General Peace Agreement for Mozambique

1992

Intermediate Implementation

The General Peace Agreement (GPA) for Mozambique had a provision for UN peacekeeping. As soon as the peace agreement was signed, and before the establishment of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), the interim Special Representative and a team of 21 military observers, drawn from existing United Nations peacekeeping missions, arrived in Mozambique on 15 October 1992.¹

“On 16 December 1992, the Security Council, by its resolution 797 (1992), approved the Secretary-General’s report and decided to establish ONUMOZ until 31 October 1993. The Council endorsed the Secretary-General’s recommendation that the elections not take place until the military aspects of the General Peace Agreement had been fully implemented. It called upon the Mozambican Government and RENAMO to cooperate fully with the United Nations and to respect scrupulously the ceasefire and their obligations under the Agreement.”² The mandate of ONUMOZ included four important elements: political, military, electoral and humanitarian.

The formal request for a UN peacekeeping mission led to the Security Council’s approval of a substantial and multifunctional UN peacekeeping operation to be deployed and operational until the first general elections took place. However, ONUMOZ was slow to deploy. In the first few months, peace was only sustained due to the exhaustion of the warring parties and the general enthusiasm and support of the population for the peace agreement. Although operating behind schedule, ONUMOZ was largely successful in fulfilling its mission.

1. “Mozambique — United Nations Operation in Mozambique — ONUMOZ,” United Nations, accessed September 2, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumoz.htm.
2. “Mozambique – ONUMOZ Background,” United Nations, accessed June 4, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumozFT.htm.

1993

Full Implementation

By the beginning of May 1993, ONUMOZ was fully deployed and its military infrastructure established in all three operational regions. It verified the violations of the ceasefire by both sides to the conflict as well as monitored the situations with strong military and police components. Its maximum military strength as of 30 November 1993 was 6,576 combatants from all ranks.¹

1. Ibid.

1994

Full Implementation

ONUMOZ verification continued in 1994. As of 31 October 1994, it had a strong civilian police component consisting of 1,087 police observers stationed all over Mozambique to monitor the situation, especially issues related to human rights violations by the state police force. The UN verification mission was completed as soon as the post-conflict elections took place and election results were announced. The UN mission left Mozambique on December 1994.¹ It had contributed to the demobilization, disarmament, integration, and reintegration of former combatants from both sides. It facilitated post-conflict elections and helped to avert the possible resumption of conflict when RENAMO was about to boycott the post-conflict elections.

1. Ibid.

1995

Full Implementation

The UN peacekeeping mission, ONUMOZ, was deployed in 1992 and completed its task by December 1994.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1992

Minimum Implementation

The General Peace Agreement (GPA) had a provision for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Mozambique, particularly of those from Zimbabwe and Malawi. Upon the insistence of RENAMO, the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country in the implementation phase and their replacement by UN forces in the transition stage created some tensions with the neighboring countries who had committed military forces to secure access to the trade corridors. This was an especially important issue for landlocked neighbors. The tensions emerged when the Zimbabwean Defence Minister, Moven Mahachi, said that the UN had asked for a suspension of the Zimbabwean withdrawal until strategic roads and rail corridors had been secured. This allegation, however, was denied by the UN mission and the head of the UN military observer team in Mozambique.¹

Transport and Communications Minister Armando Guebuza, who was also head of the government team to the Supervision and Control Commission (CSC), said that the GPA required that the foreign troop withdrawal plan be presented to and approved by the CSC and that the implementation of that plan be overseen by the CSE. Despite the fact that the government possessed these plans, which had been drawn up in line with the views of the Malawian and Zimbabwean governments, the CSC had not yet assessed these plans.² Reportedly, Zimbabwe had postponed the withdrawal of its 5,000 troops in Mozambique, which highlighted the shambles of the peace process there.³

1. “UN official denies delaying Zimbabwe troop withdrawal from Mozambique,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 16, 1992.
2. “Mozambique Guebuza Expresses Fears Over Delays in Troop Confinement Process,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 26, 1992.
3. “Army to Stay as Mozambique Peace Delayed,” The Guardian (London), November 27, 1992.

1993

Full Implementation

It was reported that the withdrawal of Malawian and Zimbabwean troops from Mozambique had recently been completed.¹

1. “Salvaging Peace In Mozambique,” Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA), July 9, 1993.

1994

Full Implementation

Foreign troops were withdrawn by June 1993.

1995

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1992

Intermediate Implementation

The General Peace Agreement for Mozambique had a provision for UN peacekeeping. As soon as the peace agreement was signed and before the establishment of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), the interim Special Representative and a team of 21 military observers drawn from existing United Nations peacekeeping missions arrived in Mozambique on 15 October 1992.¹

Before the arrival of the UN military observers, Radio Mozambique in the capital of Maputo reported that “the Mozambique Armed Forces (FAM) and elements of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) had clashed for the first time since the signing of the peace agreement when MNR forces attacked a FAM position at Charre, about 10 km from Mutarara in Tete Province, on 14th October”.²

A first group of 10 UN cease-fire observers from the USA, France, and Russia arrived in the capital. A document cited by ‘Noticias’ stated that the Supervision and Control Commission (CSC), which was established in November 1992 as per the General Peace Agreement, regarded the retaking of Lugela by government forces as a clear violation of the cease-fire accord. The document, which was issued by the CSC on December 2, urged the Mozambican government to honor the accord and adhere to the structures that had been created to uphold the peace process.³

There were no further violations of the cease-fire agreement.

1. “Mozambique: United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ),” UN ONUMOZ, accessed September 2, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumoz.htm.
2. “Mozambique Government and Rebel Forces Clash in Tete; UN Observers Arrive,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts/The Monitoring Report, October 16, 1992.
3. “Mozambique Commission Says Recapture of Lugela Was Violation of Peace Accord,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 10, 1992.

1993

Full Implementation

The government team of the CSC sent a note to UN Operations in Mozambique in response to a RENAMO communique signed by Raul Domingos, head of the RENAMO team of the CSC. In the communique, RENAMO stated that “our military strategists will select a strategic target whose destruction will mean an end to the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)”. The RENAMO communiqué was a violation of the spirit of the peace agreement.¹

However, no violation of the cease-fire was reported. Both the government and the rebels reiterated that they no longer wanted violence.

1. “Mozambique: Government Notifies UN about “Serious” MNR Violations,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 7, 1993.

1994

Full Implementation

The cease-fire was successfully implemented during the transitional period. Since the 1994 elections, no significant political violence had been reported. However, tensions between the government and the opposition still existed. Criminal activities were not a rare occurrence, but political violence was very rare.

1995

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1992

Minimum Implementation

The General Peace Agreement (GPA) provided for a free election of the executive by a simple majority vote (50 + 1) and if none of the candidates won on the first round, the two with the highest number of votes would participate in a run-off. Presidential and parliamentary elections were scheduled for October 1993.

1993

Minimum Implementation

Presidential and parliamentary elections were scheduled for October 1993, but were delayed due to lags in the schedule for the demobilization of the RENAMO and FRELIMO soldiers. At a news briefing in the Mozambican capital, the United Nations Special Representative for Mozambique, Aldo Ajello, suggested that the country’s first multi-party presidential and parliamentary elections should be postponed until mid-1994 due to delays in the demobilization process.¹

1. “Mozambique: UN Representative Ajello Proposes Postponement of Elections Until June 1994,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 15, 1993.

1994

Full Implementation

The first multiparty elections for the president and the parliament took place from the 27th to the 29th of October, 1994. President Joaquim Chissano received 53.3 percent of the vote, and RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama received 33.7 percent of the vote. Chissano’s FRELIMO party won 129 seats in the 250-member parliament. Dhlakama’s RENAMO took 112 seats. The Democratic Union won the other nine parliamentary seats.¹ This was the first multi-party election. The 1994 elections were extensively monitored by observers representing both parties as well as some of the key donors and the UN.

1. “Mozambique: Election Results,” Africa News, November 1, 1994 / November 30, 1994.

1995

Full Implementation

A multi-party election for the executive by simple majority vote took place in October 1994.

No further developments.

1996

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1997

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1998

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1999

Full Implementation

The second multi-party election for the executive by simple majority vote took place from December 3-5, 1999. FRELIMO’s Chissano received 52.29% of the vote and RENAMO’s Dhlakama received 47.71% of the vote.¹

1. “Elections in Mozambique,” African Election Database, accessed September 9, 2010, http://africanelections.tripod.com/mz.html#1999_Presidential_Election.

2000

Full Implementation

The second multi-party election for the executive by simple majority vote took place in December 1999.

No further developments observed this year.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1992

Full Implementation

The representative of Mozambique informed the Security Council that the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique had, on 12 October 1992, unanimously approved a law adopting the General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, which would enter into force on 15 October 1992.¹“Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 1989-1992, Chapter VIII: Consideration of questions under the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security,” 4; “The situation in Mozambique,” United Nations Security Council, 295, accessed September 9, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/89-92/Chapter%208/AFRICA/item%2004_Mo… The Agreement became part of the constitution.

1993

Full Implementation

The General Peace Agreement was adopted by the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique on 12 October 1992 and became effective on 15 October 1992. The agreement became part of the constitution.

No further developments.

1994

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1995

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1992

Intermediate Implementation

The 1992 General Peace Agreement (GPA), signed in Rome by President Joaquim Chissano and guerrilla leader Afonso Dhlakama, marked the beginning of a fundamentally successful process of democratic change in Mozambique. It provided an institutional framework for a transformation from a one party to a multi-party democracy by providing the means for both RENAMO and FRELIMO to change themselves into legitimate political parties.¹

The electoral act in Protocol III of the General Peace Agreement was passed as law in October 1992.²

1. Carrie Manning, The Politics of Peace in Mozambique: Post-Conflict Democratization, 1992-2000 (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2002).
2. Irae Baptista Lundin, “Towards Stable Electoral Laws in Mozambique,” African Journal on Conflict Resolution 4, no. 2 (2004): 97-118, 103.

1993

Intermediate Implementation

Since the demobilization was still going on, no serious debate on electoral law took place.

1994

Full Implementation

The GPA changed the Constitution and introduced ‘principles of Electoral LawÕ in article 107. Paragraph 3 of article 107 was revised and changed from majority vote to proportional vote according to the protocol of the GPA. The new Constitution and the GPA had thus established the foundations for the creation of the planning, executing, directing, and supervising organs of the electoral processes for the multi-party elections—the National Electoral Commission (CNE) and the Technical Secretariat of the Electoral Administration (STAE).¹

1. Ibid., 103.

1995

Full Implementation

The electoral law was adopted in 1994.

1996

Full Implementation

The electoral law was adopted in 1994. However, there were amendments to the constitution in 1996 by Law 6/96 on 22 November 1996.¹

1. Ibid.

1997

Full Implementation

The following laws were approved by parliament for local government elections:¹

• Law 2/97 on February 18th: Approving the legal framework for the implementation of the local municipalities.
• Law 4/97 on May 28th: Creating the National Electoral Commission.
• Law 5/97 on May 28th: Institutionalizing the systematic electoral census for the realization of the election and opinion polls.
• Law 6/97 on May 28th: Establishing the legal-juridical framework for the elections of the local municipal organs.
• Law 7/98 on May 31st: Establishing the framework for the administrative tutelage of the State upon the local municipalities.
• Law 8/97 on May 31st: Establishing the special norms that regulate the organization and the functioning of the city of Maputo (the capital city of the Republic).
• Law 9/97 on May 31st: Defining the statute of the office holders and members of the local municipalities.
• Law 10/97 on May 31st: Creating the municipalities in cities and villages and in some territorial circumscriptions.
• Law 11/97 on May 31st: Defining and establishing the legal-juridical regime of the municipal finances and patrimony.

1. Ibid.

1998

Full Implementation

In 1998, just before the general election, Justice Minister Jose Abudo proposed amendments to the 1997 law creating the National Elections Commission, and a new law on electoral procedures based largely on the law used for the country’s first multi-party elections in 1994. The RENAMO General Secretary, Joao Alexandre, accused the government of waiting until the last minute to draft a new electoral law “even though it has known since 1992 that there would be general elections in 1999.”¹ The law was not amended in 1998.

1. “Mozambique: Government Presents Electoral Bill,” Africa News, October 22, 1998.

1999

Full Implementation

In September 1999 Mozambique’s National Parliament amended the country’s electoral law. “The amendments changed the organic structure of the STAE. The innovation was to permit the appointment of two Deputy General Directors by the political parties according to the representation in parliament. They would assist the General Director but have no right to vote. The CNE was also changed. In 1994, the most consensual CNE was composed of members chosen by the government, by RENAMO, as well as from the small parties.”¹

“Paragraph 2 of article 19 of law 4/99 that created the CNE, stipulated that in the electoral periods the organic framework of STAE, at each level, is to be complemented by political appointments. Law 4/99 introduced alterations in the composition of CNE, enlarging the organ at provincial, district and city levels. The new composition of the CNE for 1999 increased from eight members in 1998 to 17 members: 15 members elected proportionally by political parties represented in parliament, and two members appointed by government. The president of the organ was to be nominated by civil society and appointed by the President of the Republic. At provincial level CNE was to have seven members, one designated by government and six by the parties represented in the parliament, proportionally. At district and city level, the membership stood at five in the total, one plus four following the same principle. The amended electoral law in 1999 did also provide for a new electoral census, and the limit of 18 years to register to vote, to be completed up to the last day of the census. In 1999 FRELIMO’s candidate won the presidency, and representation in the national parliament is 133 seats for FRELIMO and 117 seats for RENAMO-Electoral Union.”²

1. Irae Baptista Lundin, “Towards Stable Electoral Laws in Mozambique,” 110.
2. Ibid.

2000

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2001

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

“In 2002 parliament amended the law for local elections to be held in 2003, in order to make it more consensual.”¹ Three new laws were discussed and approved, providing a framework for the national elections to be held in 2004:

• Law 18/2002 on October 10: Altering the laws 5/97 and 9/99, related to the institution of the systematic electoral census for the realization of elections and opinions polls.
• Law 19/2002 on October 10: Introducing alterations to the law 6/97, related to the election of the organs of the local municipalities.
• Law 2/2002 on October 10: Creating the National Electoral Commission.

“The new CNE will have 19 members, 17 appointed by the parliament on a proportional basis, and one member without a voting right, appointed by the government. The 19th member is the president of CNE appointed by the civil society. The CNE will choose the provincial and district commission to be in force from 45 days before the date of the electoral census, electoral acts and electoral polls, and ceases its functions ten days after the results have been presented to the public. The electoral commissions at city and district levels, function from 30 days before the date of the electoral census, electoral acts and opinion polls, and cease their functions five days after the results have been presented to the public.”²

“The most notable feature of the amendment was that the CNE was to be headed by a member appointed by the civil society, to be approved by the parliament from the list of at least three names, and nominated by the President of the Republic. The process caused a good feeling of counting in state affairs in the civil society, even if because it was a new practice it has probably not produced the best results in the eyes of all sectors of the civil society. Decisions in the CNE will be made by consensus, there will be a permanent voter’s roll, and CNE will remain a permanent structure.”³

“STAE will have its General Director selected by the CNE, after a public contest based on curriculum evaluation, and appointed by the Cabinet on the recommendation of the CNE. During the electoral period the Director of the STAE is assisted by two Deputy General Directors nominated by the political parties according to the representation in the parliament. This fact will hopefully prevent boycotts and turn the election into a really participatory democratic exercise. Moreover, the new law (20/2002) will hopefully prevent the accusations of fraud that the opposition has made since 1994, the worst in 1999 when the Supreme Court ruled out the appeal.”⁴

1. Ibid., 111- 113.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

1992

Full Implementation

As stipulated in the General Peace Agreement, RENAMO (or its armed wing, the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR)) continued to hold control of territory. RENAMO controlled approximately twenty-five percent of Mozambican territory, scattered all over the country, at the end of the war in 1992 and about six percent of the population. The largest concentrations of RENAMO-controlled territory were in the central part of the country, specifically in Manica, Sofala, and Zambézia provinces.¹ However, territorial administration by RENAMO was meant to be temporary until the holding of post-conflict elections. As such, RENAMO continued to hold its control over areas as territorial powersharing for a temporary period.

1. Dorina A. Bekoe, “Mutual Vulnerability and the Implementation of Peace Agreements: Examples from Mozambique, Angola, and Liberia,” International Journal of Peace Studies 10, no. 2 (2005): 51.

1993

Full Implementation

Territory under RENAMO control was administered by RENAMO members. On 15 March 1993, the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) announced in a communique issued in Maputo that it would not participate in any of the peace agreement committees until the government resolved all the administrative problems of the MNR in Maputo, challenging recent statements about government expenditure on the MNR administration in Maputo made by the Minister of Construction and Water Joao Salomao.¹

A presidential decree was issued on 14 July 1993 that created a national commission aimed at facilitating cooperation and fostering understanding between the State Administration Ministry and the administration in areas controlled by the Mozambique National Resistance [MNR – RENAMO]. Meanwhile, RENAMO had issued a communique saying the state administration in RENAMO-controlled areas would only begin once the commission begins to operate. In its communique, RENAMO once again pointed out that the General Peace Accord signed in Rome referred to the existence of two administrations in Mozambique.²

1. “Mozambique: MNR Stops Participation in Peace Committees until Problems Resolved,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts/The Monitoring Report, March 16, 1993.
2. “Mozambique: Radio Says Issue of ‘Double Administration’ Needs To Be Clarified,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 16, 1993.

1994

Full Implementation

As of 1994, most of the country was under government control, but RENAMO was restricting access to its strongholds in central Mozambique. After elections, the administrative control of RENAMO ended.¹

1. “Ballots, Not Bullets: Mozambique Goes to the Polls This Week but the Question is What Happens Next,” The Gazette (Montreal, Quebec), October 23, 1994.

1995

Full Implementation

RENAMO’s territorial powersharing ended after the elections as planned and a unified administration was established.

No further develoments.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1992

Full Implementation

The Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) was appointed on 4 November 1992 to guarantee the implementation of and assume responsibility for authentic interpretation of the Agreement, settle any disputes between the parties that might arise, and guide and coordinate the activities of the other Commissions. The United Nations led the CSC with Government and RENAMO delegations, and representatives of Italy, France, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The first meeting of the CSC was held on 4 November 1992, where the Ceasefire Commission (CCF), the Commission for the Reintegration of Demobilized Military Personnel (CORE), and the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces (CCFADM) were established.¹

The Supervision and Control Commission (CSC) met in Maputo on 25 November 1992 to discuss rules for its investigation teams should cease-fire violations occur. “Speaking to the media shortly after the meeting, Lt-Col Sinha, commander of the UN forces in Mozambique, said those rules have come into force on an interim basis. The definitive rules had still to be approved by the UN. The meeting also looked into Mozambique government and MNR [MNR] reports of violations of the Rome Peace Accords. It also drew up a plan for trips to areas where such violations are said to have occurred, so that they can be investigated” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1992).²

1. “Mozambique: United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ),” UN ONUMOZ, accessed September 2, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumoz.htm.
2. “Mozambique Commission Discusses Ceasefire Implementation,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 27, 1992.

1993

Full Implementation

The Supervision and Control Commission (CSC) held a meeting on 22 January 1993 in order to discuss UN proposals concerning the confinement of government and Mozambique National Resistance [MNR – RENAMO] troops. In the meeting, the United Nations proposed that the 12 assembly points already identified should be occupied as soon as possible. The Mozambican government had already approved the proposal, though RENAMO still had to make a final decision on the matter. RENAMO believed that the accommodation of troops should begin simultaneously only after the 49 assembly points provided for in the accord had been identified.

The CSC also discussed regulations governing the various commissions and the replacement of the Humanitarian Assistance Committee. The UN Operations Team on Emergency and Humanitarian Assistance in Mozambique would replace that committee.¹

Territory under RENAMO control was administered by RENAMO members. On 15 March 1993, the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) announced in a communique issued in Maputo that it would not participate in any of the peace agreement committees until the government resolved all the administrative problems of the MNR in Maputo, challenging recent statements about government expenditure on the MNR administration in Maputo made by the Minister of Construction and Water Joao Salomao.²

The CSE meeting was convened by Mr. Aldo Ajello, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and Chairman of the CSE, on Saturday March 6, 1993. The meeting was called to examine the report from the Chairman of the Cease-Fire Commission on an alleged cease-fire violation that the Mozambican government had reported. The Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) did not attend the meeting, which was deplored by the Commission chair.³

For three months, the CSE did not operate. The proceedings of the CSE resumed on June 3, 1993. The Mozambican government team was led by Mineral Resources Minister John Kachamila; Raul Domingos led the Mozambique National Resistance team to the CSC.⁴

1. “Other Southern African Reports; Mozambique: Commission Proposes Immediate Occupation of Assembly Points,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 25, 1993.
2. “Mozambique: MNR Stops Participation in Peace Committees until Problems Resolved,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts/The Monitoring Report (ME/1636 B/8), March 16, 1993.
3. “Mozambique: UN Explains and ‘Deplores’ MNR’s Absence from Meeting,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 10, 1993.
4. “Mozambique: Peace Accord Commission Resumes Work,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts/The Monitoring Report, June 4, 1993.

1994

Full Implementation

With the successful holding of elections in October 1994 and the departure of the UN Mission in Mozambique, the Supervision and Control Commission completed its task of monitoring the peace process and resolving any differences that arose during the peace process.

1995

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1992

Intermediate Implementation

The Supervision and Control Commission (CSC) of the Mozambique General Peace Accord (GPA) held its first meeting in the hall of the Maputo Executive Council on Nov. 4, 1992 under the guidance of Aldo Ajello, the UN Secretary-General’s interim representative in Mozambique. The meeting established working procedures for the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (CCFADM).¹ The Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces would be headed by army commander Tobias Dai for the government, and Mateus Ngonyamo for the Mozambique National Resistance.

The military reform was one of the most extensively developed parts of the 1992 GPA, providing for the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration plan (DDR). Along with the DDR, the Armed Defense Force of Mozambique (FADM) was established. Yet, finding volunteers to join the army proved difficult. While the GPA agreement recommended 30,000 for the FADM, the actual number of volunteers at the time of the general election was only around one third of that number.

1. “Mozambique: First Meeting of Peace Agreement Supervision and Control Commission,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 6, 1992.

1993

Intermediate Implementation

The Portuguese government was willing to take part in the training of the future united Mozambican Armed Forces.¹ The Portuguese government had allocated 460,000 Portuguese contos towards the formation of the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces. The fund was to pay for the planned operations to be carried out within the framework of the single army, notably for the renovation of the Nacala and Catembe barracks in Nampula Province and Maputo Province, respectively, where Mozambican special forces would be trained. Nogueira, the visiting Portuguese Defense Minister, said that in 1993 alone, Portugal would contribute about 900,000 Portuguese contos.²

“The Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (CCFADM), established following the October 1992 peace treaty, reached agreement on Aug. 14 on the formation of the future Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (FADM). The documents, signed by senior officers from the government and from the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR or RENAMO), related to the timetable for the formation of the FADM, the structure of its supreme command, and guidelines on the selection of personnel to receive training at the Nyanga Military Training Centre in Zimbabwe. These guidelines were employed immediately to select 100 officers, 50 from each side, who began a 16-week course at Nyanga on Aug. 17. At the end of the course they would be required to train FADM infantry battalions. A further 540 soldiers were expected to attend the course.”.³

1. “Mozambique: Portuguese Official Says Portugal to Help With Army Training and Peace-Keeping,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 5, 1993.
2. “Mozambique: Visiting Portuguese Defence Minister on Aid for National Army,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 14, 1993.
3. “Progress in formation of unified army,” Keesing’s Record of World Events
   (Volume 39), August 1993, 39585.

1994

Intermediate Implementation

“On Aug. 24 President Joaquim Chissano, who had himself been demobilized as a general in the FPLM on Aug. 12, reported that the new FADM would have only 11,000 of its intended 30,000 members operational by the elections in October.”¹

On December 20, 1994 it was reported by the Mozambique Information Agency (AIM) that the new Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (FADM) had trampled on the existing laws of the country and the constitution of the republic by establishing a new military judicial system.

A source cited by AIM said that the new system was a copy of the military judicial structures in force in Portugal. The new system consisted of a Supreme Military Tribunal, to which three regional military tribunals were seconded. The regional tribunals were based in Maputo, Beira, and Nampula and served southern, central, and northern Mozambique.²

However, Supreme Court Deputy Chairman Norberto Carrilho had described the system as being in serious violation of the constitution and existing laws. The senior Supreme Court official had warned that a declaration that the system was unconstitutional might be approved unless its authors revoked it.³

1. “Formation of new army,” Keesing’s Record of World Events (Volume 40), August 1994, 40127.
2. “Mozambique: Agency Reports New Military Judicial System Established,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 21, 1994.
3. “Mozambique: Supreme Court Official Describes Military Court System as ‘Unconstitutional’,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 29, 1994.

1995

Intermediate Implementation

Mozambique Defence Armed Forces soldiers staged a mutiny at the Military Hospital area in Maputo on 16 March 1995. Joaquim Chissano, President of the Republic and Chief in Command of the FADM, said he did not think that the mutinies staged by soldiers in different parts of the country were politically motivated but due to a lack of civic education, which would be reintroduced into the military. He proposed to eliminate the joint command and create a direct command, resume civic education programs in the FADM forces, and adopt more sound disciplinary measures which would correspond with what is required of an army. He intended to do this without creating panic, since the new military was made up of two groups of armed forces which had previously fought each other.¹

1. “Mozambique: Chissano on Changes to Armed Forces, Need for ‘Civic Education’,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 22, 1995.

1996

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

1992

Intermediate Implementation

“The Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM) was created on 31 December 1992 by Law 19/92, to replace the existing Mozambique People’s Police (PPM). The General Peace Agreement (Protocol IV, Section IV) also established clear objectives relating to the depoliticization and restructuring of the police force.”¹

The CNI, established under the terms of the peace accord, had been assigned the task of verifying that the State Information and Security Service did not violate the law during the transition period.²

1. Mark Malan, “Peacebuilding in Southern Africa: Police Reform in Mozambique and South Africa,” International Peacekeeping 6, no. 4 (1999): 172.
2. “Mozambique: President Meets Body Charged with Overseeing Security Service During Transition,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 8, 1993.

1993

Full Implementation

In an interview with Radio Mozambique on 11 February 1993, Aldo Ajello, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Mozambique, said the National Information Commission and the National Commission for Police Affairs, two commissions established within the framework of the general peace accord, had not begun operating because the MNR (RENAMO) had not yet named its representatives, even though there were MNR accusations that the government had integrated approximately 15,000 soldiers and 3,000 employees of the State Information and Security Service into the police force.¹ In an interview, the Special Representative reported that President Chissano already had the names on the government side, the names of the nine people who would be appointed after consultation with the other parties, and he was still waiting for a designation from MNR.

On 21 June 1993, two presidential decrees established the National Information Commission (COMINFO) and the National Commission for Police Affairs (COMPOL), both of which were called for in the General Peace Accord (GPA). Each commission consisted of 21 members. COMINFO was charged with the task of verifying that the State Information and Security Service (SISE) did not violate the law or citizens’ political rights. COMPOL was assigned the task of verifying that the police did not violate the law or citizens’ political rights. The two presidential decrees stated that COMPOL and COMINFO members would be sworn in by the President of the Republic and would operate from the day they were sworn in.²

(Comments from External Reviewer: “While COMINFO and COMPOL were created, they were established late and were far less functional than the other peace commissions. Most importantly, the failure to deal decisively with the question of Dhlakama’s personal security detail has resulted in ongoing disagreements between RENAMO and the government, including government raids on houses in Beira where these armed bodyguards stay, the ongoing presence (for several years after the first elections) of armed men in Maringue that Dhlakama claimed were members of his security detail awaiting integration into one or another police force, etc. So while there has been “relative peace and security in society,” police behavior has continued to be a bone of contention between the two former belligerents and indeed the behavior of the police in some districts has been pretty reprehensible, both toward ordinary citizens and toward the political opposition.

“Wherever it could, the government sought to stall the work of commissions that dealt with issues it felt were properly the domain of government and not of a bilateral peace commission. In other words, the FRELIMO government went through the motions on the commissions related to security reform and territorial reintegration with the hope that once the transitional elections were over, the government (FRELIMO, confident that it would be in government) would be able to resolve these matters as it saw fit. This is important because it was not as if all provisions of the peace agreement were uniformly and comprehensively implemented, yet the outcome was still durable peace and some degree of democratic politics.”)

1. “Mozambique: Some UN Military Observers Arrive: Interview with UN’s Ajello on Commissions,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 13, 1993.
2. “Mozambique: Presidential Decree Establishes Two Commissions on Citizens’ Rights,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 23, 1993.

1994

Full Implementation

“In his 28 January 1994 report, the Secretary-General also stated that recent political developments in Mozambique had evolved in such a way as to allow an increasing shift of focus from monitoring ceasefire arrangements to general verification of police activities in the country and the respect of civil rights. Therefore, the Secretary-General, in an addendum to his report, recommended the establishment of a 1,114-strong ONUMOZ Civilian Police Component – inclusive of the 128 already authorized by the Council.”¹ On 23 February 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 898 (1994), authorized the establishment of the police component, as recommended by the Secretary-General.

The ONUMOZ Civilian Police Component (CIVPOL) was mandated to monitor all police activities in the country and verify that their actions were consistent with the General Peace Agreement: to monitor respect of citizens’ rights and civil liberties; provide technical support to the National Police Commission; verify that the activities of private protection and security agencies did not violate the General Peace Agreement; verify the strength and location of the government police forces and their materiel; and monitor and verify the process of the reorganization and retraining of the quick-reaction police force, including its activities, weapons, and equipment. In addition, CIVPOL, together with other ONUMOZ components, monitored the proper conduct of the electoral campaign and verified that political rights of individuals, groups, and political organizations were respected.

CIVPOL was established in strategic locations. By mid-March 1994, CIVPOL had been established in the central headquarters and regional and provincial capitals. In the second phase, 70% of CIVPOL posts and locations began operating in the months from April to June, which coincided with the voter registration process. The remainder of the components deployed before the beginning of the electoral campaign, which began on 1 September 1994.²

In January 1994, shortly after the first phase of CIVPOL operations had been initiated, the Mozambican police numbered 18,047, with the command structure of national headquarters in Maputo, 11 provincial headquarters, and over 200 stations and posts in the districts. There was also a quick-reaction police force numbering several thousand, as well as various private security companies and agencies. Also, CIVPOL was mandated to oversee police neutrality during the peace process. Its mandate did not include training or technical assistance to the local police force.³ CIVPOL had a positive impact on curbing human rights abuses in the remote parts of the country. Once CIVPOL was concluded after the election period, allegations of human rights abuses increased.

1. “Mozambique — ONUMOZ Background,” United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), accessed September 13, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumozFT.htm
2. Ibid.
3. Mark Malan, “Peacebuilding in Southern Africa: Police Reform in Mozambique and South Africa,” International Peacekeeping 6, no. 4 (1999): 171-190.

1995

Full Implementation

“After the elections and the termination of ONUMOZ, a UNDP-financed mission of officers from the Spanish Guardia Civil went to Mozambique during March-April 1995 to carry out an in-depth study of the needs and type of support required by the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM) in order to do its job effectively and appropriately. This mission found that a broad and intensive programme of education and training was needed, as well as a fundamental structural reorganization of the PRM – complemented of course, by the requisite investments in equipment and infrastructure. Importantly, the PRM had itself recognized that it had not been effective, attributing poor performance to factors such as inadequate command and control.”¹

1. Ibid., 177.

1996

Full Implementation

Although the Police of the Republic of Mozambique was established immediately after the signing of the General Peace Agreement and COMPOL and COMINFO were established to oversee and verify that the police did not violate human rights, it was alleged that the Mozambican police force had been taken over by organized crime.¹

1. Ibid., 176.

1997

Full Implementation

“On 27 June 1997, an agreement between the Government of Mozambique and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) was signed on a comprehensive project to assist and strengthen the PRM, through the retraining of existing staff and the training of new recruits, as well as through the reinforcement of management capacities. Spain and the Netherlands are the principal backers of the UNDP project, with Spain committing $US 8 million over a seven-year period and guaranteeing $3 million worth of in-kind training and advisory assistance from the Guardia Civil. The government of the Netherlands has earmarked a further $6 million for the project. The total cash value of the UNDP project ($11,228,224) compares very favourably with the cost of the two-year ONUMOZ CIVPOL mission, which is estimated at $30,199,824.”¹

1. Ibid., 177.

1998

Full Implementation

There were still many human rights abuses by police, who were also found to be involved in corruption. Nevertheless, the reform programs had some positive impact on the organizational capacity of the PRM. The PRM expelled 322 policemen from its ranks for ‘incorrect behavior’ between November 1997 and November 1998. The General Commander of the PRM was able to report the following police successes over the same one-year period:

· 22,942 registered crimes, down from the 23,528 the previous year.

· The dismantling of 152 ‘criminal gangs’ (including livestock rustlers, armed robbers and drug dealers) and confiscation from gang members of 185 pistols and 274 kg of narcotics.

· The discovery of 52 arms caches, resulting in the destruction of 1,107 firearms (including 504 AK-47 rifles), 33 mortars, 43 rocket-propelled grenade launchers and 320 grenades, 95 landmines, 202 hand grenades, and over 50,000 rounds of ammunition.¹

1. Ibid., 178.

1999

Full Implementation

The Police of the Republic of Mozambique was established immediately after the signing of the General Peace Agreement in 1992. COMPOL and COMINFO were established in 1993 to oversee and verify that the police did not violate human rights. In the subsequent years, the organization went through substantial reform with training designed to respect human rights. It managed to achieve a level of trust and relative security in society.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1992

No Implementation

Under the General Peace Agreement (GPA), the demobilization and reintegration of the 75,000-strong government army and the 20,000 rebels was to take place. A new army of 30,000 men was to be created in their place, with fighters drawn equally from each side.

Under the plan, both armies — that of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) government and of Mr. Dhlakama’s Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO) — had undertaken to finish their demobilization within six months. A general election was to follow six months after that. All troops were supposed to gather at assembly points by November 15th. So far, there had not been much evidence of movement. But Mr. Ajello, UN’s special envoy, promised that, if demobilization was delayed, the election would have to wait as well. “We would not vote with arms,” he declared.¹

To not repeat the mistake made in Angola, the UN outlined proposals that would deploy troops to ensure the demobilization of RENAMO rebels and government forces, and stated there would be no election before this is done. Unlike in Angola, in Mozambique the UN would supervise the organizing of elections, closing the door to ballot-rigging charges. “Less than half UNITA’s troops reported to demobilisation camps and most were never disarmed.”²

1. “What Mozambique Can Learn,” The Economist, November 7, 1992, 74.
2. “Angola Teaches Lesson to UN,” The Guardian (London), December 11, 1992.

1993

No Implementation

By January 1993, the UN mission in Mozambique identified 49 assembly points where soldiers from both sides would be confined, 29 for government troops and 20 for RENAMO. Joint reconnaissance of the first 12 points began on January 15, 1993. The process started in the Province of Maputo in southern Mozambique. According to Mr. Ajello, RENAMO’s president (Afonso Dhlakama) had agreed on four stages for the whole process of confinement to be completed.¹

The demobilization process began in the city of Maputo and the town of Boane on April 17, 1993. The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) stated that the 16,000 troops that had demobilized during the talks and prior to the signing of the General Peace Accord could still receive demobilization subsidies.²

About 1,000 government soldiers were demobilized in Gaza Province, southern Mozambique, between the 15th and 21st of June, 1993.³

According to UN Special Representative Aldo Ajello, of the 13,991 government soldiers registered for demobilization, 12,337 had already been moved to troop confinement areas.⁴

The Mozambique National Resistance [RENAMO] had decided to send 50 soldiers to Zimbabwe’s Nyanga military training center on August 2nd so they could be trained as instructors in Mozambique’s future unified army.⁵

The MNR delayed in the demobilization of its armed forces and continued to make demands. The MNR leader, Afonso Dhlakama, demanded that at least half of the provincial governor posts belong to the MNR. Only after the question of the administration was resolved would he begin to discuss the confinement of his troops.⁶

Starting August 25, 1993, five days of talks between Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano and former rebel leader Gen. Afonso Dhlakama took place, which raised hopes of reviving the ailing United Nations-monitored peace process, leading to Mozambique’s first democratic ballot in October of the next year.

The first face-to-face talks between the two leaders on Mozambican soil had, in principle, secured agreement to unite the country under a single administration in preparation for the following year’s elections. In the meeting, General Dhlakama, leader of the Mozambican Resistance Movement (RENAMO), had dropped his insistence on the appointment of five RENAMO governors. He would settle instead for written assurances that the governors of all 10 provinces would ensure equal treatment of people living in RENAMO-controlled areas.⁷

On August 14, 1993, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution on the Mozambican peace process which urged the Mozambique National Resistance [RENAMO] and other opposition parties to reduce disputes concerning the Draft Electoral Law, notably with regard to the composition of the National Elections Commission, so as to allow elections to take place the following year. The UN Security Council resolution also called on RENAMO and the government to go ahead with the troop confinement and demobilization processes.

On Sept. 17, 1993, Dhlakama, the leader of RENAMO, demanded disbandment of private armed groups as a condition for the demobilization of RENAMO armed forces.⁸

On 25 September 1993, RENAMO made a decision that it would participate in the October 1993 elections, without full demobilization of the two armed forces.⁹ President Joaquim Chissano rejected the RENAMO decision as it was unacceptable to hold elections while the Mozambique National Resistance [MNR, RENAMO] forces remained in bases and barracks.¹⁰

The World Health Organization (WHO) was studying ways to secure an additional 3.5 million dollars to finance the second stage of its operation in Mozambique within the framework of demobilizing government and Mozambique National Resistance [MNR – RENAMO] troops. The second stage of that operation was aimed at ensuring that rural health units were run correctly, a determining factor in the process for demobilized soldiers to reintegrate into society and to return to their normal lives. The third stage of the WHO operation in Mozambique was said to include the reconstruction of more than 600 health units destroyed by the war.¹¹

On 20 October 1993, RENAMO and FRELIMO leaders reached an agreement on an election timetable leading to the elections in October 1994. After the definitive election timetable, RENAMO leader Dhlakama, in a news conference, said that the most important issues – namely, the immediate approval of the electoral law, the confinement and demobilization of the troops, and the formation of a single army – were no longer a problem.¹² On October 22, 1993, the Supervision and Control Commission [CSC] of the General Peace Accord approved a new timetable for the country’s peace process, thereby giving it a new impetus. According to the approved timetable, the first free multiparty elections in Mozambique would take place in October 1994. The demobilization of troops would take place from January to May and the formation of a new army would be concluded in August. The army was to be operational in September 1994.¹³

During the debate on the draft electoral law, RENAMO demanded the presence of UN observers at 11 provincial and 158 district commissions. The Mozambican government accepted the demand.¹⁴

On November 11, 1993, the Mozambican government and the Mozambique National Resistance [MNR – RENAMO] signed a document on troop demobilization at a Cease-Fire Commission meeting in Maputo.¹⁵

Reports from Maputo said that the first 550 instructors of the new Mozambican army were to complete their training at the Zimbabwean military base at Nyanga within two weeks. The instructors comprised an equal number of RENAMO and government soldiers, and would be in charge of integrating Mozambican government soldiers and RENAMO fighters into a united national army. The reports said that government and RENAMO officers would leave Maputo for the United States the next day to attend seminars on the demobilization of military personnel and their integration into civilian life.¹⁶

As of 15 December 1993, 5,063 government soldiers had presented themselves in assembly points (all over) the country, with the exception of Manica Province. According to the UNOMOZ Technical Demobilization Unit, as of 12 December 1993, 3,318 government soldiers had been registered at troop confinement points and 671 RENAMO soldiers had presented themselves at three assembly points in Nampula, Zambezia and Niassa Provinces; 570 of which had been registered. No RENAMO soldiers had presented themselves at assembly points in central and southern Mozambique.¹⁷

On 15 December 1993, a group of government soldiers abandoned the Namialo troop confinement center in Nampula Province and occupied a Mozambique Railroad station, thereby preventing train traffic between the cities of Nampula and Nacala. These soldiers demanded the payment of the demobilization subsidy.¹⁸

Only about 15% of troops from the government and the Mozambique National Resistance [RENAMO] had been confined when less than one week remained for the conclusion of the troops’ confinement process, according to the peace accord timetable. A report issued by the UN Operations Technical Demobilization Unit revealed that of the 90,000 men to be confined by the end of this month, only about 12,000 had already presented themselves at confinement centers. Of this number, more than 8,000 belonged to the government and about 4,000 belonged to RENAMO. This means that the government had so far confined 13% of its troops, while RENAMO had confined about 19%.¹⁹

On 28 December 1993, government, RENAMO, and UN officials discussed assembly points and training for the new army, including the reintegration of demobilized soldiers. On reintegration, the Mozambican Minister said, “the reintegration of demobilized soldiers was a problem that would be resolved with the assistance of the international community. We had had many meetings, including an important one within the context of the World Bank’s Consultative Group that had met in Paris to see how those soldiers could receive financial assistance greater than that stipulated in the General Peace Accord. This is an important step being taken by the international community and the UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination.” The Minister suggested providing, with the backing of the international community, more financial assistance as well as more aid to integrate demobilized soldiers into Mozambique’s productive life and civilian life.²⁰

On 29 December 1993, RENAMO withdrew its troops from the Savane region in the Sofala Province that it had occupied shortly after the signing of the Rome peace accord in October 1992. RENAMO announced the planned withdrawal from the Savane region and a withdrawal from Dunda and Salamanga at a meeting of the joint peace agreement supervisory commission in Maputo on October 28, 1993.²¹ The occupation of the territory was in violation of the peace agreement.

1. “Mozambique: UN Representative Says Process to Confine Troops Has Started,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 16, 1993.
2. “Mozambique: Demobilisation to Begin in Maputo,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 17, 1993.
3. “Mozambique: 1,000 Government Troops Demobilised in Gaza Province,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 25, 1993.
4. “Mozambique: UN Representative Ajello on Progress in Peace Process,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 19, 1993.
5. “Mozambique: Fifty MNR Soldiers to be Trained as Instructors in Unified Army,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 31, 1993.
6. “Mozambique: MNR Demands Half of Provincial Governorships Before Troop Confinement,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 5, 1993.
7. “Talks in Mozambique Solidify Peace Accord,” Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA), August 31, 1993.
8. “Dhlakama Calls for Disbandment of Private Armed Groups,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 17, 1993.
9. “MNR Is Ready To Take Part in Elections Without Demobilization of the Two Armies,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 27, 1993.
10. “Chissano Reportedly Says that the MNR is Following Example Set by UNITA,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 28, 1993.
11. “WHO to Finance Second Stage of Troop Demobilization,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 15, 1993.
12. “Butrus Ghali Meets Chissano and Dhlakama; Agreement on Election Timetable,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 22, 1993.
13. “Supervision and Control Commission Approves New Timetable for Elections,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 25, 1993.
14. “Government Agrees to MNR Demands on UN Observers at Electoral Commissions,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 6, 1993.
15. “Government and RENAMO Sign Demobilization Agreement,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 15, 1993.
16. “Principles for Future Army Approved; Training of Instructors Near Completion,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 27, 1993.
17. “UNOMOZ Reports 5,063 Government and 671 RENAMO Soldiers in Assembly Points,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 15, 1993.
18. “Government Soldiers Leave Assembly Point Demanding Demobilization Subsidy,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 17, 1993.
19. “Only 15% of Target Number of Troops Confined Days Before Deadline,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 30, 1993.
20. “Government, RENAMO, UN Officials Discuss Assembly Points, Training for New Army,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 30, 1993.
21. “RENAMO Announces Withdrawal from Savane Area, Dunda and Salamanga,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 31, 1993.

1994

Full Implementation

On 7 January 1994, RENAMO set the demobilization of militias and other irregular forces as a condition for the transportation of 50% of the weapons collected at confinement centers to regional depots.¹

According to the decision at a meeting of the Supervision and Control Commission [CSC] of the General Peace Accord on 12 February 1994, the demobilization of troops from the government and RENAMO was set to begin on 1 March 1994. It was decided that a total of 5% of troops from both sides would be demobilized in the first phase.²

The demobilization of government and MNR [RENAMO] troops would no longer begin on March 1st as planned. This was because the Finance Ministry had not yet received from both sides the lists of soldiers to be demobilized. The Finance Ministry had the money to begin to pay the six-month subsidy provided by the government and the 18-month subsidy provided by the international community.³ It turned out that demobilization did not take place because RENAMO had not yet delivered to ONUMOZ its lists with the names of men to be demobilized and to join the future national army.

On March 3, 1994, the government was to begin demobilizing its forces from assembly areas at once without waiting from the list from the RENAMO. The government’s decision was designed to speed up the peace process and enable soldiers to leave assembly areas.⁴ The decision was welcomed by the ONUMOZ chief.

On March 5, 1994, RENAMO president Dhlakama had expressed his readiness to begin demobilizing RENAMO troops, starting the following week.⁵

On March 9, 1994, ONUMOZ chief said that the RENAMO demobilization would begin March 18th and the demobilization of government troops would begin on March 10th.⁶

RENAMO began demobilizing its troops stationed at the Neves assembly point, Inhambane Province on March 18, 1994.⁷

On March 21, 1994, the government selected another 45 soldiers to join the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (FADM). A total of 1,739 soldiers had joined the unified army by the 21st of March: 1,010 from the government army and 729 from RENAMO. A total of 3,420 soldiers had been demobilized by the 21st of March: 3,320 from the government and 100 from RENAMO.⁸

On April 12, 1994, ONUMOZ said that the Mozambican government had demobilized 10,615 soldiers as of April 8. RENAMO had only demobilized 365 men since the troop demobilization process began on the 10th of March.⁹

According to ONUMOZ, slightly more than 333 government soldiers were confined to their assembly areas over the weekend; RENAMO sent 89 soldiers to its assembly areas over the same period. ONUMOZ also reported that RENAMO demobilized 38 soldiers at Neves troop confinement center in Inhambane Province on April 15.¹⁰

On April 22, 1994, ONUMOZ chief Dr. Aldo Ajello, at his normal Friday news conference, drew attention to the fact that 55% of government soldiers and 81% of RENAMO soldiers had now been confined in assembly areas. He revealed that 14,306 government soldiers and 561 from RENAMO had been demobilized. The UN Observer Mission to Mozambique Technical Unit for Demobilization had a list of 18,859 government and 1,112 RENAMO troops that were to be demobilized. Aldo Ajello said the process of demobilizing troops was very slow on both sides. RENAMO had to demobilize 4,000 soldiers and the government 60,000.¹¹

On May 5, 1994, the President of the Republic, Joaquim Chissano, announced that the government had decided to temporarily suspend its troop demobilization process. To justify this decision, the Mozambican Head of State said that the RENAMO troop demobilization process had not been balanced. He also noted the need for making technical corrections to the figures and lists that RENAMO had been supplying to the ONUMOZ Technical Unit.¹² On May 11, 1994, the government lifted the suspension on demobilization. According to the ONUMOZ Technical Unit, 14,240 government and 1,585 RENAMO troops were demobilized.¹³

On 18 May 1994, the ONUMOZ chief announced that the government and RENAMO had different dates for a complete troop confinement. The government troops would complete their confinement by July 1 and demobilization would be completed by August 15. In the meantime, the RENAMO troops were expected to be confined and demobilized one month earlier; that is, within the deadline proposed in a UN Security Council resolution.¹⁴

By May 30, 1994, the government and RENAMO had demobilized 17,445 and 2,170 troops, respectively. By the same date, both sides had sent 4,696 soldiers to join the new nonpartisan armed forces.¹⁵

On June 22, 1994, just over 1,000 commandos near Maputo demanded immediate demobilization and that their salaries, which had been in arrears for 24 months, be paid immediately.¹⁶

On 14 June 1994, National Defence Minister Alberto Chipande said in Maputo that the troop demobilization process would be over by August 15.¹⁷

On July 27, 1994, the government army looted the local market in protest against non-payment of wages and delays in the demobilization process.¹⁸

UN Special Representative Dr. Aldo Ajello said in the Mozambican capital on September 2, 1994 that 70,335 government and Mozambique National Resistance [RENAMO] soldiers had been demobilized so far. The government had demobilized 52,108 men, while RENAMO had demobilized 18,227 soldiers. A total of 4,296 government men and 3,478 RENAMO troops had been drafted into the new army so far. A total of 470 soldiers from both sides had not been allowed to join the new Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (FADM) because of physical problems or because they wore stripes that did not correspond to their actual ranks. Ajello also predicted the new army would have some 12,000 men by October.¹⁹

Presidential and legislative elections took place from the 27th to the 29th of October, 1994. Twelve candidates participated in the presidential election and 14 political parties and coalitions in the legislative election. On the eve of the elections, the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) announced its withdrawal from the poll. Following the intervention of the international community, including a message from the President of the Security Council, the active involvement of the Secretary-General in international efforts, as well as guarantees by ONUMOZ and the international members of the CSC that the electoral process would be closely monitored, RENAMO decided to participate.

On 19 November 1994, the Chairman of the National Elections Commission (NEC) announced the results of the elections. Mr. Chissano, received 2,633,740 votes, amounting to 53.3 per cent of those cast in the presidential election. The leader of RENAMO, Mr. Afonso Macacho Marceta Dhlakama, received 1,666,965 votes, or 33.7 per cent. In the legislative election, FRELIMO received the largest share of the votes with 2,115,793 (44.3 per cent), followed by RENAMO with 1,803,506 votes (37.8 per cent) and the União Democrática (UD) with 245,793 votes (5.2 per cent). Those three parties would have the following share of the new Parliament’s 250 seats: FRELIMO – 129, RENAMO – 109, and UD – 12.²⁰

“A total of 91,691 (67,042 government and 24,649 RENAMO) soldiers had been registered by ONUMOZ. Some 78,078 soldiers (57,540 government and 20,538 RENAMO) were demobilized, while some of the remainder joined the new army.”²¹

1. “RENAMO Calls for Demobilization of Militias and Irregular Forces,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 10, 1994.
2. “Demobilization of Government and RENAMO Troops to Begin on 1st March,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 14, 1994.
3. “Troop Demobilization Will Not Begin on 1st March as Planned,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 25, 1994.
4. “Minister Announces Immediate Unilateral Demobilization of Government Troops,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 4, 1994.
5. “Maputo Radio Cites Dhlakama on Demobilization of RENAMO Troops,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 8, 1994.
6. “UN Official Aldo Ajello Gives Details of Demobilization Timetable,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 11, 1994.
7. “Dhlakama Officiates at Troop Demobilization Ceremony,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 21, 1994.
8. “Figures for Troop Demobilization, Formation of New Army,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 25, 1994.
9. “ONUMOZ Gives Government and RENAMO Demobilization Figures,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 13, 1994.
10. “ONUMOZ Reports Progress in Demobilization Programme,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 21, 1994.
11. “UN’s Ajello to Propose Deadline for Demobilization; Says RENAMO Slower,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 25, 1994.
12. “Chissano Announces Temporary Suspension of Troop Demobilization Process,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 7, 1994.
13. “Government Lifts Its Suspension of Troop Demobilization,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 14, 1994.
14. “Government and RENAMO Confirm Dates for Complete Demobilization,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 20, 1994.
15. “Maputo Radio Cites UN Report of Government, RENAMO Demobilization Statistics,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 2, 1994.
16. “Commandos Mutiny Over Pay and Demobilization Near Maputo,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 24, 1994.
17. “Defence Minister Says Troop Demobilization to End by 15th August,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 18, 1994.
18. “Mozambican Troops Loot Market in Mutiny Over Demobilization,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, July 27, 1994.
19. “UN Envoy Discusses Troop Demobilization, Formation of New Army,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 2, 1994.
20. “Final Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ),” U.N. Security Council (S/1994/1449). December 23, 1994.
21. Ibid.

1995

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1992

No Implementation

Weapons collection and destruction was one of the mandates of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ), which was established in October 1992. Because the demobilization process had not yet begun in 1992, weapons were not collected and destroyed.

1993

No Implementation

Because demobilization process had not yet begun in 1993, weapons were not collected and destroyed.

1994

Minimum Implementation

“UNOMOZ collected a total of 189,827 weapons, 43,491 of which belonged to paramilitary forces (out of a projected total of 49,806). This was significantly less than the amount of weapons that were known to be in Mozambique. Because of delays in the demobilization process, UNOMOZ was unable to complete the verification of weapons before the expiration of its mandate. Many of the weapons which were collected at the assembly areas were of poor quality, thus suggesting that the better quality weapons remained outside the disarmament process.”¹

1. “Practitioners’ Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament, and Demobilization During Peacekeeping Operations,” United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 1995, vii-viii, in Peter Batchelor, Disarmament, Small Arms, and Intra-State Conflict: The Case of Southern Africa (Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project—Small Arms Management and Peacekeeping in Southern Africa, 1996).

1995

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

1992

No Implementation

Reintegration of demobilized combatants from both sides was one mandate among many from the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ), which was established in October 1992. Because the demobilization process did not begin in 1992, the reintegration process also did not begin in 1992.

The Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC), which was to guarantee the implementation of the agreement, assumed its responsibility on 4 Nov. 1992. In its first meeting on 4 November 1992, it appointed the main subsidiary commissions: the Ceasefire Commission (CCF), the Commission for the Reintegration of Demobilized Military Personnel (CORE), as well as the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces (CCFADM).

1993

Minimum Implementation

On 28 December 1993, officials from the Mozambican government, RENAMO, and the UN discussed assembly points, training for the new army, and the reintegration of demobilized soldiers. On reintegration, the Mozambican Government minister said, “the reintegration of demobilized soldiers was a problem that would be resolved with the assistance of the international community. We had had many meetings, including an important one within the context of the World Bank’s Consultative Group that had met in Paris to see how those soldiers could receive financial assistance greater than that stipulated in the General Peace Accord. This is an important step being taken by the international community and the UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1993). The Minister suggested providing, with the backing of the international community, more financial assistance as well as more aid to integrate demobilized soldiers into Mozambique’s productive life and civilian life.¹

“With the demobilization process well under way, UNOHAC focused particular attention on its programme for the reintegration of former combatants into civilian life. Through informal tripartite discussions within the Commission for Reintegration, it was to secure agreement on a three-pronged strategy to address the needs of ex-soldiers.”²

1. “Government, RENAMO, UN Officials Discuss Assembly Points, Training for New Army,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 30, 1993.
2. “Mozambique — ONUMOZ Background,” United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), accessed September 13, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumozFT.htm.

1994

Intermediate Implementation

Mozambican combatants received six months’ severance pay for demobilization and additional reintegration subsidies, representing a further 18 months’ pay.¹

The Reintegration and Support Scheme (RSS) provided a financial subsidy to all ex-combatants. This was set at MT 75,000 (approximately $15) for the lowest ranks and MT 1,270,080 ($130) for the highest-ranking officers, and was disbursed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on a monthly basis from the many branches of the Banco Popular de Desinvolvimento (BPD) located around the country.²

“In addition, one of the key underlying assumptions of the reintegration programme was the strongly held belief that the average soldier was of peasant origins and, first and foremost, would want to return to the land. In view of this, the decision was taken to provide each former soldier with a ‘kitÕ consisting of a hoe, a bucket and seeds. It was hoped that this would encourage former combatants to return to rural agricultural communities, where there were greater employment opportunities for less skilled ex-soldiers than in the urban and semi-urban areas.”³

“The Occupational Skills Development programme (OSD) provided vocational training to demobilized soldiers and was implemented by the International Labour Organization (ILO). Utilizing established training centres, a curriculum was developed that incorporated 49 courses aimed at producing skilled and semi-skilled graduates.”⁴

By October 1994, the international humanitarian assistance program had aided the reintegration of some 200,000 former combatants and their dependents. With the demobilization process well under way, UNOHAC focused particular attention on its program for the reintegration of former combatants into civilian life. Through informal tripartite discussions within the Commission for Reintegration, agreement was secured on a three-pronged strategy to address the needs of ex-soldiers.⁵

An extension of the program was authorized in the form of the Provincial Fund — an approach that dovetailed nicely with the excess financial commitments donated to Mozambique — which was launched in November 1994.

On December 5, 1994, the government disbanded the Reintegration Commission and empowered the Labour Ministry to continue with the reintegration of war-demobilized personnel.⁶

On 16 December 1994, President Chissano appointed a new cabinet. A Social Reintegration Commission would be created.⁷

1. The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995, Blue Books Series, Volume V (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1995).
2. Chris Alden, “Making Old Soldiers Fade Away: Lessons from the Reintegration of Demobilized Soldiers in Mozambique,” Security Dialogue 33 no. 3 (September 2002): 344.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. “Mozambique — ONUMOZ Background,” United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), accessed June 4, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumozFT.htm.
6. “Government to Continue Reintegration Process for RENAMO and Government Troops,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 8, 1994.
7. “President Chissano Appoints New Cabinet,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 19, 1994.

1995

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1996

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1997

Full Implementation

“By 1997, the project cycle (and funding) of all of these initiatives had come to an end, the subsidies for ex-soldiers had run out, and the implementing agents were conducting their final impact assessments. These found unanimously that former combatants had been fully reintegrated into society, citing as evidence perceptions on the part of both demobilized soldiers. It was reported that the surveys of demobilized soldiers indicated that 85—90% of them felt that they were fully reintegrated into society.¹

1. Chris Alden, “Making Old Soldiers Fade Away,” 345.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1992

Minimum Implementation

According to the Human Rights Watch Annual Report of 1993, a large number of political prisoners remained detained as of 1992 but were expected to be released following the cease-fire accords, which stipulated that the government and RENAMO release all prisoners.¹

Raul Domingos, chief negotiator for the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR — RENAMO), in his interview with Radio Mozambique reporter Emilio Manhique in Maputo on 3 November 1992, stated that RENAMO had no prisoners of war.²

In an interview in Maputo on 17 November 1992, Communications Minister Armando Guebuza alleged that RENAMO was still taking political prisoners. He stated that the government was releasing RENAMO prisoners. Transport Minister said that “It is strange and worrisome, particularly if we take into account a recent media report which said that journalists attempting to visit RENAMO bases could be taken as political prisoners” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1992).³

1. “Mozambique,” Human Rights Watch World Report, 1993, accessed September 13, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/WR93/Afw-06.htm#P289_114819.
2. “Mozambique MNR Negotiator Says His Organization is Not Holding Any POWS,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 5, 1992.
3. “Mozambique Report on Interviews With Dhlakama and Transport Minister Guebuza,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 20, 1992.

1993

Full Implementation

According to the U.S. State Department Human Rights Report (1994), “in 1993 there were no reports of detention of prisoners for national security reasons” in Mozambique. However, in 1993 there were charges that RENAMO had tortured apparent defector Tiago Salgado before his death (See section 1.b.), as well as a Nampula police sergeant detained in December after an alleged attempt on the life of Afonso Dhlakama. While similar highly publicized allegations were not known to have been directed at the government in 1993, the suspicion that it too continued to employ torture remained widespread.¹“Mozambique Human Rights Practices, 1993,” U.S. Department of State, January 31, 1994, accessed September 13, 2010, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993_hrp_report/93hrp_report_afr…

1994

Full Implementation

Justice Minister Ossumane Ali Dauto had said in Maputo that there were no political prisoners in Mozambique. Dauto told newsmen that the fact was known to all Mozambican and international human rights agencies, including Amnesty International and the International Committee of the Red Cross. He said jails were open to [visits by] anyone, including institutions set up within the framework of the General Peace Accord.¹

Human Rights Watch as well as the U.S. State Department Human Rights Report of 1994 did not report any political prisoners in Mozambique.

1. “Justice Minister Says There Are No Political Prisoners in Mozambique,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 12, 1994.

1995

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1992

Minimum Implementation

The General Peace Agreement (GPA) provided means for RENAMO to change itself into a legitimate political party.¹

Following the regulations on political parties enshrined in the GPA and upon its signing, the main military group RENAMO was due to be dismantled and transformed into a political party. Initially, the process of de-mobilization and transformation was slowed down due to lack of qualified cadres for the RENAMO party; and so, the newly created RENAMO party had to recruit new supporters.

There were no “splinter groups” that refused to demobilize. RENAMO remained a unified organization. Leadership apparently chose to retain a small number of men under arms in Maringue at its main base, as a kind of insurance. They were never formally demobilized, and in 1997-98 the PIR moved in to establish government control in the area, though the presence of these armed men had not caused any problems other than suggesting that the state was not in full control of this area.

1. Carrie Manning, The Politics of Peace in Mozambique: Post-Conflict Democratization, 1992-2000 (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2002).

1993

Intermediate Implementation

As of 1993, the demobilization of RENAMO and the state’s armed force was still going on. There were no splinter groups or paramilitary organizations.

1994

Full Implementation

There were no reports of paramilitary organizations. “A total of 91,691 (67,042 government and 24,649 RENAMO) soldiers had been registered by ONUMOZ. Some 78,078 soldiers (57,540 government and 20,538 RENAMO) were demobilized, while some of the remainder joined the new army” (ONUMOZ, S/1994/1449).¹

1. “Final Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ),” U.N. Security Council (S/1994/1449), December 23, 1994.

1995

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1992

Intermediate Implementation

According to Human Rights Watch reports on the situation of human rights in Mozambique, Mozambican citizens in the major towns continued to enjoy the freedoms recognized in the 1990 constitution and related legislation. Political parties were able to function. The press law enacted by the government in 1991, which guaranteed freedom of press, had led to a flowering of independent journalism, including candid coverage of the war, famine, corruption, and banditry. However, there had been incidents of harassment and censorship of journalists, and in April a journalist at Notícias, Noe Ditimande, was dismissed after criticizing two senior government figures. The government also began to disclose the fate of dissidents detained and executed after independence in 1975. Prison conditions and the rights of detainees had improved in comparison to previous years, but remained well below international standards.¹

1. “Mozambique,” Human Rights Watch World Report, 1993, accessed September 13, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/WR93/Afw-06.htm#P289_114819.

1993

Intermediate Implementation

According to the U.S. State Department Human Rights Report, “the Rome Accord addressed political party registration, organization of the electoral system, the size of the military, political amnesty, and oversight of the state intelligence service. Approximately sixteen unarmed political parties were active in 1993, eleven of which met the registration criteria set by the Government. FRELIMO and the Mozambican National Union (UNAMO) were registered by the end of 1992. The former insurgents, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), had acquired political party status as a result of the peace accord.” Freedom of assembly, religion, and movement were protected by the constitution as well as the peace agreement.¹“Mozambique Human Rights Practices, 1993,” U.S. Department of State, January 31, 1994, accessed September 13, 2010, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993_hrp_report/93hrp_report_afr…

1994

Intermediate Implementation

Following decades of war, Mozambique enjoyed in 1994 its second year of peace and a significantly improved human rights situation.¹“Mozambique Human Rights Practices, 1994,” U.S. Department of State, January 31, 1995, accessed September 13, 2010, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1994_hrp_report/94hrp_report_afr…

1995

Intermediate Implementation

“After Mozambique’s first ever multi-party elections in October 1994, human rights practices improved throughout the country. For many observers Mozambique is seen as a success story in Africa with a bloody civil war ended and elections generally considered free and fair. However, significant human rights concerns remain, including restrictions on freedom of movement and expression in some areas controlled by the former rebel Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), heavy-handed and intimidatory government policing, and appalling prison conditions.”¹

1. “Mozambique,” Human Rights Watch World Report, 1996, accessed September 13, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/WR96/Africa-06.htm#P445_101189.

1996

Intermediate Implementation

The U.S. State Department Human Rights Report suggested significant improvement in Mozambique’s human rights situation.¹“Mozambique Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996,” U.S. Department of State, January 30, 1997, accessed September 13, 2010, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/mozambiq.ht…

1997

Intermediate Implementation

The State Department Human Rights Report suggested significant improvement in Mozambique’s human rights situation.² However, human rights concerns remained, including restrictions on freedom of expression and freedom of movement by the former armed opposition, Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), heavy-handed policing, and appalling prison conditions.³

2. “Mozambique Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997,” U.S. Department of State, January 30, 1998, accessed September 13, 2010, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1997_hrp_report/mozambiq.ht… Human rights practices continued to improve in many parts of the country in 1997.¹“Mozambique.” Human Rights Watch World Report. 1998, accessed September 13, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/worldreport/Africa-08.htm#P686_179007..
3. Ibid.

1998

Intermediate Implementation

“Mozambique continued to consolidate peace and reconciliation, five years after the peace accord, with the 1999 presidential and parliamentary elections to be a litmus test of how sustainable the peace was to be. Despite improvements, human rights concerns including heavy-handed policing and the manipulation of the electoral process remained.”¹

1. “Mozambique,” Human Rights Watch World Report, 1999, accessed September 13, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/worldreport99/africa/mozambique.html.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

Notwithstanding that 1999 was an election year, human rights concerns, including heavy-handed policing and appalling prison conditions, remained a problem, though there were a number of improvements in human rights practices.¹

1. “Mozambique,” Human Rights Watch World Report, 2000, accessed September 13, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Africa-06.htm#TopOfPage.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

“Improvements in the respect for human rights were not as dramatic” according to the Human Rights Watch Report of 2000.¹ According to a U.S. State Department Report, “The Government’s human rights record was generally poor. Police continued to commit numerous abuses, including extrajudicial killings, disappearances, excessive use of force, torture, and other abuses. Police officers tortured and beat persons in custody, and abused prostitutes and street children. In September the president of the League of Human Rights (LDH), a local non-governmental organization, noted that the LDH documented an overall decline in the respect of human rights by police forces during the year.”²

1. “Mozambique,” Human Rights Watch World Report, 2001, accessed September 13, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/africa/mozambique.html.
2. Ibid.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

According to a U.S. State Department Human Rights Practice Report, “The Government’s human rights record remained poor, and although there were some improvements in a few areas, it continued to commit serious abuses. Police continued to commit numerous abuses, including extrajudicial killings, excessive use of force, torture, and other abuses. Police officers tortured and beat persons in custody, and abused prostitutes and street children. During the year, the president of the League of Human Rights (LDH), a local nongovernmental organization (NGO), noted that the human rights situation in general had deteriorated in several areas, such as police corruption, brutality, and intimidation; labor strife, and other societal concerns. Prison conditions remained extremely harsh and life threatening; several prisoners died due to the harsh conditions.”¹

The U.S. State Department Human Rights Practice Report did not suggest any improvement in 2002 from the previous year.²

1. “Mozambique – Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2001,” U.S. State Department, March 4, 2002, accessed September 13, 2010, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/af/8394.htm.
2. “Mozambique – Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2002,” U.S. State Department, March 31, 2003, accessed September 13, 2010, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18217.htm.

1992

Full Implementation

FRELIMO soldiers, RENAMO soldiers, and high command were not prosecuted for war crimes or crimes against humanity. Following parliamentary ratification on October 13, 1992, Chissano promulgated on October 14, 1992 legislation approving the actual peace treaty as well as a general political amnesty. The amnesty covered all crimes committed to date under the country’s security and military legislation, and was agreed upon under the terms of the accord, which committed both sides to release all but common criminals.¹

Except in the provision on Protocol IV.VI.3.II, amnesty was not explicitly mentioned in the 1992 General Peace Agreement, although a blanket amnesty was given for both sides. This was the principle of the peace process. According to both Harsch² and Cobban, the 1992 peace accord in Mozambique contained a blanket amnesty for everyone, on all sides.³

1. “Signature of peace treaty,” Keesing’s Record of World Events (Volume 38), October 1992, 39129.
2. Ernest Harsch, “Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: When War Ends: Transforming Africa’s Fighters into Builders,” Africa Renewal 19, no. 3 (2005).
3. Helena Cobban, Amnesty after Atrocity? Healing Nations after Genocide and War Crimes (Paradigm Publishers, 2007); Helena Cobban, “Healing lessons from another war-torn society —Mozambique,” Christian Science Monitor, May 8, 2003, http://helenacobban.org/03-05-08-healing-from-Mozambique.htm.

1993

Full Implementation

The Amnesty Law passed in 1992 and both sides received blanket amnesty.

1994

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1995

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1992

Minimum Implementation

“Zimbabwe has nearly 250,000 Mozambicans on its soil, about 130,000 of whom are officially registered as refugees. The number is part of the more than two million Mozambicans who have sought refuge from violence and drought.”¹

It was reported that there were about 1 million Mozambican refugees in Malawi.² Some of these refugees began returning spontaneously to their villages in the Tete province.³ By November 21, 1992, it was reported that more than 12,000 refugees coming from refugee centers in Malawi had already presented themselves to the Zobue administrative area in Tete Province’s Moatize District.⁴

1. “Number of Refugees from Mozambique to Zimbabwe Reportedly Decreasing,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 28, 1992.
2. “What Mozambique Can Learn,” The Economist, November 7, 1992, 48 (U.K. Edition, 74).
3. “Food Aid Begins to Reach Mozambique Hinterland,” Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA), November 12, 1992.
4. “Mozambique Return of 12,000 Refugees from Malawi,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 23, 1992.

1993

Intermediate Implementation

It was reported early in February 1993 that more than 100,000 refugees had come home from the neighboring countries.¹

Refugees’ Assistance Organization Director Fernando Fazenda told the ‘Noticias’ newspaper that more than 300,000 Mozambicans, who sought refuge in neighboring countries, might have returned to the country on their own since the signing of the General Peace Accord. The official repatriation of refugees would begin in May 1993.²

“In Ulongue, the district capital of Angonia, the district administrator rattled off the estimates of returnees. In October, 1,472. In November, 9,228. In December, 33,184. In January, when the rain slowed them, 31,530. The administrator, Evaristo Wezulo, said two-thirds of Angonia’s prewar population of 159,000 had fled. Most have already come home. Those who remain behind, relief workers say, are wives and children subsisting on refugee-camp ration cards until the first harvest at home, or children finishing the Malawi school year.”³

It was reported on 23 March 1993 that the Zimbabwe government had undertaken to facilitate the repatriation of some 140,000 Mozambican refugees from that country.⁴

More than 150,000 Mozambican refugees had returned from Malawi to their home districts in Mozambique’s northwestern Tete Province since the preceding October’s peace agreement between the government and RENAMO. Most of these returnees were from districts of Angonia, Tsangano and Mutarara.[fn]”Mozambique; Over 150,000 refugees return to Tete Province from Malawi,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 29, 1993.[/efn_note]

On May 1993, it was reported that RENAMO would send three representatives to Maputo to work with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This would ensure that RENAMO would not be left out of the refugee repatriation process.⁵

More than 10,000 Zimbabwe and South Africa-based Mozambican refugees had been repatriated.⁶

“For what has been described as the largest operation ever carried out by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Africa, a ceremony was held in the border town of Machipanda on 12 June 1993, marking the beginning of the repatriation of Mozambicans who had sought refuge in Zimbabwe. The first group, consisting of 254 men, women and children, returned home on that day from the Nhagombe [phonetic] refugee centre. A total of 145,000 Mozambican refugees were scheduled to be repatriated from Zimbabwe by the end of July. The ceremony was attended by Aldo Ajello, special representative of the UN secretary-general; Elias Chimuzo, representative of Manica Province’s governor; Vicente Ululu, secretary-general of the Mozambique National Resistance; James Nkomo, Zimbabwe’s Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare Minister; members of the diplomatic corps accredited in Mozambique; and a number of Mozambican and foreign officials.”⁷

It was reported on 19 August 1993 that an agreement between Swaziland, Mozambique, and the UNHCR was signed that would make provisions for 24,000 Mozambicans in Swaziland to return home.⁸ “By the end of 1993, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that more than half of Mozambique’s 1.5 million refugees had returned to the country. A further 350,000 were expected to return by the end of 1994, with the remaining 375,000 expected to repatriate during 1995.”⁹ The 2002 UNHCR Statistical Year Book reported that 604,387 refugees had returned in 1993 alone.¹⁰

1. “Mozambique: Still Waiting,” The Economist, February 6, 1993.
2. “Mozambique: Refugee director on numbers returned since peace accord,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 15, 1993.
3. Bill Keller, “Peace From Chaos — A special report.; Mozambique’s Outlook Brightens As Truce Holds and Drought Ends,” The New York Times, February 22, 1993 (sec. A, 1).
4. “OTHER SOUTHERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES; Zimbabwe agrees to “repatriation” of 140,000 refugees from Mozambique,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 26, 1993.
5. “OTHER SOUTHERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES; Mozambique: three RENAMO representatives to work with UNHCR in Maputo,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 14, 1993.
6. “OTHER SOUTHERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES; Mozambique: South Africa repatriates more than 9,000 people to Gaza Province,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 24, 1993.
7. “SOUTHERN AFRICA; Mozambique: ceremony to mark start of repatriation of refugees from Zimbabwe,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 14, 1993.
8. “SOUTHERN AFRICA; Mozambique and Swaziland sign agreement on repatriation of refugees,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 21, 1993.
9. “Mozambique – ONUMOZ Background,” United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), accessed June 4, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumozFT.htm.
10. “2002 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook— Mozambique,” UNHCR, 2002, accessed September 14, 2010, http://www.unhcr.org/414ad5990.html.

1994

Intermediate Implementation

On 15 June 1994, Alfredo del Rio, the representative of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), said that over one million Mozambicans had already returned home through the repatriation program.¹ The repatriation of refugees would continue until the end of October.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) believed 1.5 million Mozambican refugees had returned to the country by the end of November 1994. Quoting a UNHCR report, the Mozambique Information Agency (AIM) reported that about 100,000 Mozambican refugees were still living in neighboring countries and were likely to repatriate the next year. The 2002 UNHCR Statistical Year Book reported that 804,376 refugees had been returned in 1994 alone.²

1. “MOZAMBIQUE; UNHCR says over one million refugees have returned home,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 17, 1994.
2. “2002 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook — Mozambique.”

1995

Full Implementation

The Zimbabwe Inter-African News Agency (ZIANA) reported that the UN program for the voluntary repatriation of Mozambican refugees in Zimbabwe ended on 30 May 1995 when the last group of 1,300 crossed through the Forbes border post near Mutare.

“UN High Commissioner for Refugees spokesman Yusuf Hassan said 1.7 million Mozambican refugees had so far been repatriated from six southern African countries, in the largest and most complex operation undertaken by the commissioner. The cost so far was 152m US dollars.”¹ Similarly, the program for repatriating Mozambican refugees from Malawi officially ended on 21 November 1995.² On 28 March 1995, it was reported that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) would stop repatriating Mozambicans from South Africa at the end of the month, and the last 2,000 would be repatriated that week.³ The 2002 UNHCR Statistical Year Book reported that 159,134 refugees had been returned in 1995 alone.⁴

1. “MOZAMBIQUE; UN completes voluntary repatriation of Mozambican refugees in Zimbabwe,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 2, 1995.
2. “MALAWI AND MOZAMBIQUE; Repatriation of Mozambican refugees from Malawi ends,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 22, 1995.
3. “MOZAMBIQUE; UNHCR to stop repatriating Mozambicans from South Africa,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 30, 1995.
4. “2002 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook — Mozambique.”

1996

Full Implementation

The 2002 UNHCR Statistical Year Book reported that 1,605 refugees were returned in 1996 alone.¹

1. Ibid.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1992

No Implementation

“A major goal of the ONUMOZ humanitarian assistance programme was to respond effectively to the reintegration needs of all Mozambicans, particularly those returning to resettle in their original communities. It had been projected that approximately 6 million Mozambicans would resettle during the following two years, including about 4.0 to 4.5 million internally displaced persons.”¹

1. “Mozambique – ONUMOZ Background,” United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), accessed June 4, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumozFT.htm.

1993

Intermediate Implementation

It was reported on 13 June 1993 that “a source in the Emergency Provincial Commission told Radio Mozambique that during that period more than 150,000 war-displaced people had returned to their homes.”.¹

“There were 3 million to 4 million internally displaced people in Mozambique who had also begun returning to their places of origin” (Christian Science Monitor 1993).²

It was reported that many of the 2 to 3 million internally displaced persons had returned home along with refugees in the neighboring countries.³

1. “SOUTHERN AFRICA; Mozambique: refugees returning from neighbouring countries,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 15, 1993.
2. “UN, Mozambique Begin Massive Repatriation,” Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA), August 11, 1993.
3. “Building a Nation in Mozambique; Extensive U.N. Peacemaking Operation Appears to Be Working,” The Washington Post, October 31, 1993, (sec. 1, A27).

1994

Intermediate Implementation

The Secretary General of the United Nations said that about half of the 4 to 4.5 million people displaced within the country by the civil war in Mozambique had gone back to their villages while some 621,000 people, or about 40 percent of those who fled into neighboring countries, had returned home.¹

1. “U.N. Sets Deadline of November For Ending Role in Mozambique,” The New York Times, February 24, 1994 (sec. A, p. 13).

1995

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

1992

Intermediate Implementation

Human Rights Watch gave favorable remarks on press freedom in Mozambique in its 1993 report, which includes 1992. According to the report, “Mozambican citizens in the major towns have continued to enjoy the freedoms recognized in the 1990 constitution and related legislation. Political parties are able to function. The press law enacted by the government in 1991, which guarantees press freedom, has led to a flowering of independent journalism, including much candid coverage of the war, famine, corruption and banditry. However, there have been incidents of harassment and censorship of journalists, and in April a journalist at Notícias, Noe Ditimande, was dismissed after criticizing two senior government figures.”¹

1. “Human Rights Watch World Report 1993 – Mozambique,” Human Rights Watch, 1993, accessed September 14, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/WR93/Afw-06.htm#P289_114819.

1993

Intermediate Implementation

The US State Department, in its annual Human Rights Practice report, suggested improving press freedom in Mozambique. According to the report “on balance, freedom of the press continued to improve in 1993. The media, particularly the private newssheet Mediafax, television, and radio, reported objectively on controversial topics, including disagreements between the Government and RENAMO on peace agreement implementation, high-level military corruption, internal unrest in the military, and political opposition viewpoints.”¹“Mozambique Human Rights Practices, 1993,” U.S. Department of State, January 31,1994, accessed September 15, 2010, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993_hrp_report/93hrp_report_afr…

1994

Intermediate Implementation

The 1994 US State Department report on human rights practices in Mozambique was critical of media freedom in the country. According to the report, “the Constitution, the 1991 Press Law, and the 1992 Rome Peace Accords provide for freedom of expression and the press, except in cases involving national defense considerations. In practice, however, the Government restricts these freedoms. Although criticism of the President is not legally prohibited, the 1991 Press Law holds that, in cases of defamation against the President, truth is not a sufficient defense against libel. Although this law had not been tested in court, it resulted in considerable media self-censorship and almost no direct criticism of the President.”¹“Mozambique Human Rights Practices, 1994,” U.S. Department of State, 1995, accessed September 15, 2010, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1994_hrp_report/94hrp_report_afr… The report also mentioned the harassment of the press by security officials. Nevertheless, the gradual growth of the independent media was also reported, which was critical of the government. RENAMO also had its own magazine and radio station, both of which began to broadcast nationwide.

1995

Intermediate Implementation

The 1995 US State Department report on human rights practice in Mozambique suggested a dominance of the government media as well as tight control over independent media. Nevertheless, it was reported that “the small, independent press carry opposition viewpoints and generally have far more credibility. However, the influence of the independent press and, for that matter, of the official press as well, is limited largely to Maputo and the provincial capitals because of the logistical difficulty of distribution of any publication in rural areas. The independent media consist of two weekly newspapers (Savanna and Demos), two daily fax newsletters (Mediafax and Imparcial), the second television station (RTK), and a few limited-range radio stations. RTK began its third year of broadcasting in 1995. While independent of the Government, the station is owned by a FRELIMO Central Committee member, and programming has not taken an independent political line. Both RTK and the government station broadcast only in Maputo and two other major cities, leaving the vast majority of the country without television coverage.”¹“Mozambique Human Rights Practices, 1995,” U.S. Department of State, 1996, accessed September 15, 2010, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1995_hrp_report/95hrp_report_afr…

1996

Intermediate Implementation

There had not been much improvement from the 1995 report.¹“Mozambique Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996,” U.S. Department of State, 1997, accessed September 15, 2010, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/mozambiq.ht…

1997

Intermediate Implementation

According to State Department report on human rights practices in 1997, “The Government continued to restrict press freedom; the media remained largely owned by the Government and state enterprises and manipulated by factions within the ruling party, but there was a greater criticism of government policies and an increase in the number of independent media sources. Also, with increased press and nongovernmental organization (NGO) scrutiny, even more abuses by security forces came to light than in previous years, and in some instances the Government investigated and punished those responsible.”¹“Mozambique Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997,” U.S. Department of State, 1998, accessed September 15, 2010, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1997_hrp_report/mozambiq.ht…

1998

Intermediate Implementation

According to the U.S. State Department report on human rights practices in 1998, “Media outlets owned by the government and state enterprises largely reflected the views of factions within the ruling party, but many of them also carried significant criticism of the Government’s handling of the local elections. The number of independent media increased, and their criticism of the Government, its leaders, and their families largely is tolerated.”¹“Mozambique Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998,” U.S. Department of State, 1999, accessed September 15, 2010, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/mozambiq.ht…

1999

Intermediate Implementation

According to the U.S. State Department report on human rights practices, “Media outlets owned by the Government and State enterprises largely reflected the views of factions within the ruling party; however, the number and diversity of independent media increased, and their criticism of the Government, its leaders, and their families largely is tolerated. Human rights violations received extensive coverage in both government and independent media during the year.”¹

1. “Mozambique — Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1999,” U.S. Department of State, 2000, accessed September 15, 2010, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/262.htm.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

1992

Full Implementation

In 1992, the parliament approved the amendments to the Constitution that were taken from the peace agreements.¹

1. “Signature of peace treaty,” Keesing’s Record of World Events (Volume 38), October 1992, 39129.

1993

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1994

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1995

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1992

Intermediate Implementation

According to a news report, as per the General Peace Agreement, Italy took a leadership role in the donor’s conference. The first donor’s conference concluded in Rome on December 16, 1992, in which countries promised $320 million dollars for emergency programs and for the resettlement of war-displaced people, refugees, and demobilized soldiers.¹ It was reported that the money raised at the donor’s conference would be handled by members of the donor community: Italy, the European Community, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, the USA, Germany, Poland, Switzerland, France, Portugal, Britain, Austria, South Africa, Spain, Australia, Japan, and Belgium.²

1. “Mozambique: Italy reportedly asked to supervise election preparations,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 18, 1992.
2. “Mozambique Peace Accord donor countries named,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 23, 1992.

1993

Intermediate Implementation

RENAMO was hesitant to demobilize its combatants from conflict zones as there was delay in the allocation of funding to RENAMO to operate as a political party. At the donor’s conference the year before, Italy and some other donors had agreed to provide funds to RENAMO. On 8 June 1993, RENAMO made an indirect threat to take up arms once again if there was no money to finance its activity as a political party. At the opening session of the second donor’s conference in the Mozambican capital Maputo on June 8, 1993, the MNR’s chief negotiator, Raul Domingos, resorted to a veiled threat of war and blackmailing the Mozambican people and demanded financing and material goods for his movement.¹ The donor’s conference ended on June 9, 1993 and the donor countries pledged an additional $70 million to support the peace process in Mozambique. RENAMO received its promised monetary support from the international community.²

1. “OTHER SOUTHERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES; Mozambique: MNR makes “veiled threat” to Maputo donors’ conference,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 10, 1993.
2. Jeroen De Zeeuw, “Understanding the Political Transformation of Rebel Movement,” in From Soldiers to Politicians: Transforming Rebel Movements after Civil War, ed. Jeroen De Zeeuw (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008).

1994

Full Implementation

The peace process in Mozambique was one of the best supported processes at the time. The United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC) led a massive campaign for the support of the Mozambican peace process. The large-scale coordination of donor activities included several large agencies and organizations along with NGOs and other donor countries, and was generally efficient. Some of the organizations represented by UNOHAC were the World Health Organization, UNICEF, and the International Organization for Migration. They also worked in parallel with dedicated international donors such as Canada, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the European Union, and the United States. The number of international NGOs involved in the process rose from 150 to 250 between 1992 and 1994. However, due to the large number of NGOs present on the ground, coordination was often difficult and not all NGOs performed at the necessary level. However, the large international support for the peace process in Mozambique proved instrumental in securing peace and relative stability in the country.¹

1. Marc de Tollenaere, “Fostering Multiparty Politics in Mozambique,” in Promoting Democracy in Postconflict Societies, ed. Jeronen de Zeeuw and Krishna Kumar (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 75-96.

1995

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

The implementation schedule of the General Peace Agreement for Mozambique was partially realized as more time was needed for both sides to adjust and conform to the new rules. Demobilization took longer than expected, which pushed back the general elections as well. The UN mission was also slow to materialize, leaving the peace process to sustain itself until late February 1993. The time lags did not substantially hinder the peace process.

1993

Intermediate Implementation

Until late February 1993, implementation timeline was partially met. Demobilization took longer than expected but started in January 1993, which pushed back the general elections as well. The UN mission was also slow to materialize, leaving the peace process to sustain itself until late February 1993.

1994

Full Implementation

Elections, which were originally scheduled for October 1993, took place in October 1994, signaling the completion of the formal process.

1995

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1992

Intermediate Implementation

The General Peace Agreement (GPA) for Mozambique had a provision for UN peacekeeping. As soon as the peace agreement was signed, and before the establishment of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), the interim Special Representative and a team of 21 military observers, drawn from existing United Nations peacekeeping missions, arrived in Mozambique on 15 October 1992.¹

“On 16 December 1992, the Security Council, by its resolution 797 (1992), approved the Secretary-General’s report and decided to establish ONUMOZ until 31 October 1993. The Council endorsed the Secretary-General’s recommendation that the elections not take place until the military aspects of the General Peace Agreement had been fully implemented. It called upon the Mozambican Government and RENAMO to cooperate fully with the United Nations and to respect scrupulously the ceasefire and their obligations under the Agreement.”² The mandate of ONUMOZ included four important elements: political, military, electoral and humanitarian.

“On 4 November 1992, the interim Special Representative appointed the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC). CSC was to guarantee the implementation of the Agreement, assume responsibility for authentic interpretation of it, settle any disputes that might arise between the parties and guide and coordinate the activities of the other Commissions. It was chaired by the United Nations and was initially composed of Government and RENAMO delegations, with representatives of Italy (the mediator State), France, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States (observer States at the Rome talks) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). In December 1992, Germany also became a member of CSC. CSC held its first meeting on 4 November 1992 and appointed the main subsidiary commissions: the Ceasefire Commission (CCF), the Commission for the Reintegration of Demobilized Military Personnel (CORE), as well as the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces (CCFADM).”³

1. “Mozambique — United Nations Operation in Mozambique — ONUMOZ,” United Nations, accessed September 2, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumoz.htm.
2. “Mozambique – ONUMOZ Background,” United Nations, accessed June 4, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumozFT.htm.
3. Ibid.

1993

Full Implementation

By the beginning of May 1993, ONUMOZ was fully deployed and its military infrastructure established in all three operational regions. It verified the violations of ceasefire by both sides to the conflict and monitored the situations with strong military and police components. Its maximum military strength as of 30 November 1993 was 6,576 combatants from all ranks.¹

1. Ibid.

1994

Full Implementation

ONUMOZ verification continued in 1994. As of 31 October 1994, it had a strong civilian police component of 1,087 police observers stationed all over Mozambique to monitor the situation, especially issues related to human rights violations by the state police force. The UN verification mission was completed as soon as the post-conflict elections took place and election results were announced. The mission left Mozambique on December 1994.¹

1. Ibid.

1995

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.