Comprehensive Peace Agreement

2006

Intermediate Implementation

At the behest of the unified Seven Political Parties in the Parliament (SPA), who opposed the direct rule of the King, the Maoists declared a unilateral ceasefire in April 2006. This allowed them to join the non-violent opposition movement. Peace negotiations followed, and on May 26, 2006, the government and the Maoists reached an agreement on the 25-Point Ceasefire Code of Conduct. Between the signing of the Ceasefire Code of Conduct and the signing of the CPA, a number of violations of the Code of Conduct were reported. According to the Secretary General’s report to the Security Council, a total of 154 ceasefire violations were recorded. These were mostly perpetrated by new recruits from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which is the armed wing of the Maoist party.[fn]”Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2006/1007), December 20, 2006.[/efn_note] When the CPA was signed on November 22, 2006, the Joint Mentioning Coordination Committee (JMCC) replaced the Ceasefire Monitoring Committee, which had been established in the Ceasefire Code of Conduct. The JMCC was established by the Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA). The committee was comprised of representatives from both sides, and was chaired by the UN. The AMMAA established the Joint Monitoring Teams (JMTs) to assist in monitoring the cessation of hostilities. The AMMAA agreement was signed on December 6, 2006.[fn]”Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/235), April 26, 2007; “Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies,” Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, December 8, 2006, accessed July 22, 2010, http://www.peace.gov.np/arvhives-13-np.html.[/efn_note]

A few violations of the ceasefire were reported after the signing of the CPA on the 22nd of November 2006. According to one such report, an Inspector of Armed Police Force and a Nepali Army Lieutenant took inappropriate action towards six Maoist cadres, including females, in the Mahottari district. In the clash, five Maoists and two policemen were injured. On the 26th of November 2006, Maoists raided a police post in the Banke district and stole nine rounds of bullets and some cash. The Maoist cadres were also involved in a skirmish in the office of District Education in the Gulmi District. Another incident was reported when Maoist cadres disrupted a Council Meeting in the Nepaljung Municipality Office in the west. Similarly, the Maoists combatants, cantoned at the Chulachuli Cantonment in Eastern Nepal, came out with weapons that were supposed to be re-stored in a container.[fn]”Nepal’s Peace Process on the Verge of Failure,” Conflict Study Center (Situation Report 19), December 20, 2006.[/efn_note]

2007

Intermediate Implementation

The United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), established by the Security Council resolution 1740 (2007), started to work in January 2007. It had various mandates, one of which was monitoring the ceasefire. As a tactical shift, the Maoists formed an unarmed paramilitary force called the Young Communist League (YCL), which was directed by the Maoist Central Committee. The YCL was created in April 2007, in order to advance the MaoistsÕ semi-militant activities on the streets. Formation of the YCL alone would not violate any agreement because any party can form a youth wing. But YCL activities violated the previous agreements including ceasefire and the AMMAA agreement of December 6th, 2006. As such, the Maoists did not fully renounce violence. They continued the use of intimidation, extortion, and abduction. In the August 2007 plenum, the Maoists adopted a more aggressive stance in the face of the perceived failure of the peace process to deliver their desired result. In the Tarai region, the Maoists and the armed outfits were engaged in violent incidents.¹ Despite all these concerns, the ceasefire held with no major violation by either army. There was no resumption of an armed conflict.

1. “Nepal’s Fragile Peace Process,” International Crisis Group, Asia Briefing N°68, 2007.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

Some violations of the ceasefire agreement were reported. During this time it was reported that some of the Maoist combatants stationed in various cantonments were leaving the cantonments to participate in activities related to the Constituent Assembly elections. The Maoist-affiliated Young Communist League (YCL) was also involved in various violent activities. Other skirmishes were reported that indicted the Maoists for using violence in the Tarai region.¹ Nevertheless, there was no resumption of an armed conflict.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/313), May 12, 2008.

2009

Full Implementation

While the YCL’s intimidation and use of violence remained a concern, both armies generally upheld the ceasefire. A large number of armed outfits were reported operating in the eastern hill region and the Tarai region, but they are denounced as criminals or unregulated paramilitary groups. According to a report, at least 69 armed groups were engaged in violent activities as of March 29th.¹

1. “Govt categorizes 70 outfits as ‘criminal groupsÕ,” Kathmandu Post, September 6, 2009.

2010

Full Implementation

Full implementation reached in 2009. No reversal reported.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2013

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2014

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2015

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Minimum Implementation

Once the House of the Representative was reinstated, the Seven Political Parties-led government started consulting with the coalition leadership and the Maoists on stripping the King’s power and drafting an interim constitution. This process began before the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 21 November 2006. On 16 June 2006, the government of Nepal and the Maoists agreed to form an Interim Constitution Draft Committee (ICDC) to complete the draft interim constitution within the time frame of 15 days. On 7 July 2006, the government asked the ICDC to begin its work. The committee submitted the draft interim constitution on 25 August 2006. The modality of transitional government was explained in the interim constitution. Yet the constitution’s promulgation was delayed until the agreement on the implementation of the monitoring of arms and army management (AMMAA) began. This was established according to the CPA, signed on 21 November 2006, and the Monitoring of Arms and Army Management, signed on 8 November 2006.[fn]”SCHEDULE-2 RELATING TO CLAUSE (2) OF ARTICLE 167,” Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2007.[/efn_note]

2007

Intermediate Implementation

The interim constitution was promulgated on 15 January 2007.¹ According to the constitutional provision, a consensus government was to be formed until the final constitution was agreed upon and promulgated. The following includes the interim constitution’s provision on power sharing in the interim government:

38. Constitution of Council of Ministers: (1) The Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers under the chairpersonship of the Prime Minister shall be constituted by political consensus.

Explanation: For the purpose of this Constitution, “political consensus” means the political consensus reached between the seven party Nepali Congress: NCPN(UML), Nepali Congress (Democratic), Janamorcha Nepal, Nepal Sadbhawana Party (Anandidevi), Nepal Majdur Kisan Party, Samyukta Bam Morcha Nepal and NCP(Maoist) on 22 Kartik 2063 (November 8, 2006).

(2) If consensus cannot be reached, pursuant to clause (1), the Prime Minister, shall be elected by a majority of two-thirds of the members of the Legislature-Parliament.

(3) The structure and the allocation of business of the Interim Council of Ministers shall be determined by mutual understanding.

(4) The Council of Ministers shall consist of Deputy Prime Minister and other Ministers as required.

Explanation: For the purpose of this Article, the word ‘Minister’ shall also mean the Minister of State who takes independent responsibility of a Ministry.

(5) While appointing Ministers, the Prime Minister shall appoint them, on the recommendation of the concerned political party, from amongst the members of the Legislature-Parliament.

(6) The Prime Minister and the other Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the Legislature-Parliament, and the Ministers shall be individually responsible for the work of their respective Ministries to the Prime Minister and the Legislature-Parliament.

(7) The Prime Minister shall be relieved from his/her office under the following circumstances:

a) If a written resignation is submitted to the Speaker of the Legislature Parliament,
b) If he/she ceases to be a member of the Legislature-Parliament; or
c) If he/she dies.

(8) The Deputy Prime Minister, Minister, State Minister and Assistant Minister shall be relieved from their respective offices under the following circumstances:

(a) If a written resignation is submitted to the Prime Minister,
(b) If the Prime Minister is relieved from his/her office pursuant to clause (7) above,
(c) If he/she is relieved of his/her office by the Prime Minister upon the recommendation of or consultation with the concerned party, or
(d) If he/she dies.

(9) If the Prime Minister is relieved from his/her office pursuant to clause (7) above, the existing Council of Ministers shall continue to function until a new Council of Ministers is constituted.

(10) In the case of the death of the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister or the senior-most Minister shall act as the Prime Minister until a new Prime Minister is selected.

According to this constitutional provision, a power-sharing government was formed on 1 April 2007. The Seven Party Alliance and Communist Party of Nepal- Maoist (CPN-M), or the “the eight parties,” formed an interim Government under Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala. In the interim government, the CPN-M held 5 out of 22 Cabinet positions. Maoists also shared legislative power in the interim legislature with 83 representatives out of 330 members.²

1. Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council, S/2007/235 26 April 2007.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/235), April 26, 2007.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

After the Constituent Assembly elections took place in April 2008 and the Maoist party established itself as the largest party in the assembly. A delay in the formation of a consensus government prompted the Fifth Amendment to be added to the interim constitution. The Fifth Amendment was adopted on 13 July 2008. It provided the basis for the formation of a majoritarian government.¹ Political parties could not agree on the consensus government and therefore the election for the prime minster took place on 15 August 2008. The Maoist leader Puspa Kamal Dahal was elected Prime Minister with 464 out of 601 votes. His opponent, Sher Bahadur Deuba from the Nepali Congress (NC) party , received 113 votes. After the CA elections, the NC decided not to join a national government and remained in the opposition, in particular because the Maoists and the NC could not agree on division of Cabinet Ministries. The NC did not join the government without getting the Defense Ministry in its share, which the Maoists declined. The Maoist leader Dahal was sworn in as Prime Minister on 18 August 2008.²

The consensus and power-sharing government that was expected to work until the final draft of the new constitution did not last. This is the reversal from the provision of 2006 CPA and the Interim Constitution of 2007.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/670), October 24, 2008.
2. “Nepal’s former guerrilla chief Prachanda sworn in as PM,” Reuters. August 18, 2008.

2009

Minimum Implementation

The Maoist government made a controversial decision to dismiss the Chief of Army Staff, General Rookmangad Katawal. President Ram Baran Yadav did not approve the Cabinet decision and directly instructed Katawal to continue to work as the Chief, which prompted the resignation of the Prime Minister Dahal on 4 May 2009.¹ A new coalition government of 21 parties was formed under Madhav Kumar Nepal, a leader in the Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML). This was on 23 May 2009.² This was a coalition government that excluded the largest party in the Constituent Assembly: the Maoist party. The power sharing consensus government did not materialize in 2009.

1. “Nepal’s Peace Process at the Crossroads,” Conflict Study Center (Situation Update 83), May 10, 2009.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2009/351), July 13, 2009.

2010

Minimum Implementation

The Madhav Kumar Nepal government resigned following the extension of the Constituent Assembly for another year in May 2010.¹ Nevertheless, Nepal continued to work as a caretaker prime minister until 3 February 2011 as the CA was not able to elect a new prime minister. Efforts were made to form a consensus government but parties failed to do so.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2010/453), September 2, 2010.

2011

Minimum Implementation

In February 2011, Jhala Nath Khanal, a leader from the CPN-UML, formed a coalition government with the support of the Maoist party. Political parties were still trying to form a consensus government but had not been successful.

This failure to form a consensus government resulted in the failure of the Constituent Assembly to complete its task of producing a final draft of the constitution. The tenure of the CA was extended for the second time in May 2011 for three months. It was set to expire on 28 August 2011. Prime Minister Khanal resigned on 14 August 2011, as his government could not jumpstart the stalled peace process to pave the formation of the national consensus government.¹ Parties failed to form a consensus government again and a majoritarian government was formed under the leadership of the Maoist party leader Babu Ram Bhattrai on 28 August 2011.² He became the fourth prime minister within the tenure of this Constituent Assembly. He had support from Madeshi based political parties.

1. New York Times, August 15, 2011, A10.
2. Republica, August 29, 2011.

2012

Minimum Implementation

Efforts to establish a national consensus government to bring all political forces together and finish the dual task of completing the peace process and drafting a constitution remained unmet even after the extension of the tenure of the Constituent Assembly. The Constituent Assembly failed to deliver the constitution on 28 May 2012 even after extending its tenure by an additional two years. The parties, nevertheless, realized the need for a unity government, which never materialized in post-CA election periods until September 2012.

2013

Minimum Implementation

While the former rebel party and other parties believed that the unity government would be ideal for drafting and promulgating a constitution and completing the peace process, the establishment of the national unity government did not happen this year.

2014

Minimum Implementation

A powersharing government was not established in 2014. In the second constituent assembly elections held in November 2013, none of the parties won the required seats to form a majoritarian government. After the election, the Nepali Congress Party and the Communist Party of Nepal – United Marxist and Leninist formed a coalition government on February 10, 2014.¹

1. “Sushil Koirala won the vote to become Nepal’s prime minister,” BBC News, February 10, 2014 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26116387.

2015

Minimum Implementation

After the earthquake on 12 May 2015, the constitution drafting process stalled as the focus of the government shifted to post-earthquake reconstruction. As dissatisfaction among key leaders within the governing coalition and the opposition parties (including the former rebel group) grew over the handling of relief and reconstruction activities, parties started to talk about the formation of the national unity government.¹“Political Aftershocks,” Nepali Times, Issue 760, Page 4, May 29, 2015 http://nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/The-deadline/political-aftershock… As of July 2015, however, the unity government has not been reestablished.

2006

Minimum Implementation

Once the House of the Representative was reinstated, a new Seven Political Parties government was formed and the government started consulting with the coalition leaderships and the Maoists on stripping the King’s power and drafting an interim constitution. This process began before the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 21 November 2006. On 16 June 2006, the government of Nepal and the Maoists agreed to form an Interim Constitution Draft Committee (ICDC) to create the draft interim constitution within 15 days. On 7 July 2006, the government asked the ICDC to begin its work. The committee submitted the draft interim constitution on 25 August 2006. The interim constitution, however, was not adopted in 2006. Nevertheless, by the time the peace agreement was signed on 21 November 2006, the king had restricted prerogatives as well as limited executive powers.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

The interim constitution was promulgated on 15 January 2007.[fn]”Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/235), April 26, 2007.[/efn_note] The provisions regarding the king, his property and his family members were adopted in Article 3.3 of the interim constitution. These provisions read as follows:

3.3. No powers to rule the country shall be vested in the King. The properties of late King Birendra, late Queen Aishwarya and their family shall be transferred to the Government of Nepal and be utilized for the national interest by forming a trust. All properties (like the palaces located in different places, forest and parks, heritages of historical and archeological importance etc.) acquired by King Gyanendra in that capacity shall be nationalized. Matters regarding whether or not to maintain the institution of monarchy shall be decided by a simple majority in the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly.

Given that the king had cultivated a personal and institutional leadership of Royal Nepal Army, the Seven Party Alliance forged a 23-point agreement on 23 December 2007. The text of the agreement provided that:

1. The following amendments will be made in place of Subtitles and Sub-article (1), (2), (3a).

(3b) of Article 159 of the Constitution:

a) Nepal shall be a federal democratic republic.

b) The republic will be implemented at the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly, provided that, if the King poses a threat to holding the Constituent Assembly election, a two thirds majority of the interim Legislature-Parliament can implement the republic by voting for the proposal. The Council of Ministers shall make the decision to submit such a proposal and the Council of Ministers shall present the proposal to the interim legislature-parliament.

c) The King shall not have any responsibility for handling any state affairs.

d) The Prime Minister shall be responsible for handling all state affairs. e) Until the implementation of a republic, the Prime Minister shall conduct all the duties of the head of state.

A third amendment, adopting an agreement among the SPA, was made to the interim constitution on 28 December 2007. This amendment stripped the king of all executive power and instead vested those powers in the office of the interim prime minister.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

After the Constituent Assembly (CA) elections took place in April 2008, the CA was convened on 28th of May. The first session of the CA voted by 560 votes to 4 to end a 239-year-old monarchy and to implement in its place a federal democratic republic. At the same time, a fourth amendment to the constitution created the post of President and Vice President. The former king agreed to the CA’s decision and left the palace on 11 June after organizing a press conference.¹

The interim constitution was further amended, (by the Fifth Amendment), on 25 June. This amendment indicated that the President would be elected by a simple majority if a consensus could not be reached.² When consensus could not be established among the political parties, the Assembly elected the Nepali Congress Candidate Dr. Ram Baran Yadev. This was done with the support of the UML and MPRF, as well as the NC, on 21 July. According to the constitution, the president assumed the role of the head of the state.³

These changes in the executive branch of the government, however, were only temporary as the final reform had yet to be materialized through the promulgation of the new constitution due to be announced on 28 May 2010.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/454), July 10, 2008.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/670), October 24, 2008.
3. Ibid.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

The final constitution was due on 28 May 2010 and was expected to provide the modality of the executive branch of the government. However, the major political parties in Nepal could not agree on the form of the executive. These parties could not figure out whether a republic of Nepal should adopt a parliamentary system or a presidential system of government among other issues related to the executive branch of the government.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

The CA failed to meet the deadline to produce a draft of the constitution. The CA’s tenure was extended by one year.¹ The modality of the executive branch was one of the issues of contention amongst political parties. A compromise was not reached because the Maoists were fully in favor of the presidential system while the other major political parties (and specifically the Nepali Congress) were in favor of the parliamentary system.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2010/453), September 2, 2010.

2011

Intermediate Implementation

The CA failed to deliver the final constitution even after the extension of its tenure by one year in May 2010. The tenure of the CA was extended again in May 28, 2011, this time for three months. Nevertheless, contentious issues, including the modality of the executive branch of the government, remained as litigious as they had been in 2010.

2012

Intermediate Implementation

Major political parties failed to resolve issues related to executive branch reform. Three main political parties offered three different modalities: the Maoists advocated for presidential system, the NC for parliamentary system and the CPN-UML for mixed form of government system with directly elected president and house of representative elected prime minister. In May, parties involved in the negotiation process agreed on mixed model with parliamentary supremacy.¹ This agreement however did not last long as parties failed to draft the constitution through the Constituent Assembly.

1. “Parties Agree on 11-Province Model,” Myrepublica, May 15, 2012.

2013

Intermediate Implementation

In the constituent assembly, major parties failed to resolve issues related to executive branch reform. This is one of the reasons for the constituent assembly elections on November 19, 2013.

2014

Intermediate Implementation

While campaigning for votes, parties have made public pledges to draft a constitution within a year. Nevertheless, disagreement on form of government remained one of the main obstacles to break the impasse throughout the year. In September 2014, the Committee for Constitutional, Political Dialogue and Consensus Building (CCPDC) submitted reports to the Constituent Assembly highlighting contentious issues among political parties. While the CCPDC was able to settle some of the issues, form of government remains one of the main issues that was not settled.¹

1. “CCPDC submits report to CA,” Kathmandu Post, September13, 2014.

2015

Intermediate Implementation

Political parties failed to draft and promulgate a new constitution by the 22 January 2015 deadline they had set after the CA elections in November 2013.¹ One of the contentious issues was related to the form of government. After the massive earthquake in early May, political leaders representing the big four parties in
the Constituent Assembly met to discuss the constitution issue on 31 May, and agreed to settle all key issues within a few days and produce a draft constitution through fast-track.² On 9 June, 4 major political parties reached a 16-point agreement to deal with the contentious issues, which the Supreme Court ordered not to implement on 19 June.³ Nevertheless, the CA approved the draft constitution on July 7 forpublic feedback.⁴ According to the draft constitution, Nepal shall have a constitutional president as head of the state. Federal legislature, parliament and provincial assemblies elect the president for a five year term. According to the draft constitution, Nepal shall have multiparty competitive parliamentary system of government. Accordingly, the leader of the party having a clear majority or having support of other parties in Parliament will become the executive prime minister. For the first time, the draft constitution instructs that the number of ministers cannot exceed 25 at the federal level. The draft constitution also provides that a no-confidence motion cannot be introduced in the parliament in the first two years once the Prime Minister is elected. Also, a no-confidence motion cannot be introduced for the second time within a year
once it is failed. At the provinces levels, the party that wins the majority seat will form the provincial government.

1. “Nepal fails to draft new constitution before promised deadline,” Xinhua News Agency,
   January 22, 2015 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-01/23/c_133941628.htm.
2. “Big 4 agree to settle key disputes in next 3 days,” Republica, May 31,
   2015.
3. “Supreme Court stays 16-point agreement,” MyRepublica, June 19, 2015.
4. “CA concludes deliberation on draft constitution, sends for public feedback,” Himalayan Times, July 7, 2015.

2006

Minimum Implementation

Once the House of the Representative was reinstated, the government started to consult the Seven Party Alliance and the Maoists on a draft of the interim constitution. This process started before the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed on 21 November 2006. On 16 June 2006, the government of Nepal and the Maoists agreed to form an Interim Constitution Draft Committee (ICDC) and complete a draft interim constitution within 15 days. On 7 July 2006, the government asked the ICDC to begin its work. The committee submitted the draft for the interim constitution on 25 August 2006. However, the interim constitution was not adopted in 2006 and therefore an interim legislature was not established in that year.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

The interim constitution was promulgated on 15 January 2007.[fn]”Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/235), April 26, 2007.[/efn_note] The document established an interim power sharing legislature whose representatives would be comprised from all the political parties, including all the members of the dissolved parliament. In the agreement, members of the dissolved parliament who supported the King were excluded.¹ A 330-member interim parliament was established by the interim constitution. The constitutional provision regarding the interim legislature reads as follows (Article 45):

45. Constitution of Legislature-Parliament

(1) There shall be a unicameral Legislature-Parliament in Nepal, which shall consist of the following 330 members as set out in schedule 2.

(a) 209 members of the seven political parties and other parties who were sitting as elected members of the House of Representatives and National Assembly immediately before the commencement of this Constitution. Explanation: The phrase “Seven Political Parties” means Nepali Congress, Communist Party of Nepal (UML),   Janamorcha Nepal, Nepal Sadbhawana (Anandidevi), Nepal Majdur Kisan Party and Samyukta Bam Morcha (United Left Front), which reached a political understanding on Kartik 22, 2063 (November 8, 2006),

(b) 73 members on behalf of Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), (c) 48 members nominated by consensus from the Samyukta Bam Morcha, people-based and professional organizations, oppressed communities, backward regions, indigenous ethnic groups[Adivasi Janajati], and from among women and various political personalities.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (1), persons who were against the People’s Movement shall not be in the Legislature-Parliament.

(3) The Legislature-Parliament shall be conducted on the basis of political consensus. (4) The term of the Legislature-Parliament shall come to an end following the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly. (5) If any seat of a member of the Legislature-Parliament falls vacant, for any reason, the vacancy shall be filled for the remaining period by nomination by the same political party or group, which the member was representing.

The 330 member interim legislature met for the first time on 15 January 2007. The interim legislature was designed to be replaced by the Constituent Assembly once the CA elections took place. The elections for the Constituent Assembly, however, did not take place as scheduled.

1. “Nepal’s Parliamentary Inclusion: Not a Reality Yet,” Conflict Study Center, Situation Update 23, January 22, 2007.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

The Constituent Assembly (CA) elections took place on 10 April 2008. The mixed electoral system elected 240 members on a first-past-the-post basis, and 335 members on the basis of a proportional representation system. The remaining 26 members were nominated by each political party present in the CA.¹ The Maoists won 120 seats in the first-past-the-post portion of the elections, and 100 seats in the proportional representation portion. The NC won 37 seats in the first-past-the-post elections and 73 proportional representation seats. The Communist Party of Nepal- United Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML) won 33 first-past-the-post seats and 70 proportional representation seats. MPRF obtained 30 first-past-the-post seats and 22 proportional representation seats, while the other two UDMF parties between them won 13 first-past-the-post seats and 16 proportional representation seats.² After the elections for the Constituent Assembly were held, the interim parliament was dissolved. The CA was convened on 28 May 2008. The CA is highly representative in terms of the number of seats held by women, minorities and Dalits.

The composition of the CA and the use of the PR system in the CA elections both suggest that a greater reform in the legislative branch of the government has transpired. Furthermore, ethnic minorities and linguistic groups were now able to use their own language in the CA. Nevertheless, a final modality of the composition of the legislative branch of the government was yet to be finalized in the constitution.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/313), May 12, 2008.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/313), May 12, 2008.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

The final constitution was due on 28 May 2010 and was expected to provide the modality of the legislative branch of the government. Nevertheless, the major political parties had yet to agree on the modality of the legislative branch of the government, especially the number of seats and the type of electoral system.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

The CA failed to come up with the final draft of the constitution, which was due on 28 May 2010. The CA’s tenure was extended by one year.¹ The number of seats and the type of electoral system of legislative branch had not been finalized.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2010/453), September 2, 2010.

2011

Intermediate Implementation

The CA failed to deliver the final constitution, even after the extension of its tenure by one year in May 2010. The tenure of the CA was extended again on May 28, 2011, this time for another three months. However, contentions over the modality of the legislature, along with other contentious issues, still remained unresolved.

2012

Intermediate Implementation

In May 2012, the parties reached an agreement on the constitution of federal parliament, which was said to have 371 members with 311 members in the lower house and 60 members in the upper house. Among 311 members in the lower house, 171 members were to be directly elected and 140 through the proportional representation method.¹ This agreement, however, faltered because the Constituent Assembly was dissolved on 28 May 2012 without promulgating the constitution.

1. “Parties Agree on 11-Province Model,” Myrepublica, May 15, 2012.

2013

Intermediate Implementation

No substantial progress was recorded in 2013 as the elections for another CA took place in November 2013.

2014

Intermediate Implementation

Major political parties within the Constituent Assembly established the Committee for Constitutional, Political Dialogue and Consensus Building (CCPDC) with responsibilities to settle disputed issues in the constitution making processes. Former rebel leader, Baburam Bhattarai was elected unopposed as the chairman of the CCPDC on 25 April 2014.¹ One of the issues was the electoral system. In September 2014, the CCPDC submitted its final report, and the CCPDC was not able to force consensus among political parties on electoral system among other issues.². The CCPDC reported that the structures and the formation of the legislative body, formation of the upper house, and provincial parliaments were settled.³

In December, positive discussion among political parties was reported. On the issue of the electoral system to elect members of the legislative branch, it was reported that the parties are close to agreeing on a mixed electoral system suggesting a certain number of legislatures be elected directly and a certain number of legislatures based on proportional representation. However, the exact ratio is still to be sorted out.⁴

1. “Bhattarai elected chairperson of CA’s political dialogue comm,” Nepal News, April 25, 2014.
2. “CCPDC submits report to CA,” Kathmandu Post, September 13, 201)
3. “CCPDC submits report to CA,” Kathmandu Post, September 13, 2014.
4. “Parties in ‘positive discussionsÕ to settle contentious subjects,” Kathmandu Post, 11 December 2014.

2015

Intermediate Implementation

The disagreement on the electoral system could not be sorted out by the 22 January due date for the draft of the constitution.¹ After the massive earthquake on May 12, political leaders representing the big four parties in the Constituent Assembly met to discuss the constitution issue on 31 May, and agreed to settle all key issues within a few days and produce a draft constitution through fast-track.² On 9 June, 4 major political parties reached 16-point agreement to deal with the contentious issues.³ The CA approved the draft constitution on July 7 forpublic feedback.⁴ The draft constitution provided a bicameral parliament comprised of the federal legislature parliament and the upper house. There will be 275 members in the legislature parliament of which 165 will be elected through first-past-the-post system and the rest (110 members) will be elected through the proportional system. The Upper house will have 45 members of which 40 members will be elected equally from each federal province and five will be nominated by president on the recommendation of the council of ministers. Provincial parliaments will be unicameral. The constitution requires that the parties must elect at least one-third women representatives in the federal legislature as well as the provincial legislature.

1. “Nepal fails to draft new constitution before promised deadline,” Xinhua News Agency, January 22, 2015. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-01/23/c_133941628.htm
2. “Big 4 agree to settle key disputes in next 3 days,” Republica, May 31, 2015
3. “Way paved for constitution as four parties reach 16-pt deal,” Kathmandu Post, June 9, 2015.
4. “CA concludes deliberation on draft constitution, sends for public feedback,” Himalayan Times, July 7, 2015.

2006

Minimum Implementation

Once the House of the Representative was reinstated, the government started consulting with the Seven Political Parties and the Maoists on stripping the King’s power and drafting an interim constitution. This process began before the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 21 November 2006. On 16 June 2006, the government of Nepal and the Maoists agreed to form an Interim Constitution Draft Committee (ICDC) to complete the draft interim constitution within the time frame of 15 days. The work of the draft committee, however, was delayed. On 7 July 2006, the government asked the ICDC to begin its work. The committee submitted the draft interim constitution on 25 August 2006. The modality of the transitional government was explained in the interim constitution. Yet, the constitution’s promulgation was delayed until the agreement on the implementation of the monitoring of arms and army management (AMMAA) began. This was established according to the CPA, signed on 21 November 2006, and the Monitoring of Arms and Army Management, signed on 8 November 2006.[fn]”SCHEDULE-2 RELATING TO CLAUSE (2) OF ARTICLE 167,” Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2007.[/efn_note]

2007

Intermediate Implementation

The interim constitution was promulgated on 15 January 2007.¹ According to the constitutional provision, a consensus government was to be formed until the final constitution was agreed upon and promulgated. A 330 member interim parliament was established that included representatives from the Maoists. The King was stripped of his royal power.

The interim constitution replaced the 1990 constitution.

In 2007, the interim constitution was amended further: the First Amendment on 13 April 2007, the Second Amendment on 13 June 2007 and the Third Amendment on 28 December 2007. These constitutional amendments included provisions that would allow for the removal of the prime minister and the king by a two-third vote of the interim legislature if they should pose an obstacle to the Constituent Assembly elections.² The third amendment ensured that Nepal was to be a republic. This amendment was to be implemented by the first CA session.³

It was planned that the CA would write the final constitution. However, the election for the CA did not take place in 2007.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/235), April 26, 2007.
2. Ibid.
3. “Interim Constitution of Nepal (2007) As Amended by the First, Second and Third Amendments,” UNDP – Nepal.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

The Constituent Assembly elections took place on 10 April 2008 and the Maoist party established itself as the largest party by winning 220 seats. A delay in the formation of a consensus government prompted that the Fifth Amendment be added to the interim constitution. The Fifth Amendment was adopted on 13 July 2008 and provided the basis for the formation of a majoritarian government.¹

The CA started to work on the draft constitution, which was scheduled to be promulgated before the tenure of the CA expired on 28 May 2010. On 14 November 2008, the CA approved a set of regulations and procedures for drafting the country’s constitution. The assembly endorsed an 82-week calendar for completing the drafting process and established 14 committees to carry out the drafting of the constitution. The core of these committees was the Constitutional Committee, a 61-member committee that was created to work on the concept papers prepared by the 10 thematic Assembly committees.² However, the constitution making process did not move smoothly because the major political parties were unable to reach a consensus.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/670), October 24, 2008.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2009/1), January 2, 2009.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

All members of the Constitutional Committee, as well as the members of the Legislature-Parliamentary Committee, were elected by 13 January 2009. Mr. Madhav Kumar Nepal, a senior leader of the Communist Party Nepal-United Marxists Leninists, was unanimously elected Chair of the CC. In the process of drafting the constitution, 40 teams comprised of CA members visited all 75 districts to solicit public opinion on constitution.¹ Despite all these efforts, the constitution making process faced major obstacles, as the predominant political parties could not find a common ground on many issues including federalism, the modality of government, the management of arms, and the Maoist combatants. Moving from the national consensus government to a majoritarian government posed the greatest obstacle in the constitutional writing process.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” Untied Nations (S/2009/221), April 24, 2009.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

In March 2010, “the Constitutional Committee (CC) adjourned its proceedings until further notice, unable to complete the first draft of the constitution, due on 5 March, since only one of ten thematic committee reports had been approved by the Constituent Assembly (CA). Meanwhile, contentious issues such as state restructuring and the future form of governance remain unresolved.”¹ The CA failed to deliver the final constitution on 28 May 2010. An amendment to the interim constitution extended the term of the CA for another year, until 28 May 2011. To resolve the constitutional dispute, a high-level political mechanism was established and chaired by Mr. Puspa Kamal Dahal. This mechanism was comprised of representatives from seven parties in the Constituent Assembly, and was formed in October. Its aim was to settle the 210 disputed issues that had been identified by the Agni Kharel-led panel who consulted the concept papers of eight thematic committees of the CA. The task force resolved 100 of the disputed issues.²

1. Nepal Monthly Situation Updates (Issue No. 58), March 16, 2010.
2. “Nepal Constitution Drafting – Taskforce settles over 100 of 210 disputed issues,” The Kathmandu Post, December 12, 2010.

2011

Intermediate Implementation

The failure to form a consensus government resulted in the failure of the Constituent Assembly to complete its task of producing a final draft of the constitution. Other reasons were the reluctance of the Maoist party to initiate the rehabilitation of their combatants and the ideological gap between the Maoist party and other parties as the Maoist had argued for the “people’s constitution” and the other parties were in favor of a fully “democratic constitution.” The tenure of the CA was extended for the second time in May 2011, this time for three months. This extension is set to expire on 28 August 2011. It has been reported that the three major parties agreed to establish a State Restructuring Commission, which is expected to recommend a viable model for the federal province system in Nepal to the Constituent Assembly.¹ The Constitutional Commission proposed a mixed model of government.² These developments, however, failed to bring all political parties and stakeholders together. The remaining obstacles obstructing the finalization of the constitution include contentions over state restructuring, the integration and rehabilitation of the Maoist combatants, and the form of government. Lack of consensus among political parties has made the constitutional drafting process difficult.

1. “Big Three agree to form State Restructuring Commission,” My Republica, May 30, 2011.
2. “Statute taskforce proposes mixed model for form of governance,” nepalnews.com, July 11, 2011.

2012

Intermediate Implementation

Parties had finalized the composition of the government and federal legislature. Parties also had agreed that federalized state of Nepal was to have 11 states. The names of the provinces were to be finalized by the respective provincial assemblies and the federal commission was to finalize the territorial boundaries of the provinces.¹ But, under tremendous pressure from Madesh-based parties in the Maoist-led coalition government, the Maoist party backtracked from earlier agreements on federalism by insisting on a form of ethnically based federalism.² With this development, effort to resolve all contentious issues based on consensus between major political parties failed. This fed the mistrust among political parties at the crucial moment and parties failed to settle all contentious issues leading to the demise of the Constituent Assembly on 28 May 2012.

1. “Parties Agree on 11-Province Model,” Myrepublica, May 15, 2012.
2. “Maoist party ‘backtracks’ from earlier agreement,” Kathmandu Post, May 20, 2012.

2013

Intermediate Implementation

Political parties promised to deliver a draft constitution within a year after holding the constituent assembly elections. Elections for the constituent assembly took place on 19 November 2013. No further progress was made in the constitution drafting process.

2014

Intermediate Implementation

While major political parties tried to settle disputed issues in the constitution drafting processes, substantial progress was not made. As a result, the Committee for Constitutional, Political Dialogue and Consensus Building was created and former rebel leader Baburam Bhattarai was elected unopposed as the chairman of the CCPDC on 25 April 2014.¹ The CCPDC had three months to engage political parties in dialogue and forge consensus on major issues. The CCPDC produced a report in September and reported that the committee was able to settle 30 contentious issues but key issues (federalism, form of government, judiciary, and electoral system) related to the constitution were not settled. ²

1. “Bhattarai elected chairperson of CA’s political dialogue comm,” Nepal News, April 25, 2014.
2. “CCPDC submits report to CA,” Kathmandu Post, September 13, 2014.

2015

Intermediate Implementation

While efforts to find solutions to contentious issues continued, parties have not been able to settle constitution related issues and produce a draft version of the constitution. On 31 May 2015, leaders from four major parties met and agreed to settle all key issues within a few days and produce a draft constitution through fast-track.¹ On 9 June, 4 major political parties reached a 16-point agreement to deal with the contentious issues.² The draft constitution was submitted to the CA on 30 June.³ Deliberation on the draft constitution started on 2 July and completed on 7 July. The CA engrossed the draft constitution and sent it to publish in the Nepal Gazette to collect people’s feedback for the next fifteen days on 7 July.⁴

1. “Big 4 agree to settle key disputes in next 3 days,” Republica, May 31, 2015.
2. “Way paved for constitution as four parties reach 16-pt deal,” Kathmandu Post, June 9, 2015.
3. “CA gets constitution draft, Kathmandu Post, June 30, 2015.
4. “CA concludes deliberation on draft constitution, sends for public feedback,” Himalayan Times, July 7, 2015.

2006

Minimum Implementation

In the peace agreement, both sides agreed to restructure the state in order to end structural discrimination based on caste and ethnicity. Yet substantial progress has not been made towards restructuring the state, and as a result, little has been accomplished in terms of ending caste/ethnic-based discrimination.

2007

Minimum Implementation

Some progress was made in terms of ending caste/ethnic-based discrimination by restructuring of the state. The need to restructure the state in order to end structural discrimination was recognized by the interim constitution in the following provisions:

PART 4
RESPONSIBILITIES, DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES OF THE STATE

33. Responsibilities of the State: The State shall have the following responsibilities:

(d) To carry out an inclusive, democratic and progressive restructuring of the State by eliminating its existing form of centralized and unitary structure in order to address the problems related to women, Dalits, indigenous tribes, Madhesis, oppressed and minority communities and other disadvantaged groups, by eliminating class, caste, language, sex, culture, religion and regional discriminations.

PART 17
FORM OF STATE AND LOCAL SELF GOVERNANCE

138. Progressive Restructuring of the State: (1) Inclusive, democratic and progressive restructuring of the state shall be made to bring about an end of the discrimination based on class, caste, language, sex, culture, religion and region by eliminating the centralized and unitary form of the state.

(2) A High Level Commission shall be constituted to recommend for the restructuring of the State in accordance with clause (1) above. The composition, function, duty, power and terms of service of such Commission shall be as determined by the Government of Nepal.

(3) Final decision of restructuring of the State shall be as determined by the Constituent Assembly.

Though these provisions were written into the interim constitution, they do not ensure that cordial relations will exist between ethnic/caste groups and the state. The responsibility to fairly restructure the state falls solely on the shoulders of the Constituent Assembly. Since CA elections did not take place in 2007, the state was not restructured.

2008

Minimum Implementation

The Constituent Assembly elections took place on 10 April 2008 (Also see, Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council, S/2008/670, 24 October 2008). The CA was supposed to establish a High-Level Commission for Restructuring the State. The political parties were trying to forge a consensus on this commission in June 2008.[fn]”Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/454), July 10, 2008.[/efn_note] The commission, however, was not established in 2008. Nevertheless, the state restructuring issue was considered and handled by the Constitutional Committees.

2009

Minimum Implementation

Though it had been agreed upon in the peace agreement and provided for in the interim constitution, a High-Level Commission for Restructuring the State was not formed in 2009. Nevertheless, the state restructuring issue was considered and handled by the Constitutional Committees.

The restructuring of the state was expected to end caste/ethnic based discrimination by allowing for greater representation of ethnic caste or minority groups and thus giving them power in the decision making process.

2010

Minimum Implementation

Though it had been agreed upon in the peace agreement and provided for in the interim constitution, a High-Level Commission for Restructuring the State was not formed in 2010. Nevertheless, the state restructuring issue was considered and handled by the Constitutional Committees. The CA failed to deliver the constitution by 28 May 2010. This constitutional standstill was mostly due to the political partiesÕ inability to come to a consensus on the federal statesÕ boundaries and the role ethnic groups would play within the federal state among other contentious issues.

2011

Intermediate Implementation

The CA failed again to deliver the draft constitution by the 28 May 2011 deadline. The term of the CA, then, was extended by 3 months. After the extension of the CA tenure, the three major political parties agreed to establish a State Restructuring Commission. This group is expected to recommend a viable model for the federal provinces in Nepal to the Constituent Assembly. Yet the Madesh-based political parties opposed the formation of the commission.¹ The Madesh demanded that the restructuring of the state be dealt with by a sub-committee headed by the CPNU-Maoist leader Puspa Kamal Dahal. The reason they favored this specific leader is because the Maoists were responsive to their demands.²

At present, the commission has not been established and the efforts to promote inter-ethnic relations have yet to materialize in 2011. The Madesh parties wanted to scrap the constitutional provision of establishing the State Restructuring Commission and the Maoists were not opposed to that. On 28 August the Maoist party and the United Democratic Front of Madesh parties, (UDMF) made a four-point deal, which among other things included provisions to bypass the formation of the State Restructuring Commission, to form a coalition government. The government was formed on August 28.³ Any constitutional amendments, however, require a two-third majority. This, however, does not mean that progress has been at a standstill. Achievements, in terms of providing greater opportunity for ethnic minorities in the governance structure have been made. In the Constituent Assembly, the previously excluded caste and ethnic groups were represented through the quota system. Accordingly, Dalits hold 13% of the seats, oppressed caste/indigenous groups hold 37.8%, the Madeshi hold 31.2%, other groups hold another 30%, while backward regions hold 4% seats.⁴

On 1 November 2011, major political parties (Nepali Congress, Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist and Leninists, Communist Party of Nepal- United Maoist and Samyukta Loktantrik Madhesi Morcha) reached a 7-point agreement on army integration, constitution drafting and a power-sharing government. According to the accord, the parties agreed to form an expert panel from the CA instead of the Constitutional Commission on State Restructuring.⁵ Nevertheless, the constitutional amendment requiring the formation of an expertsÕ panel could not materialize because of differences with the CPN-UML and Nepali Congress.⁶ After failure to amend the constitution for the formation of an expertsÕ panel, the main political parties who were signatories of the 7-point accord forged a consensus on 22 November 2011 to form the State Restructuring Commission (SRC) without a Chairman for a time being. On 22 November 2011, an eight-member SRC was formed.⁷

1. “Big Three agree to form State Restructuring Commission,” My Republica, May 30, 2011.
2. “Madesh-based parties against formation of state restructuring commission,” Republica, August 23, 2011.
3. Republica, August 29, 2011.
4. “Nepal Human Development Report 2009-State Transformation and Human Development,” UNDP, 2009.
5. “Parties join hands on peace process,” Kathmandu Post, November 2, 2011.
6. “State Restructuring: Dispute delays statute amendment,” Kathmandu Post, November 17, 2011.
7. “STATE RESTRUCTURING: Commission takes shape, finally,” Kathmandu Post, November 23, 2011.

2012

Intermediate Implementation

On 31st January 2012, the State Restructuring Commission submitted two separate reports to the government because commissioners in the Commission could not agree on substantive issues related to the bases of federal provinces. In a report submitted by six members, commissioners proposed 11 states based on ethnic identity. It also gave the priority rights to dominant ethnic groups at the local level for one term. The three members prepared a separate report proposing six federal provinces: two from the plain region based on identity, history and culture, and four from hill and mountain regions based on economic viability. The report was submitted to the Constituent Assembly for deliberation on 25 March.¹ After discussion at the CA meetings, the report was to be forwarded to the constitution committee, which never happened. Nevertheless, parties reached an agreement to have 11 provinces on 15 May but the agreement was not fulfilled by the Maoist because the 11-state model agreed earlier did not resolve the issues related to ethnic identity.² The Constituent Assembly was dissolved without promulgating the constitution on 28 May. As such, the inter-state and ethnic-relations provision of the accord was not implemented.

1. “Constitutional Update, Support to Participatory Constitution Building Process in Nepal,” accessed July 20, 2012, http://www.ccd.org.np/.
2. “Maoist party ‘backtracks’ from earlier agreement,” Kathmandu Post, May 20, 2012.

2013

Intermediate Implementation

This is related to the federalism issues and was not implemented in 2013.

2014

Intermediate Implementation

Federalism and whether the federal states should be delineated based on ethnic identity remained contentious issues. The Committee for Constitutional, Political Dialogue and Consensus Building started multiparty dialogues to forge consensus on this issue among others but failed.¹ The ruling coalition had proposed to create seven states whereas the rebel party, Maoist, had proposed the creation of ten states based on ethnic identity.

1. “CCPDC submits report to CA,” Kathmandu Post, 13 September 2014).

2015

Intermediate Implementation

On 31 May 2015, parties had agreed to reach a consensus on disputed issues including federalism and issues of ethnicity and adopt a fast track approach to produce a draft of the constitution. On 9 June, 4 major political parties reached a 16-point agreement to deal with the contentious issues.¹ The draft constitution was submitted in the Constituent Assembly on 30 June. The draft constitution was approved for public debate on July 7.² The draft constitution provides that Nepal shall have eight provinces based on five criteria of identity (ethnicity/community, language, culture, geography/territorial continuity and historical continuity) and four criteria of capability (economic interdependence, and capability; status of infrastructure development, possibilities; availability of natural resources; administrative feasibility). The Nepal government will form a federal commission to recommend the demarcation of federal provinces. Two third majority of all members of the provincial assemblies will name the provinces.The draft constitution provided for the establishment of National Inclusive Commission, which is said to protect and promote interests of ethnic and minority groups.

1. “Way paved for constitution as four parties reach 16-pt deal,” Kathmandu Post, 9 June 2015.
2. “CA concludes deliberation on draft constitution, sends for public feedback,” Himalayan Times, July 7, 2015.

2006

No Implementation

The November 2006 CPA called for the establishment of Constituent Assembly elections and a competitive multiparty democratic system. As such, the Maoists were expected to allow their combatants to be assembled in the cantonments and participate in the Constituent Assembly (CA) elections. However, these reforms did not take place in 2006 because the promulgation of the interim constitution was delayed.

2007

Minimum Implementation

The interim constitution was promulgated on 15 January 2007. The constitution allowed for an interim parliament to meet until the CA elections. The constitution also made it very clear that there will be no restrictions on the number of political parties. The provisions regarding the Constituent Assembly read as follows:

PART 7: CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

63. Formation of the Constituent Assembly: (1) There shall be a Constituent Assembly constituted to formulate a new Constitution by the Nepalese people themselves, subject to the provisions of this Constitution.

(2) After the commencement of this Constitution, the Election of the Constituent Assembly shall be held on the date as specified by the Government of Nepal.

(3) The Constituent Assembly shall consist of the following four hundred twenty five members, out of which four hundred and nine members shall be elected through mixed electoral system and sixteen members shall be nominated, as provided for in the law:

(a) Two hundred and five members shall be elected from among the candidates elected on the basis of first-past-the-post system from each of the Election Constituencies existing, in accordance with the prevailing law before the commencement of this Constitution.

(b) Two hundred and four members shall be elected under the proportional electoral system on the basis of the votes to be given to the political parties, considering the whole country as one election constituency.

(c) Sixteen members to be nominated by the interim Council of Ministers, on the basis of consensus, from amongst the prominent persons of national life.

(4) The principle of inclusiveness shall be taken into consideration while selecting the candidates by the political parties pursuant to sub-clause (a) of clause (3) above, and while making the list of the candidates pursuant to sub-clause (b) above, the political parties shall have to ensure proportional representation of women, Dalit, oppressed tribes/indigenous tribes, backwards, Madhesi and other groups, in accordance as provided for in the law. Notwithstanding anything contained in this clause, in case of women there should be at least one third of total representation obtained by adding the number of candidature pursuant to sub-clause (a) of clause (3) to the proportional representation pursuant to sub-clause (b) of clause (3).

(5) The election of the members of the Constituent Assembly shall be held through secret ballots, as provided for in the law.

(6) For the purpose of election of the Constituent Assembly, every Nepali citizen who has attained the age of eighteen years by the end of Mangsir, 2063 (15th December 2006) shall be entitled to vote, as provided for in the law.

(7) Subject to the provisions of this Article, election for the Constituent Assembly and other matters pertaining thereto shall be regulated as provided for in the law.

PART 18: POLITICAL PARTIES

141. Prohibition on the Imposition of Restrictions on Political Parties: (1)
Persons who are committed to common political ideology, philosophy and program shall, subject to the laws made under proviso (3) of clause (3) of Article 12 of this Constitution, be entitled to form and operate political parties of their choice and to generate or cause to be generated publicity in order to secure public support and cooperation from the general public for their ideology, philosophy and programs, and to carry out any other activities for that purpose. Any law, arrangement or decision, which restricts any such activities, shall be considered inconsistent with this Constitution and shall ipso facto be void.

(2) Any law, arrangement or decision which allows for participation or involvement of only a single political party or persons having a single political ideology, philosophy or program in the elections, political system of the country or conduct of State Affairs shall be considered inconsistent with this Constitution and shall ipso facto be void.

(3) Political Parties with the objectives contrary to the spirit and norms of the preamble of this constitution shall not be considered qualified for the party registration.

The interim constitution’s enactment in January 2007 suggests that certain reforms to the political party and electoral system were implemented. Nevertheless, these reforms were not tested because the elections for the CA did not occur in 2007. Elections for the CA had been originally scheduled for 15 July 2007, but were delayed. This was the fact that the Elections Commission needed additional time to prepare for the elections. The Seven Party Alliance (SPA) was also unprepared for the elections and the Maoists required more time too. The Cabinet decided to hold the CA elections on 22 November 2007. 62 political parties registered with the Election Commission. For the purpose of the elections, about 120,000 civil personnel and about 70,000 security personnel were mobilized.[fn]”Is Constitutional Assembly Possible in Nepal,” Conflict Study Center (Situation Update 42), July 6, 2006.[/efn_note]

The CA elections were postponed for the second time on 5 October 2007 due to the intransigence of the Seven Party Alliance and Maoist Party. The key obstacles blocking the elections were the “MaoistsÕ demand for the declaration of a republic before the Constituent Assembly election and the adoption of a fully proportional representation (FPR) system of election instead of the mixed system, as agreed earlier, of first-past-the-post for half the seats and proportional representation for the other half”.[fn]”Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/5), January 3, 2008.[/efn_note] The Maoists quit the government to leverage their demands.[fn]”Nepal’s Twelve-Point Rationale of Poll Postponement,” Conflict Study Center (Situation Update 52), October 11, 2007.[/efn_note] Parties reached a 23-point agreement on December 23. In the agreement, parties agreed to distribute the PR and the direct election seats along a 60-40-percentage line. They also agreed to hold elections before mid-April 2008 and that Nepal would be a republic state. These changes were adopted in the third amendment of the interim constitution on 28 December 2007.[fn]”Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/5), January 3, 2008.[/efn_note] Once these agreements were reached, the Maoists opted to rejoin the government on 30 December 2007.[fn]Ibid.[/efn_note]

2008

Intermediate Implementation

The Constituent Assembly (CA) elections took place on 10 April 2008. The mixed electoral system elected 240 members on a first-past-the-post basis, and 335 members on the basis of proportional representative. The remaining 26 members were nominated by each political party present in the CA.¹ The Maoists won 120 seats in the first-past-the-post elections and 100 seats in the PR portion, The NC won 37 seats in the first-past-the-post elections and 73 proportional representation seats. The Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) (UML) won 33 first-past-the-post seats and 70 proportional representation seats. MPRF obtained 30 first-past-the-post seats and 22 proportional representation seats, while the other two UDMF parties won 13 first-past-the-post seats and 16 proportional representation seats.² After the elections for the Constituent Assembly were held, the interim parliament dissolved. The CA was convened on 28 May 2008. The CA is highly representative in terms of the number of seats held by women, minorities and Dalits.

The success of the CA elections and the PR electoral system suggest that major reforms took place in terms of transformation of the Maoist party as a legitimate party and the adoption of the PR electoral system. On 14 November 2008, the CA approved the regulations and procedures for drafting the country’s constitution. The assembly endorsed an 82-week calendar for completing the drafting process. The CA tasked 14 committees with drafting the constitution.³ Nevertheless, these reforms were temporary because the CA has yet to complete the new constitution, which will determine which type of electoral system will be used in the future.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/313), May 12, 2008.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/313), May 12, 2008.
3. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2009/1), January 2, 2009.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

Constitutional drafting committees were functioning. The final constitution was due by 28 May 2010.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

In March 2010, “the Constitutional Committee (CC) adjourned its proceedings until further notice, unable to complete the first draft of the constitution, due on 5 March, since only one of ten thematic committee reports has been approved by the Constituent Assembly (CA). Meanwhile, contentious issues such as state restructuring and the future form of governance remain unresolved.”¹ The CA failed to deliver the final constitution on 28 May 2010. An amendment to the interim constitution extended the term of the CA for another year, until 28 May 2011. To resolve the constitutional dispute, a high-level political mechanism was established. The Maoist leader and former Prime Minister, Mr. Puspa Kamal Dahal, chaired this political mechanism.

1. Nepal Monthly Situation Updates (Issue No. 58), March 16, 2010.

2011

Intermediate Implementation

Contentions over the type of electoral system still remain unresolved among other issues. The Maoists favor a winner take all system at the federal and constituent levels, while the Nepali Congress and the CPN-UML prefer that a mixed system be adopted similar to the one adopted for the 2008 CA elections.¹

1. “Constitution In Progress: Constitution Building Updates,” Center for Constitutional Dialogue, accessed August 4, 2011, http://www.ccd.org.np.

2012

Intermediate Implementation

In their efforts to resolve contentious issues in drafting the constitution, political parties had in principle agreed a mixed system of government in which the president was said to be elected directly and the prime minister from the federal legislature. Regarding, the electoral system which was to elect the federal parliament, parties agreed for a mixed model in which 171 members would be elected directly and 140 members proportionally in the 311-member lower house.¹ Because the CA failed to promulgate the constitution by the stipulated deadline of 28 May, provisions related to political party or electoral system reform was not implemented as of July 2012.

1. “Parties Agree on 11-Province Model,” Myrepublica, May 15, 2012.

2013

Intermediate Implementation

No progress was made in 2013.

2014

Intermediate Implementation

While major political parties tried to settle disputed issues including the electoral system in the constitution drafting process, substantial progress was not made. The Committee for Constitutional, Political Dialogue and Consensus Building was created in April to expedite the dialogue and find consensus among political parties on disputed issues and produce a report within three months.¹ In its report, the CCPDC listed the electoral system as one of the contentious issues that it was not able to solve.² While political parties agreed on a mixed electoral system comprised of the majoritarian representation and proportional representation, parties had differences on the ratio for the directly and proportionally elected members, and within the proportional system, parties had different positions on whether the candidate names in the proportional list should be ranked.

1. “Bhattarai elected chairperson of CA’s political dialogue comm,” Nepal News, April 25, 2014.
2. “CCPDC submits report to CA,” Kathmandu Post, September 13, 2014.

2015

Intermediate Implementation

As of 31 May 2015, major political parties have agreed and initiated to find solutions on disputed issues, including the electoral system, within a month.¹. On 9 June, 4 major political parties reached a 16-point agreement to deal with the contentious issues.² The Constituent Assembly approved the draft constitution on July 7.³ The draft constitution outlines the mixed electoral system with one-third seats in the legislature guaranteed for women. There will be 275 members in legislature parliament of which 165 will be elected through first-past-the-post system and the rest (110 members) will be elected through the proportional system. The Upper house will have 45 members of which 40 members will be elected equally from each federal province and five will be nominated by president on the recommendation of the council of ministers. Provincial parliaments will be unicameral. The constitution requires that the parties must elect at least one-third women representatives in the federal legislature as well as the provincial legislature. The mixed electoral system is used to elect members of the provincial legislature which is unicameral.

1. “Big 4 agree to settle key disputes in next 3 days,” Republica, May 31 2015.
2. “Way paved for constitution as four parties reach 16-pt deal,” Kathmandu Post, June 9, 2015.
3. “CA concludes deliberation on draft constitution, sends for public feedback,” Himalayan Times, July 7, 2015.

2006

Minimum Implementation

In the peace agreement, both sides agreed to restructure the state into federal units. With respect to federalism, the Maoists were clear; they formed 9 different autonomous republics.[fn]”Nepal’s Maoist Federalism, Autonomy and Social Justice,” Conflict Study Center (Situation Report 47), September 3, 2007.[/efn_note]

2007

Minimum Implementation

Some progress was made towards restructuring the state after this problem was recognized by the interim constitution. The interim constitution made the following provisions:

PART 4
RESPONSIBILITIES, DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES OF THE STATE

33. Responsibilities of the State: The State shall have the following responsibilities:

(d) To carry out an inclusive, democratic and progressive restructuring of the State by eliminating its existing form of centralized and unitary structure in order to address the problems related to women, Dalits, indigenous tribes, Madeshis, oppressed and minority community and other disadvantaged groups, by eliminating class, caste, language, sex, culture, religion and regional discriminations.

PART 17
FORM OF STATE AND LOCAL SELF GOVERNANCE

138. Progressive Restructuring of the State: (1) Inclusive, democratic and progressive restructuring of the state shall be made to bring about an end of the discrimination based on class, caste, language, sex, culture, religion and region by eliminating the centralized and unitary form of the state.

(2) A High Level Commission shall be constituted to recommend for the restructuring of the State in accordance with clause (1) above. The composition, function, duty, power and terms of service of such Commission shall be as determined by the Government of Nepal.

(3) Final decision of restructuring of the State shall be as determined by the Constituent Assembly.

These provisions to the interim constitution, however, needed to be enforced in order to create federal units. Since the CA elections did not take place in 2007, the restructuring of the state did not occur.

The state reconstruction, from unitary to a federal republic, remained a contentious issue along all party and ethnic lines. Madesh groups in the Terai, Limbu, and Rais regions in the east were involved in violent activities. These groups demanded an autonomous state.¹ Along with the division caused by the outbreak of violence based on ethnic identity, the political parties remained divided over federalism. The Maoist party was the clearest in laying out a plan for the creation of federal units. The party formed 11 federal-state and 3 federal-sub-state committees.²

1. “Nepal’s Madeshi Movement: Against Khas Chauvinism,” Conflict Study Center (Situation Update 45), August 6, 2007.
2. “Nepal’s Maoist Federalism, Autonomy and Social Justice,” Conflict Study Center (Situation Report 47), September 3, 2007.

2008

Minimum Implementation

The Constituent Assembly elections took place on 10 April 2008.¹ The CA was supposed to establish a High-Level Commission for Restructuring the State. Political parties were trying to forge a consensus on this commission in June 2008.² The commission, however, was not established in 2008. Nevertheless, the restructuring of the state issue was considered and handled by the Constitutional Committees.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/670), October 24, 2008.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/454), July 10, 2008.

2009

Minimum Implementation

Though it was agreed upon in the peace agreement and provided for in the interim constitution, a High-Level Commission for Restructuring the State was not formed in 2009. The restructuring of the state was expected to end caste/ethnic-based discrimination and create federal units that would allow ethnic castes and minority groups greater representation and involvement in the decision-making processes. In the week between the 11th and 18th of December, 2009, the Maoist party unilaterally declared 13 autonomous states. This plan for the restructuring of the state was heavily criticized by the government and other political parties as it violated the spirit of the CPA.¹ The main political parties remained divided over the issue of federalism. In a survey conducted in 2009 in Nepal, 26.7% opposed federalism, 48.1% supported federalism, and 19.5% wanted federalism to be based on ethnicity or language.²

1. “Nepalis Want New Constitution to Promote Decentralization And Equality,” Carter Center, 2010, accessed August 3, 2011, http://un.org.np.
2. Sudhindra Sharma, “Public opinion of federalism,” The Kathmandu Post, December 8, 2009.

2010

Minimum Implementation

Though it was agreed upon in the peace agreement and provided for in the interim constitution, a High-Level Commission for Restructuring the State was not formed in 2010. Nevertheless, the restructuring of the state was considered and handled by the Constitutional Committees. The CA failed to deliver the constitution by 28 May 2010. The restructuring of the state remains at a standstill mainly because the major political parties have failed to reach a consensus on how to draw the federal states boundaries, and the role ethnic groups will play within the federal state. In the State Restructuring Subcommittee, which is a subset of the Constitutional Committee of the CA, separate political parties presented 26 different modalities.¹ The Nepali Congress Party proposed seven new provinces be created. Though there was much disagreement over how the state would be restructured, the committee was able to pass a 14-province federation by a majority of votes.²

1. Center for Constitutional Dialugue, accessed August 3, 2011, http://www.ccd.org.np.
2. “Parties agree to form state restructuring commission,” Republic, March 4, 2010.

2011

Minimum Implementation

The CA failed again to deliver the draft constitution by the 28 May 2011 deadline. The term of the CA was then extended by another three months. After the CA’s tenure was extended, the three major political parties agreed to establish a State Restructuring Commission. This commission was expected to recommend a viable model for the federal province system to the Constituent Assembly (CA). However, Madesh-based political parties opposed the formation of the commission.¹ The Madeshi demanded that instead, a sub-committee headed by the CPNU-Maoist leader Puspa Kamal Dahal, be established to deal with the restructuring of the state. The reason they favored this specific leader was because the Maoists were responsive to their demands.²

At this point, the State Restructuring Commission has not been established. It is still too early to tell whether federalism will materialize in Nepal. Currently, the Maoists and the Madesh-based politics parties are beginning to recognize that federalism based on ethnicity and language is become a less viable option. The name, number, and boundaries of the future provinces still remain under contention.³

The Madeshi wanted to scrap the constitutional provision of establishing the State Restructuring Commission and the Maoist Party were not opposed to that. On 28 August, the Maoist party and the unified front of the Madeshi parties, United Democratic Madeshi Front (UDMF) made a four-point deal, which among other things included provisions to bypass the formation of the State Restructuring Commission, to form a coalition government. The government was formed on August 28.⁴ Nevertheless, this requires constitutional amendments.

On 1 November 2011, major political parties (Nepali Congress, Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist and Leninists, Communist Party of Nepal- United Maoist and Samyukta Loktantrik Madhesi Morcha) reached a seven-point agreement on army integration, constitution drafting and power-sharing government. According to the accord, the parties agreed to form an expert panel from the CA instead of a constitutional commission on state restructuring.⁵ According to the accord, the government introduced an amendment bill in the legislative parliament to amend the interim constitution and allow the formation of an experts panel instead of a commission. The amendment bill never made to the discussion stage because of differences with the CPN-UM and CPN-UML.⁶ After failure to amend the constitution for the formation of an expertsÕ panel, the main political parties who were signatories of the seven-point accord forged a consensus on 22 November 2011 to form the State Restructuring Commission without a Chairman for a time being. On 22 November 2011, an eight-member SRC was formed (23 November 2011).

1. “Big Three agree to form State Restructuring Commission,” My Republica, May 30, 2011.
2. “Madesh-based parties against formation of state restructuring commission,” Republica, August 23, 2011.
3. “Constitution In Progress: Constitution Building Updates,” Center for Constutitional Dialogue, accessed August 4, 2011, http://www.ccd.org.np.
4. Republica, August 29, 2011.
5. “Parties join hands on peace process,” Kathmandu Post, November 2, 2011.
6. “State Restructuring: Dispute delays statute amendment,” Kathmandu Post, November 17, 2011.

2012

Minimum Implementation

On 31st January 2012, the State Restructuring Commission submitted two separate reports to the government because commissioners in the Commission could not agree on substantive issues related to the bases of federal provinces. In a report submitted by six members, commissioners proposed 11 states based on ethnic identity. It also gave the priority rights to dominant ethnic groups at the local level for one term. The three members prepared a separate report proposing six federal provinces: two from the plains region based on identity, history and culture, and 4four from hill and mountain regions based on economic viability. The report was submitted at the Constituent Assembly for deliberation on 25 March.¹ After discussion at the CA meetings, the report was to be forwarded to the Constitution Committee, which never happened. Nevertheless, on 15 May the parties reached agreement to have 11 provinces but the agreement was not fulfilled by the Maoist because the 11 state model agreed earlier did not resolve the issue related to ethnic identity.² The Constituent Assembly was dissolved without promulgating the constitution on 28 May. As such, the inter-state and ethnic relations provision of the accord was not implemented.

1. “Constitutional Update, Support to Participatory Constitution Building Process in Nepal,” accessed July 20, 2012, http://www.ccd.org.np/.
2. “Maoist party ‘backtracks’ from earlier agreement,” Kathmandu Post, May 20, 2012.

2013

Intermediate Implementation

No progress was made this year.

2014

Intermediate Implementation

Issues related to the number of federal states, demarcation of federal state boundary, and name of such states remained contentious among political parties. The former rebel party and other parties organized around ethnic identity continued to make their demands of federal states based on ethnic identity which was opposed by other mainstream political parties. As a result, the Committee for Constitutional, Political Dialogue and Consensus Building (CCPDC), which was established to sort out differences among political parties and submit reports to the Constituent Assembl,y submitted its report indicating failure to find consensus on many issues including federalism.¹ The ruling coalition had proposed to create seven states whereas the rebel party, Maoist, had proposed for the creation of ten states based on ethnic identity.

1. “CCPDC submits report to CA,” Kathmandu Post, September 13, 2014.

2015

Intermediate Implementation

On 31 May 2015, parties had agreed to reach a consensus on disputed issues including federalism and issues of ethnicity and adopt a fast track approach to produce a draft constitution. On 9 June, 4 major political parties reached a 16-point agreement to deal with the contentious issues¹ The CA engrossed the draft constitution and sent it to publish in the Nepal Gazette to collect people’s feedback for the next fifteen days on 7 July.² According to the draft constitution, Nepal shall have eight provinces based on five criteria of identity (ethnicity/community, language, culture, geography/territorial continuity and historical continuity) and four criteria of capability (economic interdependence, and capability; status of infrastructure development, possibilities; availability of natural resources; administrative feasibility). The Nepal government will form a federal commission to recommend the demarcation of federal provinces. Two third majority of all members of the provincial assemblies will name the provinces.

1. “Way paved for constitution as four parties reach 16-pt deal,” Kathmandu Post, 9 June 2015.
2. “CA concludes deliberation on draft constitution, sends for public feedback,” Himalayan Times, July 7, 2015.

2006

No Implementation

No action was taken towards establishing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).

2007

Minimum Implementation

The interim constitution provided for the creation of a TRC, in order to investigate the violations of human rights and crimes against humanity that took place during the course of the conflict. It was hoped that a TRC would help create an environment that promoted reconciliation. The constitutional provision regarding the TRC reads as follows:

PART 4
RESPONSIBILITIES, DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES OF THE STATE

33. Responsibilities of the State: The State shall have the following responsibilities:

(s) To constitute a high-level Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate the facts regarding grave violation of human rights and crimes against humanity committed during the course of conflict, and create an atmosphere of reconciliation in the society.

According to the OHCHR-Nepal report to the Human Rights Council, “the new Government appointed a five-member High-Level Commission of Inquiry, chaired by former Supreme Court judge, Krishna Jung Rayamajhi, to investigate human rights violations and abuse of State funds since 1 February 2005, including those committed during the April 2006 protests. Its report was submitted to the Government on 22 November, reportedly with over 200 names of individuals against whom action was to be taken. The Council of Ministers appointed a committee to study the findings. However, the Government has resisted repeated calls to make the report public.”[fn]”Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation and the activities of her Office, including technical cooperation, in Nepal,” UNHCR (A/HRC/4/97), January 17, 2007.[/efn_note]

According to the Human Rights Watch Report, a draft Truth and Reconciliation Commission bill was tabled in June 2007. The report contended that the bill proposed to establish a commission with a mandate to investigate gross violations of human rights and crimes against humanity committed during the civil war, between 13 February 1996 and 21 November 2006. The HRW report claimed that “amnesties can be granted even for gross human rights violations if these acts had a political motivation, if the perpetrator made an application indicating regret, or if victims and perpetrators agree to a reconciliation process.”[fn]”World Report,” Human Rights Watch, 2008, accessed August 4, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k8/.[/efn_note]

Even if the government had drafted the bill, the commission was not established in 2007, so it would not have come into effect.

2008

Minimum Implementation

According to the UN Secretary General’s report, the Ministry of Peace and Reconciliation continued to work towards establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. However, the OHCHR-Nepal insisted on a comprehensive and inclusive consultation process.¹

In an effort to establish the TRC, the Council of Ministers on 25 June 2008 singed an agreement that recommitted their parties to establish several commissions, including the TRC.² This recommitment, however, did not materialize due to the delay in the formation of the government.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/313), May 12, 2008.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/454), July 10, 2008.

2009

Minimum Implementation

The creation of a TRC was delayed because a necessary balance between peace and justice had yet to be reached and further inclusive consultations with stakeholders needed to be held. In this regard, the OHCHR-Nepal reported that the Ministry of Peace and Reconciliation consulted together to draft the bill.¹ Although the bill fell short of international standards, the government sent a draft bill to the Legislature-Parliament for consideration in November 2009. The bill assigns criminal responsibility to those involved in acts of disappearances.² However, the TRC was not established in 2009.

1. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation and the activities of her office, including technical cooperation, in Nepal, A/AHC/10/53, 3 March 2009.
2. “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation and the activities of her office, including technical cooperation, in Nepal,” UNHRC (A/HRC/13/73), February 5, 2010.

2010

Minimum Implementation

The bill to establish the TRC remained pending in the legislature-parliament.

2011

Minimum Implementation

The TRC bill was still pending. A TRC had not been established as of 31 December 2011.

2012

Minimum Implementation

In March 2012, three major political parties (CPN-Maoist; Nepali Congress and CPN-UML) agreed to finalize the TRC bill and establish the TRC commission.¹ In April, three major parties agreed to form the TRC and Commission on Disappearance by adopting a reconciliation approach. Parties also agreed to discuss two bills related to the formation of these two commissions.² The bills were pending at the Bill Commission for the past two years. On 19 April 2012, however, parties agreed to integrate two bills into one and propose a single commission. Because the proposed bill focused only on reconciliation and removes provisions on prosecution, the proposed bill was sharply criticized by Human Rights Watch as well as the International Commission of Jurists.³ Because the Constituent Assembly was dissolved without promulgating the constitution on 28 July 2012, the provision related to TRC commission was never implemented. The bill remained pending until the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly.

1. “Leaders likely to finalize TRC bill soon,” Republica, March 5, 2012.
2. “Major Parties Agree to Form Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” Kathmandu Post, April 8, 2012.
3. “Reject amnesty for serious crimes: ICJ, HRW,” Kathmandu Post, April 24, 2012.

2013

Minimum Implementation

No progress was made this year.

2014

Intermediate Implementation

Some significant progress was made on issues related to establishing a truth and reconciliation commission. In January, Nepal’s Supreme Court ordered the government to form a separate commission for truth and reconciliation, and one for disappearance. The court also asked the government to draft a bill in consultation with victims and stakeholders, and scrap the provision for blanket amnesty. On 7 April 2014, major political parties forged an agreement for the establishment of two separate commissions.¹ Accordingly, on 10 April, the government tabled two bills in the legislature parliament on the formation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearance.². Because the TRC law could permit amnesty for serious crimes, rights groups and victims groups opposed the bills.³ Notwithstanding these oppositions, the parliament passed the TRC bills on 26 April 2014. As provided by the TRC bill, a special court will be established to handle war-era cases, and the government attorney must file cases forwarded by TRC.⁴

The government appointed a committee on 16 June to recommend names of five officials for each commission. This process continued this year and therefore these commissions have not been formally established as of December.

1. (“Major parties forge agreement on TRC bills,” Kathmandu Post, April 8, 2014)
2. “TRC bill tabled,” Nepali Times, April 10, 2014
3. “Victims, rights advocates find fault with TRC bill,” Kathmandu Post, April 11, 2014.
4. “Parliament passes TRC bill,” Kathmandu Post, April 27, 2014.

2015

Intermediate Implementation

Upon recommendations of the commission formed to recommend names for the members of each commission, the government appointed Leela Udashi, Krishna Subedi, Dr. Madhavi Bhatta and Manchala Jha as members and a former secretary general at the parliament secretariat Surya Kiran Gurung as the chairman of the TRC commission. The government appointed Bijul Bishwokarma, Prof. Dr. Bishnu Pathak, Narakumari Gurung and Aai Bahadur Gurung as members of the CIED commission with former appellate court’s chief justice Lokendra Mallik as the chairman. Each commission has two years to submit work and the deadline can be extended for a year if the commissions fail to produce reports within two years.¹ Further details on works of these commissions are not available.

1. “Cabinet appoints Gurung as TRC chairman, Mallik as CIED head,” Rising Nepal, Feb 11, 2015.

2006

Minimum Implementation

The CPA did not establish a dispute resolution committee per se. Instead, it established a joint mechanism, comprised of members from all sides. This mechanism was intended to interpret the preamble of the constitution and the documents annexed in the original agreement. No fundamental disputes were reported with regards to the implementation of the CPA in 2006.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

A joint mechanism was used to amend the interim constitution three times in 2007 (the First Amendment on 13 April 2007, the Second Amendment on 13 June 2007 and the Third Amendment on 28 December 2007). These constitutional amendments contained provisions regarding the removal of the prime minister and the king. The provisions mandated that a two-third vote of the interim legislature could remove the prime minister and king should they pose an obstacle to the Constituent Assembly elections.[fn]”Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/235), April 26, 2007.[/efn_note] The Third Amendment ensured Nepal would become a republic; this amendment was implemented during the first session of the CA.[fn]”Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2007, As amended by the First, Second and Third Amendments,” UNDP, Nepal.[/efn_note] Both sides agreed to the creation of these amendments. Among these three amendments, the third addressed the MaoistsÕ demands that the country be declared a republic and that a PR electoral system be used in the upcoming elections. The Maoists withdrew from the government in order that these demands were met. This postponed the elections for a second time. Finally, parties reached a 23-point agreement on December 23. In the agreement, parties agreed to distribute the PR and the direct election seats along a 60-40 percentage line. They also agreed to hold elections before mid-April 2008 and that Nepal would be a republic state. These changes were adopted in the third amendment of the interim constitution on 28 December 2007.[fn]”Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/5), January 3, 2008.[/efn_note] After this agreement was reached, the Maoists opted to join the government on 30 December 2007.[fn]Ibid.[/efn_note]

2008

Intermediate Implementation

After the CA elections were held on 10 April 2008, a dispute over the formation of the national consensus government emerged. Part of the reason this occurred was because the established political parties were reluctant to recognize the Maoists as the largest party in the Constituent Assembly. Finally, parties agreed to amend the constitution for the fifth time. The amendment was adopted on 13 July 2008 and provided the basis for the formation of a majoritarian government.¹

After the elections were held, the most contentious issue remained the peace process, specifically, management of the Maoist combatants. Parties disputed over whether or not the Young Communist Leagues should be dismantled, whether or not the properties seized by the Maoists during the insurgency should be returned, and finally, how peace and democracy would be effectively established. These disputes were not resolved despite the series of dialogues between the political parties at the task-force level and top-leadership level.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/670), October 24, 2008.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

After the elections were held, the most contentious issue remained the peace process. Parties disputed over whether or not the Young Communist Leagues should be dismantled, whether or not the properties seized by the Maoists during the insurgency should be returned, and finally, how peace and democracy would be effectively established. These disputes were not resolved. The Supreme Court ordered the government to return seized properties, but this order was not implemented.¹ A dispute emerged amongst parties over the recruitment of the personnel to the Nepal Army. Parties failed to settle this dispute. The Maoist party eventually acquiesced to pressure to sack the Chief of Armed Staff (CoAS). This led to the collapse of the Maoist-led government when the president decided to reinstate the CoAS.²

1. “Nepal top court orders government to return property seized by Maoists,” BBC Monitoring South Asia, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, January 8, 2009.
2. “Nepal’s Peace Process at the Crossroads,” Conflict Study Center (Situation Update 83), May 10, 2009.

2010

Minimum Implementation

The dispute over recruitment was settled when the Supreme Court dismissed a writ petition challenging how recruitment was handled in the Nepali Army.¹ Nevertheless, other issues, including how to handle the YCL, whether or not to return seized property, and how to best establish peace and democracy, remain contentious.

Because many issues remained unresolved, the CA failed to deliver a draft constitution on the due date of 28 May 2010. To resolve the constitutional disputes, a high-level political mechanism was established and chaired by the Maoist leader and former Prime Minister, Mr. Puspa Kamal Dahal. This mechanism was comprised of representatives from seven parties in the Constituent Assembly, and was formed in October. Its aim was to settle the 210 disputed issues that had been identified by the Agni Kharel-led panel who consulted the concept papers of eight thematic committees of the CA. The task force resolved 100 of the disputed issues.²

1. “SC quashes writ against army recruitment,” The Himalayan Times, July 29, 2010.
2. “Nepal Constitution Drafting – Taskforce settles over 100 of 210 disputed issues,” The Kathmandu Post, December 12, 2010.

2011

Intermediate Implementation

Even though the CPA established a joint dispute resolution mechanism and parties were willing to work together, major issues still remain unresolved.

2012

Intermediate Implementation

The Joint Dispute Resolution mechanism was dysfunctional. Notwithstanding the effort put together by the Joint Dispute Resolution mechanism and willingness of parties to resolve their differences on contentious issues, the mechanism failed to reconcile differences among parties. As a result, the Constituent Assembly failed to promulgate the constitution on 28 May 2012.

2013

Intermediate Implementation

The Joint Dispute Resolution mechanism was dysfunctional.

2014

Intermediate Implementation

As the high level joint dispute resolution mechanism failed to find consensus on various disputed issues, the main political parties agreed to form the Committee for Constitutional, Political Dialogue and Consensus Building (CCPDC) within the CA in order to find consensus on disputed issues. In the Constituent Assembly, elections for the CCPDC chairman and members took place on 25 April. Former rebel leader and former Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai was elected unopposed as the chairman.¹ The CCPDC had three months to submit its report to the CA. The CCPDC submitted its report in September in which it outlined disputed issues that were resolved and issues that were not resolved.²

1. “Bhattarai elected chairperson of CA’s political dialogue comm,” Nepal News, April 25, 2014.
2. “CCPDC submits report to CA,” Kathmandu Post, 13 September 2014.

2015

Intermediate Implementation

While some major issues related to federalism, form of government, judiciary, and electoral system remained contested, a high level political mechanism involving senior leaders from major political parties continued to meet. After the earthquake on 12 May, senior leaders from major political parties prioritized finding solutions to disputed issues and finalizing the constitution drafting process in order to focus on post-earthquake reconstruction. As of 3 June 2015, leaders from major political parties are engaged in dialogue with hope to resolve disputed issues within days.¹ Most of the disputes except for the demarcation of the boundary for the provinces were settled and the CA passed the draft constitution on 7 July 2015.² For the boundary demarcation, the drafting committee suggested the establishment of a federal commission, which was mentioned in the draft constitution.

1. “Disputed issues should be finalized soon: NC,” Kathmandu Post, June 3, 2015.
2. “CA concludes deliberation on draft constitution, sends for public feedback,” Himalayan Times, July 7, 2015.

2006

No Implementation

When the conflict ended in 2006 the then Royal Nepal Army (RNA) had over 91,000 personnel. The number of personnel had increased sharply from 45,000 in 1990. In 2011, the Nepal Army (NA)was 105,500 strong according to the US Central Intelligence Agency.[fn]”Nepal Military Strength, Nepal Military Strength Detail by the numbers,” accessed August 8, 2011, http://www.globalfirepower.com.[/efn_note] The CPA called for the inclusive democratization of the NA along with the integration of Maoist combatants. To ensure that this happened, the CPA established a cabinet appointed commission. These changes, however, did not materialize in 2006.

2007

Minimum Implementation

The interim constitution was promulgated on 15 January 2007. The constitution addressed the civilian control of the NA and the integration of Maoist combatants specifically:

PART 20
PROVISIONS REGARDING THE ARMY

144. Formation of Nepal Army: (1) There shall be a Nepal Army in Nepal as an institution.

(2) The Council of Ministers shall appoint the Commander-in-Chief of the Nepal Army.

(3) The Council of Ministers shall control, mobilize and manage the Nepal Army in accordance with the law. The Council of Ministers shall, with the consent of the political parties and by seeking the advice of the concerned committee of the Legislature-Parliament, formulate an extensive work plan for the democratization of the Nepal Army and implement it.

(4) In the case of formulating and implementing the action plan pursuant to clause (3) above, determination of the appropriate number of Nepal Army, its democratic structure and national and inclusive character shall be developed, and training shall be imparted to the army in accordance with the norms and values of democracy and human rights. (5) The other matters pertaining to the Nepal Army shall be as provided for in the law.

145. National Defense Council: (1) There shall be a National Defense Council in order to recommend the Council of Ministers for mobilization, operation and use of the Nepal Army Consisting with the following chairman and members:-

(a) Prime Minister Chairman
(b) Defense Minister Member
(c) Home Minister Member
(d) Three ministers nominated by the Prime Minister Members

(2) In case the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister would be the same person, the senior most member of the Council of Ministers shall be the member of the National Defense Council.

(3) If the National Defense Council deems necessary, it may invite other persons at the meeting of the Council.

(4) The Secretary of the Ministry of Defense shall work as the Secretary of the National Defense Council, and, in his/her absence, the officer designated by the Prime Minister shall carry out such work.

(5) Except in the case of mobilization of Nepal Army for the reason of natural calamities, the decision made by the Council of Ministers of the Government of Nepal for the mobilization of the army shall have to be presented to the special committee prescribed by the Legislature-
Parliament within a month of the decision, and be approved accordingly. (6) The National Defiance Council may regulate its working procedures on its own.

146. Interim Provision for the Combatants: The Council of Minister shall form a special committee to supervise, integrate and rehabilitate the combatants of the Maoist Army, and the functions, duties and powers of the committee shall be as determined by the Council of ministers.

The constitution makes the NA responsible to the civilian government by breaking its traditional ties with the palace. The democratization of the army is extremely controversial, since the NA had never been involved in politics in the past.

The Maoists demanded that the Army Integration Special Committee (AISC) be formed before the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) began to verify the Maoist combatants in the cantonments.¹ According to the Secretary General’s report, the Maoists also demanded, as precondition for the UNMIN verification, that a new national force be created that included members from both sides of the conflict.² This obviously delayed the verification process. The Army Integration Special Committee (AISC) was not formed in 2007. The Maoist combatants were also not integrated into the army during that year. On 23 December 2007 the Seven Party Alliance and the Maoists signed the 23-point agreement, which mandated the formation of a special committee to handle the implementation of these demands.

1. “UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/442), July 18, 2007.
2. “UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/612), October 18, 2007.

2008

Minimum Implementation

On 25 June 2008 the major political parties agreed to amend the constitution in order to further the peace process. Accordingly the constitution was amended on 13 July 2008¹. Parties agreed to form a multiparty Special Committee within 15 days. But the formation of the committee was delayed and formed on 28 October 2008.² In the agreement, parties came to the concord that the “verified combatants would have a choice between possible integration into security bodies ‘after fulfilling the standard requirements,Õ and an economic package and other alternatives for rehabilitation.”³ However, immediately after the formation of the Special Committee, progress was stalemated because of the controversy surrounding the parameter of the committee’s functions and composition.⁴ The democratization of the NA also remained a contentious issue.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/670), October 24, 2008.
2. “Maoist combatants handed over to SC at a function in Shaktikhor,” Himalayan Times, January 23, 2011.
3. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/454), July 10, 2008.
4. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2009/1), January 2, 2009.

2009

Minimum Implementation

The Special Committee met for the first time on 16 January 2009. The Committee is comprised of two representatives from the UCPN-M, UML, MPRF and NC. The committee adopted its terms of reference on 5 February. These terms elaborated the committee’s responsibilities, which included compiling a list of soldiers wishing to be integrated into the army or rehabilitated. The Special Committee established the Technical Committee on 27 March. It was responsible for providing technical support and assisting the Special Committee.¹ Later, the Maoist government, made the controversial decision to dismiss the Chief of Army Staff, General Rookmangud Katawal. However, President Ram Baran Yadav intervened and reversed the Cabinet’s decision. This reversal prompted Prime Minister Dahal’s resignation on 4 May 2009.² This resignation led to political uncertainty, which delayed the work of the Special Committee and the Technical Committee.³ Under the direction of the CPN-UML leader, Madhav Kumar Nepal, a coalition government of 21 parties formed on 23 May 2009.⁴ After many discussions over its composition, the Special Committee was reactivated and met on 1 September 2009. The mandate of the Technical Committee was also extended by three months.⁵

The Special Committee and the Technical Committee began functioning after remaining inactive for months. However, integration of the Maoist combatants did not occur. After the appointment of a new COAS Chatra Man Gurung as per the Cabinet decision on 9 September 2009, the democratization or civilian control of the NA could be deemed settled. The NA worked in concordance with the cabinet decisions.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2009/221), April 24, 2009.
2. “Nepal’s Peace Process at the Crossroads,” Conflict Study Center (Situation Update 83), May 10, 2009.
3. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2009/351), July 13, 2009.
4. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations S(/2009/351), July 13, 2009.
5. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2009/553), October 26, 2009.

2010

Minimum Implementation

The Secretary General reported that the Prime Minister had submitted a 112-day action to the Special Committee. This action contained a plan for the integration and rehabilitation of the Maoist army before the promulgation of the constitution due on 28 May 2010. Yet many parties disagreed with the action plan. The SC then requested that a high-level political mechanism be formed to make political decisions on issues related to integration. This issue was not resolved in 2010. The integration of the Maoist’s ex-combatants did not occur during this year.¹ These issues, along with the democratization could be deemed settled as the Nepal Army always functioned in concordance with the cabinet decisions.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2010/214), April 28, 2010.

2011

Minimum Implementation

On 22 January 2011, the Maoist’s PLA came formally under the Special Committee for Army Integration. Prior to this, the PLA were under the UNMIN’s Supervision.¹ This was an important step in the progress of integration; however, the issues surrounding the integration modality and rehabilitation of ex-combatants remained unsettled. As of September, the Maoists wanted to integrate as many as 8,000 ex-combatants. Yet the other parties (more specifically the NC and CPN-UML) in the Special Committee only wanted to integrate up to 7,000 combatants.² Also, there has been some progress to the options of rehabilitation or voluntary retirement package. The voluntary retirement package bestows a lump sum of NRs 450,000 on the retiree.³ The NA also proposed to create a separate but mixed force consisting of qualified ex-combatants and personnel from the existing security sector. Furthermore, it proposed a separate directorate for the new force that will remain under the control of the Nepalese Army. The NA made this proposal in May 2011. For the most part it has gained support from all the stakeholders, yet the modalities of the integration, the system of ranking, and the rehabilitation packages, are still to be determined.

1. “NEPAL: Maoist Combatants Come Under the Control of Government: Update No. 243,” South Asia Analysis Group, January 26, 2011.
2. “PLA integration: Parties keen, complexities remain,” Kathmandu Post, June 5, 2011.
3. “Golden Handshake for PLA combatants: Panel plans Rs 450,000 for fighters,” Kathmandu Post, June 10, 2011.

2012

Intermediate Implementation

The main political parties finally agreed in December 2011 to integrate 6,500 combatants into the Nepalese Army.¹ Ex-combatants went through the re-verification process and they were given options either to opt for a voluntary retirement, join the Nepalese Army or rehabilitate.² In terms of allocating positions to the integrated Maoist combatants, the Nepal Army had proposed to give 64 combatants the rank of major, 120 combatants the captain, 96 lieutenants and 120 second lieutenants. In doing so, the army had counted the cut-off date on rank determination. They also argued that its cadets enrolled in 1996 had so far given the rank of major. The army had took the position that the combatants at the lower rank need to complete a nine-month training and those at the office level need to go 20-month training after completing the bridge course. The NA was against the unit-wise entry as the combatants were looking for.³

The integration was to occur on an individual basis, which was contrary to what the Maoist leader had promised the PLA combatants: group entry into the Nepalese army, rank considerations based on combatantsÕ current level of education, and high ranking positions to PLA commanders. Internal divisions with the party and discontent among combatants created a security threat to the PLA commanders in cantonments. The Maoist party chairman made a dramatic decision that the Nepalese Army should take control of the cantonments, combatants and the weapon containers. Wthin a day, all the cantonments and weapons came under the control of the Nepal Army.⁴ This development, perceived as a betrayal by many in the cantonment sites, led to a large decline in the number of those wanting to be part of the government army. The number of combatants seeking integration declined from 9,705 in the initial re-grouping process down to 3,194.⁵

The integration process however became contentious among former Maoist combatants as the process moved similar to new recruitment in the Nepal Army. As a result, the former Maoist combatants asked the Maoist party and its Chairman to negotiate with other political parties for the respectable integration. Alternatively, the former combatants asked the Maoist party to take a decision to send all combatants for voluntary retirement if other parties remained inflexible.⁶ Reintegration process started in the second week of September. As of 14 September 2012, among combatants willing to join the national army, only 1,647 were selected for the integration of which 86 former Maoist combatants were selected for officer positions. Remaining combatants opted for voluntary retirement and received reintegration package.⁷

1. “Number of NA aspirants sees a free fall,” Kathmandu Post, April 18, 2012.
2. “Parties divided on ways to reduce PLA number for integration,” Kathmandu Post, December 19, 2011.
3. “Army shows further flexibility on PLA integration,” Kathmandu Post, February 16, 2012.
4. “Army takes charge of PLA fighters, weapons,” Kathmandu Post, April 2012.
5. “Number of NA aspirants sees a free fall,” Kathmandu Post, April 18, 2012.
6. “Former PLA commanders urge early decision on integration,” Kathmandu Post, July 31, 2012.
7. “1,647 to be vetted for integration process,” My Republica, September 14, 2012.

2013

Full Implementation

On 13 March 2013, political parties reached an agreement on the highest rank to be attained by the ex-rebel combatants. According to the agreement, the highest rank will be one colonel, two lieutenant colonels, 13 majors, 30 captains and 24 lieutenants. A total of 1,422 ex-combatants jointed the Nepal Army and this process was concluded on 5 July 2013.¹ These new entrants were said to be housed in the newly formed General Directorate for National Development within the Nepal Army.

1. “1352 Ex-Combatants Now Army Personnel,” Kathmandu Post, July 6, 2013.

2014

Full Implementation

Military reform took place in 2013. No further development reported.

2015

Full Implementation

No further development reported.

2006

No Implementation

The CPA required that the Maoist combatants be held in 7 main and 21 satellite cantonment sites for the purposes of verification and subsequently, demobilization, integration, and rehabilitation. Similarly, the CPA required that the Nepali Army (NA) be confined to the barracks. More details of the process were outlined in a separate agreement called the Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies, which was signed on 8 December 2006. Accordingly, the Nepal government requested that the UN monitor the management of arms and armies.[fn]”Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/7), January 9, 2007.[/efn_note]

2007

Intermediate Implementation

The cantonment of the Maoist combatants started as soon as the United Nations Mission in Nepal was established on 23 January 2007. In a press statement on 23 February 2007, the UNMIN claimed that 32,250 Maoist combatants were registered either in the seven major cantonment sites or in the 21 satellite sites. A news report attested that the first phase of the registration of combatants was completed within one month. The UNMIN reported the results to the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee (JMCC) on March 8 confirming 31,252 personnel and 3,475 weapons.¹ The registered number of Maoist combatants later increased slightly to 32,250.² Once the cantonment process was complete, the UNMIN had to verify the registered combatants, in order that those unqualified for reintegration could be demobilized. This verification process was completed by the end of 2007. Accordingly, the UNMIN began the second phase of the registration on 19 June 2007. The second phase involved collecting the age of the recruits, as well as the date of their recruitment, so as to establish their eligibility as combatants. This process started on 19 June 2007.³ Those who were disqualified and those who were qualified but opted out of reintegration were to be subsequently demobilized.

1. “UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/235), April 26, 2007.
2. Ameet Dhakal, “The People’s Liberation Army (PLA),” Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2009.
3. “UNMIN and peace process Not properly utilized,” Himalayan Times, November 5, 2010.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

The UNMIN verified 19,602 ex-combatants as meeting the criteria for reintegration. 8,640 ex-combatants were not available for the verification. Among the initially registered combatants, 4,008 were disqualified. Among these disqualified combatants, 1,035 were recruited after the ceasefire code of conduct was signed on 26 May 2006. 2,973 Maoist combatants were under the age of eighteen at the time the ceasefire code of conduct agreement was signed.¹ According to the report, the disqualified combatants received allowances. However, their scheduled discharge or demobilization did not occur because of the political uncertainty that surrounded the formation of the government after the Constituent Assembly elections.² The disqualified combatants were not formally discharged from the cantonments in 2008.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/259), April 18, 2008.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/454), July 10, 2008.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

In February, the Special Committee for the Integration and Rehabilitation of Maoist combatants requested that the Government allow them to proceed with the discharge and rehabilitation of 4,008 Maoist ex-combatants. After months of delay, the demobilization of unqualified combatants began on 11 October 2009.¹ This process, however, was not completed in 2009.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2009/553), October 26, 2009.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

The discharge or demobilization of the disqualified was completed on 8 February 2010. According to the discharge plan, the UN monitored the discharge process and provided rehabilitation support for the discharged child combatants.¹ The discharge of the unqualified combatants, however, did not complete the demobilization process. The demobilization of those who qualified, but did not wish to be reintegrated, has yet to begin. This has been delayed because the qualified combatants have yet to be integrated into the security force, as agreed on in the CPA.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2010/183), April 13, 2010.

2011

Intermediate Implementation

The demobilization of those who qualified, but did not wish to be reintegrated, has yet to begin. This has been delayed because the qualified combatants have yet to be integrated into the security force, as agreed on in the CPA.

In December 2011, the main political parties agreed to integrate 6,500 Maoist combatants into the Nepalese Army.¹ For the integration process to begin, parties agreed to allow the Special Committee to re-verify combatants in seven main and 21 satellite cantonment sites. Of 19,602 Maoist combatants that met the criteria for reintegration in the UNMIN verification, 17,074 combatants participated, of which 9,705 opted for integration into the state army.²

1. “Number of NA aspirants sees a free fall,” Kathmandu Post, April 18, 2012.
2. “Parties divided on ways to reduce PLA number for integration,” Kathmandu Post, December 19, 2011.

2012

Intermediate Implementation

By mid-February, almost 40% of 17,170 verified combatants who chose retirement options and to be rehabilitated were given initial payments and demobilized.¹ After the combatants retired (demobilized), the Special Committee for Supervision, Integration and Rehabilitation decided to vacate 13 cantonment sites.² The numbers of demobilized former-Maoist combatants increased over time due to dissatisfaction among combatants regarding the integration process, which was said to be very disrespectful, and the party’s decision to allow the Nepal Army to control the cantonment sites which contained weapons locked in secured lock boxes. By mid-April, there were only 3,194 combatants down from 9,705 waiting for integration. Others chose voluntary retirement and were demobilized.³ After four years of inter-party negotiations, some 16,000 Maoist combatants were formally demobilized. As of September 2012, an additional 1,762 have opted for voluntary retirement.⁴ They received their retirement package and demobilized.

1. “Special Committee to close 14 PLA camps,” Kathmandu Post, February 13, 2012.
2. “Maoist cantonments to be reduced,” Kathmandu Post, February 29, 2012.
3. “Number of NA aspirants sees a free fall,” Kathmandu Post, April 18, 2012.
4. “1,647 to be vetted for integration process,” My Republica, September 14, 2012.

2013

Full Implementation

As of July 2013, the demobilization process was concluded. A total of 17,076 who showed up after the UN verification in 2011 were demobilized. Among the 17,076, a total of 9,705 ex-combatants opted for integration, 7,365 choose voluntary discharge and six combatants were registered for rehabilitation.¹

1. “Political risk and ex-combatants,” Martin Chautari, Policy Brief No. 9, page 3 http://www.martinchautari.org.np/.

2014

Full Implementation

A process to demobilize ex-combatants concluded in 2013.

2015

Full Implementation

No further development reported.

2006

No Implementation

The 2006 CPA does not specifically call for disarmament. Rather, the CPA and the subsequent Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA) signed on 8 December 2006, demand that all Maoist weaponry be securely stored within a cantonment. These arms must be sealed within the container, which must have a single-lock and the key must be given to the concerned party. The containers were to be monitored by the UN. The Nepal Army was said to have placed an equivalent number of weapons, to those stored by the Maoist army, under around-the-clock United NationsÕ monitoring.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

According to the CPA and the subsequent AMMAA agreement, 3,475 Maoist weapons were registered and stored in one location. The process was completed in April 2007. In accordance with the agreement, 2,855 weapons from the Nepal Army were registered and stored. Among the weapons registered by the Maoists, 96 were retained outside the cantonments for the security of the Maoist leaders.[fn]”Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/235), April 26, 2007.[/efn_note] This development is recognized as the complete implementation of the CPA. Nevertheless, these weapons were not fully detached from the combatants.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

Arms that had belonged to the Maoists were securely stored and monitored by the UNMIN. The Nepal Army, matching this number, stored the same amount of weapons.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2011

Intermediate Implementation

Arms that had belonged to the Maoists were securely stored and monitored by the UNMIN. The Nepal Army, matching this number, stored the same amount of weapons. The UNMIN left Nepal in January 2011, at which point the Special Committee started monitoring the cantonments and arms. As the deadline for the extension of the Constituent Assembly loomed, the Nepali Congress Party, as a pre-condition to extending the tenure of the CA, demanded that the weapons stored in the cantonments be handed over to the government and that state security personnel be deployed to supervise the cantonment sites.¹ In the end, the Maoists agreed to return their own security, but refused to hand over the key to the arms container. However, as of 7 August 2011, Maoist combatants had not been allowed to return to duty as security guards for their leaders.²

On 27 August 2011, a day ahead of the election for the Prime Minister, the remaining combatants providing security to the Maoists leaders, especially Vice-chairman Mohan Baidya, were returned to the cantonment.³

1. “Peace process: NC, Maoist war on weapons handover goes on,” Kathmandu Post, May 26, 2011.
2. “Special Committee meet put off,” Republica, August 8, 2011.
3. Republica, August 28, 2011.

2012

Full Implementation

Disarmament process can be said completed in April when the Maoist party allowed the Nepal Army to take control of its weapons locked in boxes. Within a day, the Nepal Army took control of all weapons in the cantonment sites.¹

1. “Army takes charge of PLA fighters, weapons,” Kathmandu Post, April 10, 2012.

2013

Full Implementation

No further development reported.

2014

Full Implementation

No further development reported.

2015

Full Implementation

No further development reported.

2006

No Implementation

(2006 CPA uses the term “rehabilitation” which is similar to reintegration.)

The Special Committee responsible for the integration and rehabilitation of Maoist army combatants has yet to finalize the modality for the integration of ex-Maoists combatants. They have also not finalized a package for those who prefer to be reintegrated back to the society.

2007

No Implementation

No progress made on integration and rehabilitation modalities.

2008

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2009

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2010

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2011

Minimum Implementation

Progress is being made on rehabilitation package to those ex-combatants willing to go back to civilian lives, but a substantive steps are yet to be taken. Parties had discussed a ‘golden handshakeÕ package that would grant a lump sum of NRs 450,000 to those combatants wishing to be reintegrated back into the society.[fn]”Golden Handshake for PLA combatants: Panel plans Rs 450,000 for fighters,” Kathmandu Post, June 10, 2011.[/efn_note]

The US and the international community have begun to show interest in supporting Nepal’s peace process in general and specifically in the rehabilitation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) combatants.[fn]”US willing to support in Maoist combatants’ rehab: DeLisi,” Republica, August 6, 2011.[/efn_note]

2012

Full Implementation

By July 2012, some 16,000 Maoist combatants choose voluntary retirement in different phases. Those opting for voluntary retirement received retirement and rehabilitation packages to return back to civilian lives in their communities.¹ In September, additional 1,762 have opted for voluntary retirement.² They received their retirement package and were in a process to be rehabilitated back to their communities.

1. “Number of NA aspirants sees a free fall,” Kathmandu Post, April 18, 2012; Former PLA commanders urge early decision on integration, Kathmandu Post, July 31, 2012.
2. “1,647 to be vetted for integration process,” My Republica, September 14, 2012.

2013

Full Implementation

Based on their rank, ex-combatants who chose integration, voluntary discharge or rehabilitation received between $5,300-$8,500 in two installments. Reports claimed that the ex-combatants were engaged in buying lands, building homes and a family life. They were engaged in various economic activities such as starting shops and agricultural activities. Nevertheless, they reported economic hardships and expressed political dissatisfaction on how the Maoist leaders handled the combatant issues.¹

1. “Political risk and ex-combatants,” Martin Chautari, Policy Brief No. 9, http://www.martinchautari.org.np/

2014

Full Implementation

Reintegration process concluded as of 2013.

2015

Full Implementation

No further development reported.

2006

Full Implementation

The Informal Sector Service Center reports that the government withdrew its charges under the Terrorist and Destructive Activities Ordinance (TADO) on 25 May, after parliament was restored. Subsequently, they decided to release all the Maoist prisoners. The release of these prisoners started the following day. The government made these decisions with the hopes that they would create an environment conducive to dialogue. After releasing the prisoners, on 26 May 2006, the first round of discussions began. The discussions were successful as both sides reached a 25-point ceasefire code of conduct on the first day.[fn]”Human Rights Yearbook 2007,” Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), 2007.[/efn_note]

2007

Full Implementation

Prisioners were released in 2006. According to the US State Department Human Rights Practice Report, there were political prisoners in Nepal at the beginning of the year but all of them were released by the end of the year.¹

1. “2006 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- Nepal,” US State Department, 2007, accessed August 8, 2011, http://www.state.gov.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2013

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2014

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2015

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Minimum Implementation

From September 2006 to December 2006, the INSEC reported that the human rights situation had improved. Nevertheless, the INSEC documented that both the state and the Maoists had killed at least one person each in December 2006.[fn]”Human Rights Yearbook 2007,” Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), 2007.[/efn_note]

2007

Minimum Implementation

The human rights situation deteriorated in 2007. According to the INSEC report, violent armed groups emerged in the Tarai region and non-state actors were actively engaged in human rights violations. In 2007, the non-state actors killed 514 people. This figure includes 15 who had been killed by the Maoists. During the same period, the state killed 37 people.¹ The INSEC also reported that Maoists were involved in activities like abduction and extortion.

1. Ibid; “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/612), October 18, 2007.

2008

Minimum Implementation

In 2008, 541 people were killed. This figure includes 50 people killed by the state and eight people killed by the Maoists and affiliated organizations. Similarly 729 people were abducted. This figure includes 138 people kidnapped by the Maoists and 162 people kidnapped by its sister organization, the Young Communist League. With regards to electoral-related violence, it was reported that the Maoists killed 12 people, injured another 383, beat 813, threatened 142 and abducted 304. Other political parties were also involved in similar activities. Yet the MaoistsÕ violations of human rights surpassed those of all parties.¹ Incidents of violations of human rights by other non-state actors were very high during the year.

1. “Human Rights Yearbook 2009,” Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), 2009; “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2009/313), May 12, 2008.

2009

Minimum Implementation

The INSEC reported 1420 counts of human rights violations by the state and 5,137 counts of violations by non-state actors. In 2009, the state killed 41 people. The Maoists, and their affiliated organization, killed three. A total of 473 people were killed during this year. The Maoists and affiliated organizations were also involved in the capturing of property. During the same period, the Maoists and their affiliated organizations beat at least 491 people. The state beat 243 people.¹ Incidents of violations of human rights by other non-state actors were very high during the year.

1. “Human Rights Yearbook 2009,” Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), 2010.

2010

Minimum Implementation

In 2010, a total of 459 people were killed. Of this figure, 32 people were killed by the state, and 5 people were killed by the Maoists. The Maoists also abducted 55 people and issued 123 threats compared with the state, which threatened 5 people. During the same period, the number of beatings enacted by the state was 122. The Maoists enacted 370 beatings.¹ Incidents of violations of human rights by other non-state actors were very high during the year.

1. “Human Rights Yearbook 2010,” Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), 2011.

2011

Minimum Implementation

The situation did not improve in 2011. According to INSEC, 19 people were killed in the first three months of 2011. This included one person being killed by the state. Non-state armed groups, (not including the Maoists), were responsible for the rest of the killings. Similarly, there were reports of 17 abductions. This figure includes 6 persons abducted by the Maoists.¹ Between July and September 2011, 25 individuals were killed in 19 different districts. Among those, three were killed by the state, two by Akhil Tarai Jantantrik Mukti Morcha and 19 people were killed by unidentified persons.[fn vaue=7]”Trend Analysis- July-September 2011,” INSEC, 2011, accessed July 31, 2012, http://www.inseconline.org.[/efn_note]

1. “Trend Analysis-April-June 2011,” INSEC, 2011, accessed August 10, 2011, http://www.inseconline.org.

2012

Minimum Implementation

Human rights situation did not improve in 2012. In its report, Amnesty International suggested Nepal heading toward “full-spectrum impunity” because the government reneged on its commitment to hold perpetrators of human rights abuses accountable before the law.¹ As a matter of fact, Nepal was criticized by the International Commission of Jurists and Human Rights Watch as political parties were preparing for general amnesty for all conflict-era crimes through the proposed transitional justice commissions.² The human rights violation trend for 2012, however, is not available from the local human rights organizations.

1. “Report: Nepal towardsfull-spectrum impunity,” Kathmandu Post, May 25, 2012.
2. “Reject amnesty for serious crimes: ICJ, HRW,” Kathmandu Post, April 24, 2012.

2013

Minimum Implementation

The human rights situation did not improve in 2013. For lack of political commitment to prosecute those responsible for conflict era human rights abuses, a culture of impunity prevails. On allegations of human rights abuses against Nepali people, especially for torturing two civilians in an army barrack in 2005, Colonel Kurma Lama from the Nepal Army was arrested in in Great Britain in January 2013.¹ The Nepal government had asked for the immediate release of the colonel (“Nepal’s Colonel Kumar Lama held after court appearance,” BBC News, January 5 , 2013). The government hired internationally recognized Kingslay Napley law firm to defend Col. Lama.² The country’s top human rights monitoring mechanism, National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), had no commissioners since 16 September as the government allowed the terms of all commissioners to expire and did not appoint new commissioners.³ The NHRC had called for the prosecution of those responsible for conflict era human rights violations.

1. “UK defends decision to prosecute Nepalese colonel accused of torture,” The Guardian, January 6 , 2013
2. “Pinochet lawyers take up Col Lama case,” Kathmandu Post, January 24, 2013.
3. “Nepal: Appoint Independent Rights Commissioners,” Human Rights Watch, September 19, 2013.

2014

Full Implementation

The human rights situation did not improve in 2014. After the arrest of Col. Lama in Great Britain, the Maoist party and the government had felt pressure to establish the truth and reconciliation commission to deal with the conflict era human rights violation cases. Both sides were in agreement to give immunity to those who were involved in serious human rights violation during the conflict. Accordingly, after an agreement with all parties, the government on 10 April tabled two bills in the legislature parliament on the formation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearance.¹ Because the TRC law could permit amnesty for serious crimes, rights groups and victims groups opposed the bills.² Notwithstanding these oppositions, the parliament passed the TRC bills on 26 April 2014. The bill was criticized by victims groups and national and international human rights organizations. The formation of the TRC and CIED commission however faced setbacks as the law required that the National Human Rights Commission chairperson or his designated member be a committee member. After almost a year, the government appointed former Chief Justice Anup Raj Sharma as the Chairman of the NHRC. Other members of the commission were former Supreme Court justice Prakash Osti, Senior Advocate Govinda Sharma Pudel, rights activist Sudip Pathak and former member of National Women’s Commission Mohona Ansari.³

1. “TRC bill tabled,” Nepali Times, April 10, 2014.
2. “Victims, rights advocates find fault with TRC bill,” Kathmandu Post, April, 11, 2014.9
3. “NHRC gets chairman, four commissioners,” Kathmandu Post, September 20, 2014.

2015

Full Implementation

Prosecuting those involved in human rights violations and whether they should be granted amnesty or not remain sensitive issues. On 27 February 2015, the Supreme Court annulled the amnesty provisions in the TRC bill in a response to the appeal filed by over 200 conflict victims.¹ The decision was hailed as a victory for the victims but the Maoist and splinter groups called for the nullification of the Supreme Court verdict. The court also had limited the mandate of the TRC and CIED commission so that they could not recommend amnesty.²

1. “Court rescinds amnesty clause,” Kathmandu Post, Feb 28, 2015.
2. “Political move cannot correct verdict: lawyers,” Kathmandu Post, April 8, 2015.

2006

Minimum Implementation

As soon as the Maoists declared a unilateral ceasefire, those who had been displaced due to the conflict and had fled to India began to return to their communities. It was reported that thousands of people from the western hill districts of Humla, Mugu, Kalikot, Bajhang, Bajura, Achham, Baitadi, Doti and Dadeldhura, returned.[fn]”Nepal Displaced Nepali people returning home,” ReliefWeb, May 3, 2006, accessed August 11, 2011 http://reliefweb.int.[/efn_note] The process of rehabilitating the IDPs was slow. This was due, not only to the fact that the Maoists failed to abide by the ceasefire, but also to the fact that the government failed to introduce effective policies and plans. Also, local and district level Maoist activists demanded trials of displaced people in their own judicial system called the “people’s court.”[fn]”Human Rights Yearbook 2007,” Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), 2007.[/efn_note]

2007

Minimum Implementation

According to the UN Office of Coordination and Humanitarian Affairs, the IDPs started to return spontaneously to Nepal due to improved security.¹ It was reported that the Maoists burdened the rehabilitation process because they did not fulfill their commitment to return captured property. Nevertheless, the government came up with an IDP policy and program in February. The government decided “to provide Rs300- Rs 1,000 per IDP as fare to return home, plane fare for the IDPs of Karnali from Nepalgunj, Rs 25,000 of loan without interest for crop and animal husbandry, Rs 10,000 to buy seed and sapling, Rs 15,000 for cattle, Rs 10,000 for every house exploded or torched and Rs 5,000 for repair work of the houses.”²

1. OCHA. 2007. “OCHA Nepal Situation Overview,” OCHA (Issue No. 9), December 2006.
2. “Human Rights Yearbook 2007,” Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), 2008, 83.

2008

Minimum Implementation

Although the Maoists leaders were committed to rehabilitating the displaced persons, they did not return the property seized during the conflict.¹ Nevertheless, the government took the initiative and encouraged the IDPs to return home by providing them with up to Rs 50,000 to put towards food, clothing, health care and shelter for a temporary basis. The government also formed a working group that was tasked with planning how to settle those who could not return to their community. The work of this group, however, was not made public in 2008.²

Based on the number of registered IDPs, the government estimated that there were 44,831 IDPs in the country, while the NGOs and international agencies estimated the figure to be between 50,000 and 70,000.³

1. “Human Rights Yearbook 2009,” Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), 2009.
2. Ibid., 87.
3. “NEPAL: IDPs still waiting for help, despite peace accord,” IRIN, August 6, 2008, accessed August 11, 2011, http://www.irinnews.org.

2009

Minimum Implementation

The IDPs gradually returned to their communities, however, as per the statistics collected by the Nepali Congress, some 40,000 families remained displaced. Due to flooding and landslides, the number of displaced persons increased. It was reported that the victims were deprived of the meager relief assistance that had been originally provided by the state.¹

1. “Human Rights Yearbook 2007,” Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), 2010.

2010

Minimum Implementation

The IDP policy of the government was not properly implemented and it was reported that up to 70,000 people were either unable or unwilling to return home.¹

1. “Failed Implementation Of IDP Policy In Nepal Leaves Many Unassisted,” Indigenous People’s Issues Today, January 30, 2010.

2011

Minimum Implementation

Between 2008 and 2011, the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction helped around 25,000 people officially registered as IDPs to return home. And, many returned IDPs were said had difficulty to meet their basic needs. Part of the reasons was related to the return of land and property ceased by the Maoist party during conflict.¹ As such, the IDP issue was not resolved in 2011.

1. “NEPAL: Unresolved property issues and IDP policy hiatus undermine search for durable solutions,” Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), 2012, accessed August 20, 2012, http://www.internal-displacement.org.

2012

Minimum Implementation

The IDMC estimates that around 50,000 conflict-era IDPs are either unwilling or unable to return to their communities as of April 2012. The issues that hindered the return of IDPs were related to unresolved property or land issue, insecurity and lack of government assistance.¹

1. Ibid.

2013

Intermediate Implementation

Nepal Peace Trust Fund reported that the estimated 50,000 IDPs who were displaced during the conflict were rehabilitated in 73 different districts. The project cost about five million USD.¹ However, many of those who were displaced during the conflict were not returning back to their communities. Part of the reason was related to the rebel control over their land and property. The Maoist party has committed to return confiscated land and property to its rightful owner but this has yet to happen.²

1. “Special Program for Rehabilitation of IDPs,” Nepal Peace Trust Fund, 2013. http://www.nptf.gov.np/userfiles/NPTF%20-%20Cluster%202%20Project%20Sheets%20%2821%20May%2012%29_1.pdf.
2. “After 13-hr marathon, parties okay cj govt,” Kathmandu Post, March 14, 2013.

2014

Full Implementation

Nepal Peace Trust Fund reported completion of the conflict era IDP resettlement programs. Nevertheless, many conflict-era victims are yet to return to their communities for psychological reasons.¹

1. “Displaced 8 years ago, conflict victims still ‘unwillingÕ to return,” Kathmandu Post, April 24 , 2014.

2015

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year. Earthquake on 12 May displaced hundreds of thousands across 13 hard-hit districts.¹

1. “Nepal: Earthquake 2015.” OCHA, Situation report no. 19, May 29, 2015.

2006

Minimum Implementation

In the 2006 CPA, parties agreed to restructure the state in order to address the grievances of indigenous and marginalized groups. The interim constitution making process involved inputs from indigenous and marginalized groups.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

In the interim constitution of 2007, issues related to indigenous and marginalized groups were incorporated. In the interim constitution, it was agreed that the state’s reconstruction was a responsibility of the state that should be handled by a newly formed High Level Commission.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

The formation of the High Level Commission remains a contentious issue amongst political parties. These parties differ in opinion on the number of states that should be created, the names of the states, the boundaries, and what role ethnic groups will play within the federal state. Notwithstanding the delay in the restructuring of the state, achievements were made in terms of providing greater opportunities for ethnic minorities in the governance. In the Constituent Assembly, the previously excluded castes and ethnic groups were represented through the quota system. According to this systems, the Dalits had 13%, the oppressed caste/indigenous groups had 37.8%, the Madeshi had 31.2%, other groups had 30%, and the backward regions had 4% of the total seats.[fn]”Nepal Human Development Report 2009-State Transformation and Human Development,” UNDP, 2009.[/efn_note]

2009

Intermediate Implementation

The formation of the High Level Commission remains a contentious issue amongst political parties. Notwithstanding the delay in the restructuring of the state, parties were committed to the issues of indigenous and minority groups.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2011

Intermediate Implementation

As of August 2011, the Maoist party was considering using a constitutional amendment to avoid establishing a State Restructuring Commission.¹

On 1 November 2011, major political parties (Nepali Congress, Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist and Leninists, Communist Party of Nepal- United Maoist and Samyukta Loktantrik Madhesi Morcha) reached a seven-point agreement. One of the provisions of the accord was to form an expert panel from the CA instead of a constitutional commission on state restructuring.² The 2006 CPA has provided for the establishment of constitutional commission on state restructuring that could address grievances of ethnic and indigenous groups secluded from the state power. Implementing the 1 November accord required constitutional amendment, which did not happen due to differences among major political parties.³ A consensus deal was reached on 22 November 2011 among main political parties to form the State Restructuring Commission without a Chairman for the time being. On 22 November 2011, an eight member SRC was formed.⁴

1. “Dahal for amendment to settle state,” Kathmandu Post, August 5, 2011.
2. “Parties join hands on peace process,” Kathmandu Post, November 2, 2011.
3. “State Restructuring: Dispute delays statute amendment,” Kathmandu Post, November 17, 2011.
4. “State Restructuring: Commission takes shape, finally,” Kathmandu Post, November 23, 2011.

2012

Intermediate Implementation

The SRC remained divided for reasons related to party affiliation and indigenous or ethnic identity of most of the members. As a result, the SRC failed to develop consensus among its members on its recommendations. On 31 January 2012, the State Restructuring Commission submitted two separate reports to the government because the majority commissioners (six members) proposed 11 states based on ethnic/indigenous identity and gave priority rights to dominant ethnic groups at the local level for one term. The minority report prepared by three members proposed six provinces: two from the plains region based on identity, history and culture, and four from hill and mountain regions based on economic viability. The report was submitted at the Constituent Assembly for deliberation on 25 March.¹ After discussion at the CA meetings, the report was to be forwarded to the constitution committee, which never happened.

On 15 May 2012, after sidelining the SRC reports, major parties reached an agreement to have 11 federal states pending its name and geographic demarcation. The Maoist party later backtracked from this agreement as it faced growing presser from different ethnic and indigenous fronts.² This issue dominated the constitution drafting process in May. As the parties failed to resolve contentious issues, including the state restructuring based on either single- or multi-ethnic (or indigenous) identity, the Constituent Assembly failed to promulgate the constitution on 28 May leading to the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. As such, the indigenous minority rights provision of the accord through the state restructuring was not implemented as of July 2012.

1. “Constitutional Update, Support to Participatory Constitution Building Process in Nepal,” accessed July 20, 2012, http://www.ccd.org.np/.
2. “Maoist party ‘backtracks’ from earlier agreement,” Kathmandu Post, May 20, 2012.

2013

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2014

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year. The indigenous minority rights provision of the accord through state restructuring remains unfulfilled as of 2014. Major political parties disagree on state restructuring, especially on the issue of number of states and whether the state should reflect single- or multi-ethnic (or indigenous) identity and prerogatives to indigenous groups in newly created federal states.

2015

Intermediate Implementation

Parties are expected to address the indigenous minority rights provisions through state restructuring especially through boundary demarcation, and name special rights, if any. As of 3 June 2015, leaders from major political parties have been engaged in dialogue with the hope of resolving disputed issues including minority identity within the federal states within days.¹ The CA approved the draft constitution on July 7 forpublic feedback.² The draft constitution suggests that the federal commission to recommend on demarcation of boundaries will be based on five criteria of identity, such as ethnicity. The draft constitution also has a provision for the representation of indigenous communities in the civil service, security forces, provincial and federal legislature. The draft constitution provides for the establishment of National Inclusive Commission, which is said to protect and promote the rights of indigenous people and those who are underrepresented in the state systems.

1. “Disputed issues should be finalized soon: NC,” Kathmandu Post, June 3 , 2015.
2. “CA concludes deliberation on draft constitution, sends for public feedback,” Himalayan Times, July 7, 2015.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

Some progress was made towards ensuring women’s rights, especially in terms of their representation in the government in the interim constitution making process.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

In the interim parliament, which was established through the Interim Constitution of Nepal (2007), there were 330 members, 57 of which were women. The total number of Maoist Parliamentarians was 83; 31 of these were women. The Interim Constitution of Nepal (2007) required, for the first time, that the one-third of total seats for the representation of women through the PR system. Given that the 1990 constitution mandated that at least 5 percent of the seats be represented by women, the 2007 constitutional provision indicates substantial progress.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

197 women were elected in the Constituent Assembly (30 through the FPTP system and 161 through the PR System). In the CA, 33 percent of elected members are women.[fn]Seira Tamang, “The politics of conflict and difference or the difference of conflict in politics: the women’s movement in Nepal,” Feminist Review 91 (2009): 61-80; Archana Aryal, Bullets to Ballots: Participation of Maoist Women in the Parliament and the Government of Nepal after the People’s Movement 2006, (MA Thesis prepared for the Graduate School of Development Studies, The Hague, the Netherlands, 2008).[/efn_note] However, whether these achievements survive will depend on the final constitutions.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

In the Constituent Assembly elected in 2008, 33% elected members were women. Among other issues, gender-based inequality declined. Problems such as regional disparity, however, still exist.¹

1. “Nepal Human Development Report 2009-State Transformation and Human Development,” UNDP, 2009.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

The formation of the High Level Commission remains a contentious issue amongst political parties. Notwithstanding the delay in the restructuring of the state, parties were committed to the gender issues.

2011

Intermediate Implementation

The State Restructuring Commission took shape on 22 November 2011 and was given a range of responsibilities, including making recommendations on women’s rights. But it did not happen in 2011. According to Human Rights Watch Report, trafficking, domestic violence, dowry-related violence, rape and sexual assaults remain serious problem in 2011.¹

1. “World Report-2012-Nepal,” Human Rights Watch, 2012, accessed August 1, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012.

2012

Intermediate Implementation

The State Restructuring Commission (SRC)¹ voted for granting special rights to women representing ethnic, indigenous, Dalit, Muslim and Madhesi communities on 24 January 2012. But the SRC recommendation was not implemented because the major parties did not go with the SRC recommendation. On top of that, the Constituent Assembly was dissolved on 28 May after its failure to promulgate a new constitution. Gender-related violence remained a serious issue.

1. “SRC hits priority rights hurdle,” Kathmandu Post, January 25, 2012.

2013

Intermediate Implementation

As the parties moved to elect the Constituent Assembly for the second time, they agreed to take ownership of issues agreed in the erstwhile CA. This presumably includes an agreement on granting special rights to women representing marginalized communities. Nevertheless, the gender related violence remains a serious issue. Children born to non-Nepali fathers do not have citizenship rights.¹

1. “Human Rights Watch. 2013.” World Reports, 2013-Nepal. http://www.hrw.org.

2014

Intermediate Implementation

Gender based discrimination remains a serious issue. The Human Rights Watch reported that much of the conflict-era sexual violence against women by both the government forces and the rebel forces remains unreported and uninvestigated.¹ The most important issue however is whether women’s rights are promoted and safeguarded in the new constitution.

1. “Silenced and Forgotten,” Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nepal0914_ForUpload_0.pdf, 2014.

2015

Intermediate Implementation

Gender based discrimination remains a serious issue. Nevertheless, the draft constitution institutionalizes at least one-third representation of women in the national and provincial legislature. The draft constitution has a provision for the establishment of National Women’s Commission to protect and promote women’s rights including the monitoring of implementation of laws related to women and protection of their rights. The draft constitution guarantees gender equality and provides equal Jus Sanguinis rights.

2006

Minimum Implementation

In the 2006 CPA, parties to the conflict agreed to immediately stop all types of violence against children as well as to no longer conscript or use children who were younger than 18 in the armed forces. However, abduction and conscription of children did not stop immediately after the CPA was signed. It was reported that the Maoists had pulled 11 children, in 6th and 7th grade, out of schools in the Chitwan district and taken them away to conscript them into their people’s army.[fn]”Nepal Maoists abduct 11 school children for conscription into their army,” BBC Monitoring South Asia — Political, November 22, 2006.[/efn_note] This happened just after CPA was signed on 21 November 2006. Also, on 5 December 2006, a team of employees from the National Human Rights Commission had “drawn the attention of the Maoists to the alleged conscription of children into their army and looting of crops from farmers” in a mid-far western town Nepaljung.[fn]”Nepal Maoists warned to stop conscripting children, looting crops,” BBC Monitoring South Asia — Political, December 5, 2006.[/efn_note] There were no reports of conscripting children.

2007

Minimum Implementation

The cantonment and the verification of the Maoists combatants started as soon as the UNMIN was established on 23 January 2007. Among 32,250 combatants registered, 4,008 were disqualified. Among the disqualified combatants, 1,035 were recruited after the ceasefire code of conduct was signed on 26 May 2006. 2,973 Maoist combatants were under the age of eighteen when the ceasefire code of conduct agreement was signed.¹

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/259), April 18, 2008.

2008

Minimum Implementation

Discharge of the child soldiers and their rehabilitation did not happen in 2008. Among other issues related to childern, children with disabilities also faced abuses and neglect at home and in their communities.

2009

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

The discharge of child combatants was completed on 8 February 2010. The UNMIN monitored the discharge process and provided rehabilitation support for the discharged child combatants.¹ In Tarai region, several armed groups recruited children for extortion purposes as well as for enforcing general strikes called by the armed groups.² Children with disabilities also faced abuses and neglect at home and in their communities. Children with disabilities were often denied access to quality education.³ Such behavior suggests that children’s rights, as provided by the 2006 CPA, remained unimplemented in some parts of the country.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2010/183), April 13, 2010.
2. “World Report 2011-Nepal,” Human Rights Watch, 2011, accessed August 1, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/en/world-report-2011/nepal.
3. “Future Stolen: Barriers to Education for Children with Disabilities in Nepal,” Human Rights Watch, 2011, accessed August 1, 2012, http://www.hrw.org.

2011

Intermediate Implementation

The provision prohibiting the conscription of children into the armed forces was adhered to with the discharge of child soldiers from the Maoist cantonments as well as their subsequent rehabilitation. Children, however, were used in violent activities in Tarai region by different armed outfits. There was no documentation of children being recruited into the armed forces by any groups but it still remains a problem in Tarai region. The children were used for labor purposes, and many of them were working in the informal sector and as domestic helper.

2012

Intermediate Implementation

There was no documentation of children being recruited into the armed forces by any groups but it still remains a problem in Tarai region. The children were used for labor purposes, and many of them were working in the informal sector and as domestic helper.

2013

Intermediate Implementation

While recruitment of children in armed forces stopped in recent years, children were forced to work in agriculture, industry, and service sectors.¹ The Nepal government has various laws and regulations related to child labor and has set up various enforcement agencies. As a matter of fact, the government’s Department of Labor has recruited inspectors to monitor inspection programs and child rights officers in all districts of Nepal have received basic training from the government.² According to the US State Department Human Rights report, violence against children in Nepal remains widespread.³“Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 – Nepal,” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper…

1. “Nepal — 2013 Findings on the works forms of child labor,” United States Department of Labor, http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/child-labor/nepal.htm#ENREF_1.
2. Ibid.

2014

Intermediate Implementation

Issues related to child labor and violence against children have not been adequately addressed. Further details are not available.

2015

Intermediate Implementation

Issues related to child labor and violence against children have not been adequately addressed. Nevertheless, the draft constitution provides various rights to children. It is unconstitutional to practice child labor and force them to work in factories, mines or other dangerous places. Conscription of children is strictly prohibited.

2006

No Implementation

No progress made in terms of education reform.

2007

Minimum Implementation

Notwithstanding the provisions in the CPA, the Maoists as well as other political parties organized strikes on educational institutions. According to a news report, the Maoists shut down all (private) educational institutions indefinitely, and demanded pay raises. This affected more than 35,000 people across the country. A student wing of the Maoists as well as a forum of seven teachers’ unions, also affiliated with the Maoists, were the organizers.[fn]”Maoists close down Nepal schools indefinitely,” Indo-Asian News Service, May 17, 2007.[/efn_note] The strike lasted for 11 days and schools reopened after pressure from parents and right groups.[fn]”Millions of students head back to schools in Nepal after teachers end strike,” Associated Press Worldstream, May 28, 2007.[/efn_note] Multiple student organizations, affiliated with almost every political party, organized strikes on educational institutions.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

Schools and colleges were closed due to strike called by student organizations affaliated to political parties. Education institutions were politicized. There was no fear of students being conscripted by armed groups.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

Along with the strikes and politicization of the education sector in Nepal, the Maoist leader in December 2010 warned that “his party would turn all campuses and schools across the country into ‘barracksÕ if conspiracies against peace and the new constitution go unabated.”¹ Despite this warning and the Constituent Assembly failure to finalize the draft constitution in a timely manner, there have been no reports of schools being turned into barracks. There were also no reports of capturing school teachers and educational institutions.

1. “Nepal: Prachanda Warns Against Conspiracies to Impede New Constitution,” Revolution in South Asia, December 13, 2010.

2011

Intermediate Implementation

General strikes called by various groups hit the educational institutions hard. Nevertheless, there was also no report of capturing school teachers and educational institutions by politically motivated groups.

2012

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed this year.

2013

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed this year.

2014

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed this year.

2015

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed this year.

2006

Minimum Implementation

In the 2006 CPA, parties agreed to restructure the state in order to address the grievances of minority groups. The interim constitution making process involved inputs from minority groups.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

In the interim constitution of 2007, issues related to indigenous and minority groups were incorporated. In the interim constitution, it was agreed that the state’s reconstruction was a responsibility of the state that should be handled by a newly formed High Level Commission.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

The formation of the High Level Commission remains a contentious issue amongst political parties. These parties differ in opinion on the number of states that should be created, the names of the states, the boundaries, and what role ethnic groups will play within the federal state.

Notwithstanding the delay in the restructuring of the state, achievements were made in terms of providing greater opportunities for ethnic minorities in the governance. In the Constituent Assembly, the previously excluded castes and ethnic groups were represented through the quota system. According to this system, the Dalits had 13%, the oppressed caste/indigenous groups had 37.8%, the Madeshi had 31.2%, other groups had 30%, and the backward regions had 4% of the total seats.[fn]”Nepal Human Development Report 2009-State Transformation and Human Development,” UNDP, 2009.[/efn_note]

2009

Intermediate Implementation

The formation of the High Level Commission remains a contentious issue amongst political parties. Notwithstanding the delay in the restructuring of the state, parties were committed to the issues of minority groups.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2011

Intermediate Implementation

As of August 2011, the Maoist party was considering using a constitutional amendment to avoid the constitutional requirement of forming a State Restructuring Commission.¹ On 1 November 2011, major political parties (Nepali Congress, Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist and Leninists, Communist Party of Nepal- United Maoist and Samyukta Loktantrik Madhesi Morcha) reached a seven-point agreement. One of the provisions of the accord was to form an expert panel from the CA instead of a constitutional commission on state restructuring.² The 2006 CPA provided for the establishment of a constitutional commission on state restructuring that could address grievances of ethnic and indigenous minorities secluded from the state power. Implementing the 1 November accord required a constitutional amendment, which did not happen due to differences among major political parties.³ A consensus deal was reached on 22 November 2011 among the main political parties to form the State Restructuring Commission without a Chairman for the time being. On 22 November 2011, eight members SRC was formed.⁴

1. “Dahal for amendment to settle state,” Kathmandu Post, August 5, 2011.
2. “Parties join hands on peace process,” Kathmandu Post, November 2, 2011.
3. “State Restructuring: Dispute delays statute amendment,” Kathmandu Post, November 17, 2011.
4. “State Restructuring: Commission takes shape, finally,” Kathmandu Post, November 23, 2011.

2012

Intermediate Implementation

The SRC remained divided for reasons related to party affiliation and indigenous or ethnic identity of most of the members. As a result, the SRC failed to develop consensus among its members on its recommendations. On 31 January 2012, the State Restructuring Commission submitted two separate reports to the government because the majority commissioners (six members) proposed 11 states based on ethnic/indigenous identity and gave priority rights to dominant ethnic groups at the local level for one term. The minority report prepared by three members proposed six provinces: two from the plains region based on identity, history and culture, and four from hill and mountain regions based on economic viability. The report was submitted at the Constituent Assembly for deliberation on 25 March.¹ After discussion at the CA meetings, the report was to be forwarded to the constitution committee, which never happened.

On 15 May 2012, after sidelining the SRC reports, major parties reached an agreement to have 11 federal states pending its name and geographic demarcation. The Maoist party, later backtracked from this agreement as it faced growing pressure from different ethnic and indigenous fronts.² This issue dominated the constitution drafting process in May. As the parties failed to resolve contentious issues, including the state restructuring based on single- or multi-ethnic (or indigenous) identity, the Constituent Assembly failed to promulgate the constitution on 28 May leading to the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. As such, the minority rights provision of the accord, through the state restructuring, was not implemented as of July 2012.

1. “Constitutional Update,” UNDP Support to Participatory Constitution Building Process in Nepal, accessed July 20, 2012, http://www.ccd.org.np/.
2. “Maoist party ‘backtracks’ from earlier agreement,” Kathmandu Post, May 20, 2012.

2013

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2014

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year. The minority rights provision of the accord through the state restructuring remains unfulfilled as of 2014. Major political parties have disagreements on state restructuring, especially on the issue of number of states and whether the state should reflect single- or multi-ethnic (or indigenous) identity.

2015

Intermediate Implementation

Parties are expected to address the minority rights provisions through state restructuring especially through boundary demarcation and naming. As of 3 June 2015, leaders from major political parties have been engaged in dialogue with the hope of resolving disputed issues including minority identity within the federal states within days.¹ On 9 June, 4 major political parties reached a 16-point agreement to deal with the contentious issues.² The draft constitution also has a provision for the representation of minority communities in the civil service, security forces, provincial and federal legislature. The draft constitution provided for the establishment of National Inclusive Commission, which is said to protect and promote rights of minority groups among others who are underrepresented in the state systems.

1. “Disputed issues should be finalized soon: NC,” Kathmandu Post, June 3, 2015.
2. “Way paved for constitution as four parties reach 16-pt deal,” Kathmandu Post, June 9, 2015.

2006

No Implementation

Notwithstanding that both sides agreed to establish a national peace and rehabilitation commission to rehabilitate and provide relief support to conflict victims, such a commission has not been established in 2006.

2007

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2008

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2009

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2010

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2011

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2012

No Implementation

A national peace and rehabilitation commission to rehabilitate and provide relief support to conflict victims has not been established as of August 2012.

2013

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2014

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2015

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2006

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2007

No Implementation

A common minimum program (CMP) of interim government was finalized and the interim government was formed in April 2007, but CMP and other socio-economic progisions in CPA were not implemented.

2008

No Implementation

Once the Constituent Assembly elections took place on 10 April 2008, the CMP was no longer required.[fn]”Nepal’s Election and Beyond,” International Crisis Group, Asia Report N°149, 2008.[/efn_note] Nevertheless, the National Planning Commission had prepared a three-year interim plan that dictated the CMP’s objectives regarding socio-economic issues.[fn]”Three-Year Interim Plan: Approach Paper,” Government of Nepal National Planning Commission, 2007.[/efn_note] One of the CMP’s objectives was to nationalize royal property. This was implemented, but the other provisions related to socio-economic development, such as the reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure, the common development strategy and effective social reforms and welfare programs, the enforcement of educational facilities and health institutions as peace zones, the creation of an investment-friendly environment, the indictment of willful defaulters, and the end to strikes and bandas were either not implemented or violated.

Issues related to scientific land reform is yet to be dealt with.

No plans have been devised to deal with to either food security or an individual’s rights to livelihood through employment.

While the supply of medicine and health-related campaigns and assistance had not been obstructed, victims of conflicts did not receive adequate treatment or rehabilitation support.

The Maoists continued to seize private property and/or did not return the private property that had been seized during the conflict. The land reform provision of the CPA has yet to be implemented.

Notwithstanding the facts that parties were committed to not disrupting the industrial climate and that workers were encouraged to seek peaceful settlements to their disputes, organized laborers and trade unions frequently called strikes in industrial sectors.

2009

No Implementation

Socio-economic reforms sought in the 2006 CPA have not been implemented. As a matter of fact, the socio-economic reforms are a second priority for all parties, including the Maoist party. The economy grew by 1.32% in 2006, 1.44% in 2007, 4.15% in 2008, 2.66% in 2009.¹

1. “World Development Indicators,” World Bank, 2012, accessed August 1, 2012.

2010

No Implementation

Socio-economic reforms sought in the 2006 CPA have not been implemented. No developments observed this year.

2010

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2012

No Implementation

Economic reform provisions of the accord remain unfulfilled. As a matter of fact, there were serious threats to property rights as the Maoist-led government sought to legalize the conflict ear transactions of the seized land by the PeoplesÕ Government of the Maoist party. The move was criticized by the opposition parties as lands were looted by the Maoists during conflict. The parties also obstructed the proceedings of the parliament.¹ The government decided to distribute land ownership certificates for plots purchased, sold and transferred by the “Revolutionary Council” through the Land Revenue Office.

1. “Oppn slams legalisation of war-era land dealings,” Kathmandu Post, January 18, 2012.

2013

No Implementation

Political stalemate and focus on holding elections for the Constituent Assembly election for the second time dominated the government policy and programs, and therefore economic and social development were not prioritized. The scientific land reform remains an elusive goal. The Maoist party, however, reiterated its commitment to return land and property confiscated during the conflict to their rightful owners.¹

1. “After 13-hr marathon, parties okay cj govt,” Kathmandu Post, March 14 , 2013.

2014

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2015

No Implementation

While the CPA called for developing a common development concept for socio-economic transformation of the country, this has not been done. Similarly, the scientific land reform agenda has now been neglected even by the rebel Maoists. The Maoist-led government in 2008 and the CPN-UML led government in 2010 had established two separate high level commissions on scientific land reform. Both of these commissions failed to produce any policy recommendation.¹

1. “There is hope,” Kathmandu Post, Oped, February 6, 2015.

2006

No Implementation

The 2006 CPA does not specifically ask for financial support. Nevertheless, countries, international donors and UN agencies are all providing funding to establish a full-fledged democracy and lasting peace in Nepal. No information is available regarding the extent of donor support in 2006.

2007

Full Implementation

In February 2007, the government initiated the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) and earmarked one billion Nepalese Rupees (NPR) from the Government to this fund. This initiative was designed to provide a mechanism for interested donor agencies and governments to contribute to the peace process by providing additional funding. In this regard, the United Kingdom, Norway, and Switzerland signed an agreement with the government and agreed to jointly contribute to the Fund.[fn]”UK donates for Nepal’s Peace Fund,” BBC Monitoring South Asia, February 27, 2007.[/efn_note] The size of the fund, however, was not revealed. In March 2007, Nepal met with bilateral and multilateral donor agencies. In the meeting, multilateral and bilateral donors agreed to extend assistance towards reconstruction, rehabilitation, and the peace process in Nepal, in an integrated manner.[fn]”Donors express commitment to provide assistance to Nepal,” Xinhua General News Service, March 11, 2007.[/efn_note] In August, Nepal’s donors agreed to give more than 2bn rupees.[fn]”Donors pledge over 30m dollars for Nepal peace process,” BBC Monitoring South Asia, August 11, 2007.[/efn_note] In December 2007, the UN Secretary General declared that Nepal was eligible to receive assistance from the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (UNPFN).[fn]”Secretary-General Declares Nepal Eligible for UN Peacebuilding Fund,” States News Service, December 28, 2007.[/efn_note] The UNPFN was complementary to the NPTF. The NPTF was designed to last until 2010. The peace fund was designed to channel resources in four different clusters: Cantonment Management and Rehabilitation of Combatants, Conflict Affected Persons and Communities, Security and Transitional Justice and Constituent Assembly & Peace Building Initiatives at National & Local Levels.[fn]”Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF),” accessed August 2, 2012, http://www.nptf.gov.np/.[/efn_note] As of 15 January 2008, a total of 57.21 million USD was committed and about 43.30 million USD was received. This includes USD 26.8 million from the Nepal government and USD 16.51 million from donor countries like UK, Norway, Finland, Denmark and Switzerland.[fn]”Second Four-Monthly Progress Report, Ministry of Finance,” Nepal Peace Trust Fund, 2008.[/efn_note]

2008

Full Implementation

In March 2008, the DFID provided seven million GBP for peace and human rights in Nepal.¹ In April, the United Kingdom announced a grant of 14 million dollars to support Nepal’s elections scheduled for April 10. The funding was said to go to the government’s Nepal Peace Trust Fund, the UN Peace Fund, and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.² In September the UN approved $10 million from its Peace Fund to support Nepal’s peace process.³ As of 15 January 2009, the NPTF had received USD 101.36 million including USD 30.81 million from the government of Nepal.[fn valu=10]”Fifth Four-Monthly Progress Report, Ministry of Finance,” Nepal Peace Trust Fund, 2009.[/efn_note]

1. “DFID: GBP7 million for peace and human rights in Nepal,” M2 PressWIRE, March 12, 2008.
2. “UK provides $14 million to Nepal,” United News of India (UNI), April 5, 2008.
3. “UN approves funds to support Nepal peace consolidation,” BBC Monitoring South Asia, September 10, 2008.

2009

Full Implementation

As the peace process dragged on, the NPTF in its action place estimated a fund of USD 795.2 million (258.1 from government of Nepal and 537.1 from donors) to put towards projects in different four clusters.¹ By the end of 2009, the NPTF had received USD 31.23 Million from donor countries and the government of Nepal had contributed USD 42.47 million in the peace fund.²

1. Ibid.
2. “Eighth Four-Monthly Progress Report, Ministry of Finance,” Nepal Peace Trust Fund, 2010.

2010

Full Implementation

By mid November 2010, 20 different projects were designed in the cluster of Cantonment Management and Rehabilitation of Combatants, of which 14 were completed. In the second cluster of Conflict Affected Persons and Communities two different projects were ongoing. In the third cluster of Security and Transitional Justice, two different projects were ongoing. In the forth cluster of Constituent Assembly & Peace Building Initiatives at National & Local Levels, 11 different projects were initiated, of which eight were completed. By the end of November 2011, Germany, Denmark, Finland, UK, Norway, Switzerland and the European Union disbursed 3216.31 million NPR whereas the government of Nepal contributed NPR 5047.40 million.¹

By the end of 2010, the UN Peace Fund for Nepal (UNPFN) had disbursed a total of USD 32 million through 17 projects. These included the Program Support for Children and Adolescents Formerly Associated with the Maoist Army in Nepal, the Support to Female Members of the Maoist Army, and the Jobs for Peace. About 12,500 youth were employed and empowered through an integrated approach and Transitional Justice Project.²

1. “10th Four-Monthly Progress Report, Ministry of Finance,” Nepal Peace Trust Fund, 2010.
2. “United Nations Peace Fund for Nepal (UNPFN),” accessed August 11, 2011, http://www.un.org.np.

2011

Full Implementation

The first phase of NPTF was completed in 2010 but the peace process was not. As a result, a second Joint Financing Arrangement (JFA) was signed in 2010, which was to last until 2013. Out of 40 different projects in four different clusters, 24 projects were completed. There were 16 different ongoing projects.¹

1. “12th Four-Monthly Progress Report, Ministry of Finance,” Nepal Peace Trust Fund, 2011.

2012

Full Implementation

By July 2012, the NPTF funded 49 total projects in four different clusters of which 24 are completely finished. There are seven ongoing projects in Cantonment and Rehabilitation of Combatants cluster with funding of 5288 million NPR, four projects in Conflict-Affected Persons and Communities cluster with funding of 1066 million NPR, seven projects in Security and Transitional Justice cluster with 3845 million NPR and seven projects in Constituent Assembly and Peacebuilding cluster with 3612 million NPR. Altogether there are 18 projects in preparation.¹

1. “NPTF Funded Projects,” Nepal Peace Trust Fund, 2012, accessed August 2, 2012, http://www.nptf.gov.np.

2013

Full Implementation

Nepal received a net USD 26,014,826 in 2013 from the Multi Partner Trust Fund for various activities.¹ Various donor countries also contributed to the Nepal Peace Trust Fund.²

1. “2014 Annual Progress Report,” /http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/NPF00 page 27.
2. “19th Progress Report, 16 July 2013 — November 15, 2013,” Nepal Peace Fund, http://www.nptf.gov.np/.

2014

Full Implementation

Various countries continued to fund Nepal Peace Trust Fund initiated projects.¹As of December 2014, USD 877,074 came from the Multi Partner Trust Fund for various activities.²

1. “21 Progress Report, 16 July 2013 – July 15, 2014 (Annual Report),” Nepal Peace Fund, http://www.nptf.gov.np/.
2. “United Nations Peace Funds for Nepal,” United Nations http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/NPF00.

2015

Full Implementation

As of June 2015, the Nepal Peace Trust funds continues to receive support from donor countries for peace related activities. The Multi Partner Trust Fund is expected to close by December 2015. For the duration of its activities between 2007 and 2015, the UN Peace Fund provided USD 26,772,355.02 to support peace processes in Nepal.¹

1. “Funding Status – Nepal UN Peace Fund,” Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, http://mptf.undp.org/.

2006

Minimum Implementation

Implementation timeline was not properly followed. People under the custody of each side were released in 2006. Nevertheless, there were hundreds of disappearance cases that were not solved. A plan for socio-economic development has yet to be formulated.

2007

Minimum Implementation

There were hundreds of disappearance cases that were not solved. A plan for socio-economic development has yet to be formulated. The Constituent Assembly elections date was deferred.

2008

Minimum Implementation

The Constituent Assembly elections were held on 10 April 2008 after almost a year-long delay. Rehabilitation of Maoist combatants did not start on time and the integration process is still lingering. The national unity government provision in the CPA was not implemented after the CA elections in 2008.

2009

Minimum Implementation

Rehabilitation of Maoist combatants did not start on time and the integration process is still lingering. The national unity government provision in the CPA was not implemented after the CA elections in 2008.

2010

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2011

Minimum Implementation

Ambushes and landmines were cleared and Nepal was declared landmine free in June 2011.[fn]”Nepal declared free of mines five years after civil war,” BBC News, June 14, 2011.[/efn_note] Nevertheless, the DDR process is still lingering. The CPA mandated Truth Commission, Commission on disappearance are yet to be established.

2012

Minimum Implementation

The CA failed to deliver the constitution after extending its tenure for almost two years. It was dissolved on 28 May 2012. As such, many provisions of the 2006 CPA related to institutional reforms remained unimplemented.

2013

Minimum Implementation

Integration of ex-combatants in the Nepal Army and the DDR process which were expected to be completed within six months were finally concluded this year. The CA failed to deliver the constitution on schedule.

2014

Minimum Implementation

Deadline for the draft constitution was not met from the beginning. After the CA election in November 2013, parties agreed to deliver a draft constitution by 22 January.

2015

Minimum Implementation

The CA failed to deliver the draft constitution by 22 January.

2006

Minimum Implementation

There has been some progress in relation to the management of conflict related to natural resources, i.e. forestry. Land reform provision was not implemented.

2007

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2008

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2009

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2010

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2011

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2012

Minimum Implementation

The land reform provision of the CPA has yet to be implemented. Policy has not been created on how to protect and promote natural resources. Nevertheless, there has been some progress in relation to the management of conflict related to natural resources. This is especially true at the community level with issues related to community forestry. In this regard, the Federation of Community Forest Users Nepal (FECOFUN) is involved, along with international funding agencies, with resolving conflict related to community forests. The FECOFUN encourages the proper utilization and equitable distribution of resources from community forests to improve the socio-economic conditions of deprived sections of the community.[fn]”Federation of Community Forest Users, Nepal ( FECOFUN),” http://www.fecofun.org/.[/efn_note]

The Natural Resource provisions of the 2006 CPA are yet to be fully implemented.

2013

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2014

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2015

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2006

Full Implementation

Both sides periodically met and reviewed and revised the agreement. They also forged additional agreement to deal with the issues in the accord. The first revision/review took place on 30 November 2006 on dissolution of National Monitoring Committee on Code of Conduct on Ceasefire, which was established on 26 June 2006.

2007

Full Implementation

Both sides periodically met and reviewed and revised the agreement or specific deadline in the agreement. They also forged additional agreement to deal with the issues in the accord. For example, parties agreed to hold the Constituent Assembly election in 2008.

2008

Full Implementation

Both sides periodically met and reviewed and revised the agreement. In 2008, parties agreed for the Fifth Amendment of the interim constitution (adopted on 13 July 2008), which provided the basis for the formation of a majoritarian government.[fn]”Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/670), October 24, 2008.[/efn_note]

2009

Full Implementation

Periodic review of the agreement continued in 2009.

2010

Full Implementation

Periodic review of the agreement continued in 2010.

2011

Full Implementation

Periodic review of the agreement continued in 2011.

2012

Full Implementation

Periodic review of the agreement continued. Both sides periodically met and reviewed and revised the agreement. They also forged additional agreement to deal with the issues in the accord. Between 2006 and 2012, the Seven Political Parties and the Maoists (parties to CPA) and the government of Nepal and Maoist party, and the Maoist Party, Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal- United Marxists and Leninists formed at least eight formal agreements related to implementing provisions of the 2006 CPA, revision of CPA and interim constitution, and extension of the tenure of Constituent Assembly. As a matter of fact, parties reviewed and revised the CPA to fit their political objectives, which hindered the implementation of the CPA.

2013

Full Implementation

Periodic review of the agreement continued.

2014

Full Implementation

Periodic review of the agreement continued. Political parties periodically reviewed progress made and areas where they needed to work on resolving disputed issues. In this regard, they also created the Committee for Constitutional, Political Dialogue and Consensus Building (CCPDC) within the CA in order to find consensus on disputed issues.¹

1. “Bhattarai elected chairperson of CA’s political dialogue comm,” Nepal News, April 25, 2014.

2015

Full Implementation

Periodic review of the agreement continues. Political parties were in agreement that federalism, form of government, the judiciary, and the electoral system were the main issues outlined in the 2006 CPA that needed to be resolved.

2006

Minimum Implementation

The CPA provided that the UN provides assistance with the monitoring of human rights, the management of arms and armies and that they observe the elections for the Constituent Assembly. The human rights monitoring responsibility was also given to the National Human Rights Commissions.

Once the CPA was signed on 22 November 2006, the Ceasefire Monitoring Committee established in the Ceasefire Code of Conduct was replaced by the Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA). This agreement established the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee (JMCC), which was comprised of representatives from both sides and chaired by the UN for the purpose of monitoring, reporting and coordinating. The AMMAA also established the Joint Monitoring Teams (JMTs) as the mechanism for monitoring the cessation of hostilities. The AMMAA agreement was signed on 6 December 2006.[fn]”Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/235), April 26, 2007; “Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies,” Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, December 8, 2006, http://www.peace.gov.np.[/efn_note] According to the agreement, the nine-member JMCC would have a chairman appointed by the UN Mission. The JMCC would also consist of two vice chairmen, one from the Maoist Army, and one from the NA. The remaining six members would consist of two from the UN, two from the NA and two from the Maoist Army.

To establish the UN’s political mission, the Secretary General of the UN dispatched a multidisciplinary assessment mission to Nepal that lasted from the 9th to the 17th of December. The mission developed plans for the rapid deployment of up to 35 monitors and 25 electoral personnel as approved by the Security Council resolution S/PRST/2006/49.[fn]”Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/7), January 9, 2007.[/efn_note] The assessment mission identified a number of technical and electoral processes, related to the Constituent Assembly elections including voter registration and voter education. In terms of human rights monitoring, the OHCHR had been involved since 2005 and after the peace agreement was signed the mission had a stronger civil component and representatives deployed in the regions.[fn]”Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/7), January 9, 2007.[/efn_note]

2007

Full Implementation

The United Nations Missions in Nepal (UNMIN) was established on 23 January. The Secretary General Appointed Ian Martin as his personal representative in Nepal on 8 February 2007.¹

Management of arms and the armies: The first step in the management of arms and armies was to initiate the cantonment process and register the Maoist combatants and verify the return of the Nepal Army to their barracks. This process should also have included the deposit of weapons in containers. The cantonment of the Maoist combatants started as soon as the United Nations Mission in Nepal was established on 23 January 2007. In a press statement on 23 February 2007, the UNMIN claimed that 32,250 Maoist combatants were registered either in the seven major cantonment sites or in the 21 satellite sites. A news report attested that the first phase of the registration of combatants was completed within one month. The UNMIN reported the results to the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee (JMCC) on March 8 confirming 31,252 personnel and 3,475 weapons.² The registered number of Maoist combatants later increased slightly to 32,250.³ Once the cantonment process was complete, the UNMIN had to verify the registered combatants, in order that those unqualified for reintegration could be demobilized. This verification process was completed by the end of 2007.

According to the CPA and the subsequent AMMAA agreement, 3,475 of the Maoist’s weapons were registered and stored in cantonment locations. The process was completed in April 2007. In accordance with the agreement, 2,855 of the Nepal Army’s weapons were registered and stored. Among the weapons registered by the Maoists, 96 weapons were retained outside the cantonments for the security of the Maoist leaders.⁴ The UNMIN was also involved in the clearance of the mines.

Human Rights: According to the Secretary General’s report, the OHCHR continued to monitor the human rights situation, with particular attention to the peace process. The UNMIN and OHCHR coordinated together. The OHCHR documented a number of human rights violations. The UNMIN continued to push for a credible independent national monitoring mechanism for the peace process that would include appointing members of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). Five members of the NHRC members were appointed in September after a parliamentary hearing. In June, the government also agreed in principle to establish a high-level monitoring body.⁵

Constituent Assembly Elections: The UNMIN contributed to the work of the Election Commission on various issues including the adoption of an electoral code of conduct, candidate nomination, and the procedures to meet the complex quota system of the electoral legislations. As a part of their electoral assistance, the UNMIN helped to recruit international and national volunteers, who took up positions as district electoral advisers.⁶ After postponing elections twice in 2007, the CA elections were rescheduled for April 2008.

By October 2007, the five UNMIN regional offices, in Dhangadi, Nepalgunj, Pokhara, Kathmandu, and Biratnagar, were operational. As of 30 September, 881 of the planned 1,073 personnel were at their posts and more staff was deployed in regions and districts than at headquarters.⁷

1. “UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/235), April 26, 2007.
2. “UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/235), April 26, 2007.
3. Ameet Dhakal, “The People’s Liberation Army (PLA),” Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2009.
4. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/235), April 26, 2007.
5. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/ 442), July 18, 2007; (S/2007/612), October 18, 2007.
6. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/612), October 18, 2007.
7. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/612), October 18, 2007.

2008

Full Implementation

Management of arms and the armies: The UNMIN verified 19,602 ex-combatants as meeting their criteria and 8,640 as not available for verification. Among initially registered combatants, 4,008 were disqualified. Among these disqualified combatants, 1,035 were recruited after the ceasefire code of conduct was signed on 26 May 2006. 2,973 Maoist combatants were under the age of eighteen by the time of the ceasefire code of conduct agreement.¹ According to the report, the disqualified combatants received allowances. However, their scheduled discharge or demobilization did not occur because of the political uncertainty that surrounded the formation of the government after the Constituent Assembly elections.²

The UNMIN Mine Action Unit has fulfilled their obligations under the Agreement on Monitoring the Management of Arms and Armies to locate mine sites. Accordingly, the UNMIN unit destroyed over 7,250 kilograms of explosive items including 14,682 improvised explosive devices at nine locations.³ Out of the 53 minefields laid by the Nepal Army during the civil conflict, only five land minefields were cleared by October 2008.⁴

Human Rights: The human rights situation remained very serious as a number of armed groups emerged in the eastern and southern parts of the country. In 2008, 541 people were killed. This figure included 50 people killed by the state and eight people killed by Maoist-affiliated organizations. Similarly 729 people were abducted. This included 138 people abducted by the Maoists and 162 by its sister organization, the Young Communist League. In electoral related violence, it was reported that the Maoists killed 12 people, injured another 383, beat 813, threatened 142, and abducted 304. Other political parties were also involved in similar activities, but the MaoistsÕ violations of human rights surpassed all other parties.⁵ The delay in the formation of the government after the CA elections in April led to the delay in the establishment of a transitional justice mechanism. This would have included establishing a truth and reconciliation commission and a commission on disappearance as agreed in the 2006 CPA.⁶

The Constituent Assembly (CA) elections The CA elections took place on 10 April 2008. A mixed electoral system was adopted. Accordingly, 240 members were elected based on a first-past-the-post election and the 335 members were elected on the basis of proportional representation. The remaining 26 members were nominated by each political party present in the CA.⁷ The Maoists won 120 seats in the first-past-the-post election and 100 seats in the PR portion. The NC won 37 first-past-the-post seats and 73 proportional-representation seats. The Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) (UML) won 33 first-past-the-post seats and 70 proportional representation seats. The MPRF obtained 30 first-past-the-post seats and 22 proportional representation seats, while the other two UDMF parties between them won 13 first-past-the-post seats and 16 proportional representation seats.⁸ After the elections for the Constituent Assembly were held, the interim parliament dissolved. The CA was convened on 28 May 2008. The CA is highly representative in terms of the number of seats held by women, minorities and Dalits. These successful elections completed the UN Security Council’s mandate as well as the CPA’s provisions regarding the role of the UNMIN with respect to electoral monitoring.

As of 10 October the overall number of staff of the UNMIN was 283, out of the authorized 306 civilian personnel. This figure includes 85 arms monitors out of the authorized strength of 90.⁹

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/259), April 18, 2008.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/454), July 10, 2008.
3. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/454), July 10, 2008.
4. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/670), October 24, 2008.
5. “Human Rights Yearbook 2009,” Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), 2009; “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2009/313), May 12, 2008.
6. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/670), October 24, 2008.
7. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/313), May 12, 2008.
8. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/313), May 12, 2008.
9. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/670), October 24, 2008.

2009

Full Implementation

Management of arms and the armies: After months of delay, the demobilization of unqualified combatants started on 11 October 2009.¹ This process, however, was not completed in 2009. Similarly, political deadlock delayed the integration and rehabilitation of the qualified ex-combatants. The JMCC, which was mandated to monitor partiesÕ compliance with the agreement, continued to meet under the chairmanship of the UNMIN Chief Arms Monitor. The UNMIN Monitors were also present when the salary payment was made for August and September to verified Maoist combatants.²

Human Rights: Overall, the human rights situation remained very serious given the surge in violent activities by different armed outfits. INSEC reported 1420 counts of human rights violations by the state and 5,137 counts of violations by non-state actors, (the Maoists included).³ The OHCHR raised concerns regarding security personnel’s involvement in extrajudicial killings in the troubled Tarai region. Concurrently, the NHRC’s recommendations were not implemented by the government.⁴

As of 16 October, 261 of the 278 authorized personnel were assigned to the Mission.⁵

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2009/553), October 26, 2009.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2009/553), October 26, 2009.
3. “Human Rights Yearbook 2007,” Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), 2010.
4. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2009/553), October 26, 2009.
5. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2009/553), October 26, 2009.

2010

Full Implementation

The human rights situation remained serious: “In September, OHCHR-Nepal released a summary of concerns entitled “Investigating allegations of extrajudicial killings in the Terai.”¹ The report documents 39 incidents in the Terai region which resulted in the deaths of 57 persons between January 2008 and June 2010, all involving credible allegations of the unlawful use of force by security forces.² The same report also suggested phasing out the OHCHR-Nepal regional office as per the agreement.

Management of arms and the armies: The discharge or demobilization of the disqualified and of children was completed on 8 February 2010. According to the discharge plan, the UN monitored the discharge process and provided rehabilitation support for discharged child combatants.³

The Special Committee was responsible for supervising the integration and rehabilitation of the Maoist army. It formed a secretariat comprised of the former members of the Technical Committee. The committee appointed a secretariat coordinator. The issues related to the integration and rehabilitation of the Maoist army, however, did not make progress because parties failed to reach a consensus on the number and modality of the reintegration. They also did not decide on the exact composition of a support package for those choosing rehabilitation.

Throughout the year, the JMCC continuously investigated and resolved reported violations of the AMMAA agreement.

According to a report, 33 of the 53 minefields have been cleared by the Nepal Army demining teams with technical support from the United Nations mine action team.⁴

In 2010 the UNMIN was involved in a serious controversy. The UNMIN conveyed its disapproval when the Nepal Army announced a vacancy for 3,434 soldiers, including 250 officer positions, and invited applications from eligible and interested Nepali citizens. The UNMIN was criticized for being too partial to the Maoists. The UNMIN in the past had adopted a soft approach to the MaoistsÕ non-compliance with the AMMAA agreement. This controversy led to the NA boycotting a meeting of the JMCC, which had put the NA recruitment on its agenda for 26 August 2010.⁵ While the Maoists wanted the UNMIN to continue its work in Nepal, other political parties, including the government, concluded that the UNMIN’s presence would create incentives for the Maoists to delay the integration and rehabilitation of their ex-combatants. Even though these tensions prevailed, the government and the Maoists still sent a joint letter asking for the seventh extension of the UNMIN for four months on 14 September.⁶ On 15 September 2010, the Security Council decided that the present UNMIN mandate would be terminated on 15 January 2011. As of 29 November 2010, 254 of the authorized 278 personnel were serving in the Mission.⁷

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2010/658), December 23, 2010.
2. Ibid.
3. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2010/183), April 13, 2010.
4. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2010/658), December 23, 2010.
5. “Nepal Army to boycott JMCC meet,” Kathmandu Post, August 26, 2010.
6. “Govt, Maoists send second letters to UN,” Kathmandu Post, September 15, 2010.
7. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2010/658), December 23, 2010.

2011

Full Implementation

As scheduled, the UNMIN withdrew its mission in Nepal on 15 January 2011. Originally established for one year on 23 January 2007, its mandate was extended on 23 January 2008 for six months, on 24 July 2008 for six months, on 24 January 2009 for six months, on 24 July 2009 for nine months and for 3 weeks.on 15 May 2010 for four months, and on 16 September 2010 for four months. During its tenure, the UNMIN assisted in the holding of successful Constituent Assembly elections, the registration of the Maoist combatants, and the verification and demobilization of child and unqualified Maoist combatants. It also monitored human rights situations. Nevertheless, the mission could not complete its mandate to reintegrate and rehabilitate the Maoist army.¹

Once the UNMIN withdrew from Nepal, a Special Committee (SC) replaced it. The Special Committee is currently monitoring the arms and armies. Nevertheless, the issues surrounding the integration and rehabilitation of the Maoists combatants remain contentious.

In June 2011, all landmines planted during insurgency periods were cleared.²

1. “The UN Mission in Nepal-UNMIN’s Humiliating Withdrawal,” Conflict Study Center (Situation Update 100), March 21, 2011.
2. “Nepal celebrates becoming the second country in Asia to become free of minefields,” UNICEF, June 22, 2011, accessed August 12, 2011, http://www.unicef.org.

2012

Full Implementation

The UNMIN was withdrawn in 2011.

2013

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2014

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2015

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.