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Implementation of the Colombia Peace Accord: A Comprehensive Report after Two Years

Executive Summary

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Acronyms and Abbreviations¹

ANT	National Land Agency
ANTV	National Television Authority
APC	Presidential Agency for International Cooperation of Colombia
ARN	Reincorporation and Normalization Agency
ART	Territorial Renewal Agency
CEPDIPO	Center for Political Thinking and Dialogue
CEV	Truth, Coexistence, and Non-Recurrence Commission
CIV	International Verification Component
CNGS	National Commission on Security Guarantees
CNPRC	National Council for Peace, Reconciliation and Coexistence
CNR	National Reincorporation Council
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreements
CSIVI	Commission for Monitoring, Promoting and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement
DNP	National Planning Department
ELN	National Liberation Army
ETCR	Territorial Training and Reincorporation Spaces
FARC	Common Alternative Revolutionary Force
FCP	Colombia in Peace Fund
GAO	Organized Armed Groups
GAOR	Residual Organized Armed Groups
ITPS	Tripartite Protection and Security Mechanism
JAC	Community Action Councils
JEP	Special Jurisdiction for Peace
MADS	Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development
MEE	Special Electoral Mission
MMV	Monitoring and Verification Mechanism
MOE	Electoral Observation Mechanism
NPR	Transitional Local Points for Normalization
 OCDH	Civil Organizations for Humanitarian Landmine Removal
PAI	Immediate Action Plan
PAO	Timely Action Plan
PAM	Peace Accords Matrix
PAP	Broad Participatory Process
PAPCOC	Permanent Action Plan against Criminal Organizations
PATR	Action Plan for Regional Transformation
PDET	Development Plans with a Territorial Focus
PISDA	Comprehensive Community Plans for Substitution and Alternative Development
PMI	Framework Plan for Implementation

¹ This report presents the Spanish version of all acronyms.

PND	National Development Plan
PNIS	National Comprehensive Program for the Substitution of Crops Used for Illicit Purposes
SAT	Early Warning System
SISEP	Comprehensive Security System of the Exercise of Politics
SIIPO	Comprehensive Information System for Post-Conflict
UARIV	Unit for the Attention and Comprehensive Reparation of Victims / Victims Unit
UBICAR	Police Basic Units
UBPD	Special Unit for the Search for Persons Deemed as Missing in the context of and due to the armed conflict
UEI	Special Investigation Unit
UIAF	Financial Information and Analysis Unit
UN	United Nations
UNGASS	Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on the World Drug Problem
UNIPEP	Police Unit for Peacebuilding
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNP	National Protection Unit
URIEL	Immediate Reception Unit for Electoral Transparency
URT	Land Restitution Unit
ZEI	Strategic Zones for Intervention
ZOMAC	Areas Most Affected by the Armed Conflict
ZRC	Campesino Reserve Zone
ZVTN	Transitional Local Zones for Normalization, or cantonment zones

Introduction

Implementation continues to progress in the two years since the signing of the Colombian Final Accord. More than two thirds of the commitments in the accord have been initiated, and more than one-third have been completed or have achieved substantial progress. This level of implementation at the two-year mark is comparable to other comprehensive peace agreements analyzed by the Kroc Institute in its Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) database. Considering the complexities and challenges of the Colombia process, and the 15-year official timeline for implementation, progress to date has been significant.

Since President Duque and his government took office in August 2018, the implementation process has continued. The rate of progress slowed slightly in the first months of the new administration, but this is normal as a new administration takes office and leadership in the responsible agencies changes hands. The government has introduced a new political and conceptual framework centered on equity, stabilization and legality rather than the peace agreement, but its policies incorporated most of the agreement's commitments. The norms, institutions and programs created from the accord have been maintained. The positive momentum of the implementation process has continued, and moving forward should be focused on the territories. This means strengthening the comprehensive institutional presence of the state, and improving citizen participation in political, social and economic processes while anchoring democratic governance and responsibility for development locally.

It is important to firmly respect the commitments reached in a peace agreement. However, implementation must be flexible and open to new agreements that enhance the former's transformative capacity. Societies change throughout the implementation of the peace agreement, which is by definition a generational process. For this reason, mechanisms for monitoring implementation and dispute resolution are extremely relevant. It is important that needed adjustments to the implementation process arise from broad political consensus among the various social, political, and economic forces in the country, without excluding key actors in the process—in particular the FARC, the communities, and the victims. The case of Northern Ireland reveals how the Good Friday Agreement opened the doors to further dialogue after the signed peace agreement, with the political parties continuing to discuss how implementation could progress, and even signing new agreements to better resolve new dilemmas. Like Northern Ireland, Colombia could use the Final Accord to continue much needed political dialogue while adjusting the process as required to ensure that the desired transformative results are achieved.

As of November 2018, 68% of the commitments in the Final Agreement are in the process of being implemented.² Just over a third of these commitments have reached advanced levels of implementation—that is, they have been fully implemented (23%) or are expected to be fully implemented within the time stipulated by the Agreement (12%). Thirty-three percent have advanced minimally—measures have been initiated, but because of sequencing factors or limited progress to date completion of the commitments is not assured yet. Thirty-two percent of the commitments have not been initiated—the result of delays or obstacles such as the non-approval of special electoral districts for victims, or because certain commitments are tied to the completion of prior steps. The Truth Commission is scheduled to deliver a report in 2021, for example, but this can only be achieved after it completes other steps such as compiling and processing public testimonies from across society.

The main achievements in the implementation process have been the end of the armed conflict between the Government and FARC-EP and the transformation of the guerrilla group into a democratic party that participates in the country's political life. Comparative studies of peace processes show that passing the two-year mark without the resumption of armed conflict is an important milestone that augurs well for the prospects of ultimate success. Despite the problems that exist with some FARC-EP dissidents, the persistence of illegal armed actors such as the ELN and criminal organizations associated with drug trafficking, and the continued violence against human rights defenders, it is important to remember the significance of the peace agreement in ending the armed conflict and that FARC today is a democratic political actor pursuing its goals through peaceful and democratic means.

Another important area of progress is the regular functioning of the various instruments of verification, monitoring, conflict resolution, and international accompaniment. Compared to other peace processes, these mechanisms in Colombia have very high levels of implementation. Since the start of the process, the Government and the Congress have developed a wide set of normative, political, and programmatic measures that have created an institutional framework that grants legal stability to the central mechanisms needed for implementation. This institutional and normative architecture is a major accomplishment that will allow continuous progress of implementation on many fronts.

It is important to consolidate these advances, address the pending regulatory issues, and not back down. The government of President Duque can take advantage of these advances to focus on the implementation of policies and programs focused on improving the quality of life of Colombians and on guaranteeing their rights. It is an opportunity for the country. As recalled by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, "most of the commitments assumed by the State in the Agreement are

² The quantitative data in this report is dated November 30, 2018, two years after the implementation of the Final Accord. The qualitative analysis, and some important factual elements, are updated with a cut-off date of March 14, 2019.

part of the human rights agenda that has been outlined in many of the treaties, mechanisms, recommendations, and guidelines of the United Nations and the inter-American human rights system of which Colombia is a part.”³

Significant challenges and areas of concern also exist. One of the most serious is the lack of adequate security guarantees for social leaders, human rights defenders and FARC-EP ex-combatants and their families in the territories. Communities in danger of attack from illegal armed actors and criminal gangs do not have effective protection. The Kroc Institute joins with many other observers in expressing concern about the gravity of the humanitarian situation in rural areas prioritized for implementation. Mounting a comprehensive response to these security threats will require building a consensus on strategies for protection. Priorities include mechanisms of community policing and collective protection, the National Political Pact to eliminate violence from politics, the Comprehensive Security System for the Exercise of Politics, and more effective use of mechanisms for prevention, including the Early Warning System of the Ombudsman’s Office and community-based collective mechanisms for protection and prevention.

A comprehensive response should also focus on structural prevention mechanisms. The implementation of many commitments in the Agreement—such as the measures for the access and use of land, the PDETs, the national plans for the provision of rural public goods and services, the voluntary substitution of crops for illicit use, the prevention of drug consumption in Colombia, or the mechanisms of access to justice and transitional justice—help guarantee an effective integral presence of the State in the territories, a presence that complements reactive security responses.

Peace implementation processes are inherently fragile and challenging because their starting point is political polarization and social distrust, and resistance to the changes that peace can bring. A peace agreement does not end political disagreements, or quickly eliminate all armed violence. In cases like Nicaragua, Nepal, Northern Ireland and El Salvador, violence continued in territories previously affected by the conflict, as we have also seen recently in Colombia with the murders of social leaders. Nonetheless the Colombian process has overcome many obstacles, and this resilience should continue to pave the way for a more transformative and quality peace. Going forward, implementation should focus on improving the quality of life of Colombians, particularly those who suffered most from the armed conflict, who live in historically marginalized regions, and who directly experience post-accord complexities and difficulties.

Signs of the resilience of the peace process are the following:

1. To date, the various institutions, agencies, and programs that drive implementation continue to function. The Commission for Monitoring,

³ United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Colombia" (A / HRC / 40/3 / Add.3, February 4 of 2019), 3.

Promoting, and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement (CSIVI), the National Reincorporation Council (CNR), the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), the Truth, Coexistence, and Non-Recurrence Commission (CEV), Special Unit for the Search for Persons Deemed as Missing in the context of and due to the armed conflict (UBPD), the National Land Agency (ANT), the Territorial Renewal Agency (ART), the Police Unit for Peacebuilding (UNIPEP), the Elite Police Corps, the Special Investigation Unit (UEI), the National Comprehensive Program for the Substitution of Crops Used for Illicit Purposes (PNIS), and the Tripartite Protection and Security Mechanism (ITPS), among others, are in operation. It is important to keep these institutions and programs fully functioning, particularly, the Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Recurrence (SIVJRNR) because without it, the guarantee of victims' rights will be at risk. The JEP, for example, represents an unprecedented opportunity in Colombia and internationally to prosecute crimes committed during the armed conflict, effectively protect the rights of victims, and address the differentiated impact of violence on women, children, youth, and ethnic peoples. Guaranteeing the autonomy and independence of these mechanisms is essential to strengthening the resilience and transformative capacity of the peace process.

2. Faced with disagreements and difficulties, Government and FARC political actors have made pragmatic decisions that sustain the implementation process, in some cases innovating in ways not foreseen in the peace agreement. An example of this is the emergence of the Territorial Spaces for Training and Reincorporation (ETCR), which were established by the parties in the framework of the CSIVI to train ex-combatants for reincorporation into civilian life and foster their ability to prepare livelihood projects and meet the technical training needs of nearby communities.⁴ Another example of productive cooperation has been the continuing tripartite security and protection model combining the National Police, UN officials and FARC-EP ex-combatants.
3. International accompaniment has remained strong. This is reflected in the International Verification Component (CIV), the UN Political Mission, the political and technical accompaniment of several donor and allied countries of Colombia, including the European Union Special Envoy, and visits to the country by Heads of State and Pope Francis. Political, technical, and economic assistance

⁴ Presidency of the Republic. Decrees 1274 of 2017 and Decree 2026 of 2017.

<http://es.presidencia.gov.co/normativa/normativa/DECRETO%201274%20DEL%2028%20DE%20JULIO%20DE%202017.pdf>

<http://es.presidencia.gov.co/normativa/normativa/DECRETO%202026%20DEL%2004%20DE%20DICIEMBRE%202017.pdf>

have been essential to sustaining the momentum for peace brought about by the final agreement.

4. At the local level, processes of self-organization and self-management for peace have emerged. In the face of complexities or delays in implementation, grass roots initiatives stemming from local leadership and alliances are accompanying the role of the state and generating initiatives that solve concrete problems, and in some cases adapt the process to local interests. An example of this is the PDET document developed in Chocó, which was renamed PDETE – by its acronym in Spanish, which stands for Development Plan with a Territorial Ethnic Focus. Another example is the Alternative Rural Schools (ERA) in which training and technical assistance are provided, among other things, to ex-combatants and *campesino* communities with the purpose of generating rural development in areas affected by the armed conflict.⁵ Such “positive deviations” show that peace implementation does not depend on the government in Bogota to solve all problems. Peace also emerges from the commitment, creativity and capacity for innovation of all Colombians.⁶
5. Interesting spaces for dialogue have emerged at the national and territorial levels. An example is the political dialogue—sometimes overshadowed by media noise and polarization—about how to advance in a more strategic and effective way in the fight against corruption. Also important are the many dialogues on how to protect social leaders in the country. Today these two challenges are considered priorities in the national political agenda, made visible by the pressure of social engagement and mobilization. In the territories, improbable dialogues between political opponents are developing in the departments of Cesar and Meta. Territorial civil society platforms are attempting to shape state intervention and public investment in Montes de María and Magdalena Medio. Collaborations between public authorities, ex-combatants, and local and international allies have advanced projects such as a hydro-electric plant at the Miravalle ETCR to provide clean electricity to the territory.⁷

⁵ The Alternative Rural Schools (ERA) are productive and educational spaces in which ex-combatants and campesino communities meet and receive training and technical assistance, as well as being granted access to the capital, and promote collaborative business alliances (ACC) to help the participants sell their products in cooperation with allies such as UNARTHONE FUTURE, PNUD, ILLY, PMA, FAO, Universidad del Valle, Javeriana University, Unibam, RNA, Confiar, Sacha Colombia, and Universidad de los Llanos. The ERA accounts are collaborative networks that include actors from all sectors of society, with the aim of generating economic opportunities and rural development in areas affected by the armed conflict.

⁶ Positive deviation is an approach to social change and human behavior based on community observation. There are people and communities that thanks to unexpected behaviors of an innovative and disruptive nature are able to face existing problems and find positive solutions. Positive deviation shows viable paths not previously conceived that help solve social problems.

⁷ "The clean energy that the ex-combatants brought to Miravalle" El Espectador, November 28, 2018, <https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/medio-ambiente/la-energia-limpia-que-los-excombatientes-carried-miravalle-article-826191>

These examples show that the implementation of the peace accord in Colombia has been a dynamic and adaptive process that, while progressing in compliance with the agreement, has been flexible enough to adapt and proactively address existing difficulties and unforeseen problems that emerge.

Continuous progress in the implementation process will depend on strong collaboration between the State and society, as well as the level of commitment to the principles of equity, stabilization, and lawfulness highlighted by the new Government. The priorities are to strengthen security and the integral presence of the State, promote citizen participation in both political and social processes, promote rural reform and the provision of public goods and services, and advance the objectives and goals outlined in the National Development Plan 2018–2022. These actions will improve the legitimacy of the State and contribute to the construction of a stable and quality peace anchored in stronger democratic governance with more equitable access to opportunities for development.

An Overview of the State of Implementation of the Colombia Peace Agreement

Implementation of the Colombian Comprehensive Peace Accord continues to advance. As of November 30, 2018, of the 578 stipulations followed by the Barometer Initiative, implementation activity is underway in 391 stipulations (68%). Two thirds of the commitments that were agreed in the final accord are in the process of being implemented or have been completed.

During the first two years of implementation, the main achievements include the ceasefire and laying down of arms, the transformation of the FARC-EP into a political party, the adoption of legal measures needed for implementation, and the creation of mechanisms to monitor and verify the implementation of the agreement. These advances have demonstrated commitment on the part of the FARC and the state to the peace process, in addition to showing the capacity of both parties to work together in the development of mechanisms for the implementation of the agreement.

According to the Kroc Institute's research, the first 24 months of implementation can be summarized by the following observations:

- Each month since December 2016, the number of stipulations that have advanced from zero implementation to the categories of minimum, intermediate, and complete implementation has increased.
- The number of stipulations in various stages of implementation increased from 83 (14%) in December 2016 to 391 (68%) in November 2018.
- The percentage of stipulations that have been fully implemented has increased from 4% in December 2016 to 23% in November 2018.

As shown in Figure 1, from December 2016 to November 30, 2018, there has been significant implementation activity. This figure shows the universe of stipulations which have reached some level of progress in implementation, accumulated month by month. The stipulations that have reached a minimum level of implementation are shown by the yellow area; intermediate is shown in light blue and stipulations, which have been completed, are shown in dark blue.

The number of commitments that have been completed has grown almost every month since the beginning of implementation. The most implementation activity is seen in the minimum level. This indicates that many commitments have been started. This reflects the laying of the legal foundations and the creation of public policies, plans, and programs stipulated in the final agreement.

Although the initial steps are critical, all the plans and programs envisioned in the agreement require budgets, staff, and operations in the territories to reach intermediate and complete levels of implementation. In the coming years, it is necessary to increase the number of stipulations that are at intermediate or complete levels.

Figure 1. Summary of monthly implementation status





Figure 2 presents the status of the implementation as of November 2018. Twenty-three percent (23%) of the commitments have been fully implemented, 12% have an intermediate implementation level, and 33% have been minimally implemented. In summary, 68% of all commitments in the accord are in some stage of implementation.

Figure 2. Implementation status of the 578 stipulations (November 2018)



Since the publication of the second Kroc Institute report, the most significant progress has been in the number of commitments that have been initiated. This is shown by

Figure 3. In May of 2018, 39% of the commitments in the Colombian final accord had not been initiated, whereas in November 2018, 32% of the commitments remain to be implemented. Of these not initiated stipulations, it is important to highlight that, according to the Framework Plan for Implementation, and due to implementation sequencing, a subgroup of these commitments that have not been initiated (approximately 5%) are scheduled to begin in 2019 onward.⁸

Figure 3. Status of implementation May 2018 vs. November 2018





Figure 4 shows the monthly implementation progress in a different way. The blue line represents the number of commitments which have not been initiated and the orange line represents the commitments that are completed or in progress. The blue line decreases over time, which demonstrates that the number of commitments remaining to be initiated gets smaller each month. Conversely, the orange line grows each month, showing continued progress in implementation. Currently the number of commitments that are at some level of implementation (68%) is double the number of commitments that have not been initiated (32%). That is, two thirds of the commitments are in the process of being implemented or have been fully implemented.


⁸ In order to analyze which of non-initiated stipulations should initiate in 2019 or after, the Kroc Institute team carried out a preliminary comparison between the 225 stipulations that were not initiated as of May 31, 2018 (39%) and the indicators of the Framework Plan for Implementation (PMI). The categorization of these stipulations was based strictly on the text of the final agreement and the PMI (year start – year end).

Figure 4. Stipulations in the process of being implemented vs. commitments not initiated, month by month



As was observed in the Kroc Institute’s second report, there is notable variation in implementation across the six major points of the Colombian final accord. Since December 2016, the greatest amount of progress has occurred in point three (End of Conflict) and in point six (Implementation, Verification and Public Endorsement). The lowest levels of full implementation are seen in point one (Comprehensive Rural Reform) and point four (Illicit Use Crops). The points with the lowest levels of initiation of commitments are point two (Political Participation) and point 5 (Victims).

Figure 5. Implementation overview of six points in the Colombian final accord



Conclusion

All peace agreements face a similar challenge: the implementation of that which has been agreed upon after years of negotiation must be able to adjust proactively to new conditions and emerging challenges. Some of the challenges may present opportunities to increase legitimacy and consensus around the agreement and the peace process. Others may present difficulties, pressures, or unforeseen circumstances that can hinder implementation and must be resolved with new instruments and strategies. Comparative analysis of the implementation of peace agreements around the world shows that higher levels of implementation have a positive correlation with the general improvement of indicators of social welfare, public and private investment, and peaceful stability. However, comparative experience also shows that implementation is not an easy process, and that it is necessary to persist and navigate the complexities that arise.

The dilemma when obstacles arise is not a binary choice between implementing or tearing up the agreement. Rather, the parties to the agreement must be open to negotiation and adjustment. It is important to respect the text and the spirit of the original political agreement and commit to implementing its provisions. But we must also be open to opportunities for creating new political agreements that can increase consensus around the reforms that must be achieved to sustain and take advantage of the transformative power of peace.

An example of this is the government's new policy framework of equity, entrepreneurship, stabilization, and legality released in the National Development Plan and other policy frameworks. The new emphasis on stabilization, legality and development does not use the language of peace, but it is compatible with many of the provisions of the peace accord and can be realized through a greater commitment to its implementation. The National Development Plan 2018-2022 will be a major public policy priority over the next four years, but this should not be seen as diversion from the priorities of the peace agreement. On the contrary, implementation of the peace agreement will be a key strategy to help the government achieve many of its development priorities while yielding the benefits of social peace for all Colombians. Building upon what already exists generates a unique opportunity for the Duque administration to show quick results that benefits people.

The analysis in this report reveals that the peace process has been very resilient to date, overcoming difficulties, tensions and crises with some agility. None of the disputes and obstacles to date have significantly slowed or reversed the trajectory of implementation or the commitment of the parties. This resilience is illustrated in the continued desire of the Government of Colombia and FARC to resolve implementation problems. It is also reflected in the leadership of local communities most affected by the armed conflict and FARC ex-combatants to assume responsibility in the construction of peace.

The resilience of the process is threatened, however, by the declining security conditions in some regions of the country. Preventing the murders of social leaders is a critical priority. These crimes have a corrosive effect at the local level and erode confidence in the government. Each murder increases civilian uncertainty about the possibility of sustaining peace and the success of the peace agreement. These crimes also directly hinder the implementation of the territorial provisions of the accord, and jeopardize the quality of the peace created. To counter these threats, the state must coordinate and strengthen implementation of the full range of agreed security and protection measures, especially at the local level.

The territorial dimensions of the process are necessary to fulfill the promise of peace, and to begin concretely transforming and improving the quality of life at the local level. An effective and integral implementation in the territories would increase the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of historically marginalized citizens who reside there. Legitimacy can also be gained if the state strengthens its role as an authority against illegal actors while protecting and promoting human rights. The essential goal is to help citizens recognize the state as the sole legitimate authority, taking that status away from violent groups. To increase its legitimacy, the state must be able to provide public goods and services effectively and equitably, and it must guarantee citizens the democratic right to participate politically and voice their grievances.

Another important priority is fulfilling the state's commitment to families that are voluntarily substituting their coca-leaf crops as part of the fight against drug trafficking. Failure to implement this commitment will create negative perceptions at the territorial level and undermine the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of local citizens, allowing illegal actors to continue to assert authority and generate insecurity. More support is needed for voluntary substitution efforts and the comprehensive fight against drug trafficking outlined in the accord.

Advancing the socio-economic reincorporation of ex-combatants is another catalytic element that fosters stability in peace processes. Delays in the process of long-term reincorporation can generate dissatisfaction and distrust among ex-FARC-EP fighters. Allocating sufficient resources to the reincorporation of former guerrillas into society will help to ensure the rejection of violence as a political instrument.

A major challenge for the coming months will be advancing and protecting the transitional justice mechanisms and their integrity, placing victims at the center of the peacebuilding process. Transitional justice will never be able to attain all the truth, all the justice and all the necessary forms of reparation that are necessary to guarantee the end of all violence. However, transitional justice has the potential to break the vicious cycles of violence that lead to war and create virtuous cycles of reconciliation that create the foundations for peace. The process is contentious and tense, as has been the case in many peace and justice processes in the world. The Colombian model of transitional justice creates a comprehensive and conditioned justice system that can make

significant progress in achieving a balance between peace and justice, based on truth, reparations, and guarantees of non-repetition. It is important to support the transitional justice mechanisms and generate narratives that help create a better understanding of the comprehensive system and its innovations. If the transitional justice system fails, it could derail the peace process and lead to increased levels of violence, instability, and illegality throughout the country.

As the new government is consolidated and the National Development Plan is approved and becomes operational, it should become possible to accelerate the pace of implementation and achieve significant advances toward a transformative peace based on greater equity, stability and legality. This will be a peace based not only on the number of laws passed, institutions created, or programs implemented, but also on concrete improvements in the quality of life for the citizens of Colombia. Going forward, peace must be experienced through the effective delivery of goods and services—through genuine guarantees of security, justice and community protection, the formalization of land and property titles, and investments in rural development that respond to the needs of the people as expressed in the PDETs and other planning instruments.

This transformative peace means greater opportunities for economic development for all citizens, especially in the territories among previously neglected or marginalized communities: women, ethnic groups, and the *campesinos*, those most affected by criminality, illicit economies, and violence. This is peace, not as an intellectual or philosophical concept, but as the positive fulfillment of the promise for a better life and greater social and economic opportunity for all Colombians, and the achievement of human rights in all its dimensions.