Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement
Date Signed: 9 January, 2005
Accord Type: Comprehensive Peace Agreement
Country: Sudan
72.87Implementation Score after 7 years
Provisions in this Accord
Cease Fire
2005
With the signing of the CPA in January 2005, the ceasefire agreement of December 2004 came into effect. In the agreement, parties agreed to international monitoring and verification of the ceasefire which included the redeployment of armed forces (from respective parties) and the monitoring of some 39,000 military personnel deployed under the joint/integrated units. The ceasefire agreement gave the UN a prominent role to play the verification and monitoring of the ceasefire by calling for the active participation of the United Nations in a number of bodies that were to be created to assist in the implementation of the Agreement. These included a Ceasefire Political Commission, a Ceasefire Joint Military Committee, Area Joint Military Committees and numerous joint military teams to be deployed throughout the area of operations.1
The United Nations Missions in the Sudan (UNMIS) was established on 24 March 2005 and the ceasefire monitoring and verification started as soon as the peacekeepers were deployed on the ground on 28 April 2005.2
The Ceasefire Political Commission, which had a mandate to supervise, monitor and oversee the implementation of the agreement as well as providing a political forum for a dialogue between parties and international community was established on 30 August 2005. Similarly, the government and SPLM started to nominate officers to form the Joint Integrated Units, the military unit of the future Sudanese National Armed Force should South Sudan prefer unity over secession in a referendum.3 It is not clear when other commissions/committees were established that were part of the ceasefire agreement. Nevertheless, there were news reports that the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee as well as Area Joint Military Committees were working.4 Nevertheless, the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee was the only committee/commission that met regularly in 2005.5 A Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC) answerable to the Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC) was established in 2005 and had its first meeting at the newly established Joint Monitoring and Coordination Office (JMCO) at the UN Compound in Juba on 8 May 2005.6 Formation of the Area Joint Military Committee (AJMC) was delayed until September. The first AJMC was held in the Nuba Mountains Area on 20 September 2005.7 The formation of the Joint Military Teams (JMTs), the lowest operating units of the Ceasefire Military Mechanism, was delayed. Also, due to the delay in the Joint Defense Board (JDB) the Joint Integrated Units were not formed in 2005.8 The Ceasefire Political Commission was established on 27 August 2005 by presidential decree and its membership announced on 1 November 2005.9
The ceasefire provision of the accord requires both sides to incorporate and reintegrate other armed groups. In this connection, the president of the government of Southern Sudan, Salva Kiir and leaders of other armed groups were negotiating on their participation in southern state governments.10 The ceasefire agreement requires both sides to expedite the process of incorporation and reintegration of armed groups allied to either side. The process continued in 2005.
Both parties have imposed restrictions on UNMO movement in Abyei in 2005.11 This was the violation of the ceasefire agreement even though no hostility was reported between the Sudan Armed Force (SPF) and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).
- “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/57), January 31, 2005.
- “UNMIS Background,” UNMIS, accessed on January 9, 2012, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/background.shtml.
- “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/579), September 12, 2005.
- “Only Political Settlement Can Resolve Darfur Conflict, Secretary-General Tells Constitutional Review Commission in Sudan,” U. S. Fed News, May 31, 2005; “UN: Security Council extends UN mission in Sudan until 24 March 2006, unanimously adopting resolution 1627 (2005),” M2 Presswire, September 23, 2005.
- “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/160), March 14, 2006.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
- “U.N. Secretary General’s Report on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/82), December 21, 2005.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA, 2009.”
2006
The First Vice President of Sudan Salva Kiir and the leader of the South Sudan Defense Forces, Major General Paullino Matip, signed the “Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the South Sudan Defense Forces” on 8 January 2006. Most former SSDF commanders had officially declared their allegiance to SPLA, while a minority had decided to be loyal to the SAF. This was part of the ceasefire provisions. The ceasefire provisions also required incorporation of other armed groups into the regular forces of either of the parties or their reintegration into civil service or society to be completed by 9 January 2006. This deadline was not met and therefore, Ceasefire Joint Military Committee extended the deadline until 9 March 2006. The Ceasefire Political Commission met for the first time on 23 February 2006.1
The violence perpetrated by the Ugandan rebel group Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) remained a concern. Similarly, the Upper Nile saw numerous clashes involving other armed groups since the end of 2005.2 A fear of resumption of conflict was expected with the withdrawal of SPLM from East Sudan, as mandated by the ceasefire provisions.3 According to the Ceasefire agreement, the SPLM was said to redeploy its troops in Eastern Sudan to south Sudan. The redeployment took place in observation and monitoring of the UN mission in East Sudan. The UN had deployed 10,000 troops to observe the commitment of the government and the SPLM.4 The UNMIS verified the redeployment of 5,672 troops out of a declared strength of 8,763. The troops unaccounted were considered to have abandoned the SPLA.5 The redeployment of SAF was on schedule. According to the same report, the security mechanisms such as Ceasefire Joint Military Committee and the Area Joint Military Committees were functioning as intended.
In 2006, there were three major clashes reported. In March an unarmed convoy north of Abyei was ambushed, and in August a clash between off-duty SPLA and SFA officers in the Rubkona of Unity State left eight civilians and three soldiers dead. Similarly, heavy fighting between elements of the SFA and SPLA took place in Malakal from 27 to 30 November that left at least 150 people dead, including civilians.6 After the incident, parties agreed to a new ceasefire, a joint investigation was launched and both sides withdrew forces. This suggests the fragile situation on the ground.7
The peace process continued amidst repeated violation of ceasefire provision of the accord. Parties supported integrating other armed groups into existing military structures and to create functioning JIUs. The implementation of the formation of Joint Integrated Unites provision of ceasefire was 18 months behind the schedule. The delay was also partly contributed by the lack of logistical support.8 Similarly, the Ceasefire Political Commission proved unable to solve important issues such as restrictions imposed on UNMIS freedom of movement north of Abyei town and the status of disputed redeployment assembly areas.9
In October and December 2006, movement restrictions imposed on UNMO movement in Abyei in Abyei were lifted temporarily.10
- “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/160), March 14, 2006.
- Ibid.
- “Roundup: Conflict predicted after SPLM troops pullout from east Sudan,” Xinhua General News Service, January 10, 2006.
- “UN to withdraw its mission from Eastern Sudan,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, July 6, 2006.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/728), September 12, 2006.
- “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/42), January 25, 2007.
- Johan Brosché, Sharing Power — Enabling Peace? Evaluating Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005, (Uppsala University: Uppsala, 2009), http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/18/18210_Sharing_Power.pdf, 29.
- “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/42), January 25, 2007.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/728), September 12, 2006.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
2007
The security situation remained under control as no heavy fighting took place to disrupt the holding of the ceasefire agreement. On 22 and 23 December, violent clashes erupted in areas of Meiram, Al Girinti and Al Jurf between Misseriya tribe and SPLA units but the tension was diffused once a meeting between Misseriya leaders and the Secretary General of SPLM met on 24 December.1 Some 3,600 SAF troops remained in southern Sudan. The troops were said required to secure oil fields until the deployments of JIUs, which the SPLA disputed.2 Some progress was made in terms of the formation of JIUs. The SPLA redeployment was contingent upon the establishment of the JIUs, which reached 77% (30,112) of total anticipated strength of 39,000 troops.3 However, there were some provisions of the ceasefire agreement that were not implemented on time. The redeployment of the SAF to the north of the 1 January 1956 border between northern and southern Sudan was not completed by 9 July 2007.
In September, the SPLA was accused of not withdrawing its troops from two regions – al-Mujlad and al-Dibab- north of the border.4 Even when the Cease-fire Political Commission had determined that the SPLA should withdraw its forces from these two areas in a one week period of time, the SPLA suggested timeline indicated that the it would start to withdraw its troops by the end of February 2008.5 On issues related to relocation of SAF and SPLA, the Cease-fire Commission set the 9th January 2008 as deadline for relocation of SAF from the south and the SPLA from the Blue Nile and south Kordofan in their respective places.6
While both sides maintained ceasefire amidst some eruptions of violent activities, provisions related to redeployment of troops from both side, the formation of JIUs were delayed. Also, both parties re-imposed restrictions on UNMO movement in Abyei on 28 February 2007.7
- “Reports of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2008/64), January 31, 2008.
- “Reports of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/500), August 20, 2007.
- “Reports of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/213), April 17, 2007.
- “Sudan: Ruling Party Accuses Ex-Southern Rebels of Breaching Cease-Fire Pact,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 29, 2007.
- “Sudan: SPLA Refuses to Withdraw from South Kordofan State Before Feb 2008,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, October 17, 2007.
- “UN envoy urges Sudan’s peace partners to solve pending issues,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, December 8, 2007.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
2008
While all security mechanisms designed to implement ceasefire provisions of the CPA were in place, the levels of trust between the Khartoum and the SPLM remained very low. Tension between the SPLA and the SAF increased along the disputed border.1
In May 2008, the force commander of the UN Mission in Sudan and chairman of the Joint Military Commission to Monitor the Cease-Fire, Lieutenant General Jasper Singh Lidder, confirmed “the complete redeployment of 97.2 percent of the armed forces northward, compared with 11.3 percent of the total of the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA) troops stationed north of the border line.”2
On May 14, clashes between the SPLM and the SAF erupted in Abyei town and lasted for two days. The fighting caused around 90 casualties and destroyed a large part of the town.3 After the clashes, it was reported an estimated 25,000 people fled the town.4 Both sides reached an agreement, Abyei Roadmap, that called for an immediate ceasefire and the removal of other armed groups from Abyei.5 The SPLM was said to be responsible for the attack in Abyei. The SAF accused the SPLM of redeploying 3000 fully armed troops from the east and placing them in the area of Akyec and Majok, around Abyei. The presence of SPLM forces caused the 31st Infantry Brigade to remain in the area.6 An immediate meeting of Ceasefire Political Committee was held after clashes. Nevertheless, the security situation remained fragile, which prompted the UN announcement of suspension of repatriation operations to Abyei region.7
On a more positive note, the SPLA, in collaboration with the Cease-fire Joint Military Committee, organized a four-day workshop in Juba to discuss the implementation of the security arrangements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.8
Along with clashes in Abyei, the ceasefire provisions of the CPA were violated. The CPA prohibits the replenishment of arms, but the government of Sudan made a decision to buy arms without consulting the SPLA.9 At the same time, the government of Sudan confirmed the military build-up in the Southern Kordofan State.10 This violated the ceasefire provision of the CPA.
- “UN Envoy Warns that Peace Between Government And Southern Rebels in Sudan Remains Fragile,” Associated Press Worldstream, February 19, 2008.
- “Sudan: UN Force Chief Says ‘Nearly’ All Government Forces Redeployed,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, March 25, 2008.
- Johan Brosché, Sharing Power — Enabling Peace, 29.
- “Sudan; Faultline Town Deserted After Clashes,” Africa News, May 16, 2008.
- “Sudan; Agreement Reached, Ending Clashes in Disputed Town,” Africa News, May 16, 2008.
- “Sudan: Armed Forces Issue Statement on Abyei,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, May 20, 2008.
- “Sudan: UN Suspends Repatriation Process in Abyei Due To Insecurity,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, May 27, 2008.
- “Sudan’s SPLA Holds Workshop on Implementation of Security Arrangements,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, October 8, 2008.
- “Sudan Army Defends Decision to Buy Arms Without Consulting the Ex-Rebel Movement,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, November 16, 2008.
- “Government Defends Deployment Of More Troops in Central Sudan State,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, December 7, 2008.
2009
According to the CPA implementation update, the security situation in Malakal deteriorated after Major General Gabriel Tang returned to the town on 23 February. Fighting broke out between SPLA and SAF JIU components on 24-26 February that killed at least 50 people.1 After the CJMC’s two emergency sessions on 23 and 26 February, the situation remained stable but tense.2
On issues related to the deployment of the JIUs, both parties were slow in filling their respective quota of troops and in deployment to all eight agreed locations, complaining of logistical problems. If deployed in time with its full capacity, the JIUs could increase stability during the CPA-period, but this mechanism became a liability. As of September 2009, the 8 JIUs locations were occupied by SAF and SPLA. Locations still to be filled with the agreed quota in all locations included: Um-darfa, Menza, Wadal Mahe. Dindiro, Ulu, Gissan, Kurmuk and Taliya. The 109th CJMC meeting was held on 02-03 December 2009 in JUBA.3
- Johan Brosché, Sharing Power — Enabling Peace, 29.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA.”
- Ibid.
2010
In its January 2010 meetings, the CJMC considered the presence of SPLA troops at Ngolongolo (07°40Õ30″N; 27°55Õ30″E) a violation to the CPA. The CJMC tasked Sector II AJMC to take up this issue with the Governor to remove SPLA from the area. They were to be replaced by the police or JIUs if there were any security issues.1 There were some reports of violation of ceasefire. The SAF aircraft was said seen by the Timsha Team Site carrying out aerial bombings on 6, 8 and 9 December. There was no report of casualties but the incident was recorded as a violation of CPA in the 132nd meeting of the CJMC. In the same meeting, the CJMC decided to carry out an investigation of aerial bombing in the Kiir River area.2 The CJMC mechanism remained one of the most important security mechanisms to resolve issues related to ceasefire violations.
Delay in the formation of JIUs led to the delay in the SPLA redeployment from Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile areas.3 As a matter of fact, there was no significant change in the deployment status of JIUs. The JIUs was at 82.6% of the mandated strength of 39,639 troops.4 The update suggests no restrictions on UNMOs movement. Nevertheless, various provision of ceasefire accord were either not implemented in timely manner or never implemented, or violated.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, January 2010.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2010.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, January 2010.
- The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2010.
2011
Between 9 and 15 January 2011, a referendum took place in South Sudan. Following the referendum, South Sudan became an independent country 9 July 2011. The security situation, however, remained an issue even after the referendum. According to CPA update from the UNMIS, on 4 May 2011, the 141st CJMC meeting was held in Khartoum. In the meeting, CJMC requested CPC to approach the Joint Defense Board (JDB) to form a Board of Inquiry to investigate the 1 May clash in the Abyei Area resulted from the invasion of SAF. This was the breach of ceasefire agreement. On 10 May 2011 CJMC meeting, the status of SPLA in the Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States was discussed because the war was breaking out in the North before the independence of the South and thus before the end of the CPA-period.1 Once southern Sudan became an independent state, all the security mechanism established by the 2005 CPA either became obsolete or dissolved.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, May 2011; Johan Brosché, “The Crises Continue. Sudan’s Remaining Conflicts,” ISPI – Working Paper no. 41, accessed May 21, 2012, http://www.ispionline.it/it/documents/WP41_2011.pdf.
Annexure I: Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 31st December 2004)
Part I: The Ceasefire Arrangements
1. General and Fundamental Provisions
1.1. The Parties agree that the national ownership of the peace process, political will, and continuous dialogue are indispensable elements for sustainable peace. They shall collaborate to observe and respect the ceasefire and resort to their own wisdom to contain and solve any problem that may arise;
1.2. The Parties shall always refrain from any act or acts that may in any way spoil the peace process. They shall unceasingly create and maintain a conducive atmosphere for peace and tranquility;
1.3. The Parties shall abide by good governance, democracy and foster civil society;
1.4. The Parties agree that inclusiveness is of the essence to this Agreement and shall engage the other armed groups and political forces to become part of the peace process, play a role thereto and contribute to the sustenance of this Agreement;
1.5. The Cease fire Agreement shall ensure clarity by eliminating any room for ambiguity in all elements of the Ceasefire Agreement;
1.6. The Ceasefire Agreement shall guarantee the free movement of people, goods and services throughout Sudan;
1.7. The Parties shall, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Ceasefire Agreement, provide and share information and statistics on their troops strength, arms and military equipment and any other relevant information, among themselves and with the UN Peace Support Mission;
1.8. The Parties shall commit themselves to immediate release of prisoners of war (POWs) and as a gesture of national reconciliation release any other persons detained as a result of the war upon the endorsement of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement;
1.9. The Parties shall involve the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in the process of arranging the release of POWs and other persons detained as a result of the war;
1.10. The Parties shall commit themselves to render and facilitate humanitarian assistance through creation of conditions conducive to the provision of urgent humanitarian assistance to displaced persons, refugees and other affected persons and their right to return;
1.11. The Parties agree to inform the rank and file of their armed forces as a way of popularizing the Ceasefire Agreement;
1.12. The Parties shall commit themselves that all forces, troops under their respective command and forces allied and affiliated to them at all levels and rank and file shall fully ceasefire and stop hostilities;
1.13. The Parties shall endeavour to promote and disseminate peace culture and confidence building measures among and between the people as well as their forces as integral part of ceasefire arrangements and sustenance of the peace;
1.14. The Parties agree not to arm, train, harbour on their respective areas of control, or render any form of support to external subversive elements or internal armed groups;
1.15. Nothing in this Agreement shall in any way undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Sudan.
2. Entry into Force
The Ceasefire Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the Agreement or this Agreement) shall come into effect from the date of signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (that day hereafter referred to as D-Day).
3. Amendment of this Agreement
This Agreement may only be amended by the Presidency upon recommendation of the Ceasefire Political Commission.
4. The Parties of the Agreement
The Parties to this Agreement shall be:
4.1. The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), with all its formations and units; and
4.2. The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), with all its formations and units.
5. Principles of the Ceasefire
5.1. The Parties agree to a permanent ceasefire among all their forces with the broader objective of sustaining the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, promoting peace culture, reconciliation and confidence building;
5.2. The ceasefire shall uphold the following principles:
5.2.1 Permanent cessation of hostilities between SAF and SPLA within 72 hours of the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
5.3.l. The Permanent cessation of hostilities shall include final termination of the following activities:
5.3.1 Military activities including movement, reconnaissance, reinforcement, recruitment, draft, and military exercises other than those permitted by the Joint Defence Board (JOB). The JDB will inform the UN Peace Support Mission of permitted current and future activities;
5.3.2. Land, air, and river operations;
5.3.3. Laying of mines and other subversive activities;
5.3.4. Use of force against and abuse of civilians;
5.3.5. Replenishment of ammunition, weapons and other lethal or military equipment;
5.3.6. Hostile propaganda from inside or outside the country;
5.3.7. Occupation of new locations;
5.3.8. Any other actions that may impede the normal progress of the cease fire process.
6. The Ceasefire Zone
The scope of the ceasefire shall be:
6.1. Southern Sudan, which shall be subdivided, for all the purposes of ceasefire and monitoring activities, into three areas of:
a) Bahr el Ghazal Area;
b) Equatorial Area;
c) Upper Nile Area.
6.2 Nuba Mountains Area;
6.3 Southern Blue Nile Area;
6.4 Abyei Area;
6.5 Eastern Sudan Area (Hamashkoreb, New Rasai, Kotaneb, Tamarat, and Khor Khawaga).
7. Duration and Calendar of Major Ceasefire Activities
7.l. Duration of the ceasefire shall be divided into four phases:
7.1.1 Phase I: The Pre-interim Period duration 6 months (D-day to D-day + 6 months) ceasefire activities shall start (as per attached lists), including the redeployment of SAF from the South to the North, the beginning of the Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration and Reconciliation (DDRR) , the redeployment of SPLA forces from Eastern Sudan, the formation, co-location in training centres, training of the Joint/Integrated Units (JIUs) and the UN monitoring.
7.1.2 Phase II: First half of the Interim Period duration 36 months (D-day+ 6 mo D-day + 42 months). This phase shall cover the completion of deployment of the JIUs, redeployment of the SPLA forces from the Eastern Sudan to the South, redeployment of the SPLA forces from Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile to the South and redeployment of SAF from the South to the North. The DDR activities shall continue. The negotiations on proportionate downsizing shall also start at this phase.
7.1.3 Phase III: Second half of the Interim Period duration 36 months (D-day + 42 months to D-day + 78 months). Continuation of DDR process, training and the monitoring process. Development of plans and modalities of transforming the JIUs into integrated ones.
7.1.4 Phase IV: Post Interim Period duration 6 months (D- day + 78 months to D-day + 84 months). Formation of Sudan National Armed Forces (SNAF) in case of unity or dissolution of JIU in case of secession.
7.2. The Calendar of major ceasefire activities is agreed by the parties as per Appendix 2.
8. Disengagement
8.1. There shall be lines of disengagement according to the assembly areas, as specified in Appendix 1, and shall be adjusted by the monitors of the UN Peace Support Mission.
8.2. On the declaration of the ceasefire, the forces of the SAF, inclusive of their allied forces and the SPLA, inclusive of their allied forces, shall maintain their current positions.
8.3. All forces shall take defensive positions and be redeployed to assembly points within the first three months of the Pre-Interim Period according to the agreed timetable.
8.4. All forces shall be disengaged, separated, encamped in their assembly points, and redeployed subject to international monitoring arrangements.
8.5. The parties shall provide maps and sketches showing their current dispositions before the declaration of the ceasefire. Such maps and sketches shall include:
8.5.1. Current dispositions including deployment and weapons sites.
8.5.2. All necessary information about roads, tracks, passages, minefields, and command posts.
8.6. To safeguard against the menace and hazards posed by landmines and unexploded ordnance, the Parties agree that:
8.6.1. The laying of mines, explosive devices or booby traps of whatever type shall be prohibited;
8.6.2. The Parties and forces under their control shall promptly provide on D-day to the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC) all known information concerning the locations and descriptions of all minefields, unexploded ordnance, demolitions, booby traps and any other physical or military hazards which could affect the safe movement of persons, within the ceasefire zones. The Parties shall also promptly produce a plan to mark and signpost any danger areas and initiate this plan according to agreed priorities. The Parties shall allow and facilitate cross-line de-mining activities, the repair and reopening of roads and the removal, dismantling or destruction of mines, unexploded ordnance and all other such hazards as described above immediately upon the signature of this Agreement;
8.6.3. The Parties and forces under their control shall promptly provide to the CJMC information concerning the stockpiles of Anti Personal Mines;
8.6.4. The Parties shall conduct de-mining activities as soon as possible, and in coordination with the UN Peace Support Mission with a view to create the conditions necessary for deployment of the UN Peace Support Mission and the return of displaced populations;
8.6.5. The UN Peace Support Mission, in conjunction with United Nations Mine Action Office, will assist the Parties’ de-mining efforts by providing technical advice and coordination. The Parties shall, as necessary, seek additional de-mining assistance and advice from the UN Peace Support Mission;
8.6.6 The Parties shall establish by D Day + 30 Days two de-mining authorities (Northern and Southern) that shall work together and coordinate their de-mining activities and to work jointly in close cooperation with UN Mine Action Office;
8.7. Before the declaration of the ceasefire, the Parties shall present detailed lists of size and location of their forces in each area to United Nations Advanced Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS), subject by verification of the Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT) and Joint Military Commission (JMC) Nuba Mountains. Such lists shall be attached to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
8.8. Notwithstanding 8.7 above, the Parties shall present detailed lists of particulars of all troops to the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC) or, pending the formation of the CJMC, to the VMT and JMC/Nuba. The lists shall be verified by the CJMC and/or the VMT and JMC, as the case
may be, immediately after the declaration of the ceasefire.
8.9. The Parties agree and in collaboration with the UN Peace Support Mission to pull back all the weapons of effective range fire within the other Party’s assembly areas.
8.10. The Parties shall provide detailed data on their inventories and stocks including different weapons and munitions, fuel oil and lubricants, etc., and their exact locations to CJMC or the VMT in the cease fire zone. Such inventories shall be verified immediately after the declaration of the ceasefire. The Parties shall agree on ways and means of monitoring such stocks and/or stores to make sure that they are no longer accessible to the Parties.
9. Permitted Activities
In view of negative consequences of war, the key principle that shall underpin permitted activities shall be to alleviate the effects of the war on the civilians and war-affected areas and to galvanize popular support for peace. Permitted activities shall therefore include:
9.1. De-mining and decommissioning of military hazards (this shall be done in collaboration with other bodies referred to in 8.6 herein, according to agreed timetables and mechanisms, and under UN monitoring);
9.2. Development activities to include opening of roads, rehabilitation of bridges and passages, railways, airports and airstrips, and lines of river navigation etc;
9.3. Humanitarian activities such as securing unimpeded access to humanitarian relief according to agreed regulations;
9.4. Socioeconomic activities such as assisting free movement of people, goods and services;
9.5. Free movement of unarmed soldiers in plain clothes who are on leave, medical referrals, or visiting their families;
9.6. Re-supply of armed forces lethal items as shall be deemed appropriate by the IDB and coordinated with UN Mission;
9.7. Supply of non-lethal items (food, water, medicine, fuel oils and lubricants, stationery, uniforms, etc.);
9.8. Training and Refresher training.
9.9. During the disengagement of forces, they shall not exercise any military activities except the following:
9.9.1. Training and refresher training (UN Mission shall be informed of such training – location, duration and type); particularly the field training of platoon level and higher;
9.9.2. Administrative movement (e.g. replenishment with non-lethal supplies or equipment);
9.9.3. Medical evacuation.
10. Violations
10.1. The following acts shall constitute violations to this Agreement:
10.1.1. Any acts that may contravene this Agreement;
10.1.2. Unauthorized movement of troops;
10.1.3. Unauthorized recruitment, draft and/or mobilization drive;
10.1.4. Unauthorized replenishment of military equipment and supplies;
10.1.5. Hostile acts that may provoke confrontation;
10.1.6. Violation of human rights, humanitarian law and obstruction of freedom of movement;
10.1.7. Hostile propaganda and media warfare;
10.1.8. Espionage, sabotage, and acts of subversion to undermine either party and/or the Agreement;
10.1.9. Recruitment of child soldiers.
10.2 In event of any violation to provisions of this Agreement, the CJMC will determine appropriate disciplinary measures which may include, where appropriate, the following:
10.2.1. Publicizing or mentioning the parties that took part in the violations; Exposing or shaming the guilty or recommending severe punishment in event of grave violations;
10.2.2. Recommend referral to civil, criminal trial procedures, or courtmartial of individual or parties involved as applicable;
10.2.3. Recommend referral to civil, criminal trial procedures, or courtmartial of individual or parties involved as applicable;
10.2.4. The Parties agree to follow up on recommendations for disciplinary measures as proposed by CJMC.
10.3. The hostile propaganda as provided in sub-section 10.1.7 above shall be comprehensively monitored by CJMC as part of the ceasefire monitoring process;
10.4. Without prejudice to the freedom of press and media, the Parties agree to set up a Joint Media Committee upon signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to establish guidelines for the media and press to enhance conducive environment for the smooth implementation of the ceasefire.
10.5. The Parties agree that any deadlock arising out of the implementation of the ceasefire shall be referred, as of last resort, to the Presidency for consideration and action after having exhausted all avenues of dispute management at all lower levels;
11. Other Armed Groups
In accordance with Article 7 (a) of the Agreement on Security Arrangements, the Parties agree to expedite the process of incorporation and reintegration of armed groups allied to either Party, into their armed forces, other organized forces, the civil service and civil societal institutions.
11.2. The Parties agree to each setting up “Incorporation and Reintegration Adhoc Committee” to implement the provision of sub-section 11.1 above.
11.3. In accordance with the Framework Agreement on Security Arrangements during the Interim Period, no armed group allied to either party shall be allowed to operate outside the two forces. Other Armed Groups (OAGs) who have a desire and qualify shall be incorporated into the organized forces of either party (Army, Police, Prisons, and Wildlife Forces), while the rest shall be reintegrated into the Civil Service and civil society institutions.
11.4. The Parties agree to adopt a collaborative approach for handling OAGs and to establish by D day + 15 days an OAGs Collaborative Committee (OAGs CC) which shall comprise equal number of representatives from both parties (three each) and an independent observer from UN.
11.5. The OAGs CC shall, inter alia, perform the following functions:
11.5.1. Ascertain strength and armament conditions of all OAGs units which shall be verified by the VMT until UN monitors take over;
11.5.2. Ensure freedom of choice for all OAGs personnel as to the party they so desire to be incorporated in;
11.5.3. Ensure free and fair access of the parties to the OAGs;
11.5.4. Supervise and review incorporation processes of both Parties;
11.5.5. Provide a forum for the parties to exchange information and data on the OAGs as well as handling complaints that pertain to their incorporation process and their activities;
11.5.6. Receive regular updates on the progress of the OAGs incorporation;
11.5.7. Keep the Ceasefire Political Committee abreast on the progress of the OAGs incorporation;
11.5.8. Monitor the DDR programme for the OAGs.
11.6. DDR programme for the OAGs shall be worked out by Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC) by the end of the Pre-Interim Period with technical assistance from international experts. All integration options shall be open in that programme.
11.7. Upon signature of this Agreement, the process of incorporation of individual members of all other armed groups, who desire and qualify shall start as soon as possible into the ranks of either SAF or SPLA or integrated into organized forces (Police, Prisons and Wildlife Services), while the rest shall be reintegrated into the civil service or civil society institutions.
11.8. By D Day + 6 months, the OAGs Collaborative Committee after ascertaining the strength and armament conditions of OAGs units, shall ensure freedom of choice for all OAGs members to join either Party they so desire to be incorporated in, provided that no other armed groups shall continue to have a separate existence outside the command of either SAF or SPLA.
11.9. By D Day + 12 Months, the OAGs Collaborative Committee shall finish the incorporation process of OAGs members who desire and qualify into the armed forces of either Party and Police, Prisons, Wildlife Service and Civil Service.
11.10. When the incorporation process of OAGs referred to above in sub-section 11.9 is completed, the incorporated OAGs members shall not be allowed to decamp from one Party to the other nor to change from Police, Prisons, Wildlife and Civil Service to the military.
11.11. The Parties commit themselves, through OAGs Collaborative Committee and Incorporation and Reintegration of Adhoc Committees, to jointly brief all the OAGs about the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and their rights and obligations in the Agreement so as to ensure that they adhere to and respect all the provisions of the Agreement.
11.12. The Southern Sudan DDR Commission shall continue the reintegration process of the demobilized and disarmed members of OAGs into the civil service and civil society institutions in Southern Sudan, with a follow up of the OAGs Collaborative Committee.
11.13. The Parties shall not entertain, encourage, or permit reincorporation/defection of groups or individuals who were previously members or associated with any OAGs and have been incorporated into either party organized forces. Such act, if committed by either party, shall constitute a violation to sub-section 10.1.8 of this Agreement.
12. Foreign Insurgency Groups
12.1. The parties appreciate the threat and menace that the foreign insurgency groups pose on the security and stability of the Sudan and neighboring countries.
12.2. The parties have resolved to end the presence of the foreign insurgency groups on the Sudanese soil;
12.3. The parties shall work together to disarm, repatriate or expel these groups as soon as possible.
13. Verification, Monitoring, Complaints and Obligations
13.1 The structure and levels of monitoring and verification of the implementation of this Agreement shall be as follows:
13.1.1. Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC)
13.1.2. Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC)
13.1.3. Area Joint Military Committee (AJMC)
13.1.4. Joint Military Teams (JMTs)
14. The Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC)
14.1 The CPC shall be answerable to the Presidency;
14.2 The CPC shall be a political decision making body composed of:
14.2.1. One senior political representative from each Party;
14.2.2. One senior officer each from SAF and SPLA;
14.2.3. Special Representative of UN Secretary General or his deputy;
14.2.4. Senior Security officer (after the establishment of National Security Service);
14.2.5. One Legal advisor from each Party;
14.2.6. Representative of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (observer);
14.2.7. Representative of IGAD Partner’s Forum (lPF) (observer);
14.3. The CPC chair shall be’ rotational between the Parties;
14.4. The CPC shall reach its decisions by consensus of the Parties;
14.5. The mandate and functions of the CPC shall be to:
14.5.1. supervise, monitor and oversee the implementation of this Agreement;
14.5.2. complete negotiating any operational details as shall be necessary;
14.5.3. sound the Parties to rise up to their obligations in this Agreement;
14.5.4. update the Parties on the progress of the ceasefire implementation;
14.5.5. co-ordinate with other relevant national and international bodies;
14.5.6. settle deadlocks arising out from the cease fire implementation as reported by the CJMC and refer the unresolved ones to the Presidency;
14.5.7. provide disciplinary measures for violations;
14.5.8. provide a political forum for continuous dialogue between the Parties and the international community;
14.5.9. foster confidence building between the Parties;
14.5.10. Update the IGAD, IPF, African Union (AU) and the United Nations periodically on the process of the ceasefire implementation as deemed necessary;
14.5.11. propose amendments in the Agreement to the Presidency.
14.6. Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC)
14.6.1. The CJMC shall be answerable to the CPC and shall oversee the activities of AJMC;
14.6.2. The CJMC shall be located in Juba;
14.6.3. The CJMC shall be a military decision making body and shall be composed of:
14.6.3.1. The Force Commander of the UN Monitoring Mission (Chair),
14.6.3.2. The Deputy Force Commander from countries acceptable to the Parties. Considering that the official working languages in Sudan are Arabic and English;
14.6.3.3. Three officers from SAF with ranks not less than Colonel;
14.6.3.4. Three senior officers from SPLA
14.6.3.5. Officer in charge of National Security at that level;
14.6.3.6. One senior police officer at the level of Southern Sudan.
14.6.4. The CJMC shall reach its decisions by consensus of the Parties and shall establish its own internal regulations;
14.6.5. The CJMC shall have the following functions:
14.6.5.1. Oversee compliance of the Parties to their obligations under this Agreement;
14.6.5.2. Coordinate planning, monitoring and verification of the implementation of this Agreement;
14.6.5.3. Facilitate liaison between the Parties;
14.6.5.4. Coordinate monitoring and verification of disengagement, disarmament and redeployment of the forces as agreed upon in this Agreement;
14.6.5.5. Check on the conduct of the military forces;
14.6.5.6. Specification of current locations of troops as of the D Day;
14.6.5.7. Monitoring troop strength, stocks of arms, ammunitions and other war-related equipment;
14.6.5.8. Coordination and monitoring of pennitted military movement and itineraries thereof;
14.6.5.9. Receiving and verifying unresolved violations, disputes and complaints and rule on them;
14.6.5.10. Serving as a channel of communication between the Parties;
14.6.5.11. Inspection of replenishment of supplies to the forces;
14.6.5.12. Supervision of demining activities, decommissioning of unexploded ordnance and other form of military hazards;
14.6.5.13. Dissemination of infonnation about this Agreement;
14.6.5.14. help Parties in disarming and reintegrating armed groups;
14.6.5.15. monitor and verify the disarmament of all Sudanese civilians who are illegally armed;
14.6.5.16. be responsible for executing peace support operations in collaboration with VMT, JMC and CPMT, until the deployment of the UN monitors; after which the roles of the latter shall cease to exist;
14.6.6. Decisions reached by the CJMC shall be communicated down through the individual chains of command and reported up to the CPC.
14.6.7. Subject to the timing of different activities specified in the Agreement on Security Arrangements, the CJMC may readjust on practical considerations the timing of activities or obligations related to ceasefire including redeployment North and South of the 1956 North South border and activities referred to in sub-section 8.7 herein.
14.6.8. The CJMC shall compile necessary cartographical and mapping references which, once agreed to by the Parties, shall be used for the purposes of monitoring the implementation of this Agreement. However, such cartographical and mapping references shall have no bearing whatsoever on the subsequent delineation of the 11/1/1956 North/South border by the ad hoc border commission that the Parties will set up as part of the Agreement on Implementation Modalities.
14.6.9. The CJMC shall be entitled to move freely throughout the Ceasefire Zone.
14.7 Area Joint Military Committee (AJMC)
14.7.1 The AJMC that shall be established in Juba, Malakal, Wau, Kadugli, Abyei, Damazien or Kurmuk, and shall be composed as follows:
14.7.1.1 The most senior UN Officer in the Area, Chairperson;
14.7.1.2 Equal number of senior officers from SAF and SPLA;
14.7.1.3 UN monitors.
14.7.2 AJMC shall be established in Kassala or Hamashkoreb in Eastern Sudan to monitor and verify the redeployment of SPLA forces as provided in sub-section 4 (c)(v)(a) of Agreement on Security Arrangements;
14.7.3 The AJMC shall be charged with the following functions:
14.7.3.1 monitor and verify alleged violations and resolve disputes;
14.7.3.2 report periodically and refer unresolved complaints to CJMC;
14.7.3.3 Liaise and share information with the Security Committee in the designated area;
14.8 Joint Military Teams (JMTs)
14.8.1. JMTs shall be the lowest operating unit of the cease fire monitoring mechanism;
14.8.2. JMTs shall be established and designated by the AJMC at that level;
14.8.3. A JMT shall be composed of UN senior officer at that level, international monitors, equal number of officers from SAF and SPLA.
14.8.4. JMTs shall conduct regular patrols and visits throughout their respective areas to prevent violations, preserve the ceasefire, and assist in building confidence.
14.8.5. JMTs shall monitor, verify and report alleged violations to the appropriate AJMC.
15. UN Peace Support Mission
15.1. The Parties agree to request the United Nations to constitute a lean, effective, sustainable and affordable UN Peace Support Mission to monitor and verify this Agreement and to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement as provided for under Chapter VI of the UN Charter;
15.2. The Parties call upon the international community to provide technical and financial assistance, given the financial constraints of GoS and particularly the nature and structure of SPLA, to expedite the implementation of the cease fire activities.
15.3. International monitoring shall be carried out by UN, considering that the official working languages in Sudan are Arabic and English, who may make the use of the services of UN protection unit. The size of the UN Peace Support Mission, including any UN force protection element, shall be determined by the UN in consultation with the Parties.
15.4. For the purpose of monitoring activities related to the ceasefire, the international monitors shall have unrestricted access in accordance with a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which shall be concluded with the United Nations as soon as possible. Such SOFA shall contain the provisions agreed to by the Parties with the United Nations immediately following the conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
15.5. The parties agree that the presence and size of the UN peace support mission shall be determined by the implementation time table of this Agreement (disengagement, disarmament, redeployment, etc) and shall gradually phase out with successful implementation of the time tables, increased confidence building, and commitment of the parties towards the implementation of this Agreement.
15.6. The Parties agree to request the UN to provide cultural orientation to all its members to create conducive a s here for respect and better understanding of social values and cultures so as to ensure effective implementation of this Agreement;
15.7. The Parties undertake to respect the exclusively international nature of the UN Peace Support Mission as in terms of flag, vehicle markings, communication, travel and transport, privileges and immunities, facilities, provisions, supplies, services, sanitary arrangements, recruitment of local personnel, currency, entry, residence, departure, uniform, arms, permits and licences, military police, arrest, transfer of custody, mutual assistance, jurisdiction, deceased members and settlement of disputes;
15.8. SAF and SPLA members of AJMCs and JMTs shall have the right to participate in verification and monitoring missions, however in case of failure of either or both Parties to participate, the mission shall still continue with its verification and monitoring tasks.
15.9. The Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT), the Joint Military Commission (JMC) in Nuba Mountains and the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (CPMT) shall continue performing their duties, under’ operational control of the UN Mission, according to their present and/or expanded mandate, fill the gap and carry out duties as shall be entrusted to them by the Parties until the UN Mission is operational, after which their roles shall cease to exist.
Powersharing Transitional Government
2005
There was considerable delay in the establishment of the Government of National Unity (GoNU). The CPA provided that the GoNU be established within six months of the signing of the CPA or by 9 July 2005. The dispute over the allocation of energy and mining ministerial portfolio between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLM caused the delay in the formation of the national unity government. Nevertheless, the three member presidency was inaugurated on 9 July 2005. Omer Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir was sworn in as President, John Garang de Mabior as First Vice President and Ali Osman Mohamed Taha as Vice President. The First Vice President, Dr. Garang, was killed in a helicopter crash on 30 July 2005. The vacant position was filled by SPLM leader Lt. General Salva Kiir Mayardiit.1
President Bashir issued four decrees on 20 September 2005 establishing the GoNU. The CPA formula of power-sharing was followed in the formation of the unity government. The GoNU included one presidential assistant, 12 presidential advisors, 28 federal ministers and 33 state ministers. The NCP retained five sovereign ministries (Presidency, Interior, Justice, Defence and Federal Government), six economic ministries (Finance, Energy, Irrigation, Agriculture, International Cooperation and Animal Resources) and four service ministries (Labour and Public Service, Culture and Youth, Social Welfare and Guidance and Endowment). The SPLM received two sovereignty ministries (Council of Ministers and Foreign Affairs), three economic ministries (Foreign Trade, Investment and Transportation) and three service ministries (Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Higher Education). The disputed energy and mining ministry was retained by the president’s party NCP.2 The opposition umbrella group, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) received two ministerial seats on 27 November 2005.3 Other opposition parties did not show interest in joining the GoNU.
As agreed, the National Legislature (the National Assembly and the Council of States) was formed and convened on 31 August 2005. Ahmed Ibrahim El-Tahir (NCP) was elected Speaker for the National Assembly and Atim Garang Deng (SPLM) Deputy Speaker. Ali Yahia (NCP) was elected Speaker and Remo Olair (SPLM) Deputy Speaker of the Council of States. In the 450 member National Assembly, the NCP had 234 seats, SPLM 126 seats, Northern political forces 55 seats, Southern political forces 27 seats, and the remaining eight seats were designated for national personalities. Similarly, the power-sharing formula was adopted in allocating 19 standing specialized committees in the National Assembly. The NCP chaired ten committees, SPLM five, other Northern political forces three and the other Southern political forces one.4
Consistent with the CPA provision, Mr. John Aungi Kasiba from SPLM and Dr. Wahabi Mohamed Mukhtar from NCP were appointed as Deputy Chief Justices. Mr. Jalal-Eddin Mohamed Osman from NCP was appointed as Chief Justice. These appointments were made on 28 November 2005. Similarly, the president and members of the Constitutional Court were sworn in on 31 December 2005.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
2006
The National Unity Government was formed in 2005. The SPLM shared power in the presidency, in the national assembly and in judiciary.
2007
On14 October 2006, Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement was negotiated between the Eastern Front and the National Unity Government. In an effort to implement the accord, three leaders of the Eastern Front were appointed in the national unity government as Assistant to the President, Adviser to the President and the State Minister of Transport and Roads.1
On 11 October 2007, the SPLM recalled all of its ministers and presidential advisers from the government of national unity as many provisions of the CPA were either rejected or not implemented by the GoNU. In its decision to withdraw its participation in the GoNU, the SPLM gave four reasons: the lack of demarcation of the north-south border, problems with wealth-sharing (the oil), delayed withdrawal and no solution to Abyei.2 The SPLM alleged that the delay in the demarcation of the north-south border was a result of impediments caused by the NCP in the work of the border commission. Similarly, the SAF were also not withdrawn from the South, especially from the oil fields. The SPLM also alleged that there was no transparency on issue of wealth sharing. Finally, the SPLM was excluded from the management and development of the oil sector. On 12 December 2007, the parties reached an agreement to deal with these issues including issues related to entrust the security of the oil area to the Joint Integrated Units.3 Once the dispute resolved, President Al-Bashir issued a series of decrees appointing new SPLM ministers, state ministers and presidential advisors in the Government of National Unity (GoNU) on 26 December 2007. The new SPLM ministers were sworn in on 27 December 2007.4
Representatives of the Darfur Peace Agreement signatory parties also joined the National Assembly in 2007.5 Similarly, after the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement, the Eastern Front was allocated eight members in the National Assembly. Those members took their oath on 24 October 2007.6
- “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/500), August 20, 2007.
- “Sudan; South Quits Unity Government,” Africa News, October 11, 2007.
- “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2008/64), January 31, 2008.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
2008
No major changes took place in the composition of the Government of National Unity except for the cabinet reorganization of 14 February 2008. President Al-Bashir reshuffled NCP Ministers in the GoNU and reallocated portfolios of several Ministers of State.1
2009
The parties, including SPLM, continued to share power through their participation in the GoNU in 2005. No cabinet reshuffle took place in 2009.
2010
Following the national census and the SPLM’s objection to the national census results, which should have taken place before 9 July 2007 as provided in the 2005 CPA, the presidency reached an agreement regarding the contested census results that provided for an additional 40 seats for the south in the new National Assembly. In addition, Southern Kordofan and Abyei would be allocated four and two seats, respectively, in the new assembly. The presidential and the parliamentary elections took place in April 2010. Elections across Sudan were held, fulfilling a CPA benchmark. Omar Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir was elected President of the Republic and Salva Kiir Mayardit President of the Government of Southern Sudan. According to the CPA’s power-sharing formula, the President of the Republic issued decrees (on 14 June 2010) appointing 35 Ministers and 42 State Ministers in the national government. The NCP was allocated 24 ministerial seats, the SPLM eight, and the other parties who had participated in the elections three. The newly-appointed ministers were sworn in on 16 June.1
2011
The CPA’s provisions related to the Government of National Unity were implemented. The power-sharing provisions, however, became obsolete once Southern Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 2011 following the April referendum.
Chapter II: Power Sharing (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 26th May, 2004)
2.5. The Government of National Unity
2.5.1 During the Interim Period, there shall be a Government of National Unity reflecting the need for inclusiveness, the promotion of national unity, and the defense of national sovereignty, and the respect and implementation of Peace Agreement.
2.5.2 The Presidency and Council of Ministers shall exercise the Executive powers and competencies in respect of the matters in Schedules A and D, read together with Schedules E and F, and as conferred upon it by this Agreement and the Interim National Constitution.
2.5.3 Cabinet posts and portfolios in all clusters, including the National Sovereignty Ministries, shall be shared equitably and qualitatively by the two Parties. The Parties agree to cluster the National ministries under the implementation modalities.
2.5.4 Representation of the SPLM and other political forces from the South in each of the clusters shall be determined by the Parties Signatory to Agreement prior to the conclusion of the Peace Agreement.
2.5.1 During the Interim Period, there shall be a Government of National Unity reflecting the need for inclusiveness, the promotion of national unity, and the defense of national sovereignty, and the respect and implementation of Peace Agreement.
2.5.2 The Presidency and Council of Ministers shall exercise the Executive powers and competencies in respect of the matters in Schedules A and D, read together with Schedules E and F, and as conferred upon it by this Agreement and the Interim National Constitution.
2.5.3 Cabinet posts and portfolios in all clusters, including the National Sovereignty Ministries, shall be shared equitably and qualitatively by the two Parties. The Parties agree to cluster the National ministries under the implementation modalities.
2.5.4 Representation of the SPLM and other political forces from the South in each of the clusters shall be determined by the Parties Signatory to Agreement prior to the conclusion of the Peace Agreement.
2.5.5 Prior to elections, the seats of the National Executive shall be allocated as follows:
(a) The National Congress Party shall be represented by Fifty-Two Percent (52%);
(b) Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) shall be represented by Twenty-Eight Percent (28%);
(c) Other Northern political forces shall be represented by Fourteen Percent (14%);
(d) Other Southern political forces shall be represented by Six Percent (6%);
2.5.6 The Government of National Unity shall be responsible for the administration and functioning of the State and the formulation and implementation of national policies in accordance with the Interim National Constitution.
2.5.6 The Government of National Unity-shall be responsible for establishing recruitment systems and admission policies to national universities, national institutes, and other institutions of higher education based on fair competition, giving equal opportunity to all citizens.
2.5.8 The Government of National Unity shall make decisions related to the ongoing or future activities of the organizations of the United Nations, bilateral, national, or international governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGDs), with a view toward ensuring equitable and transparent distribution of projects, activities, and employment of personnel in the whole of Sudan and especially the reconstruction of the war affected areas. There is to be an equivalent obligation on all levels of Government.
2.5.9. The Government of National Unity shall implement an information campaign throughout Sudan in all national languages in Sudan to popularize the Peace Agreement, and to foster national unity, reconciliation and mutual understanding.
2.2. The National Legislature:
2.2.5 Prior to the Parliamentary elections, the seats of the National Assembly shall be allocated as follows:
(a) The National Congress Party (NCP) shall be represented by Fifty-Two Percent (52%);
(b) Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) shall be represented by Twenty-Eight Percent (28%);
(c) Other Northern political forces shall be represented by Fourteen Percent (14%);
(d) Other Southern political forces shall be represented by Six Percent (6%);
2.3. The National Executive
2.3.1 The National Executive shall consist of the Presidency and a Council of Ministers.
2.3.2 There shall be established the Institution of the Presidency consisting of the President and two Vice Presidents.
2.3.3 The functions of the two Vice Presidents shall be clearly defined by the parties to this Agreement.
2.3.4 There shall be a partnership and collegial decision-making process within the Institution of the Presidency in order to safeguard the Peace Agreement.
2.3.5 Until such time as elections are held, the current incumbent President (or his successor) shall be the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). The current SPLM Chairman (or his successor) shall be the First Vice President and shall at the same time hold the posts of President of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and Commander-in-Chief of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).
2.3.6 In respect of the following matters, the President shall take decisions with the consent of the First Vice President, namely:
2.3.6.1 Declaration and termination of a state of emergency;
2.3.6.2 Declaration of war;
2.3.6.3 Appointments that the President is required to make according to the Peace Agreement, (to be specified); and
2.3.6.4 Summoning, adjourning, or proroguing the National Legislature.
2.11 The National Judiciary
2.11.4.6.
(iii) Southern Sudan shall be adequately represented in the Constitutional Court, the National Supreme Court and other national courts that are situated in the National Capital, by qualified lawyers having regard to competence and credibility;
2. 11.4.7. The tenure of Judges shall not be affected by their judicial decisions. Judges may only be removed for gross misconduct, incompetence, incapacity, or otherwise in accordance with the law, and only on the recommendation of the National Judicial Service Commission.
Executive Branch Reform
2005
According to the CPA provision to reform the executive branch of the government, the institution of the presidency should be established with one president and two vice presidents. The CPA prescribed that the office of the Vice president, prior to the election, be filled within two weeks of the signing of the CPA. This did not occur. Nevertheless, the three member presidency was inaugurated on 9 July 2005. Omer Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir was sworn in as President, John Garang de Maribor as First Vice President and Ali Osman Mohamed Taha as Vice President. The First Vice President Dr. Garang was killed in a helicopter crash on 30 July 2005. The vacant position was filled by SPLM leader Lt. General Salva Kiir Mayardiit.1 The CPA also required that the Institution of Presidency adopt a collegial decision-making process and consult with the vice presidents. This satisfies the executive branch reform as the CPA provides.
Immediately after establishing the Government of National Unity (GoNU) on 20 September 2005, the presidency started to develop the formation and staffing of many commissions and Committees as specified by the CPA. By the end of October and November 2005, the presidency issued decrees to establish the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, the National Petroleum Commission, the Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission and the Technical Ad Hoc Border Committee, the Cease-fire Political Commission, and National Judicial Service Commission.2 The Secretary General’s report also suggests that the presidency received the report defining the borders of the Abyei area from the Abyei Boundary Commission in July 2005, but had yet to implement the decision.
The executive branch of the government was reformed in 2005 by establishing a three member presidency and adopting a collegial decision making process.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly Report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
- “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/821), December 21, 2005.
2006
Executive branch reform took place with the establishment of the presidency in 2005.
In 2006, the presidency issued a decree declaring the Boundaries of Southern Kordofan State as the previous boundaries of Southern Kordofan Province as defined in the 1974 Act of the Division of Provinces. Western Kordofan and Southern Kordofan merged in accordance with the decree. Similarly, the Presidency decided on 3 January 2006 that the Cabinet for the administration of the National Capital would include eight ministers: four from the NCP, two from the SPLM (one of them Deputy Governor), and two from Northern political forces (one of them Deputy Governor). By a decree issued in August 2006, the presidency established the Commission on the Protection of the Rights of Non-Muslims in the National Capital. On 18 February 2006, President Al-Bashir issued a presidential decree to form the National DDR Coordination Council (NDDRCC). The presidency failed to agree on the adoption of the Abyei Boundaries Commission submitted to the presidency on 14 July 2005.1 The presidency, however, resolved a deadlock over the draft constitution, which was signed into law in December.2
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly Report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
- “Report of Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/42), 25 January 2007.
2007
Executive branch reform took place with the establishment of the presidency in 2005.
On 26 July 2007, the President issued a decree establishing the National Civil Service Commission. The presidency issued a decree replacing Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission (FFAMC) Chair, Ibrahim Monim Mansour, with Homahed Osaman Ibrahim. Nevertheless, the presidency failed to agree on the adoption of the Abyei Boundaries Commissions.1
2008
Executive branch reform took place with the establishment of the presidency in 2005. No further developments reported.
2009
No further developments observed.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
Chapter II: Power Sharing (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 26th May, 2004)
2.3. The National Executive
2.3.1 The National Executive shall consist of the Presidency and a Council of Ministers.
2.3.2 There shall be established the Institution of the Presidency consisting of the President and two Vice Presidents.
2.3.3 The functions of the two Vice Presidents shall be clearly defined by the parties to this Agreement.
2.3.4 There shall be a partnership and collegial decision-making process within the Institution of the Presidency in order to safeguard the Peace Agreement.
2.3.5 Until such time as elections are held, the current incumbent President (or his successor) shall be the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). The current SPLM Chairman (or his successor) shall be the First Vice President and shall at the same time hold the posts of President of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and Commander-in-Chief of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).
2.3.6 In respect of the following matters, the President shall take decisions with the consent of the First Vice President, namely:
2.3.6.1 Declaration and termination of a state of emergency;
2.3.6.2 Declaration of war;
2.3.6.3 Appointments that the President is required to make according to the Peace Agreement, (to be specified); and
2.3.6.4 Summoning, adjourning, or proroguing the National Legislature.
2.3.7 The President shall be elected in national elections, the timing of which shall be subject to the agreement of the two parties. The President elect shall appoint two Vice Presidents, one from the South and the other from the North. If the President-elect is from the North, the position of the First Vice President shall be filled by the person who has been elected to the post of President of the Government of Southern Sudan, as the President’s appointee to the said position. In the event that a person from the South wins the Presidential elections, the President-elect shall appoint the First Vice President from the North. All the other provisions in this Agreement relating to the presidency shall continue to apply.
2.3.8 Should the post of the President fall vacant, the functions of the President shall be assumed by a Presidential Council comprising of the Speaker of the National Assembly, the First Vice President and the Vice President.
2.3.8.1 The Speaker of the National Assembly shall be Chairperson of the Council in the period prior to elections, after elections the First Vice President shall be the chairperson of the Council;
2.3.8.2 The Presidential Council shall take its decision by consensus;
2.3.8.3 The Vice President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF).
2.3.9 Should the post of the President fall vacant in the period prior to elections, the Office of the President shall be filled by the nominee of the National Congress Party within two weeks.
2.3.10 Should the post of the President fall vacant in the period after the elections, the post shall be filled through presidential elections which shall be held within sixty
(60) days.
2.3.11 Should the post of the First Vice President fall vacant:
2.3.11.1 Prior to elections, the office of the First Vice President shall be filled by the nominee of the SPLM within two (2) weeks;
2.3.11.2 After the elections, the President shall appoint a First Vice President in accordance with the Interim National Constitution and the provisions of this Peace Agreement.
2.3.12 The President shall, within Thirty (30) days of the entry into force of the Peace Agreement, and in consultation with the First Vice President, establish a Council of Ministers, having due regard to the need for inclusiveness and diversity in the establishment of a Government of National Unity. The Cabinet Ministers shall be accountable to the President and the National Assembly in the performance of their functions and may be removed by a resolution supported by two-thirds eh) of all the members of the National Assembly.
2.3. 13 The President, the First Vice President and the Vice President shall be members of the Council of Ministers.
2.3.14 The National Legislature shall be required to approve declarations of war or state of emergency, but in either event, there shall be no derogation from the provisions of the Peace Agreement, except as may be provided herein.
2.3.15 Any Executive Orders or other legal acts by the President of the Republic shall be discussed with, and adopted by Council of Ministers.
Legislative Branch Reform
2005
As agreed in the CPA, the National Legislature (the National Assembly and the Council of States) was formed and convened on 31 August 2005. Ahmed Ibrahim ElTahir (NCP) was elected Speaker for the National Assembly and Atim Garang Deng (SPLM) Deputy Speaker. Ali Yahia (NCP) was elected Speaker and Remo Olair (SPLM) Deputy Speaker of the Council of States. As far as equitable representation is concerned, the NCP had 234 seats, SPLM 126 seats, Northern political forces 55 seats, Southern political forces 27 seats, and national personalities eight seats in the 450 member National Assembly. The Interim Constitution came into effect on 9 July 2005.1 According to the 2005 CPA, elections will be held in 2009.
2006
The National Assembly and the Council of States were established in 2005. According to the 2005 CPA, Elections will be held in 2009. No election date was set for the elected National Assembly and the Council of States.
2007
In a step towards holding general elections, the Political Parties Act was finalized. Nevertheless, a national election commission was yet to be established and an election act was yet to be enacted.1 The election date was set for the elected National Assembly and the Council of States. Nevertheless, the Sudanese government was firm on holding election on time.2
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
- “Sudan’s Al-Bashir tells political parties to “get ready for elections,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, January 7, 2007.
2008
The legislative reform provided in the 2005 CPA was to be complete once elections took place. In this regard, some progress was made in 2008. Most importantly, the National Assembly on 7 July 2008 passed the National Elections Act 2008 and the National Assembly endorsed the members of the National Elections Commission (NEC) in November 2008.1 President Bashir was committed for the 2009 general elections.2
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
- “Beshir Cows Sudan Elections on Time,” Agence France Presse, August 3, 2008.
2009
The elections were delayed by the National Election Commission due to delay in census. The election was originally scheduled for July 2009, which was set to take place on February 10 2010.1 The Election Commission, on 30 June 2009, released a revised electoral calendar and rescheduled the election to 5-12 April 2010.2
- “Sudan: General elections reportedly postponed to February 2010,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, April 2, 2009; “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, April 2009.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, June 2009.
2010
The polling for the election commenced on 11 April 2010. The election schedule was revised. In the National Assembly, the National Congress party won a total of 312 seats, the SPLM won 99 seats, the Popular Congress Party won four seats, the Federal UMMA Party won three seats, the Democratic Unionist Party won four seats, the Democratic Unionist Party-Original won one seat, the SPLM-DC won two seats, the UMMA Reform & Development won two seats, the National UMMA Party won one seat, the independent candidate won one seat, and the Muslim Brotherhood won one seat. On May 24 2010, Ahmed Ibrahim Eltahir from NCP was elected speaker for the National Assembly. Lt. Gen. Adam Musa Hamid was elected as the Speaker of the Council. Atem Garang from SPLM was elected as the deputy speaker of the National Assembly.1 The Council of State was composed of 50 members represented by two members from each 25 states and two observers from Abyei. Members of Council of States were elected by the MPs of state legislature which took place in May.2
This satisfies the legislative branch reform provision of the 2005 CPA. This however, does not suggest that the elections were free and fair. As a matter of fact, international observers regarded the elections as deeply flawed.3“Carter Center Reports Widespread Irregularities in Sudan’s Vote Tabulation and Strongly Urges Steps to Increase Transparency (10 May 2010),” Carter Center, 2010, accessed May 22, 2012, http://cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/pr/counting-tabulation-may20…
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, May 2010.
- “Sudan Report Says Al-Bashir to Be Sworn-in After States Council Formation,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, May 3, 2010.
2011
The legislative branch reform was completed in 2010. Implementation of this provision became obsolete once Southern Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 2011 following the April referendum.
Chapter II: Power Sharing (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 26th May, 2004)
PART II
2.2. The National Legislature:
2.2.1 There shall be a bicameral National Legislature comprised of:
2.2.1.1 A National Assembly; and
2.2.1.2 A Council of States.
2.2.2. In the establishment of the National Legislature, the following principles shall apply:
2.2.2.1. There shall ·be equitable representation of the people of South Sudan in both legislative chambers; and
2.2.2.2. Relevant considerations shall be taken into account in determining what constitutes equitable representation.
2.2.3 The National Legislature shall be structured and operate as follows:
2.2.3.1 The National Assembly shall be elected in accordance with the procedures set forth by an impartial. and representative Electoral Commission and in accordance with fair electoral laws;
2.2.3.2 There shall be a Council of States comprised of two representatives from each state;
2.2.3.3 Free and fair elections for the National Assembly shall be conducted in accordance with the Interim National Constitution governing the Interim Period. The date shall be determined by the Parties signatory to this Agreement, after consulting with the Electoral Commission.
2.2.4 Pending the elections referred to above, the National Assembly shall consist of such members representing the Parties to the Agreement, and other forces in the North and South so as to promote inclusiveness and stability, in such proportions to be determined by the parties prior to the conclusion of the Peace Agreement.
Constitutional Reform
2005
On 23 April 2005, the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC) was formed. The NCRC had 60 members. The National Congress Party and the SPLM had insisted “on applying general power-sharing quotas agreed upon in the January deal, which give them 52 percent and 28 percent of the seats, respectively, leaving other parties a paltry 20 percent and no power to block decisions.”1 A few opposition parties were said not to take part in the constitution drafting process. Nevertheless, drafting of the interim constitution moved quickly upon the arrival of SPLM political advisors in Khartoum.2 The commission started its work on 30 April and was expected to complete its task within six weeks. The Sudanese opposition block, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), after signing a landmark agreement with Khartoum in Cairo in June 2005 also joined the constitution drafting process. It nominated 27 members to participate in the NCRC.3 The draft interim constitution was adopted by the National Assembly and the SPLM National Liberation Council on 6 July 2005. The constitution came into effect on 9 July 2005.4
The drafting of the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan started separately. The 40-member Southern Sudan Constitution Drafting Committee (SSCDC) — representing SPLM (28 members), NCP (six members) and other Southern political parties (six members) – was set up to draft Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan. The draft constitution was prepared by the 14 member SPLM technical committee. The Committee submitted its draft to First vice President Salva Kiir. On 17 September 2005, the Minister of Justice formed a committee which examined the compatibility of the draft constitution with the Interim National Constitution (INC). By the end of October, the draft constitution was approved by the Transitional Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly. After the National Ministry of Justice verified the ICSSÕ compatibility with the INC on 24 November 2005, the ICSS was signed into law on 5 December 2005.5
- “Sudan Sets up Constitution Committee,” Agence France Presse, April 23, 2005.
- “Sudan People’s Liberation Movement political advisor arrives in Khartoum,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, April 29, 2005.
- “Sudan opposition bloc to join constitution drafting process,” Agence France Presse, June 21, 2005.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
- Ibid.
2006
Constitution reform took place in 2005 with promulgation of the Interim National Constitution in Sudan and the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan. No further developments reported.
2007
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
2009
No further developments observed.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
Chapter II: Power Sharing (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 26th May, 2004)
2.12 Constitutional Review Process
2.12.4.2 A representative National Constitutional Review Commission shall be established, as is more fully described below, which shall within six (6) weeks of receipt of the Agreement prepare a Legal and Constitutional Framework (“The Constitutional Text”);
2.12.4.3 The National Constitutional Review Commission shall be comprised of the NCP, SPLM and representatives of such other political forces and civil society as agreed by the Parties. Such composition shall be reflected in the final Peace Agreement.
2.12.5 The National Constitutional Review Commission shall have as its first task the preparation of a Legal and Constitutional Framework text in the constitutionally appropriate form, based on the Peace Agreement and the current Sudan Constitution, for adoption by the National Assembly. The same text shall be presented to the SPLM National Liberation Council for adoption. In the event of a contradiction, the terms of the Peace Agreement shall prevail in so far as that contradiction exists.
2.12.6 Without prejudice to the provisions of 2.12.5 above, the National Constitutional Review Commission in the preparation of the Legal and Constitutional Framework Text, shall draw upon relevant experiences and documents as may be presented by the Parties.
2.12.7 Upon adoption by the National Assembly and the SPLM National Liberation Council, the Constitutional Text shall become the Interim National Constitution for the Sudan during the Interim Period.
2.12.8 Pending the adoption of the Constitutional Text, the Parties agree that the legal status quo in their respective areas shall remain in force.
2.12.9 The National Constitutional Review Commission shall also be required to prepare such other legal instruments as is required to give effect to the Peace Agreement. It shall provide in such draft statutes or in the Constitutional Text for the appointment and other mechanisms to ensure the independence of such National Institutions as are referred to in Section 2.10 herein.
2.12.10 Without prejudice to the provisions of the Peace Agreement, as a subsequent task and during the course of the six-year Interim. Period, the national Constitutional Review Commission shall be responsible for organizing an inclusive Constitutional Review Process. The process must provide for political inclusiveness and public participation.
2.12.11 Without prejudice to the functions of the State Legislatures, the National Constitutional Review Commission shall prepare model Constitutions for the States, subject to compliance with the National Constitution, and, as relevant, the Constitution of Southern Sudan.
2.12.12 The National Ministry of Justice shall, with the assistance of concerned attorneys, declare the compatibility of the constitution of Southern Sudan with the Interim National Constitution, and also declare the compatibility of the constitutions of the States with the Interim National Constitution and, as appropriate, with the constitution of Southern Sudan. Upon such declaration, the same constitutions shall be signed by the head of the appropriate level of government.
Inter-ethnic/State Relations
2005
The accord does not specifically provide for inter-ethnic state relations, but the SPLM/A conflict in Sudan had religious and ethnic components to it and was envisaged to be managed through devolution of powers at the national, state and local levels of government, including in southern Sudan. In this regard, as per the 2005 CPA provision, the 2005 national interim constitution recognized autonomy status of the government of southern Sudan. The CPA and the interim constitution clearly outline autonomy status of governments at different levels and their obligation. According to the inter-governmental provisions of the CPA, the president of Sudan appointed governors of 15 northern states in 2005. Similarly, the first-vice president and president of southern Sudan appointed governors of 10 southern states in 2005. This could be taken as initiation of implementation of the inter-governmental relations provisions in the CPA. Nevertheless, the state level constitution was not finalized in 2005.
2006
By 19 December 2006, all fifteen Northern states had adopted state constitution. The southern state had yet to adopt a constitution.1 An attempt to make the state constitution compatible with the Interim National Constitution resulted in a delay as the states would not overstep its constitutional boundaries. Therefore, inter-state relations provision of the accord was not implemented in 2006.
2007
After much wrangling over the compatibility of the constitution of southern states, all 10 southern states received compatibility certificates and adopted the state constitution by July 2007. No issues emerged on intergovernmental relations.
2008
All states adopted their constitutions. No issues emerged on intergovernmental relations.
2009
All states adopted their constitutions. No issues emerged on intergovernmental relations.
2010
In April 2010, there were elections at the state level in which the SPLM candidate won gubernatorial position in nine out of ten states in the South. In Central Equatoria State of Southern Sudan, an independent candidate won the elections. NCP candidates won the elections for the office of Governor in thirteen Northern States. In Blue Nile State, the SPLM won the election. Gubernatorial elections in Southern Kordofan were postponed as agreed upon by the CPA parties.
2011
Election in Southern Kordofan took place in May 2011. The result was disputed, which led to clashes between the Sudan Armed forces and SPLM/A.1Despite disputes related to elections results, no issues emerged regarding intergovernmental relations. Obligations and autonomy of governments at different levels were finalized in constitutions at the state level in 2006 and at southern Sudan and national levels in 2005.
Chapter II: Power Sharing (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 26th May, 2004)
Part I
1.5 Principles of Administration and Inter-Governmental Linkages:
1.5.1 In the administration of the Government of National Unity, the following provisions shall be respected:
1.5.1.1 There shall be a decentralized system of government with significant devolution of powers, having regard to the National, Southern Sudan, State, and Local levels of government;
1.5.1.2 The Interim National Constitution, being the legal and constitutional framework text adopted as contemplated in paragraph 2.12.6 herein, shall be the Supreme Law of the land and the Southern Sudan Constitution, state constitutions, and the laws of all levels of government must comply with it;
1.5.1.3 The linkage between the National Government and the states in the Southern Sudan shall be through the Government of Southern Sudan, subject to paragraph 1.5.1.4 below, and as provided for in the Interim National Constitution and the Southern Sudan Constitution;
1.5.1.4 In their relationships with each other or with other government organs, all levels of government and particularly National, Southern Sudan, and State Governments shall:
(a) Respect each others’ autonomy;
(b) Collaborate rather than compete, in the task of governing and assist each other in fulfilling each others’ constitutional obligations;
(c) Perform their functions and exercise their powers so as:
(i) Not to encroach on another level’s powers or functions;
(ii) Not to assume another level’s powers or functions conferred upon it by the Constitution;
(iii) To promote co-operation between them;
(iv) To promote open communication between government and levels of government;
(v) To strive to render assistance and support to other levels of government;
(vi) To advance the good co-ordination of governmental functions;
(vii) To adhere to procedures of interÂgovernmental interaction as agreed upon;
(viii) To promote amicable settlement of disputes before attempting litigation;
(ix) To respect the status and institutions of other levels of government.
(d) Allow the harmonious and collaborative interaction of the different levels of government within the context of national unity and for the achievement of a better quality of life for all.
Boundary Demarcation
2005
According to the Abyei Protocol, which was part of the 2005 CPA, the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) was to be composed of five members from the government, five from the SPLM/A, and five ‘international expertsÕ from the US, UK and the IGAD. The government was required to nominate two from the Messiriya and the SPLM/A from the neighbouring Dinka tribe in the Abyei area. The experts in the commission were to consult the British and other relevant archives. The ABC was instructed to determine the boundary to be included in the special administration. The commission was expected to deliver its final report by the end of pre-interim period or 9 July 2005.
According to the CPA mandate, the ABC started its work in April of 2005. The experts presented the rules of procedure for the ABC to the parties on 11 April 2005, which parties accepted. In rules of procedure, it was said that the “commission will endeavor to reach a decision by consensus. If, however, an agreed position by the two sides is not achieved, the experts will have the final say.”1 The government of Sudan and the SPLM/A members of the ABC submitted to the experts the two partiesÕ preliminary presentations. Then, the ABC flew to the town of Abyei. The ABC heard testimony from locals for six days. After the visit, the ABC flew to Nairobi, where they reviewed their notes and the testimony heard in southern Sudan and consulted with IGAD. The experts returned to Khartoum on 27 April and for the next two weeks examined historical documents and surveys. They also listened to the testimony of a group of Ngok Dinka and a group of Twich Dinka in Khartoum.2 According to the report, the experts also went to Oxford University where they examined documents and maps. Then, they travelled to the University of Durham. In England, the experts consulted experts and anthropologists. The government and the SPLM/A positions differed. The ABC submitted its report to the Presidency on 14 July 2005, five days past of the 9 July deadline. The presidency, however, failed to agree on the adoption of the report.3
- “Abyei Boundaries Commission Report- Part I, ” July 14, 2005, accessed January 18, 2012, http://gosscanada.org/pdf/abey_boundary_com_report-1.pdf.
- Ibid.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2006.
2006
The parties failed to approve and implement the ABC report. Nevertheless, in May 2006, the National Congress Party and the SPLM joint leadership meeting referred the deadlock over the report to its political sub-committee for consideration. The NCP-SPLM joint high political subcommittee considered four different options: a) reach a political agreement; b) call on the ABC experts to defend their recommendations; c) refer the matter to the Constitutional Court or d) seek arbitration by a third party. Nevertheless, the deadlock continued in 2006.1
2007
The deadlock on the ABC report continued. Nevertheless, at the invitation of government of southern Sudan and following strong criticism from the National Congress Party, the ABC experts went to southern Sudan to defend the commission’s finding. They stressed that the findings were based on scientific facts and they did not overstep their mandate.1
2008
Unable to resolve deadlock on the ABC report, the NCP and the SPLM joint political committee reached to a roadmap agreement that included four points dealing with security arrangements, the return of the displaced persons, the interim administration and the international arbitration tribunal. The agreement was signed by Sudanese president and the ceremony was attended by the First-Vice President on 10 July 2008.1 On 11 July 2008, the arbitration agreement was deposited with the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).3
- “Sudan: Plans for Interim Administration in Abyei Detailed,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, June 10, 2008.
- “Abyei Terms of Appointment,” PCA, 2008, accessed January 18, 2012, http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/Abyei_Terms_of_Appointment_signed_24… According to the Abyei Terms of Appointment, the GoS appointed two arbitrators on 14 August 2008 and the SPLM appointed two arbitrators on 15 August 2008. The presiding arbitrator (the fifth one) was appointed by PCA on 27 October 2008. The terms of appointment were signed by both sides and the five arbitrators on 24 November 2008. The SPLM and the GoS filed their memorials on 18 December 2008.2“Permanent Court of Arbitration,” The Government of Sudan / The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (Abyei Arbitration), accessed January 18, 2012, http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1306.
2009
International arbitration on Abyei continued its work. The GoS and SPLM submitted their counter memorials on 13 February 2009. The oral pleadings continued for six days from 18 April to 23 April 2009. The Tribunal rendered its final decision late in July 2009. “On 22 July 2009, the Abyei Arbitral Tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration rendered its decision in the Abyei dispute, finding that the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) had exceeded its mandate in some locations, but it also upheld ABC recommendations in others. The Tribunal determined that the Abyei Area’s northern boundary lies along latitude 10°10′ North, its western boundary along longitude 27°50′ East, and its eastern boundary along longitude 29°00′ East. The SPLM, NCP, and senior Misseriya and Ngok-Dinka tribal leaders all publicly reaffirmed their commitment to accept the PCA decision as final and binding.”1 The border technical team, which comprised three from ruling national congress party, three from SPLM, two from international communities and four invited independent journalists arrived in the area on 10 September 2009.2 Nonetheless, the demarcation of border stalled and was not completed in 2009.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2009.
- “Border technical demarcation team arrives in Sudan’s oil-rich Abyei region,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 11, 2009.
2010
The demarcation of border stalled in 2010. The parties were said to have talks over the disputed territory of Abyei on the north-south border in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa in November 2010.1 This issue, however, was not resolved in 2010.
2011
The dispute continued over border demarcation as well as over who was eligible to vote in the Abyei referendum. As a result, a referendum planned in Abyei on its future status was never held.1 As a matter of fact, Sudan invaded and occupied Abyei in May 2011.2Jeffrey Gettleman and Josh Kron, “Warnings of All-Out War in Fight Over Sudan Town,” New York Times, May 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/world/africa/23sudan.html?pagewanted=a… Sudan and South Sudan had agreed to pull their troops out of the disputed territory by the end of September 2011. The UN peacekeepers were deployed in the region to maintain peace as the disputed territory became a flashpoint between the north and the south.
- “Sudan, South Sudan to pull out troops from Abyei – UN,” BBC News Africa, September 9, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14849100.
ABYEI APPENDIX
UNDERSTANDING ON ABYEI BOUNDARIES COMMISSION
1. Upon signature, and notwithstanding Article 5.1 of the Protocol on Abyei, there shall be established by the Parties Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) to define and demarcate the Area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905, referred to herein as Abyei Area.
2. Pursuant to Article 5.2 of the Protocol on Abyei, the ABC shall be composed
as follows:-
2.1 One representative from each Party;
2.2 The Parties shall ask the US, UK and the IGAD to nominate five impartial experts knowledgeable in history, geography and any other relevant expertise. The ABC shall be chaired by one of those experts;
2.3 Each Party shall nominate two from the present two administrations of Abyei Area;
2.4 The GoS shall nominate two from the Messiriya;
2.5 The SPLM/A shall nominate two from the neighbouring Dinka tribes to the South of Abyei Area.
3. The ABC shall listen to representatives of the people of Abyei Area and the neighbours, and shall also listen to presentations of the two Parties.
4. In determining their findings, the Experts in the Commission shall consult the British Archives and other relevant sources on Sudan wherever they may be available, with a view to arriving at a decision that shall be based on scientific analysis and research. The experts shall also determine the rules of procedure of the ABC.
5. The ABC shall present its final report to the Presidency before the end of the Pre-Interim Period. The report of the experts, arrived at as prescribed in the ABC rules of procedure, shall be final and binding on the Parties.
6. The Presidency shall establish the administration of Abyei Area simultaneously with the Government of South Sudan and the Governments of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States by the beginning of the Interim Period.
7. In case the ABC delays presentation of the final report beyond the time prescribed above, the Presidency shall take necessary action to put the Abyei Area special status into effect with Abyei town as its seat subject to any readjustment or confirmation by the ABC final report.
8. Meanwhile, the two Parties shall issue appropriate instructions to their respective administrations in Abyei Area to facilitate the return of the citizens of the Area. The JIUs and the UN monitors shall facilitate and provide necessary protection to the IDPs.
9. The Parties shall issue an appeal to the International Community to make funds available for the formation and proper functioning of the ABC.
Electoral/Political Party Reform
2005
The 2005 CPA in Sudan sought several reforms related to political parties and electoral laws and institutions, including establishment of an impartial and representative election commissions. The election was scheduled for 2009 and no progress was made in terms of implementing the electoral system and political party reform provision of the 2005 CPA.1 Nevertheless, the July 2005 interim constitution secures universal adult suffrage (article 42(2)).
2006
The election was scheduled for 2009 and no progress was made in terms of implementing the electoral system and political party reform provision of the 2005 CPA.
2007
The national assembly adopted the Political Parties Act on 6 February 2007. The Debate over the Political Parties Act was very contentious especially on issues related to registration and dissolution of the parties. Initially, the draft bill had provisions that the court could dissolve political parties. This issue was resolved by requiring the dissolution of political parties upon the decision of the Constitutional Court on the basis of a case raised by a two-third majority of the Political Parties Council, if it is proven before the court that the party violated article 40(3) of Interim National Constitution. The provision, however, was refused by the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). The National Congress Party demanded tougher requirement for party registration (Article 4 of the Act). The Act was adopted in the absence of NDA. The Act was signed by the president on 6 February 2007.1 The Act repeals the Political Parties and Organizations Act of 2001 and establishes a Council known as Political Parties Affairs Act.
2008
On July 7 2008, the National Assembly passed the National Elections Act by 350 votes and 14 opposed, while two legislators abstained. The total number of MPs who participated in the vote was 366.1 The National Election Act adopts a mixed electoral system with 60% of National Assembly’s 450 members elected through the majority votes in geographical constituencies and 40% by proportional representation party lists, of which 25% was allocated to a separate women’s party list and 15% for political party lists. For the PR seats, the parties must receive 4% of the overall votes. This act was signed into law on 14 July 2008.2 Chapter Two of the Election Act provides for the establishment of an independent National Election Commission. The commission is composed of nine members appointed by the president with consultation of First-Vice President and approval of two-third members of the National Assembly. The National Election Commission’s composition is said to be inclusive of representation by including women and other civil society groups.
On November 17 2008, the National Assembly endorsed the members of the National Election Commission. The endorsed members were Abel Alier, Chairman; Abdallah Ahmed Abdallah, Deputy Chairman; and Fillister Baya, Mahassin Haj Al-Saffi, James Bol Kajmal, Abdallah Ballah Al-Hardalou, Mohamed Taha Abu Samrah, Mukhtar Al-Asam and Al-Hadi Mohamed Ahmed Hassabou.3
- “Sudan Parliament Passes Election Law,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, July 8, 2008.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2009.
- Ibid.
2009
With the establishment of an independent National Election Commission in 2008, political party and electoral system reform provisions of the 2005 CPA were fully implemented. Nevertheless, the National Election Commission delayed general election until February 2010. The election was originally scheduled for July of 2009. For the second time, the Election Commission, on 30 June 2009, released a revised electoral calendar and rescheduled the election for 5-12 April 2010.1
2010
Elections were held in April 2010 as scheduled. In the National Assembly, the National Congress party won a total of 312 seats, the SPLM won 99 seats, the Popular Congress Party won four seats, Federal UMMA Party won three seats, the Democratic Unionist Party won four seats, Democratic Unionist Party-Original won one seat, SPLM-DC won two seats, UMMA Reform & Development two seats, National UMMA Party won one seat, independent candidate won one seat, and the Muslim Brotherhood won one seat.1
2011
The provisions became obsolete with the secession of southern Sudan in 9 July 2011.
Chapter II: Power Sharing (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 26th May, 2004)
1.4 The Parties agree that the following principles shall guide the distribution of powers and the establishment of structures:
1.4.6 Recognizing the need to legitimize the arrangements agreed to herein, fair electoral laws shall be adopted, including the free establishment of political parties. Elections at all levels of government shall be held by universal adult suffrage.
2.2.3 The National Legislature shall be structured and operate as follows:-
2.2.3.1 The National Assembly shall be elected in accordance with the procedures set forth by an impartial. and representative Electoral Commission and in accordance with fair electoral laws;
2.10 Other Independent and/or National Institutions to be Established in Accordance with the Peace Agreement:
2.10.1 The National Constitutional Review Commission, as detailed in Section 2.12 herein, shall also detail the mandate and provide for the appointment and other mechanisms to ensure the independence of the following institutions:-
2.10.1.1 An impartial and representative National Electoral Commission;
Territorial Powersharing
2005
The 2005 CPA allowed the SPLM to maintain its control over southern Sudan as per the border of 1/1/1956. According to this provision, the SPLM troops were said to be redeployed south of the north-south border. At the same time, the accord established the executive, legislative and judicial branch of the government of southern Sudan. The accord provides for a power-sharing arrangement within the executive and legislative branch of the government of southern Sudan.
According to the 2005 CPA, SPLM Chairman Dr. John Garang was appointed and sworn in as vice president of Sudan on 9 July 2005. As president of southern Sudan, Garang issued a decree to dissolve all governments of the 10 southern states of southern Sudan and relieve all governors, minister, advisors and commissioners of their positions and instead announced an interim administration.1 After Garang’s death in a helicopter crash, Salva Kiir Mayardiit became first vice president of Sudan and president of southern Sudan.2 Pending the adoption of the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, the care-taker Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) was appointed on 22 October 2005 and sworn in on 25 October. The government was composed with representatives from 10 southern states and the National Congress Party from the North. The government was dominated by Dinka ethnic group; small tribes were not represented in the government. Similarly, Muslims were not included.3
First Vice-President Kiir appointed the Transitional Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly (TSSLA) by issuing a decree on 20 September 2005. The assembly had 161 members: 110 from SPLM, 25 from NCP, and 26 from other Southern political parties (seven from Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP), three from Sudanese African National Union (SANU), four from United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF), four from Southern Sudan Democratic Forum (SSDF), four from United Democratic Front (UDF), and four from USAP2 (splinter of USAP)). The Assembly convened its first session on 26 September 2005 and elected Mr. James Wani Igga (SPLM) as Speaker and Mr. Tor Deng (NCP) as Deputy Speaker.4
The Transitional Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly approved the draft interim constitution of southern Sudan in October 2005 and the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan was signed into law on 5 December 2005.5
The CPA had provisions for the establishment of Supreme Court of Southern Sudan and other lower courts. Ambrose Riiny was appointed as President of the Supreme Court of Southern Sudan.6
- “Sudan’s New First Vice President Sets Up Interim Administration for South,” AP Worldstream, July 19, 2005.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
2006
Provisions related to territorial power-sharing were implemented in 2005.
2007
No developments observed this year.
2008
No developments observed this year.
2009
No developments observed this year.
2010
No developments observed this year.
2011
With the secession of southern Sudan on 9 July 2011, the territorial power-sharing provision of the accord became obsolete.
Annexure I: Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 31st December 2004)
18.3. SPLA commits to redeploy its forces pursuant to Article 3 (c) and Article 4 (c)
(V) (a) of the Agreement on Security Arrangements as detailed below.
18.4. The SPLA forces in the eastern Sudan shall be redeployed to the south of North/South border of 1/1/1956 beginning from pre-interim period according to the following steps:
a) Reduction by thirty percent (30%) by D-day + four months.
b) Reduction by fourty percent (40%) by D-day+ 8 months.
c) Complete redeployment of the remainder thirty percent (30%) by D-day 12 months.
18.5. The SPLA shall complete redeployment of its excess forces from Southern Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains within six months of the deployment of the JIUs in those areas.
Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement
Chapter II: Power Sharing (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 26th May, 2004)
PART III
3. Government of Southern Sudan
In respect of the Southern Sudan, there shall be a Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), as per the borders of 1/1/56, which shall consist of:
3.1.1 The Legislature of Southern Sudan;
3.1.2 The Executive of Southern Sudan;
3.1.3 The Judiciary of Southern Sudan;
3.2 The Government of Southern Sudan shall function in accordance with a Southern Sudan Constitution, which shall be drafted by an inclusive Southern Sudan Constitutional Drafting Committee and adopted by the Transitional Assembly of Southern Sudan by a two-thirds (2/3) majority of all members. It shall conform with the Interim National Constitution.
3.3 The powers of the Government of Southern Sudan shall be as set forth in Schedules B and D, read together with Schedules E and F, the Interim National Constitution, Southern Sudan Constitution, and the Peace Agreement.
3.4 A primary responsibility of the Government of Southern Sudan will be to act as an authority in respect of the States of Southern Sudan, to act as a link with the National Government and to ensure that the rights and interests of the people of Southern Sudan are safeguarded during the Interim Period.
3.5 Legislature of Southern Sudan
3.5.1 Pending the elections, the First Southern Sudan Assembly shall be an inclusive, constituent legislature comprised of:
3.5.1.1 The SPLM shall be represented by Seventy Percent (70%);
3.5.1.2 The NCP shall be represented by Fifteen Percent (15%);
3.5.1.3 The other Southern political forces shall be represented by Fifteen Percent (15%).
3.5.2 The Southern Sudan Assembly shall, in accordance with the Constitution adopted by it, provide for the election of its Speaker and other office holders.
3.5.3 When enacting the Constitution of Southern Sudan, the Assembly of Southern Sudan shall be empowered to assign such powers as set forth in Schedules B and D, read together with Schedules E and F, to the Government of Southern Sudan.
3.5.4 The Southern Sudan Constitution shall make provision for the Assembly of Southern Sudan to be reconstituted through elections in accordance with the provisions herein related to the timing of general elections. The Constitution of the Southern Sudan shall also make provision for the election of the President and appointment of the Vice President of the Government of Southern Sudan. Such elections shall be in accordance with the provisions set forth by the National Electoral Commission specified in sub-paragraph 2.10.1.1 herein.
3.5.5 The Assembly of Southern Sudan may amend the Constitution of the Southern Sudan by a two-thirds (2/3) majority vote of all members.
3.5.6 Apart from applicable national legislation, legislative authority in Southern Sudan shall be vested in the Assembly of Southern Sudan. It shall establish its own offices, committees and rules of procedure. It shall elect a Speaker and Deputy Speaker and other officers at its first meeting.
3.6 The Southern Sudan Executive
3.6.1 An Executive Council of Ministers appointed by the President of the Government of Southern Sudan, in consultation with his/her Vice President and approved by the Assembly of Southern Sudan, shall be established in accordance with the Southern Sudan Constitution. The Executive Council of Ministers shall be accountable to the President of the Government of Southern Sudan and the Southern Sudan Assembly in the performance of their functions and may be removed by a motion supported by two-thirds (eh» of all the members of the Southern Sudan Assembly.
3.6.2 The Executive Authority of Southern Sudan shall establish such independent institutions as the Peace Agreement, the Interim National Constitution and the Southern Sudan Constitution contemplate. It shall be empowered to establish such further commissions and institutions compatible with its powers as it deems necessary to promote the welfare of its people, good governance and justice.
3.6.3 The Government of Southern Sudan shall be established with due regard to the need for inclusiveness.
3.6.4 Prior to elections, the Government of Southern Sudan shall be allocated as follows:
3.6.4.1 The SPLM shall be represented by Seventy Percent (70%);
3.6.4.2 The NCP shall be represented by Fifteen Percent (15%);
3.6.4.3 The other Southern political forces shall be represented by Fifteen Percent (15%).
3.6.5 The Government of Southern Sudan shall discharge its obligations and exercise such rights and powers in regard to administration, security, financial, and development issues as is set forth in the Southern Sudan Constitution, the Interim National Constitution, the Peace Agreement and any other agreement relating to the reconstruction and development of the Southern Sudan.
3.6.6 (a) Should the post of the President of GoSS fall vacant, and pending the nomination and swearing in of the new President, the functions of the President shall be assumed by the Vice President of GoSS;
(b) Should the post of the President of GoSS fall vacant in the period prior to elections, the Office of the President of GoSS shall be filled by a nominee of the SPLM within two (2) weeks;
(c) Should the post of the President fall vacant in the period after the elections, the post shall be filled through elections which shall be held within sixty (60) days.
3.7 The Judiciary of Southern Sudan
3.7.1 There shall be at the Southern Sudan Level:
3.7.1.1 A Supreme Court of Southern Sudan;
3.7.1.2 Courts of Appeal; and
3.7.1.3 Any such other courts or tribunals as deemed necessary to be established in accordance with the Southern Sudan Constitution and the law.
3.7.2 The Constitution of Southern Sudan shall provide for a Supreme Court for Southern Sudan which shall be the highest court in the South and to which appeals may lie from Southern state courts or other Courts of Southern Sudan on matters brought under or relating to Southern state, Southern Sudan or National law, as may be determined by the Constitution of Southern Sudan.
3.7.3 The Southern Sudan Supreme Court shall:
3.73.1 Be the court of final judicial instance in respect of any litigation or prosecution under Southern State or Southern Sudan law, including statutory and customary law, save that any decisions arising under National Laws shall be subject to review and decision by the National Supreme Court;
3.7.3.2 Have original jurisdiction to decide on disputes that arise under the Constitution of Southern Sudan and the constitutions of Southern Sudan states at the instance of individuals, juridical entities or of government;
3.7.3.3 Adjudicate on the constitutionality of laws and set aside or strike down laws or provisions of laws that contradict the Constitution of Southern Sudan or the constitutions of Southern Sudan states;
3.7.3.4 Be a court of review and cassation in respect of any criminal or civil matter arising out or under Southern Sudan Laws.
3.7.3.5 Have criminal jurisdiction over the President and Vice President of the Government of Southern Sudan and the Speaker of Southern Sudan Legislature;
3.7.3.6 Review death sentences imposed by Southern Sudan courts in respect of matters arising out of or under Southern Sudan Laws;
3.7.3.7 Have such other jurisdictions as determined by Southern Sudan Constitution, the Peace Agreement and the Law.
3.7.4 Judges of the Courts of Southern Sudan shall perform their functions without political interference, shall be independent, and shall administer the law without fear or favour. The provisions of the Southern Sudan Constitution and the Law shall protect their independence.
3.7.5 Without prejudice to Sub-paragraph 2.11.4.4, the Legislature of Southern Sudan shall provide for appointments, terms of service and dismissal of Southern Sudan appointed Judges.
Decentralization/Federalism
2005
The 2005 CPA had provisions for the executive, legislative and judiciary at the state level. This provision was institutionalized by the 2005 interim constitution which was adopted by National Assembly and the SPLM National Liberation Council on 6 July 2005 and came into effect on 9 July 2005.1 The interim constitution’s article 24 provided that the Sudan is a decentralized state with the government at the national level, southern Sudan level of government, and state level of government and the local level of government. The constitution recognized autonomy status of the government of southern Sudan.
There are 25 states in Sudan: 15 in northern Sudan and 10 in southern Sudan. According to the CPA, prior to the elections in these states, the SPLM will have 70% of the positions in the executive and legislative branch of the state government in 10 southern states; and the National Congress Party will have 70% of the positions in 15 northern states. The remaining 20% positions both at the executive and legislative branch were allocated to other parties and groups.
According to the CPA provision, the President appointed governors for 14 northern states on 27 August 2005, and the governor of Southern Kordofan on 20 October 2005. Similarly, ten governors of southern states were appointed on 22 October 2005 by the first-vice president and president of southern Sudan.2 The southern state governments were sworn in December 2005.
No significant development took place in terms of state legislatures and state judiciary.
2006
By 19 December 2006, all of the fifteen Northern states had adopted a Constitution. The southern states had yet to adopt a constitution.1 In November 2006, chief judge of the Supreme Court of Southern Sudan announced the completion of appointments of all judges and justices in the 10 southern states.2
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
- “New Judges Appointed in 10 Southern Sudan States,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, November 2, 2006.
2007
After much wrangling over the compatibility of the constitution of southern states, all 10 southern states received compatibility certificate and adopted the state constitution by July 2007.1
2008
All states adopted their constitutions. The northern and southern states established power-sharing executive and legislative branches. This confirms the implementation of the 2005 CPA provision on decentralization/federalism.
2009
All states adopted their constitutions. The northern and southern states established power-sharing executive and legislative branches. This confirms the implementation of the 2005 CPA provision on decentralization/federalism.
2010
In April 2010, there were elections at the state level in which the SPLM candidate won the gubernatorial position in nine out of ten states in the South. In the Central Equatoria State of southern Sudan, an independent candidate won the election. NCP candidates won the elections for the office of Governor in thirteen out of fifteen Northern States. Gubernatorial elections in Southern Kordofan postponed as agreed upon by the CPA parties. In the Blue Nile State, the SPLM won the election. This completes the decentralization/federalism provision of the 2005 CPA as parties moved from power-sharing executive and legislature to the elected executive and legislature with no power-sharing arrangements.
2011
Provisions related to federalism/decentralization were implemented. Gubernatorial elections in South Kordofan took place in May 2011 in which the NCP candidate won the election. The result was disputed because the SPLM withdrew from vote sorting and did not recognize the result.1 The result dispute sparked clashes in the area. This issue still is contentious even after southern Sudan’s secession on 9 July 2011.
Chapter II: Power Sharing (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 26th May, 2004)
PART IV
4. Institutions at the State level
4.1 The Institutions at the State level shall consist of:
4.1.1 The State Legislature;
4.1.2 The State Executive; and
4.1.3 The State Judiciary.
4.2 There shall be legislative, executive, and judicial institutions at state level which shall function in accordance with this Agreement, the Interim National Constitution and, in respect of the states of Southern Sudan, also with the Constitution of Southern Sudan.
4.3 Local Government is an important level of Government and its election, organization and proper functioning shall be the responsibility of the states, in accordance with the relevant state constitution.
4.4 The State Legislature
4.4.1 There shall be a State Legislature comprised of members elected in accordance with the electoral provisions herein and as set forth by the National Electoral Commission referred to in sub-paragraph 2.10.1.1 herein.
4.4.2 Pending the elections referred to in sub-article 4.4.1 herein, the composition of the state legislatures shall be comprised as follows:
4.4.2.1. The NCP is to hold Seventy Percent (70%) in the Northern states, and the SPLM Seventy Percent (70%) in the Southern states;
4.4.2.2. The remaining Thirty Percent (30%) in the Northern and the Southern states shall be allocated as follows:
(i) Ten Percent (10%) in the Southern states to be filled by the NCP;
(ii) Ten Percent (10%) in the Northern states to be filled by the SPLM; and
(iii) Twenty Percent (20%) in the Northern and Southern states to be filled by representatives of other Northern and Southern political forces respectively.
4.4.3. The elections referred to in sub-article 4.4.1. herein shall take place on the same date as the elections for the National Assembly referred to in Section 1.8.3.
4.4.4. The state legislatures shall prepare and adopt state constitutions provided that they are in conformity with the National Constitution, the Peace Agreement, and for Southern States, also in conformity with the Constitution of Southern Sudan.
4.4.5. The State Legislature shall have law-making competency in respect of the functional areas listed in Schedules C and D, read together with Schedules E and F.
4.4.6. Members of the State Legislature and the State Council of Ministers, including the Governor, shall have such immunities as are provided by law.
4.4.7. The State Legislature shall decide its own rules, procedures, and committees, and elect its Speaker and other officers.
4.5 The State Executive
4.5.1 Prior to elections the state executives shall be allocated as follows:
4.5.1.1 The NCP is to hold Seventy Percent (70%) in the Northern states, and the SPLM Seventy Percent (70%) in the Southern states;
4.5.1.2 The remaining Thirty Percent (30%) in the Northern and the Southern states shall be allocated as follows:
(i) Ten Percent (10%) in the Southern states to be filled by the NCP;
(ii) Ten Percent (10%) in the Northern states to be filled by the SPLM; and
(iii) Twenty Percent (20%) in the Northern and Southern states to be filled by representatives of other Northern and Southern political forces, respectively.
4.5.2 As part of the Ten Percent (10%) share of the NCP in Southern states the two Parties agreed as follows:
(i) The Governor of one Southern State shall be a nominee of the NCP;
(ii) One Deputy Governor in a different Southern State shall be a nominee of the NCP.
4.5.3 The States’ Council of Ministers shall be appointed by the Governor in accordance with the State Constitution, having regard to the need for inclusiveness. The State Ministers shall be accountable to the Governor and the State Legislature in the performance of their functions and may be removed by the Governor on a motion supported by two-thirds (e/3» of all the members of the State Legislature.
4.5.4 The Governor shall, together with the States’ Council of Ministers appointed by him/her, exercise the executive powers of the state which shall be in respect of the functional areas listed in Schedules C and D, read together with Schedules E and F, and such other are conferred upon the State by the Interim National Constitution, the Southern Sudan Constitutions, the State Constitutions, and the Peace Agreement.
4.5.5 State Governors must sign any law duly approved by the State Legislature, failing which, after thirty (30) days it shall be deemed to have been signed into law by the State Governor. Where the State Governor withholds his/her signature, he/she must present reasons for his/her refusal to so sign when reintroducing the bill to the State Legislature within the 30-day period stated within. The Bill shall become law if the State Legislature again passes the bill by two-thirds ((2/3)) majority of all the members and the assent of the Governor shall not be required.
4.6 State Judicial Institutions
4.6.1 The State Constitutions shall provide for the establishment of such state courts by the State Judiciary as necessary.
4.6.2 State legislation must provide for:
4.6.2.1 The appointment and dismissal of State-appointed judges (lay magistrates); and
4.6.2.2 Guarantees of the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and ensure that judges shall not be subject to political or other interference.
4.6.3 State Courts shall have civil and criminal jurisdiction in respect of State, Southern Sudan, and National Laws, save that a right of appeal shall lie as provided in this Agreement.
4.6.4 Notwithstanding sub-paragraph 4.6.3, the National Legislature shall determine the civil and criminal procedures to be followed in respect of litigation or prosecution under National laws in accordance with the Interim National Constitution.
4.6.5 The structures and powers of the Courts of the States of Southern Sudan shall be subject to the provisions of this Agreement and the Constitution of Southern Sudan.
Civil Administration Reform
2005
The 2005 accord contained provisions related to civil service reform in Sudan. It proposed establishing a National Civil Service Commission (NCSC) to address imbalance in the National Civil Service while formulating policies aimed at training and recruiting 20% to 30% from southern Sudan, notably at the Senior and middle-levels, within six years. Along with making the civil service a representative of the people of Sudan, the accord ensures fair competition for jobs and forbids discrimination based on religion, ethnicity, region, gender or political beliefs.
Along with promoting the representation of southern Sudan in civil service, simply establishing the civil service in southern Sudan was crucial. As a matter of fact, southern Sudan lacked meaningful civil administration and the SPLM/A sought to transform itself “into peace-time political, military and civil administrations.”1 Nevertheless, no action was taken to reform civil service in Sudan; neither did the government of southern Sudan have meaningful civil administration. It was said that the civil service and associated management systems and institutions to oversee development programs needed to be established from scratch.2
- “Sudan; Statesman’s Clear Vision for Future of Free Sudan,” Africa News, January 9, 2005.
- “WORLD BANK: Southern Sudan Receives Assistance for Recovery,” M2 Presswire, December 2, 2005.
2006
It was reported that a preparatory team had formed to establish six CPA commissions including a National Civil Service Commission. Also, some progress was said made in terms of the drafting of the Civil Service Act and the National Service Act at the national level, which were pre-requisites for the establishment of the National Civil Service Commission. By the end of March 2006, the commission preparatory team had prepared a draft law, according to which the commission was said to remain an advisory body to the Ministry of Labour.1 Despite this progress, there was delay in reshaping the national civil service into a more representative and professional institution, which was said to be one of the contentious issues.2
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
- “Sudan: Speech of Vice-President Kiir at Ruling Party NC, SPLM Leadership Meeting,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, May 28, 2006.
2007
The National Civil Service Bill was adopted by the National Assembly on 23 January 2007. By issuing a decree on 26 July 2007, the Presidency established the National Civil Service Commission (NCCS). Prof. Moses Machar was appointed as chairman of the NCCS. The NCCS had 10 members who were appointed 4 August 2007 and met for the first time on 22 August. In September, the NCSC agreed to “establish a joint committee to follow up on the implementation of the allocation of 20%-30% of the civil service posts to the Southerners as per the provisions of the CPA, Interim National Constitution and the 2007 Civil Service Commission Act.”1 No information is available on the implementation of the percentage of civil service positions allocated to the southern Sudan. Nevertheless, some progress was made especially after the establishment of the joint committee.
The situation of civil service in southern Sudan remained as it was. The government was said to be having difficulty with regards to completing accurate civil service and military headcounts and reviews.2 Also, it was suggested that a considerable number of combatants from different armed groups were absorbed in the civil service sector.3
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
- “Sudan; CPA Was Doomed – None of the Signatories Had Any Conviction,” Africa News, October 23, 2007.
- “Sudan: Army, SPLA to Absorb over 54,000 Men from Armed Groups in South,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, June 24, 2007.
2008
The NCSC, as reported by the government media, had completed the first stage in accommodating 20% of the civil service national positions allocated for the south Sudan citizens. According to the NCSC’s secretary general, the commission was coordinating with the civil service recruitment committee in Khartoum.1 The appointment process, however, started only in June. According to a news report, around 1,500 graduates from southern Sudan began to occupy the 20% of the public posts in the government ministries and departments.2 The reform of civil service, however, was behind the originally agreed upon schedule. In August, it was reported that the NCSC chairman revealed that 700 among those interviewed in June were recruited to join public service. This represents 10% of the agreed to 20% to 30% of vacancies in public service. The remaining 10% of the allocated quota was said to be completed after population census (Source: Some 700 Southern Sudan Graduates “Recruited” into Public Service, BBC Monitoring Middle East, 10 August 2008). In September, it was reported that the Ministry of Labour had finished technical arrangements to absorb 20% southerners in public services.3
- “Sudan Completes Arrangements for Civil Service Recruitment of Southerners,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, January 5, 2008.
- “Sudan Government Reportedly Employing more Southerners to Address Imbalance,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, June 14, 2008.
- “Sudan: Labour Ministry to Absorb Southerners into Public Service,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 6, 2008.
2009
It was reported that the members of other armed groups who joined the peace process were absorbed into civil service.1 Also, the energy ministry reported that it handed over a list of the vacant posts to the NCSC to be filled by citizens from southern Sudan.2 By the end of 2009, it was reported that the Presidency approved 1,150 southern Sudanese candidates for appointment in the National Civil Service. Also, the Southern Kordofan State formed a special committee to facilitate the integration of 1,708 SPLM civil servants into the political and administrative structure of the state in November of 2009.3 Given that the appointment of 700 southerners in 2008 was said to meet the 10% civil service positions, it can be said that the civil service reform provisions of the accord were implemented.
- “Ex-eastern Sudan Rebel Chief Says Peace Accord Represents Move to End Suffering,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, October 20, 2009.
- “Sudan Adopts Transparency Principal on Oil Production — Official,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, August 17, 2009.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, January 2010.
2010
No detailed information is available with regards to civil service reform in 2010. Given that the appointment of 700 southerners in 2008 was said to meet the 10% civil service positions, the appointed 1,150 southerners in National Civil Service and 1,708 SPLM civil servants into the political and administrative structure of the Southern Kordofan State meet the CPA provisions for civil service reform.
2011
The provisions related to civil service reform were implemented. Nevertheless, with the referendum that led to the successful secession, it is not clear whether the southerners holding civil service positions at the national level were dismissed or not. This provision became obsolete.
Chapter II: Power Sharing (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 26th May, 2004)
2.6 Civil Service:
2.6.1 The Government of National Unity shall also ensure that the National Civil Service, notably at the senior and middle-levels, is representative of the people of Sudan. In so doing, the following principles shall be recognized:
2.6.1.1 Imbalances and disadvantages which exist must be redressed;
2.6.1.2 Merit is important and training is necessary;
2.6.1.3 There must be fair competition for jobs in the National Civil Service;
2.6.1.4 No level of government shall discriminate against any qualified Sudanese citizen on the basis of religion, ethnicity, region, gender, or political beliefs;
2.6.1.5 The National Civil Service will fairly represent all the people of the Sudan and will utilize affirmative action and job training to achieve equitable targets for representation within an agreed time frame;
2.6.1.6 Additional educational opportunities shall be created for war-affected people.
2.6.2 In, order to create a sense of national belonging and address imbalances in the National Civil Service, a National Civil Service Commission shall be established with the task of:
2.6.2.1 Formulating policies for training and recruitment into the civil service, targeting between Twenty-Thirty Percent (20% -30%) of the positions, confirmed upon the outcome of the census referred to herein, for people of South Sudan who qualify;
2.6.2.2 Ensuring that not less than Twenty Percent (20%) of the middle and upper level positions in the National Civil Service (including the positions of Under Secretaries) are filled with qualified persons from the South within the first three years and achieving Twenty Five Percent (25%) in five (5) years and the final target figure referred to in sub-paragraph 2.6.2.1 above, within six (6) years; and
2.6.2.3 Reviewing, after the first three (3) years of the beginning of the Interim Period the progress made as a result of the policies and setting new goals and targets as necessary, taking into account the census results.
Truth or Reconciliation Mechanism
2005
The 2005 CPA provided that the national unity government would work out mechanisms and forms for national reconciliation. The CPA also suggested that the presidency would start peace and reconciliation process for Abyei.
No significant efforts were made to promote the national reconciliation process by the national unity government in 2005. Similarly, the presidency was divided and it failed to make the decisions required to implement the report submitted by the Abyei Boundary Commission.1 The division within the presidency and the National Congress Party and the SPLM on boundary report did not help the initiation of the peace and reconciliation process for Abyei.
Nevertheless, a delegation from the Sudanese Peace and Reconciliation Commission of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement went to Rwanda to learn from its reconciliation experience, focusing especially on its unity and reconciliation process, the repatriation of refugees, and the establishment of an unique armed force.2
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2006.
- “South Sudan Delegation Visiting Rwanda to Learn About Reconciliation Process,” BBC Monitoring Africa, November 12, 2005.
2006
The training workshops were organized and designed to help develop programs for the youth as part of a sports for peace initiative and organized in South Sudan were very effective medium in the reconciliation process. Other mechanisms and attempts that the national unity government made to facilitate the reconciliation process remained unclear. So far as the reconciliation and peace in Abyei is concerned, the deadlock on implementing the boundary commission’s report continued in 2006.1
2007
While president Al-Bashir called for National reconciliation in January 2007, the parties had major differences on implementation of the CPA and lacked trust of each other. In October 2007, the SPLM pulled out of the government citing a failure to begin a national reconciliation process, among other things.1
In Abyei, the deadlock over the boundary commission’s report continued. That being said, however, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) initiated several confidence-building initiatives in response to issues related to migration including a peace conference between the Dinka Ngok and the Misseriya tribal groups.2
- “Sudan; SPLA Pulls Out of Government,” Africa News, October 12, 2007.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
2008
Some attempts were made in terms of promoting the national reconciliation process. President Al-Bashir, in his opening address to the National Legislature on 13 October 2008, affirmed the government’s commitment to implement the outcomes of the dialogue and affirmed the government’s determination to boost national accord and reconciliation processes.1 In addition, the SPLM and 9 Southern Sudan Political Parties held a dialogue conference in Juba between 8 and13 November 2008. Salva Kiir, who was the 1st Vice President of the Republic, the President of the Government of Southern Sudan, and the Chairman of the SPLM, had organized the conference in order to promote dialogue among the parties. Among the resolutions and recommendation of the conference was a national reconciliation and healing process for which the all political parties were called upon by the conference to participate in peace and reconciliation processes throughout the country.2 In Abyei, the NCP and the SPLM joint political committee reached to a roadmap agreement that included four points dealing with security arrangements, the return of the displaced persons, the interim administration, and the international arbitration tribunal. The agreement was signed by Sudanese president and the ceremony was attended by the First-Vice President on 10 July 2008.3
- “Sudan: Al-Bashir Affirms ‘Determination to Boost National Accord’ Process,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, October 17, 2008.
- “Resolutions of South- South Sudan Dialogue Conference,” Sudan Tribune, November 19, 2008.
- “Sudan: Plans for Interim Administration in Abyei Detailed,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, June 10, 2008.
2009
A group of legislators from the southern Sudan went to Rwanda in early May to learn that country’s unity and reconciliation process.1 In his speech at all Sudanese Political Parties Conference in Juba, the First Vice president highlighted the need for a genuine process of reconciliation, healing, forgiveness and confidence-building.2 The lack of a reconciliation process was one of the factors making the unity of Sudan less attractive to southern Sudan.3
On the Abyei issue, the International Tribunal made its decision and upheld the recommendation of the border commission.4 The border was not demarcated due to political differences.
- “Rwanda; South Sudan MPs Here for Reconciliation Experience,” Africa News, May 5, 2009.
- “Salva Kiir’s speech at All Sudan Political Parties Conference in Juba,” Sudan Tribune, September 29, 2009.
- “Sudan; Statement on Peace Process in the South,” Africa News, December 1, 2009.
- “Border technical demarcation team arrived in Sudan’s oil-rich Abyei region,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 11, 2009.
2010
The border demarcation issue was not resolved in 2010 and because of this, a fear of Abyei becoming a conflict flashpoint remained very high. A delegation from the government of Southern Sudan went to Rwanda to learn from their experience with the reconciliation process and was impressed with the work of National Unity and Reconciliation Commission.1 The team also visited the Ministry of Defense to understand the role of army in the reconciliation process.2 In September, the SPML deputy chairman said that the SPLM was committed to unity, but pointed out that the parties to the CPA (SPLM and the NCP-led government) “did not work in building trust amongst themselves and neglected the national reconciliation process which could have removed psychological barriers between the north and the south.”3
- “Sudan; South Sudan Delegation Impressed By NURC,” Africa News, June 1, 2010.
- “Rwanda; South Sudan Delegation Visits MoD,” Africa News, June 5, 2010.
- “Southern Sudan deputy says SPLM still committed to support unity,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 26, 2010.
2011
With the referendum for the secession of southern Sudan, the parties failed to promote national reconciliation and peace. The issue of Abyei remained as it was. Sudan and South Sudan had agreed to pull their troops out of the disputed territory by the end of September 2011. UN peacekeepers were deployed in the area to maintain peace as the disputed territory became a flashpoint between the north and the south.
Chapter II: Power Sharing (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 26th May, 2004)
1.7. Reconciliation
The Parties agree to initiate a comprehensive process of national reconciliation and healing throughout the country as part of the peace building process. Its mechanisms and forms shall be worked out by the Government of National Unity.
2.5.9. The Government of National Unity shall implement an information campaign throughout Sudan in all national languages in Sudan to popularize the Peace Agreement, and to foster national unity, reconciliation and mutual understanding.
Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement
Chapter IV: The Resolution of the Abyei Conflict (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 26th May, 2004)
9. Reconciliation Process
Upon signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Presidency shall, as a matter of urgency, start peace and reconciliation process for Abyei that shall work for harmony and peaceful co-existence in the Area.
Dispute Resolution Committee
2005
According to the 2005 CPA, all disputes related to the implementation of the ceasefire agreement would be referred to the Presidency as a last resort for dispute settlement. The agreement contained provisions for dispute settlement related to the implementation of the ceasefire agreement at lower levels. As provided, the Joint Military Team (JMT) was to monitor, verify and report alleged violations to the appropriate Area Joint Military Committee (AJMC). The AJMC was to monitor and verify alleged violations and resolve disputes. The AJMC was also instructed to refer unresolved complaints to Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC). The Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC) was to settle deadlocks arising from the ceasefire implementation as reported by the CJMC, and was to refer the unresolved ones to the Presidency.
All these mechanisms to settle disputes related to the implementation of ceasefire settlement were in place in 2005. The Ceasefire Political Commission was established on 27 August 2005 by presidential decree and its membership announced on 1 November 2005.1
2006
Even with the establishment of a dispute resolution mechanism related to the implementation of ceasefire provisions, the mechanism did not function quite as well as intended. Many issues remained unresolved due to a deadlock within the Ceasefire Political Commission as well as at the level of the presidency.
2007
No developments observed this year.
2008
No developments observed this year.
2009
The CPA provides for the freedom of movement of the UN Monitors throughout the Ceasefire Zone. However, their movement was oftentimes restricted by both sides. The JMT refereed the issue at various Ceasefire Joint Military Committee meetings and the CJMC had been regularly referred to CPC. Nevertheless, the CPC could not resolve the dispute.1
2010
No developments observed this year.
2011
Even with the establishment of a dispute resolution mechanism related to the implementation of ceasefire provisions, the mechanism did not function quite as well as intended. Many issues remained unresolved due to a deadlock within the Ceasefire Political Commission as well as at the level of the presidency. In its meeting the CJMC requested CPC to approach the Joint Defense Board to form a Board of Inquiry to investigate the 1 May 2011 invasion in the Abyei area. Issues referred to the Ceasefire Political Commission, however, often were left unresolved due to deadlock.1
Annexure I: Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 31st December 2004)
10.1. The following acts shall constitute violations to this Agreement:
10.5. The Parties agree that any deadlock arising out of the implementation of the ceasefire shall be referred, as of last resort, to the Presidency for consideration and action after having exhausted all avenues of dispute management at all lower levels;
13. Verification, Monitoring, Complaints and Obligations
13.1 The structure and levels of monitoring and verification of the implementation of this Agreement shall be as follows:
13.1.1. Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC)
13.1.2. Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC)
13.1.3. Area Joint Military Committee (AJMC)
13.1.4. Joint Military Teams (JMTs)
14. The Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC)
14.1 The CPC shall be answerable to the Presidency;
14.2 The CPC shall be a political decision making body composed of:
14.2.1. One senior political representative from each Party;
14.2.2. One senior officer each from SAF and SPLA;
14.2.3. Special Representative of UN Secretary General or his deputy;
14.2.4. Senior Security officer (after the establishment of National Security Service);
14.2.5. One Legal advisor from each Party;
14.2.6. Representative of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (observer);
14.2.7. Representative of IGAD Partner’s Forum (lPF) (observer);
14.3. The CPC chair shall be’ rotational between the Parties;
14.4. The CPC shall reach its decisions by consensus of the Parties;
14.5. The mandate and functions of the CPC shall be to:
14.5.1. supervise, monitor and oversee the implementation of this Agreement;
14.5.2. complete negotiating any operational details as shall be necessary;
14.5.3. sound the Parties to rise up to their obligations in this Agreement;
14.5.4. update the Parties on the progress of the ceasefire implementation;
14.5.5. co-ordinate with other relevant national and international bodies;
14.5.6. settle deadlocks arising out from the cease fire implementation as reported by the CJMC and refer the unresolved ones to the Presidency;
14.5.7. provide disciplinary measures for violations;
14.5.8. provide a political forum for continuous dialogue between the Parties and the international community;
14.5.9. foster confidence building between the Parties;
14.5.10. Update the IGAD, IPF, African Union (AU) and the United Nations periodically on the process of the ceasefire implementation as deemed necessary;
14.5.11. propose amendments in the Agreement to the Presidency.
14.6. Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC)
14.6.1. The CJMC shall be answerable to the CPC and shall oversee the activities of AJMC;
14.6.2. The CJMC shall be located in Juba;
14.6.3. The CJMC shall be a military decision making body and shall be composed of:
14.6.3.1. The Force Commander of the UN Monitoring Mission (Chair),
14.6.3.2. The Deputy Force Commander from countries acceptable to the Parties. Considering that the official working languages in Sudan are Arabic and English;
14.6.3.3. Three officers from SAF with ranks not less than Colonel;
14.6.3.4. Three senior officers from SPLA
14.6.3.5. Officer in charge of National Security at that level;
14.6.3.6. One senior police officer at the level of Southern Sudan.
14.6.4. The CJMC shall reach its decisions by consensus of the Parties and shall establish its own internal regulations;
14.6.5. The CJMC shall have the following functions:
14.6.5.1. Oversee compliance of the Parties to their obligations under this Agreement;
14.6.5.2. Coordinate planning, monitoring and verification of the implementation of this Agreement;
14.6.5.3. Facilitate liaison between the Parties;
14.6.5.4. Coordinate monitoring and verification of disengagement, disarmament and redeployment of the forces as agreed upon in this Agreement;
14.6.5.5. Check on the conduct of the military forces;
14.6.5.6. Specification of current locations of troops as of the D Day;
14.6.5.7. Monitoring troop strength, stocks of arms, ammunitions and other war-related equipment;
14.6.5.8. Coordination and monitoring of pennitted military movement and itineraries thereof;
14.6.5.9. Receiving and verifying unresolved violations, disputes and complaints and rule on them;
14.6.5.10. Serving as a channel of communication between the Parties;
14.6.5.11. Inspection of replenishment of supplies to the forces;
14.6.5.12. Supervision of demining activities, decommissioning of unexploded ordnance and other form of military hazards;
14.6.5.13. Dissemination of infonnation about this Agreement;
14.6.5.14. help Parties in disarming and reintegrating armed groups;
14.6.5.15. monitor and verify the disarmament of all Sudanese civilians who are illegally armed;
14.6.5.16. be responsible for executing peace support operations in collaboration with VMT, JMC and CPMT, until the deployment of the UN monitors; after which the roles of the latter shall cease to exist;
14.6.6. Decisions reached by the CJMC shall be communicated down through the individual chains of command and reported up to the CPC.
14.6.7. Subject to the timing of different activities specified in the Agreement on Security Arrangements, the CJMC may readjust on practical considerations the timing of activities or obligations related to ceasefire including redeployment North and South of the 1956 North South border and activities referred to in sub-section 8.7 herein.
14.6.8. The CJMC shall compile necessary cartographical and mapping references which, once agreed to by the Parties, shall be used for the purposes of monitoring the implementation of this Agreement. However, such cartographical and mapping references shall have no bearing whatsoever on the subsequent delineation of the 11/1/1956 North/South border by the ad hoc border commission that the Parties will set up as part of the Agreement on Implementation Modalities.
14.6.9. The CJMC shall be entitled to move freely throughout the Ceasefire Zone.
14.7 Area Joint Military Committee (AJMC)
14.7.1 The AJMC that shall be established in Juba, Malakal, Wau, Kadugli, Abyei, Damazien or Kurmuk, and shall be composed as follows:
14.7.1.1 The most senior UN Officer in the Area, Chairperson;
14.7.1.2 Equal number of senior officers from SAF and SPLA;
14.7.1.3 UN monitors.
14.7.2 AJMC shall be established in Kassala or Hamashkoreb in Eastern Sudan to monitor and verify the redeployment of SPLA forces as provided in sub-section 4 (c)(v)(a) of Agreement on Security Arrangements;
14.7.3 The AJMC shall be charged with the following functions:
14.7.3.1 monitor and verify alleged violations and resolve disputes;
14.7.3.2 report periodically and refer unresolved complaints to CJMC;
14.7.3.3 Liaise and share information with the Security Committee in the designated area;
14.8 Joint Military Teams (JMTs)
14.8.1. JMTs shall be the lowest operating unit of the cease fire monitoring mechanism;
14.8.2. JMTs shall be established and designated by the AJMC at that level;
14.8.3. A JMT shall be composed of UN senior officer at that level, international monitors, equal number of officers from SAF and SPLA.
14.8.4. JMTs shall conduct regular patrols and visits throughout their respective areas to prevent violations, preserve the ceasefire, and assist in building confidence.
14.8.5. JMTs shall monitor, verify and report alleged violations to the appropriate AJMC.
Judiciary Reform
2005
The 2005 CPA contained judicial reform provisions that required the establishment of the Constitutional Court, the National Supreme Court, and appellate Courts. With respect to the Constitutional Courts, its members are appointed by the president upon the approval of the National Judicial Service Commission, and subject to two-third majority approval of all members of the Council of States. Nevertheless, the CPA requires an adequate representation of southern Sudan in the Constitutional Court. In the 2005 Interim Constitution, which was enacted in July, these reforms were institutionalized.
The National Assembly approved the Constitutional Court Act on 1 October 2005. This act became law in November. According to this act, Mr. John Aungi Kasiba from SPLM and Dr. Wahabi Mohamed Mukhtar from NCP were appointed as Deputy Chief Justices. Mr. Jalal-Eddin Mohamed Osman from NCP was appointed as Chief Justice. These appointments were made on 28 November 2005. Similarly, the president and members of the Constitutional Court were sworn in on 31 December 2005.1
Similarly, the National Judicial Service Act was adopted in October 2005. The National Judicial Service Commission was established on 7 December 2005.2 With the establishment of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court and the representation of southern Sudan in the Constitutional Court, the judicial reforms took place in Sudan as sought by the 2005 CPA.
2006
Judicial reforms took place in 2005. No further developments observed.
2007
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
2009
No further developments observed.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
Chapter II: Power Sharing (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 26th May, 2004)
2.11 The National Judiciary
2.11.1 The powers of the Judiciary shall be exercised by Courts and other tribunals. The Judiciary shall be independent of the Legislature and the Executive. Its independence shall be guaranteed in the Interim National Constitution.
2.11.2. There shall be established at the National Level:
2.11.2.1. A Constitutional Court;
2.11.2.2. A National Supreme Court;
2.11.2.3. National Courts of Appeal; and
2.11.2.4. Any other National Courts or tribunals as deemed necessary to be established by law.
2.11.3. The Constitutional Court
2.11.3.1 There shall be established-a Constitutional Court in accordance with the provisions of this Peace Agreement and the Interim National Constitution.
2. 11.3.2. The Constitutional Court shall:
(i) Be independent from the Judiciary and any other courts in the country. It shall-be headed by the President of the Constitutional Court, duly appointed by the President with the consent of the First Vice President, and shall be answerable to the Presidency;
(ii) Uphold the Interim National, Southern Sudan, and State Constitutions and its composition shall be representative;
(iii) Have original jurisdiction to decide disputes that arise under the National Interim Constitution and the constitutions of Northern States at the instance of individuals, juridical entities or of government;
(iv) Adjudicate on the constitutionality of laws and set aside or strike down laws or provisions of laws that do not comply with the National, Southern Sudan, or the relevant State constitutions;
(v) Have appellate jurisdiction on appeals against the decisions of Southern Sudan Supreme Court on the Constitution of Southern Sudan and the constitutions of Southern Sudan states;
(vi) Adjudicate on constitutional disputes between organs and levels of government, with respect to areas of exclusive or concurrent competencies;
(vii) Protect human rights and fundamental freedoms;
(viii) Have criminal jurisdiction over the President, the two (2) Vice Presidents of the two (2) Speakers of the National Legislature, and the Justices of the National and Southern Sudan Supreme Courts.
2. 11.3.3. Decisions of the Constitutional Court shall be final and binding.
2. 11.4. The National Supreme Court
2.11.4.1 The National Supreme Court shall:
(i) Be a court of review and cassation in respect of any criminal or civil matter arising out of or under national laws;
(ii) Have criminal jurisdiction over the Justices of the Constitutional Court;
(iii) Review death sentences imposed by any Court in respect to matters arising out of or under National Laws; and
(iv) Have such other jurisdiction as determined by the Interim National Constitution, the Peace Agreement, and law.
2. 11.4.2. The National Supreme Court may establish panels for the purposes of considering and deciding appeals on matters requiring special expertise including commercial, personal, or labour matters.
2. 11.4.3. The Justices of the Constitutional and National Supreme Courts and all the judges of other National Courts shall perform their functions without political interference; they shall be independent, and shall administer justice without fear or favour. The Interim National Constitution and the law shall’ protect their independence.
2. 11.4.4. Judges other than the Justices referred to in Section 2.11.4.6 herein shall be appointed by the Presidency on the recommendation of the National Judicial Service Commission.
2. 11.4.5. The National Judicial Service Commission shall be chaired by the Chief Justice. Amongst others, representatives of academia, judges, members of the legal profession, members of the National Legislature, and the Minister of Justice shall sit on this Commission. The National Judicial Service Commission shall be as determined in the Interim National Constitution referred to in paragraph 2.12 herein and shall reflect the need for appropriate representation, inclusiveness, and diversity.
2.11.4.6. (i) All Justices of the Constitutional Court shall be appointed by the Presidency on the recommendation of the National Judicial Service Commission, subject to approval by two-thirds ((2/3)) majority of all the members of the Council of States, having regard to competence, credibility and the need for fair representation.
(ii) All Justices of the National Supreme Court shall be appointed by the Presidency on the recommendation of the National Judicial Service Commission, having regard to competence and credibility.
Military Reform
2005
The 2005 CPA in Sudan was unique in the sense that it legitimized the existence of the Sudan Armed Force and the Sudan People’s Liberation Armed force and suggested the creation of Joint Integrated Units comprising armed personnel from both forces. The SAF and SPLA were to be withdrawn from the 1956 border between the North and the South and the JIUs were to be deployed in those areas.
The main issues included military doctrine. Additionally, the size of the military was pending until the referendum in the South Sudan. Nevertheless, the 2005 CPA provides for the establishment of the Joint Defense Board (JDB) comprising both the SAF and SPLA in parity basis with responsibility to make a decision on external and internal security threat. The JDB would form a Technical Committee out of four senior officers from both sides with the responsibility to coordinate the two forces and resolve the various problems that could ensue. Also, both sides would integrate other interested armed groups into their armed forces; and the parties were to establish an “Incorporation and Reintegration Adhoc Committee.”
According to the Accord, both arms of the armed forces (SAF and SPLA) would complete the selection and organization of officers, non-commissioned Officers (NCOs) and men for the JIUs within three months from the beginning of the Pre-Interim Period. The JIUs, were to be dissolved with each component reverting to its mother armed forces to pave the way for the formation of the separate armed force for the emerging state, should the referendum result favor for the secession of the South from the North. If the referendum would confirm the unity, the JIUs was said to be the nucleus of the future Sudanese National Armed Forces (SNAP).
The Accord requires the formation of JIUs during the pre-interim and the interim period from the SAF and SPLA, on a parity basis. Nevertheless, the delay in the establishment of the Joint Defense Board delayed in the formation of the JIUs. The JDB was established by a presidential decree on 29 December 2005. The JIU act was endorsed by the National Assembly on 19 December 2005. By the end of December 2005, it was said that the SPLM and SAF had nominated 46% and 97% personnel joining the JIUs.
Parties were behind to integrate other armed groups in existing military structures and to create functioning JIUs. The implementation of the formation of the Joint Integrated Unites provision of the ceasefire was 18 months behind schedule. Contributing to the delay was the lack of logistical support.1 Similarly, an Incorporation and Reintegration Adhoc Committee for the incorporation of the Other Armed Groups (OGAs) into the regular forces of the parties was not formed by the parties. However, parties had registered OGAs allied with either SAF or SPLA. The SAF disclosed that about 43,000 members of OGAs were aligned to it and SPLA claimed its overall strength to be about 270,000.2
- “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/42), January 25, 2007.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/821), December 21, 2005.
2006
After its formation, the JDB met for the first time on 2-3 January 2006. The Board was jointly chaired by First Lieutenant-General Abbas Arabi Abdallah, representing the SAF, and First Lieutenant General Oyai Deng Ajak, representing the SPLA. The National Assembly passed the Joint Integrated Units Act on 17 January 2006.1 The SPLA signed the Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration of SPLA and SSDF with Paulino Matip. The SSDF was the umbrella organization comprising the Majority of formerly SAF-aligned OAGs.2 At issue for the OGAs was the fact that each of the parties had provided the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee with a list of groups that were said to be aligned with each party while the actual alignment status, composition and location of the group remained opaque.3 Also, the implementation of the formation of Joint Integrated Unites provision of ceasefire was 18 months behind the schedule. Contributing to the delay was the lack of logistical support.4
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/728), September 12, 2006.
- “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/42), January 25, 2007.
2007
The JDB regularly met, as it did in 2006. In February 2007, the parties adopted a common military doctrine and code of conduct to guide the work of JIU forces.1 It was reported that the SAF declared in May 2007 that there were no more SAF-aligned OAGs in South Sudan.2 Nevertheless, the formation of JIUs was delayed and thus the redeployment of the JIUs.3
- “Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/520), August 29, 2007.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” United Nations, February 2009.
- Ibid.
2008
The JDB regularly met in 2008. Progress related to the formation and deployment of the JIUs was made. As of 4 October 2008, the JIUs had reached 84.7% of their mandated strength of 39,639 troops, SAF soldiers comprising 52.4 percent and SPLA soldiers 47.6 per cent of the total.1 There was no report on OGAs aligned with either of the parties.
2009
The JDB regularly met in 2009. The other armed groups were officially banded in 2006.1 On issues related to the deployment of the JIUs, both parties were slow in filling their respective quota of troops and in deployment to all eight agreed-upon locations, complaining of logistical problems. As of September 2009, the eight JIUs locations were occupied by SAF and SPLA. But still to be filled with the agreed quota in all locations: Um-darfa, Menza, Wadal Mahe. Dindiro, Ulu, Gissan, Kurmuk and Taliya.2
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2009/545), October 21, 2009.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2009.
2010
The JDB regularly met in 2010. “There has been no change on the status of the JIU since April 2009. They are at 82.6 per cent of their mandated strength of 39,639 troops.”1
2011
The JIU dissolution process had officially been completed by 9 April 2011; by the end of May 2011, the movement of the SAF JIU troops from the South to the North was underway. The SPLA JIUs in Khartoum agreed to stay there until 9 July 2011.1 On 23 May 2011, the JDB informed the SPLA of an instruction from the President of Sudan to redeploy its forces to the south of the 1-1-56 boundary; the SAF would redeploy its forces to all the areas north of the boundary as of 1 June 2011.2 Since critical issues such as the size of the armed force and the common military doctrine were contingent on the referendum result favoring the unity, military reform did not take place in Sudan.
Chapter VI: Security Arrangements (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 25th September 2003)
6. Common Military Doctrine
The parties shall develop a common military doctrine as a basis for the Joint Integrated Units, as well as a basis for a post Interim Period army of the Sudan, if the referendum vote is in favour of unity. The parties shall develop this common doctrine within one year from the beginning of the Interim Period. During the Interim Period, the training of the SPLA (in the South), the SAF (in the North) and the joint units (in both North and South) will be based on this common doctrine.
7. Status of Other Armed Groups (OAGs) in the Country
a. No armed group allied to either party shall be allowed to operate outside the two forces.
b. The Parties agree that those mentioned in 7(a) who have the desire and qualify shall be incorporated into the organized forces of either Party (Army, Police, Prisons and Wildlife forces), while the rest shall be reintegrated into the civil service and civil society institutions.
c. The parties agree to address the status of other armed groups in the country with the view of achieving comprehensive peace and stability in the country and to realize full inclusiveness in the transition process.
Annexure I: Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 31st December 2004)
Part II: The Armed Forces
16. Military Mission and Mandate
16.1. Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-sections 1 (b) and 4.1 (b) of the Agreement on Security· Arrangements, the mission and mandate for Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Joint/Integrated Forces within their respective areas of deployment during the interim period shall clearly be specified within the first year of the interim period by the Joint Defence Board subject to the approval of the Presidency.
16.2. Without prejudice to sub-section 16.1 above, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Joint/Integrated Units (JIUs) shall be charged with the mission of defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Sudan during the Interim Period.
16.3. The two Armed Forces and the JIUs shall be regular, professional, and nonpartisan armed forces. They shall respect the rule of law and civilian government, democracy, basic human rights, and the will of the people.
16.4. As per Article (1) (b) and (4) (b) (III) of the Agreement on Security Arrangements, the Armed Forces (SAF, SPLA and JIUs) shall undertake the responsibility of the defence of the country against threats in their areas of deployment pending appropriate decision from the JDB.
16.5. The involvement of the Armed Forces as defined in sub-section 16.4 above, in constitutionally specified emergencies, shall be determined in the Interim Constitution.
16.6. The Parties shall jointly develop a code of conduct for the members of all armed forces based on the common military doctrine that shall be developed as stipulated for in section 6 of the Agreement on Security Arrangements.
16.7. The elements of the code of conduct provided for in sub-section 16.6 above shall:
16.7.1. be informed by the provisions of sub-section 16.2 above;
16.7.2. make a clear distinction between the military functions from partisan political functions;
16.7.3. make repudiation that such forces can be used as agency of physical intimidation of the civilian population;
16.7.3. make a clear distinction between military mandate from the policing mandate during cease fire period;
16.7.4. make clear distinction between military mandate from the policing mandate during ceasefire period;
16.7.5. make clear that all members of armed forces shall not be involved in illicit activities that may affect the environment and natural resources.
17. The Joint Defence Board (JDB)
17.1. The JDB shall be composed and structured on parity basis and take its decisions by consensus. It shall be composed of the Chiefs of Staff of SAF and SPLA, their deputies and four senior officers from each Party.
17.2. The JDB shall exhibit a characteristic of well-functioning body capable of timely response to tasks and situation.
17.3. The JDB shall have a Technical Committee to be formed from four senior officers from both sides.
17.4. The Technical Committee shall undertake the duty of coordination between the two forces and resolve different problems that may ensue. It shall report regularly to the JDB in all ordinary and extraordinary sessions.
17.5. The two Commanders in Chief shall appoint the Commander and the deputy commander of the JIUs who shall be ex officio members of the JDB.
17.6. In the event of any external or internal threat, the JDB shall, subject to section 16.2 above, decide on how to address the situation. The JDB shall decide whether all forces, the JIUs or either force (SAF and SPLA) shall handle the threat alone or collectively. The JDB may also decide on the appropriate support and reinforcements that other forces shall lend to the forces facing direct threat and aggression. In a joint operation, JDB shall determine lead HQS for that operation.
17.7. The JDB shall be entrusted to work out a comprehensive framework for confidence building. Confidence building measures between the SAF and SPLA may include exchanging visits, organizing cultural and sport events, convening of joint training courses, and participating in national and religious celebrations and any other activities that shall help in building confidence.
17.8. The JDB shall form a committee to lay down the principles of the future Sudan National Armed Forces, should the result of the referendum on self determination confirm unity.
17.9. At the earliest opportunity, appointed representatives of SAF and SPLA will determine, taking into account point 17.1 of this Agreement, a staff structure in support of IDB command. They will calculate a budget and recommend how it is be resourced.
18. Redeployment
18.1. The line of redeployment of SAF and SPLA shall be South/North Border of 1/1/1956 as came in Article 3 (b), in the Agreement on Security Arrangements during the Interim Period signed on 25th September, 2003.
18.2. SAF commits to redeploy its forces as per Article 3 (b) of the Agreement on Security Arrangements to the North of South/North border of 1/1/1956 beginning from the Pre Interim Period according to the following steps:
a) Step I: Reduction by seventeen percent (17%) by D-day + 6 months;
b) Step II: Reduction by fourteen percent (14%) by D-day + 12 months;
c) Step III: Reduction by nineteen percent (19%) by D-day + 18 months;
d) Step IV: Reduction by twenty-two percent (22 %) by D-day + 24 months;
e) Step V: Complete redeployment of the remainder twenty-eight percent (28%) by D-day + 30 months.
18.3. SPLA commits to redeploy its forces pursuant to Article 3 (c) and Article 4 (c) (V) (a) of the Agreement on Security Arrangements as detailed below.
18.4. The SPLA forces in the eastern Sudan shall be redeployed to the south of North/South border of 1/1/1956 beginning from pre-interim period according to the following steps:
a) Reduction by thirty percent (30%) by D-day + four months.
b) Reduction by forty percent (40%) by D-day+ 8 months.
c) Complete redeployment of the remainder thirty percent (30%) by D-day 12 months.
18.5. The SPLA shall complete redeployment of its excess forces from Southern Blue Nile and Southern Kordofanl/Nuba Mountains within six months of the deployment of the JIUs in those areas.
18.6. Without prejudice to the Agreement on the Security Arrangements and the right of Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) Command to deploy forces all over North Sudan as it deems fit, SAF troop levels in Southern Kordofanl/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile during the Interim Period shall be determined by the Presidency.
18.7. After the JlUs deployment in Abyei, all other forces shall be redeployed outside the area. However, the size JlUs Battalion in Abyei shall conform to JIUs organizational standards according to the Protocol between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’& Liberation Movement on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei Area of 26th May, 2004.
19. Optimal Size of the Armed Forces
After the Completion of SAF redeployment to the North the parties shall begin the negotiations on proportionate downsizing. Nonetheless, the parties shall allow voluntary demobilization, demobilization of non-essentials (child soldiers and elderly, disabled) during the first year of Interim Period.
20. The Status of Joint Integrated Units
20.1. There shall be formed Joint/Integrated Units (hereinafter referred to as JIUs) during the pre-interim and the interim period from the SAF and the SPLA. This shall form the nucleus of the future Sudanese National Armed Forces (SNAP) should the result of the referendum on the right of self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan confirm unity of the country.
20.2. If the result of the referendum is in favour of secession of the South from the North, the JIUs shall dissolve with each component reverting to its mother Armed Forces to pave the way for the formation of the separate Armed Forces for the emerging states.
20.3. Notwithstanding sub-Sections 20.10.1, 20.10.2, 20.10.3, 20.10.4, and 20.10.5, formation, training, tasking and deployment of JIUs formations and sub-formations shall be completed not later than D-day + 21 months.
20.4. At the initial stage of the formation of the JIUs, SAF component shall be liable to relief “after two years of deployment”. Nonetheless, they shall be locked-in by D-day + 33 months.
20.5. At the inception, the JIUs shall remain in their joint form. However, the process of full integration shall be completed by D-day + 52 months.
20.6. The JIUs as per Agreement on Security Arrangements shall fall under the command of the Joint Defence Board (JDB). Nevertheless, the two Commanders-in-Chief shall appoint the commander and deputy commander for the JIUs as the highest level who shall, by virtue of their positions, be members of the JDB. They shall oversee routine command matters of the JIUs in accordance to authority conferment by the JDB.
20.7. The JIUs command shall be exercised on parity basis between SAF and the SPLA officers with alternation of roles at the uppermost and other levels of command.
20.8. The JIUs personnel shall be treated equally. There shall be uniformity in welfare, salaries, emoluments nsions rights, supplies, armament, and equipment.
20.9. The Parties have further discussed the issue of establishing JIUs in Eastern Sudan and have decided to continue discussing the issue during the Interim Period and resolve it as they deem fit.
20.10 Training of the Joint Integrated Units
20.10.1. Both Armed Forces (SAF and SPLA) shall complete selection and organization of officers, Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and men for the JIUs within three months from the beginning of the Pre-Interim Period.
20.10.2. Notwithstanding sub-section 20.3 above, the JIUs components from both Parties shall be formed within three months from the Pre-Interim Period and co-locate in their various training centres to be trained for not less than six months after which they shall be tasked and deployed.
20.1 0.3. There shall be developed as soon as practicable a joint doctrine, code of conduct, as well as disciplinary laws, regulations, and standing operating procedures to govern the nus general training policies, programmes, disciplinary scopes and behavioral patterns.
20.10.4. In view of special status of Khartoum and Juba, the JIUs Command shall allot tasks to the nus contingents that shall be deployed to these cities by the end of the Pre-Interim Period after completion of initial joint training session that shall not exceed three months. Nonetheless, the JIUs command shall organize further training sessions for these contingents in accordance to JIUs training policy and programmes.
20.10.5. The parties shall appeal to the international community to render additional technical, material and financial support to assist in forming and training the JIUs.
20.11. JIUs Command and Control
The JIUs Headquarters is under command of JDB and shall be located in Juba. The JIUs command shall perform among other things, the following duties and responsibilities:
20.11.1. Command of the JIUs formations and units;
20.11.2. Promotion of mutual cooperation between the JIUs, SAF and SPLA at all command levels;
20.11.3. Coordination of supply and replenishments plans with the JDB;
20.11.4. Implementation of the JDB plans, policies, programmes and directives pertaining to the JIUs;
20.11.5. Appointment and transfer of JIUs officers within the discretion of the JIUs command;
20.11.6. Create and promote confidence building measures;
20.11.7. Development and execution of training programmes fro the JIUs;
20.11.8. Coordination and the CPC;
20.11.9. Resolution of disputes that may arise within the JIUs jurisdiction.
20.12. The JIUs Commanders shall exercise the following authority/responsibility:
20.12.1. Command and control of JIUs in their respective areas of command;
20.12.2. Implementation of and compliance with the directives of the JIUs Higher Headquarters;
20.12.3. Implement confidence building policies of the higher headquarters as well as create and promote confidence building measures within their power as shall be desirable;
20.12.4. Development and execution of training programmes within their command jurisdiction;
20.12.5. Performance of any other duties that may be conferred upon them by the higher headquarters.
20.13. The JIUs Composition and Organization
20.13.1 Composition
20.13.1.1. The JIUs shall initially be formed from SAF and SPLA, out of their ground forces;
20.13.1.2. By D-Day + 12 months, SPLA nominated personnel shall commence training in the service arms of the Airforce, Navy and Air Defence, so as to make available SPLA contribution to the JIUs Service Arms which shall be established as per sub-section 20.13.1.3 below;
20.13.1.3. By D-Day+36 months, the first JIUs service arms unit shall be established, others shall follow according to the graduation of qualified SPLA JIUs personnel as determined by the JDB; further training may continue according to the needs as may be decided by the JDB;
20.13.1.4. SAF component of the JIUs service arms shall be nominated and assigned as soon as the SPLA component of JIUs service arms is trained and graduated;
20.13.1.5. JIUs Service Arms of the Airforce, Navy and Air Defence shall be part of the overall number of forces of the JIUs already agreed to by the Parties.
20.13.2 Organization
20.13.2.1. The higher JIUs formation shall be division (see organizational
structure attached as appendixure 3). Thus, there shall be formed five JIUs division and one independent brigade as follows:
a) 1st Infantry Division which shall have a total strength of 9000 officers, NCOs and men and shall be deployed in Equatoria area.
b) 2nd Infantry Division which shall have a total strength of 8000 officers, NCOs and men and shall be deployed in Upper Nile area.
c) 3rd Infantry Division which shall have a total strength of 7000 officers, NCOs and men and shall be deployed in Bahr el Ghazal area.
d) 4th Infantry Division (unlike the other divisions, both 4th and 5th Infantry divisions are under-strength divisions) which shall have a total strength of 6000 officers, NCOs and men and shall be deployed in southern Blue Nile.
f) 5th Infantry Division which shall have a total strength of 6000 officers, NCOs and men and shall be deployed in southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains.
f) Independent Brigade which shall be deployed in Khartoum with the total strength of 3000 officers, NCOs and men.
20.13.2.2. There shall be formed a JIU Infantry Battalion (lnf. Bn.) for Abyei Area whose strength shall be in accordance with JIUs standards. It shall be deployed in Abyei area and attached to 3rd Infantry Division.
20.13.2.3. Infantry brigades, of not more than 3000 troops each, to compose of:
i. Brigade Command;
ii. Brigade HQ Company;
iii. Two to four infantry Battalions;
IV. Armored, artillery, engineering, transport, signal and medical corps.
20.13.2.4. The infantry battalion shall compose of:
1. Battalion Command;
ii. Battalion HQ Company;
111. Two to four infantry companies;
iv. Support Company.
20.13.2.5. JIUs battalion shall be formed of two SAF companies and two SPLA companies, whereas the HQs Company and the support company shall be mixed. The size of the forces in each locality shall not exceed one infantry battalion.
20.14 JIUs Detailed Deployment
20.14.1. First nus Infantry Division – Equatoria
a) Division Headquarters: Juba town.
b) Juba Brigade Headquarters: Juba town.
c) Subunits deployment: Around Juba town.
d) Torit Brigade Headquarter (+) Inf Bn: Torit town.
e) Subunit Deployment: Kapoeta, Yei, and Jabor.
f) Maridi BrigadeHeadquarters (+) Inf Bn: Maridi town.
g) Subunits deployment: Mondari, Yambio, Tombara.
20.14.2. Second Infantry Division – Upper Nile
a) Division Headquarters: Malakal town.
b) Malakal Brigade Headquarters (+) two Inf Bns: Malakal town.
c) Subunits deployment: Nasir, Bounj and Malut.
d) Bentiu Brigade headquarters (+) Inf Bn: Bentiu town.
e) Subunits deployment: Pariang, and Bor.
20.14.3. Third Infantry Division – Bahr el Ghazal
a) Division Headquarters: Wau town.
b) Wau Brigade headquarters (+) two InfBns: Wau town.
c) Subunits deployment: Tonj, Rumbek, and Shambe
d) Aweil Brigade headquarters (+) two Inf Bns: Aweil town.
e) Subunits deployment: Raja, Gogrial.
f) Abyei Area Independent Battalion attached.
20.14.4. Fourth Infantry Division – Southern Blue Nile
a) Division Headquarters: Dindiro town.
b) Dindiro Brigade headquarters (+) Bde Hqs (+) one Inf Bn: Dindiro.
c) Subunits deployment: Kurmuk, Geizan, Ulu.
d) Takamul Brigade headquarters (+) one Inf Bn: Takamol.
e) Subunits deployment: Damazin, Umdarfa’a, Menza.
20.14.5. Fifth Infantry Division – Nuba MOlJlltains
a) Division headquarters (+) one Inf Bn: Kadogli town.
b) Kadugli Brigade headquarters: Heiban.
c) Subunits deployment: Heiban, EI Buram, Talodi.
d) Deleng Brigade headquarters (+) one Inf Bn: Deleng town.
e) Subunits deployment: Jebel Eried, Julurl;, Urn Sirdibba.
20.14.6. Khartoum Independent Brigade
There shall be one JIUs Brigade in Khartoum that shall be deployed with the Republican Guard in Soba. The VIP Protection Force is located according to the Presidential Unit, and Capital Security Force in Jebel Awaliaa.
20.14.7. The Parties agree that the JIU s shall protect the oilfields as provided in sub-section 20.14.2 and the oil installations shall be demilitarized. In case of any threat to the oil installations, the JDB shall decide on the appropriate and necessary measures.
21. Funding of the Armed Forces
21.1. During the Interim Period, SAF forces and JIUs shall be funded by the National Government, whereas the SPLA forces shall be funded by the Government of Southern Sudan, subject to the principle of proportional downsizing as per Security Arrangements Protocol and the approval of Southern Sudan Legislature. To meet this obligation, the Government of Southern Sudan shall raise financial resources from both local and foreign sources and seek international assistance. These financial resources shall be channeled through the Bank of Southern Sudan and managed according to the principles of Wealth Sharing Protocol.
21.2. The elected National Legislature during the Interim Period shall review and finally resolve the issue of the funding of the Sudan National Armed Forces (SNAF) so as to make unity of the Sudan an attractive choice in the referendum on self-determination by the people of Southern Sudan, and to create sound basis for the formation of the future army of the Sudan that shall be composed from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the JIUs, should the result of referendum on self-determination confirm unity.
22. Policing Issues and Domestic Security
22.1. In order to facilitate the removal and withdrawal of the military and paramilitary forces from areas where they were previously located and in order to return societal order and harmony, in accordance with the law, in compliance with national and international acceptable standards and with accountability to the Courts and civil Administration, the police at the appropriate level during the ceasefire shall:
22.1.1. Maintain law and public order;
22.1.2. Ensure safety and security of all people and their property;
22.1.3. Prevent and detect crimes.
22.1.4. Assist returning refugees, the displaced and other returnees to start a normal, stable and safe life in their respective communities;
22.1.5. Provide national service ( such as nationality, civil registry, identity documents (IDs), passports etc.) and other police services and make them available to all citizens in their locations;
22.1.6. Protect VIPs in collaboration with other security agencies;
22.1.7. Preserve natural resources;
22.1.8. Combat illicit trafficking in narcotics, drugs and illegal trade in fireanns and other organized and trans boundary crimes in the area;
22.1.9. Control illegal presence and movement of aliens in the area;
22.1.10. Collect data and information on criminal matters that threaten implementation of the peace agreement in the area.
22.1.11. Remove the need for the deployment of military and para-military forces in villages, communities and city streets;
22.1.12. Combat corruption at all levels of government and civil society; and
22.2. In order to strengthen the effective implementation of this Agreement, the National Police may assist, as required, other police at all levels to establish and promote police service at that level;
22.3. The police shall cooperate and participate in the entire process of ceasefire implementation;
22.4. The Parties agree that the police in the territorial jurisdiction of the ceasefire shall assume their normal functions and activities, particularly in the areas where military and para-military forces had previously assumed their functions;
22.5. The Parties call upon the international community to assist in the areas of training, establishment and capacity building of police and other law enforcement agencies for the sustenance of peace and rule of law;
22.6. The Parties recognize the need for cooperation and coordination mechanism between the national police and other law enforcement agencies at all levels with regards to the implementation of this Agreement.
Police Reform
2005
The 2005 CPA provided that the police and law enforcement organs should be dealt with as part of the power-sharing arrangement. The parties also agreed to let the police force assume its normal functions in areas where military and para-military forces had previously assumed their functions. The accord also called for the training and capacity-building of the police. Parties also recognized the need for cooperation and coordination mechanisms between the national police and other law enforcement agencies at all levels of government in order to implement the accord.
No significant progress was made regarding police reform. The Ministry of Justice Law reform had reestablished a committee to review laws to ensure their compatibility with the CPA and the Interim National Constitution on 19 October 2005. The committee had identified 50 laws requiring reforms including the Police Act.1 In front of the training and capacity-building of police, the UN police in the field had monitored, advised and reported on the activities of the local police in South Sudan. The Police Commander of South Sudan had approved a proposal to co-locate UN police in police stations to monitor and train local police. The UN police also organized 11 training courses for 448 Sudanese police officers. The U.N. Secretary General’s report suggests that the strategic plan for police development and training had advanced.2
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
- “U.N. Secretary General’s Report on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/821), December 21, 2005.
2006
In the spirit of the power-sharing provisions in the CPA, the Khartoum State cabinet approved the Khartoum Police Force Bill but discussion on the bill was pending until the National Police Bill had been approved. Nevertheless, immediately after the signing of the CPA it was agreed that position discrimination towards Southerners and Darfurians would be applied at the Police College (Rabat University) with a lower entrance mark being accepted. It was suggested that at least 20% of 350 officer candidates in the police college would be from the South.1
There was no progress with regards to deploying Joint Integrated Police Units. Nevertheless, UN Police supported both the GoNU Police and the Southern Sudan Police Services (SSPS) with capacity building and standards. The UNMIS recommended the establishment of the Police Development Committee in South Sudan Police Service to formulate policy and coordinate capacity building initiatives. The committee was representative of the SPLM, the government and National Unity and international agencies. The UNMIS police component drafted a framework and action plan for community policing in Juba. The code of conduct for Sudanese police was also at the stage of approval. The UNMIS police component played a crucial role in training the initial group of 34 officers. The human rights training for the Government of National Unity Police also began in September 2006.2
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/728), September 12, 2006.
2007
Some progress was made with regards to police reform. In June 2007, the Council of Ministers approved the National Police Bill that would affirm the provision of the CPA and INC that created three levels of police: national, southern, and state. The UNDP started training police and prison personnel with support from the Multi-Donor Trust Fund.1 The UN police unit also continued to advise the SSPS on strategic developments including command and communication structures. The UN police officers were co-located in six out of 10 southern States. The first group of 29 officers graduated in 2007. The UNMIS had also received requests from five northern states for police training support.2 There was no progress on deploying Joint Integrated Police Units.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly Report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/500), August 20, 2007.
2008
In June 2008, the National Assembly passed the National Police Bill following a protracted debate. In South Sudan, the organized forces bill (police, fire brigade and wildlife) had been drafted and forwarded to the GoSS council of ministers for consideration. In July, officers to serve in the JIPU had been identified by the GoS Police Service and the SSPS and were deployed in Abyei town. After the appointment of the Abyei police commissioner, parties had also agreed to phase-wise deployment of 1,000 joint integrated police units comprising equal numbers from both the north and south. The UN coordinator was quoted saying that 379 police officers from the north had already arrived and the police personnel from the south were expected to arrive by the end of the week.1 The integrated units were deployed to maintain law and order in Abyei.
The UNMIS police component continued to train police officers, with a special focus on basic training. It was reported that the UNMIS trained a total of 1,700 government police officers in various specialties: forensics, crime investigation, gender issues, computers, explosives awareness and community policing. The UNMIS trained 100 women police officers in Khartoum on issues related to gender, domestic violence and child protection. In South Sudan, the UNMIS training 2,104 police officers. It was also reported that over 6,500 officers were harmonized and added to the UNMIS police personnel database.2
- “Joint Police Force Poised for Sudan Oil Flashpoint,” Agence France Presse, July 9, 2008; “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2008/662), October 20, 2008.
- Ibid.
2009
Once the National Police Bill was passed in 2008, the Khartoum Legislative Council passed the Khartoum State Police Act in August 2009. Similarly, the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly passed the Southern Sudan Police Bill in October 2009. The Joint Integrated Police Unit remained deployed in Abyei town. Remarkable progress was made in capacity building and in the standards of the GoNU Police and Southern Police Service. In December 2009, the police unit of the UNMIS concluded 48 training courses in which 1,058 local police officers (418 GoS and 640 SSPS) participated in those courses, including 73 female officers. The UNMIS Police trained 8,351 (6004 GoS and 2,347 SSPS) local police officers, including 763 females, in Election Security Training. It was also reported that 26,955 SSPS officers had been fully registered from Sector I, II & III.1
2010
Legal reforms related to the police were completed in 2009. Nevertheless, the UNMIS police continued to provide capacity- and confidence-building classes to national and south Sudan police service personnel. The UNMIS police officers were co-located in all 10 Southern States. Furthermore, 25,840 SSPS personnel, including 2,254 female officers, were trained in referendum security duties.1
2011
The CPA provision related to police reform became obsolete when South Sudan succeeded from the north after the referendum. Nevertheless, the UNMIS continued with support for the security sector reform in South Sudan. The new mandate that the U.N. Secretary General requested from the U.N. Mission in South Sudan also incorporated aspects of support to strengthen the capacity of the SSPS through technical advice in policy and legislative development, as well as training and mentoring.1
CHAPTER VI: SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
8. National Security Organs and Police forces Structures and arrangements affecting all law enforcement organs, especially the Police, and National Security Organs shall be dealt with as part of the power sharing arrangements, and tied where is necessary to the appropriate level of the executive.
Annexure I: Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 31st December 2004)
Part II: The Armed Forces
22. Policing Issues and Domestic Security
22.1. In order to facilitate the removal and withdrawal of the military and paramilitary forces from areas where they were previously located and in order to return societal order and harmony, in accordance with the law, in compliance with national and international acceptable standards and with accountability to the Courts and civil Administration, the police at the appropriate level during the ceasefire shall:
22.1.1. Maintain law and public order;
22.1.2. Ensure safety and security of all people and their property;
22.1.3. Prevent and detect crimes.
22.1.4. Assist returning refugees, the displaced and other returnees to start a normal, stable and safe life in their respective communities;
22.1.5. Provide national service ( such as nationality, civil registry, identity documents (IDs), passports etc.) and other police services and make them available to all citizens in their locations;
22.1.6. Protect VIPs in collaboration with other security agencies;
22.1.7. Preserve natural resources;
22.1.8. Combat illicit trafficking in narcotics, drugs and illegal trade in fireanns and other organized and trans boundary crimes in the area;
22.1.9. Control illegal presence and movement of aliens in the area;
22.1.10. Collect data and information on criminal matters that threaten implementation of the peace agreement in the area.
22.1.11. Remove the need for the deployment of military and para-military forces in villages, communities and city streets;
22.1.12. Combat corruption at all levels of government and civil society; and
22.2. In order to strengthen the effective implementation of this Agreement, the National Police may assist, as required, other police at all levels to establish and promote police service at that level;
22.3. The police shall cooperate and participate in the entire process of ceasefire implementation;
22.4. The Parties agree that the police in the territorial jurisdiction of the ceasefire shall assume their normal functions and activities, particularly in the areas where military and para-military forces had previously assumed their functions;
22.5. The Parties call upon the international community to assist in the areas of training, establishment and capacity building of police and other law enforcement agencies for the sustenance of peace and rule of law;
22.6. The Parties recognize the need for cooperation and coordination mechanism between the national police and other law enforcement agencies at all levels with regards to the implementation of this Agreement.
Demobilization
2005
The DDR process in Sudan was recognized as very challenging given that the accord did not specifically provide detailed information regarding the number of combatants to be demobilized, disarmed and integrated into society. The accord, however, provided a phased approach by establishing an Interim DDR Program (IDDRP) before finalizing a full scale multi-year DDR program.1 Government of Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), SPLA, non-allied OGAs, and children and women associated with the fighting forces were eligible for the DDR process. The CPA established the National DDR Coordination Council and two sub-national level commissions the Northern’ Sudan DDR Commission (NDDRC) and the Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SDDRC), which were mandated to design, implement and manage the DDR process at the northern and southern sub-national levels respectively. These institutional structures were agreed to be established within 30 days of the signing of the CPA. The CPA also provides for assembly locations for the SFA and the SPLA combatants for the DDR process.
As agreed, the Northern Sudan DDR Interim Authority was established and even established regional offices. Similarly, the Southern Sudan DDR Interim Authority was established and set up its regional offices. To carry out the DDR program, surveys and registration of disabled ex-combatants and women associated with armed groups were being carried out and the removal of child soldiers was expected to begin in January 2006. The UNMIS and the UN DDR unit provided assistance ranging from expert advice to demobilization packages.2
In 2005, the SAF disclosed that about 43,000 members of OGAs were aligned with it and SPLA claimed its overall strength to be about 270,000.3 It was not clear how many of the disclosed members of the armed forces were going to participate in the DDR process.
- “Sudan,” UNDDR, accessed February 3, 2012, http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=35.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” I (S/2005/821), December 21, 2005.
2006
The National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Coordination Council (NDDRCC) was established on 18 February 2006. The Minister of Presidency was the chair and other members of the council were cabinet members—as well as Chief of Staff of the SAF and SPLA, General Commissioner for DDR for the Northern States, General Commissioner for DDR for the Southern States and other dignitaries to be appointed by the Presidency. The NDDRCC has the responsibility of policy formation. Therefore, on 19 February, the Northern Sudan Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration Commission (NDDRC) was established by a presidential decree. The NDDRC had responsibility to design, implement and manage the DDR process at the northern states. The GoSS established the Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC) and appointed its chairperson and the deputy chairperson. It was reported that the GoSS also formally endorsed the interim DDR program in January 2006.1 The SPLA, in technical support of UNICEF, had demobilized and reunited some 142 children in February 2006.2 It is not clear how demobilized child combatants were integrated into the society.
2007
There was some momentum after the establishment of the NDDRCC and NDDRC and SSDDRC. In Southern Sudan, a technical committee on disarmament and demobilization was established in January 2007. It was also reported that the SAF conducted unilateral disarmament of its aligned former OAG members and the United National Military Observers observed the disarmament procedure. A total of 957 OAG combatants were disarmed and given a onetime payment. It did not involve the Northern and Southern Sudan DDR institutions.1
2008
UNMIS continued to work with parties to the CPA for a plan to commence the multi-year DDR program in the Sudan. In this regard, the NDDRCC in September had agreed to conduct a pilot disarmament and demobilization program for 700-1000 combatants. There were 88 children associated with the SPLA who were demobilized in May 2008. The UNICEF DDR staff, with NSDDRC in the Blue Nile State, had also started an interim program to monitor demobilized child combatantsÕ participation in the integration programs.1
2009
Important progress was made in terms of establishing the target number of DDR. It was estimated that some 180,000 combatants would participate in the DDR program, starting with 50,000 participants (25,000 each from the SAF and the SPLA) in the first phase. Approximately, 6,000 women associated with armed forces or groups (WAAFGs) and 17,500 people with disabilities as well as children associated with forces were expected to be beneficiaries of the DDR program.1 The cost of reintegrating 182,000 combatants from both sides was estimated to be $430 million. The Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan also agreed to directly contribute $250 for each participant.
The demobilization process started in February 2009 and by the end of August 2009 a total of 12,428 combatants had been demobilized. The demobilized combatants received reintegration support in the form of cash, non-food items, and coupons from the WFP for food rations for three months.2 The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA, December 2009). Also, in December of 2009, a total of 697 ex-combatants and members of special needs groups were demobilized. Those who participated in the DDR program also received counseling.3
- “Disarmament, Demo and Reintegration- Fact Sheet,” UNMIS, 2010, accessed February 3, 2012, http://sudanddr.org/en/facts/Factsheet%20DDR%20CPA%20areas.pdf.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2009/545), October 21, 2009; “Disarmament, Demo and Reintegration.”
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2009.
2010
According to the UNMIS, some 21,700 adult ex-combatants including women associated with armed forces or groups were demobilized in five different centers by mid-April 2010. It was also reported that over 13,000 participants received counseling on reintegration opportunities.1 As of 1 December 2010, the Sudan disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program had demobilized 33,693 ex-combatants — 23,678 in the North and 10,015 in the South — including 6,258 women.2 By the end of December 2010, the total number demobilized stood at 37,124.3 The DDR program was said to have funding shortage.
- “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration-Fact Sheet.”
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2010/681), December 31, 2010.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2010.
2011
The DDR program, as of May 2011, demobilized 48,594 combatants–27,081 for SAF and 21,513 for SPLA. In Northern Sudan, a total of 36,069 DDR participants, including 5,985 female and 3,356 disabled participants, went through the demobilization process. In Southern Sudan, a total of 12,525 DDR participants, including 6,188 female and 617 disabled participants, had been demobilized. By the end of May, 31,525 (North: 19,811; South: 11,714) ex-combatants had been counseled on reintegration opportunities in the Sudan. Of these, 21,189 registered with UNDP’s DDR program implementation partners in order to receive reintegration support.1
The DDR program in South Sudan continued even after the successful secession in July 2011. Following the secession, the Republic of South Sudan DDR Commission was re-instituted by the interim National Constitution (July 2011). The commission expected to demobilize and disarm some 90,000 ex-combatants, of which a total of 12,525 were demobilized by December 2011. By December 2011, some 10,926 demobilized combatants (87%) registered with implementing partners for reintegration support training.
Annexure I: Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 31st December 2004)
Part III: Demobilization, Disarmament, Re-Integration and Reconciliation
23. Objectives
23.1 The overarching objective of the DDR process is to contribute to creating an enabling environment to human security and to support post-peace-agreement social stabilization across the Sudan, particularly war affected areas.
23.2 The DDR programme shall take place within a comprehensive process of national reconciliation and healing throughout the country as part of the peace and confidence building measures.
24. Guiding Principles
24.1 In implementing the DDR programme the Parties agree that the implementing organs shall be guided by the following common principles:
24.2. The national ownership of the process and that the capabilities of the National Institutions shall be built to effectively lead the overall DDR process; for this purpose efficient planning, implementation and supervisory institutions shall be established to operate as soon as possible.
24.3. That the DDR process in the Sudan shall be led by recognized state institutions and international partners shall only play a supportive role to these institutions. The process shall be sustained through cooperation and coordination with local NGOs and active support from the international community by facilitating and extending material and technical assistance throughout the entire DDR process and the transition from war to peace.
24.4. That no DDR planning, management or implementation activity shall take place outside the framework of the recognized interim and permanent DDR institutions referred to in paragraphs 25.1 and 25.2. here under.
24.5. Fairness, transparency, equitability and consistency for determining the eligibility of ex-combatants targeted for assistance.
24.6. Ex-combatants shall be treated equitably irrespective of their previous military affiliations; as well, they shall be empowered by provision of training and information to voluntarily choose their path to reintegration. The reintegration process shall be community based and equally benefits returnees and local communities.
24.7. That the DDR is mostly a civilian process although the military input is vital. While disarmament and demobilization are mainly military, the civilian efforts in reintegration are paramount, particularly with reference to decisions of methodology and organization. The military will have input but the decisions and implementation of ‘such programmes are the responsibility of the relevant institutions created for this purpose.
24.8. The DDR programme shall be, gender sensitive and shall encourage the participation of the communities and the civil society organizations with the view’ to strengthening their capacities to play their role in improving and sustaining the social and economic reintegration of former combatants.
24.9. The demobilization of all child soldiers within six months of the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
24.10. The identification and registration within six months from the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of all children separated from their families for family tracing and ultimate reunification;
24.11. UNICEF, JCRC and other international organizations are called upon to assist in the child component of the DDR in the Sudan;
24.12. That adequate financial and logistical support shall be mobilized by the international community including governments, governmental agencies, humanitarian organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
24.13. The observance of a high level of transparency and accountability with respect to the DDR programmes financial management.
24.14. The maintenance of an appropriate and optimal degree of flexibility to respond to the emerging needs on the ground in a timely manner.
25. DDR Institutions
25.1. To realize the best objective of the DDR process in the entire country, and to avoid any possibilities of relapsing into war, the Parties state their dedication to undertake timely steps to establish the following institutions to plan, manage and implement the DDR programmes:
25.1.1. The National DDR Coordination Council (NDDRCC), with the prime responsibility of policy formulation, oversight, review, coordination and evaluation of the progress of the Northern and Southern Sudan DDR commissions referred to in 25.1.2 hereunder. The NDDRCC shall be appointed by and accountable to the Presidency.
25.1.2. The Northern’ Sudan DDR Commission (NDDRC) and the Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SDDRC) shall be mandated to design, implement and manage the DDR process at the northern and southern sub-national levels respectively.
25.1.3. The State DDR commissions shall be entrusted with the responsibility of implementation of the programmes at the state and local levels.
25.2. Until the aforementioned institutions are established the Parties agree to put in place Interim DDR bodies to:
25.2.1. Act as bases for the future Sub-National DDR institutions established in 25.1 above.
25.2.2. Coordinate and prepare detailed DDR proposals.
25.2.3. Commence technical discussion with international donors and agencies regarding partnership and funding requirements and modalities for the DDR implementation programmes.
25.2.4. Coordinate with the UN-DPKO mission on issues pertaining to DDR.
25.2.5. Prepare draft operational proposals for DDR programmes.
25.2.6. Prepare to establish formal DDR capacity building and facilitate training in DDR through seminars, workshops and study tours.
25.2.7. Coordinate joint DDR preparatory activities.
25.2.8. Prepare in collaboration with the international actors data collection, including socio-economic surveys in the areas where the DDR programmes will be implemented and undertake needs assessment to provide data on target groups.
26. Previous Contractual Obligations
Recognizing that both Parties have existing contractual arrangements with international organizations and agencies related to DDR, the Parties agree:
26.1. To commence a process of negotiations with these agencies and organizations to close down and transfer current DDR-related activities to the incoming DDR institutions.
26.2. That the interim DDR bodies shall undertake the task of leading and concluding these negotiations, and shoulder the operational responsibility of the activities thereafter.
27. Humanitarian and General Provisions
27.1. Upon signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Parties shall:
27.1.1. exchange information on Missing in Action and shall trace them to their best efforts;
27.1.2. agree to lifting the state of emergency in the Sudan except in areas where conditions do not permit;
27.2. The Parties agree that the issue of the release of all civil political detainees as part of the confidence building measures, national healing and reconciliation process shall be discussed on and dealt with within the discussions on the implementation modalities.
27.3. Humanitarian law and civil and political rights shall be closely observed.
27.4. Collateral, secondaiy agreements and legislation shall not contradict this Agreement and shall be equally binding on the Parties.
27.5. The Parties shall call upon the governments at all levels, civil societal organizations, political forces, national NGOs and international community to assist and facilitate the reconciliation process at grass root levels.
(Note: for detailed timeline see CPA)
Disarmament
2005
The DDR process in Sudan was understood to be challenging given that the accord did not specifically provide detailed information on combatants to be demobilized, disarmed and integrated into society. The accord, however, provided a phased approach by establishing an Interim DDR Program (IDDRP). The purpose of the establishment of the IDDRP was to identify address groups that could be clearly identified up-front while continuing to move forward on the formulation and preparation of full-scale multi-year DDR program.1 Government of Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), SPLA, non-allied OGAs, and women and children associated with the fighting forces were eligible for the DDR process. The CPA established the National DDR Coordination Council and two sub-national level commissions:–the Northern’ Sudan DDR Commission (NDDRC) and the Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SDDRC)–which were mandated to design, implement and manage the DDR process at the northern and southern sub-national levels, respectively. It was agreed upon that these institutional structures would be established within 30 days of the signing of the CPA. The CPA also provided assembly locations for the SFA and the SPLA combatants for the DDR process. The civilian disarmament was not part of this research.
As agreed, the Northern Sudan DDR Interim Authority was instituted and it established its regional offices. Similarly, the Southern Sudan DDR Interim Authority was instituted and established its regional offices. To carry out the DDR program, surveys and registration of disabled ex-combatants and women associated with armed groups were being carried out and the removal of child soldiers as expected to begin in January 2006. The UNMIS and the UN DDR unit provided various means of assistance ranging from expert advice to demobilization packages.2
In 2005, the SAF disclosed that about 43,000 members of OGAs were aligned to it and the SPLA claimed its overall strength to be about 270,000.3 It was not clear how many of the disclosed members of the armed forces would participate in the DDR process.
Information on disarmament and number of weapon collected is not available.
- “Sudan,” UNDDR, accessed February 3, 2012, http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=35.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/821), December 21, 2005.
2006
The National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Coordination Council (NDDRCC) was established on 18 February 2006. The Minister of Presidency was the chair and other members of the council were cabinet members as well as the Chiefs of Staff of the SAF and SPLA, General Commissioner for DDR for the Northern States, General Commissioner for DDR for the Southern States and other dignitaries to be appointed by the Presidency. The NDDRCC had the responsibility of policy formation. Similarly, on 19 February, the Northern Sudan Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration Commission (NDDRC) was established by a presidential decree. The NDDRC had the responsibility of designing, implementing and managing the DDR process in the northern states. The GoSS established the Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC) and appointed its chairperson and the deputy chairperson. It was reported that the GoSS also formally endorsed the interim DDR program in January 2006.1
The SPLA technical support of UNICEF had demobilized and reunited some 142 children in February 2010.2 It is not clear how demobilized child combatants were integrated into the society.
Information on disarmament and number of weapon collected is not available.
2007
Some momentum was gained following the establishment of the NDDRCC, NDDRC and SSDDRC. In Southern Sudan, a technical committee on disarmament and demobilization was established in January 2007. It was also reported that the SAF conducted unilateral disarmament of its aligned former OAG members and the United National Military Observers observed the disarmament procedure. A total of 957 OAG combatants were disarmed and given onetime payments. It did not involve the Northern and Southern Sudan DDR institutions.1
Information on disarmament and number of weapon collected is not available.
2008
UNMIS continued to work with parties to the CPA for a plan to commence the multi-year DDR program in the Sudan. In this regard, the NDDRCC in September had agreed to conduct a pilot disarmament and demobilization program for 700-1000 combatants. There were 88 children associated with the SPLA who were demobilized in May 2008. The UNICEF DDR staff with NSDDRC in the Blue Nile State had also started an interim program to monitor demobilized child combatants participation in the integration programs.1
Information on disarmament and number of weapon collected is not available.
2009
Important progress was made with regards to deciding on the target number of DDR. It was estimated that some 180,000 combatants would participate the DDR program, beginning with 50,000 participants (25,000 each from the SAF and the SPLA) in the first phase. Approximately 6,000 women associated with armed forces or groups (WAAFGs) and 17,500 people with disabilities, as well as children associated with forces, were expected to be beneficiaries of the DDR program.1 The cost of the reintegration of 182,000 combatants from both sides was estimated at $430 million. The Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan also agreed to contribute $250 directly for each participant.
The demobilization process started in February 2009 and by the end of August 2009 a total of 12,428 combatants had been demobilized. The demobilized combatants received reintegration support in form of cash, non-food items, and coupons from the WFP for food rations for three months.2 Also, in December of 2009, a total of 697 ex-combatants and members of special needs groups were demobilized. Those who participated in the DDR program also received counseling.3
Information on disarmament and number of weapon collected is not available.
- “Disarmament, Demo and Reintegration- Fact Sheet,” UNMIS, accessed February 3, 2012, http://sudanddr.org/en/facts/Factsheet%20DDR%20CPA%20areas.pdf.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2009/545), October 21, 2009; “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2009.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2009.
2010
According to the UNMIS, some 21,700 adult ex-combatants, including women associated with armed forces or groups, were demobilized in five different centers by mid-April 2010. It was also reported that over 13,000 participants received counseling on reintegration opportunities.1 As of 1 December 2010, the Sudan disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program had demobilized 33,693 ex-combatants — 23,678 in the North and 10,015 in the South — including 6,258 women.2 By the end of December 2010, the total demobilized number stood at 37,124.3 The DDR program was said to have funding shortage.
Information on disarmament and number of weapons collected is not available.
- “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration- Fact Sheet.”
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2010/681), December 31, 2010.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2010.
2011
The DDR program as of May 2011 demobilized 48,594 combatants 27,081 for SAF and 21,513 for SPLA). In Northern Sudan, a total of 36,069 DDR participants including 5,985 female and 3,356 disabled participants went through the demobilization process. In Southern Sudan, a total of 12,525 DDR participants including 6,188 female and 617 disabled participants had been demobilized. By the end of May, 31,525 (North: 19,811; South: 11,714) ex-combatants had been counseled on reintegration opportunities in the Sudan. Of these, 21,189 registered with UNDP’s DDR program implementation partners for receipt of reintegration support.1
The DDR program in South Sudan continued even after the successful secession in July 2011. Following the secession, the Republic of South Sudan DDR Commission was re-instituted by the interim National Constitution (July 2011). The commission expected to demobilize and disarm some 90,000 ex-combatants of which a total of 12,525 were demobilized by December 2011. By December 2011, some 10,926 demobilized combatants (87%) had registered with implementing partners for reintegration support training.
Annexure I: Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 31st December 2004)
Part III: Demobilization, Disarmament, Re-Integration and Reconciliation
23. Objectives
23.1 The overarching objective of the DDR process is to contribute to creating an enabling environment to human security and to support post-peace-agreement social stabilization across the Sudan, particularly war affected areas.
23.2 The DDR programme shall take place within a comprehensive process of national reconciliation and healing throughout the country as part of the peace and confidence building measures.
24. Guiding Principles
24.1 In implementing the DDR programme the Parties agree that the implementing organs shall be guided by the following common principles:
24.2. The national ownership of the process and that the capabilities of the National Institutions shall be built to effectively lead the overall DDR process; for this purpose efficient planning, implementation and supervisory institutions shall be established to operate as soon as possible.
24.3. That the DDR process in the Sudan shall be led by recognized state institutions and international partners shall only play a supportive role to these institutions. The process shall be sustained through cooperation and coordination with local NGOs and active support from the international community by facilitating and extending material and technical assistance throughout the entire DDR process and the transition from war to peace.
24.4. That no DDR planning, management or implementation activity shall take place outside the framework of the recognized interim and permanent DDR institutions referred to in paragraphs 25.1 and 25.2. here under.
24.5. Fairness, transparency, equitability and consistency for determining the eligibility of ex-combatants targeted for assistance.
24.6. Ex-combatants shall be treated equitably irrespective of their previous military affiliations; as well, they shall be empowered by provision of training and information to voluntarily choose their path to reintegration. The reintegration process shall be community based and equally benefits returnees and local communities.
24.7. That the DDR is mostly a civilian process although the military input is vital. While disarmament and demobilization are mainly military, the civilian efforts in reintegration are paramount, particularly with reference to decisions of methodology and organization. The military will have input but the decisions and implementation of ‘such programmes are the responsibility of the relevant institutions created for this purpose.
24.8. The DDR programme shall be, gender sensitive and shall encourage the participation of the communities and the civil society organizations with the view’ to strengthening their capacities to play their role in improving and sustaining the social and economic reintegration of former combatants.
24.9. The demobilization of all child soldiers within six months of the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
24.10. The identification and registration within six months from the signature of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement of all children separated from their families for family tracing and ultimate reunification;
24.11. UNICEF, JCRC and other international organizations are called upon to assist in the child component of the DDR in the Sudan;
24.12. That adequate financial and logistical support shall be mobilized by the international community including governments, governmental agencies, humanitarian organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
24.13. The observance of a high level of transparency and accountability with respect to the DDR programmes financial management.
24.14. The maintenance of an appropriate and optimal degree of flexibility to respond to the emerging needs on the ground in a timely manner.
25. DDR Institutions
25.1. To realize the best objective of the DDR process in the entire country, and to avoid any possibilities of relapsing into war, the Parties state their dedication to undertake timely steps to establish the following institutions to plan, manage and implement the DDR programmes:
25.1.1. The National DDR Coordination Council (NDDRCC), with the prime responsibility of policy formulation, oversight, review, coordination and evaluation of the progress of the Northern and Southern Sudan DDR commissions referred to in 25.1.2 hereunder. The NDDRCC shall be appointed by and accountable to the Presidency.
25.1.2. The Northern’ Sudan DDR Commission (NDDRC) and the Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SDDRC) shall be mandated to design, implement and manage the DDR process at the northern and southern sub-national levels respectively.
25.1.3. The State DDR commissions shall be entrusted with the responsibility of implementation of the programmes at the state and local levels.
25.2. Until the aforementioned institutions are established the Parties agree to put in place Interim DDR bodies to:
25.2.1. Act as bases for the future Sub-National DDR institutions established in 25.1 above.
25.2.2. Coordinate and prepare detailed DDR proposals.
25.2.3. Commence technical discussion with international donors and agencies regarding partnership and funding requirements and modalities for the DDR implementation programmes.
25.2.4. Coordinate with the UN-DPKO mission on issues pertaining to DDR.
25.2.5. Prepare draft operational proposals for DDR programmes.
25.2.6. Prepare to establish formal DDR capacity building and facilitate training in DDR through seminars, workshops and study tours.
25.2.7. Coordinate joint DDR preparatory activities.
25.2.8. Prepare in collaboration with the international actors data collection, including socio-economic surveys in the areas where the DDR programmes will be implemented and undertake needs assessment to provide data on target groups.
26. Previous Contractual Obligations
Recognizing that both Parties have existing contractual arrangements with international organizations and agencies related to DDR, the Parties agree:
26.1. To commence a process of negotiations with these agencies and organizations to close down and transfer current DDR-related activities to the incoming DDR institutions.
26.2. That the interim DDR bodies shall undertake the task of leading and concluding these negotiations, and shoulder the operational responsibility of the activities thereafter.
27. Humanitarian and General Provisions
27.1. Upon signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Parties shall:
27.1.1. exchange information on Missing in Action and shall trace them to their best efforts;
27.1.2. agree to lifting the state of emergency in the Sudan except in areas where conditions do not permit;
27.2. The Parties agree that the issue of the release of all civil political detainees as part of the confidence building measures, national healing and reconciliation process shall be discussed on and dealt with within the discussions on the implementation modalities.
27.3. Humanitarian law and civil and political rights shall be closely observed.
27.4. Collateral, secondaiy agreements and legislation shall not contradict this Agreement and shall be equally binding on the Parties.
27.5. The Parties shall call upon the governments at all levels, civil societal organizations, political forces, national NGOs and international community to assist and facilitate the reconciliation process at grass root levels.
(Note: for detailed timeline see CPA)
Reintegration
2005
The DDR process in Sudan was especially challenging given that the accord did not specifically provide detailed information on combatants to be demobilized, disarmed and integrated into society. The accord, however, provided a phased approach by establishing an Interim DDR Program (IDDRP). The purpose of the establishment of the IDDRP was to identify and address groups that could be clearly identified up-front while continuing to move forward with the formulation and preparation of a full-scale multi-year DDR program.1 Government of Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), SPLA, non-allied OGAs, and women and children associated with the fighting forces were eligible for the DDR process. The CPA established the National DDR Coordination Council and two sub-national level commissions the Northern’ Sudan DDR Commission (NDDRC) and the Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SDDRC), which were mandated to design, implement and manage the DDR process at the northern and southern sub-national levels respectively. These institutional structures were agreed to be established within 30 days of the signing of the CPA. The CPA also provides assembly locations for the SFA and the SPLA combatants for the DDR process.
As agreed, the Northern Sudan DDR Interim Authority was instituted and it established its regional offices. Similarly, the Southern Sudan DDR Interim Authority was instituted and had established its regional offices set up. To carry out the DDR program, surveys and registration of disabled ex-combatants and women associated with armed groups were being carried out and the removal of child soldiers as expected to begin in January 2006. The UNMIS and the UN DDR units provided various assistance ranging from expert advice to demobilization packages.2
In 2005, the SAF disclosed that about 43,000 members of OGAs were aligned to it and the SPLA claimed its overall strength was about 270,000.3 It was not clear how many of the disclosed members of the armed forces participated in the DDR process.
Information related to the integration of the demobilized combatants is not available.
- “Sudan,” accessed February 3, 2012, UNDDR, http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=35.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/821), December 21, 2005.
2006
The National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Coordination Council (NDDRCC) was established on 18 February 2006. Minister of Presidency was chair and other members of the council were cabinet members as well as Chief of Staff of the SAF and SPLA, General Commissioner for DDR for the Northern States, General Commissioner for DDR for the Southern States and other dignitaries to be appointed by the Presidency. The NDDRCC has responsibility of policy formation. Similarly, on 19 February, the Northern Sudan Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration Commission (NDDRC) was established by a presidential decree. The NDDRC had the responsibility of designing, implementing and managing the DDR process at the northern states. The GoSS established the Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC) and appointed its chairperson and the deputy chairperson. It was reported that the GoSS also formally endorsed the interim DDR program in January 2006.1
The SPLA in technical support of UNICEF had demobilized and reunited some 142 children in February 2010.2 It is not clear how demobilized child combatants were integrated into the society.
Information related to the integration of the demobilized combatants is not available.
2007
Some momentum was gained after the establishment of the NDDRCC, NDDRC and SSDDRC. In Southern Sudan, a technical committee on disarmament and demobilization was established in January 2007. It was also reported that the SAF conducted unilateral disarmament of its aligned former OAG members and the United National Military Observers observed the disarmament procedure. A total of 957 OAG combatants were disarmed and given onetime payment. It did not involve the Northern and Southern Sudan DDR institutions.1
Information related to the integration of the demobilized combatants is not available.
2008
UNMIS continued to work with parties to the CPA for a plan to commence the multi-year DDR program in the Sudan. In this regard, the NDDRCC in September had agreed to conduct a pilot disarmament and demobilization program for 700-1000 combatants. There were 88 children associated with the SPLA who were demobilized in May 2008. The UNMIS in support from the UNICEF had commented reintegration activities for them. The UNICEF DDR staff with NSDDRC in the Blue Nile State had also started an interim program to monitor demobilized child combatants participation in the integration programs.1
Information on reintegration of demobilized combatants is not available.
2009
Important progress was made with regards to developing the target number of DDR. It was estimated that some 180,000 combatants would participate the DDR program starting 50,000 participants (25,000 each from the SAF and the SPLA) in the first phase. Approximately 6,000 women associated with armed forces or groups (WAAFGs) and 17,500 people with disabilities, as well as children associated with forces, were expected to be beneficiaries of the DDR program.1 The cost of the reintegration of 182,000 combatants from both sides was estimated at $430 million. The Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan also agreed to contribute $250 directly for each participant.
The demobilization process started in February 2009 and by, the end of August 2009, a total of 12,428 combatants had been demobilized. The demobilized combatants received reintegration support in form of cash, non-food items, and coupons from the WFP for food rations for three months.2 Also, in December of 2009, a total of 697 ex-combatants and members of special needs groups were demobilized. Those who participated in the DDR program also received counseling.3
Information on reintegration of demobilized combatants is not available.
- “Disarmament, Demo and Reintegration- Fact Sheet,” UNMIS, 2010, accessed February 3, 2012, http://sudanddr.org/en/facts/Factsheet%20DDR%20CPA%20areas.pdf.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2009/545), October 21, 2009; “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2009.
- Ibid.
2010
According to the UNMIS, some 21,700 adult ex-combatants including women associated with armed forces or groups were demobilized in five different centers by mid-April 2010. It was also reported that over 13,000 participants received counseling on reintegration opportunities.1 As of 1 December 2010, the Sudan disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme had demobilized 33,693 ex-combatants — 23,678 in the North and 10,015 in the South — including 6,258 women.2 By the end of December 2010, total demobilized number stood at 37,124.3 The DDR program was said to have funding shortage.
Information on reintegration of demobilized combatants is not available.
- “Disarmament, Demo, and Reintegration- Fact Sheet,” UNMIS, 2010, accessed February 3, 2012, http://sudanddr.org/en/facts/Factsheet%20DDR%20CPA%20areas.pdf, accessed 3 February 2012.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2010/681), December 31, 2010.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2010.
2011
The DDR program, as of May 2011, demobilized 48,594 combatants 27,081 for SAF and 21,513 for SPLA). In Northern Sudan, a total of 36,069 DDR participants including 5,985 female and 3,356 disabled participants went through the demobilization process. In Southern Sudan, a total of 12,525 DDR participants, including 6,188 female and 617 disabled participants, had been demobilized. By the end of May, 31,525 (North: 19,811; South: 11,714) ex-combatants had been counseled on reintegration opportunities in the Sudan. Of these, 21,189 registered with UNDP’s DDR program implementation partners in order to receive reintegration support.1
The DDR program in South Sudan continued even after the successful secession in July 2011. Following the secession, the Republic of South Sudan DDR Commission was re-instituted by the interim National Constitution (July 2011). The commission expected to demobilize and disarm some 90,000 ex-combatants of which a total of 12,525 were demobilized by December 2011. By December 2011, some 10,926 demobilized combatants (87%) registered with implementing partners for reintegration support training.
Annexure I: Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 31st December 2004)
Part III: Demobilization, Disarmament, Re-Integration and Reconciliation
23. Objectives
23.1 The overarching objective of the DDR process is to contribute to creating an enabling environment to human security and to support post-peace-agreement social stabilization across the Sudan, particularly war affected areas.
23.2 The DDR programme shall take place within a comprehensive process of national reconciliation and healing throughout the country as part of the peace and confidence building measures.
24. Guiding Principles
24.1 In implementing the DDR programme the Parties agree that the implementing organs shall be guided by the following common principles:
24.2. The national ownership of the process and that the capabilities of the National Institutions shall be built to effectively lead the overall DDR process; for this purpose efficient planning, implementation and supervisory institutions shall be established to operate as soon as possible.
24.3. That the DDR process in the Sudan shall be led by recognized state institutions and international partners shall only play a supportive role to these institutions. The process shall be sustained through cooperation and coordination with local NGOs and active support from the international community by facilitating and extending material and technical assistance throughout the entire DDR process and the transition from war to peace.
24.4. That no DDR planning, management or implementation activity shall take place outside the framework of the recognized interim and permanent DDR institutions referred to in paragraphs 25.1 and 25.2. here under.
24.5. Fairness, transparency, equitability and consistency for determining the eligibility of ex-combatants targeted for assistance.
24.6. Ex-combatants shall be treated equitably irrespective of their previous military affiliations; as well, they shall be empowered by provision of training and information to voluntarily choose their path to reintegration. The reintegration process shall be community based and equally benefits returnees and local communities.
24.7. That the DDR is mostly a civilian process although the military input is vital. While disarmament and demobilization are mainly military, the civilian efforts in reintegration are paramount, particularly with reference to decisions of methodology and organization. The military will have input but the decisions and implementation of ‘such programmes are the responsibility of the relevant institutions created for this purpose.
24.8. The DDR programme shall be, gender sensitive and shall encourage the participation of the communities and the civil society organizations with the view’ to strengthening their capacities to play their role in improving and sustaining the social and economic reintegration of former combatants.
24.9. The demobilization of all child soldiers within six months of the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
24.10. The identification and registration within six months from the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of all children separated from their families for family tracing and ultimate reunification;
24.11. UNICEF, JCRC and other international organizations are called upon to assist in the child component of the DDR in the Sudan;
24.12. That adequate financial and logistical support shall be mobilized by the international community including governments, governmental agencies, humanitarian organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
24.13. The observance of a high level of transparency and accountability with respect to the DDR programmes financial management.
24.14. The maintenance of an appropriate and optimal degree of flexibility to respond to the emerging needs on the ground in a timely manner.
25. DDR Institutions
25.1. To realize the best objective of the DDR process in the entire country, and to avoid any possibilities of relapsing into war, the Parties state their dedication to undertake timely steps to establish the following institutions to plan, manage and implement the DDR programmes:
25.1.1. The National DDR Coordination Council (NDDRCC), with the prime responsibility of policy formulation, oversight, review, coordination and evaluation of the progress of the Northern and Southern Sudan DDR commissions referred to in 25.1.2 hereunder. The NDDRCC shall be appointed by and accountable to the Presidency.
25.1.2. The Northern’ Sudan DDR Commission (NDDRC) and the Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SDDRC) shall be mandated to design, implement and manage the DDR process at the northern and southern sub-national levels respectively.
25.1.3. The State DDR commissions shall be entrusted with the responsibility of implementation of the programmes at the state and local levels.
25.2. Until the aforementioned institutions are established the Parties agree to put in place Interim DDR bodies to:
25.2.1. Act as bases for the future Sub-National DDR institutions established in 25.1 above.
25.2.2. Coordinate and prepare detailed DDR proposals.
25.2.3. Commence technical discussion with international donors and agencies regarding partnership and funding requirements and modalities for the DDR implementation programmes.
25.2.4. Coordinate with the UN-DPKO mission on issues pertaining to DDR.
25.2.5. Prepare draft operational proposals for DDR programmes.
25.2.6. Prepare to establish formal DDR capacity building and facilitate training in DDR through seminars, workshops and study tours.
25.2.7. Coordinate joint DDR preparatory activities.
25.2.8. Prepare in collaboration with the international actors data collection, including socio-economic surveys in the areas where the DDR programmes will be implemented and undertake needs assessment to provide data on target groups.
26. Previous Contractual Obligations
Recognizing that both Parties have existing contractual arrangements with international organizations and agencies related to DDR, the Parties agree:
26.1. To commence a process of negotiations with these agencies and organizations to close down and transfer current DDR-related activities to the incoming DDR institutions.
26.2. That the interim DDR bodies shall undertake the task of leading and concluding these negotiations, and shoulder the operational responsibility of the activities thereafter.
27. Humanitarian and General Provisions
27.1. Upon signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Parties shall:
27.1.1. exchange information on Missing in Action and shall trace them to their best efforts;
27.1.2. agree to lifting the state of emergency in the Sudan except in areas where conditions do not permit;
27.2. The Parties agree that the issue of the release of all civil political detainees as part of the confidence building measures, national healing and reconciliation process shall be discussed on and dealt with within the discussions on the implementation modalities.
27.3. Humanitarian law and civil and political rights shall be closely observed.
27.4. Collateral, secondary agreements and legislation shall not contradict this Agreement and shall be equally binding on the Parties.
27.5. The Parties shall call upon the governments at all levels, civil societal organizations, political forces, national NGOs and international community to assist and facilitate the reconciliation process at grass root levels.
(Note: for detailed timeline see CPA)
Prisoner Release
2005
After the signing of CPA in January 2005, the Sudanese government and the International Red Cross signed a protocol on 14 February 2005 regarding the rules and principles governing the release and transfer of persons detained in relation to the armed conflict in southern Sudan. A Sudanese Minister also said that the SPLM-held 700 prisoners of war who would be freed in the third week of February (Source: Red Cross, Sudan Government Sign Protocol on Prisoner release, Agence France Presse, 14 February 2005). Throughout 2005, the SPLM released a number of Prisoners of War (PoWs). The ICRC reported on the basis of partial involvement in the process and interviews that PoWs had been well-treated and had returned voluntarily.1 According to the U.S. State Department Human Rights Report, the SPLM/A released approximately 500 prisoners of war in 2005. The Sudanese government maintained that it did not have PoWs.2
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, May 2011.
- “2005 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- Sudan,” U.S. State Department, 2006, accessed January 10, 2012, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61594.htm.
2006
Provision related to the release of the PoWs was implemented in 2005.
2007
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
2009
No further developments observed.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
Annexure I: Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 31st December 2004)
Part I: The Ceasefire Arrangements
1.8. The Parties shall commit themselves to immediate release of prisoners of war (POWs) and as a gesture of national reconciliation release any other persons detained as a result of the war upon the endorsement of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement;
Paramilitary Groups
2005
The 2005 CPA requires the removal and withdrawal of the paramilitary forces (Popular Defence Forces) from areas where they were previously located. This withdrawal or removal was intended to boost the capacity of civilian police. Prior to the CPA, the paramilitary organization worked as a police force without accountability to the community or independent oversight. According to the U.N. Secretary General’s Report, “in five locations in the south, approximately 17,000 former government police remain deployed as well as the emergent police force derived from the Sudan People’s Liberation Army.”1 Available news archives, reports from the U.N. Secretary General and CPA implementation updates available from the UNMIS on the implementation of this CPA provision do not suggest that the removal or withdrawal of the paramilitary forces did not take place. This suggests that this provision of accord was implemented. Nevertheless, the withdrawal of the paramilitary forces depended on the capacity increase of the civilian police force, which did not improve significantly.
2006
Removal and withdrawal of the paramilitary forces took place in 2005.
2007
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
2009
No further developments observed.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
Annexure I: Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 31st December 2004)
Part II: The Armed Forces
22. Policing Issues and Domestic Security
22.1. In order to facilitate the removal and withdrawal of the military and paramilitary forces from areas where they were previously located and in order to return societal order and harmony, in accordance with the law, in compliance with national and international acceptable standards and with accountability to the Courts and civil Administration, the police at the appropriate level during the ceasefire shall:
22.1.1. Maintain law and public order;
22.1.2. Ensure safety and security of all people and their property;
22.1.3. Prevent and detect crimes.
22.1.4. Assist returning refugees, the displaced and other returnees to start a normal, stable and safe life in their respective communities;
22.1.5. Provide national service ( such as nationality, civil registry, identity documents (IDs), passports etc.) and other police services and make them available to all citizens in their locations;
22.1.6. Protect VIPs in collaboration with other security agencies;
22.1.7. Preserve natural resources;
22.1.8. Combat illicit trafficking in narcotics, drugs and illegal trade in fireanns and other organized and trans boundary crimes in the area;
22.1.9. Control illegal presence and movement of aliens in the area;
22.1.10. Collect data and information on criminal matters that threaten implementation of the peace agreement in the area.
22.1.11. Remove the need for the deployment of military and para-military forces in villages, communities and city streets;
22.1.12. Combat corruption at all levels of government and civil society.
Human Rights
2005
The 60-Member National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC) was formed on 23 April 2005; and the commission began drafting a new interim constitution on 30 April. The draft interim constitution was adopted by the National Assembly and the SPLM National Liberation Council on 6 July 2005.1 The constitution came into effect on 9 July 2005. The Human Rights provisions, including provision to establish the National Human Rights Commissions (NHRC), were incorporated in the interim constitution. Article 142 of the interim constitution contains provisions for the NHRC. The process for establishing the NHRC, however, was not initiated in 2005. Without the Human Rights Commission Act, the commission would not be established.
With respect to human rights improvements in Sudan, the 2005 CPA brought little change. As per the CPA requirement, the government lifted state of emergency throughout Sudan but Darfur and the east. Nevertheless, human rights violations such as arbitrary arrests and detentions, killings, looting, and rape took place on a regular basis.2
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
- “World Report — 2006,” Human Rights Watch, 2006, accessed January 23, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2006.pdf.
2006
Some progress was made in drafting NHRC Act. The draft act was submitted to the legislative department of the Ministry of Justice. Once the review was completed at the Ministry of Justice, the act would be submitted for the approval of the Council of Ministers.1 Nevertheless, the NHRC Act did not move forward. The NHRC was not established in 2006.
According to the Human Rights Watch, the human rights situation remained abysmal due to incidents of arbitrary arrests and detention, killings, looting and rape. Nevertheless, some progress was said made by the Government of Southern Sudan in terms of setting up the Human Rights Commission for the South.2
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
- “World Report — 2007,” Human Rights Watch, 2007, accessed January 23, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k7/wr2007master.pdf.
2007
The Government of National Unity in July 2007 submitted the NHRC Bill to the National Assembly to be discussed at the Assembly’s Human Rights Committee in October.1 Nevertheless, no significant progress was made in terms of establishing the NHRC as well as the Human Rights Commission for the South. Human Rights Watch suggested in its report that the security forces killed and injured seven people involved in protests against two dam projects in northern Sudan. Also, arbitrary arrests and detention of journalists, activists as well as restrictions on freedom of expression persisted.2
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
- “World Report — 2008,” Human Rights Watch, 2008, accessed January 23, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k8/pdfs/wr2k8_web.pdf.
2008
Though already behind the schedule, the Human Rights Committee of the National Assembly finalized the draft law of NHRC on 29 December 2008. The draft law was said in line with the rights mentioned in the interim constitution. Also, the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly was considering the southern Sudan Human Rights Commission Bill.1 Nevertheless, the NHCR and the Southern Sudan Human Rights Commission were not established in 2008. The human rights situation remained a serious concern. In July of 2008, the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor requested an arrest warrant for President al-Bashir on 10 counts of war crimes.2
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
- “World Report — 2009,” Human Rights Watch, 2009, accessed January 23, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/en/node/79212.
2009
The human rights situation remained as grave as it was in 2008. South Sudan witnessed ethnic conflicts causing atrocities of civilian targeting and rapes. The Human security situation was worse.1 Despite grave situations related to human security, progress was made in terms of approving international conventions related to human rights. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol was ratified on 24 April 2009. The National Assembly endorsed the Child Act on 29 December 2009, which brought Sudan closer into line with the Convention on the Rights of the Child.2
With respect to progress related to the NHRC, the National Assembly adopted the NHRC bill on 21 April 2009. The act provides that the president would appoint commissioners following consultation with the presidency. After the bill was adopted, the civil society groups in October submitted a list of 15 potential candidates to the presidency. Nevertheless, the commissioners of the NHCR were not appointed in 2009.3 With respect to the Human Rights Commission in southern Sudan, the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly passed the legislation on 3 February 2009. The commission started its outreach program in October 2009 in order to monitor and report on the human rights situation in southern Sudan. Furthermore, the Southern Sudan Human Rights Commission had been expanded into eight of the ten southern states.4
- “World Report 2011- Sudan,” Human Rights Watch, 2011, accessed January 30, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/en/world-report-2011/sudan.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2009.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2009.
- Ibid.
2010
According to the U.S. State Department human rights report, there were numerous reports that the government and its agents committed arbitrary and unlawful killings. The SPLA soldiers also committed extrajudicial killings. There were several reports of disappearances, arbitrary detentions and arrests.1 The commissioners for the NHRC were not appointed in 2010.
- “2010 Human Rights Report: Sudan,” U.S. State Department, 2011, accessed January 23, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/af/154371.htm.
2011
The Human Rights situation did not improve. The armed group supported by Khartoum started rebellions in South Sudan against the GoSS. There was no progress in establishing a National Human Rights Commission. Also, with the secession of southern Sudan as an independent state after the referendum, the provision of the CPA referencing human rights became obsolete.
After much delay, Sudanese President al-Bashir issued a decree on 11 January 2012 to form a NHRC. He appointed 13 members in addition to Amal Hassan Babiker and Joseph Khalil Suleiman, as president and vice-President of the commission, respectively.1
Chapter II: Power Sharing (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 26th May, 2004)
1.6 Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms:
1.6.1 The Republic of the Sudan, including all levels of Government throughout the country, shall comply fully with its obligations under the international human rights treaties to which it is or becomes a party. These include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Slavery Convention of 1926, as amended, and the related Supplementary Convention, the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, the International Convention Against Apartheid in Sports, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the Related Protocol, and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. The Republic of the Sudan should endeavor to ratify other human rights treaties which it has signed.
1.6.2. The rights and freedoms to be enjoyed under Sudanese law, in accordance with the provisions of the treaties referred to above, include in particular the following:
1.6.2.1 Life
Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his/her life;
1.6.2.2 Personal Liberty
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his/her liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law;
1.6.2.3 Slavery
No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave trade in all their forms shall be prohibited. No one shall be held in servitude or be required to perform forced or compulsory labour;
1.6.2.4 Torture
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
1.6.2.5 Fair Trial
(a) Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his/her arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him/her;
(b) In the determination of any criminal charges against him/her, or of his/her rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law;
(c) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law;
(d) No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed;
(e) In the determination of any criminal charge against him/her, everyone shall be entitled, in full equality, to be tried without undue delay, to be tried in his/her presence and to defend himself/herself in person or through legal assistance of his/her own choosing and to have legal assistance assigned to him/her in any case where the interests of justice so require.
1.6.2.6 Privacy
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his/her privacy, family, home or correspondence;
1.6.2.7 Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
1.6.2.8 Freedom of Expression
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression;
1.6.2.9 Freedom of Assembly and Association
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his/her interests;
1.6.2.10 Family and Marriage
(a) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State;
(b) The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized, according to their respective family laws.
1.6.2.11 Right to Vote
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without distinctions and unreasonable restrictions, to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
1.6.2.12 Equality Before the Law
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law;
1.6.2.13 Freedom from Discrimination
The law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status;
1.6.2.14 Freedom of Movement
Everyone has the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his/her residence;
1.6.2.15 The Rights of Children
Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are required by his/her status as a minor.;
1.6.2.16 Equal Rights of Men and Women
(a) The equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and all economic, social, and cultural rights set forth in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights shall be ensured;
(b) The human rights and fundamental freedoms embodied in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) shall also be reflected in the Interim National Constitution. No derogation from these rights and freedoms shall be made under the Constitution or under the ICCPR except in accordance with the provisions thereof and only with the approval of the Presidency and the National Legislature, as required by Section 2.3.14 herein;
(c) These human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be monitored by the Human Rights Commission specified in paragraph 2.10.1.2 herein.
2.10 Other Independent and/or National Institutions to be Established in
Accordance with the Peace Agreement:
2.10.1 The National Constitutional Review Commission, as detailed in Section 2.12 herein, shall also detail the mandate and provide for the appointment and other mechanisms to ensure the independence of the following institutions:-
2.10.1.2 A Human Rights Commission;
Refugees
2005
The 2005 CPA provides that the parties were committed to render and facilitate humanitarian assistance to war affected persons including refugees and their rights to return. The parties were also committed to assisting returning refugees to start a normal, stable and safe life in their respective communities. At the time of the signing of CPA in 2005, the UNHCR estimated some 693,632 Sudanese sought asylum status in different part of the world.1 The UNMIS estimate was over 500,000 refugees in neighboring countries.2
Over half a million former refugees were expected to return to southern Sudan.3 According to the U.N. Secretary General’s report, there had been over 500,000 spontaneous returns in the Sudan.4
The UNHCR had helped the first group of up to 150 southern Sudanese refugees return home from Kenya, which was said the beginning of the home-going of about 560,000 refugees from southern Sudan living in seven neighboring countries.5 The UNHCR estimated that some 70,000 to 80,000 South Sudanese refugees went home on their own from exile abroad in 2005.6
- “2005 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook-Sudan,” UNHCR, 2007, October 26, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/4641bec40.html, accessed.
- “Sudan IDP & Refugee Returns, Reintegration Operations Statistical Overview,” accessed October 26, 2011, http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/FEED5CE5022A706CC125753E003F3046/$file/Returns_RRR-Jan09.pdf.
- “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/57), January 31, 2005.
- “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/821), December 21, 2005.
- “UN to Help First Group of Southern Sudan Refugees Return Home,” Xinhua General News Service, December 13, 2005.
- “Sudan; Agreement Signed for Refugee Return from Kenya,” Africa News, January 13, 2006.
2006
The humanitarian situation in southern Sudan remained stable and the increased assistance of the international community with the reconstruction or repair of some 370 kilometers of road supported the return of over 10,000 refugees to southern Sudan.1
In January 2006, Sudan and Kenya, together with the UNHCR, signed a tripartite agreement in helping South Sudanese refugees return home from Kenya. This agreement was one of seven that the UNHCR had expected to sign with neighboring countries which would clear return of some 70,000 refugees to south Sudan in the first half of 2006.2 The tripartite agreement with Kenya was supposed to facilitate the return of some 10,000 Sudanese refugees from Kenya
There were several setbacks in refugee repatriation. The deteriorating security situation forced the UNHCR to reduce its operation in Darfur region.3 Similarly, increasing Lord’s Resistance Army activities in southern Sudan also hampered the return of refugees.4 As of early September, only 12,000 refugees went back to southern Sudan with UNHCR assistance due to lack of funds for repatriation.5 The cumulative number of refugees returning in 2006 was 25,811.6
- “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/728), September 12, 2006.
- “Sudan; Agreement Signed for Refugee Return from Kenya,” Africa News, January 13, 2006.
- “UN Slashes Operations for Refugees in Sudan’s Darfur,” Xinhua General News Service, March 10, 2006.
- “Insecurity Hampering Return of South Sudan Refugees,” Agence France Presse, March 18, 2006.
- “Sudan; Lack of Funds Threatens Refugee Repatriation – UNHCR,” Africa News, September 19, 2006.
- “Sudan IDP & Refugee Returns, Reintegration Operations Statistical Overview,” accessed October 26, 2011, http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/FEED5CE5022A706CC125753E003F3046/$file/Returns_RRR-Jan09.pdf.
2007
By mid-April 2007, it was reported that some 25,000 refugees returned home from five neighboring countries.1 To help facilitate repatriation of refugees, the UNHCR opened two new corridors from Ethiopia to Southern Sudan. It was estimated that, as of February 2007, there were some 328,000 refugees from Sudan in Uganda, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Egypt.2 The UNHCR was quoted saying that approximately 50,000 refugees had returned from Ethiopia and Central African Republic voluntarily.3 After the initiation of the refugee repatriation programs in December 2005, the UN-backed refugee return to southern Sudan hit the 157,000 person mark.4 The cumulative result of the organized return of refugees for 2007 was 50,932.5 More than 40% of the estimated 418,000 refugees in neighboring countries had returned home voluntarily by the end of 2007.6
Funding for humanitarian assistance, as well as a fragile security situation, hindered repatriation programs.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/213), April 17, 2007.
- “Sudan; Nearly 9,000 More People Have Returned to Southern Region This Year – UN Mission,” Africa News, March 27, 2007.
- “50,000 refugees returns to South Sudan,” Suna News Agency, April 12, 2007.
- “UN-backed Refugee Return to Southern Sudan Hits 157,000,” Xinhua General News Service, August 17, 2007.
- “Sudan IDP & Refugee Returns, Reintegration Operations Statistical Overview,” accessed October 26, 2011, http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/FEED5CE5022A706CC125753E003F3046/$file/Returns_RRR-Jan09.pdf.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2008/64), January 31, 2008.
2008
The monsoon caused hazardous road conditions and brought the repartition of refugees to a complete halt. Nevertheless, the UNHCR reported in October that a total of 60,665 refugees returned to Sudan in 2008. The estimated cumulative returnees were 62,185 for 2008.1 By December 2008, some 290,000 refugees have returned to Sudan since the signing of the 2005 CPA and the UNHCR was said assisted half of them return home.2
Funding for humanitarian assistance as well as the fragile security situation hindered the repatriation programs.
- “Sudan IDP & Refugee Returns,” Reintegration Operations Statistical Overview, accessed October 26, 2011, http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/FEED5CE5022A706CC125753E003F3046/$file/Returns_RRR-Jan09.pdf.
- “Commissioner on Sudan-Uganda Border Urges Refugees to Return Home,” Sudan Tribune, December 25, 2008.
2009
The security situation and funding remained the main challenge for the repartition of refugees in Sudan in 2009. In his October 2009 report to the U.N. Security Council, the Secretary General reported that the UNHCR and its assisted programs helped repatriate a total of 171,154 refugees, of whom fewer than 32,000 were repatriated since the beginning of 2009.1
2010
According to a news report, some 330,000 refugees returned from exile, the majority of them with the help of UNHCR.1 It was also reported that the government of southern Sudan was planning to repatriate 1.5 million southern who fled to the north during the long civil war.2 Exact figure of returnees from the north, however, is not available.
- “Sudan; Thousands Heading Back Ahead of Independence Vote — UN,” Africa News, December 21, 2010.
- “Statement by Refugees International on the Government of Southern Sudan’s Mass Repatriation Plans,” Targeted News Service, August 27, 2010.
2011
As South Sudan decided to became an independent state in a referendum, relief agencies had expected that some 800,000 northerners would return to the South Sudan, of which 200,000 had already returned by early February.1 Once South Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 2011, the UNHCR, in its press release, stated that approximately 350,000 former refugees had returned to South Sudan over the past six years, and that the thousands of southerners were joining them from elsewhere in Sudan.2 This suggests that not all refugees returned to Sudan.
In addition, the refugee provisions of the CPA became obsolete as southern Sudan became the independent state of South Sudan.
Annexure I: Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 31st December 2004)
PART I: The Ceasefire Arrangements
1. General and Fundamental Provisions
1.10. The Parties shall commit themselves to render and facilitate humanitarian assistance through creation of conditions conducive to the provision of urgent humanitarian assistance to displaced persons, refugees and other affected persons and their right to return;
22. Policing Issues and Domestic Security
22.1.4. Assist returning refugees, the displaced and other returnees to start a normal, stable and safe life in their respective communities;
Internally Displaced Persons
2005
The 2005 CPA provides that the parties were committed to humanitarian assistance to war-affected persons including IDPs and their rights to return. The parties were also committed to assisting returnees with starting normal, stable and safe lives in their respective communities. At the time of the signing of CPA in 2005, the United Nations Missions in Sudan estimated there were over four million conflict-caused internally displaced persons in Sudan.1 The International Displacement Monitoring Center estimated 5,355,000 IDPs in Sudan in 2005.2
By the end of the year, there had been over 500,000 spontaneous returns of IDPs and refugees in Sudan.3 The IDMC statistics suggest IDPs were not resettled back to their communities as the estimated IDPs did not change for 2006. The main concern remained the security situation of the communities to which the IDPs were returning. In this regard, the UNHCR would prepare communities to receive IDPs displaced within Sudan as well as refugees returning from neighboring countries. The UNHCR had built or rebuilt schools, hospitals, vocational training centers and water points not only for IDPs but to help entire communities.4
- “Sudan IDP & Refugee Returns,” Reintegration Operations Statistical Overview, accessed October 26, 2011, http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/FEED5CE5022A706CC125753E003F3046/$file/Returns_RRR-Jan09.pdf.
- “Internal displacement caused by conflict and violence,” IDMC, 2011, http://www.internal-displacement.org/IDMC_IDP-figures_2001-2010.pdf, accessed January 24, 2012.
- “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/821), December 21, 2005.
- “Sudan; First UN-Organized Repatriation of Southern Sudan’s Refugees Gets Under Way,” Africa News, December 19, 2005.
2006
The International Displacement Monitoring Center estimated there were 5,355,000 IDPs in Sudan in 2006.1 This suggests no significant resettlement of IDPs took place in 2006. The UNMIS statistics, however, indicates that 7,432 IDPs were assisted with returning back to their communities.2 Ongoing conflicts as well as a lack of funding for programs posed a direct threat to the return of IDPs.3
- “Internal displacement caused by conflict and violence.”
- “Sudan IDP & Refugee Returns, Reintegration.”
- “Sudan; UN Repatriation Scheme Still Faces Shortfall,” Africa News, September 22, 2006.
2007
As of August 2007, some 85,000 IDPs and refugees returned back to their communities with assistance from the UN as part of the joint plan agreed to by the national and southern governments and the United Nations.1 An estimated 45,355 IDPs returned home in 2007.2 The IDMC, however, suggests that the estimated number of IDPs actually increased in 2007 to 5,800,000.3 This, however, does not suggest that efforts were not made with regards to returning IDPs. Between January 23 and early February of 2007, some 747 IDPs returned home in eight convoys. Those returnees were part of an estimated 15,000 IDPs who UNHCR helped to return under an agreement signed the previous year by the world body, Sudan’s Government of National Unity and the Government of South Sudan.4 Nevertheless, funding for humanitarian assistance, as well as a fragile security situation, hindered the return of IDPs to their communities. It was estimated that up to 160,000 people were displaced to Darfur since the beginning of 2007 alone.5
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/500), August 20, 2007.
- “Sudan IDP & Refugee Returns,” Reintegration Operations Statistical Overview, accessed October 26, 2011, http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/FEED5CE5022A706CC125753E003F3046/$file/Returns_RRR-Jan09.pdf.
- “Internal displacement caused by conflict and violence,” IDMC, 2011, accessed January 24, 2012, http://www.internal-displacement.org/IDMC_IDP-figures_2001-2010.pdf.
- “Sudan; UN-Aided Return of Displaced Persons to Blue Nile State Gathers Pace,” Africa News, February 13, 2007.
- “Sudan; Over 160,000 Have Been Displaced since January,” Africa News, October 9, 2007.
2008
As of October 2008, the UNHCR assisted 28,151 IDPs with returning home, which brought the total number returned to 80,938.1 This figure includes only those who returned to southern Sudan. Resettlement in Darfur, where a civil war was ongoing for the fifth consecutive year and Abyei, where clash took place in May 2008 did not take place. According to the report of the U.N. Secretary General, of the approximately 50,000 individuals displaced, between 12,000 and 16,000 returned voluntarily to Abyei.2 According to a news report that quoted UNHCR, some two million southern Sudanese who were internally displaced had returned to their homes since the signing of the peace agreement.3 The IDMC reported that the number of IDPs for Sudan declined to 4,900,000 IDPs.4 This suggests that about one million IDPs returned to their community in 2008.
- “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2008/662), October 20, 2008.
- Ibid.
- “Commissioner on Sudan-Uganda Border Urges Refugees to Return Home,” Sudan Tribune, December 25, 2008.
- “Internal displacement caused by conflict and violence.”
2009
The U.N. Secretary General’s report suggested that the organized return of IDPs reached 8,687 as of July and over 90,000 when the peace process started in 2005. This figure does not include the number of spontaneous returns–over 120,000 returned spontaneously from northern Sudan to southern Sudan.1 By October of that year, approximately 9,100 IDPs returned to southern Sudan under the joint plans initiated by the UNHCR. An estimated 1.9 million IDPs had returned spontaneously to their place of origin since 2005.2 Violence was one of the factors that contributed to the delay in the return of IDPs. LRA violence displaced 54,000 people within Southern Sudan.3 Continued violence in Darfur and Abyei slowed the return of IDPs. Furthermore, the land rights issue contributed to a delay in the return of IDPs as land was cultivated by others in their absence.4
- “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2009/357), July 14, 2009.
- “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2009/545), October 21, 2009.
- “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2009/357), July 14, 2009.
- “Sudan; Land Rights Hinder Darfur IDP Returns,” Africa News, November 25, 2009.
2010
Most of the focus on issues related to IDPs shifted upon the return of southerners who went to the north to escape the conflict. The government of Southern Sudan, in collaboration with the Repatriation Taskforce formed by South Sudan Referendum Commission, started repatriating Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from Khartoum to South Sudan by air, beginning in November 2010.211 As a matter of fact, Abyei received the first group of 1,200 IDPs returning from north.2 Over 28,000 IDPs had returned from northern to southern Sudan by December 15, 2010.3 According to U.N. Secretary General’s report, the Government of Southern Sudan had estimated as many as 150,000 people would have returned from northern Sudan by the end of March 2011, just before the referendum.4
- “Southern Sudan Begins Repatriation of IDPs from North Ahead of Referendum,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, November 26, 2010.
- “Sudan; Abyei Receives First Batch of IDPs Returning From North Sudan,” Sudan Africa News, November 22, 2010.
- “Over 28,000 IDPs Return from North to Southern Sudan Ahead of Referendum,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, December 16, 2010.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2010/681), December 31, 2010.
2011
As South Sudan decided to became an independent state in a referendum, relief agencies had expected that some 800,000 northerners would return to the South Sudan, of which 200,000 had already returned by early February.1 Once South Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 2011, the 2005 CPA provision on IDPs became obsolete.
Annexure I: Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 31st December 2004)
PART I: The Ceasefire Arrangements
1. General and Fundamental Provisions
1.10. The Parties shall commit themselves to render and facilitate humanitarian assistance through creation of conditions conducive to the provision of urgent humanitarian assistance to displaced persons, refugees and other affected persons and their right to return;
8.6. To safeguard against the menace and hazards posed by landmines and unexploded ordnance, the Parties agree that:
8.6.4. The Parties shall conduct de-mining activities as soon as possible, and in coordination with the UN Peace Support Mission with a view to create the conditions necessary for deployment of the UN Peace Support Mission and the return of displaced populations;
22. Policing Issues and Domestic Security
22.1.4. Assist returning refugees, the displaced and other returnees to start a normal, stable and safe life in their respective communities;
Right of Self-Determination
2005
The 2005 CPA provided that the people of South Sudan would have the right to self-determination and, in this regard, the people of south Sudan would have the option to confirm the unity or to vote for secession. South Sudan’s right to self-determination was incorporated in the interim constitution (Article 219). Similarly, the CPA gave the residents of Abyei the option to cast a separate ballot and to make a choice between retaining its special administrative status in the north or to be part of Bahr el Ghazal. This provision was also incorporated in the interim constitution (Article 183.3). The constitution came into effect on 9 July 2005.1
2006
No developments observed this year.
2007
No developments observed this year.
2008
No developments observed this year.
2009
As provided for in 2005 CPA, the National Assembly adopted the Southern Sudan Referendum Bill in December 2009. The National Assembly adopted the Abyei Referendum Bill 2009.1
2010
The members of the referendum commission were appointed in June 2010. The referendum was scheduled for 9 to 15 January 2011.1
2011
The referendum for southern Sudan took place from 9 to 15 January 2011. The referendum was conducted in the Sudan and in eight out-of-country-voting (OCV) countries (with the exception of an OCV centre in Brisbane where the polling continued until 18 January).1 On 7 February 2011, the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission announced the final results for the Referendum. 1.17% of valid votes were cast in favor of unity, 98.83% of valid votes were cast in favor of secession with a 97.58% voter turnout (3,851,994 registered voters).2 This satisfies that the provision related to self-determination for southern Sudan was implemented. Nevertheless, the Abyei referendum did not take place as after the north and south could not agree on who was eligible to vote.3 The southern Sudan called for the referendum for Abyei and insisted that the Abyei belonged to the south Sudan.4
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, January 2011.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2011.
- “Southern Sudan Official: Abyei Belongs with Us,” Associated Press Online, April 29, 2011.
- “Sudan; South Calls for Abyei Referendum,” Africa News, May 26, 2011.
Chapter I: The Machakos Protocol (Signed at Machakos, Kenya on 20th July, 2002)
Part A: Agreed Principles
1.3 That the people of South Sudan have the right to self-determination, inter alia, through a referendum to determine their future status.
The Right to Self-Determination for the People of South Sudan
1.3 That the people of South Sudan have the right to self-determination, inter alia, through a referendum to determine their future status.
2.5 At the end of the six (6) year Interim Period there shall be an internationally monitored referendum, organized jointly by the GoS and the SPLM/A, for the people of South Sudan to: confirm the unity of the Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the Peace Agreement; or to vote for secession.
CHAPTER IV: The Resolution of The Abyei Conflict
1.3 End of Interim Period
Simultaneously with the referendum for southern Sudan, the residents of Abyei will cast a separate ballot. The proposition voted on in the separate ballot will present the residents of Abyei with the following choices, irrespective of the results of the southern referendum:
a. That Abyei retain its special administrative status in the north;
b. That Abyei be part of Bahr el Ghazal.
Women's Rights
2005
The 2005 CPA provided for the equal rights of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights. This provision of CPA was incorporated in the interim constitution’s Article 15.2. As such, the state was said to promote and empower women in public life. The interim constitution came into effect on 9 July 2005.1 The constitution also allowed women as well as men to pass on Sudanese nationality to their children (Article 7). Amnesty International had welcomed the emphasis on women’s and children’s rights in Sudan’s interim constitution.2 Nevertheless, only two out of 22 ministerial portfolios were given to women in interim transitional government in southern Sudan.3 The Legislative Council of Southern Kordofan was formed on 12 December 2005 and convened on 22 December 2005 with 54 members (30 NCP and 24 SPLM), seven of whom were women.4 Women representation in the power-sharing national assembly and the unity government is not known.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
- “Sudan’s National Assembly Passes Constitution Paving Way for Former Rebel Leader to Be Vice President,” AP Worldstream, July 6, 2005.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA.”
- Ibid.
2006
The Secretary General of the U.N., in his report, suggested that some progress had been made after the CPA in 2005, but indicated challenges remained regarding the political and economic empowerment of women.1
2007
It was reported that the UNMIS partnered with the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Child Affairs to formulate a work plan for the implementation of the national policy for women’s empowerment. The UNMIS gender unit also continuously provided technical support and capacity building, focusing on preventing gender-based violence and the recognition of the role of women in peace-building.1
2008
Some significant progress was made in terms of empowering women in political and civil life. Sudan’s president, in his address to the first Sudanese Women parliamentarian’s Forum organized by the National Organization of Sudanese Women Parliamentarians, stressed that women would be given 25 percent representation in the next parliamentary, national, and state elections.1 The National Assembly passed the National Election Act of 2008 on 7 July 2008, which gave 25 percent of the seats to a separate women’s party list.2
- “Sudan; President Affirms Special Status for Women in Allotting Posts,” Africa News, March 21, 2008.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
2009
The UNMIS coordination mechanism was established to coordinate activities in the area of women’s participation in elections.1
2010
In the April elections for the National Assembly, the NCP won 82 seats for women, the SPLM won 26 seats, the Popular Congress Party (PCP) won three seats, and the Federal UMMA Party obtained one Women’s List seat. Also, in elections for the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, the SPLM won 42 women’s seats and the SPLM-DC won one seat.1
2011
With elections of women representatives in the legislatures, provision related to equal political rights was implemented.
Chapter II: Power Sharing (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 26th May, 2004)
1.6.2.16 Equal Rights of Men and Women
(a) The equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and all economic, social, and cultural rights set forth in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights shall be ensured;
Children's Rights
2005
Under the guiding principles and directives of the state, the interim constitution, which became effective on 9 July 2005, had provisions for the welfare of children under Article 14. The constitution dictated that education through grade eight be made compulsory, prohibited exploitation of children, and established the legal age of marriages, 10 for girls and 15 for boys. Nevertheless, the government’s commitment to children’s rights and welfare was uneven and there were significant inequality in access to the health service for children living in different region of the country. The U.S. State Department Human Rights Report suggested that the government-allied militias and rebel forces accepted children into their military camps.1 Under the DDR program, the UNMIS initiated disarmament of some 17,000 children.2
- “2005 County Reports on Human Rights Practices-Sudan,” U.S. State Department, 2006, accessed January 26, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61594.htm.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/821), December 21, 2005.
2006
The U.S. State Department Human Rights Report suggested that there were some challenges to the protection of children’s rights–despite commitment from the government regarding children’s rights and welfare.31 Similarly, reports from the United Nations secretary general suggested that children remained vulnerable to recruitment into armed groups.2
- “2006 County Reports on Human Rights Practices-Sudan,” U.S. State Department, 2007, accessed January 26, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78759.htm.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/160), March 14, 2006.
2007
The U.S. State Department Human Rights Report suggested that there were some challenges to the protection of children’s rights–despite commitment from the government regarding children’s rights and welfare.1 Nevertheless, some progress was made in terms of promoting children’s rights. In this regard, the Child Bill of 2006, which prohibits the recruitment of children, passed its first reading in the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly in June 2007. Similarly, significant progress was made in finalizing the draft child rights bill which would replace the Child Act of 2004.2
- “2007 County Reports on Human Rights Practices- Sudan,” U.S. State Department, 2008, accessed January 26, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100506.htm.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/520), August 29, 2007.
2008
The U.S. State Department Human Rights Report suggested that there were some challenges to the protection of children’s rights–despite commitment from the government regarding children’s rights and welfare.1 The Child Act was pending in the National Assembly in 2008.2 Nevertheless, the demobilized and disarmed children were integrated and, in this effort, UNMIS supported UNICEF. Also, on 17 December 2008, the Justice Minister, Abd-al-Basit Sabdarat, issued a decree establishing specialized child attorney offices in a number of Sudan states.3
- “2008 County Reports on Human Rights Practices- Sudan,” U.S. State Department, 2009, accessed January 26, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119026.htm.
- “UN Human Rights Expert Concludes Visit to Sudan,” States News Service, August 6, 2007.
- “Child attorney offices established in Sudan,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, December 20, 2008.
2009
The U.S. State Department Human Rights Report suggested that there were some challenges to the protection of children’s rights–despite commitment from the government regarding children’s rights and welfare.1 However, on 29 December 2009, the National Assembly endorsed the Child Act, bringing Sudanese legislation closer into line the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). The new Child Act defines a child as a person less than 18 years of age. The Act increases the age of criminal responsibility from 7 years to 12 years of age, and increases in the maximum period of imprisonment for rape to 20 years. The Act also criminalized the corporal punishment of children in schools.2
- “2009 County Reports on Human Rights Practices- Sudan,” U.S. State Department, 2010, accessed January 26, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135978.htm.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2009.
2010
The U.S. State Department Human Rights Report suggested that there were some challenges to the protection of children’s rights–despite commitment from the government regarding children’s rights and welfare.1 The UNMIS said that it had continuously tried to secure the release of children in SPLA armed forces.2
- “2009 County Reports on Human Rights Practices- Sudan,” U.S. State Department, 2010, accessed January 26, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/af/154371.htm.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2010/681), December 31, 2010.
2011
The situation remained stable insofar as children’s rights are concerned. Following independence, a mission of the UN in South Sudan proposed to support “the government in implementing the SPLA action plan to end the recruitment and use of children” as well as to “encourage the government to ratify into law and implement a set of key international human rights treaties and conventions, including those related to women and children.”1
Chapter II: Power Sharing (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 26th May, 2004)
1.6.2.15 The Rights of Children
Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are required by his/her status as a minor.
Education Reform
2005
Under the guiding principles and directives of the state, the CPA provision related to education was incorporated in the Interim Constitution (Article 13), which was enacted in July 2005. As such, the state would promote education at all levels across the Sudan and would ensure free and compulsory education programs. Prior to incorporating the free primary education in the Interim Constitution, the National Education Plan was initiated which aimed to raise the literacy rate, especially among women, and to integrate other programmes into adult education syllabus (i.e. income-generating activities, health and agricultural education, etc.).1 Similarly, the multi-donor trust fund had provided support in the areas of government capacity-building, community development, rule of law, health, education, water and sanitation, and infrastructure development (including transport). These programs were developed in cooperation with authorities at the national and local levels.2
- “Sudan Govt Cares for Women’s Healthcare and Education,” Malaysia General News, May 8, 2005.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2011/821), December 21, 2005.
2006
The government reiterated its commitment to education for all and the ministry allocated a special administration for technical education. The ministry also began an ambitious program designed to qualify 100,000 basic level school teachers.1 The government of South Sudan also offered free and compulsory primary education to all children of school-going age.2 The government of South Sudan also signed an education sector accord with Kenya to help strengthen the education sector in southern Sudan.3 Detailed information related to competition and fairness in education is not available.
- “Sudan Renews Commitment to Education for All,” Suna News Agency, April 25, 2006.
- “South Sudan Government to Offer ‘Free, Compulsory’ Primary Education,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, August 8, 2006.
- “Kenya, Southern Sudan Sign Education Sector Accord,” BBC Monitoring Africa, August 9, 2006.
2007
Detailed information related to competition and fairness in education is not available. Nevertheless, southern Sudan had planned to provide education to SPLA soldiers and other members of the armed force (about 52,000 soldiers, but the number of SPLM/A soldiers is much higher) to improve the levels of education.1 International aid agencies, including USAID, were involved in promoting education in southern Sudan. USAID promoted gender equality in education in Southern Sudan.2
- “Southern Sudan Plans to Step up Education for Soldiers,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, March 6, 2007.
- “USAID Promotes Gender Equity in Education in Southern Sudan,” Christian Newswire, October 24, 2007.
2008
Detailed information related to competition and fairness in education is not available. In Southern Sudan, however, the education minister was quoted for encouraging teaching in the mother tongue.1 But, the Ministry of Education dismissed disabled teachers.2 Nevertheless, the number of girls enrolled in schools increased from 400 in 2005 to over 40,000 in 2008.3
- “Southern Sudan Education Minister Encourages Teaching of Mother Tongue,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, April 3, 2008.
- “South Sudan Ministry of Education dismisses disabled teachers,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, April 7, 2008.
- “Education Officials in Southern Sudan State Say More Girls Enrolling in Schools,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, April 18, 2008.
2009
Detailed information related to competition and fairness in education is not available. Nevertheless, the South Sudan government and UNICEF were campaigning to get millions more children into schools, despite a resources shortfall for those already in schools.1 The South Sudan Ministry of Education also launched the South Sudan Institute of Education in Rumbek, Lakes State, which was first of its kind established to train educational cadres.2 Under the multi-donor trust funds (MTDF), 100 schools were proposed to be rehabilitated but only 34 schools were under construction for three years, suggesting “erratic and insignificant achievements,” according to the educational panel that presented to the Security and Public Order Committee chairman on 26 August 2008. A standing panel, the Public Accounts Committee, was tasked by the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly to investigate possible misuse of Ministry of Education funds. Funds were allegedly misused by companies contracted by the Ministry of Education to build schools in addition to misuse of scholarship funds.3
- “Sudan; South Sudan Charts Own Course in Education,” Africa News, January 30, 2009.
- “South Sudan’s Institute of Education launched in Rumbek,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, June 27, 2009.
- “South Sudan to probe alleged misuse of education funds,” Sudan Tribune, August 27, 2009.
2010
The Education Ministry of the Government of South Sudan had appealed for more support from donors to enhance the quality of education in the south.1 In May 2010, it was reported that over 3 million students obtained a free primary education in South Sudan.2 In order to enhance the quality of education, the government urged education institutions to embrace information communication technologies.3 Despite all these proposed reforms, corruption remained the main problem. Also, cultural attitudes and beliefs had curtailed girl’s enrollment in schools.4
- “South Sudan appeals for more donor support to ensure quality education,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, January 27, 2010.
- “Over 3 million people get free primary education in South Sudan,” Sudan Tribune, May 20, 2010.
- “South Sudan urges education institutions embrace ICT,” Sudan Tribune, May 29, 2010.
- “South Sudan: Cultural attitudes, beliefs hindering girls’ education,” Sudan Tribune, June 2, 2010.
2011
The government of South Sudan continuously tried to improve education sector. Nevertheless, the CPA became obsolete with the secession of South Sudan as an independent state.
Chapter II: Power Sharing (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 26TH MAY, 2004)
2.5. The Government of National Unity
2.5.6 The Government of National Unity- shall be responsible for establishing recruitment systems and admission policies to national universities, national institutes, and other institutions of higher education based on fair competition, giving equal opportunity to all citizens.
2.6 Civil Service:
2.6.1.6 Additional educational opportunities shall be created for war- affected people.
Official Language and Symbol
2005
The language provision of the 2005 CPA was incorporated in the Interim Constitution. The constitution came into effect on 9 July 2005.[fn]”The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.[/efn_note] As such, there was no discrimination against the use of any language at any levels of government. Nevertheless, it was only on 2 October 2005 that the Sudan’s National Unity Government that included the NCP, SPLM and other parties approved English as an official language, together with Arabic.1
2006
No developments observed this year.
2007
No developments observed this year.
2008
The constitutional provisions as well as the adoption of English as the official language of National Unity government confirms the implementation of the CPA provision related to language. However, it was only in June 2008 that the National Assembly passed the National Council for Developing and Promoting the National Languages Bill.1
2009
No developments observed this year.
2010
No developments observed this year.
2011
No developments observed this year. With the secession of southern Sudan as an independent state on 9 July 2011, provisions related to language became obsolete.
Chapter II: Power Sharing (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 26th May, 2004)
2.8 Language
2.8.1 All the indigenous languages are national languages which shall be respected, developed and promoted.
2.8.2 Arabic language is widely spoken national language in the Sudan.
2.8.3 Arabic, as a major language at the national level, and English shall be the official working languages of the National Government business and languages of instruction for higher education.
2.8.4 In addition to Arabic and English, the legislature of any sub-national level of government may adopt any other national language(s) as additional official working language(s) at its level.
2.8.5 The use of either language at any level of government or education shall not be discriminated against.
Cultural Protections
2005
In Article 13(4), Sudan’s Interim Constitution recognized the cultural diversity of the country in accordance with the 2005 CPA provision. Similarly, the 2005 CPA had provisions to establish a special commission to ensure that the rights of non-Muslims were protected in the capital. No further developments reported.
2006
One of the challenges facing the Sudan on issues related to cultural tradition was the protection of non-Muslim minorities in the capital city. They had formerly been subject to the Sharia law tradition, which was the cultural tradition of the dominant Arabs in the northern Sudan. In August of 2006, the Presidency issued a decree for the establishment of the Commission on the Protection of the Rights of Non-Muslims in the National Capital.[fn]”The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2009. [/efn_note]
2007
The members of the Commission on the Protection of the Rights of Non-Muslims in the National Capital were appointed on 15 February 2007. The commission contained five Christians and five Muslims, ten community leaders, two traditional and customs experts, and one representative each from the Khartoum State, the Judiciary, the Ministry of Justice, the Police and National Security.1
2008
No developments observed this year.
2009
No developments observed this year.
2010
No developments observed this year.
2011
The cultural protection provision of the CPA was implemented. Nevertheless, with the secession of southern Sudan on 9 July 2011, the provision became obsolete.
Chapter II: Power Sharing (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 26th May, 2004)
2.4.5 Without prejudice to the competency of any National Institution to promulgate laws, judges and law enforcement agents shall, in dispensing justice and enforcing current laws in the National Capital be guided by the following:
2.4.5.2 Behavior based on cultural practices and traditions which does not disturb public order, is not disdainful of other traditions, and not in flagrant disregard of the law or’ disturbing public order shall be deemed in the eyes of the law as an exercise of personal freedoms.
Media Reform
2005
The Joint Media Committee was established in April 2005 for the purpose of promoting an understanding of the peace processes. The committee contained representatives from both parties to the CPA. The committee did not meet regularly, and the UNMIS effort to obtain the support of the committee for a public awareness proved unsuccessful.1 Nevertheless, the agreement between the Government of Sudan and the UNMIS on 28 December of 2005 gave the UNMIS the “right to establish, install and operate United Nations radio stations under its exclusive control to disseminate to the public in Sudan information relating to its mandate.”2 Programs broadcasted under the UNMIS radio stations were said to be free from any kind of censorship.
No further information is available regarding the effectiveness of the Joint Media Committee in promoting an understanding of the peace processes in Sudan. It is however worth mentioning that the freedom of press situation did not improve as suggested by the Human Rights Watch annual reports.3
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006; “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2011/821), December 21, 2005.
- “Agreement Between the Government of Sudan and the United Nations Concerning the Status of the United Nations Mission in Sudan,” UNMIS, accessed January 30, 2012, unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Documents/General/sofa.pdf.
- “World Report (2005-2011),” Human Rights Watch, accessed January 30, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/node/79288.
2006
No further developments observed.
2007
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
2009
No further developments observed.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
Annexure I: Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 31st December 2004)
10. Violations
10.4. Without prejudice to the freedom of press and media, the Parties agree to set up a Joint Media Committee upon signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to establish guidelines for the media and press to enhance conducive environment for the smooth implementation of the ceasefire.
Minority Rights
2005
The 2005 CPA contained provisions for the establishment of a special commission to ensure that the rights of non-Muslims were protected in the capital. On 18 October 2005, a joint ad-hoc committee, composed of ten members representing the NCP and the SPLM, was formed to discuss issues related to administering the capital during the interim period. The committee was unable to agree on the implementation of the CPA provision guaranteeing rights of non-Muslims in the capital.1 The interim constitution contained provisions for the specialized commission to protect the non-Muslims in the nation’s capital.
2006
In August of 2006, the Presidency issued a decree for the establishment of the Commission on the Protection of the Rights of Non-Muslims in the National Capital. The commission’s mandate and function, among other things, was to protect the rights of non-Muslims in “accordance with the human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Interim National Constitution as well as the principles stated in the CPA guiding judges and law enforcement agencies ‘in dispensing justice and enforcing lawÕ in Khartoum.”1 The commission received a mandate to ensure that non-Muslims were not affected by the application of the Sharia law in the National Capital. The members of the commission were not appointed in 2007.
2007
By a presidential decree on 15 February 2007, the members of the commission were appointed. The commission contained five Christians and five Muslims, ten community leaders, two traditional and customs experts, and one representative each from Khartoum State, the Judiciary, the Ministry of Justice, the Police and National Security.1 With the establishment of the commission, several important changes took place. The head of the commission revealed that a number of courts for non-Muslims were formed in the capital. It was also reported that the Judiciary released 858 non-Muslim female prison inmates accompanied by 147 children.2
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2009.
- “Sudan: Authorities Free Hundreds of Non-Muslim Female Prisoners,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, August 3, 2007.
2008
Under the sponsorship of the Interior Minister, the Commission for the Rights of Non-Muslim organized a workshop and discussed the rights of non-Muslims in relation to law texts and the reality of their practice.1 Criticizing the composition of the non-Muslim commission which contained only five Christians, the SPLM called for a special court for non-Muslims.2
- “Sudan: Workshop Discusses Rights of non-Muslims,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, August 4, 2008.
- “Sudan’s SPLM Calls for Special Courts for Non-Muslims,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, August 24, 2008.
2009
Little information is available on the non-Muslim Commission. Nevertheless, it was reported that the Commission planned to propose to the Presidency the establishment of special ministry for dealing with issues of national unity and a center for unity and integration following the Malaysian experiment in that respect.1
- “Sudan: Non-Muslim Commission Proposes Formation of Unity, Integration Ministry,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, May 30, 2009.
2010
The Non-Muslim Commission briefed the first vice-President and the president of the GoSS on the commission’s activities and operations. The commission’s future plan included programs related to peaceful co-existence between citizens of various religions and culture in the capital Khartoum.1 In September, the non-Muslim Commission had proposed amendments to the rights of non-Muslims, which was criticized by Sudan’s Muslim scholars.2 But, the Non-Muslim Commission said that the proposed law would not affect the constitution.3 No further information available on whether the proposed law was approved by the National Assembly.
- “Sudan’s Kiir Briefed on Activities of Non-Muslims Rights Commission in Khartoum,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, August 30, 2010.
- “Sudan’s Muslim Scholars Slam Proposed Changes to Non-Muslim Rights Laws,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 1, 2010.
- “Non-Muslim Rights Commission Says Proposed Laws Not to Affect Sudan Constitution,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 3, 2010.
2011
No further information available. With the secession of southern Sudan on 9 July 2011, the provision became obsolete.
Chapter II: Power Sharing (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 26th May, 2004)
2.4.6 A special commission shall be appointed by the Presidency to ensure that the rights of non-Muslims are protected in accordance with the aforementioned guidelines and not adversely affected by the application of Sharia Law in the Capital. The said commission shall make its observations and recommendations to the Presidency.
Economic and Social Development
2005
The guiding principle of the wealth-sharing agreement in Sudan was based on the premise that all parts of Sudan are entitled to development. Similarly, the parties recognized the need for the construction and reconstitution of southern Sudan to bring up to the same level of socio-economic and public service standard of the northern state. The need for the wealth revenue distribution and establishment of two special funds were envisaged to build up local institutions and their human and economic capacities. Nevertheless, the accord was more specific regarding wealth redistribution rather than economic and social development. The accord did not specify economic and social programs as part of the economic and social reforms.
For details on the implementation of wealth-sharing provisions and land commissions, see Natural Resource Management. For Multi-Donor Trust Funds, see Donor Supports.
2006
No further developments observed.
2007
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
2009
No further developments observed.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
Chapter V: The Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan And Blue Nile States (Signed At Naivasha, Kenya On 26th May 2004)
9. State Land Commission
9.1. The regulation of the land tenure, usage and exercise of rights in land shall be a concurrent competency exercised by the National and State Governments.
9.2. Rights in land owned by the National, Government within the State shall be exercised through the appropriate or designated level of government.
9.3. There shall be established a State Land Commission in the State of Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, respectively.
9.4. The State Land Commission shall be composed of persons from the State concerned.
9.5. The State Land Commission shall exercise all the powers of the National Land Commission at the State level.
9.6. The State Land Commission shall be competent to review existing land leases and contracts and examine the criteria for the present land allocations and recommend to the State authority the introduction of such necessary changes, including restitution of land rights or compensation.
9.7. The National Land Commission and the State Land Commission shall cooperate and coordinate their activities so as to use their resources efficiently. Without limiting the matters of coordination, the National Land Commission and the State Land Commission may agree as follows:-
9.7.1. To exchange information and decisions of each Commission;
9.7.2. That certain functions of the National Land Commission, including collection of data and research, may be carried out through the State Land Commission; and
9.7.3. On the way in which any conflict between the findings or recommendations of each Commission may be resolved.
9.8. In case of conflict between the findings and recommendations of the National Land Commission and the State Land Commission which cannot be resolved by agreement, the two Commissions shall reconcile their positions. Failure to reconcile, the matter shall be referred to the Constitutional Court for adjudication.
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) Chapter III: Wealth Sharing (Signed At Naivasha, Kenya on 7th January, 2004)
1. Guiding Principles in Respect of an Equitable Sharing of Common Wealth
1.1 The Parties agree that the guiding principles and provisions below shall be the basis for the comprehensive text on Wealth Sharing.
1.2 The wealth of Sudan shall be shared equitably so as to enable each level of government to discharge its legal and constitutional responsibilities and duties.
1.3 The National Government shall also fulfil its obligation to provide transfers to the Government of Southern Sudan.
1.4 The sharing and allocation of wealth emanating from the resources of the Sudan shall ensure that the quality of life, dignity and living conditions of all the citizens are promoted without discrimination on grounds of gender, race, religion, political affiliation, ethnicity, language, or region. The sharing and allocation of this wealth shall be based on the premise that all parts of Sudan are entitled to development.
1.5 The Parties agree that Southern Sudan faces serious needs to: (i) be able to perform basic government functions, (ii) build up the civil administration, and (iii) rehabilitate and reconstruct/construct the social and physical infrastructure in a post-conflict Sudan.
1.6 The Parties agree that Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile, Abyei and other war affected areas face serious needs to: (i) be able to perform basic government functions, (ii) establish and build civil administration and (iii) rehabilitate and reconstruct/construct the social and physical infrastructure in a post-conflict Sudan.
1.7 That, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1.3 herein, Southern Sudan, and those areas in need of construction/reconstruction, shall be brought up to the same average level of socio-economic and public services standard as the Northern states. To achieve these objectives will take time and effort to build up local institutional, human and economic capacity. For this purpose, two special funds shall be established as provided herein.
1.8 That revenue sharing should reflect a commitment to devolution of power and decentralisation of decision-making in regard to development, service delivery and governance.
1.9 The development of infrastructure, human resources, sustainable economic development and the capacity to meet human needs shall be conducted within a framework of transparent and accountable government.
1.10 That the best known practices in the sustainable utilization and control of natural resources shall be followed.
1.11 This Agreement sets out the respective types of income, revenue, taxes and other sources of wealth to which the various levels of government are entitled.
1.12 The Parties recognize that the National Government, during the Interim Period, will need to mobilize additional national resources.
1.13 There is a limit on how much additional national resources can be mobilized and part of the national needs in a post-conflict Sudan will have to be met by external assistance.
1.14 The National Government shall not withhold an allocation due to a state/regional or the Government of Southern Sudan. Any level of Government may initiate proceedings in the Constitutional Court should any other organ or level withhold monies due to it. The National Government shall make transfers to the Government of Southern Sudan based On the principles established. (Footnote: The issue of nomenclature will be resolved in the power sharing agreement.)
1.15 In agreeing to these wealth sharing arrangements the Parties signal to the international community that it will have to play a strong and constructive role in providing post-conflict construction/reconstruction assistance to Sudan, especially to Southern Sudan and other war affected and least developed areas.
1.16 The National Government shall assist the Government of Southern Sudan, during the Pre-Interim Period, in cooperation with international organizations, to develop and implement a program for capacity enhancement in the South. The highest priority should be public finance and intergovernmental relations, including expenditure management to ensure accountability.
2. Ownership of Land and Natural Resources
2.1 Without prejudice to the position of the Parties with respect to ownership of land and subterranean natural resources, including in Southern Sudan, this Agreement is not intended to address the ownership of those resources. The Parties agree to establish a process to resolve this issue.
2.2. The Parties agree that the regulation, management, and the process for the sharing of wealth from subterranean natural resources are addressed below.
2.3. The Parties record that the regulation of land tenure, usage and exercise of rights in land is to be a concurrent competency exercised at the appropriate levels of government.
2.4. Rights in land owned by the Government of Sudan shall be exercised through the appropriate or designated levels of Government.
2.5. The Parties agree that a process be instituted to progressively develop and amend the relevant laws to incorporate customary laws and practices, local heritage and international trends and practices.
2.6 Without prejudice to the jurisdiction of courts, there shall be established a National Land Commission that shall have the following functions:
2.6.1 Arbitrate between willing contending Parties on claims over land, and sort out such claims.
2.6.2 The party or group making claims in respect of land may make a claim against the relevant government and/or other Parties interested in the land.
2.6.3 The National Land Commission may at its discretion entertain such claims.
2.6.4 The Parties to the arbitration shall be bound by the decision of the National Land Commission on mutual consent and upon registration of the award in a court of law.
2.6.5 The National Land Commission shall apply the law applicable in the locality where the land is situated or such other law as the Parties to the arbitration agree, including principles of equity.
2.6.6 Accept references on request from the relevant government, or in the process of resolving claims, and make recommendations to the appropriate levels of government concerning:
2.6.6.1 Land reform policies;
2.6.6.2 Recognition of customary land rights and/or law.
2.6.7 Assess appropriate land compensation, which need not be limited to monetary compensation, for applicants in the course of arbitration or in the course of a reference from a court.
2.6.8 Advise different levels of government on how to co-ordinate policies on national projects.
2.6.9 Study and record land use practices in areas where natural resource exploitation occurs.
2.6.10 The National Land Commission shall be representative and independent. The composition of the membership and terms of appointment of the National Land Commission shall be set by the legislation constituting it. The Chairperson of the National Land Commission shall be appointed by the Presidency.
2.6.11 The National Land Commission may conduct hearings and formulate its own rules of procedure.
2.6.12 The National Land Commission will have its budget approved by the Presidency and will be accountable to the Presidency for the due performance of its functions.
2.7 In accordance with this Agreement and without prejudice to the jurisdiction of courts, there shall be established a Southern Sudan Land Commission which shall have the following functions:
2.7.1 Arbitrate between willing contending Parties on claims over land, and sort out such claims.
2.7.2 The party or group making claims in respect of land may make a claim against the relevant government and/or other Parties interested in the land.
2.7.3 The Southern Sudan Land Commission may entertain such claims at its discretion.
2.7.4 The Parties to the arbitration shall be bound by the Southern Sudan Land Commission’s decision on mutual consent and upon registration of the award in a court of law.
2.7.5 The Southern Sudan Land Commission shall apply the law applicable in the locality where the land is situated or such other law as the Parties to the arbitration agree, including principles of equity.
2.7.6 Accept references on request from the relevant government, or in the process of resolving claims, and make recommendations to the appropriate levels of government concerning:
2.7.6.1 Land reform policies;
2.7.6.2 Recognition of customary land rights and/or law.
2.7.7 Assess appropriate land compensation, which need not be limited to monetary compensation, for applicants in the course of arbitration or in the course of a reference from a court.
2.7.8 Advise different levels of government on how to co-ordinate policies on GoSS projects.
2.7.9 Study and record land use practices in areas where natural resource exploitation occurs.
2.7.10 The Southern Sudan Land Commission shall be representative and independent. The composition of the membership and terms of appointment of the Southern Sudan Land Commission shall be set by the legislation constituting it. The Chairperson of the Southern Sudan Land Commission shall be appointed by the President of the Government of Southern Sudan.
2.7.11 The Southern Sudan Land Commission may conduct hearings and formulate its own rules of procedure.
2.7.12 The Southern Sudan Land Commission shall have its budget approved by the Government of Southern Sudan and shall be accountable to the President of the Government of Southern Sudan for the due performance of its functions.
2.8 The National Land Commission and the Southern Sudan Land Commission shall co-operate and co-ordinate their activities so as to use their resources efficiently.
Without limiting the matters of coordination, the National Land Commission and the Southern Sudan Land Commission may agree:
a) to exchange information and decisions of each Commission;
b) that certain functions of the National Land Commission, including collection of data and research, may be carried out through the Southern Sudan Land Commission;
c) on the way in which any conflict between the findings or recommendations of each Commission may be resolved
2.9 In the case of conflict between the findings or recommendations of the National Land Commission and the Southern Sudan Land Commission, which cannot be resolved by agreement, the two Commissions shall reconcile their positions. Failure to reconcile, the matter shall be referred to the Constitutional Court.
3. Oil Resources
A. Guiding Principles for the management and development of the petroleum sector
3.1 The Parties agree that the basis for an agreed and definitive framework for the management of the development of the petroleum sector during the Interim Period shall include the following:
3.1.1 Sustainable utilization -of oil as a non-renewable natural resource consistent with:
a) the national interest and the public good;
b) the interest of the affected states/regions;
c) the interests of the local population in affected areas;
d) national environmental policies, biodiversity conservation guidelines, and cultural heritage protection principles.
3.1.2 Empowerment of the appropriate levels of government to develop and manage, in consultation with the relevant communities, the various stages of oil production within the overall framework for the management of petroleum development during the Interim Period.
3.1.3 Give due attention to enabling policy environment for the flow of foreign direct investment by reducing risks associated with uncertainties regarding the outcome of the referendum on self-determination at the end of the Interim Period.
3.1.4 A stable macroeconomic environment that emphasizes stability of the petroleum sector.
3.1.5 Persons enjoying rights in land shall be consulted and their view shall duly be taken into account in respect of decisions to develop subterranean natural resources from the area in which they have rights, and shall share in the benefits of that development.
3.1.6 Persons enjoying rights in land are entitled to compensation on just terms arising from acquisition or development of land for the extraction of subterranean natural resources from the area in respect of which they have rights.
3.1.7 The communities in whose areas development of subterranean natural resources occurs have the right to participate, through their respective states/regions, in the negotiation of contracts for the development of those resources.
3.1.8 Regardless of the contention over the ownership of land and associated natural resources, the Parties agree on a framework for the regulation and management of petroleum development in Sudan during the Interim Period.
B. National Petroleum Commission (NPC)
3.2 The Parties agree that an independent National Petroleum Commission (NPC) shall be established during the Pre-Interim Period and its decisions shall be by consensus.
3.3 Taking into account the provisions elsewhere in this Agreement, the NPC shall be constituted as follows:
a) The President of the Republic and President of the GoSS as Co-chairs and permanent members;
b) four (4) permanent members representing the National Government;
c) four (4) permanent members representing the GoSS; and
d) not more than three (3) representatives of an oil producing State/Region in which petroleum development is being considered, non-permanent members.
3.4 The NPC shall have the following functions:
3.4.1 Formulate public policies and guidelines in relation to the development and management of the petroleum sector consistent with paragraph
3.1.1.
3.4.2 Monitor and assess the implementation of those policies to ensure that they work in the best interests of the people of Sudan.
3.4.3 Develop strategies and programs for the petroleum sector.
3.4.4 Negotiate and approve all oil contracts for the exploration and development of oil in the Sudan, and ensure they are consistent with the NPC’s principles, policies and guidelines.
3.4.5 Develop its internal regulations and procedures.
3.5 In performing the functions referred to in paragraph 3.4 above, the NPC shall take into account relevant considerations, including the following:
3.5.1 The extent to which the contract provides benefits to local communities affected by the development.
3.5.2 The extent to which the views of the state/region and the affected groups are incorporated in the proposed contracts.
3.5.3 If the NPC decides to approve the contract, persons holding rights in land who are aggrieved by the decision shall seek relief through arbitration or in a court of law.
3.5.4 If the non-permanent members of the NPC representing the oil producing States/Regions collectively disagree with the decision of the NPC to approve the contract related to their States/Regions , the National Minister of Petroleum shall not sign the contract and shall refer the matter to the Council of States/Regions. If the Council of States/Regions rejects the objection by two-thirds e13) majority, the National Minister of Petroleum shall sign the contract. If the Council of States/Regions does not reject the objection by two-thirds e13) majority within 24 sitting days of receiving it, the Council of States/Regions shall remit the objection within that period and by two-thirds e13) majority to a mechanism established by the Council to arbitrate on the objection. The arbitration decision shall be made within six calendar months of referral to arbitration. The arbitration decision shall be binding.
3.5.5. If the NPC approves the contract the National Minister of Petroleum shall sign the contract on behalf of the Government of the Sudan.
3.5.6 In performing functions 3.4.1, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, and 3.4.5 of paragraph 3.4, the NPC shall include only its permanent members.
3.5.7 In performing function 3.4.4 of paragraph 3.4, the NPC shall include its permanent members and representatives of oil producing State/Region in which contracts for the exploration and development of the petroleum are being negotiated and considered for approval.
4. Existing Oil Contracts
4.1 The SPLM shall appoint a limited number of representatives to have access to all existing oil contracts. The representatives shall have the right to engage technical experts. All those who have access to the contracts will sign confidentiality agreements.
4.2 Contracts shall not be subject to re-negotiation.
4.3 If contracts are deemed to have fundamental social and environmental problems the 90vernment of Sudan will implement necessary remedial measures.
4.4 The Parties agree that “existing oil contracts” mean contracts signed before the date of signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
4.5 Persons whose rights have been violated by oil contracts are entitled to compensation. On the establishment of these violations through due legal process the Parties to the oil contracts shall be liable to compensate the affected persons to the extent of the damage caused.
5. Guiding Principles for Sharing Oil Revenue
5.1 The Parties agree that the basis for an agreed and definitive framework for the sharing of the wealth emanating from oil resources of Southern Sudan shall include the following:
5.1. I The framework for sharing wealth from the extraction of natural resources should balance the needs for national development and reconstruction of Southern Sudan.
5.2 The Parties agree that a formula for sharing the revenue from oil resources shall be as set forth in this Agreement.
5.3 For the purposes of this Agreement. ‘Net revenue from oil’ shall be the sum of the net revenue (i) from exports of government oil and (ii) from deliveries of government oil to the refineries. Exports shall be valued at the actual Free on Board (FOB) export prices less the charges to deliver the oil to any export destination including pipeline and management charges. Oil delivered to the refinery shall be valued at the average FOB export prices during the last calendar month in which there was an export sale -less the charges that would have been incurred to deliver the oil to any export destination including pipeline and management charges.
5.4 An Oil Revenue Stabilization Account shall be established from government oil net revenue derived from actual export sales above an agreed benchmark price. The benchmark price will be established annually as part of the national budget reflecting changing economic circumstances.
5.5 The Parties agree that at least two percent (2%) of oil revenue shall be allocated to the oil producing states/regions in proportion to output produced in such states/regions.
5.6 After the payment to the Oil Revenue Stabilization Account and to the oil producing states/regions, fifty percent(50%) of net oil revenue derived from oil producing wells in Southern Sudan shall be allocated to the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) as of the beginning of the Pre-Interim Period and the remaining fifty percent (50%) to the National Government and States in Northern Sudan.
5.7 A Future Generation Fund shall be established once national oil production reaches two (2) million barrels per day. This production criterion may, as part of the National Government’s normal budget process, be reduced down to one (1) million barrels per day.
5.8 The Parties agree that all funds/special accounts referred to in this Agreement and future accounts shall be on-budget operations.
6. Sharing of Non-Oil Revenue
6.1 The National Government shall be entitled to legislate, raise and collect the below-listed taxes and to collect revenue from these sources:
6.1.1 National Personal Income Tax;
6.1.2 Corporate or Business Profit Tax;
6.1.3 Customs Duties and import taxes;
6.1.4 Sea-ports and Airports Revenue;
6.1.5 Service charges;
6.1.6 Oil revenues as set out herein;
6.1.7 National Government Enterprises and projects;
6.1.8 VAT or GST or other retail taxes on goods and services;
6.1.9 Excise Tax;
6.1.10 Any other tax as agreed upon in these negotiations;
6.1.11 Loans, including borrowing from the Central Bank and the public.
6.2 The Government of Southern Sudan shall be entitled to revenue from the following sources and to raise and collect the below-listed taxes:
6.2.1 The National revenue allocation to’ the Government of Southern Sudan and States/Regions from the National Revenue Fund as set forth in section 7.0 of this Agreement;
6.2.2 Revenue from any of the sources listed as state/region revenue sources referred to in paragraph 6.3 herein;
6.2.3 The Southern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund (SSRDF);
6.2.4 Oil revenues as is set out in this Agreement;
6.2.5 Southern Sudan Government Taxes, which do not encroach on the exclusive National Government taxing powers or which are contemplated in the Power Sharing Protocol;
6.2.6 Service charges of the Government of Southern Sudan;
6.2.7 Government of Southern Sudan enterprises and projects;
6.2.8 Grants in Aid and Foreign Aid;
6.2.9 Taxes and levies on small and medium business;
6.2.10 Excise taxes on goods within the region deemed to be luxury consumables;
6.2.11 Southern Sudan Personal Income Tax;
6.2.12 Any other taxes as may be agreed to from time to time;
6.2.13 Loans and Borrowing in accordance with the Monetary Policy, Banking, Currency and Borrowing sections of this Agreement.
6.3 The states/regions shall be entitled to raise and collect the below-listed taxes and revenue from the below listed sources:
6.3.1 States/Regions al Land and property tax and royalties;
6.3.2 Service charges for state/regional services;
6.3.3 Licences;
6.3.4 State/Regional Personal Income Tax;
6.3.5 Levies on Tourism;
6.3.6 States/Regions al share of oil Revenues as is set out in paragraphs 5.5 and 5.6 of this Agreement;
6.3.7 States/Regions al Government projects and state/regional nature parks;
6.3.8 Stamp duties;
6.3.9 Agricultural Taxes;
6.3.10 Grants in Aid and Foreign Aid through the National Government and the GoSS;
6.3.11 Excise taxes;
6.3.12 Border Trade charges or levies in accordance with National Legislation;
6.3.13 Other state/region taxes which do not encroach on national or Southern Sudan Government taxes;
6.3.14 Any other tax as may be agreed to from time to time; and
6.3.15 Loans and borrowing in accordance with the Monetary Policy, Banking, Currency and Borrowing sections of this Agreement.
7. Equalization and Allocation to the National, Southern Sudan and States/Regional Levels of Government in Respect of Revenue Collected Nationally
7.1. All revenues collected nationally for or by the National Government shall be pooled in a National Revenue Fund (NRF) administered by the National Treasury. Such Fund shall embrace all accounts and sub-funds into which monies ‘due to the Government are collected, reported or deposited.
7.2 All the revenues and expenditures of the Government will be on-budget operations and made public.
7.3 Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 5.6, 7.1 and 13.1, the National Government shall allocate fifty percent (50%) of the national non-oil revenue collected in Southern Sudan, as provided for herein under paragraph 6.1 above, to the GoSS to partially meet the development cost and other activities during the Interim Period. The Parties agree to review this arrangement, at mid-term of the Interim Period, with the view of the National Government allocating additional resources to the Government of Southern Sudan.
7.4 As a result of the allocation arrangements in paragraph 7.3 above, the Parties agree to appeal to the international’ and donor community to help the Government of Southern Sudan by providing post-conflict reconstruction assistance especially at the be inning of the transition.
7.5 The states/regions and the Government of Southern Sudan shall retain and dispose of such other income raised and collected under their own taxing powers.
8. Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission (FFAMC)
8.1 To ensure transparency and fairness both in regard to the allocation of nationally collected funds to the states/regions and the Government of Southern Sudan, a Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission shall be established. This body shall be comprised of experts nominated by the various states/regions, the Government of Southern Sudan and the National Government. Decision making arrangements of the FF AMC shall be as agreed to by the Parties.
8.2 The FFAMC shall undertake the following duties and responsibilities:
8.2.1 Monitor and ensure that equalization grants from the National Revenue Fund are promptly transferred to respective levels of government;
8.2.2 Ensure appropriate utilization and sharing of financial resources;
8.2.3 Ensure that resources allocated to war affected areas are transferred in accordance with agreed upon formula; and
8.2.4 Ensure transparency and fairness in the allocation of funds to the GoSS and states/regions according to established ratios or percentages stipulated in this Agreement.
8.3. The FFAMC shall be composed of representatives from the National Government and the Government of Southern Sudan and States/Regions as follows:
a) Three (3) Representatives of the National Government;
b) Three (3) Representatives of the Government of Southern Sudan (OOSS);
c) All Finance Ministers in all States/Regions of Sudan
8.4 The Chairperson of the FFAMC shall be appointed by the Presidency.
8.5 The FFAMC shall work out its own rules and procedures, which shall be approved by the Presidency.
9. Interstate Commerce
9.1 There shall be no legal impediment to interstate commerce or the flow of goods and services, capital or labour between the states/regions.
10. Government Liabilities
10.1 Any debts/liabilities incurred by any level of government shall be the responsibility of that level of government.
11. Division of Government Assets
11.1 There shall be a fair and equitable division of government assets. An asset shall in the first instance be allocated to the level of government responsible for the function in respect of which the asset is related (e.g. school buildings to the level of government responsible for education). In the event of a dispute, the Parties agree that such dispute shall be referred to a committee comprising a representative of each of the Parties involved in the dispute and a mutually agreed expert.
12. Accounting Standards and Procedures and Fiscal Accountability
12.1 All levels of government shall comply with generally accepted accounting standards and procedures. There shall be institutions at the state/region, Government of Southern Sudan and National levels to ensure that funds are distributed according to the agreed government budget, and properly expended having regard to value for money.
12.2 To ensure the effective operation of such institutions, there shall be independent National and Southern Sudan Audit Chambers, which shall have responsibility for the functions referred to above. The National Audit Chamber shall set auditing standards. Appointments to the National Audit Chamber shall be made by the Presidency and confirmed by the National Assembly.
12.3 All levels of government shall hold all income and revenue received by it in public accounts and subject to public scrutiny and accountability.
13 Financing the Transition
13.1 The National Government shall assist, during the Pre-Interim Period to the extent that it is able, the SPLMI A in the establishment of the new transitional governments at the States/Regional level and the Government of Southern Sudan. The Government of Southern Sudan shall meet the direct costs of establishing these levels of government, with the assistance from the international community.
13.2. Upon signature of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Parties shall establish a Joint National Transition Team to undertake the following:
13.2.1 Prepare budget estimates for the establishment of Governments at the National, Southern Sudan and state/regional levels as provided for by the Peace Agreement;
13.2.2 Organize and prepare relevant documents for the donor conference, including the agenda of the conference, letters of invitations and be a secretariat to the donors’ conference;
13.2.3 Develop fund raising strategies, and assist in the identification of potential sources of funds necessary’ for a smooth and timely commencement of the Interim Period.
14. Monetary Policy, Banking, Currency and Borrowing
A. Monetary Policy, Banking and Currency
14.1. The Parties agree, consistent with the Machakos Protocol of 20th July 2002, to have a dual banking system in Sudan during the Interim Period. An Islamic banking system shall operate in Northern Sudan and conventional banking system shall operate in Southern Sudan.
14.2. The Parties agree that conventional banking facilities are urgently needed in Southern Sudan. The Parties therefore agree to establish, during the Pre-Interim Period, the Bank of Southern Sudan (BOSS) as a branch of Central Bank of Sudan (CBOS) consistent with paragraph 14.1 above.
14.3. The Parties agree to restructure, during the Pre-Interim Period, the CBOS so as to reflect the duality of the banking system in Sudan. The CBOS shall therefore use and develop two sets of banking instruments, one Islamic and the other Conventional, to regulate and supervise the implementation of a single monetary policy through: (i) an Islamic financing window in Northern Sudan under a deputy governor of CBOS using Islamic financing instruments to ‘implement the national monetary policy in Northern Sudan; and (ii) the Bank of Southern Sudan (BOSS), headed by a deputy governor of CBOS, to manage the conventional window using conventional financing instruments in implementing the same national monetary policy in Southern Sudan.
14.4. The CBOS shall be responsible for the conduct of monetary policy. All banking institutions shall be subject to the rules and regulations set by the CBOS.
14.5. The primary responsibility and mandate of the CBOS shall be ensuring price stability, maintaining stable exchange rate, sound banking system and issuance of currency. The monetary policy shall be carried out accordingly relying primarily on market-based instruments instead of administrative allocation of credit.
14.6. The CBOS shall be fully independent in its pursuit of monetary policy.
14.7. The Governor of CBOS and his/her two deputies shall be appointed by the Presidency. The Governor of CBOS shall appoint in consultation with his/her two deputies’ other senior officers within the Central Bank.
14.8. The Parties agree to establish, during the Pre-Interim Period, an independent Board of Directors (BOD). Decisions of BOD on matters that may affect adversely the interest of either Party to this Agreement shall be by consensus. The BOD shall be responsible to the Presidency on the accountability of the CBOS and shall consist of nine (9) members as follows:
a) Governor of CBOS (Chairperson) and his/her two deputies and;
b) Six highly qualified Sudanese to be appointed by the Presidency taking into account the agreed formula in the Power Sharing Protocol for the institutions of the National Government.
14.9 The CBOS shall adopt a program to issue a new currency as soon as is practical during the Interim Period. The design of the new currency shall reflect the cultural diversity of Sudan. Until a new currency has been issued with the approval of the Parties on the recommendations of the CBOS, the circulating currencies in Southern Sudan shall be recognised.
14.10 The BOSS shall be responsible for chartering and supervising financial institutions in Southern Sudan.
14.11 All financial institutions shall be subject to internationally recognized regulatory and prudential standards for Islamic and conventional finance, as set by the CBOS.
14.12 All financial institutions shall be bound to implement monetary policies set by the CBOS.
B. Borrowing
14.13. The Government of Southern Sudan and the states/regions may borrow money based on their respective credit worthiness. Neither the National Government nor the CBOS shall be required or expected to guarantee borrowing by sub-national governments.
14.14 The GoSS and all sub-national governments shall report financial and fiscal data to the relevant National Government bodies for statistical purposes.
14.15 The Government of Southern Sudan and the states/regions may borrow money from foreign sources based on their respective credit worthiness.
14.16 Foreign borrowing by all sub-national governments shall be done in a manner that does not undermine national macroeconomic policies and shall be consistent with the objective of maintaining external financial viability. All sub-national governments’ foreign borrowing transactions shall conform to the CBOS specifications.
15. Reconstruction and Development Funds
A. Southern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund (SSRDF)
15.1. There shall be established a Southern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund (SSRDF) to solicit, raise and collect funds from domestic and international donors and disburse such funds for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the infrastructure of the South, for the resettlement and reintegration of internally and externally displaced persons, and to address past imbalances in regional development and infrastructure.
15.2. A monitoring and evaluation system shall be established to ensure accountability, transparency, efficiency, equity and fairness in the utilization of resources.
15.3. The Government of Southern Sudan shall be responsible for expenditure from the fund and shall be entitled to raise additional funds by way of donation from foreign States, multilateral organizations, or other bodies for the purposes of the reconstruction and development of the southern states/regions. The Fund shall be transparently administered and professionally managed subject to an oversight committee appointed by .the Government of Southern Sudan but having on it a representative of the National Ministry of Finance and of the National Audit Chamber.
B. National Reconstruction and Development Fund (NRDF)
15.4. There shall be established by the Treasury, a National Reconstruction and Development Fund (NRDF) having the mission of developing the war affected areas and least developed areas outside Southern Sudan and a steering committee with appropriate representation from such areas. A member of the Southern Sudan Ministry of Finance shall be a member of the Steering Committee. A report on the income, expenditure and the projects supported by the fund shall be placed before the National Assembly and the Council of States/Regions, which shall exercise oversight over the Fund.
C. Multi-Donor Trust Funds
15.5. The Parties recognize the need to establish, during the Pre-Interim Period, two Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs), one for the National Government and one for the Government of Southern Sudan to support urgent recurrent and investment budget costs under clearly stated criteria of eligible financing components. The Trust Funds shall be operational for the Pre-Interim Period, and shall thereafter be transformed into (i) one MDTF dedicated to the Southern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund (the “SRRDF”); and (ii) one MDTF dedicated to the National Reconstruction and Development Fund (the “NRDF”).
15.6. The MDTFs shall commence immediately to support, among other things, priority areas of capacity building and institutional strengthening and quick start/impact programs identified by the Parties.
15.7. Both funds shall support urgent recurrent and investment budget costs under clearly stated criteria of eligible financing components, and both shall have the right to solicit, raise and collect funds from foreign donors.
15.8. All trust funds shall report the flow of funds to the CBOS.
15.9. To ensure proper accountability for funds disbursed through the MDTFs the Parties shall cause audits to be performed on funds used within six (6) months of the close of the recipient’s financial year.
15.10. During the Pre-Interim as well as the Interim Period, funds may be channeled directly to finance activities beneficial to the National Government or the GoSS as the case may be.
15.11. During the Pre-Interim Period, the flow of foreign funds shall be through special accounts established in the Bank of Sudan for areas outside Southern Sudan and for Southern Sudan in a commercial bank in Southern Sudan until the Bank of Southern Sudan is established and operational. For the Interim Period: (i) the flow of foreign funds for the National Fund will go through the CBOS; and (ii) for the Southern Fund, the foreign funds will be disbursed through a special account at the Bank of Southern Sudan designated for the Government of Southern Sudan; or through arrangements as specified in the MDTF.
Ratification Mechanism
2005
The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed by leaders of both parties on 9 January 2005. The deadline for the approval of the CPA was 24 January 2005 for the SPLM National Liberation Council. The peace accord was approved by the SPLM National Liberation Council on 24 January 2005. The accord was ratified unanimously by the SPLM National Liberation Council, which was presided over by the SPLM chief John Garang.1 The National Assembly was expected to approve the CPA by 29 January and it was approved.2 As such, the ratification mechanism provision of the accord was implemented.
- “SPLM Parliament Ratifies Sudan Peace Deal,” Agence France Presse, January 24, 2005.
- “Letter dated 30 March 2007 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,” United Nations (S/2007/185), April 3, 2007.
2006
The ratification mechanism provision of the accord was implemented.
2007
No further developments observed.
2008
No further developments observed.
2009
No further developments observed.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
Chapter II: Power Sharing (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 26th May, 2004)
2.12.1 The Peace Agreement shall be signed by the leaders of the two Parties.
2.12.2 Upon signature, the Parties shall be bound by the Agreement and shall assume the obligations arising there from, more especially the obligations to implement the Agreement and to give legal and constitutional effect to the arrangements agreed therein.
2.12.3 Upon signature the Parties commit themselves to ensure that all the organs, committees and structures under their control, including their members, shall observe the terms of the Agreement.
2.12.4 After the Agreement has been signed:
2.12.4.1 The text thereof shall be forwarded to the National Assembly and the SPLM National Liberation Council for approval as is;
Donor Support
2005
In January 2005, immediately after the signing of the CPA, the World Bank made the decision to open its office in Sudan for the purpose to administer the Multi-Donor Trust Funds for the reconstruction and development of national and the Southern Sudan. The European Union also started to release the development fund to Sudan for the first time since 1990.[fn]”Sudan; EU Resumes Development Aid,” Africa News, January 26, 2005.[/efn_note] In April 2005, international donors pleaded for $4.5 billion, which exceeded the target of $2.6 billion.1 The MDTFs and other funding from EU and the Government of National Unity became operational in June 2005 with the holding of the first Interim oversight Committee Meetings.2 By the end of December 2005, $102.1 Million in MDTS contributions were paid in, of which $46.5 Million went to NRDF and $56.6 Million went to SRRDF. Nevertheless, the World Bank was not allowed to open its office in Sudan in 2005.
- “Sudan; International Donors Pledge Billions for Reconstruction,” Africa News, April 12, 2005.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
2006
In August 2006, the World Bank formally inaugurated its office in Khartoum to administer the MDTFs on behalf of donors.1
- “Inauguration of the World Bank Country Office in Khartoum,” World Bank News Release (No:2006/52/AFR), 2006, accessed May 22, 2012, http://go.worldbank.org/U016OGUEQ0.
2007
No developments observed this year.
2008
No developments observed this year.
2009
No developments observed this year.
2010
No developments observed this year.
2011
By 2011, the Multi-Donor Trust Fund approved 57 programs for the budget of more than $1,072 million, of which $1,039 million was transferred.1 It was said that the disbursement from the MTDFs had been slower than expected.
- “Country Factsheet-Sudan,” MDTF, 2012, accessed January 31, 2012, http://mdtf.undp.org/factsheet/country/SDN.
Chapter III: Wealth Sharing (Signed At Naivasha, Kenya on 7th January, 2004)
C. Multi-Donor Trust Funds
15.5. The Parties recognize the need to establish, during the Pre-Interim Period, two Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs), one for the National Government and one for the Government of Southern Sudan to support urgent recurrent and investment budget costs under clearly stated criteria of eligible financing components. The Trust Funds shall be operational for the Pre-Interim Period, and shall thereafter be transformed into (i) one MDTF dedicated to the Southern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund (the “SRRDF”); and (ii) one MDTF dedicated to the National Reconstruction and Development Fund (the “NRDF”).
Detailed Implementation Timeline
2005
Many provisions of the CPA were not implemented as outlined in the implementation timeline. The establishment of CPA-mandated commissions and committees were delayed including Boundary Demarcation Commission for the Abyei Region. There was delay in the formation of National Unity Government. Similarly, there was delay in the withdrawal of forces, which led to the delay in the deployment of the Joint Integrated Units of forces. Elections for the Presidency as well as the National Assembly were delayed until April 2010. Nevertheless, many provisions of the CPA were subsequently implemented.
2006
While many provisions of the CPA were subsequently implemented, implementation of main provisions such as the establishment of CPA-mandated commissions and committees were delayed including Boundary Demarcation Commission for the Abyei Region. Elections were delayed as well.
2007
No developments observed this year.
2008
No developments observed this year.
2009
No developments observed this year.
2010
No developments observed this year.
2011
While many provisions of the CPA were subsequently implemented, implementation of main provisions such as the establishment of CPA-mandated commissions and committees were delayed including Boundary Demarcation Commission for the Abyei Region. Elections were delayed as well.
The 2005 accord provides detailed timeline for implementing provisions of the accord, including ceasefire related issues, the holding of the referendum and setting up commissions as well as transitional mechanisms (see 2005 accord from page 126-128 and from page 221-228.
Natural Resource Management
2005
There were two main components of natural resources uses provision in Sudan’s 2005 CPA, the first focused on land-related conflict. The CPA provided that the Government of Sudan should exercise rights in land owned by the state through the appropriate or designated levels of government. The accord also established the National Land Commission and the Southern Sudan Land Commission to arbitrate between willing parties on issues related to land claims. The Land Commissions was mandated to study and record land use practices in areas where natural resource exploitation occurs. The second issue deals with sharing revenue from oil revenue. According to the CPA provision, after paying 2% of oil revenue to the oil producing states/regions in proportion to output produced in the respective state/region, fifty percent (50%) of net oil revenue derived from oil producing wells in Southern Sudan would be allocated to the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) as of the beginning of the Pre-Interim Period and the remaining fifty percent (50%) to the National Government and States in Northern Sudan.
The proposed land commissions were not established in 2005. Similarly, there was no record of the Southern Sudan receiving a 50% share of oil revenues. Nevertheless, it was estimated that the GoSS would receive $1.2 billion in oil transfers as per the GoS budget estimate of 2005.1 This estimate was disputed in November 2005 as the North claimed the Hedlig oil field, which was the main contributor of the estimated oil revenue for the South. The revised estimate was $700 million.2
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
- “Dispute over Sudan Oil Revenue-Sharing as North Claims Heglig Field,” World Markets Analysis, November 24, 2005.
2006
The oil revenue dispute continued into 2006. For 2005, the south believed that the production amounted to as much as 450,000 barrels per day, while the north claimed that the production was at 330,000 barrel per day. The South received US$544 million in oil revenue which was deemed as insufficient by the southern authorities.1 Nevertheless, oil revenues for the remainder of 2006 increased. The total oil revenue of southern Sudan amounted to $865 million in September 2006, which increased by $73.5 million in the month of October 2006.2 The Joint Commission for Supervision of oil pricing and oil revenue had stressed that oil revenue accounts and shared distribution had been transparent and open.
The proposed National Land Commission was not established in 2006. The Southern Sudan Land Commission was established. The commission had five members who were appointed by the president of Southern Sudan.3
- “Disputes in Sudan over Oil Revenues,” World Markets Analysis, February 3, 2006.
- “Southern Sudan Government share in oil revenues,” Suna News Agency, December 10, 2006; “Southern Sudan Oil Revenue Up to $865 Mln Sept 2006,” See News Middle East & Africa, November 3, 2006.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
2007
Detailed information regarding oil revenue and its distribution for the 2007 year is not available. According to a news report, Southern Sudan netted $1.5 billion in 2007 as its share of $4.3 billion in oil revenues.1
The proposed National Land Commission was not established in 2007.
2008
The provisions related to oil sharing were implemented. In 2008, the Ministry of Finance & National Economy indicated that the total oil revenue for GoSS in 2008 was $2,888.20 million and in December of 2008 the oil revenue of GoSS stood at $265.66 million.1 The national government continuously transferred oil revenue to the government of southern Sudan.
The proposed National Land Commission was not established in 2006.
2009
According to a GoSS Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning report, Sudan’s total oil revenue in 2009 from oil resources in the Southern Sudan was $2,566.16 million, of which the GoSS’s share was $1,067.7 million. Also, approximately $666.14 million had been transferred to the GoSS between July and October 2009.1
The National Assembly adopted the National Land Commission Bill on 20 April 2009. The National Land Commission and the Southern Sudan Land Commission were independent commissions and as such had been mandated by the CPA to arbitrate between contending parties regarding claims over lands without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the courts.2 Nevertheless, members of the commission were not appointed in 2009.
2010
Regarding their share of the oil revenue, the national government had transferred approximately $669.92 million to the GoSS in the first quarter of 2010. The total oil revenue of the Sudan in 2010 was $ 4,423 million, of which the Government of Southern Sudan’s share was $1,802 million. The government of southern Sudan received $1,553 million from the national government in 2010.1
Although the National Legislature passed the National Land Commission Bill in 2009, members of the commission were not appointed in 2010. The South Sudan Land Commission was working to expose land use problems in South Sudan. The commission, however, was seeking financial assistance to undertake a thorough verification of land use and ownership in all ten states of Southern Sudan.2
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2010.
- “South Sudan Land Commission Seeks Financial Assistance to Clean Up Land Ownership Issues,” Sudan Tribune, July 21, 2010.
2011
Detailed information regarding oil revenue distribution between the north and the south is not available.
Although the National Legislature passed the National Land Commission Bill in 2009, members of the commission were not appointed in 2011. The South Sudan Land Commission, however, was quite effective. It worked on land draft policy and handed it over to the government of South Sudan in February 2011.1
Once southern Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 2011, provisions related to the natural resource management became obsolete.
Chapter III: Wealth Sharing (Signed At Naivasha, Kenya on 7th January, 2004)
1. Guiding Principles in Respect of an Equitable Sharing of Common Wealth
1.10 That the best known practices in the sustainable utilization and control of natural resources shall be followed.
2. Ownership of Land and Natural Resources
2.1 Without prejudice to the position of the Parties with respect to ownership of land and subterranean natural resources, including in Southern Sudan, this Agreement is not intended to address the ownership of those resources. The Parties agree to establish a process to resolve this issue.
2.2. The Parties agree that the regulation, management, and the process for the sharing of wealth from subterranean natural resources are addressed below.
2.3. The Parties record that the regulation of land tenure, usage and exercise of rights in land is to be a concurrent competency exercised at the appropriate levels of government.
2.4. Rights in land owned by the Government of Sudan shall be exercised through the appropriate or designated levels of Government.
2.5. The Parties agree that a process be instituted to progressively develop and amend the relevant laws to incorporate customary laws and practices, local heritage and international trends and practices.
2.6 Without prejudice to the jurisdiction of courts, there shall be established a National Land Commission that shall have the following functions:
2.6.1 Arbitrate between willing contending Parties on claims over land, and sort out such claims.
2.6.2 The party or group making claims in respect of land may make a claim against the relevant government and/or other Parties interested in the land.
2.6.3 The National Land Commission may at its discretion entertain such claims.
2.6.4 The Parties to the arbitration shall be bound by the decision of the National Land Commission on mutual consent and upon registration of the award in a court of law.
2.6.5 The National Land Commission shall apply the law applicable in the locality where the land is situated or such other law as the Parties to the arbitration agree, including principles of equity.
2.6.6 Accept references on request from the relevant government, or in the process of resolving claims, and make recommendations to the appropriate levels of government concerning:
2.6.6.1 Land reform policies;
2.6.6.2 Recognition of customary land rights and/or law.
2.6.7 Assess appropriate land compensation, which need not be limited to monetary compensation, for applicants in the course of arbitration or in the course of a reference from a court.
2.6.8 Advise different levels of government on how to co-ordinate policies on national projects.
2.6.9 Study and record land use practices in areas where natural resource exploitation occurs.
2.6.10 The National Land Commission shall be representative and independent. The composition of the membership and terms of appointment of the National Land Commission shall be set by the legislation constituting it. The Chairperson of the National Land Commission shall be appointed by the Presidency.
2.6.11 The National Land Commission may conduct hearings and formulate its own rules of procedure.
2.6.12 The National Land Commission will have its budget approved by the Presidency and will be accountable to the Presidency for the due performance of its functions.
2.7 In accordance with this Agreement and without prejudice to the jurisdiction of courts, there shall be established a Southern Sudan Land Commission which shall have the following functions:
2.7.1 Arbitrate between willing contending Parties on claims over land, and sort out such claims.
2.7.2 The party or group making claims in respect of land may make a claim against the relevant government and/or other Parties interested in the land.
2.7.3 The Southern Sudan Land Commission may entertain such claims at its discretion.
2.7.4 The Parties to the arbitration shall be bound by the Southern Sudan Land Commission’s decision on mutual consent and upon registration of the award in a court of law.
2.7.5 The Southern Sudan Land Commission shall apply the law applicable in the locality where the land is situated or such other law as the Parties to the arbitration agree, including principles of equity.
2.7.6 Accept references on request from the relevant government, or in the process of resolving claims, and make recommendations to the appropriate levels of government concerning:
2.7.6.1 Land reform policies;
2.7.6.2 Recognition of customary land rights and/or law.
2.7.7 Assess appropriate land compensation, which need not be limited to monetary compensation, for applicants in the course of arbitration or in the course of a reference from a court.
2.7.8 Advise different levels of government on how to co-ordinate policies on GoSS projects.
2.7.9 Study and record land use practices in areas where natural resource exploitation occurs.
2.7.10 The Southern Sudan Land Commission shall be representative and independent. The composition of the membership and terms of appointment of the Southern Sudan Land Commission shall be set by the legislation constituting it. The Chairperson of the Southern Sudan Land Commission shall be appointed by the President of the Government of Southern Sudan.
2.7.11 The Southern Sudan Land Commission may conduct hearings and formulate its own rules of procedure.
2.7.12 The Southern Sudan Land Commission shall have its budget approved by the Government of Southern Sudan and shall be accountable to the President of the Government of Southern Sudan for the due performance of its functions.
2.8 The National Land Commission and the Southern Sudan Land Commission shall co-operate and co-ordinate their activities so as to use their resources efficiently.
Without limiting the matters of coordination, the National Land Commission and the Southern Sudan Land Commission may agree:
a) to exchange information and decisions of each Commission;
b) that certain functions of the National Land Commission, including collection of data and research, may be carried out through the Southern Sudan Land Commission;
c) on the way in which any conflict between the findings or recommendations of each Commission may be resolved
2.9 In the case of conflict between the findings or recommendations of the National Land Commission and the Southern Sudan Land Commission, which cannot be resolved by agreement, the two Commissions shall reconcile their positions. Failure to reconcile, the matter shall be referred to the Constitutional Court.
5. Guiding Principles for Sharing Oil Revenue
5.1 The Parties agree that the basis for an agreed and definitive framework for the sharing of the wealth emanating from oil resources of Southern Sudan shall include the following:
5.1. I The framework for sharing wealth from the extraction of natural resources should balance the needs for national development and reconstruction of Southern Sudan.
5.2 The Parties agree that a formula for sharing the revenue from oil resources shall be as set forth in this Agreement.
5.3 For the purposes of this Agreement. ‘Net revenue from oil’ shall be the sum of the net revenue (i) from exports of government oil and (ii) from deliveries of government oil to the refineries. Exports shall be valued at the actual Free on Board (FOB) export prices less the charges to deliver the oil to any export destination including pipeline and management charges. Oil delivered to the refinery shall be valued at the average FOB export prices during the last calendar month in which there was an export sale -less the charges that would have been incurred to deliver the oil to any export destination including pipeline and management charges.
5.4 An Oil Revenue Stabilization Account shall be established from government oil net revenue derived from actual export sales above an agreed benchmark price. The benchmark price will be established annually as part of the national budget reflecting changing economic circumstances.
5.5 The Parties agree that at least two percent (2%) of oil revenue shall be allocated to the oil producing states/regions in proportion to output produced in such states/regions.
5.6 After the payment to the Oil Revenue Stabilization Account and to the oil producing states/regions, fifty percent(50%) of net oil revenue derived from oil producing wells in Southern Sudan shall be allocated to the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) as of the beginning of the Pre-Interim Period and the remaining fifty percent (50%) to the National Government and States in Northern Sudan.
5.7 A Future Generation Fund shall be established once national oil production reaches two (2) million barrels per day. This production criterion may, as part of the National Government’s normal budget process, be reduced down to one (1) million barrels per day.
5.8 The Parties agree that all funds/special accounts referred to in this Agreement and future accounts shall be on-budget operations.
Independence Referendum
2005
The 2005 CPA provided that the people of South Sudan would have right to self-determination and, in this regard, people of south Sudan would have the option to confirm unity or to vote for secession. South Sudan’s right to self-determination was incorporated in the interim constitution (Article 219). As such, the people of south Sudan would exercise their self-determination in a referendum that was to be held by the end of six year interim period. Similarly, the CPA gave the residents of Abyei the opportunity to cast a separate ballot in order to make a choice between retaining its special administrative status in the north or being a part of South Sudan. This provision was also incorporated into the interim constitution (Article 183.3). The constitution came into effect on 9 July 2005.[fn]”The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.[/efn_note]
2006
No developments observed this year.
2007
No developments observed this year.
2008
No developments observed this year.
2009
With respect to holding a referendum in southern Sudan, some important achievements were made. As provided in 2005 CPA, the National Assembly adopted the Southern Sudan Referendum Bill in December 2009.1
2010
The members of the referendum commission were appointed in June 2010. The National Assembly approved the nominees appointed to serve on the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission submitted by the Presidency on 28 June 2010. The Government of Southern Sudan nominated members to serve in the Southern Sudan Referendum Bureau who were to be sworn in in July. In August, members of the ten Southern Sudan Referendum State High Committees were nominated and sworn in. On 2 September 2010, Mohamed Osman El-Negoumi was nominated as the Secretary General of the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission; and his nomination was ratified by the Presidency. Parties to the CPA also held a post-referendum negotiation exposure workshop in Juba on 20 July 2010 as part of their discussion on post-referendum issues.1
Once the institutional structures were in place, the referendum commission approved the voter registration training manual and training of the State Referendum High Committee state level trainers in South Sudan started and was completed on 28 October. A South Sudan political Parties Conference was also organized in Juba from 13-17 October which adopted a “Common Code of Conduct for the Referenda and Popular Consultations.”2 Voter registration took place on 15 November as scheduled by the referendum commission and was extended for 7 days until 8 December 2010.3
The National Assembly adopted the Abyei Referendum Bill 2009.4 There was no progress on setting up an institutional framework for the referendum.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, October 2010.
- Ibid.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, December 2010.
- Ibid.
2011
The referendum for southern Sudan took place from 9 to 15 January 2011. The referendum was conducted in the Sudan and in eight out-of-country-voting (OCV) countries (with the exception of an OCV centre in Brisbane, where the polling continued until 18 January).1 On 7 February 2011, the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission announced the final results for the Referendum. 1.17% of valid votes were cast in favor of unity and 98.83% of valid votes were cast in favor of secession, with a 97.58% voter turnout (3,851,994 registered voters).2 This confirms the provision related to self-determination for southern Sudan was implemented. Nevertheless, the Abyei referendum did not take place as the north and south couldn’t agree on who was eligible to vote.3 Southern Sudan called for a referendum for Abyei and insisted that Abyei belonged to south Sudan.4
Southern Sudan became an independent state of South Sudan on 9 July 2011.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, January 2011.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2011.
- “Southern Sudan Official: Abyei Belongs with Us,” Associated Press Online, April 29, 2011.
- “Sudan; South Calls for Abyei Referendum,” Africa News, May 26, 2011.
Chapter I: The Machakos Protocol (Signed at Machakos, Kenya on 20th July, 2002)
Part A: Agreed Principles
1.3 That the people of South Sudan have the right to self-determination, inter alia,
through a referendum to determine their future status.
The Right to Self-Determination for the People of South Sudan
1.3 That the people of South Sudan have the right to self-determination, inter alia, through a referendum to determine their future status.
PART B: THE TRANSITION PROCESS
2.4 An independent Assessment and Evaluation Commission shall be established during the Pre-Transition Period to monitor the implementation of the Peace Agreement during the Interim Period. This Commission shall conduct a midterm evaluation of the unity arrangements established under the Peace Agreement.
2.4.1 The composition of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission shall consist of equal representation from the GoS and the SPLMI A, and not more than two (2) representatives, respectively, from each of the following categories:
2.4.1.1 Member states of the IGAD Sub-Committee on Sudan (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda);
2.4.1.2 Observer States (Italy, Norway, UK and US); and
2.4.1.3 Any other countries or regional or international bodies to be agreed upon by the Parties.
2.4.2 The Parties shall work with the Commission during the Interim Period with a view to improving the institutions and arrangements created under the Agreement and making the unity of Sudan attractive to the people of South Sudan.
2.5 At the end of the six (6) year Interim Period there shall be an internationally monitored referendum, organized jointly by the OOS and the SPLMI A, for the people of South Sudan to: confirm the unity of the Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the Peace Agreement; or to vote for secession.
2.6 The Parties shall refrain from any form of unilateral revocation or abrogation of the Peace Agreement.
2.10 Other Independent and/or National Institutions to be established in Accordance with the Peace Agreement:
2.10.1 The National Constitutional Review Commission, as detailed in Section 2.12 herein, shall also detail the mandate and provide for the appointment and other mechanisms to ensure the independence of the following institutions:
2.10.0.5 An ad-hoc Commission to monitor and ensure accuracy, legitimacy, and transparency of the Referendum as mentioned in the Machakos Protocol on Self-Determination for the People of South Sudan, which shall also include international experts;
Chapter IV: The Resolution of the Abyei Conflict (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 26th May, 2004)
8. Abyei Referendum Commission
8.1 There shall be established by the Presidency an Abyei Referendum Commission to conduct Abyei referendum simultaneously with the referendum of Southern Sudan. The composition of the Commission shall be determined by the Presidency.
8.2 The residents of Abyei shall cast a separate ballot. The proposition voted on in the separate ballot shall present residents of Abyei with the following choices; irrespective of the results of the Southern referendum:
a. That Abyei retain its special administrative status in the north;
b. That Abyei be part of Bahr el Ghazal.
8.3 The January 1, 1956 line between north and south shall be inviolate, except as agreed above.
Arms Embargo
2005
There was evidence of Sudan purchasing weapons from various mechanisms after the initiation of the peace process. It was documented that the Sudan acquired major weapon systems as well as light weapons from countries such as Russia, Belarus, China, Egypt, Iran and even from European Union Countries such as France, Italy and Germany between 2003 and 2008.[fn]Mike Lewis, “Skirting the Law: Sudan’s Post-CPA Arms Flows,” Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 18 (2009), accessed May 21, 2011, 23-25, http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-SWP-18-Sudan-Post-CPA-Arms… However, no complaint was lodged by the SPLM/A or the UNMIS on this issue. Chinese were exporting weapons and importing Sudanese oil.1 Therefore, the armed embargo provision of the accord was never implemented.
- “Arms, oil, and Darfur: the evolution of relations between China and Sudan,” Small Arms Survey HSBA Issue Brief No. 7 (2007), accessed May 21, 2012, http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-SIB-7-Arms.pdf
2006
Sudan acquired major weapon systems as well as light weapons from various countries in 2006.1
2007
Sudan acquired major weapon systems as well as light weapons from various countries in 2007.1
2008
Sudan acquired major weapon systems as well as light weapons from various countries in 2008.1
2009
No further developments observed.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
Annexure I: Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 31st December 2004)
5.3. The permanent cessation of hostilities shall include final termination of the following activities:
5.3.5. Replenishment of ammunition, weapons and other lethal or military
equipment;
Review of Agreement
2005
Many CPA provisions related to transitional arrangements, including the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC), were not established immediately after the formation of the National Unity Government. After considerable delay, the AEC was established in October 2005; and the Commission was co-chaired by Norway and Kenya.1 The commission’s main responsibility was to assess and evaluate the implementation of the CPA. It contained 13 members and four observers and met in plenary sessions once a month. The AEC had four working groups: power-sharing, wealth-sharing, security arrangements and three areas chaired by international members (Italy, USA, UK and the Netherlands).
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/821), December 21, 2005; “Kenyan Leader Urges International Community to Help Southern Sudan,” BBC Monitoring Africa, November 8, 2005.
2006
No developments observed this year.
2007
There was separate assessment and evaluation commission for Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan states, which was established by presidential decree on 26 July 2007. The AEC and its working groups met regularly and discussed issues related to the implementation of CPA along with post-referendum arrangements, negotiations, and border demarcation of Abyei which became very contentious.1
Detailed information regarding the success of the AEC in forcing the parties to implement the CPA provision was not very clear. Also, the AEC was just the evaluation commission and it did not have authority to review the CPA itself.
2008
No further developments observed.
2009
No further developments observed.
2010
No further developments observed.
2011
No further developments observed.
Chapter I: The Machakos Protocol (Signed at Machakos, Kenya on 20th July, 2002)
PART B: THE TRANSITION PROCESS
2.4 An independent Assessment and Evaluation Commission shall be established during the Pre-Transition Period to monitor the implementation of the Peace Agreement during the Interim Period. This Commission shall conduct a midterm evaluation of the unity arrangements established under the Peace Agreement.
2.4.1 The composition of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission shall consist of equal representation from the GoS and the SPLMI A, and not more than two (2) representatives, respectively, from each of the following categories:
2.4.1.1 Member states of the IGAD Sub-Committee on Sudan (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda);
2.4.1.2 Observer States (Italy, Norway, UK and US); and
2.4.1.3 Any other countries or regional or international bodies to be agreed upon by the Parties.
Verification/Monitoring Mechanism
2005
The 2005 CPA provides for the establishment of UN Peace Support Mission to monitor and verify this agreement and to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement as provided for under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. The CPA provides that the Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Commission will be chaired by the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) force commander. The UN monitors were to have unrestricted access for the purpose of monitoring activities related to the ceasefire, as provided by the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA). The CPA also provided that the Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT), the Joint Military Commission (JMC) in Nuba Mountains, and the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (CPMT) would continue their duties until the UN mission is in operation.
The security council established, with resolution 1590, the United National Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) on 24 March 2005. The UNMIS consisted of 10,000 personnel, 715 police personnel and an appropriate civilian component. The Mission’s headquarters was established in Khartoum and the Joint Monitoring Coordination Team’s headquarters were established in Juba. The deployment of the UNMIS military component moved very slowly. By December 2005, only 4,291 personnel were deployed, including 468 military observers. In April 2005, the African Union Peace and Security Council increased the African Mission in Sudan force to a total authorized strength of 6,171 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police.1
As provided in the 2005 CPA, the UNMIS force commander chaired the first Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Committee (CJMC) meeting on 8 May 2005 and agreed to convene fortnightly meetings. In the meeting, parties also agreed to the Terms of Reference (TOR) of both the CJMC and the Area Joint Military Committees (AJMCs).2 In 2005, the CJMC held 15 meetings. It was reported that while progress was made in terms of collecting data to permit verification and monitoring of movements of their combatants/troops, parties had yet to provide data of their troops and movement for all sectors.3
The UNMIS was also involved in civilian monitoring and protection activities across the Sudan as well as human rights monitoring and promotion activities.
- “UNMIS- United Nations Mission in Sudan- Background,” accessed January 20, 2012, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/background.shtml; “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/821), December 21, 2005.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
- “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2005/821), December 21, 2005.
2006
The CJMC was the mechanism to verify and monitor the implementation of the ceasefire component of the CPA in addition to investigating violations and resolving disputes through discussions. While, CJMC’s role had avoided many incidents that would have otherwise triggered wider conflict, the Sudan Armed Force (SAF) notified UNMIS that a number of towns in the north of UNMIS Sector VI were to be excluded from monitoring and verification, restricting the area operation of the UNMOs. Also, in September 2006, the SPLA imposed restrictions on the movement of UNMIS monitors south of Abyei.1 In October and December 2006, movement restrictions in Abyei were lifted temporarily.2
The CPA requires its signatories to demobilize children in their ranks by July 2005. It was verified that 1,000 children were released one year later. The reason for the delay was the denial of the SAF of the presence of children in their units. The SAF, however, accepted the fact at the CJMC that there are children in unincorporated other armed groups and in incorporated armed groups in the SAF in southern Sudan. It was estimated that there were approximately 19,000 soldiers in those units and significant number of them were under 18 years of age.3
The CJMC, through the Joint Monitoring and Coordination Office, had successfully trained 66 national monitors (of a planned total of 225) who had been deployed to the sector.4 According to the Ceasefire agreement, the SPLM was to redeploy its troops in Eastern Sudan. The redeployment took place in the observation and monitoring of the UN mission in East Sudan. The UN had deployed 10,000 troops to observe the commitment of the government and the SPLM.5 The UNMIS verified the redeployment of 5,672 troops out of a declared strength of 8,763. The troops unaccounted for were considered to have abandoned the SPLA.6 The redeployment of SAF was on schedule. According to the same report, the security mechanisms such as Ceasefire Joint Military Committee and the Area Joint Military Committees were functioning as intended. It was reported that although each party had provided the CJMC with a list of aligned other groups, their actual alignment status, composition and location of these groups remained vague.7
The UNMIS continued its civilian monitoring and protection activities, as well as their human rights monitoring and promotion activities, across the Sudan.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, March 2006.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/662), August 17, 2006.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/160), March 14, 2006.
- “UN to withdraw its mission from eastern Sudan,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, July 6, 2006.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/728), September 12, 2006.
- Ibid.
2007
Both parties imposed restrictions on the movement of UNMOs in the Abyei area (Source: UNMIS. 2009. The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA, February 2009), which affected the mission’s monitoring and verification ability. It was reported that the CJMC chair and force commander convened special sessions to address discrepancies in data provided by the parties on the formation of JIUs and the alignment of other armed groups. The UNMIS military personnel had verified the composition of JIUs.1
The UNMIS continued to work with parties towards the full redeployment and verification of forces. Nevertheless, the deadline of 9 July 2007, by which the SAF was expected to mark the full redeployment of its troops to the north of the 1956 boundary line, was not met Similarly, the status of SAF troops in the south remained not finalized.2 Under verification by joint monitoring teams, the SPLA began the redeployment of its remaining forces in southern Kordofan and Blue Nile State in July 2007.
By December 2007, the special representative of the UN Secretary-General verified that the SAF had completed about 80 percent of the redeployment of its troops to the north beyond 1956 border, while the SPLA had redeployed 8 percent. The main challenge for the verification and monitoring was the unilateral movement of troops by both sides. Therefore, the parties were asked to respect the 1956 border line and not to make unilateral movements for the security of oil installations (as well as placing no other forces in the proximity of the oil installations).3 Following the CJMC meeting on 1 January 2008, restrictions imposed by both parties in the Abyei area were lifted.4
The UNMIS continued its civilian monitoring and protection activities across the Sudan as well as human rights monitoring and promotion activities.
- “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/213), April 17, 2007.
- “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2007/500), August 20, 2007.
- “UN Envoy Urges Sudan’s Peace Partners to Solve Pending Issues,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, December 8, 2007; “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2008/64), January 31, 2008.
- Ibid.
2008
The SAF announced that it had completed its redeployment from the south in accordance with the agreed deadline of 9 January, 2008. The UNMIS verified 88 percent of some 46,000 SAF troops as of 15 January. The figure included voluntarily demobilized soldiers, who comprised 16.2 percent of the total. The SPLA, however, continued to question the existence of the voluntary demobilization of SAF troops as they had been receiving a salary.1
The Ceasefire Political Commission asked the CJMC to lead an inquiry into the events in Abyei of 14 and 20 May and to produce a report. However, the report was delayed by both sides of the committee. As of 4 December 2008, the UNMIS verified 96.9% of 46,403 total redeployment of SAF troops. The CJMC accepted this verification. The SPLA’s verified and accepted redeployment of troops stood at 10.6 percent of 59,168 troops initially stated as being present north of the current border line. It was also verified that the Joint Integrated Units had reached 84.7 per cent of their mandated strength of 39,639 troops, SAF soldiers comprising 52.4 per cent and SPLA 47.6 per cent of the total.2 The SPLA, in collaboration with the CJMC, organized a four day workshop in Juba to discuss the implementation of the security arrangements in the CPA.3
Also, the NCP and the SMLM reached the Abyei Roadmap agreement. With the agreement in place, the UNMO had freedom of movement with the Abyei Administrative Area.4 Nevertheless, the UNMIS monitoring and verification in the north and east of Abyei was stopped by the SPLA troops on 13 November.5
The UNMIS continued its civilian monitoring and protection activities as well as human rights monitoring and promotion activities across the Sudan.
- “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2008), January 31, 2008.
- “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2008/662), October 20, 2008.
- “Sudan’s SPLA Holds Workshop on Implementation of Security Arrangements,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, October 8, 2008.
- “The CPA Monitor-Monthly report on the Implementation of the CPA,” UNMIS, February 2009.
- “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2009/61), January 30, 2009.
2009
The CJMC submitted its comprehensive redeployment review to the CPC for consideration after the SAF verified redeployed figures standing at 95.5 per cent (of the 46,403 initially stated) and SPLA verified the figures standing at 13.7 per cent (of the 59,168 initially stated) and this figure was increased to 33.7% as accepted by the parties in the 108th CJMC meeting on 16 November.1 Similarly, it was reported in the 100th meeting of CJMC held in 14 July 2009, SPLA redeployment from Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States stood at 27.6 per cent, while SAF redeployment from the South was at 100 per cent, not including Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States.2
The UNMIS continued its civilian monitoring and protection activities across the Sudan as well as human rights monitoring and promotion activities.
- “Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sudan,” United Nations (S/2009/357), July 14, 2009; “Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sudan,” United Nations (S/2010/31), January 19, 2010.
- “Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sudan,” United Nations (S/2009/545), October 21, 2009.
2010
While all verification mechanisms were working steadily, very little progress was made in terms of the revivification of redeployments and joint integrated units. According to the report, the SAF redeployment from the south was completed and the SPLA redeployment from the north stood only at 37.7%, as verified at the CJMC meeting of 14-15 December. Nevertheless, the SPLA redeployed from the Nuba Mountains to White Lake Jaw and Duar. In Duar, only 752 of 2,700 SPLA troops were confirmed present.1 The verified size of the JIUs remained unchanged since April 2009.
Along with the monitoring and verification of troop redeployment and deployment of the JIUs, the UNMIS continued its civilian monitoring and protection activities across the Sudan as well as human rights monitoring and promotion activities. This however, does not mean that the UNMIS had successfully carried out its mandate related to verification and monitoring of the ceasefire agreement.
- “Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sudan,” United Nations (S/2010/681), December 31, 2010.
2011
The number of troops in JIUs remained the same. Also, no significant change occurred in terms of redeployment of troops. During a monitoring and verification mission in 2010, the majority of 4,003 SPLA elements were found just inside Blue Nile State, at Yafta. As far as the redeployment of the SPLA from Southern Kordofan is concerned, 3,071 of 5,147 SPLA elements were at the SPLA assembly point in White Lake.1 This suggests that the UNMIS had verified the ground reality but does not suggest that it successfully carried out its mandate related to implementing ceasefire provisions.
With the referendum approving for secession, all the verification and monitoring provisions of the CPA became obsolete. Also, the UNMIS mandate ended on 9 July 2011- the date the southern Sudan became an independent state.
Annexure I: Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 31st December 2004)
Part II
15. UN Peace Support Mission
15.1. The Parties agree to request the United Nations to constitute a lean, effective, sustainable and affordable UN Peace Support Mission to monitor and verify this Agreement and to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement as provided for under Chapter VI of the UN Charter;
15.2. The Parties call upon the international community to provide technical and financial assistance, given the financial constraints of GoS and particularly the nature and structure of SPLA, to expedite the implementation of the cease fire activities.
15.3. International monitoring shall be carried out by UN, considering that the official working languages in Sudan are Arabic and English, who may make the use of the services of UN protection unit. The size of the UN Peace Support Mission, including any UN force protection element, shall be determined by the UN in consultation with the Parties.
15.4. For the purpose of monitoring activities related to the ceasefire, the international monitors shall have unrestricted access in accordance with a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which shall be concluded with the United Nations as soon as possible. Such SOFA shall contain the provisions agreed to by the Parties with the United Nations immediately following the conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
15.5. The parties agree that the presence and size of the UN peace support mission shall be determined by the implementation time table of this Agreement (disengagement, disarmament, redeployment, etc) and shall gradually phase out with successful implementation of the time tables, increased confidence building, and commitment of the parties towards the implementation of this Agreement.
15.6. The Parties agree to request the UN to provide cultural orientation to all its members to create conducive a s here for respect and better understanding of social values and cultures so as to ensure effective implementation of this Agreement;
15.7. The Parties undertake to respect the exclusively international nature of the UN Peace Support Mission as in terms of flag, vehicle markings, communication, travel and transport, privileges and immunities, facilities, provisions, supplies, services, sanitary arrangements, recruitment of local personnel, currency, entry, residence, departure, uniform, arms, permits and licences, military police, arrest, transfer of custody, mutual assistance, jurisdiction, deceased members and settlement of disputes;
15.8. SAF and SPLA members of AJMCs and JMTs shall have the right to participate in verification and monitoring missions, however in case of failure of either or both Parties to participate, the mission shall still continue with its verification and monitoring tasks.
15.9. The Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT), the Joint Military Commission (JMC) in Nuba Mountains and the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (CPMT) shall continue performing their duties, under’ operational control of the UN Mission, according to their present and/or expanded mandate, fill the gap and carry out duties as shall be entrusted to them by the Parties until the UN Mission is operational, after which their roles shall cease to exist.
UN Peacekeeping Force
2005
The 2005 CPA provides for the establishment of UN Peace Support Mission to monitor and verify this Agreement and to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement as provided for under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Accordingly, the security council by its resolution 1590, established the United National Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) on 24 March 2005. The UNMIS consisted of 10,000 personnel, 715 police personnel and the appropriate civilian components. The Mission’s headquarters was established in Khartoum and the Joint Monitoring Coordination Team in Juba. The deployment of the UNMIS military component moved very slowly. By December 2005, only 4,291 personnel were deployed including 468 military observers.
2006
Following the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement on May 2006, the UN Secretary General, in his 28 July 2006 (S/2006/591) report to the Security Council, suggested a UN Peacekeeping force of as many as 18,600 troops to protect civilians, especially IDPs living in camps across Darfur’s three states. The UN Security Council by its resolution 1706 (2006) expanded the mandate of the UNMIS to include its deployment to Darfur and authorized a maximum of up to 17,300 personnel and up to 3,300 civilian police personnel. The request of the Secretary General to accept the UN peacekeeping role in Darfur, however, was rejected by the Sudanese government. As an alternative, the Security Council by its resolution 1769 (2006), authorized the establishment of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The UNMIS continued its support mission “by providing good offices and political support to the parties, monitoring and verifying their security arrangements and offering assistance in a number of areas, including governance, recovery and development.”1 By 27 August 2006, 9,608 military personnel (695 observers, 8,727 troops, 186 staff officers) and 666 civilian police personnel were deployed under UNMIS.2
- “UNMIS- United Nations Mission in Sudan- Background,” accessed January 20, 2012, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/background.shtml.
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” United Nations (S/2006/728), September 12, 2006.
2007
The UN mission, along with its observation and verification of ceasefire implementation, continuously engaged in implementing its mandate related to promoting political support and reconciliation, DDR, electoral assistance, civilian protections, human rights monitoring and promotion. By 17 July 2007, the UNMIS had 9,414 military personnel and 656 police force.1
2008
The UN mission, along with its observation and verification of ceasefire implementation, continuously engaged in implementing its mandate related to promoting political support and reconciliation, DDR, electoral assistance, civilian protections, human rights monitoring and promotion. By 7 October 2008, the UNMIS had 8,560 military personnel and 593 police force.1
2009
As of 22 September 2009, 9,275 of the authorized 10,000 military personnel were deployed under UNMIS, consisting of 483 military observers, 193 staff, and 8,599 troops. As of 15 September 2009, there were 666 members of the police force, which was 93% of the mandated strength of 715. The UNMIS revised benchmarks and indicators of progress of the period 2009-2011 on CPA provisions related to security and stability, elections, referendums, implementation of CPA protocols, wealth sharing, human rights monitoring, humanitarian recovery and development, and rule of law.1
2010
As of 30 December, the UNMIS military component had deployed 9,745 of the 10,000 troops authorized (466 military observers, 198 staff officers, and 9,081 troops). Similarly, out of an authorized 715 police personnel, 662 were deployed. The UNMIS police provided training to the Southern Sudan Police Service on referendum security and assistance with the preparation of referendum security plans.1
2011
As the southern Sudanese voted to secede from Sudan and became an independent state on 9 July 2011, the Secretary General forwarded a letter from the Government of Sudan to the Security Council on 31 May 2011. The government of Sudan had decided to terminate the presence of UNMIS as of 9 July 2011.1 Nevertheless, the government of southern Sudan had requested for a follow-upUN mission in South Sudan. Due to South Sudan’s complex and fragile regional environment, internal security concern and challenges to build institutional capacity of the state along with protecting civilians, the Secretary General recommended an establishment of a multidimensional UN operation in South Sudan (UNMISS) for four years under Chapter VI. The recommended military strength was 7,000 troops (of all ranks) and 900 police personnel.2 The UN Security Council established the UNMISS for an initial period of one year on 9 July 2011 by its Resolution 1996. The Mission was mandated “to consolidate peace and security, and to help establish the conditions for development with a view to strengthening the capacity of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to govern effectively and democratically and establish good relations with its neighbors.”3
The UNMIS faced challenges related to maintaining peace as well as hold referendum. Despite the fact that the UNMIS fulfilled its mandate related to referendum, it failed to protect civilians from violence.
UN, International and Internal Verification
Annexure I: Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 31st December 2004)
Part II
15. UN Peace Support Mission
15.1. The Parties agree to request the United Nations to constitute a lean, effective, sustainable and affordable UN Peace Support Mission to monitor and verify this Agreement and to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement as provided for under Chapter VI of the UN Charter;
15.3. International monitoring shall be carried out by UN, considering that the official working languages in Sudan are Arabic and English, who may make the use of the services of UN protection unit. The size of the UN Peace Support Mission, including any UN force protection element, shall be determined by the UN in consultation with the Parties.
Withdrawal of Troops
2005
The 2005 CPA provides that all parties should work together to disarm, repatriate or expel foreign insurgency groups from Sudan as soon as possible. The biggest concern for the SPLM/A was the involvement of Lords Resistance Army- a rebel group from Uganda. Immediately after signing of the accord, the SPLA leader and first vice-president Col. John Garang said that the LRA and its leader Joseph Kony had to leave South Sudan.[fn]”Sudan’s Garang says Ugandan rebel leader must leave,” BBC Monitoring Africa, January 11, 2005.[/efn_note] As a matter of fact, on 14 January 2005, the SPLM gave a 72 hour (14 January) ultimatum to the LRA to leave southern Sudan territories.1 This ultimatum did not work. On 9 February 2005, the SPLA joined hands with the Ugandan army to hunt for LRA leader and his remaining cohorts in order to get rid of them if they did not negotiate peace with the Ugandan government.2 The First Vice-President gave the 27 July evening deadline for Joseph Kony and his LRA cohorts to leave the southern Sudan.3 The LRA posed major obstacles in peace processes in southern Sudan and efforts to expel them were not successful in 2005.
- “Ugandan Rebels Deadline to leave Sudan Ends on 14 January,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, January 14, 2005.
- “Sudan, Uganda to Join Hands in Hunt for Rebel Leader: Official,” Xinhua General News Service, February 9, 2005.
- “Sudan’s Garang Says to “Deal Firmly” with Ugandan Rebels,” BBC Monitoring Africa — Political, July 30, 2005.
2006
The LRA continued to pose a threat to peace processes in southern Sudan. Nevertheless, peace talks were held between the LRA negotiators and the Ugandan government in June of 2006. The Vice President, Riek Machar, paid Kony $20,000 and gave him stocks of food to ensure that the rebels would leave Sudan without plundering any more villages. The vice president believed that the LRA fighters left southern Sudan into the DRC.1 A peace talk was held in southern Sudan but the LRA rebels had yet to assemble in designated area.2 Nevertheless, the LRA rebels did not leave southern Sudan. The Sudan government was said to provide support to the LRA.
- “Sudan; SPLA Pays Kony to Leave Country,” Africa News, June 26, 2006.
- “Rebels Want Restrictions on Ugandan Army in Southern Sudan,” BBC Monitoring Africa, October 16, 2006.
2007
In June 2007, the LRA was given three weeks to assemble at the assembly point in southern Sudan by Riek Machar, the chief mediator of the talks between Uganda and the LRA, and the Vice President of southern Sudan.1 Nevertheless, it was not clear whether or not the LRA rebels were assembled or if they left the southern Sudan in 2007.
- “Ugandan Rebel Group Given Three More Weeks to Assemble in Southern Sudan,” Xinhua General News Service, June 6, 2007.
2008
As peace talks between the Ugandan government and the LRA started in 2006, the Uganda People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) was permitted to come and stay in southern Sudan. The LRA started their immediate withdrawal of the UPDF, which never happened. In 2008 the LRA demanded the withdrawal again.1 By the end of 2008, the LRA gradually left southern Sudan and moved their forces to the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s thick forests.2
- “Ugandan Rebels Demand Army Pull-Out from Southern Sudan,” BBC Monitoring Africa, July 30, 2008.
- “Sudan Warns of Imminent LRA Attacks in Equatoria,” Sudan Tribune, December 20, 2008.
2009
Despite efforts to purge the LRA from southern Sudan, some part of the LRA maintained its base in Southern Sudan.2 The LRA continued its base in Southern Sudan along with northeastern Congo, the Central African Republic.3
- “Lords Resistance Army,” Small Arms Survey, 2011, accessed May 21, 2012, http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/facts-figures/armed-groups/sout… Nevertheless, the top LRA commander Okello Yape was killed by the Ugandan army in South Sudan.1“Ugandan Army Kills Top LRA Rebel Commander in Southern Sudan,” BBC Monitoring Africa, March 10, 2009.
- “World urged to protect South Sudan from Uganda’s LRA rebels,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, December 19, 2009.
2010
Allegations of providing support to the LRA were denied by the Sudanese government.1 In March, the Sudanese president vowed to end LRA attacks in southern Sudan.2 As the elections drew near, the LRA attacks increased in Southern Sudan. Therefore, the government of southern Sudan intensified operations against the LRA.3 The LRA continued to operate from southern Sudan.
- “Sudan’s Ruling NCP Denies Harbouring Ugandan LRA Rebels,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, January 21, 2010.
- “Sudan’s Al Bashir Vows to End LRA Attacks in South,” Sudan Tribune, March 3, 2010.
- “South Sudan Army Vows to Clear LRA Rebels,” Sudan Tribune, June 27, 2010.
2011
A small part of LRA might still be based in South Sudan, but they are more present in Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of Congo.1 The 2005 CPA provision on foreign insurgency groups was not implemented.
Annexure I: Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices (Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on 31st December 2004)
12. Foreign Insurgency Groups
12.1. The parties appreciate the threat and menace that the foreign insurgency groups pose on the security and stability of the Sudan and neighboring countries.
12.2. The parties have resolved to end the presence of the foreign insurgency groups on the Sudanese soil;
12.3. The parties shall work together to disarm, repatriate or expel these groups as soon as possible.
Please always cite: “Annualized implementation data on comprehensive intrastate peace accords, 1989–2012.” Madhav Joshi, Jason Michael Quinn, and Patrick M. Regan. Journal of Peace Research 52 (2015): 551-562.