commission for Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (NCRRR) is not available. However, the Ministry of National Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction was created in April 1996 and it ran a program on Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction to address, “the short-term needs of demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, resettlement of displaced people and refugees, and restoration of basic social services, as well as the medium-term reconstruction necessary to lay the foundation for long-term growth and development.”¹⁰⁸

According to the Secretary General’s September 1999 report on UNAMSIL, there were about one half million refugees in neighboring countries and repatriation had not commenced as of September 1999. The UNHCR was unable to reach many areas of origin of refugees and IDPs to assess whether conditions were good enough to their return.[fn]”Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/1999/1003, September 28, 1999.[/efn_note]

1. “Secretary General’s Report on Sierra Leone,” S/1997/80, January 26, 1997, p. 7.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

At the government’s invitation, the RUF coordinator for humanitarian affairs was integrated into the NCRRR. UNHCR projects the return to be as many as 108,000 out of 450,000 in 2000 if the security situation improves. It was reported that a small number of Sierra Leonean refugees in Liberia returned to Pujehun.¹⁰⁹ During the remainder of the year, progress in reparations was hindered due to continued fighting. When major violence erupted on the Guinean border in early September 2000, the Sierra Leonean Government assisted the repatriation of more than 20,000 Sierra Leonean refugees.¹¹⁰

1. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2000/186, March 7, 2000.
2. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2000/1199, December 15, 2000.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

Repatriation of refugees and resettlement of IDPs gained momentum in 2001. According to the Secretary General’s report on UNAMSIL, there were an estimated 510,000 refugees, with some 200,000 in Guinea and Liberia. There were 247,590 IDPs within Sierra Leone.⁶⁹

2002

Intermediate Implementation

UNHCR assisted approximately 107,000 registered Sierra Leonean refugees, as well as an additional 80,000 unregistered refugees living outside camps. Since September 2000, UNHCR has assisted 68,698 refugees, while others returned spontaneously.⁴⁰

“A central aspect of the recovery process is the facilitation of the resettlement of internally displaced persons and returning refugees. They are returning to areas that are among the poorest and most devastated, and where concentrations of ex-combatants are high. The third phase of the national resettlement programme commenced on 28 March and ran through 30 April, at which point operations were suspended for the election period. Some 120,000 internally displaced persons were resettled in the newly accessible areas during this phase” (page 6). The report further suggests that the UNHCR “expanded the resettlement of returnees to chiefdoms in Kono and Kailahun districts. Since March, more than 30,000 returnees have been resettled and more than 15,500 Sierra Leonean refugees repatriated (about 7,500 from Guinea and about 8,000 from Liberia). At present, approximately 22,000 returnees continue to reside in temporary settlements or host communities, in one chiefdom in Pujehun district. It is estimated that about 165,000 Sierra Leonean refugees continue to receive asylum in the subregion” (S/2002/679, June 19, 2002, page 6).

2003

Intermediate Implementation

The Secretary General’s March 2003 Report on UNAMSIL, noted the continuation of the UNHCR program for the repatriation of Sierra Leonean refugees from Guinea, Liberia and other countries. From the beginning of the program, some 200,000 Sierra Leoneans had returned from asylum countries. Among those repatriated, 124,000 benefited from individual assistance from UNHCR.⁴³

“Since 2001, a total of 234,000 Sierra Leoneans have been repatriated (of whom 141,000 were assisted by UNHCR to return). This includes 63,000 from Liberia (48,000 assisted) and 170,000 from Guinea (92,000 assisted). An estimated 47,000 Sierra Leonean refugees remain in Guinea, of whom 25,000 are accommodated in UNHCR camps), an estimated 40,000 remain in Liberia (of whom 16,000 were in camps until the recent LURD advance on Monrovia).”¹¹¹ There was brief pause or slowdown in the repatriation process due to fighting in Liberia and rain. Repatriation of the remaining 40,000 Sierra Leonean refugees residing in the subregion restarted at the end of October. Repatriation from Guinea and Liberia was expected to continue throughout the first six months of 2004.⁴⁵

1. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2003/663, June 23, 2003, p. 14.

2004

Full Implementation

The repatriation of Sierra Leonean refugees by the UNHCR was completed on 21 July 2004. Since the program started in 2001, “UNHCR has repatriated 179,000 refugees, with 25,913 Sierra Leonean nationals repatriated in 2004.”¹¹² Estimated 92,000 refugees returned unassisted, and close to 15,000 Sierra Leonean opted to stay in other countries.¹⁵

1. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2004/724, September 9, 2004, p. 10.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Minimum Implementation

The specific date of the establishment of National Commission for Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (NCRRR) is not available. However, the Ministry of National Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction was created in April 1996 and it ran a program on Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction to address, “the short-term needs of demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, resettlement of displaced people and refugees, and restoration of basic social services, as well as the medium-term reconstruction necessary to lay the foundation for long-term growth and development.”¹⁰⁸

According to the Secretary General’s September 1999 report on UNAMSIL, there were about one half million refugees in neighboring countries and repatriation had not commenced as of September 1999. The UNHCR was unable to reach many areas of origin of refugees and IDPs to assess whether conditions were good enough to their return.¹¹³

1. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/1999/1003, September 28, 1999.

2000

Minimum Implementation

The resettlement situation for IDPs gradually improved. The Government, with support from UN agencies, started planning for the resettlement of IDPs to the areas of government control. The Government began with 52,000 IDPS residing in nine camps in the western area.¹⁰⁹

2001

Minimum Implementation

The repatriation of refugees and resettlement of IDPs gained momentum in 2001. According to Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL, there were an estimated 510,000 refugees, 200,000 of which were in Guinea and Liberia. There were also 247,590 IDPs within Sierra Leone.⁶⁹

2002

Full Implementation

As of January 2002, 204,000 IDPs were registered and being assisted by UN agencies. The resettlement program was carried out in phases. In the first phase, which began in December 2001, 4,000 IDPs and 13,000 returnees resettled in Port Loko District.⁴⁰

“A central aspect of the recovery process is the facilitation of the resettlement of internally displaced persons and returning refugees. They are returning to areas that are among the poorest and most devastated, and where concentrations of ex-combatants are high. The third phase of the national resettlement programme commenced on 28 March and ran through 30 April, at which point operations were suspended for the election period. Some 120,000 internally displaced persons were resettled in the newly accessible areas during this phase.”¹¹⁴

The final phase of resettlement of IDPs was completed in early December. Since the program began, approximately 220,000 IDPs were resettled.⁴²

1. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2002/679, June 19, 2002, p. 6.

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

No Implementation

The accord called for special attention to women’s economic roles in reconstruction efforts. There were no reports of reconstruction efforts aimed at women this year.

2000

No Implementation

No reports of reconstruction efforts aimed at women.

2001

No Implementation

No reports of reconstruction efforts aimed at women.

2002

Intermediate Implementation

On November 15th 2001, the House of Parliament passed the National Commission for Social Action Act 2001 in which special attention was given to women’s economic roles, especially as heads of households, to enable them to access land for residential and agricultural purposes.¹¹⁵

It was reported that the micro-credit programme approved over 15,000 loans, the majority going to women.¹¹⁶

1. “Sierra Leone; State of the Nation Symposium,” Africa News, April 24, 2002.
2. “Sierra Leone; NACSA’s Daunting Task!,” Africa News, June 13, 2002.

2003

Full Implementation

The National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA) continued its core programs namely, the Community-Driven Programme (CDP), the Public Works Programme (PWP) and the Micro Finance Programme (MFP).¹¹⁷

1. “Sierra Leone; National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA) – Empowering Grassroots Communities (Part 1),” Africa News, August 25, 2003.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

No Implementation

The Government did not implement plans to provide free basic education in 1999, a stipulation in the Lomé agreement.

2000

No Implementation

The Government did not implement plans to provide free basic education.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

The Free Primary Education Policy was introduced in 2001. According to the policy, primary school children in public schools were offered free schooling.¹¹⁸

The free primary education covered students in classes one to six. In 2001, there were 554,308 pupils enrolled in primary education, 42% of which were female. There were 14,875 primary education teachers.¹¹⁹

1. “National Report on the Review of the Implementation of the Brussels Programme of Action 2001-2010,” Government of Sierra Leone, 2009, https://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/ldc/shared/shared/SierraLeoneNational…, accessed November 2, 2010.
2. “World Development Indicator,” World Bank, 2010, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators, accessed October 20, 2010.

2002

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2003

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2004

Full Implementation

The Education Minister stated that the Government expected to, “expand early free and compulsory education for all primary school children.”¹²⁰ The Government wanted to increase the literacy rate from 36% to 72% by 2005, as well as meet targets to reduce gender disparities in primary and secondary education.¹⁵ In 2004, the Education Act was enacted. Primary school enrollment was expected to be approximately 1,135,000 in 2003/2004.¹²¹

The Free Primary Education Policy was in place, and the Education Act was enacted in 2004.

1. “Sierra Leone; Education Ministry Meets With Stakeholders,” Africa News, June 28, 2004.
2. “National Report on the Review of the Implementation of the Brussels Programme of Action 2001-2010,” 2009.

2005

Full Implementation

The Free Primary Education Policy was in place, and the Education Act was enacted in 2004. There was considerable progress made in terms of enrollment and developing infrastructure. According to the World Bank, there were 1,322,205 pupils enrolled in primary education, 48% of which were female. The number of primary school teachers increased to 30,239.

2006

Full Implementation

Considerable progress made in terms of enrollment and developing educational infrastructure.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

No Implementation

Under the Lomé Agreement, the Government was supposed to establish a special fund to support/rehabilitate the war victims. The fund was not established in 1999.

2000

Minimum Implementation

The Parliament of Sierra Leone approved The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 on February 10, 2000. This act provided institutional means of establishing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in line with Article XXVI of the Lomé Peace Agreement and to provide for related matters.¹²² In spite of the Parliamentary ruling, issues remained on the subject of reparations and the establishment of a special fund.

1. Paul James-Allen, Sheku B. S. Lahai, and Jamie OÕConnel, “Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Special Court: A Citizen’s Handbook,” 2003, National Forum for Human Rights and International Centre for Transitional Justice, New York, http://www.ictj.org/images/content/0/9/094.pdf, Accessed October 25, 2010.

2001

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2002

Minimum Implementation

In an effort to encourage the Government to take compensation or reparations to war victims seriously, a two-day workshop took place in Makeni on August 2 and 3, 2002. “The workshop ended with many expectations that the TRC would advise government on the need for reparation to become a grassroot issue in our search for truth and reconciliation following the end of the ten-year rebel war.”¹²³ Issues remained on questions of reparations and the establishment of a special fund.

During a press briefing held at the TRC headquarters, one commissioner suggested that president Kabbah should promote the TRC at the next UN General Assembly meeting. The move was expected to increase the profile of the TRC in order to raise funds.¹²⁴ The issue of reparations to victims became so critical that the victims of war (Amputees and War Wounded Association) started to demonstrate.¹²⁵

1. “Sierra Leone; Consultative Conference Ends With Great Expectation,” Africa News, August 7, 2002.
2. “Sierra Leone; President Kabbah to Take Truth and Reconciliation Commission to UN,” Africa News, August 9, 2002.
3. “Sierra Leone; A Reparation And the TRC,” Africa News, August 23, 2002.

2003

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2004

Minimum Implementation

“Following a two-year investigation into atrocities committed during the war, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission said both Libya and Liberia had played a key role in the West African conflict.”¹²⁶

The report recommended that Libya pay reparations for having trained top rebel military commanders. The Commission recommended measures to control corruption as well as provide free physical and mental healthcare for amputees and rape victims. The TRC also recommended a monthly pension for all war wounded. The money to fund the monthly pension was expected to be provided by the Government, with the hope that the international community would also provide funds.¹⁵ International funding was insufficient, however. “[A] recent United Nations inter-agency appeal for funds for Sierra Leone’s recovery and rehabilitation had yielded only 10 per cent of the funding goal of $60 million.”¹²⁷

1. “Sierra Leone; Independent Report Calls On Libya to Pay Reparations for Role in Civil War,” Africa News, October 6, 2004.
2. “Sierra Leone: Truth And Reconciliation Report,” Africa News, October 31, 2004.

2005

Minimum Implementation

As recommended by the TRC in its report, victims of war did not receive reparations from the Government. Therefore, the Amputees and War Wounded Association in Sierra Leone threatened to sue the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) Government for deliberately failing to respond to their welfare, as was recommended in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Report. As recommended by TRC, the victims should be receiving SU$300 as a monthly allowance. The Government was criticized for failing to get international support to establish a permanent fund.¹²⁸

1. “Sierra Leone; Amputees Threaten to Sue SLPP Government,” Africa News, August 31, 2005.

2006

Minimum Implementation

“On the occasion of the International Day in Support of Victims of torture, the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) and Forum of Conscience (FOC) call upon the Government of Sierra Leone to establish with the utmost urgency the Special Fund for War Victims.”¹²⁹

1. “Sierra Leone; International Day in Support of Victims of Torture – Victims of War Remain Without Reparations,” Africa News, June 26, 2006.

2007

Minimum Implementation

The special fund for war victims was not established, creating a growing criticism of the Government. On November 5, 2007, Amnesty International asked the newly elected Government of Sierra Leone to commit to ensuring justice and full reparations for the tens of thousands of Sierra Leonean women who were victims of sexual violence during the conflict.¹³⁰

1. “Sierra Leone; Govt Asked to Compensate Sexually Assaulted,” Africa News, November 5, 2007.

2008

Minimum Implementation

“National commission for social action (NaCSA), the institution responsible for the reparation of refugees was experiencing a slow pace with the programme due to delay in accessing the $3USM allocated to them. The said amount was earmarked by the peace building commission to fast track the reparation process in Sierra Leone.”¹³¹

1. “Sierra Leone: Reparation Process Suffers Setback,” All Africa News, October 31, 2008.

The chief of the Human Rights Section of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Lone (UNIPSIL) said, at the official launch of the reparations program by the National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA), that the lack of political will result in implementation delays.¹³²

The National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA), which was running the reparations program, lacked funding to run the program. Of the US$14 million required for 2009-10, NaCSA had less than US $3.5 million for the program. The bulk of the funding for 2009 came from the UN Peacebuilding Fund. Reparations to victims came in the form of housing, skills training, health care, education and agricultural assistance, as well as symbolic activities such as reburials, memorials and remembrance ceremonies.¹³³ Up to 100,000 Sierra Leoneans, among them amputees and other war-wounded, victims of sexual violence, war widows and children who were eligible for post-war reparations, had yet to receive any compensation.¹³⁴

1. “Sierra Leone; ‘Political Will Delays Reparations,'” Africa News, February 5, 2009.
2. “Sierra Leone; Lack of Aid Funds for Amputees, Rape Victims, War Widows,” Africa News, February 23, 2009.
3. “Sierra Leone; Special Court Receives Funding Reprieve,” Africa News, April 14, 2009.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

Immediately following the signing of the Lomé Agreement, UN General Secretary Annan recommended that the UN encourage donor countries to make contributions towards the reconstruction of war ravaged Sierra Leone.¹³⁵

Sierra Leone received international support for the DDR program. Funding for the program, which was led by the World Bank, was expected to cost $33 million. The DDR was financed by a Trust Fund set up by the World Bank in agreement with donor countries.¹³⁶ Support from the international community for reconstruction and rehabilitation in Sierra Leone was very minimal in comparison to donorsÕ one billion dollar support for Rwandan refugee camps.¹³⁷

1. “UN calls for concerted efforts to re-build Sierra Leone,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, July 10, 1999.
2. “Sierra Leone; Sierra Leone Fact Sheet #1,” Africa News, October 7, 1999.
3. “Pay up to keep the peace; Sierra Leone badly needs foreign help to recover from its civil war,” The Guardian (London), October 11, 1999.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

The Security Council, in its Resolution 1289 (February 4, 2000), asked the international community for, “sustained and generous assistance for the longer terms tasks of peace-building, reconstruction, economic and social recovery and development in Sierra Leone, and urges all States and international and other organizations to provide such assistance as a priority”(p.4).

2001

Minimum Implementation

Donors at a World Bank conference, held from June 11-12, 2001, failed to offer specific commitments to replenish the multimillion-dollar Trust Fund set up for war-weary Sierra Leone. “With just US $6 million dollars left in the fund, the Sierra Leonean government expects this to last no later than August, the World Bank Country Director for Sierra Leone told reporters in Paris. The money was being used to pay for post-war reconstruction and socioeconomic development.¹³⁸

1. “Sierra Leone; Donors Fail to Pledge Reconstruction Money,” Africa News, June 13, 2001.

2002

Minimum Implementation

“A delegation of donors from 12 counties ended a week-long mission to Sierra Leone on Friday declaring that although peace had come, the problems and needs facing the country were ‘enormous,Õ the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) reported. Alan Doss, the Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Governance and Stabilisation, told reporters that the response from donors was ‘extremely positive,Õ as Sierra Leone moved from emergency relief to the reconstruction phase, UNAMSIL reported. The purpose of the visit, Doss said, was not to make financial pledges but to discuss with the government the prospects and priorities for reintegration and recovery.”¹³⁹

1. “Sierra Leone; Donor Team Says Needs Are ‘Enormous,'” Africa News, February 11, 2002.

2003

Minimum Implementation

No additional information available on donor support.

2004

Minimum Implementation

“Sierra Leoneans from all walks of society would participate in a two-day donor conference scheduled to take place on September 4 and 5 in Maryland, USA in a bid to rebuild and develop the Marampa Chiefdom in Lunsar, Port Loko district, and other parts of the country destroyed during the decade old conflict. The programme organized by the Marampa Self Help project, a non-profiting making organization that has reconstructed over 12 houses destroyed during the war in that township, would bring together Sierra Leoneans in the Diaspora to contribute meaningfully to post-war development exercise in the country.”¹⁴⁰

1. “Sierra Leone; Donor Conference for Sierra Leone in America,” Africa News, August 24, 2004.

2005

Minimum Implementation

No additional information was available on donor support in 2005 related to the Lomé Agreement. There was still insufficient funding for reparations to war victims.

2006

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

The major elements of the timeline are Amnesty, allowing RUF to become a political party, DDR, and the Truth Commission. Although the accord does not distinguish between start dates and completion dates, which suggest that the dates given are start dates. Amnesty and party reform were passed almost immediately. The DDR program was initiated before the accord. The Truth Commission was initiated within one year. By and large, the deadlines were met.

Amnesty was passed very quickly. Immediately after signing the Lomé Agreement, President Ahmad Kabbah addressed the House of Parliament on the signing of the Lomé peace deal, which included amnesty provisions. He granted a blanket amnesty to rebels, as well as the release of more than 65 political prisoners, including RUF leader Foday Sankoh. “The prisoners were among a group of civilians and military officers held in detention for their role in the ousted military junta which rule the country in 1997… The President told Parliamentarians that such a move in granting amnesty to the political prisoners was a difficult one but that in the interest of peace it was worth making.”¹⁰²

On July 23, 1999, Parliament passed the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (Participation in Political and Democratic Process) Act, 1999 (No. 4 of 1999). The Act facilitated the transformation of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone into a political movement and the assumption by members of the Front of any public offices assigned to them pursuant to the Lomé Peace Agreement. On the same day, Parliament also passed the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and development Act, 1999 (No. 5 of 1999), as provided for under Article XXVIII of the Lomé Peace Agreement.¹⁴¹ This Act allowed the RUF to participate in the transitional government.

The DDR process started in October 1998 and was run by UNASMIL in coordination with NCDDR. The process was comprised of four different phases: (1) Phase I- September — December 1998; (2) Phase II- October 1999-April 2000; (3) Interim Phase – May 2000-May 17, 2001; (4) Phase III- May 18, 2001-January 2002.⁷²

According to the eighth report of the Secretary General on UNOMSIL (S/1999/1003, September 28, 1999), “the Government of Sierra Leone, working in close cooperation with the World Bank, the United Kingdom and UNOMSIL, developed an operational plan for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration into society of an estimated 45,000 fighters in Sierra Leone.”⁶³ “The strength of the RUF is estimated at some 15,000, approximately the same size as the Civil Defence Force. The AFRC comprises some 6,000 men, slightly fewer than the current armed forces of Sierra Leone, which have a nominal roll of 7,000. Some 2,000 fighters are thought to belong to various paramilitary groups. UNICEF estimates that about 12 per cent of all combatants are children.”¹⁴²

1. “Laws of Sierra Leone,” http://www.sierra-leone.org/laws.html, accessed October 14, 2010.
2. S/1999/1003, September 28, 1999, p. 7.

2000

Full Implementation

The Parliament of Sierra Leone approved the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 on February 10, 2000. The Act provided an institutional means of establishing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in line with Article XXVI of the Lomé Peace Agreement.¹⁴³

1. Paul James-Allen, Sheku B. S. Lahai, and Jamie OÕConnel, 2003, “Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Special Court: A Citizen’s Handbook,” National Forum for Human Rights and International Centre for Transitional Justice, New York, http://www.ictj.org/images/content/0/9/094.pdf, Accessed October 25, 2010.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

1999

Minimum Implementation

The purpose of the CMRRD was to regulate and control the mining of gold and diamonds in SL. On October 23, 1999, the President of Sierra Leone confirmed that the Revolutionary United Front leader, Corporal Foday Sankoh, would become the Chairman of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD), as agreed in the Lomé agreement. The position holds the protocol rank of vice president.¹⁴⁴

“On paper, the CMRRD was to be an autonomous body, whose head was responsible only to the president. Amidst such confusion, the CMRRD was never really constituted and Sankoh simply ignored his appointment and continued to fund his military and political programmes through mining proceeds from RUF activities in Kono District.”¹⁴⁵

1. “Sierra Leone: President confirms Kabbah’s posts as laid down in peace accord,” BBC Monitoring Africa — Political, October 24, 1999.
2. “Implementing the Lomé Peace Agreement,” Conciliation Resources, 2000, http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sierra-leone/implementing-lome.php, accessed November 3, 2010.

2000

Minimum Implementation

Sankoh was arrested in May 2000. The CMRRD was disbanded once Sankoh was arrested.

2001

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2002

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

The JIC [Joint Implementation Committee] was established during the peace talks in Lomé to oversee and monitor the implementation of the peace accord. Members of the JIC included Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia, Algeria, Ivory Coast, Togo and the moral guarantor of the agreement, the UN, ECOWAS and the Commonwealth.¹⁴⁶

The first meeting of the JIC was scheduled for the first week of August 1999.The meeting was expected to review the progress made in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme, with particular attention towards ex-combatants. The meeting also expected to review the humanitarian assistance given to the needy as well to discuss the observance of the cease-fire, release of prisoners and other key provisions of the Lomé peace accord.¹⁵

1. “Sierra Leone; UN Chief Meets With Togo’s Foreign Minister On Implementation Of Accord,” Africa News, July 19, 1999.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

The second meeting of the Joint Implementation Committee (JIC) of the Lomé peace agreement started on January 24, 2000. The meeting reviewed the implementation status of the Lomé Peace Accord and discussed future needs. Implementation of the Lomé Peace Accord lagged in several areas in addition to insufficient progress of the DDR process.¹⁴⁷

The Joint Implementation Committee (JIC) held an emergency meeting in Abuja on May 9, 2000. The JIC sought an end to the escalating crisis in Sierra Leone amidst reports that the whereabouts of rebel leader, Foday Sankoh, were unknown.¹⁴⁸

Countries constituting the Joint Implementation Committee on the Sierra Leone peace accord had taken what was regarded as a bold initiative to ensure compliance with the agreement and, therefore, insure peace in the country.¹⁴⁹

This initiative led to the ECOWAS decision to send at least 3, 000 additional troops to reinforce the faltering Lomé peace process on Sierra Leone.¹⁵⁰

Following the negotiation of a 30-day ceasefire on November 10, 2000, hostilities ended.

1. “Sierra Leone; Lomé implementation committee meets,” Africa News, January 24, 2000.
2. “Sierra Leone; Nine ECOWAS Leaders Meet In Abuja Today Over S/Leone,” Africa News, May 9, 2000.
3. “ECOWAS to use “every means” to prevent rebel takeover in Sierra Leone,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 11, 2000.
4. “Sierra Leone; ECOMOG To Return To Sierra Leone,” Africa News, May 18, 2000.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

On May 15, 2001, UNAMSIL was deployed. No further reports on the Joint Implementation Committee.

2002

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

1999

Minimum Implementation

UN or international verification was in place prior to the 1999 Lomé Agreement. The Security Council Resolution of July 13, 1998 (S/RES/1181) had established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOSMIL). The 1999 Lomé Peace agreement had specific provisions for UN involvement, which led to the provisional extension of the mission. The mission was initially authorized to have 70 military observers, a 15-person medical unit and 5 civilian police advisers. There was also a provision for 50 international civilian personnel and 48 locally recruited staff. A maximum of 192 military observers, 15 other military personnel and a two person medical team, supported by international and local civilian staff, were deployed in October 1999. The Secretary General submitted additional recommendations on the overall activities of the UN in Sierra Leone after discussions with the parties, including discussion of the mandates and structure of UN peacekeeping in the area. On August 20, 1999, the Security Council passed a resolution (S/RES/1260) authorizing the provisional expansion of the observer mission.¹⁵¹

The Security Council passed a resolution on October 22, 1999 (S/RES/1270) authorizing the deployment of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which expanded the observer and verification role of UNOMSIL to a peacekeeping role. Subsequently, the resolution terminated the observer mission. UNAMSIL had an authorized capacity, “with a maximum of 6,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers, to assist the Government and the parties in carrying out provisions of the Lomé peace agreement. At the same time, the Council decided to terminate UNOMSIL.”¹⁵²

As provided for in the Lomé Agreement, there was a new six-point mandate for ECOMOG operations in Sierra Leone, set forth by the Federal Government of Nigeria on July 8, 1999. The six points of the mandate are: reconstruction; disarmament; demobilization; integration of the citizenry; training of the Sierra Leonean Armed Forces; and a provision of security for VIPs in the post- war country.¹⁵³

However, ECOMOG troops were withdrawn from Sierra Leone in September 1999.¹⁵⁴ The first batch of 498 Nigerian troops was withdrawn on September 2, 1999.¹⁵⁵

The West African Peacekeeping Force (ECOMOG) in Sierra Leone stopped the withdrawal of troops following renewed tensions between the former military junta leader, Johnny Paul Koroma, and rebel leader, Foday Sankoh. “A senior ECOMOG official said in Freetown on Saturday that they suspended the pullout of Nigerian forces, the backbone of the peacekeepers, following an appeal by Sierra Leone’s President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and the United Nations. Some 2,000 Nigerian troops have already left the country.”¹⁵⁶

1. “United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone- UNOMSIL,” http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unomsil/Unomsil.htm, accessed October 10, 2010.
2. “Sierra Leone-UNAMSIL-Background,” http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/background.html, accessed October 10, 2010.
3. “Sierra Leone; ECOMOG’s new role revealed in Nigeria,” Africa News, July 9, 1999.
4. “Sierra Leone; Kabbah, Obasanjo discuss Ecomog withdrawal,” Africa News, September 3, 1999.
5. “NIGERIA: FIRST BATCH OF ECOMOG CONTINGENT RETURNS FROM SIERRA LEONE,” BBC Monitoring Africa — Political, September 3, 1999.
6. “ECOMOG halts withdrawal of troops from Sierra Leone,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, September 4, 1999.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

UNMASIL was involved to verify the DDR process. The DDR process was disrupted due to the outbreak of violent conflict in May and June. Following the signing of a ceasefire agreement between conflicting parties on November 10, 2000, the DDR process restarted. “É [T]he Executive Secretariat of the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, in cooperation with UNAMSIL and other key partners, has developed a draft revised joint operation plan for phase III of the programme, which was introduced to the Technical Coordination Committee of the Commission on 8 December [2001].”⁷⁵

2001

Intermediate Implementation

UNMASIL was involved with the DDR verification. In keeping with the decision taken at the meeting of the joint committee on May 15, 2001, the DDR program was re-launched on May 18, 2001. In the meeting, the parties agreed to set up additional DDR camps, including UNAMSIL’s mobile disarmament unit. It was agreed that the RUF ex-combatants would be encamped for a period of up to four weeks, while CDF ex-combatants would stay for a shorter period. They would receive orientation briefings, as well as learn about opportunities available to them during the reintegration stage. The process was monitored by a mechanism that included CDF and RUF representatives.

During the May 15, 2001 meeting, the RUF declared that it had a total of 10,000 combatants. The CDF declared a total of 15,000 combatants, a number that could increase up to 20,000, as many are not listed as combatants.⁶⁸

As of the December 9, 2001 report of the Secretary General on UNAMSIL, 36,741 combatants were demobilized and disarmed (12,087 RUF; 24,456 CDF and 196 AFRC/Ex-SLA).⁶⁹ A total of 13,500 weapons and 2.8 million assorted pieces of ammunition were collected during the process. The demobilization and disarmament process completed in the Kambia, Port Loko, Kono, Bonthe, Bombali, Moyamba, Koinadugu, Tonkolili, Bo and Pujehun districts as well as in the western area. In the remaining two districts, Kailahun and Kenema, the process was expected to begin in the last phase of the DDR process.

2002

Full Implementation

A joint committee on DDR, comprised of the Government of Sierra Leone, the RUF and UNAMSIL, met on January 17, 2002 and declared the completion of demobilization and disarmament process. A total of 47,076 combatants (19,183 RUF, 27,695 CDF and 198 AFRC/ex-SLA) were demobilized and disarmed. The actual number could be slightly higher. The higher estimate is 47,781, with the RUF accounting for 19,267, the CDF for 28,051, and others for 463.⁹⁰

As reported in Thusi and Meek (2003), 7,785 hand weapons, 17,180 assault weapons, 1,036 group weapons, and 935,495 ammunitions were collected. UNAMSIL had destroyed a total of 24,944 weapons as of the March 14, 2002 report of the Secretary General on UNAMSIL.¹⁵⁷

Citing the NCDDA’s August report (August 2002), Thusi and Meek (2003) report that Sierra Leone disarmed and demobilized 72,490 combatants (24,352 RUF, 2,574 AFRC, 5,953 ex-SLA, 37,377 CDF, and 2,234 others, including paramilitaries). By phase, the disarmed and demobilized include 3,183 in the first phase, 18,898 in the second phase, 628 in the interim phase, and 47,781 in the third phase. Among the demobilized, 6,845 were children. In the process, 42,300 weapons and 1.2 million pieces of ammunition were collected and destroyed.¹⁵⁸

The demobilization and disarmament process was completed in 2002. UNAMSIL verified the elections that were held in May 2002.

1. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2002/267, March 14, 2002.
2. Thokozani Thusi and Sarah Meek, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” 2003.

2003

Full Implementation

According to the Secretary General’s December 2003 Report on UNAMSIL, 56,751 ex-combatants registered for reintegration programs. Among those registered, “32,892 had completed their training and 15,322 were still in programmes. Of the other 8,537, the National Committed estimated the remaining caseload to be 4,500.”⁷⁸ With the near completion of the DDR process, the National Committee planned to dissolve it by March 2004.¹⁵

2004

Full Implementation

The demobilization and disarmament process was completed in 2002. UNAMSIL verified the elections that were held in May 2002.

According to the Secretary General’s July 2004 Report on UNAMSIL, a total of 54,000 ex-combatants have received reintegration benefits over the past four years.⁷⁹ The Liberian and Sierra Leone governments, UNAMSIL, and UN mission in Liberia agreed, in principle, to demobilize, disarm and reintegrate ex-combatants from Sierra Leone in Liberia, who might number between 500 and 2,000.¹⁵

The number of ex-combatants to be reintegrated back to their communities that was cited by the Secretary General’s report is significantly lower than the progress report from World Bank on the Multi Donor Trust Fund. According to the World Bank report, “Of the 72,490 combatants who were disarmed, 95 percent or 69,000 were demobilized and 56,751 or 81 percent registered with NCDDR for reintegration training. As of mid-September of 2003, 48,240 or 85 percent of the registered ex-combatants had benefited from reintegration services.”¹⁵⁹

1. “Community Reintegration and Rehabilitation,” World Bank, Implementation Completion Report, Report No. 27263, 2003, p. 9.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

The Security Council Resolution of July 13, 1998 (S/RES/1181) had established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOSMIL). The 1999 Lomé Peace agreement had specific provisions for UN involvement, which led to the provisional extension of the mission. The mission was initially authorized to have 70 military observers, a 15-person medical unit and 5 civilian police advisers. There was also a provision for 50 international civilian personnel and 48 locally recruited staff. A maximum of 192 military observers, 15 other military personnel and a two person medical team, supported by international and local civilian staff, were deployed in October 1999. The Secretary General submitted additional recommendations on the overall activities of the UN in Sierra Leone after discussions with the parties, including discussion of the mandates and structure of UN peacekeeping in the area. On August 20, 1999, the Security Council passed a resolution (S/RES/1260) authorizing the provisional expansion of the observer mission.¹⁵¹

The Security Council passed a resolution on October 22, 1999 (S/RES/1270) authorizing the deployment of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which expanded the observer and verification role of UNOMSIL to a peacekeeping role. Subsequently, the resolution terminated the observer mission. UNAMSIL had an authorized capacity, “with a maximum of 6,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers, to assist the Government and the parties in carrying out provisions of the Lomé peace agreement. At the same time, the Council decided to terminate UNOMSIL.”¹⁵²

2000

Intermediate Implementation

The strength of the UN peacekeeping force reached 7,391 military personnel, including 260 military observers, by March 1, 2000.¹⁰⁹ As of the Secretary General’s December 2000 report on UNAMSIL, the security situation had remained relatively stable.¹⁶⁰ In addition to the current deployment of UNAMSIL peacekeepers, the peacekeeping mission troops also concentrated on relief-in-place operations, while also establishing valuable contacts with RUF local commanders.

1. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2000/1199 2000, December, 2000.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

As of the Secretary General’s March 2001 report, “É UNAMSIL continued to remind RUF of its obligation under the Abuja agreement and discussed predominantly military issues with the rebel group. In particular, UNAMSIL pressed RUF to return the weapons seized from some UNAMSIL contingents in May 2000, to reopen the long-closed roads and to facilitate free movement of people and goods in REU-held areas.”¹⁶¹

According to the Secretary General’s June 25, 2001 report on UNAMSIL, 246 military observers and 12,163 troops were deployed.⁶⁸

As the elections approached, the UNAMSIL deployment covered a considerable part of Sierra Leone. By the September 7, 2001 Report of the Secretary General on UNAMSIL (S/2001/857), the UNAMSIL troop strength had increased to 16,664. The UNAMSIL military observers played important role in screening and processing the combatants as well as developing local disarmament arrangements with the faction commanders. As of the Secretary General’s report on UNAMSIL, the mission reached the authorized ceiling of 17,500 and the mission had been deployed in all districts of Sierra Leone.¹⁶²

1. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2001/228, March 14, 2001, p. 1.
2. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2001/857, September 7, 2001.

2002

Full Implementation

“By its resolution 1370 (2001) of 18 September 2001, the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) for a period of six months, ending on 30 March 2002” (S/2002/267, March 14, 2002, page 1). The mandate of the Mission was extended until 30 September 2002 by Security Council resolution S/RES/1400 on March 28, 2002). The peacekeeping mission’s mandate was extended through March 30, 2003 under Security Council Resolution S/RES/1436 on September 24, 2002.

According to Secretary General’s March 14, 2002 Report on UNAMSIL (S/2002/267), “[t]he Mission stepped up air and land patrols along the Sierra Leone/Liberia border in view of escalation of fighting in Liberia” (page 2). To ensure effective security for the post-conflict elections, UNAMSIL extended its deployment to an additional 39 locations. UNAMISL was committed to provide a secure environment for the elections and intended to deploy to additional areas during the polling period.⁹¹

The Mission played very important role in the elections. “UNAMSIL temporarily redeployed 11,000 troops to some 200 high-risk areas throughout the country, and assisted the Sierra Leone police in deploying 4,400 police personnel as well as mobile armed units to provide security for the elections. In addition, the Mission provided critical logistical support to the National Electoral Commission.”¹⁶³ “At the end of the elections, UNAMSIL troops redeployed to their previous 39 locations and continued to mount robust patrols to deter any possible disturbances.”¹⁵ The overall security situation in the post-election period remained relatively stable.

“In its resolution 1436 (2002) of 24 September 2002, the Security Council urged the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to complete, within eight months, the first and second phases of the Mission’s drawdown plan” (S/2002/1417, December 24, 2002, page 1). The plan included reductions in troop strength from 17,500 to 13,000 by May 31, 2003.

Phase one of the drawdown plan saw the repatriation of 600 troops from the Nigerian and Bangladeshi contingents by November 8, 2002. This brought the Mission’s troop strength down from the authorized ceiling of 17,500 to 16,900 personnel (S/2002/1417, December 24, 2002).

1. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2002/679, June 19, 2002, p. 2.

2003

Full Implementation

According to Secretary General’s report on UNAMSIL, “The implementation of phase 2 started in December 2002 and was completed by 31 May 2003. Under this phase, a total of 3,826 troops, consisting of the Pakistani artillery unit, the Ghanaian sector 3 headquarters staff, the Kenyan sector 2 headquarters staff, the Bangladeshi logistics battalion, some elements of the Bangladesh signals battalion, a Nigerian battalion, the Guinean battalion, and the Ghanaian level 2 hospital, were withdrawn from the Mission. The Mission’s troop strength was thus reduced from 16,900 to the current level of 13,074 personnel.”¹⁶⁴

An accelerated drawdown plan would see all UNAMSIL troops leaving Sierra Leone by June 2004.

1. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2003/663, June 23, 2003, p. 7.

2004

Full Implementation

“In its resolution 1537 (2004) of 30 March 2004, the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) for an additional period of six months, until 30 September 2004. In the same resolution, the Council approved my recommendation that a residual UNAMSIL presence remain in Sierra Leone, for an initial period of six months from 1 January 2005, and requested me to proceed with the necessary planning to ensure a seamless transition from the current configuration of UNAMSIL to its residual presence” (S/2004/724, September 9, 2004, page 1).

The withdrawal plan was on track. “As planned, by the end of December, the strength of the Mission will be reduced to fewer than 5,000 troops, of which some 1,500 military personnel will be retained for up to two months to provide logistical support and a seamless transition to the Mission’s residual presence. By the end of February 2005, it is expected that the force strength will be 3,250 troops (including 66 staff officers) and 141 United Nations military observers.” (S/2004/724, September 9, 2004, page 3).

2005

Full Implementation

“By its resolution 1610 (2005) of 30 June 2005, the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) for a final period of six months, until 31 December 2005” (S/2005/777, December 12, 2005, page 1). As of December1, 2005, the Mission’s strength stood at 1,160 military personnel (S/2005/777, December 12, 2005). The mission completed its mandate on 31 December 2005.

2006

Full Implementation

The transition from the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) was well planned and carried out without major obstacles.¹⁶⁵

1. “Secretary General’s Report on UNAMSIL,” S/2006/269, April 28, 2006.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

As provided for in the Lomé Agreement, there was a new six-point mandate for ECOMOG operations in Sierra Leone, set forth by the Federal Government of Nigeria on July 8, 1999. The six points of the mandate are: reconstruction; disarmament; demobilization; integration of the citizenry; training of the Sierra Leonean Armed Forces; and a provision of security for VIPs in the post- war country.¹⁵³

However, ECOMOG troops were withdrawn from Sierra Leone in September 1999.¹⁵⁴ The first batch of 498 Nigerian troops was withdrawn on September 2, 1999.¹⁵⁵

The West African Peacekeeping Force (ECOMOG) in Sierra Leone stopped the withdrawal of troops following renewed tensions between the former military junta leader, Johnny Paul Koroma, and rebel leader, Foday Sankoh. “A senior ECOMOG official said in Freetown on Saturday that they suspended the pullout of Nigerian forces, the backbone of the peacekeepers, following an appeal by Sierra Leone’s President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and the United Nations. Some 2,000 Nigerian troops have already left the country.”¹⁵⁶

2000

Intermediate Implementation

On January 13, 2000, the Foreign Secretary of Nigeria wrote a letter to the Secretary General of the UN offering to suspend the withdrawal of Nigerian troops that were part of ECOMOG for 90 days. To prevent a potential security vacuum, however, it was agreed that two Nigerian infantry battalions and one tank company would be incorporated for 90 days (S/2000/186, March 7, 2000).

ECOWAS played an important role facilitating the peace process, especially related to security issues.

On May 9, 2000, ECOWAS leaders agreed to consider re-deploying the West African Intervention Force, (ECOMOG), to Sierra Leone. “They also nominated Liberian President, Charles Taylor, to negotiate the release of hundreds of UN peacekeepers held hostage in Sierra Leone. The leaders warned in a statement that they would use military force to stop any attempt to grab power undemocratically in Sierra Leone.”¹⁶⁶ On May 12, 2000, the Organization of African Union supported the ECOWAS resolution on Sierra Leone.¹⁶⁷

In May 2000, ECOWAS leaders endorsed the deployment of 3,000 additional troops to Sierra Leone to help shore up the faltering peace process. The deployment was intended to reinforce the 11,000 UNAMSIL troops supervising the DDR process under the Lomé agreement.¹⁶⁸

Efforts to mediate a ceasefire between the RUF and the Sierra Leone Government were not effective due to Liberian support to the RUF. In order to protect the border areas, ECOWAS deployed an interposition force of 1,796 troops. The troops were situated along the Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea borders. “The proposed mandate of the force would include monitoring the border areas; neutralizing irregular armed groups; facilitating the movement of persons, goods and services; ensuring the security of refugees and displace persons; and creating a conducive environment for humanitarian assistance” (S/2001/228, March 14, 2001, page 4). ECOWAS continuously tried to revamp the role of UNAMSIL.

1. “Sierra Leone; ECOWAS Leaders May Re-deploy ECOMOG to S/Leone,” Africa News, May 10, 2000.
2. “Sierra Leone; OAU Supports ECOWAS Resolutions On Sierra Leone,” Africa News, May 13, 2000.
3. “Sierra Leone; ECOWAS To Send Troops To Sierra Leone,” Africa News, May 29, 2000.

2001

Full Implementation

Germany would reportedly contribute 250,000 dollars in logistical support for the deployment of an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) military force along Guinea’s volatile border with Sierra Leone and Liberia.¹⁶⁹

ECOWAS continued its presence and verification role in Sierra Leone as mandated in the Lomé Agreement.

1. “Sierra Leone: Germany to give 250,000 dollars in support for ECOWAS deployment,” BBC Monitoring Africa — Political, February 6, 2001.

2002

Full Implementation

The date ECOWAS ended ECOMOG activities in Sierra Leone is not clear. Nevertheless, ECOWAS appointed a 30-member delegation to monitor Sierra Leone’s May 14, 2002 parliamentary and presidential elections. Following the post-conflict elections, the regional peacekeeping force can be coded as ended or withdrawn.

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.