Arusha Accord – 4 August 1993
Date Signed: 4 August, 1993
Accord Type: Comprehensive Peace Agreement
Country: Rwanda
74.00Implementation Score after 10 years
Provisions in this Accord
Cease Fire
1993
The N’sele Cease-fire Agreement of 12 July 1992 did not result in a cessation of hostilities. Both sides continued to engage in fighting.1 The ceasefire agreement included a provision for a 50-member Neutral Military Observer Group – I (NMOG-I) furnished by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The observers were drawn from Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and Zimbabwe and deployed by the first week of August 1992.2
Into 1993 the fighting continued and both sides were very much involved in fighting, in violation of the ceasefire agreement to which they had agreed in July 1992, after occupying a large swath of territory in northern Rwanda in the preceding days. The Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) declared an immediate ceasefire on 12 February 1993, which the Rwandese government forces were also expected to respect immediately. The rebel group put forward a plan to achieve the ceasefire implementation through the assistance of the NMOG-I.3 The Government rejected the RPF offer of ceasefire and asked the rebels to withdraw before the ceasefire.4
A new ceasefire agreement was announced and came into effect on 9 March 1993 and parties agreed to hold further talks in Arusha, Tanzania on 15 March.5 In March, the UN Security Council approved the deployment of peacekeepers to monitor the ceasefire.6 Despite the promise of the new ceasefire agreement, it was quickly violated by both sides. As a part of the ceasefire monitoring, “the Security Council in June 1993 established the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) on the Ugandan side of the border to verify that no military assistance reached Rwanda.”7
- “Rwanda Government and Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) Accuse Each Other of Breaking Cease-Fire,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 8, 1992.
- “Egypt to Send Ceasefire Observers to Rwanda,” Xinhua General News Service, August 4, 1992.
- “Rwanda; RPF Announces Cease-Fire,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 12, 1993.
- “Government Insists on Rebel Withdrawal before Cease-Fire,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 15, 1993.
- “Dates set for cease-fire and Arusha talks,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts/The Monitoring Report, March 9, 1993.
- “Security Council OKs Cease-Fire Monitors for Rwanda,” Associated Press, March 12, 1993.
- “UNAMIR Background,” accessed September 9, 2011, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirS.htm.
1994
The UN Security Council reported that an interim civilian government was in place and parties reached a ceasefire agreement on 9 April 1994. This agreement came after the deaths of the Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana and President Cyprian Ntaryamira of Burundi, who died in a plane crash.1 The killings continued and on the sideline of the OAU summit, the RPF and the interim government agreed to a ceasefire.2 The killings from both sides did not stop. On 18 July 1994, the Rwandan rebel commander declared victory against the Hutu-led government and announced an immediate ceasefire after 14 weeks of massacres.3 Estimations of the number killed in the genocide varies from source to source. International Crisis Group in its report suggested between 800,000 to one million genocidal killings in 1994.4 After defeat from the RPF, the interim Hutu government , FAR, interahamwe militia fled along with Hutu refugees to Zaire.
- “Rwanda Cease-Fire in Effect; Toll High,” Washington Times, April 9, 1994.
- “Rwanda; RPF Representative In Tunis Announces Acceptance of Immediate Cease-Fire,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 16, 1994.
- “Rebels Declare Victory, Cease-Fire in Rwanda; Flood of Hutu Refugees into Zaire Continues,” Washington Post, July 19, 1994, (A; A1).
- “Five Years After The Genocide In Rwanda: Justice in Question,” International Crisis Group, Africa Report N°1, April 7, 1999.
1995
No further information specific to ceasefire violation between the signatories reported this year.1
- “UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia,” Uppsala Conflict Data Program – Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research, accessed September 3, 2012, www.ucdp.uu.se/database.
1996
Limited incursions into Rwanda occurred, presumably by ex-FAR and militia based in Zaire. This led the RPF to invade Zaire in October 1996. The ensuing civil war in Zaire/Congo was directly related to the situation in Rwanda. There was a brief pause in conflict after a rebel victory in 1994; new conflict was initiated in 1996.1
- Rene Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009).
1997
The Hutu refugees in Zaire started to regroup in refugee camps immediately after the start of 1994. In March 1997, the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR) and the armed wing of the Party for the Liberation of Rwanda (PALIR) declared their desire to overthrow the regime. Rebels infiltrated from Congo and initiated attacks in Rwanda. The government responded with disproportionate force, attacking civilians and relocating tens of thousands in an expulsion campaign. The reported number deaths resulting from the conflict was as high as 767 in 1997. The ALIR consisted two parts; the ALIR I was mainly based in the South Kivu and Maniema Provinces while ALIR II fought alongside the government army in conflicts in the DRC. ALIR I and II became part of a new political-military organization, the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR), in September 2000. In the conflict, the DRC helped the DFLR and the Rwandan government to provide support to the rebels in the DRC.1
- “UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia,” Uppsala Conflict Data Program – Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research, accessed September 3, 2012, www.ucdp.uu.se/database.
1998
No further information specific to ceasefire violation between the signatories reported this year.1 However, other conflicts continued.
1999
No developments observed this year.
2000
No developments observed this year.
2001
No developments observed this year.
2002
No further information specific to ceasefire violation between the signatories reported this year.1 However, other conflicts continued.
The conflict was not active from 1994 to 2003 and beyond. In 2004, the FDLR continued to ask for an inter-Rwandan dialogue, but the government refused such dialogue with a group allegedly connected to the genocide.2 The great lake region was affected significantly by the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 because both the DRC and the Rwandan government supported rebel groups against each other. In December 2008, the DRC government and a rebel group in the east of the country, the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), formalized a ceasefire agreement. In a separate agreement, both the DRC and the Rwandan armed force agreed to launch operations against Rwandan Hutu rebels operating in the same region.3 Despite the joint move by the DRC and the Rwandan armed force against the Hutu rebellion, the conflict was on-going in a limited fashion as of 2010.
N’sele Cease-fire Agreement between the Government of the Rwandese Republic and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (12 July 1992)
Article I
1. A cease-fire is hereby established throughout the territory of the Republic of Rwanda, between the Government Forces and those of the Rwandese Patriotic Front. The cease-fire shall enter into force at midnight (Rwanda time) on 31st July 1992 at the same time as the deployment of the Neutral Military Observer Group.
2. The entry into force of the cease-fire shall be preceded by a truce, that is, the cessation of fighting, which shall enter into force at midnight (Rwanda time) on 19th July 1992.
3. The present Cease-fire Agreement is the first stage of a peace process which shall culminate in a Peace Agreement to be signed at the conclusion of the political negotiations.
Article II
The cease-fire shall imply:
1. The cessation of all hostilities for the purpose of dialogue and serious negotiations between the two parties udder the auspices of the Mediator or a Facilitator;
2. The suspension of supplies of ammunition and weaponry to the field;
3. The supply of non-lethal logistical needs to the military forces in the field;
4. The release of all prisoners-of-war; the effective release of all persons arrested because and as a result of this war within five days following the entry into force of the Cease-fire Agreement;
5. The possibility of recovering the remains of the dead;
6. The withdrawal of all foreign troops after the effective deployment of the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) except for Military Officers serving in Rwanda under bilateral Cooperation Agreements;
7. A ban on infiltration of troops and on the conveyance of troops and war material to the area occupied by each party;
8. A ban on any mine-laying operations or the hindering of operations to remove the mines;
9. The establishment of the Neutral Corridor separating the areas occupied by the two respective forces.
This corridor meant to facilitate the monitoring of the cease-fire by the Neutral Military Observer Group shall be determined in consideration of the front-lines of both armies. The demarcation on the field shall be established by the representatives of the two armies in the presence of the Neutral Military Observer Group.
Article III
1. The verification and control of the cease-fire shall be conducted by the neutral military observer group under the supervision of the Secretary-General of OAU.
2. The Neutral Military Observer Group shall be composed of:
-10 Officers from Nigeria;
-10 Officers from Senegal;
-10 Officers from Zimbabwe;
-10 Officers from an African country to be chosen by the current Chairman of the OAU in collaboration with the President of the United Republic of Tanzania;
-5 Officers from the Government of Rwanda;
-5 Officers from the Rwandese Patriotic Front;
3. The Neutral Military Observer Group shall report any violation of the cease-fire to the Secretary-General of OAU and a joint political military commission.
4. The Neutral Military Observer Group shall set up the organs and machinery required for the control and verification of the cease-fire. It shall draft its own rules of procedure. It shall enjoy a status that would enable it to perform its mission as provided in the Cease-fire Agreement; including privileges and immunities enjoyed by the OAU personnel as enshrined in the general agreement.
5. The Neutral Military Observer Group shall have full communication and other equipment it deems necessary to perform its mission. The NMOG officers may have specific uniforms with insignia for easy identification, and light weapons for self-defence.
Article IV
1. A Joint Political Military Commission composed of 5 representatives of the Rwandese Government and 5 of the Rwandese Patriotic Front is established;
2. The OAU and the following countries are invited to participate, as observers, in the Joint Commission:
Burundi, United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Belgium, France and the United States of America;
3. The Joint Commission shall have the following mandate:
– To ensure the follow-up of the implementation of the Cease-fire Agreement;
– To ensure the follow-up of the implementation of the peace Agreement to be signed at the conclusion of the political negotiations;
4. The Joint Commission shall be based at the OAU Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Commission’s Headquarters may be moved upon agreement by both parties;
5. The Joint Commission shall hold its inaugural meeting not later than 26th July 1992.
Article V
The signatories of the present agreement accept the following principles whose modalities of implementation shall be specified during the political negotiations:
1. Establishment of the rule of law, that is, based namely on national unity, democracy, pluralism, and respect for human rights;
2. Formation of a national army consisting of Government forces and those of the Rwandese Patriotic Front;
3. Establishment of power-sharing within the framework of a broad-based transitional government.
Article VI
The political negotiations culminating in the peace agreement shall proceed pursuant to the following calendar:
1. Commencement of the political negotiations: 10th August 1992;
2. Completion of the political negotiations and signing of the peace agreement: not later than 10 October 1992;
3. Completion of the implementation of the mechanisms and conclusions agreed upon pursuant to the peace Agreement: not later than 10 January 1993.
Powersharing Transitional Government
1993
The peace process started with the signing of the N’sele Cease-fire Agreement of July 1992. In January 1993, RPF and the government signed the protocol agreement on power-sharing government. There was some effort in July 1993 to reach a consensus on power-sharing government, especially the position of the Prime Minister. In the Arusha Accords, the MDR was allocated the Prime Minister position, and they chose Faustin Twagiramungu as their PM candidate, but internal divisions within the party kept him from assuming office; he was opposed by a new hardline element of the MDR affiliated with Hutu Power. A power-sharing government was not established in 1993.
1994
Even though power-sharing provisions were negotiated in the 1993 accord, the actual establishment of a power-sharing government stalled as the hard-line Hutus opposed any power-sharing with the minority Tutsis.1 Agathe Uwilingiyimana from MDR became prime minister on 18 July 1993 but was assassinated on 7 April 1994.
After genocidal events, the UNAMIR technical team sought the views of political and military leaders in the camps (in Zaire) regarding the conditions, involving exiled Hutu leadership in all negotiation processes, including a revival of acceptable elements of the Arusha Accord and its power-sharing provisions.2 In September, a power-sharing government was formed and late president Habyarimana’s party was excluded.3 After taking over Rwanda, the RPF installed an “Enlarged Transitional Government” on 19-20 July 1994, which they claimed was based on the Arusha Accord. They did allocate positions to the MDR, PL, and PSD as dictated by the Arusha Accords, but they unilaterally excluded the MRND and assumed all of their posts rather than sharing them with the other parties.4 Extremist parties were rendered illegal and, therefore, not part of the power-sharing government. Other political parties were part of the power-sharing government but they were politically weak.5 According to the UN Secretary General’s report, a broad-based government of national unity was installed on 19 July 1994 and that government established control over the Rwandan territory.6
On 17 July 1994, the victorious rebels (RPF) made a declaration establishing inclusive government institutions and renouncing power-sharing with political parties and groups that organized and perpetrated genocide. From MDR, Faustin Twagiramungu was appointed prime minister on 19 July 1994. After the declaration, a protocol agreement between incumbent political forces (RPF, MDR, PDC, PDI, PL, PSD, PSR and UDPR) regarding the establishment of national institutions was signed on 14 November 1994.8
Accordingly, a power-sharing national assembly was established on 25 November 1994. Of the 70 seats in the National Assembly, the RPF had 19, MDR 13, PSD 13, PL 13, PDC 6, PSR 2, PDI 2, other 2.9 The RPF installed the Transitional National Assembly on 25 December 1994.
- “Only God Knows What Will Happen,’ Child Cries”, The Ottawa Citizen, May 11, 1994
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1994/1308), November 18, 1994
- “Some 2,000 Former Soldiers Train for Rwanda’s New Military,” Agence France Presse, October 15, 1994
- Timothy Longman, “Obstacles to peace building in Rwanda,” Durable peace: Challenges for peacebuilding in Africa, ed. Taisier Ali and Robert O. Matthews, 61-85
- Rachel Hayman, “Going in the ‘Right’ Direction? Promotion of Democracy in Rwanda since 1990,” Taiwan Journal of Democracy 5, no.1 (2009): 51-75
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1994/1133), October 6, 1994
- Wellars Gasamagera, “The Constitution Making Process in Rwanda, Lessons to Be Learnt,” 2007, accessed September 13, 2011, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan026620.pdf…
The July declaration and the November protocol agreement, as well as the power-sharing legislature that was loosely associated with the 1993 Arusha accord, were important in the formation of the national unity government.
The Government of National Unity outlined the following eight-point plan:
1. Reinforce a climate of peace and security.
2. Organize the central, prefectural, communal, sector and cell administration.
3. Restore and strengthen national unity.
4. Repatriate and settle of refugees.
5. Improve the people’s living conditions and resolve those social problems which were a result of genocide, massacres and war (i.e. those of orphans, widows and the physically handicapped).
6. Re-launch the national economy.
7. Redefine the country’s foreign policy.
8. Strengthen democracy in Rwanda.7“New Prime Minister Says He Will Continue With Government Programme”, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 4, 1995
- “The World Factbook- 1996,” CIA, 1996, accessed September 11, 2011, http://www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/wofact96/211.htm.
1995
On 31 August 1995, Pierre-Célestin Rwigema from MDR became prime minister. The power-sharing government which included Hutus and Tutsis was in place in September 1994, but the power-sharing situation remained precarious.1 The power-sharing government and legislature continued in 1995. As a matter of fact, a new government was named on August 31, 1995 after five Hutu ministers, including Prime Minister Twagiramungu, resigned in protest over their lack of real power. As agreed to in the Arusha accord, MDR received the Prime Minister position in the power-sharing government.
1996
The power-sharing legislature and government continued in 1996.
1997
The power-sharing legislature and government continued in 1997. A new government was named on 28 March 1997.
1998
The power-sharing legislature and government continued in 1998.
1999
The power-sharing legislature and government continued in 1999. A new government was named on 10 February 1999.
2000
The power-sharing legislature and government continued in 2000. The composition of the national assembly was rebalanced with RPF receiving 13 seats, MDR 13, PSD 13, PL 13, PDC six, RPA six , PSR two, PDI two, and two going to other parties.2 Paul Kagame, who had been vice president and minister of defense, assumed the presidency on March 24, 2000.3
- “The World Factbook- 2000,” CIA, 2000, accessed September 11, 2011, http://www.photius.com/wfb2000/countries/rwanda/rwanda_government.html.[… As agreed to in the accord, MDR received the Prime Minister position.
On 8 March 2000, Prime Minister Pierre-Celestin Rwigema resigned over charges of corruption and was replaced by Bertrand Makuza from the same political party (MRD).1Ibid.
- “Kagame Elected Rwandan President,” BBC News- Africa, accessed February 8, 2012, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/716861.stm.
2001
The power-sharing legislature and government continued in 2001.
2002
The power-sharing legislature and government continued in 2002
2003
On 29 September 2003, elections for the National Assembly took place; the RPF won 40 seats, PSD seven, and PL six. The total number of seats in the National Assembly was only 53.1 This effectively ended power-sharing arrangements in the transitional legislature established by the Arusha Accord of 1993. Nevertheless, the power-sharing government remained in place since the moderate Hutu, Bernard Makuza, continued to serve as Prime Minister. As agreed to in the accord, MDR received the prime minister position–though since the MDR was disbanded prior to the elections, he changed his party affiliation to RPF.
- “The World Factbook-2003,” CIA, 2003, accessed September 11, 2011, http://www.theodora.com/wfb2003/rwanda/rwanda_government.html.
Article 1
The two parties reaffirm the acceptance of the principle of power-sharing within the framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government, in conformity with Article V.3. of the N’sele Ceasefire Agreement, as amended at GBADOLITE on 16th September, 1991 and at ARUSHA on 12th July, 1992. The modalities of implementation of this principle are the object of the present Protocol of Agreement on Power-sharing.
Article 2
The two parties agree that those modalities shall consist of:
(a) the maintenance of the current structure of the Coalition Government with appropriate adjustments to be mutually agreed upon in this Protocol, with a view to making room for the participation of the RPF and other political forces in the country;
(b) appropriate adjustments to be mutually agreed upon in this Protocol, to be made at the level of the State powers with a view to enabling the RPF and other political forces in the country to participate in and make for the efficient management of the transition, in compliance principle of separation of powers.
Chapter II: Transitional Institutions
Article 3
During the Transitional Period, the State institutions shall be:
(i) The Presidency of the Republic;
(ii) The Broad-Based Transitional Government;
(iii) The Transitional National Assembly;
(iv) The Institutions of the Judiciary.
Chapter III: The Executive Power
Article 4
The Executive power shall be exercised collectively through decisions taken in Cabinet meetings, by the President of the Republic and by the Government.
Article 6
The two parties agree on the appointment of Mr. TWAGIRAMUNGU Faustin as Prime Minister of the Broad-Based Transitional Government, in accordance with Articles 6 and 51 of the Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Power-Sharing within the framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government.
Article 7
The Transitional Institutions shall be set up within thirty seven (37) days following the signing of the Peace Agreement.
Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (9 January 1993)
Article 14
The political parties participating in the Coalition Government established on 16th April, 1992 as well as the Rwandese Patriotic Front shall have the responsibility to set up the Broad-Based Transitional Government. They shall decide, by consensus, on the other political formations which may participate in that Government.
Article 15
The Government shall be composed of the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, Ministers and Secretaries of State.
Article 19
Legal acts by the Prime Minister shall be countersigned relevant Ministers and Secretaries of State.
Article 23
The Broad-based Transitional Government shall implement the programme comprising the following:
A. Democracy
1. Consolidate the democratic process by establishing the necessary mechanisms for the implementation of the provisions of the Protocol on the Rule of Law.
2. Prepare and organise general elections to be held at the end of the Transition Period.
Sub-Section 4:
Distribution of Ministerial Portfolios within the Broad-Based Transitional Government In accordance with the provisions of Article 14 of the Protocol of Agreement signed on 30th October, 1992, the numerical distribution of the portfolios among political forces called upon to participate in the Broad-Based Transitional Government shall be as follows:
MRND: 5 portfolios
RPF: 5 portfolios
MDR: 4 portfolios (including the post of Prime Minister)
PSD: 3 portfolios
PL: 3 portfolios
PDC: 1 portfolio
Article 56
Nominative distribution of portfolios shall be as follows:
MRND
1. Ministry of Defence;
2. Ministry of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Culture;
3. Ministry of Public Service;
4. Ministry of Planning;
5. Ministry of Family Affairs and Promotion of the Status of Women.
RPF
1. Ministry of Interior and Communal Development;
2. Ministry of Transport and Communications;
3. Ministry of Health;
4. Ministry of Youth and Associative Movement;
5. Secretariat of State for Rehabilitation and Social Integration.
MDR
1. Prime Minister;
2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation;
3. Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education;
4. Ministry of Information.
PSD
1. Ministry of Finance;
2. Ministry of Public works and Energy;
3. Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development.
PL
1. Ministry of Justice;
2. Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Cottage Industry;
3. Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs;
PDC: Ministry of Environment and Tourism
Article 57
The two parties further agree that:
– With reference to Article 5 of the Protocols of Agreement signed on 30th October, 1992, the Presidency of the Republic shall go to the MRND party;
– one of the holders of the five (5) ministries allocated to the RPF shall bear the title of Deputy Prime Minister in accordance with Article 20, paragraph 3 of the Protocol of Agreement signed on 30th October, 1992.
Article 58
In case one of the political forces called upon to participate in the Broad-based Transitional Government as provided for under Article 14 of the Protocol of Agreement signed on 30th October, 1992, defaults, the portfolios which had been allocated to that force shall be distributed among the remaining political forces. The possibility of opening to political forces other than those mentioned under Articles 55 and 56 above shall be agreed upon by consensus in accordance with Article 14 cited above.
Section 2: Transitional National Assembly
Article 60
The Transitional National Assembly shall, except in the case as provided for in Article 63 of this Protocol of Agreement, be normally composed of seventy (70) members called “Deputies to the Transitional National Assembly”. The “Deputies” shall be appointed by their own political forces and their mandate shall cover the whole Transitional Period. The Transitional National Assembly shall make its own rules of procedure.
Article 61
All the political parties registered in Rwanda at the signing of this Protocol as well as the RPF shall be represented in the Transitional National Assembly, on condition that they adhere to and abide by the provisions of the Peace Agreement. To that effect, all these parties and the RPF should, prior to the establishment of the Broad-Based Transitional National Assembly and the Broad-Based Transitional Government, sign a Political Code of Ethics whose principles are spelt out in Article 80 of this Protocol.
Since the RPF and the political parties Participating in the current Coalition Government are automatically, directly or indirectly, bound as a result of the Protocol of Agreement on the Rule of Law signed by the two parties to the negotiations, the political parties which do not participate in the said Government should, from the time of the signing of the Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing, demonstrate their commitment to abide by the principles governing the Protocol of Agreement on the Rule of Law, to support the peace process and to avoid engaging in sectarian practices and in any form of violence. Such commitment shall constitute a prerequisite for their participation in the Transitional National Assembly and it is incumbent upon the two parties to the negotiations to see to it that such commitment is real.
Article 62
The numerical distribution of seats in the Transitional National Assembly among the political forces, subject to the implementation of the previous Article, shall be as follows:
MRND: 11 seats
RPF: 11 seats
MDR: 11 seats
PSD: 11 seats
PL: 11 seats
PDC: 4 seats
The other registered parties shall have one (1) seat each.
Article 63
a) The maximum number of members of the Transitional National Assembly shall become the total number of seats of the remaining political forces if, for one reason or another, one or several political forces do not participate in the forming of the Transitional National Assembly, or withdraw from that assembly, provided that the total number is not reduced to less than two-thirds of the number stipulated under Article 60 of this Protocol of Agreement.
b) If one or several political forces do not participate, or cease to participate in the Transitional National Assembly, and the number of Deputies falls below that stipulated in the above paragraph, the remaining political forces participating in the Transitional National Assembly shall consult and agree on the modalities for the composition of the new National Assembly.
Article 64
A “Deputy” may resign. In this case, his political party shall replace him in consultation with the Bureau of the Transitional National Assembly.
Section 5: Miscellaneous Provisions
Sub-Section 1: Modalities of Appointment within the Judiciary.
Article 84:
In order to maintain the independence of the Judiciary, posts in the Judiciary shall not be subjected to sharing among political forces. Therefore, applications for the posts of Presiding Judge and Deputy Presiding Judge of the Supreme Court, referred to under Article 30 of the Protocol of Agreement signed on 30th October, 1992, shall be considered without any reference to political parties, in order to better ensure the neutrality of magistrates.
Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Miscellaneous Issues and Final Provisions (3 August 1993)
Article 22:
Duration of the Transition Period
The duration of the Transition period shall be twenty two (22) months, effective from the date of establishment of the Broad-Based Transitional Government, with the possibility of one (1) extension if warranted by exceptional circumstances impeding the normal implementation of the programme of the Broad-Based Transitional Government.
The length of the extension shall be determined by the Transitional National Assembly on the basis of a 3/5 majority vote. In this regard, the Broad-Based Transitional Government shall consider the need for an extension, three (3) months before the expiry of the Transition period, and shall make appropriate recommendations to the Transitional National Assembly, in consultation with third parties involved in the implementation of the Peace Agreement, namely the United Nations, the OAU and the Facilitator.
MRND: 11 seats
RPF: 11 seats
MDR: 11 seats
PSD: 11 seats
PL: 11 seats
PDC: 4 seats
Executive Branch Reform
1993
No developments observed this year.
1994
According to the UN Secretary General’s report, a broad-based government of national unity was installed on 19 July 1994 and established control over the Rwandan territory.1 Although the national unity government was in place in 1994, this does not indicate that the reforms agreed in the Arusha accord of 1993 were fully implemented. The president and the victorious RPF dominated government activities and unilaterally assumed the cabinet posts previously allocated to the MRND, then in exile. The RPF also created a powerful post of vice-president not mentioned in the Arusha Accords and occupied by RPF leader Paul Kagame, who simultaneously served as minister of defense. The accord requires a counter signature by the Prime Minister in bills passed by the legislature.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1994/1133), October 6, 1994)
1995
The National Unity Government was in place between July 1994 and 2003 (2003 being the last year of observation in the database). The government had finalized an eight point program in July 1994 forming the basis of the agenda of the National Unity Government, to which the prime minister, in September 1995, said still committed.1 On 8 March 2000, Prime Minister Pierre-Celestin Rwigema resigned on charges of corruption and was replaced by Bertrand Makuza from the same political party (MRD).2 Similarly, on 23 March 2000, Rwanda’s Hutu President, Pasteur Bizimungu–in power for almost five years since the genocide of 1994, resigned, thus paving the way for the accession of Vice President and Defense Minister Paul Kagame, who led the RPF rebel force and established it as a more powerful actor on the Rwandan political stage.3 Although the National Unity Government was in place, the reforms sought in the executive branch of the government were not implemented, partly because the president and the prime minister functioned as ceremonial heads of the state and the government, respectively, while real power resided with the defense minister and vice president, Paul Kagame.
On 29 September 2003, elections for National Assembly took place in which RPF won 40, PSD 7, PL 6. The National Assembly was comprised of only 53 seats.4 This effectively ended the power-sharing legislature and provided for increased political influence by the RPF, a former rebel group.
- “New Prime Minister Says He Will Continue With Government Programme,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 4, 1995
- “Mazuka Appointed Rwanda Premier,” Associated Press Online, March 8, 2000
- “Rwanda’s Post-Genocide Hutu President Quits,” Agence France Presse, March 23, 2000
- “The World Factbook-2003,” CIA, 2003, accessed September 11, 2011, http://www.theodora.com/wfb2003/rwanda/rwanda_government.html.
1996
No further developments observed.
1997
No further developments observed.
1998
No further developments observed.
1999
No further developments observed.
2000
No further developments observed.
2001
No further developments observed.
2002
No further developments observed.
PROTOCOL OF AGREEMENT ON POWER-SHARING WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A BROAD-BASED TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA AND THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT (9 JANUARY 1993)
Article 4
The Executive power shall be exercised collectively through decisions taken in Cabinet meetings, by the President of the Republic and by the Government.
Section 1: The President of the Republic and Head of State
Article 5
Upon the signing of the Peace Agreement, the incumbent President of the Republic and Head of State shall remain in office until the outcome of elections to be held at the end of the Transitional Period.
Article 6
As Head of State, the President of the Republic shall have the following prerogatives:
(a) He shall nominate the Prime Minister and other members of the Cabinet within three days following their appointment by the relevant bodies. After this period, the Prime Minister shall assume office and appoint other Members of the Cabinet.
Modalities for the appointment of the Prime Minister and other Members of the Cabinet shall be
provided for in this Peace Agreement;
(b) He shall nominate and accredit Ambassadors, Plenipotentiaries and Extraordinary Envoys abroad, after their appointment by the Cabinet. He shall receive credentials of Ambassadors and Extraordinary Envoys from abroad, after their approval by the Cabinet;
(c) He shall represent the Rwandese State in its relations with other States;
(d) He shall sanction and promulgate, without any right of veto, bills passed by the National Assembly and Orders in Council adopted in the Cabinet meetings within ten days following the date of receipt of the ruling on their constitutionality. After this period, Orders in Council shall be sanctioned and promulgated by the Prime Minister, and the bills shall be sanctioned and promulgated by the Speaker of the Transitional National Assembly;
(e) He shall declare war and sign armistice upon the decision of the Cabinet and after authorization by the National Assembly. To this end, he shall bear the title of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The Army and other security forces shall be accountable to the Cabinet, in accordance with the modalities specified in the Peace Agreement.
Article 7
The President of the Republic shall have the right to include any issue of national interest on the agenda of Cabinet meetings.
Article 8
The President of the Republic may, if he so wishes, attend meetings of the Cabinet. In this case, he shall chair the Cabinet meetings.
Article 9
Executive Orders by the President of the Republic, shall be discussed and adopted by the Cabinet. Since the President of the Republic shall have the right to be involved in decision-making in the Cabinet, he shall have no right of veto on decisions regularly taken by the Cabinet, in particular, draft Presidential Orders when these are submitted to him by the Prime Minister for signature. This signature officializing the Presidential Orders adopted in the Cabinet, shall be effected within ten days following the day of receipt of the said Orders at the Presidency of the Republic. After this period, the decision shall come into force by way of a Prime Ministerial Order.
Article 10
Legal Acts by the President of the Republic shall be countersigned by the Prime Minister and by relevant Ministers and Secretaries of State.
Article 11
In pursuance of the decisions of the Cabinet and in conformity with the procedure defined under Article 9 of the present Protocol, the President of the Republic shall sign Presidential Orders with regard to the following:
1. the prerogative of mercy;
2. the minting of currency;
3. award of the National Orders:
4. the implementation of laws, when he is so required;
5. the appointment and termination of services of the following senior civil servants:
– the Principal Private Secretary to the President of the Republic;
– the Chancellor for National Orders;
– the Governor of the National Bank of Rwanda;
– the Rector of the National University of Rwanda;
– Ambassadors;
– the Secretary to the Cabinet;
– the Personal Secretary to the President of the Republic;
– Advisors in the Presidency of the Republic;
– Principal Private Secretaries in Ministries;
– Advisors in Ministries;
– Head of the Prosecution Department at the Supreme Court;
6. Ratification of International Treaties, Conventions and Agreements. However, Peace Treaties, Treaties of Alliance, Treaties which may entail altering national borders or affect the rights of sovereignty, Treaties on the association of the Republic with one or several other States, as well as Treaties, Conventions and Agreements with financial implications not catered for in the budget, shall be implemented only after their approval by way of a law. The federation of the Republic of Rwanda with one or several other democratic States must be approved through a Referendum.
Article 12
The President of the Republic shall address messages to the Nation, the content of which shall be decided upon by the Cabinet.
Section 2: The Broad-based Transitional Government
Article 13
The current structure of the Government, namely, the number and appellation of Ministries, shall remain unchanged. However, a Secretariat of State in the Prime Minister’s Office in charge of Social Rehabilitation and Integration shall be established.
It shall be responsible for:
1. Repatriation and social and economic reintegration of the Rwandese refugees who may wish to go back home;
2. A Post-War Rehabilitation Programme as defined under Item 23.D of the present Protocol.
Article 14
The political parties participating in the Coalition Government established on 16th April, 1992 as well as the Rwandese Patriotic Front shall have the responsibility to set up the Broad-Based Transitional Government. They shall decide, by consensus, on the other political formations which may participate in that Government.
Article 15
The Government shall be composed of the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, Ministers and Secretaries of State.
Sub-section 1: The Powers of the Government:
Article 16
The Government shall be responsible for the management of the country. It shall determine and implement national policy. In so doing, the Government shall:
1. Be responsible for the implementation of laws and regulations;
2. Negotiate and conclude international Treaties, Conventions and Agreements;
3. Discuss and adopt draft bills and present them to the National Assembly;
4. Discuss and adopt Orders in Council, in situations of emergency or when the National Assembly is unable to seat, and transmit them to the President of the Republic for promulgation;
5. Appoint and dismiss civil servants.
6. Discuss and adopt Presidential, Prime Ministerial and Ministerial Statutory Orders on the
implementation of laws.
Article 17
The Government shall be the guarantor of national sovereignty and national unity.
Sub-section 2: The Prime Minister
Article 18:
The Prime Minister shall:
1. In accordance with the Peace Agreement and in consultation with the political forces, prepare the Government programme;
2. In conformity with the modalities provided for in the Peace Agreement, select the other members of the Cabinet;
3. Present the Government programme and the Ministerial team responsible for its implementation to the National Assembly;
4. Lead Government business, convene and chair Cabinet Meetings. He shall prepare the agenda for cabinet meetings, in consultation with the other members of the Government. The Prime Minister shall communicate the agenda to the President of the Republic and to the other members of the Government, at least two days before the date of the meeting.
5. Determine the functions of the Ministers and Secretaries of State as well as the nature and extent of powers of the services under them. The Ministers and Secretaries of State shall be delegated powers by the Prime Minister for the management of the duties of their departments. The Prime Minister shall determine the extent of this delegation of power.
6. In pursuance of the decisions of the Cabinet, sign Prime Ministerial Orders for the appointment and termination of services of the following senior civil servants:
– the Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister;
– Deputy Governors of the National Bank of Rwanda;
– Vice-Rectors of the National University of Rwanda;
– Advisers and “Chefs de Service” in the Prime Minister’s Office;
– the “Prefets de Prefecture”;
– Director in Public Enterprises;
– Directors General in the Ministries;
– Planning and Coordination Officers in Public Enterprises;
– Directors in Public Enterprises and Representatives of the Government in Parastatals;
– Directors and Heads of Division in the Ministries:
– “Sous-Prefets”;
– Bourgmestres;
– Deputy Directors of Public Prosecution at the Supreme Court;
– Head of the Prosecution Department of the Courts of Appeal;
– Deputy Directors of the Courts of Appeal;
– Head of the Prosecution Department at the Courts of First Instance;
– Assistant State Attorneys.
Upon delegation of power by the Cabinet,
(a) the Minister responsible for the Civil Service shall sign Ministerial Orders with regard to appointments and termination of services of Civil Servants from the rank of chief Clerk or equivalent and lower-level posts.
(b) The Minister of Justice shall sign Ministerial Orders for the appointment and termination of services of Judicial staff other than magistrates.
(c) In Public Enterprises, senior staff shall be appointed by the Board of Directors and the rest of the staff by the relevant Director.
7. Countersign, after their promulgation by the President of the Republic, bills passed by the National Assembly as well as Statutory Orders in Council adopted by the Cabinet.
8. By way of Orders decided upon during cabinet meetings, implement laws and regulations when he is required to do so.
9. Address messages to the Nation whose content shall be decided upon by the Cabinet.
10. May, under exceptional circumstances, after a decision taken by the Cabinet and on consultation with the Bureau of the National Assembly and the Supreme Court, declare a State of Siege or a State of Emergency.
Article 19
Legal acts by the Prime Minister shall be countersigned relevant Ministers and Secretaries of State.
Sub-section 3: Functions of the Deputy Prime Minister
Article 20
The Deputy Prime Minister shall:
1. Upon formal delegation of power, replace the Prime Minister in the event of his absence or hindrance.
2. Act as Prime Minister when the post falls vacant, until a new Prime Minister is appointed, following modalities provided for in the Peace Agreement.
3. In addition, hold a Ministerial Portfolio.
Sub-Section 4: Mode of Decision-Making within the Government
Article 21
Prior to the deliberations, the Cabinet meeting shall adopt its agenda. Cabinet decisions shall be taken by consensus. Where consensus is not reached, the issue at hand shall be returned to the relevant Minister for further study. Consensus on the issue shall once again be required subsequent discussions, and if no consensus is reached, a decision shall be taken on the basis of a partial consensus of a 2/3 of the members of the Government present. For the following issues, however, consensus shall be mandatory:
– amendment to the Peace Agreement;
– declaration of war;
– exercise of the prerogative of mercy and mitigation of sentence;
– defence and security matters,
Article 22
For each Cabinet Meeting, minutes and a summary of decisions shall be written. The summary shall be approved and signed by members who attended the said meeting.
Legislative Branch Reform
1993
No developments observed this year.
1994
The Arusha Accords created a multi-party Transitional National Assembly to replace the single-party National Council for Development. After taking power, the RPF installed a power-sharing Transitional National Assembly which was established on 25 November 1994. Of the 70 seats in the National Assembly, the RPF had 19, the MDR 13, the PSD 13, the PL 13, the PDC six, the PSR two, the PDI two, and the final two seats went to other parties.1 The 11 MRND seats were redistributed among various parties but six seats were kept for the army, a decision not provided for by Arusha. This multi-party Transitional National Assembly continued until the composition of the assembly was rebalanced. In the rebalanced Transitional National Assembly, the MDR had 13 seats, the PSD 13, the PL 13, the PDC six, the RPA six, the PSR two, the PDI two, and the other two seats went to other parties.2“The World Factbook- 2000,” CIA, 2000, accessed September 11, 2011, http://www.photius.com/wfb2000/countries/rwanda/rwanda_government.html.[…
- “The World Factbook- 1996,” CIA,1996, accessed September 11, 2011, http://www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/wofact96/211.htm.
1995
No further developments observed.
1996
No further developments observed.
1997
No further developments observed.
1998
No further developments observed.
1999
No further developments observed.
2000
No further developments observed.
2001
No further developments observed.
2002
No further developments observed.
postscript: Elections for the National Assembly took place on 29 September 2003 and brought with them the termination of the tenure of the Transitional National Assembly.
Article 9
The “Conseil National de developpement” (CND) shall remain in Office until the Transitional National Assembly is established. However, as from date of signing the Peace Agreement, it shall not enact laws.
Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government (Continuation of the Protocol of Agreement signed on 30th October, 1992)
Section 2: Transitional National Assembly
Article 60
The Transitional National Assembly shall, except in the case as provided for in Article 63 of this Protocol of Agreement, be normally composed of seventy (70) members called “Deputies to the Transitional National Assembly”. The “Deputies” shall be appointed by their own political forces and their mandate shall cover the whole Transitional Period. The Transitional National Assembly shall make its own rules of procedure.
Article 61
All the political parties registered in Rwanda at the signing of this Protocol as well as the RPF shall be represented in the Transitional National Assembly, on condition that they adhere to and abide by the provisions of the Peace Agreement. To that effect, all these parties and the RPF should, prior to the establishment of the Broad-Based Transitional National Assembly and the Broad-Based Transitional Government, sign a Political Code of Ethics whose principles are spelt out in Article 80 of this Protocol.
Since the RPF and the political parties Participating in the current Coalition Government are automatically, directly or indirectly bound, as a result of the Protocol of Agreement on the Rule of Law signed by the two parties to the negotiations, the political parties which do not participate in the said Government should, from the time of the signing of the Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing, demonstrate their commitment to abide by the principles governing the Protocol of Agreement on the Rule of Law, to support the peace process and to avoid engaging in sectarian practices and in any form of violence. Such commitment shall constitute a prerequisite for their participation in the Transitional National Assembly and it is incumbent upon the two parties to the negotiations to see to it that such commitment is real.
Article 62
The numerical distribution of seats in the Transitional National Assembly among the political forces, subject to the implementation of the previous Article, shall be as follows:
MRND: 11 seats
RPF: 11 seats
MDR: 11 seats
PSD: 11 seats
PL: 11 seats
PDC: 4 seats
The other registered parties shall have one (1) seat each.
Article 63
a) The maximum number of members of the Transitional National Assembly shall become the total number of seats of the remaining political forces if, for one reason or another, one or several political forces do not participate in the forming of the Transitional National Assembly, or withdraw from that assembly, provided that the total number is not reduced to less than two-thirds of the number stipulated under Article 60 of this Protocol of Agreement.
b) If one or several political forces do not participate, or cease to participate in the Transitional National Assembly, and the number of Deputies falls below that stipulated in the above paragraph, the remaining political forces participating in the Transitional National Assembly shall consult and agree on the modalities for the composition of the new National Assembly.
Article 64
A “Deputy” may resign. In this case, his political party shall replace him in consultation with the Bureau of the Transitional National Assembly.
Article 65
All compulsory mandates shall be null and void. The right of the “Deputies” to vote shall be individual.
Article 66
The first session of the Transitional National Assembly shall be devoted to administering the oath of the “Deputies” and to electing the Bureau of the Transitional National Assembly.
Article 67
The Bureau of the Transitional National Assembly shall be composed of the Speaker, the Deputy Speaker and a Secretary.
Article 68
The PSD and PL political parties shall each present one (1) candidate for the post of Speaker of the Transitional National Assembly. The political party that will not have taken the post of Speaker shall present two (2) candidates for the post of Deputy Speaker of the Transitional National Assembly.
The PDC and other political parties which do not hold any ministerial portfolio in the current Coalition Government shall each present one (1) candidate for the post of Secretary.
Voting for the above-mentioned posts shall be by secret ballot and on the basis of an absolute majority of the “Deputies” present.
Article 69
The Transitional National Assembly shall automatically hold, each year, three (3) ordinary sessions of three months each, followed each time by a one (1) month parliamentary leave. When circumstances may so require, the Transitional National Assembly shall hold extraordinary sessions. The first ordinary session shall begin 15 days after the “Deputies” to the Transitional National Assembly have taken oath of office.
The Transitional National Assembly shall be convened by the Speaker. It may be convened in extraordinary session upon the initiative of the President of the Republic, The Speaker, the Prime Minister or following the decision taken by its members on the basis of an absolute majority. When it is convened in extraordinary session, the Transitional National Assembly shall deal wit h only those issues that motivated its convening Whenever an ordinary or extraordinary session of the Assembly is convened, the agenda and venue shall be indicated. Before any proceedings, the Transitional National Assembly shall adopt its agenda and decide on the urgency of the matters to be discussed. A “Deputy” or the Prime Minister may request the urgent consideration of an item. When the request is made by the latter, the matter in question shall automatically be considered as urgent.
Article 70
The status of a Deputy shall be incompatible with the holding of a Ministerial portfolio and the exercise of any other remunerative activities.
Article 71
Members of the Transitional National Assembly who may be finally sentenced by Courts for criminal offences shall automatically lose their seats. In this case, they shall be replaced in accordance with the provisions of Article 62 of this Protocol.
Article 72
The legislative power shall be exercised by way of laws passed by “Deputies” in the Transitional National Assembly as well as by Orders in Council passed by the Broad-Based Transitional Government in cases of emergency or when the Transitional National Assembly, is unable to convene.
Article 73
Ordinary laws shall be passed on the basis of an absolute majority of the Deputies present. Organic laws shall be passed on the basis of a 3/5 majority.
Article 74
For any lawful seating to be held, a quorum of 2/3 of the members of the Transitional National Assembly shall be required.
Article 75
Sessions of the Transitional National Assembly shall be public; the minutes of the debates shall be published. However, upon request of the Speaker, or the Prime Minister or of one third of its members, the Assembly may, by an absolute majority, decide to sit in camera.
Section 3: Relationship between the Transitional National Assembly and the Broad-Based Transitional Government
Article 76
The Prime Minister, upon a decision of the Cabinet and after consultations with the Bureau of the Transitional National Assembly, may request the President of the Republic to dissolve the Transitional National Assembly. The dissolution cannot take place within the last three months of the Transition.
Article 77 Replacement of the members of the Transitional National Assembly shall be done as per the numerical distribution of seats referred to under Article 62 above. The replacement of each of the members of the Bureau of the Transitional National Assembly shall be made by election in accordance with Article 68 of this Protocol of Agreement.
Article 78
The Transitional National Assembly shall be endowed with the following means of control over government activities:
– Oral Questioning
– Written Questioning
– Committee Hearing
– Commission of Inquiry
– Interpellation
– Motion of censure.
An organic law shall determine the conditions and procedure for this control.
Article 79
The Transitional National Assembly may question the conduct of the Broad-Based Transitional Government as well as that of a Minister or Secretary of State, by voting on a motion of censure against the Prime Minister or any other member of the Government. Such a motion is not admissible until after questioning and unless it is presented by at least one fifth of the members of the Transitional National Assembly in the case of a Minister or a Secretary of State, and by one third of the members in the case of the Government. The motion of censure shall be adopted by secret ballot and by a 2/3 majority of the “Deputies” present.
The vote of a motion of censure against the Prime Minister shall entail his resignation and that of the Government. In this case the replacement of the Prime Minister shall be made in accordance with Article 53 of this Protocol of Agreement. The outgoing Government shall dispose of the day-to-day matters until a new Government is formed.
Constitutional Reform
1993
Constitutional reform did not take place in 1993.
1994
Constitutional reform did not take place in 1994.
1995
On 5 May 1995, Rwanda adopted a new constitution. The new constitution consisted of: 1. Constitutional items singled out from the constitution of 10 June 1991; 2. The Arusha peace agreement, signed on 4 August 1993; 3. The RPF [Rwandan Patriotic Front] declaration of 17 July 1994 establishing national institutions; 4. The agreement signed on 24th November 1994 between political parties which were not implicated in the previous year’s genocide; In a 57 member national assembly, 55 members voted in favor of the new constitution and two abstained; The Arusha peace accord was part of the new constitution, but the new constitution also included RPF’s declaration of July 1994 and the protocol agreement of November 1994.
1996
No developments observed this year.
1997
No developments observed this year.
1998
No developments observed this year.
1999
No developments observed this year.
2000
In 2000, the constitutional drafting commission was established and the constitution drafting process began in Rwanda. The participation of citizens in the process was encouraged and, in this regard, the prime minister called on local leaders to play a role in sensitizing and mobilizing the population towards full participation in the ongoing constitution drafting process.1 Regarding the draft constitution, the commission also consulted prisoners and refugees in Tanzania and South Africa. The draft constitution was defined the system of government and was expected to be finished by July 2003.2
- “Constitution Needs Participation of All,” Africa News, July 12, 2001.
- “New Constitution for Rwanda by July 2003: Report,” Agence France Presse, September 18, 2001
2001
No developments observed this year.
2002
In November 2002, the constitutional commission put forward a draft constitution, according to which the transitional period (and under which the government of national unity had been governed since its establishment on 19 July 1994) was set to end in July of the following year.1
Postscript: A two day cabinet meeting was held in February 2003 to discuss the draft constitution. The president, who was presiding over the discussion, then handed over its findings to the national assembly for the national referendum scheduled for 25 May.2 The draft constitution was adopted by the assembly on 23 April 2003.3 In the referendum of 25 May 2003, the draft constitution was adopted with more than 90% voters supporting the proposed draft.4 Once the Rwandan Supreme Court approved the referendum result, president Kagame signed the new constitution which then came into effect on 4 June 2003.5 The RPF-led government implemented extensive gender-based reforms, including changing inheritance laws and property laws to increase women’s rights. The new constitution encouraged the election of many women to public office, particularly parliament.
- “New Constitution Stipulates Transitional Period to End in July 2003,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 13, 2002
- “President Opens Two-Day Cabinet Discussions of Draft Constitution,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 28, 2003.
- “World Briefing Africa: Rwanda: New Constitution,” New York Times, April 24, 2003.
- “Rwanda Voters Approve Draft Constitution,” Voice of America News, May 27, 2003.
- “Rwanda’s New Constitution Comes Into Force,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 4, 2003
Article 3
The two parties also agree that the Constitution of 10th June, 1991 and the Arusha Peace Agreement shall constitute indissolubly the Fundamental Law that shall govern the Country during the Transition period, taking into account the following provisions:
1. The following Articles of the Constitution shall be replaced by the provisions of the Peace Agreement relating to the same matters. The Articles in question are: 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 4,3, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, .50, 51, 52, ,54, 55, .56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75 paragraph 2, 77 paragraphs 3 and 4, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88 paragraph 1, 90, 96, 99, 101.
2. In case of conflict between the other provisions of the Constitution and those of the Peace Agreement, the provisions of the Peace Agreement shall prevail.
Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (9 January 1993)
Chapter IV: Specialised Commissions
Article 24
In addition to the Commissions already agreed upon in the previous Agreements, the following broad-based specialised Commissions shall be established:
B. Legal and Constitutional Commission. This Commission shall be responsible for:
1. Drawing up a list of adaptations of national legislation to the provisions of the Peace Agreement, in particular those provisions relating to the Rule of Law.
2. Prepare a preliminary draft of the Constitution which shall govern the country after the Transitional Period.
Article 41
The Constitution which shall govern the country after the Transition Period shall be prepared by the Legal and Constitutional Commission comprising national experts referred to under Article 24.B of this Protocol. This Commission, which shall be under the National Assembly, shall prepare, after an extensive consultation with all the strata of the population, a preliminary draft Constitution which shall be submitted to the Government for advice, before submitting it to the National Assembly which shall finalise the draft Constitution, to be submitted to a Referendum for adoption.
Inter-ethnic/State Relations
1993
As a way out of ethnic conflict in Rwanda, the Arusha accord sought to eliminate ethnic identity and promote inter-ethnic reconciliations. In this regard, the accord called for the deletion of references to ethnic grouping in official documents, as well as a rejection of political ideology based on ethnic identity. No developments occured this year.
1994
After the genocide, the national unity government eliminated all ethnic references from official documents. According to a news report, Mr. Kagame, the leader of the victorious rebel movement, said that both the personal identification card and official documents would contain no references to ethnic origins.1
- “Rwanda’s Leaders Vow to Build a Multiparty State for Both Hutu and Tutsi,” The New York Times, September 7, 1994
1995
The mention of ethnicity was officially removed from identity cards when the new government began to issue cards in 1995.1
- “Rwanda: Procedure for obtaining or replacing a national identification card including a description of the card and information on the ‘attestation d’identité’ signed by a burgomaster,” Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, June 14, 2007.
1996
No developments observed this year.
1997
It was reported that the Rwandan government continued to eliminate references to ethnic origin from state documents and national identity cards.1“Rwanda Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997,” U.S. Department of State, 1998, accessed September 14, 2011, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1997_hrp_report/rwanda.html…
1998
No developments observed this year.
1999
No developments observed this year.
2000
No developments observed this year.
2001
No developments observed this year.
2002
No further developments observed.
Postscript: Other reforms related to promoting inter-ethnic relations also took place. In these instances, radical ethnic parties were not invited to join the National Unity Government. The new constitution, which came into force in June 2003, did not only eradicate the ethnic divisions but also rendered propaganda based on ethnic origin punishable by law. The constitution eliminates discrimination based on ethnic identity as well as formation of political organization or party based on ethnic orientation.1
At the same time, some government policies continued to promote ethnic identification. Both the special genocide courts and gacaca courts tried only genocide crimes, and the determination of which crimes were considered genocide was based almost exclusively on ethnic identity. Furthermore, many regime critics have charged that the regime actively discriminates in favor of Tutsi, particularly returned former Tutsi refugees who constitute the core of RPF support. Laws banning ethnic identification make it impossible for people to complain publicly about ethnic discrimination lest they be accused of “divisionism” or supporting “ethnic ideology.”
- “Constitution of Rwanda-2003,” accessed August 20, 2011, http://www.mod.gov.rw/?Constitution-of-the-Republic-of.
Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Rule of Law (18 August 1992.)
Article 2
National unity implies that the Rwandese people, as constituent elements of the Rwandese nation, are one and indivisible. It also implies the necessity to fight all obstacles to national unity, notably, ethnicism, regionalism, integrism and intolerance which subordinate the national interest to ethnic, regional, religious and personal interest.
Article 3
National unity entails the rejection of all exclusions and any form of discrimination based notably, on ethnicity, region, sex and religion. It also entails that all citizens have equal opportunity of access to all the political, economic and other advantages, which access must be guaranteed by the State.
Article 8
The two parties resolutely reject and undertake to fight:
– political ideologies based on ethnicity, region, religion and intolerance which subordinate national interest to the ethnic, regional, religious or personal interest;
– any form of coup d’etat as being contrary to the democratic system as described above.
Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Miscellaneous Issues and Final Provisions (3 August 1993)
Article 16: Deletion of reference to Ethnic Group in Official Documents
The Broad-Based Transitional Government shall, from the date of its assumption of office, delete from all official documents to be issued any reference to ethnic origin. Documents in use or not yet used shall be replaced by those not bearing any reference to ethnic origin.
Electoral/Political Party Reform
1993
Provisions related to electoral or political party reform were designed to ensure inclusive politics with a Political Code of Ethics binding on all parties. No developments occured this year.
1994
After the genocidal violence of 1994, Article 80 was interpreted as banning political parties based on ethnic identity. By banning parties formed based on ethnic identity, Rwanda enacted political reforms aimed at institutionalizing cross-cutting, multi-ethnic or secular political parties. This ban included the former President Habyarimana’s party, the National Revolutionary Movement for Development, and the extremist Hutu Coalition for the Defense of the Republic1 These changes would become part of the 1995 constitution.
- “Some 2,000 Former Soldiers Train for Rwanda’s New Military,” Agence France Presse, October 15, 1994
1995
The electoral reform provisions of the Arusha Accord became part of the new constitution signed on May 5, 1995. The new constitution consisted of: 1. Constitutional items singled out from the constitution of 10 June 1991; 2. The Arusha peace agreement, signed on 4 August 1993; 3. The RPF [Rwandan Patriotic Front] declaration of 17 July 1994 establishing national institutions; 4. The agreement signed on 24th November 1994 between political parties which were not implicated in the previous year’s genocide; In a 57 member national assembly, 55 members voted in favor of the new constitution and two abstained; The Arusha peace accord was part of the new constitution, but the new constitution also included RPF’s declaration of July 1994 and the protocol agreement of November 1994.
1996
No developments observed this year.
1997
No developments observed this year.
1998
No developments observed this year.
1999
No developments observed this year.
2000
No developments observed this year.
2001
No developments observed this year.
2002
No further developments observed.
Postscript: The transitional period was terminated in 2003 and the new constitution effectively bans ethnic parties in order to promote inter-ethnic and national reconciliation. Once the new constitution came into effect in June 2003, the elections were held based on party list proportional representation.1“Elections in Rwanda,” African Election Database, accessed September 14, 2011, http://africanelections.tripod.com/rw.html#2003_Chamber_of_Deputies_Elec…
Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government (4 August 1993)
Article 61
All the political parties registered in Rwanda at the signing of this Protocol as well as the RPF shall be represented in the Transitional National Assembly, on condition that they adhere to and abide by the provisions of the Peace Agreement. To that effect, all these parties and the RPF should, prior to the establishment of the Broad-Based Transitional National Assembly and the Broad-Based Transitional Government, sign a Political Code of Ethics whose principles are spelt out in Article 80 of this Protocol. Since the RPF and the political parties Participating in the current Coalition Government are automatically, directly or indirectly bound, as a result of the Protocol of Agreement on the Rule of Law signed by the two parties to the negotiations, the political parties which do not participate in the said Government should, from the time of the signing of the Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing, demonstrate their commitment to abide by the principles governing the Protocol of Agreement on the Rule of Law, to support the peace process and to avoid engaging in sectarian practices and in any form of violence. Such commitment shall constitute a prerequisite for their participation in the Transitional National Assembly and it is incumbent upon the two parties to the negotiations to see to it that such commitment is real.
Article 80
In a declaration signed by their authorised representatives, the political forces called upon to participate in the Transitional Institutions shall undertake to:
1. Support the Peace Agreement and work towards its successful implementation;
2. Promote national unity and national reconciliation of the Rwandese people:
3. Abstain from all sorts of violence and inciting violence, by written or verbal communication, or by any other means;
4. Reject and undertake to fight any political ideology or any act aimed at fostering discrimination based mainly on ethnic, regional, sexual or religious differences;
5. Promote and respect the rights and freedoms of the human person;
6. Promote political education among their members, in accordance with the fundamental principles of the Rule of Law;
7. Work towards a system whereby the political power serves the interests of all the Rwandese people without any discrimination;
8. Respect the secularism of the Rwandese State;
9. Respect national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the country.
Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Rule of Law (18 August 1992)
Article 10
Elections shall be organised in such a way that transparency is guaranteed and fraud eliminated through the establishment of efficient supervision mechanisms including, if the need arises, enlisting the assistance of International Observers. The prior and full explanation of the citizens’ rights and civic duties including the issues at stake in the elections is their inalienable right as a way of avoiding any form of political manipulation.
Civil Administration Reform
1993
The Arusha accord contained a provision for the reconstruction of the civil administration units in place before the conflict. No developments took place this year.
1994
According to the UN Secretary General’s report, the Rwandan government “required assistance in reestablishing system of administration, justice, police, finance, education and health and all other responsibilities a government must discharge”.1 In reestablishing the civil administration, the UNAMIR assisted the government. The southwestern zone was fully coordinated with the UNAMIR and the civil administration was restored. The government installed prefects at Kibuye, Gikongoro and Cyangugu.2
In September 1994, the Rwandan prime minister announced the eight-point program for national unity which included organizing the central, prefectural, communal, sector and cell administrations.3
- “UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1994/924), August 3, 1994
- “UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1994/1133), October 6, 1994.
- “The World Factbook-1996,” CIA,1996, accessed September 11, 2011, http://www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/wofact96/211.htm.
1995
After the establishment of a national unity government and the transitional national assembly, some progress was made in terms of reinstalling administrative entities. According to a report from the UN Secretary General, the administration was mostly restored throughout the country as of February. Nevertheless, the report highlights the challenges a lack of resources presents to running an effective administration.1
Once the civil administration was restored, UNAMIR II provided technical support to various administrative units to start-up operations.2
- “UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/107), February 6, 1995
- “UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,”United Nation (S/1995/134), February 13, 1995.
1996
No developments observed this year.
1997
No developments observed this year.
1998
No developments observed this year.
1999
For the first time, local officials were elected at the cell and sector levels.
2000
In 2000, the government announced plans for decentralization and administrative reform.
2001
In 2001, there was a reorganization of the sub-regional administrative units, moving from 154 communes led by burgomasters to 92 districts plus 14 towns led by mayors. Prefectures governed by prefects were changed to provinces led by mayors but governed by an elected district council. The first district council elections were held in June 2001. Numerous government responsibilities were given to the districts and their sub-units known as sectors and cells, and the districts were to become largely self-financing.
2002
Civil administration elections were held in March 2002.1
Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons (9 June 1993)
Section 2: Administration and Security in the War Zones
Article 37
The administration entities established before the outbreak of war shall be reconstituted.
Truth or Reconciliation Mechanism
1993
No developments observed this year.
1994
No developments observed this year.
1995
No developments observed this year.
1996
No developments observed this year.
1997
On 28 January 1997, a Presidential Decree (Number 25/01) was given to establish the National Commission For Unity And Reconciliation.
1998
Presidential Decree 25/01 was altered on 21 November 1998 in the cabinet meeting that adopted a legislation setting up a national commission for unity and reconciliation.1
- “Rwanda: Cabinet Approves Establishment of Commissions on Rights, Reconciliation,” BBC Monitoring Africa, November 21, 1998.
1999
Two years after the presidential decree, the NURC became operational in March 1999, by the law No. 03/99 of 12/03/99.1 The objective of the establishment of the commission was to both foster unity and reconciliation among the people of Rwanda and to promote ethnic reconciliations and human rights.
- “NURC- Background,” accessed September 15, 2011, http://www.nurc.gov.rw/.
2000
Once operational, the NURC was very active and its activities were followed and supported by the European Union.1 The commission actively engaged in organizing conferences throughout the country so that people would exchange ideas and together find solutions to a number of problems facing the country and also took charge of organizing ingando re-education camps for re-integrated soldiers, released prisoners, university students, government officials, and others.2
- “EU Provides 7.2m Euro To Support Justice System, Civil Society,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, December 14, 2000
- “Rwanda Holds National Conference on Unity and Reconciliation,” Xinhua General News Service, October 18, 2000.
2001
The NURC reportedly continued to make progress in its efforts to restore normalcy to the country following the 1994 genocide.1
2002
No further developments observed this year.
Postscript: As of 2003, the commission was active. While critics claim that the NURC had been used to try to promote unity around the RPF and its agenda not to truly promote reconciliations, the use of Gaçaca as a form of transitional justice and reconciliation can be seen as significant effort aimed towards reconciliations. Elections for Gaçaca judges were held in 2001 and the first sessions began in 2002 and fully completed in 2005.
Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (9 January 1993)
Chapter IV: Specialised Commissions
Article 24
In addition to the Commissions already agreed upon in the previous Agreements, the following broad-based specialised Commissions shall be established:
A. Commission for National Unity and National Reconciliation This commission, which reports to the Government, shall be responsible for:
1. Preparing a national debate on national unity and national reconciliation.
2. Prepare and distribute information aimed at educating the population and achieving national
unity and national reconciliation.
Article 80
In a declaration signed by their authorised representatives, the political forces called upon to participate in the Transitional Institutions shall undertake to:
1. Support the Peace Agreement and work towards its successful implementation;
2. Promote national unity and national reconciliation of the Rwandese people:
3. Abstain from all sorts of violence and inciting violence, by written or verbal communication, or by any other means;
4. Reject and undertake to fight any political ideology or any act aimed at fostering discrimination based mainly on ethnic, regional, sexual or religious differences;
5. Promote and respect the rights and freedoms of the human person;
6. Promote political education among their members, in accordance with the fundamental principles of the Rule of Law;
7. Work towards a system whereby the political power serves the interests of all the Rwandese people without any discrimination;
8. Respect the secularism of the Rwandese State;
9. Respect national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the country.
Article 81
The Commission on National Unity and National Reconciliation shall ensure that each political force respects the principles spelt out under Article 80 above.
Article 82
Any political force violating the provisions of Article 80 shall be liable to a sanction of exclusion from the Transitional Institutions, without prejudice to other legal or statutory provisions on the matter. This measure shall be taken by the Supreme Court upon request of the Government, acting on the Commission’s report. The request to the Supreme Court shall be preceded by a warning by the Government to the political party concerned; when the warning has not been heeded.
Sub-Section 2: Additional Duties of the Commission for National Unity and National Reconciliation.
Article 83
The two parties agree that the Commission on National Unity and National Reconciliation, in addition to the duties specified under Article 24 A of the Protocol of Agreement signed on 30th October, 1992, shall see to it that each political force respects the principles spelt out in the Political Code of Ethics binding the political forces to participate in the Transitional Institutions.
Judiciary Reform
1993
The accord called for a separation of powers as a general principle and the creation of a competent and independent judiciary. No developments observed this year.
1994
No developments observed this year.
1995
On 5 May 1995, Rwanda adopted a new constitution which dealt with judicial reform. As of October of 1995, however, it was reported that the judiciary was still non-functional.1 In the first move to revive the judicial system, the national assembly appointed six Supreme Court judges.2
- “Rwanda-Politics: Patching Up A Tattered Judiciary,” IPS-Inter Press Service, October 24, 1995.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/1002), December 1, 1995.
1996
In 1996, the courts were operational. Genocide laws were adopted and enforced ex post facto in specially created genocide courts.
1997
No developments observed this year.
1998
No developments observed this year.
1999
In 1999, the government announced plans to create Gaçaca genocide courts.
2000
In an effort to build the Rwandan judiciary into a professional and strong institution, the government adopted new merit-based recruitment policies in 2000.1
2001
Elections for Gaçaca judges were held in 2001. A Rwandan Legal Reform Commission was established by law in July 2001. It was composed of Rwandans belonging to various professional and legal institutions, in particular the Supreme Court, the Ministry of Justice, the Public prosecution service, National University of Rwanda and members of the Bar Association.1 The recommendations of the commission were largely adopted by the government and have been integrated in the new constitution.
- “Functional Review Report- Supreme Court,” DFID – Ministry of Public Service and Labour MIFOTRA, 2008, accessed February 9, 2012, http://www.mifotra.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/downloads/SUPREME%20COURT%20(Eng).pdf.
2002
The first sessions for the election of judges began in 2002. In addition, a Commission for Legal Reform proposed a wide-ranging reorganization of the legal system in 2002 that combined elements of the Napoleonic and Common Law systems.
Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (9 January 1993)
Chapter V: The Judiciary: Section 1: General Principles
Article 25
1. The powers of the Judiciary shall be exercised by courts, tribunals and other jurisdictions. The Judiciary is independent of the Legislature and the Executive.
Section 5: Miscellaneous Provisions
Sub-Section 1: Modalities of Appointment within the Judiciary.
Article 84
In order to maintain the independence of the Judiciary, posts in the Judiciary shall not be subjected to sharing among political forces. Therefore, applications for the posts of Presiding Judge and Deputy Presiding Judge of the Supreme Court, referred to under Article 30 of the Protocol of Agreement signed on 30th October, 1992, shall be considered without any reference to political parties, in order to better ensure the neutrality of magistrates.
Military Reform
1993
No military reforms took place in 1993.
1994
Rwanda’s armed forces were an estimated 30,000 strong when genocidal violence erupted in 1994. The military strength increased to 70,000 in 2002 and dropped to 33,000 as of 2007.1
The Arusha accord of 1993 contained several provisions for military reform including the composition of the armed forces. According to the accord, government forces were to comprise 60% of the new force and the RPF were to comprise 40%. The proposed armed force was said to be 13,000 strong. After the genocide of 1994, most of the members of Armed Force of Rwanda fled to the Democratic Republic of Congo. The victorious rebel group Rwandan Patriotic Front’s armed wing Rwandan Patriotic Army became the Rwandan Defense Forces on July 19, 1994. This was formally institutionalized in the law N° 19/2002 of 17/05/2002.2
- D. Scott Bennett and Allan Stam, “EUGene: A Conceptual Manual,” International Interactions 26 (2000):179-204.
- “Ministrial Order,” Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC), accessed September 19, 2011, http://www.rdrc.org.rw/ProgrommeDocs/ministerial_order.pdf.
1995
No developments observed this year.
1996
No developments observed this year.
1997
Although the military reform started in Rwanda with the signing of Arusha Accord in 1993, the actual reform was not in line with the Arusha Accord. Reform was, for the most part, domestically driven as tensions arose between the Government of National Unity and international actors i.e. France, U.N. Peacekeeping, who had previously failed to respond to the genocide. The Rwandan government started to reduce the size of the military in response to pressure from international donor agencies in 1997.1 This phase began in September 1997 and continued until February 2001 and involved the demobilization of 18,692 soldiers from the Rwandan army (RPA), 2,364 of whom were child soldiers. In this phase, some 15,000 ex-FAR combatants were integrated into the RPA and approximately 15,000 settled in Rwanda. Even if the overall objective of the RDRP Stage I was to reduce the size of the armed force to an economically sustainable level, the integration of the ex-FRA made the change economically insignificant.2
- “Rwanda Starts Demobilization,” Saint Paul Pioneer Press (Minnesota), September 30, 1997.
- “The Second Stage of Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (RDRP Stage II),” RDRC, 2002.
1998
No developments observed this year.
1999
No developments observed this year.
2000
No developments observed this year.
2001
No developments observed this year.
2002
In an effort to reform the military, the government enacted a law (no. 19/2002) on 17 May 2002 that called for the demobilization of members of Rwandan Defense Force, Former Armed Force of Rwanda, and other formerly armed groups. When the law was enacted in 2002, the RDA controlled 51,000 armed personnel. Through the RDRP Stage II, 22,000 Rwandan Defense Force members were expected to be demobilized resulting in a smaller and more professionalized armed force. As of June 2008, 22,362 RDF soldiers were demobilized exceeding their target.1 This reform initiative was supported by World Bank, DFID, GTZ and Multi Donor Trust Fund, African Union and the government of Rwanda.2
The Rwandan armed force is now an integrated and reformed armed force. Yet, it did not meet the 13,000 personnel goal as agreed to in the Arusha Accord of 1993.
- “Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission,” DDR-Rwanda, January-March 2008, 4, accessed September 19, 2011, www.rdrc.org.rw.
- “RDRC, 2001-2008,” accessed September 19, 2011, http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/mapa/rwanda09i.pdf.
Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties (9 June 1993
The Government of the Republic of Rwanda on the one hand, and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the other;
Agree on the following provisions on the integration of the Armed Forces of the two parties:
Chapter 1: The National Army: Section 1: Missions and Principles
Article 1
Subject to modalities and principles mutually agreed upon between the two parties in the present Protocol of Agreement, for the formation of the National Army, the latter shall fulfil the following missions and shall be guided by the principles below:
A. Missions
1. Defend the national territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the country;
2. Participate, within the framework established by laws and regulations and in consultation with relevant authorities, in operations of maintenance and restoration of law and order as well as in the execution of laws;
3. Participate in relief operations in the event of natural calamities;
4. Contribute to the development of the country, especially through reconstruction and production activities.
B. Principles
1. As an institution, the National Army shall be governed by the laws and regulations of the country;
2. The National Army shall be at the disposal of the Government and shall be subordinated to its
authority, the two institutions abiding by the Fundamental Law as defined in the Peace Agreement, laws, democratic principles and the Rule of Law;
3. The National Army shall be non-partisan;
4. The National Army shall be a regular Army, composed solely of volunteer Rwandese citizens
recruited on the basis of their competence. It shall be open to any Rwandese Nationals, irrespective of their ethnic group, region, sex, religion or language;
5. Members of the National Army shall have the right to be informed about the socio-political life of the country. They shall benefit from civic and political education. To that effect, the Government shall set up a programme for the civic and political education of servicemen;
6. Members of the National Army shall not be affiliated to political parties or to any other association of a political nature. They shall neither take part in activities or demonstrations of political parties or associations. They shall not portray their political allegiances in public;
7. Members of the National Army shall exercise their right to vote. Given the type of the current organization of the Army, however, its members cannot participate in local elections;
8. Members of the National Army may present their candidature for political elective posts, on condition that they resign from the Army.
Section 2: Size, Structure and Organization
Article 2
The strength of the National Army (Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, Corporals and Privates) shall be thirteen thousand (13,000) men.
The ratio between the various categories with respect to the whole size of the Army, shall be 6% for Officers, 22% for Non-Commissioned Officers and 72% for men.
Sub-Section 2: Structure
Article 3
The National Army shall comprise:
1. An Army Command High Council;
2. The Army Headquarters;
3. Four (4) Territorial Brigades;
4. Specialised Units under the Army Headquarters;
5. Support and Service Units under the Army Headquarters.
The Organizational Chart indicating the structure of the National Army is reproduced as Annex I of the present Protocol and is an integral part of it.
Sub-Section 3: Organization
Paragraph 1: The Army Command High Council
Article 4
An Army Command High Council (ACHC) is hereby established and shall, in line with the policy set by the
Government, be the highest military organ of consultation and decision-making for matters related to defence and the organization of the Army. It shall be accountable to the Government through the Minister of Defence.
Article 5: Composition
The Army Command High Council shall be composed of:
The Chief of Staff of the National Army: Chairman
The Deputy Chief of Staff of the National Army: Vice-Chairman
Brigade Commanders (4): Members
Second in Command of Brigades (4): Members
Article 6: Functions
The Army Command High Council shall exercise the following functions:
1. Study modalities of implementing the Government policy in matters of defence.
2. Ensure the execution of the defence policy of the country.
3. Set up, in line with the Government general policy, a doctrine of utilization of the Army by establishing mechanisms and strategies for the defence of the national territory as well as the maximum utilization of resources.
4. Approve plans for the utilization of the Army.
5. Draw guidelines for the organization of the supply of logistics.
6. Provide advice, either on its own initiative or upon the request of the Minister of Defence, on defence policy plans, the overall organization of the Army, the state of military service and on any military issue of general concern.
7. Ensure the implementation of the organisation plan of the Army.
8. Study major issues confronting the Units and take decisions to be implemented by the Army headquarters or make recommendations to the Minister of Defence for appropriate action.
9. Supervise the process of formation of the National Army.
Article 7: Meetings
The Army Command High Council shall meet once a month in an ordinary session upon convocation by its Chairman.
The Chairman may call for an extraordinary session when and as needed, and especially 6n instruction from the Minister of Defence, or at the request of anyone of its members.
The agenda of the meeting shall be specified upon notification to attend.
Article 8: Mode of Decision-Taking
Decisions shall be taken by consensus and communicated to the Minister of Defence.
Decisions or recommendations by the Army Command High Council shall be conveyed to the echelons concerned through the Army Chief of Staff.
Article 9: Rules of Procedure
The Army Command High Council shall establish its own rules of procedure.
Paragraph 4: Integration Operations
Article 73: Criteria for the Selection of Servicemen in the National Army
The selection of servicemen to constitute the National Army by each party and those to be demobilized shall be carried out in the Assembly points. Servicemen to constitute the National Army should meet the following criteria:
1. Officers
They should:
– be volunteers;
– be serving as Officers;
– be Rwandese Nationals.
-be physically fit, i.e. they should obtain a certificate of physical fitness from a registered physician.
-The war-wounded and handicapped shall, however, remain eligible for Army service, according to their specializations, unlike the disabled servicemen who shall be demobilized but assisted. This shall apply to all categories of servicemen.
– be at least 21 years of age.
2. Non-Commissioned Officers
They should:
– be volunteers;
– be serving as Non-Commissioned Officers;
– be Rwandese Nationals;
– be physically fit;
– be at least 18 years old.
3. Troops
They should:
– be volunteers;
– be serving in the Army;
-be Rwandese Nationals;
– be physically fit;
– be at least 18 years old.
For all 3 categories of servicemen, a cross-check shall be made out in case of any doubt concerning personal particulars, as per criteria spelled out above.
Each party shall determine independently the rank and seniority of each member of its force.
Article 74: Proportions and Distribution of Command Posts
During the establishment of the National Army, the proportions and distribution of Command posts between the two parties shall abide by the following principles:
1. The Government forces shall contribute 60% of the forces and the RPF 40% of the forces for all levels apart from the posts of Command described below.
2. In the chain of Command, from the Army Headquarters to the Battalion, each party shall have a 50% representation for the following posts:
Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff, Heads of Departments at the Army General Headquarters (G1, G2, G3, G4), Brigade Commanders, Seconds in Command of Brigades, Heads of Sections at Brigade Headquarters (S1, S2, 53, S4), Battalion Commanders and Seconds in Command of Battalions, Commanders and Seconds in Command of Specialized Units, namely: Paracommando, Reconnaissance, Military Police Battalions, and of Support Units, Engineering, Field Artillery, Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalions and the Logistics Center; Commanders and Seconds in Command of the Schools -ESM and ESO -and Commanders and Seconds in Command of the Training Centres in BIGOGWE and BUGESERA.
3. All top posts described above shall be distributed among the Officers of the Rwandese Government and those of the RPF in accordance with the principle of alternation.
Thus, the Rwandese Government forces and the RPF forces shall supply an equal number of Brigade and Battalion Commanders, of Seconds in Command of Brigade and Battalion, of Heads of Department at the Army Headquarters, of Heads of Section at Brigade Headquarters; of Commanders and Seconds in Command of Specialized and Support Units, of Schools and Training Centers described above. However, neither force can hold at the same time the posts of Commander and Second in Command within the same Unit.
4. Without prejudice to Article 73, the proportions of the two forces in all the structures of the National Army shall be affected by no prerequisite condition in terms of accessibility. Thus, adequate training shall be given to the servicemen retained without fulfilling all the necessary requirements in accordance with the modalities determined by the Army Command High Council.
5. The post of Chief of Staff of the National Army shall be held to the Government party and the one of Deputy Chief of Staff to the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF).
Article 75: Specific Case of Officer Trainees in ESM and Non-Commissioned Officer Trainees in ESO
The Trainees still following their studies in the Schools of the Armed Forces as well as servicemen undergoing short term training abroad shall be considered as active members of the Armed Forces.
The recruitment within the Armed Forces shall be frozen until the end of the Transition Period. The Broad-Based Transitional Government may, however, decide, after seeking advice from the Army Command High Council and the Command Council of the National Gendarmerie to resume admission to the School of Armed Forces before the end of the Transition Period.
Paragraph 5: Training of the National Army
Article 76
Elements of each Force selected to constitute the National Army shall undergo training for purposes of harmonizing techniques and achieving harmonious integration of servicemen.
Article 77: Training Phases
The training shall be carried out in two phases:
Phase 1: The separate training of servicemen of the Rwandese Armed Forces and the Rwandese Patriotic Army shall be conducted in their respective zones. This phase shall be aimed at preparing servicemen of both parties to live together in their future Units so as to constitute a single Army and do away with the spirit of antagonism nurtured by the war. The duration of the separate training shall be one month.
Phase 2: The joint training of the Units to constitute the National Army shall be dispensed to servicemen from the two Forces, in the same training centres.
That training shall be dispensed to servicemen to constitute the National Army and selected by each party, in accordance with the criteria spelled out under Article 73 of the present Protocol.
It shall, as much as possible, begin after the designation of servicemen within their Units.
This phase shall be aimed at harmonizing techniques of the two armies, nurturing the team spirit, enhancing the patriotic spirit and that of reconciliation. Such training shall be organized in training centres in three (3) batches composed of more or less than four thousand and four hundred (4,400) men. Each batch shall undergo a two-month training in the centres.
The duration of the joint training shall be 7 months, i.e. two (2) months training for each batch, and 2 x 15 days of preparation between the batches. Servicemen who will not be selected for the first batch shall be waiting in the Assembly points for their turn.
The Army Command High Council shall decide on the overall training programme as well as on the sequence of rotations in training centres.
The programme and calendar of training are attached of the present Protocol as Annex II and are an integral part of this Protocol.
Article 78: Instructors
For all the training phases, recourse shall be made to Rwandese instructors provided by the two parties and foreign instructors. The latter shall be provided by countries to be agreed upon by the two parties as well as the Neutral International Force. The number of instructors shall amount to 10% of the number of servicemen to be trained in each batch.
The joint training of Rwandese instructors shall be undertaken, as much as possible, before the separate training of servicemen from both parties.
Article 79: Joint Commission of Programmes
An Ad Hoc Joint Commission of Programmes is hereby set up and shall be responsible for the elaboration of syllabuses relating to all subjects to be taught during the separate and joint training periods. Those syllabuses should be made available before the disengagement of the forces of the two parties.
The said Commission shall start its work before 15th August, 1993 and shall be expected to be through by 31st August, 1993.
The draft syllabuses elaborated by each party shall constitute the basis for the work of the Commission.
The Commission shall work under the Chairmanship of the Neutral Military Observer Group Commander or a person appointed by him. The latter shall come into touch with the two parties so as to set up the calendar of work.
Police Reform
1993
The Arusha Accord of 1993 called for several limited police reforms. The accord called for the National Gendarmerie, or military police, under the Ministry of Interior to be in charge of training the Communal Police (Local Police). The language of article 146 suggests that the local police would recieve some of the same training as the National Gendarmerie. Local police may also work with the military police on security matters to maintain public order and security. However, the local police, not the military police, would enforce laws at the local level. No reforms along these lines were reported in 1993.
1994
No organizational reforms concerning the police consistent with article 146 took place this year.
1995
No developments observed this year.
1996
No developments observed this year.
1997
No developments observed this year.
1998
No developments observed this year.
1999
Prior to 1999, the National Unity Government apparently renegotiated the nature of police reforms that were needed and decided to unify all police forces in the country, which is within their mandate in the accord. In 1999, the Rwandan parliament passed a law establishing a national police force which integrated the national gendarmerie, the communal police, and judicial police.1
2000
A head of the newly formed national police force was appointed in February 2000.1 Another piece of legislation concerning the Rwandan National Police (RNP) was passed under Law No. 09/2000 of June 16, 2000. This law combined further or officially joined the former Gendarmerie Nationale, which was under the Ministry of Defense, with the former Communal Police under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Judicial Police under the Ministry of Justice.
- “Head of Newly-Formed Police, Other Top Security Officials Appointed,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, February 16, 2000.
2001
No developments observed this year.
2002
The personnel of the newly-formed force went through training and some 3,000 officers underwent classes on human rights.1
Postscript: A political training school was developed in Gishali and National Police Academy was set up in Ruhengeri in 2004.2 Community Partnership Programs and Community Partnership Committees were established at the neighborhood level and any unacceptable police behavior was recorded and communicated to the police hierarchy. The Police Training School was designed to professionalize the police service through the provision of basic training. The National Police Academy immediately removed officers from the force if any form of misconduct was detected. Police units with a Women’s Desk were established.3“Rwanda,” Security Reform Resource Center, 2010, accessed September 19, 2011, http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/Country-Prof…
- Some 3,000 Police Officers Reportedly “Sensitized On Human Rights,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 2, 2002.
- “Poverty Reduction Strategy Annual Progress Report (June 2003-June 2004),” RDRC, 104, accessed September 19, 2011, www.rdrc.org.rw/ProgrommeDocs/PRSP2004PUBLICATION.pdf.
Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties (9 June 1993)
Section 5: Collaboration between the National Gendarmerie and the Communal Police
Article 146
The Communal Police, under the Communal authority shall, in addition to its exclusive functions, assist the National Gendarmerie in the fulfilment of its general mission of maintaining public order and security.
The National Gendarmerie shall assist the Ministry of Interior and Communal Development in the training and retraining of the Communal Police.
At the Communal level, the Commander of the Gendarmerie Station shall supervise the training and daily operations of the Communal Police. However, only the Communal Police shall carry out operations related to the implementation of police regulations enacted by the Local Administrative Authority.
Demobilization
1993
No developments observed this year.
1994
No developments observed this year.
1995
No developments observed this year.
1996
No developments observed this year.
1997
Rwanda’s DDR proceeded in two different phases. In the first phase, which began in September 1997 and lasted until February 2001, 18,692 soldiers from the Rwandan army (RPA) – 2,364 of whom were child soldiers and 15,000 of whom were former members of Former Rwandan Armed Force – were demobilized.1
- “The Second Stage of Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (RDRP Stage II),” RDRC, 2002.
1998
No developments observed this year.
1999
No developments observed this year.
2000
No developments observed this year.
2001
The second phase of demobilization started in December 2001 and ended in December 2008. In this phase, a total of 20,000 ex-combatants from RPA/RDF and 12,500 members of armed groups were expected to be demobilized. By the end of March 2008, 22,362 RDF were demobilized, thereby exceeding the target number. However, out of the 12,500, only 6,397 ex-combatants from armed groups including 661 child combatants were demobilized.1 Those mobilized received insertion benefits and reintegration allowances.
- “DDR-Rwanda, January-March 2008,” Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, 4, accessed September 19, 2011, www.rdrc.org.rw.
Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties (9 June 1993)
Paragraph 3: Disengagement of Forces. Definitions.
Article 55: Definitions
An Assembly zone is a portion of the national territory within which the Assembly and Cantonment points of each of the two parties shall be located Assembly points are centres where specific groups of servicemen of the two Forces shall be confined and their identification conducted. Those centres shall be the starting point of the formation, integration and demobilization process that shall be conducted under the supervision of the Neutral International Force.
Cantonment points are places identified for the storage of heavy weapons outside the Assembly points.
Chapter III. Demobilization Process
Section 1: Principles
Article 147
Elements of the two Forces, namely the Rwandese Armed Forces and the RPF Forces which shall not have been retained among the nineteen thousand (19,000) servicemen and gendarmes shall be demobilized.
Article 148
Each party, i.e. the Coalition Government on the one hand, and the RPF on the other, shall specify those elements among its personnel to be demobilized and make a list of them.
Article 149
Demobilization is a process beginning with the formal publishing of lists of servicemen to be demobilized and ending with the final implementation of the process of integration of the demobilized personnel into civil life, in accordance with the timetable attached to the present Protocol as Annex IV.
The publishing of lists shall only take place after the disengagement and verification by the competent organs have been conducted and upon completion of the joint training phase. Servicemen to be demobilized shall remain under the responsibility of the Broad-Based Transitional Government until they have been posted, taking into account their categories.
Article 150
Upon completion of the separate training, elements to be demobilized may be put together in separate Assembly points within the respective zones. The Command Council of the National Gendarmerie shall decide, depending on the circumstances, on the need to put them together, taking especially into account the social administration requirements for the elements to be demobilized.
Article 151
Demobilization shall be a gradual process which shall adapt itself to the programme of integration of each demobilized serviceman, in line with the timetable for the demobilization attached as Annex IV.
Article 152
Upon the completion of the demobilization process, each serviceman/gendarme shall be given a demobilization certificate. This certificate is a document testifying that the holder is an ex-serviceman and he/she is entitled to certain benefits given to war veterans.
The Certificate shall testify that the military or gendarme services are terminated and that the bearer was properly demobilized. Copies of that certificate shall be kept within the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Interior and Communal Development as well as the Secretariat of State for Rehabilitation and Social Integration.
A card for ex-servicemen shall also be issued to the demobilized personnel and shall especially bear the following particulars: family name, first name, rank, domicile, a photo, date of birth, certificate number and date of issuance.
Section 2: Demobilization Modalities
Sub-Section 1: General Conditions
Article 153: Lump sum Demobilization Allowance
Each serviceman/gendarme to be demobilized shall be paid a lump sum demobilization allowance in constant value of Rwandese Francs, amounting to:
– One hundred thousand (100,000) RWF for Corporals, Privates and Gendarmes.
– Two hundred thousand (200,000) RWF for Non-Commissioned Officers – 2nd Category.
– Three hundred thousand (300,000) RWF for Non-Commissioned Officers – 1st Category.
– Four hundred thousand (400,000) RWF for Junior Officers.
– Five hundred thousand (500,000) RWF for Senior Officers.
The Broad-Based Transitional Government shall specify modalities of the distribution of those allowances.
The invalid and handicapped whose incapacity to perform their duties shall be testified by a registered physician, shall be paid a monthly invalidity allowance and the Government shall take charge of the education of all their children in Public or subsidized Private Schools.
Sub-Section 2: Specific Modalities for Demobilization per Categories of the Personnel to be Demobilized
Article 155
The personnel having the means to take care of their own integration into civil life shall be discharged upon completion of usual formalities.
Article 156
The personnel to be directly absorbed into the civil service shall be demobilized as soon as the absorption capacities of that sector will have been communicated.
Article 157
The personnel to undergo a short or long training or follow familiarization programmes shall be demobilized as soon as opportunities for their training shall have been confirmed.
Article 158
The handicapped or invalid shall take advantage of special programmes designed for socio-economic integration. They shall fall under the responsibility of the Secretariat of State for Rehabilitation and Social Integration as soon as possibilities of their integration will have been identified.
Article 159
The personnel whose integration in the civil life shall be contingent upon integration in the Rwandese society, provided for in the Repatriation Programme shall be under the responsibility of the organs responsible for the implementation of the repatriation programme, as soon as such bodies are in a position to implement those programmes.
Article 160
The personnel who do not fall under any of the above categories shall be demobilized as soon as the Secretariat of State for Rehabilitation and Social Integration and the competent organs shall be in a position to make room for job opportunities for them.
Section 3: Follow-up of the Demobilized Personnel
Article 161
The issue pertaining to the reserve of the National Army and to the compulsory national service shall be considered by the Broad-Based Transitional Government for appropriate action. The demobilized personnel may, on their own volition, become members of the Reserve.
Article 162
The Secretariat of State for Rehabilitation and Social Integration shall include a Service responsible for the implementation of the programme of integration of the demobilized personnel in the socio-economic life. It shall also ensure the follow-up of the demobilized personnel after their social integration. The Government shall specify modalities of collaboration between the Secretariat of State for Rehabilitation and Social Integration and other departments concerned with the matters of the demobilized personnel, especially the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.
Article 163
The Army Command High Council and the Command Council of the National Gendarmerie shall decide whether it is appropriate and on the time for the separation of the personnel selected to constitute the National Army and the National Gendarmerie from those to be demobilized, and shall take into account the administrative facilities required by the social services responsible for the discharge and reintegration of the demobilized personnel.
Disarmament
1993
There was no active DDR process to hand over weapons this year.
1994
There was no active DDR process to hand over weapons this year.
1995
There was no active DDR process to hand over weapons this year.
1996
There was no active DDR process to hand over weapons this year.
1997
Rwanda’s DDR began in 1997 and proceeded in two different phases. In the first phase, which began in September 1997 and lasted until February 2001, 18,692 soldiers from the Rwandan army (RPA) – 2,364 of whom were child soldiers and 15,000 of whom were former members of Former Rwandan Armed Force – were demobilized.1 No estimates were given on the specific number of weapons turned in by troops.
- “The Second Stage of Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (RDRP Stage II),” RDRC, 2002.
1998
The DDR program continued.
1999
The DDR program continued.
2000
The DDR program continued until 2001. The Rwandan government sought the disarmament of Hutu militias who remained in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.1
- “Rwanda Says No Withdrawal from Congo Without Disarmament of Hutu Militia”, Associated Press, November 14, 2000.
2001
The second phase of demobilization started in December 2001 and ended in December 2008. In this phase, a total of 20,000 ex-combatants from RPA/RDF and 12,500 members of other armed groups were expected to be demobilized. By the end of March 2008, 22,362 RDF were demobilized, thereby exceeding the target number. Another 6,397 ex-combatants from other armed groups including 661 child combatants were demobilized.1 Those mobilized received insertion benefits and reintegration allowances. Turning in arms was part of the DDR processes, but many produced no weapon. No estimates were given on the specific number of weapons turned in by troops.
- “DDR-Rwanda,”Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, January-March 2008, 4, accessed September 19, 2011, www.rdrc.org.rw.
2002
The DDR program continued until 2008.
Postscript: It was reported that Rwanda destroyed 6,000 small arms in late 2004.1
- “RDRC, 2001-2008,” accessed September 19, 2011, http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/mapa/rwanda09i.pdf.
Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties (9 June 1993)
Article 67: Definition of Heavy Weapons
All weapons shall be considered as heavy weapons except pistols, UZZI sub-machine guns, sub-machine guns, rifles, light machine-guns (6.25 mm), medium machine guns (7.62 mm) and general-purpose machine guns (7.62 mm).
Armoured vehicles such as personnel carriers, tanks etc. helicopters and other military aircraft belong to the category of heavy weapons.
Upon the request of the Army Command High Council and the Command Council of the National Gendarmerie, the Neutral International Force or the expanded NMOG may authorize the use of those vehicles and aircraft for specified missions.
Article 68: Guard and Maintenance of Arms within the Cantonment Points
The Cantonment points shall be under the only control of the Neutral Internal Force. Some members of the respective parties shall, however, be authorized by the Neutral International Force to visit the Cantonment points for purposes of servicing heavy weapons.
Article 69: Ownership of Arms and Military Equipment in the Assembly and Cantonment Points
The Military equipment based in Assembly or Cantonment points and stored in magazines located in the Assembly points shall be verified and an inventory and record kept. This equipment shall remain the property of either party until the completion of the integration of the two forces.
Thereafter, the Broad-Based Transitional Government shall, at the proposal of the Army Command High Council, decide on the fate of those arms, ammunition and military equipment.
Article 70:
The Army Command High Council (ACHC)and the Command Council of the National Gendarmerie (CCNG) shall determine the type of light weapons for the National Army and the National Gendarmerie. Those weapons should be available at the training sites at the start of the integration process of the forces.
Those weapons shall be made available by the ACHC and the CCNG and shall belong to the National Army and the National Gendarmerie respectively.
Reintegration
1993
There were no active reintegration programs this year.
1994
There were no active reintegration programs this year.
1995
There were no active reintegration programs this year.
1996
There were no active reintegration programs this year.
1997
Rwanda’s overall DDR process proceeded in two different phases. In the first phase, which began in September 1997 and lasted until February 2001, 18,692 soldiers from the Rwandan army (RPA) – 2,364 of whom were child soldiers and 15,000 of whom were former members of Former Rwandan Armed Force – were demobilized.1
The state’s first reintegration program was reportedly not successful. According to the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, only a small proportion of disabled ex-combatants received any kind of medical rehabilitation, no reintegration benefits were available for the 15,000 ex-FAR combatants who were demobilized. Demobilized RPA combatants received some reintegration support.2
- “The Second Stage of Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (RDRP Stage II),” RDRC, 2002.
- Ibid, 7.
1998
No developments observed this year.
1999
No developments observed this year.
2000
No developments observed this year.
2001
The second phase of demobilization started in December of 2001 and ended in December of 2008. In this phase, a total of 20,000 ex-combatants from RPA/RDF and 12,500 members of armed groups were expected to be demobilized. By the end of March 2008, 22,362 RDF were demobilized, thereby exceeding the target number. However, out of the 12,500, only 6,397 ex-combatants from armed groups were demobilized.1 Those mobilized received insertion benefits and reintegration allowances.
The reintegration had economic and social dimensions and was carried out in two distinct phases. Under economic reintegration, combatants received counseling, financial support and formal and informal education. Ex-combatants also received reintegration grants and tool kits. Under the social reintegration phase, activities related to supporting family network and creating informal networks of ex-combatants were carried out in order to develop informal networks.2
- “DDR-Rwanda, January-March 2008,” Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, 4, accessed September 19, 2011, www.rdrc.org.rw.
- RDRC, 2001-2008, accessed September 19, 2011, http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/mapa/rwanda09i.pdf.
2002
According to several 2008 reports, around 43,669 ex-combatants received reintegration support in the second phase which spanned from 2002 to 2008.1
- “MDRP-Supported Activities in Rwanda,” Multi Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, accessed September 19, 2011, http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/MDRP_RWA_FS_1108.pdf; A. Caramés, “Rwanda (RDRC, 2001-2008),” in Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes in the World during 2008, ed. A. Caramés and E. Sanz (Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace, 2009), 101-108.
Sub-Section 2: Specific Modalities for Demobilization per Categories of the Personnel to be Demobilized
Article 155
The personnel having the means to take care of their own integration into civil life shall be discharged upon completion of usual formalities.
Article 156
The personnel to be directly absorbed into the civil service shall be demobilized as soon as the absorption capacities of that sector will have been communicated.
Article 157
The personnel to undergo a short or long training or following familiarization programmes shall be demobilized as soon as opportunities for their training shall have been confirmed.
Article 158
The handicapped or invalid shall take advantage of special programmes designed for socio-economic integration. They shall fall under the responsibility of the Secretariat of State for Rehabilitation and Social Integration as soon as possibilities of their integration will have been identified.
Article 159
The personnel whose integration in the civil life shall be contingent upon integration in the Rwandese society, provided for in the Repatriation Programme shall be under the responsibility of the organs responsible for the implementation of the repatriation programme, as soon as such bodies are in a position to implement those programmes.
Article 160
The personnel who do not fall under any of the above categories shall be demobilized as soon as the Secretariat of State for Rehabilitation and Social Integration and the competent organs shall be in a position to make room for job opportunities for them.
Section 3: Follow-up of the Demobilized Personnel
Article 161
The issue pertaining to the reserve of the National Army and to the compulsory national service shall be considered by the Broad-Based Transitional Government for appropriate action. The demobilized personnel may, on their own volition, become members of the Reserve.
Article 162
The Secretariat of State for Rehabilitation and Social Integration shall include a Service responsible for the implementation of the programme of integration of the demobilized personnel in the socio-economic life. It shall also ensure the follow-up of the demobilized personnel after their social integration. The Government shall specify modalities of collaboration between the Secretariat of State for Rehabilitation and Social Integration and other departments concerned with the matters of the demobilized personnel, especially the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.
Article 163
The Army Command High Council and the Command Council of the National Gendarmerie shall decide whether it is appropriate and on the time for the separation of the personnel selected to constitute the National Army and the National Gendarmerie from those to be demobilized, and shall take into account the administrative facilities required by the social services responsible for the discharge and reintegration of the demobilized personnel.
Prisoner Release
1993
No POWs were reported as being released this year.
1994
No POWs were reported as being released this year. Rwandan Minister for Rehabilitation, Mr Jacques Bihozagoro told reporters that “the Government was holding some soldiers loyal to the former regime as prisoners of war but could not provide an accurate number.”[fn]”Lady Chalker flies into Rwanda as the cholera toll continues to rise. Britain backs new regime with £10m,” The Herald (Glasgow), July 27, 1994.[/efn_note]
1995
No POWs were reported as being released this year.
1996
No POWs were reported as being released this year.
1997
No developments observed this year.
1998
No developments observed this year.
1999
No developments observed this year.
2000
No developments observed this year.
2001
No developments observed this year.
2002
No further developments observed.
N’sele Cease-fire Agreement between the Government of the Rwandese Republic and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (12 July 1992)
Article II
The cease-fire shall imply:
4. The release of all prisoners-of-war; the effective release of all persons arrested because and as a result of this war within five days following the entry into force of the Cease-fire Agreement;
Human Rights
1993
The Arusha Accord of 1993 contained three main stipulations regarding human rights: (1) the establishment of a National Commission on Human Rights; (2) the establishment of an International Commission of Enquiry to investigate human rights violations committed during the war; and (3) the ratification of major international human rights treaties.
None of these stipulations were fulfilled in 1993.
1994
None of these stipulations were fulfilled in 1994. On April 6, 1994, Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana is killed when his plane is shot down. On April 7, Hutu extremists begin killing their political opponents in violence which escalates to genocide. In July 1994, RPF takes control of the government and the genocide ends.
1995
None of the stipulations regarding human rights were fulfilled this year.
1996
None of the stipulations regarding human rights were fulfilled this year.
1997
One of the provisions of the Arusha Accord was to establish a National Human Rights Commission. In November 1997, a presidential decree was given to establish the commission and a law was passed in December of 1997. The commission was not operational and no members were appointed in 1997.1“Rwanda Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998,” US State Department, 1999, accessed September 2011, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/rwanda.html…
1998
In 1998, the Rwandan government passed a law making the National Commission for Human Rights a permanent and independent entity.1
- “Cabinet Approves Establishment of Commissions on Rights, Reconciliation”, BBC Monitoring Africa, November 21, 1998
1999
In 1999 the National Commission for Human Rights was formally established and became operational.1
2000
No developments observed this year.
2001
No developments observed this year.
2002
In 2002 the government ratified two international treaties on human rights. The first was the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which involves children in armed conflict. Subsequently, on 14 March, 2002, the government ratified the CRC Optional Protocol Sale of Children 2000.1
- “Rwanda- International Treaties Adherence,” accessed September 21, 2011, http://www.adh-geneva.ch/RULAC/international_treaties.php?id_state=185
Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Rule of Law (18 August 1992)
Article 1
National unity must be based on equality of all citizens before the law, equal opportunities in all fields including the economic field and respect for fundamental rights as stipulated, notably, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
Article 6
The two parties accept the universality as well as the implications of the following fundamental principles of democracy:
– guarantee for the fundamental rights of the individual as provided for in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, among others, freedom of speech, enterprise and of political, social and economic association;
Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Rule of Law (18 August 1992)
Chapter IV: Human Rights
Article 14
The two parties recognise the universal nature of human rights and should express concern when these rights are violated anywhere and by anybody. They also recognise that the International Community would be justified in expressing concern in the event that these rights are violated by anybody on Rwandese territory. These rights should be guaranteed by the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Rwanda.
Article 15
The two parties agree that a National Commission on Human Rights shall be established. This institution shall be independent and shall investigate human rights violations committed by anybody on Rwandese territory, in particular, by organs of the State and individuals in their capacity as agents of the State or of various organisations.
The investigation work of the Commission shall not be limited in time.
The Commission shall be provided with the necessary means, especially legal means, to efficiently accomplish its mission. It shall utilise its findings to:
a) sensitize and educate the population about human rights;
b) institute legal proceedings, where necessary.
Article 16
The two parties also agree to establish an International Commission of Enquiry to investigate human rights violations committed during the war.
Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Miscellaneous Issues and Final Provisions (3 August 1993)
Article 15: Ratification of International Instruments on Human Rights
The Broad-Based Transitional Government shall ratify all International Conventions, Agreements and Treaties on Human Rights, which Rwanda has not yet ratified. It shall waive all reservations entered by Rwanda when it adhered to some of those International instruments.
Refugees
1993
None of the articles in the Arusha Accord related to the repatriation of refugees were implemented in 1993.
1994
On April 6, 1994, Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana is killed when his plane is shot down and Hutu extremists begin killing their political opponents. In late April, approximately 250,000 Tutsi flee to neighboring Tanzania. In July, approximately one million people, mostly Hutu, begin fleeing to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. By the end of the genocide, an estimated two million people had fled to neighboring countries and an estimated three million were internally displaced.1 In late October, there were an estimated 1.2 million Rwandan refugees in Zaire, 270,000 in Burundi, and over 500,000 in Tanzania.2
The repatriation of refugees began in 1994 with the establishment of the transitional government. Between August and September 1994, an estimated 200,000 refugees returned to Rwanda. Those attempting to return in later months, however, were interrupted due to militia activities. During the same period, some 400,000 refugees (mainly of Tutsi origin, who were in exile in Uganda and Burundi) returned to Rwanda. They settled on lands which had belonged to those who recently had fled creating additional problems related to property rights.3
The transitional government in its eight point program reiterated that one of its main goals was the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons.4 After the establishment of the transitional government, the Minister for Rehabilitation and Social Integration met with representatives of various NGOs and UN organizations and informed them that all agencies were free to move in all areas of Rwanda.5 A Commission for Repatriation, as called for in the Arusha Accord, was not established in 1994.
By the end of 1994, according to the UNHCR, 1,208,005 refugees had returned to Rwanda.6
- “UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1994/924), August 3, 1994
- “World Report-Rwanda,”Human Rights Watch, 1995, accessed September 22, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/WR95/AFRICA-08.htm#P397_139563.
- “UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1994/1308), November 18, 1994.
- “UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/107), February 6, 1995.
- “Roads And Airport in Rwanda Open to All Relief Agencies,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 28, 1994.
- “2002-UNHCR Statistical Yearbook-Rwanda,” UNHCR, 2004, accessed August 19, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/414ad5a50.html
1995
The government of Rwanda signed tripartite agreements with UNHCR and the Governments of Burundi and Zaire respectively on the voluntary repatriation of refugees. These agreements defined the conditions for repatriation including returnee protection and land tenure.1 On 18 July 1995, an agreement was signed to establish the tripartite commission of reparation of Rwandese Refugees from Tanzania between the Tanzanian government, the Rwandan government, and the UNHCR representative. The agreement contained provisions for four delegations representing Rwanda, Tanzania, UNHCR and the Organization of the African Unity.3 It was estimated that between 25% to 50% of refugees could return to Rwanda in the next 6 to 12 months.4 UNHCR and the rehabilitation and social integration ministry worked to improve the security sitution for returnees.5
The security situation was said to be hindering the resettlement of IDPs and the increased screening by the Rwandan authorities of the refugees had slowed the repatriation process. A tripartite commission involving the UNHCR, Tanzania and Rwanda took place in September and measures were agreed upon for starting large-scale repatriation of more than 600,000 Rwandan refugees in Tanzania.6 By the end of the year, only 240,698 refugees from neighboring countries had returned.7
- “UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/65), January 25, 1995.
- “Tripartite Commission of Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees From Tanzania,” UNHCR, 1995, accessed September 22, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/type,MULTILATERALTREATY,,RWA,3ee71f004,0.h…
It was estimated that in January 1995 there were approximately 200,000 refugees in Burundi, 600,000 in Tanzania and 1.4 million in Zaire.2“UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/65), January 25, 1995.
- “UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/65), January 25, 1995.
- “Rwanda UNHCR to Set up Refugee Repatriation,” Africa News, September 26, 1995.
- “UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/848), October 7, 1995.
- “2002-UNHCR Statistical Yearbook-Rwanda,” UNHCR, 2004, accessed August 19, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/414ad5a50.html.
1996
It was reported that roughly half of a million people returned to Rwanda during the week of 18 November 1996 after the RPF and the ADFL attacked refugee camps in eastern Congo.1 In 1996, according to the UNHCR statistical record, 1,410,782 refugees returned to Rwanda.2 Most Rwandan refugees in various camps in Tanzania had returned by the end of the year.3 The returnees were directed by Gen. Kagame to settle in unoccupied regions in Rwanda.4
- “An Update on the Refugees from Rwanda,” NPR, November 18, 1996.
- “2002-UNHCR Statistical Yearbook-Rwanda,” UNHCR, 2004, accessed August 19, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/414ad5a50.html.
- “Rwanda Says All Its Refugees Now Returned From Tanzania,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 30, 1996.
- “Rwanda’s Kagame Suggests Returning Refugees Should Settle in Unoccupied Areas,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 18, 1996.
1997
By the end of the year, 220,454 refugees returned to Rwanda1 It was reported that Zairian rebels had blocked aid workers from entering refugee camps, raising fears that 100,000 Rwandan refugees might flee the camps into the forests.2 Aid workers reported on 23 April 1997 that approximately 55,000 refugees had fled the camps after battles between Zairian rebels and renegade Rwandan soldiers.3 In December 1997, Hutu rebels attacked a camp for Tutsi refugees in northwestern Rwanda killing up to 200 refugees.4
- “2002-UNHCR Statistical Yearbook-Rwanda,” UNHCR, 2004, accessed August 19, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/414ad5a50.html.
- “Zairian Rebels Block Rwanda Refugees’ Aid,” Akron Beacon Journal (Ohio), April 22, 1997.
- “U.N. Team Find that Rwanda Refugees Have Fled Largest Camp,” Associated Press, April 24, 1997.
- “Up to 200 Tutsi Refugees Killed at Camp in Rwanda,” Associated Press, December 11, 1997.
1998
The repatriation of refugees slowed in 1998 with some 10,939 refugees returning to Rwanda.1
- “2002-UNHCR Statistical Yearbook-Rwanda,” UNHCR, 2004, accessed August 19, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/414ad5a50.html.
1999
The UNHCR reported the return of some 38,420 refugees to Rwanda in 1999.1
- “2002-UNHCR Statistical Yearbook-Rwanda,” UNHCR, 2004, accessed August 19, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/414ad5a50.html.
2000
Resettlement continued with 26,262 returnees in 2000.1
- “2002-UNHCR Statistical Yearbook-Rwanda,” UNHCR, 2004, accessed August 19, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/414ad5a50.html.
2001
Resettlement continued with 21,565 returnees in 2001.1
- “2002-UNHCR Statistical Yearbook-Rwanda,” UNHCR, 2004, accessed August 19, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/414ad5a50.html.
2002
Resettlement continued with 38, 643 returnees in 2002.1
- “2002-UNHCR Statistical Yearbook-Rwanda,” UNHCR, 2004, accessed August 19, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/414ad5a50.html.
Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Rule of Law (18 August 1992)
Article 4
The two parties acknowledge that the national unity of the people of Rwanda cannot be achieved without a definitive solution to the problem of Rwandese refugees. They recognize that the return of the Rwandese refugees to their country is an inalienable right and represents a factor of peace, unity and national reconciliation. They undertake not to hinder the free exercise of this right by the refugees.
Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (9 January 1993)
Section 2: The Broad-based Transitional Government
Article 13
The current structure of the Government, namely, the number and appellation of Ministries, shall remain unchanged. However, a Secretariat of State in the Prime Minister’s Office in charge of Social Rehabilitation and Integration shall be established. It shall be responsible for:
1. Repatriation and social and economic reintegration of the Rwandese refugees who may wish to go back home;
2. A Post-War Rehabilitation Programme as defined under Item 23.D of the present Protocol.
Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons (9 June 1993)
Article 1
The return of Rwandese refugees to their country is an inalienable right and constitutes a factor of peace, national unity, and reconciliation.
Article 2
The return is an act of free will on the part of each refugee. Any Rwandese refugee who wants to go back to his country will do so without any precondition whatsoever.
Each person who returns shall be free to settle down in any place of their choice inside the country, so long as they do not encroach upon the rights of other people.
Article 3
For purposes of settling returnees, the Rwandese Government shall make lands available, upon their identification by the “Commission for Repatriation” so long as they are not currently occupied by individuals.
The Commission shall be at liberty to explore and choose, without any restriction, resettlement sites throughout the national territory. The selection of sites, their occupation and farming shall take due consideration of the protection of endangered animal species, especially the mountain gorilla. Depending on the protection requirements and the planned farming development activities, the transfer of those species into compatible ecosystems is recommended.
Article 4
The right to property is a fundamental right for all the people of Rwanda. All refugees shall therefore have the right to repossess their property on return.The two parties recommend, however, that in order to promote social harmony and national reconciliation, refugees who left the country more than 10 years ago should not reclaim their properties, which might have been occupied by other people. The Government shall compensate them by putting land at their disposal and shall help them to resettle. As for estates which have been occupied by the Government, the returnee shall have the right for an equitable compensation by the Government.
Article 5
The repatriation exercise shall aim at achieving a harmonious and definitive integration.
Article 6
The repatriation process must mesh with the economic changes underway in the country.
Article 7
The principle of dual citizenship is hereby accepted. The laws governing the Rwandese citizenship shall be reviewed accordingly.
Sub-Section 2: The Beneficiaries of the Programme for the Return and Repatriation
Article 8
The Programme for the Return and the Repatriation shall be designed solely for Rwandese Refugees. Shall qualify as a Rwandese refugee:
1. Anyone in possession of documents issued by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), testifying that the bearer is a Rwandese refugee;
2. Any Rwandese national who declares himself to be a Rwandese refugee, but who is not registered with the Office of the UNHCR.
Sub-Section 3: Repatriation Procedures
Article 9
Upon the recommendation of the Secretariat of State for Rehabilitation and Social Integration, the Broad-Based Transitional Government shall set up a Commission for Repatriation composed of Government, UNHCR, OAU and Refugee representatives.
Article 10
The Commission shall have, as a general mandate, to finalize and to implement a programme for the repatriation and reintegration of returnees.
The concrete missions of the Commission shall be as follows:
1. Conduct a socio-economic survey of refugees;
2. Organize a pre-repatriation census and registration of returnees;
3. Conduct an information and sensitization campaign both to the refugee community and the population within the country
4. Identify settlement sites, supervise the distribution of plots and establishment of basic infrastructures such as Reception Centres, Health Centres, Educational Centres, etc.;
5. Make travel arrangements for all returnees, where necessary, and arrangements for the transport of their property;
6. Supervise all kinds of assistance for the returnees, such as food aid, farming tools, building materials, domestic items, seeds, etc.; That Commission may set up Committees, where necessary, for the execution of some of its missions.
Article 11
For border crossings, a list of items subject to an export ban in the country of asylum and to an import ban in Rwanda shall be communicated in advance to refugees opting for repatriation. Property and assets of returnees shall be exempted from all import duties and taxes, except for commercial goods.
The exchange regulations shall be communicated to returnees and facilitated by the appropriate authorities. Customs formalities shall also be specified by the country of asylum and by Rwanda.
The Secretariat of State for Rehabilitation and Social Integration, in coordination with Immigration and Emigration Services, shall provide facilities at border posts and at the International airport, for the reception of returnees who shall have opted to go back home with their own means.
Sub-Section 4: Assistance
Article 12
The repatriation funding programme shall provide for provisional accommodation centres on the settlement sites in rural or in urban areas, in existing or those to be built, on condition that the latter are built for ultimate use. Returnees at that time shall be fully taken care of, including an initial free medical check-up.
Article 13
Returnees shall provisionally be accommodated in shelters built on plots allocated to them, but they shall rapidly be given a set of building materials to enable them to build their own houses and design them in accordance with model development schemes drawn up by the Commission for Repatriation.
Article 14
Upon their arrival in the country, repatriates shall each be paid a small amount of money to enable them to meet vital needs not catered for by the aid programme.
Article 15
With the assistance of the International Community, the Rwandese Government shall provide assistance to the returnees, in the following areas:
1. food aid;
2. domestic items;
3. farming tools;
4. building materials;
5. health;
6. education.
The same assistance shall equally be provided to those returnees who may go back to their places of origin.
Article 16
Food aid shall be provided for a period of at least 15 months, after which conditions for the continued supply of that aid shall be reviewed.
Article 17
Each family of returnees shall be provided with basic items such as kitchen utensils and bed and beddings.
Article 18
The programme for the settlement of returnees shall also avail a set of farming tools and seeds, preferably selected to meet the soil and climate requirements in the area. In so doing, it shall enable the repatriated farmers to undertake farming activities as soon as possible.
Article 19
The repatriation programme shall also include the supply of medicines and various equipment for the existing or newly established Health Centres. Vulnerable groups, i.e. women, children, the aged people and the handicapped shall be specifically taken care of.
Article 20
A programme of assistance for children admitted in the educational system shall be established and tailored in such a way as to cater for school fees, funds for the purchase of uniforms and school equipment for two academic years.
Article 21
The returnees who shall take up activities other than farming, but are not able to take care of themselves, shall each benefit from some of the assistance programmes mentioned above especially:
1. Accommodation and food aid for a period of 6 months;
2. basic items such as kitchen utensils, bed and beddings
The Rwandese Government shall establish, through the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the Secretariat of State for Rehabilitation and Social Integration, mechanisms for the orientation and follow-up of job seekers.
Sub-Section 5: Integration Modalities
Article 22
Returnees may benefit from opportunities availed by the Development Projects designed for the enhancement of employment in the public and private sectors, in the same conditions as residents.
Article 23
The Rwandese Government shall undertake negotiations with international funding institutions, within the framework of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), so that the absorption capacities of the Public Sector could be enhanced. There are certain sectors, however, which already hold out employment opportunities, such as Education, Health and the Judiciary.
A returnee who shall be integrated in the public sector shall be employed at the level to be determined on the basis of their qualification and professional experience. Employment shall not be subjected to any precondition and criteria other than the age for employment and retirement.
Article 24
Returnees who have contributed to the Social Security in Rwanda may claim their dues, either for themselves or their beneficiaries. As for those who have been contributing to the Social Security abroad, the Rwandese Government shall negotiate with the countries concerned so as to arrange for the compensation or transfer of their dues.
Article 25
Lack of knowledge of Kinyarwanda or French shall not constitute an obstacle to employment and discharge of duties within the public sector. During the first three years of service, with effect from the date of appointment, the returnees shall use those languages they are most familiar with, and shall take intensive French or Kinyarwanda courses. At the end of
that period, consideration of this facility shall be re-examined in order to determine whether it would be maintained or not. To that effect, a programme of linguistic support as well as translation and interpretation services shall be organized, according to the needs, soon after the establishment of the Broad-Based Transitional Government, using funds provided for in the Plan of Action for returnees or any other funds.
Article 26
The existing Commissions on the Equivalence of diplomas shall include qualified personnel among returnees and shall pay special attention to that problem. Diplomas and certificates internationally recognised shall be considered for purposes of employment in the educational institutions or appointment to professional posts, in accordance with the UNESCO grading
regulations and systems.
Article 27
The access to employment opportunities in the Private Sector and the establishment of new enterprises in the country have been liberalized within the framework of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). They shall be open to returnees without any preconditions, and under the same conditions as residents. Government role in that field will be to reactivate support to existing firms, promote new investments and simplify formalities required to get started in the Private Sector. The Plan of Action shall also include a Guarantee Security Fund, so as to facilitate access to loans by returnees.
Article 28
The Commission for Repatriation shall develop settlement sites. The sites shall be provided with basic socioeconomic infrastructures such as schools, Health Centres, water, access roads, etc.
The Housing scheme in these areas shall be modelled on the “village†grouped type of settlement to encourage the establishment of development centres in the rural area and break with the traditional scattered housing.
Article 29
The programme for the reintegration of returnees shall provide additional school facilities, by expanding existing schools or creating new infrastructures to accommodate the returnee children already at school or of school age.
Article 30
For purposes of ensuring a smooth integration into the educational system in the country, and avoiding that students interrupt their studies and suffer adverse effects, a number of measures shall be taken:
1. During the first year, education should be provided in the language used in the country of asylum.
2. Within the first three months, intensive French courses should be organised for teachers and students, especially for students in the senior level of primary school and for students in secondary schools and institutions of higher learning, from the anglophone countries.
3. Some of the aspects of adaptation may be catered for in the private educational system.
4. The Plan of Action for Rwandese refugees shall take in charge students in their last two years of the primary, secondary schools and institutions of higher learning who may wish to stay behind and complete their studies in the host countries, if the educational systems in which they were studying are not available in Rwanda. Their certificates shall be recognized in accordance with the UNESCO system of equivalence of diplomas, certificates, etc. However, special attention shall be given to the writing and reading of Kinyarwanda through additional remedial lessons, to enable new pupils and any other who might experience similar difficulties to catch up with those who are more conversant with the language. Sub-Section 6: Implementation of the Overall Programme of Repatriation
Article 31
In accordance with the mandate entrusted to them by the Dar es Salaam Summit of 19th February, 1991, the UNHCR and the OAU shall organize, within six (6) months after the establishment of the Broad-Based Transitional Government, a Donors’ Conference for the financing of projects earmarked in the Plan of Action for the Rwandese refugees. In addition to other internal sources of funding, the Rwandese Government shall also rely on bilateral cooperation to support the Repatriation Programme.
Article 32
The implementation, at the political and administrative level, of the Repatriation Programme shall be supervised by the Secretariat of State for Rehabilitation and Social Integration. For the technical implementation of the various components of the Repatriation Programme, the Government of Rwanda and the UNHCR shall preferably resort to those NGOs with an established reliability, taking also their respective specialization into account. As such, one or several NGOs shall undertake site development activities, building activities, and the distribution of food aid.
Sub-Section 7: Timetable for Repatriation
Article 33
All the returnees having the means to settle themselves without recourse to Government assistance may do so, soon after the signing of the Peace Agreement. To that end, Rwandese Embassies shall issue travel documents to all Rwandese refugees who wish to go back to Rwanda.
Article 34
With respect to repatriation in groups, the following programme of sequence is envisaged:
1. Within six (6) months after the establishment of the Broad-Based Transitional Government, the UNHCR and the OAU shall organize a Donors Conference on the financing of the Repatriation Programme.
2. Within six (6) months after the establishment of the Broad-Based Transitional Government, tripartite agreements between Rwanda, the UNHCR and individual countries in the Region and the UNHCR shall have been concluded on issues pertaining to the repatriation of refugees.
3. Within Six (6) months after its establishment, the Broad-Based Transitional Government shall
undertake operations for the preparation of settlement sites.
4. Within nine (9) months following the establishment of that Government, the repatriation of the first batch of returnees may begin.
Section 2: Other Repatriation Solution: Settlement in the Host Country
Article 35
The Broad-Based Transitional Government shall take and implement measures, including through bilateral agreements, for the protection of the Rwandese nationals who shall have opted to settle in the host countries as immigrants. Those immigrants shall fully enjoy the same rights as all other Rwandese citizens.
Chapter II: Return of Persons Displaced by War and Social Strifes
Section 1: Preparatory Measures
Article 36
The organized return of persons displaced as a result of war and social strife shall be done after the following preparatory measures have been taken:
1. Deployment of the International Neutral Force.
2. Disengagement of Forces in the war zones.
3. Establishment of the Broad-Based Transitional Government.
4. Clearance of mines in the war zones.
5. Planning and provision of humanitarian assistance in essential services.
Section 2: Administration and Security in the War Zones
Article 37
The administration entities established before the outbreak of war shall be reconstituted.
Article 38
The socio-economic services established before the outbreak of war, especially in the educational, health, justice, youth, trade, agricultural and animal husbandry sectors at the level of administration entities in the war zones shall resume their activities.
Article 39
The Broad-Based Transitional Government shall determine mechanisms of appointing local authorities in these zones.
Article 40
The clearance of mines in the zones shall be conducted by the International Neutral Force, in collaboration with the Army Command High Council.
Article 41
Security shall be ensured by the local police to be provided with adequate means and assisted, where necessary, by the National Gendarmerie.
Section 3: Humanitarian Assistance
Article 42
Humanitarian Aid shall be distributed by the Secretariat of State for Rehabilitation and Social Integration, assisted by the Humanitarian Agencies.
Article 43
The humanitarian aid shall consist of:
1. Food aid;
2. Domestic items;
3. Farming tools;
4. Building materials;
5. Health care and Medicines;
6. Education (School equipment, uniforms, school fees for a period of two years);
7. Transport to their places of domicile for those who cannot afford it;
8. Labour costs for the construction of houses;
9. Seeds;
10. Establishment of temporary shelters.
Section 4: Timetable and Modalities for Return
Article 44
As soon as the preparatory measures spelled out in Article 36 of the present Protocol are put in place, the Broad-Based Transitional Government shall issue directives for the return of displaced persons.
Article 45
The return of war displaced persons to their homes shall, as much as possible, be coordinated with the return of the refugees who left the country during the war, as well as that of persons displaced as a result of social strife.
Internally Displaced Persons
1993
Provisions related to the resettlement of IDPs in the Arusha Accord were not implemented in 1993.
1994
The genocidal violence of 1994 produced massive waves of displacement. By the end of the genocide, an estimated 2 million people had fled to neighboring countries and an estimated 3 million were internally displaced.[fn]”UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1994/924), August 3, 1994.[/efn_note] In late October there were an estimated 1.2 million Rwandan refugees in Zaire, 270,000 in Burundi, and over 500,000 in Tanzania.[fn]”World Report-Rwanda,” Human Rights Watch, 1995, accessed September 22, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/WR95/AFRICA-08.htm#P397_139563.[/efn_note] At the end of 1994, there were 2-3 million people displaced. The largest portion sought refuge in the French-controlled Zone Tourquoise in south-west Rwanda. Most of these were Hutu who fled the RPF. When the French pulled out, the IDPs remained in large camps. The transitional government in its eight point program reiterated that one of its main goals was the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons.[fn]”UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/107), February 6, 1995.[/efn_note]
1995
In April 1995, the UN Officials started to close the IDP camps, which initiative was supported by the government. The first operation was launched on 18 April 1995 when the army surrounded Kibeho camp. The government maintained the position that the internal security had improved significantly and therefore the IDPs should return to their communities. To force the IDPs out of the camp, the government adopted a strategy of not providing food to IDPs, it also deployed the army in the camps.1 As such, the RPF sought to close the camps and eventually turned to force. In April 1995, RPF troops opened fire on IDPs at Kibeho, killing several thousand people.
- “Rwanda; Rehabilitation Minister Discusses Strategy of Closing Displaced Persons’ Camps,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 20, 1995.
1996
No developments observed this year.
1997
No developments observed this year.
1998
In 1998, the government had started the task of resettling thousands of IDPs in Ruhengeri Prefecture. The IDPs received food items and farming implements.1 The UNHCR, however, reported some 625,000 new IDPs in 1998.2
- “Rwanda Begins Resettling Thousands of Villagers in Northwest,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 28, 1998.
- “2002-UNHCR Statistical Yearbook-Rwanda,” UNHCR, 2004, accessed 19 August 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/414ad5a50.html.
1999
The UNHCR reported the return of some 625,000 IDPs in 1998.1 The organization also reported 38,420 refugeesÕ return from Zaire.2
2000
From 2000 onward, there were no further developments on IDPs reported.
2001
No further developments observed.
2002
No further developments observed.
Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons (9 June 1993)
Article 44
As soon as the preparatory measures spelled out in Article 36 of the present Protocol are put in place, the Broad-Based Transitional Government shall issue directives for the return of displaced persons.
Article 45
The return of war displaced persons to their homes shall, as much as possible, be coordinated with the return of the refugees who left the country during the war, as well as that of persons displaced as a result of social strife.
Citizenship Reform
1993
No legal changes concerning dual citizenship were made this year.
1994
No legal changes concerning dual citizenship were made this year.
1995
No legal changes concerning dual citizenship were made this year.
1996
No legal changes concerning dual citizenship were made this year.
1997
No legal changes concerning dual citizenship were made this year.
1998
No legal changes concerning dual citizenship were made this year.
1999
No legal changes concerning dual citizenship were made this year.
2000
No legal changes concerning dual citizenship were made this year.
2001
No legal changes concerning dual citizenship were made this year.
2002
Parliament included dual citizenship provision in the draft constitution. “A first draft constitution was published in November 2002, followed by new versions in December 2002 and February 2003.”1.
The new constitution was approved by referendum on 26 May 2003. Article 7 of the 2003 constitution provided that:
Every person has a right to nationality. Dual nationality is permitted. No person may be deprived of Rwandan nationality of origin. No person shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her nationality or of the right to change nationality. Rwandans or their descendants who were deprived of their nationality between 1st November 1959 and 31 December 1994 by reason of acquisition of foreign nationalities automatically reacquire Rwandan nationality if they return to settle in Rwanda. All persons originating from Rwanda and their descendants shall, upon their request, be entitled to Rwandan nationality. The conditions of acquisition, retention, enjoyment and deprivation of Rwandan nationality are determined by an organic law.
Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons (9 June 1993)
Article 7
The principle of dual citizenship is hereby accepted. The laws governing the Rwandese citizenship shall be reviewed accordingly.
Economic and Social Development
1993
The broad based Commission for the Repatriation composed of Government, UNHCR, OAU and Refugee representatives was not set up. As the result, the basic socioeconomic infrastructures such as schools, health centers, water, access roads which were said to be established by the commission did not materialized. The restoration of socio-economic services as reinstalling administration did not take place.
1994
No developments observed this year.
1995
For the settlement of the refugees, the broad based Commission for Repatriation composed of Government, UNHCR, OAU and Refugee representatives was not set up. However, the Rwandan government signed tripartite agreements with UNHCR and the Governments of Burundi and Zaire on the voluntary repatriation of refugees. These agreements define the conditions for repatriation, including returnee protection and land tenure.1 On 18 July 1995, an agreement was signed to establish the tripartite commission of reparation of Rwandese Refugees from Tanzania between Tanzanian government, Rwandan government and the UNHCR representative. The agreement had provisions for four delegation representing Rwanda, Tanzania, UNHCR and the Organization of the African Unity.2 The rehabilitation and social integration ministry was committed for providing security and protection to returnees.3 Since the civil administration was reestablished. Nevertheless, the report highlights the challenges related to lack of resources to run an effective administration.4
Some progress was made to achieve economic goals as provided in the Arusha accord. In this regard, the Rwandan government had set up a commission to start reviving the People’s Bank. The bank had been initially was set up in 1975 and it had branches in 131 of Rwanda’s 154 communes by early 1994. The infrastructure was destroyed by the conflict in 1994. The revival of the bank was a key to starting recovery of farming and rural economic activities.5
There was sign of economic recovery in the export sector as well. It was reported that farmers in tea growing districts were reviving their plantations, traditionally a hard currency earner, and foreign aid had supported initiatives to repair war-damaged factories.6 Financial supports provided by the European Union ($24.3 Million) had been distributed to rehabilitate buildings, plantations, technical training of staffs, and improving transport.7 In a sense, the economic recovery was underway.
- “UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/65), January 25, 1995.
- “Tripartite Commission of Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees From Tanzania,” UNHCR, 1995, accessed September 22, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/type,MULTILATERALTREATY,,RWA,3ee71f004,0.html.
- “Rwanda UNHCR to Set Up Refugee Repatriation,” Africa News, September 26, 1995.
- “UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/107), February 6, 1995.
- “Rwanda-Economy: Infusing New Blood in the People’s Banks,” IPS-Inter Press Service, October 26, 1995.
- Rwanda-Economy: Brewing Tea Recovery,” IPS-Inter Press Service, November 29, 1995.
- Ibid.
1996
Almost all civil administration infrastructures were restored throughout Rwanda, which facilitated a gradual repatriation of refugees. In terms of recovery, the Rwandan economy bounced back to the pre-genocide level as reported by the International Monetary Fund.1 According to the news report, some 60 to 70 per cent of enterprises in the tertiary sector, for instance, had re-opened and were thriving as of 1996. Nevertheless, to rebuild its economy, the Rwandan Government needed more than 800 million USD in the years 1996-1998.2
- “Rwanda: Ravaged Country’s Economy Bounces Back,” IPS-Inter Press Service, January 24, 1996.
- “Rwanda; More than 800m US Dollars Needed to Revive Economy,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 24, 1996.
1997
Rwanda remained heavily indebted with more than 1 billion in foreign debt or 91% of its GDP.1 Nevertheless, Rwanda made efforts to restore the situation to normal by stabilizing society, rehabilitating the judicial system and rebuilding the economy.2 Donor countries and international development agencies were providing rebuilding support throughout the year.
- “Rwanda: Review 1997,” Africa Review World of Information, February 1997.
- “Albright Arrives in Rwanda, Holds Talks with President Bizimungu,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 13, 1997.
1998
It was reported that the consolidation of government authority contributed to the economic recovery. The real GDP recovery was 13 percent, which was a rise of 76 per cent in comparison to the pre-war period.1 The relatively improved security situation in the countryside allowed the government to expand its revenue bases. The rebuilding of plantations and favorable international market for tea and coffee helped to generate much needed foreign reserve. In this regard, government also planned to boost trade and commerce and for this purpose export tariffs were reduced. To protect local industry, imports of locally produced goods were heavily taxed.2
In April 1998, the Rwandan government announced a three-year growth plan that included fiscal, monetary and structural reforms to the Rwandan economy, including the overhaul of its tax system to increase revenue. The reforms was expected to overhaul Rwanda’s public services through retrenchment , and measures to encourage domestic private sector investment to help rebuild infrastructure.3
- “Rwanda: Finance Minister Discusses 1998 Budget, Tax Policy,” BBC Monitoring Africa, January 16, 1998.
- “Rwanda: Africa Review 1998,” Africa Review World of Information, March 1998.
- “Rwanda Announces New Three-Year Growth Plan,” Business Day, April 16, 1998.
1999
Some progress was made in terms of rebuilding social and economic infrastructure. The African Development Fund financed 91 percent of the Rehabilitation of Health Infrastructure project. The economy grew gradually but a reliance on commodity exports was met by repressed prices in the world market. The agriculture sector continued to be the primary export earner. The government was also mulling over plans to exploit natural resources such as natural gas under Lake Kivu with estimated reserve of more than 50bn cu meters.1
2000
Little information is available. Nevertheless, the economy grew at the rate of 6 per cent in 1999 compared to 8 per cent in 1998.1 Poverty and AIDS were hindering the Rwanda’s economic rebuilding initiatives.
2001
The government’s program of rebuilding social and economic infrastructure continued in 2001. Much of the activities were supported by funding from donor agencies. According to a report, macroeconomic performance during 2001 was strong. A growth in manufacturing, construction, transportation, and communications activities was reported.1
2002
The government’s program of rebuilding social and economic infrastructure continued in 2002. Much of the activities were supported by funding from donor agencies. In this regard, the IMF provided financial support Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) programs, which contributed rebuilding economic and social infrastructure.1
Not much information available on economic activities. However, donor agencies and countries continued to help to rebuild socio-economic infrastructure of the country. In 2003, the transitional phase ended with the holding of the election for the president and the national assembly in which Kagame was elected president and his party the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) won the majority of seats in the assembly.2
Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Rule of Law (18 August 1992)
Article 9
In order to promote and consolidate the democratic system as described above, the two parties undertake to work for social, economic and cultural development of the country and to fight hunger, ignorance, poverty and disease.
Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (3 January 1993)
F. The Economy
1. Stimulate the economy by, as a priority, orienting economic programmes towards the disadvantaged regions and social strata.
2. Review the country’s priorities with the aim of promoting food security (application of selected seeds and fertilizers, storage, etc.)
3. Diversify export products.
4. Encourage small and medium scale industries.
5. Draw up and apply strategies for better utilization of the country’s resources (natural and human).
Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons (9 June 1993)
Article 28
The Commission for Repatriation shall develop settlement sites. The sites shall be provided with basic socioeconomic infrastructures such as schools, Health Centres, water, access roads, etc.
The Housing scheme in these areas shall be modelled on the village grouped type of settlement to encourage the establishment of development centres in the rural area and break with the traditional scattered housing.
Article 38
The socio-economic services established before the outbreak of war, especially in the educational, health, justice, youth, trade, agricultural and animal husbandry sectors at the level of administration entities in the war zones shall resume their activities.
Donor Support
1993
The Arusha Accord asked for donor supports to implement the repatriation program as well as for rebuilding war-shattered economy. Unrelated to the repatriation program, the UN appealed for aid to Rwanda to help nearly 1 million people at risk of starvation.[fn]”UN Appeals for Aid to Rwanda, Warns of Donor Fatigue,” Associated Press, April 17, 1993.[/efn_note] Further information on funding is not available.
1994
In order to help the repatriation program and with rebuilding the war-torn economy, representatives from about 40-donor governments met in Geneva on 2 August 1994, in which the UN was asking for US$434 million.21 It was not clear whether the donor countries met the request. Also, the poor funding stalled the UN genocide probe projects that required a deployment of human rights monitors across Rwanda.2
- “Donors Meet to Pledge Funds for Rwanda,” Associated Press Worldstream, August 2, 1994.
- “Rwanda: Poor Funding Stalls UN Genocide Probe; Donor Countries ‘Too Cheap’ to Pay, Official Charges,” Ottawa Citizen, October 23, 1994.
1995
A donor two-day conference funded by UNDP and attended by some 20 countries concluded in Geneva on 23 January 1995. In the conference, donor countries pleaded US$ 587 million dollars in aid to find the country’s recovery program in the year 1995-6.1 In May, donor countries like the United States, Great Britain, Spain, Belgium, Germany and Norway, among others agreed to fund the international tribunals.2
Donor agencies which pleaded for funding in January met in Rwanda for two days in July to review progress on disbursement of reconstruction funds. According to a report, only 92 million of total 430 million expected had been disbursed.3 Donor representatives again met in November for the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and agreed that their pledges made at the Geneva conference would be reassessed soon. Some countries also made new aid pledges to help Rwanda.4 Rwanda received a total of 702 million bilateral and multilateral assistance of which 662.6 million was grant assistance.5
- “Rwanda; Western donors pledge 587m dollars in aid,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 23, 1995.
- “Rwanda; Western Donors Agree to Finance International Genocide Tribunal,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 22, 1995.
- “International Aid Donors to Rwanda Meet for Progress Review,” Agence France Presse, July 6, 1995.
- “Rwanda; Donors’ Meeting Ends, Pledges Detailed,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 24, 1995.
- “Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients: 1995/1999,” Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2001, 216-21.
1996
The second donor conference was held in Geneva on June 20-21 1996 in which 30 donor countries participated and pledged 617 million dollars to rehabilitate the country. Although, Rwandan government had called on donor countries to provide more than 800 million dollars to the end of 1998. Among the pledges, the EU promised 228 million, the Netherlands promised 100 million over a three year period and the World Bank had promised 50 million dollars.1 Rwanda received a total of 466.5 million dollars in bilateral and multilateral financial assistance of which 423.9 million dollars was grant money.2
- “Urgent Donors Pledge 617 Million Dollars for Rwanda,” Agence France Presse, June 21, 1996.
- “Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients: 1995/1999,” 216-21.
1997
The donor conference did not take place in 1997. However, Rwanda received at least 178.7 million in bilateral and 50.4 million in multilateral financial assistance, of which 181.5 million was grants.1
1998
Rwanda received 30.2 million dollars in donor aid for debt servicing.1 Recognizing Rwanda as a special case, the World Bank and donors agreed in June to provide $250 million dollars in support for its economic reform project. In 1998, Rwanda received a total of 349.9 million dollars of which 260.4 million was grant.2
- “Rwanda Receives 30.2m Dollars in Donor Aid for Debt Servicing,” BBC Monitoring Africa – Economic, June 12, 1998.
- “Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients: 1995/1999,” 216-21.
1999
In 1999, Rwanda received a total of 372.9 million bilateral and multilateral aid of which 287.4 was in grants.1
2000
A two day donor conference from 8-9 November 2000 took place in Rwanda for the purpose of setting up global strategies to enable Rwanda to escape the vicious circle of perpetual aid, chronic debt and poverty. The conference concluded by reducing both the external debt (1.3 billion USD) and internal debt by half. In the conference, the donor agencies insisted on withdrawing troops from the DRC.1
2001
A three day donor conference took place on 14 November 2001 in Rwanda in which around 20 countries and organization including European Union, World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the African Development Bank participated. In the conference, the Rwandan government presented its National Strategic Plan to Reduce Poverty (PRSP) and spelled out progress on development programs.1 It was reported that the donors called for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from DRC, which the finance minister refuted.2 Participants were pledging financial support but the exact amount is not available.
- “International Donors’ Conference Opens in Rwanda,” Agence France Presse, November 14, 2001.
- “Rwanda: Finance Minister Refutes Donors Call for Withdrawal from DR Congo,” BBC Monitoring Africa, November 16, 2001.
2002
Information on donor conference and support are not available. However, Rwanda got net development assistance of 356.1 million in 2002.1
Information on donor conference and support are not available. However, a transitional period ended in 2003 with the holding of the presidential and the parliamentary elections. This effectively terminated the emergency period and also would have led to a declining donor support.2“UK Support to Rwanda Background Briefing,” DFID, accessed January 30, 2015, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/News/…
- “RWANDA: Economic Trends,” Institute for Security Studies, February 2005, accessed September 26, 2011, http://www.issafrica.org/AF/profiles/Rwanda/Table_Economic.html.
The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons (9 June 1993)
Sub-Section 6: Implementation of the Overall Programme of Repatriation
Article 31
In accordance with the mandate entrusted to them by the Dar es Salaam Summit of 19th February, 1991, the UNHCR and the OAU shall organize, within six (6) months after the establishment of the Broad-Based Transitional Government, a Donors’ Conference for the financing of projects earmarked in the Plan of Action for the Rwandese refugees.
Article 34
With respect to repatriation in groups, the following programme of sequence is envisaged:
1. Within six (6) months after the establishment of the Broad-Based Transitional Government, the UNHCR and the OAU shall organize a Donors Conference on the financing of the Repatriation Programme.
Detailed Implementation Timeline
1993
Implementation timeline was not followed. The rebel victory created different political reality, although the transitional government respected the Arusha accord.
1994
Implementation timeline was not followed.
1995
Implementation timeline was not followed.
1996
Implementation timeline was not followed.
1997
Implementation timeline was not followed.
1998
Implementation timeline was not followed.
1999
Implementation timeline was not followed.
2000
Implementation timeline was not followed.
2001
Implementation timeline was not followed.
2002
Implementation timeline was not followed.
There were no specific provisions on timeline but parties had agreed on a timeline on ceasefire mechanism, establishment of transitional government and so on.
Regarding the Ceasefire in which parties agreed for “the cease-fire shall enter into force at midnight (Rwanda time) on 31st July 1992” and agree to the “completion of the implementation of the mechanisms and conclusions agreed upon pursuant to the peace Agreement: not later than 10 January 1993.”
Establishment of the transitional government within 37 days of the signing of Arusha Accord.
Verification/Monitoring Mechanism
1993
The July 1992 N’sele Cease-fire Agreement had provisions for the deployment of Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) under the supervision of the OAU Secretary General. The NMOG, with 50 military observers, was said to supervise the ceasefire leading to political negotiations and a peace treaty between the two conflicting parties in Rwanda. According to this mandate, the OAU Secretary General appointed his personal representative to Rwanda to supervise a ceasefire on 29 July 1992.The ceasefire agreement was expected to go into effect by the end of July.1 The joint political and military commission comprising representatives of the Rwandan government, the RPF and international observers met at the OAU headquarter and a commander for a NMOG was appointed.2
The ceasefire agreement went into effect and a violation of the ceasefire was reported. However, the NOG was not assembled completely. Nevertheless, Senegal had already dispatched 10 military officers to Rwanda.3
NMOG tried to resolve the accusation and counter accusation of a violation of the ceasefire agreement alleged by both sides. On 22 October 1992, in the joint political and military commission meeting, the Rwandan ambassador representing the Rwandan government side accused the RPF of having shelled the town of Biumba and attacking the government position (which was refuted by the NMOG head by making it clear that the RPF action was in retaliation).4
The RPF alleged that the French troops were providing support to the Habyarimana regime and that the French troops were said to have starting clashing with the NMOG, who were deployed to monitor the ceasefire agreement.5
In January 1993 a violation of ceasefire was reported and a 50-member NOMG had no offensive capability.6 As ceasefire violations continued, the Rwandan government declared ceasefire and asked the NMOG to verify the truce and the return of the RPF to its previous position.7 The commander of the NMOG, however, stressed that his group be strengthened with additional staff and adequate equipment to deal with the situation caused by the resumption of conflict.8 As a matter of fact, the UNMOG was not given authorization by the Kigali Army Head Quarter to go to the spot where the ceasefire was broken off.9
The Rwandan government and the RPF committed themselves to implementing the ceasefire from 9 March after a high-level meeting held from 5th to 7th march. The NMOG’s remained intact as monitoring the ceasefire agreement.10 THE NMOG verified the withdrawal of RPF troops from the Mutara, Byumba and Ruhengeri areas to the 8th February 1993 before position.11 After the withdrawal, the area between the government and the RPF forces became a demilitarized zone and was administered by the NMOG.12
On 3 August 1993, the Arusha accord was signed. According to the agreement the current NMOG would remain in Rwanda until the deployment of international military force.13
On 5 October 1993, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 872 to establish the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda for a period of six months with mandate related to contributing to the security of the capital city, monitoring observance of the ceasefire agreement, assisting with mine clearance, monitoring the repatriation of refugees and resettlement of the IDPs for an initial period of six months.14 The UN Operation operated in four different phases. The first phase would be to establish conditions for the secure installation of national unity government, which was expected by the end of 1993. By the end of this phase, the UNAMIR strength was expected to be 1,428 military personnel. The second phase, expected to last for 90-days, involved the process s of disengagement, demobilization and integration of armed forces and gendarmerie. The UNAMIR strength was expected to be 2,548 by the end of this phase. The third phase, which was expected to last for nine months, would establish, supervise and monitor a new demilitarized zone and the mission strength was expected to reduce to 1,240 personnel. The fourth phase of four month was designed to the final stage leading up to the election. The strength of the UNAMIR was expected to be 930 personnel.15 The authorized strength for the mission was 2,548 military personnel, including 2,217 troops and 331 military observers, and 60 civilian police.16
On 5 October 1993 the UNAMIR was established and the UNAMIR commander arrived in Kigali on 22 October 1993 followed by an advance party of 21 military personnel on 27 October. On November 1, 1993, the NMOG II was integrated into UNAMIR. The UNAMIR continue to function both as peacekeeping operation and verification mission.
- “OAU to Observe Ceasefire in Rwanda,” Xinhua General News Service, July 29, 1992.
- “Rwanda’s Warring Parties Sign Reconciliation Agreement,” Xinhua General News Service, August 1, 1992.
- “Rwanda: Glimmer Of Understanding at Peace Talks,” IPS-Inter Press Service, August 14, 1992.
- “Rwanda RPF Radio Reports on Issues Discussed at Arusha Talks,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 26, 1992.
- “Rwanda RPF Says Habyarimana Sabotaging Arusha Talks,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 18, 1992.
- “Rwanda: Peace Negotiations Halted As Fighting Rages on,” IPS-Inter Press Service, February 11, 1993.
- “Rwanda; Government Declares Cease-Fire; Wants RPF to Return to Previous Positions,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 17, 1993.
- “Rwanda: MOG Wants More Staff and Equipment; Government Proposes Meeting With RPF,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 18, 1993.
- “Rwanda: Fighting Continues, Reportedly Closer to Kigali,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 6, 1993.
- “Rwanda: Foreign Minister and Observer Group Commander Discuss Cease-Fire,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 12, 1993.
- “Rwanda: Government And RPF Sign Proposals on Army Merger; RPF Troop Withdrawals,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts/The Monitoring Report, March 22, 1993.
- “Rwanda; Military Observer Group Confirms that RPF Has Withdrawn Its Forces,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 22, 1993.
- “Rwanda: Hundreds Rejoice over Peace Accord,” IPS-Inter Press Service, August 4, 1993.
- “Rwanda — UNAMIR,” accessed September 27, 2011, http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unamir_b.htm.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
1994
As the establishment of transitional government was delayed, the security situation deteriorated. Prominent political leaders were assassinated. It was reported that the UNAMIR escorted RPF convoy was ambushed. Under the grave security situation, the UN Security Council on 30 March 1994, the secretary general recommended that the UNAMIR should continue to support the negotiations and recommended an extension of the UNMIR’s mandate. Accordingly, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of UNAMIR until 29 July 1994. Aircraft carrying President Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi crashed at Kigali airport crashed on 6 April 1994 killing all those on board. This incident was followed by the months of genocidal violence. The UNAMIR tried to bring both sides together for securing a ceasefire but both sides maintained rigid positions. On 21 April 1994, the Security Council adopted a resolution 912 to reduce the number of UNAMIR personnel and adjusted the mandate of the UNAMIR to act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure ceasefire agreement and resume humanitarian reliefs including the security of civilians. As of early May the UNAMIR strength was 444 personnel.1
On 13 May 1994, however, the Secretary-General recommended a new mandate for UNAMIR, which would include 5,500 troops. The Security Council, by its resolution 918 (17 May 1994) authorized the expansion of the UNAMIR to 5,500 troops and imposed an arms embargo on Rwanda. The objective of the UNAMIR’s expanded mandate was to promote security in all sectors of Rwanda and create conditions for return and settlement of refugees and IDPs as well as support the humanitarian response. By October, all 5,500 troops were deployed and by 15 November 80 of 90 police observers authorized for UNAMIR were deployed.2 Related to the creating climate of security in camps and facilitating the resettlement of IDPs, the UNAMIR undertook an operation from 13 to 15 December 1994 to enhance security in the KIBEHO and Ndago displaced persons camps where disruptive elements had been active.3 According to the Secretary General’s report, 60 human rights monitors were deployed in the country to monitor the condition of returning refugees and IDPs. The UNMIR also helped the government to restore its administration capacity in western zones.4
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/107), February 6, 1995.
- “UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1994/1133), October 6, 1994.
1995
The UNAMIR Continued to monitor the situation. As of January 1995, UNAMIR’s strength was 5,740 including all rank forces that were providing security in the IDP camps and the border region. The mission helped a lot in establishing a suitable conditions and a favorable climate for the lunching of Operation Retour, which was an integrated inter-agency initiative aimed at facilitating the safe resettlement of IDPs. The UNHCR and the UN Volunteers continued to monitor the human rights situation.1 By the end of November, the force level stood at 1,783 troops and 37 staff officers and 285 military observers.2 The UNAMIR also provided security to the International Tribunal and the Human Rights Field Operations. By the end of November 1995, the UN Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda had some 120 members deployed in Kigali and in 10 field offices located throughout the country.3
The UNMIR troops had been deliberately targeted as the UNAMIR headquarters was hit by grenades and small arms fire on 15 February. While investigating the attack the following day, eight members of a UNAMIR patrol were injured by a landmine. Similarly on March 5, three grenades were thrown at the guard post which injured to soldiers.4 The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) continued to deny UNAMIR access to part of the country, searched and seized UNAMIR vehicles and equipment, and participated in anti-UNAMIR demonstrations. The UNAMIR and RPA used to hold meetings on a fortnightly basis which did not take place for months.5
UNAMIR’s civilian police component continued to assist in training a new integrated national police force. As of April report by the UN Sectary General, UNAMIR civilian police component was expecting to complete the training of 300 gendarmes and 20 instructors. It was requested to train additional 400 gendarmes before the training of 100 instructors. The police component also assisted the National Gendarmerie in operational requirements to ensure that the gendarmes were ready and properly equipped for deployment after their training.6 The civilian police component, as part of the UNAMIR’s monitoring and investigatory activities, were deployed in a team of 3-4 observers in each of Rwanda’s 11 prefectures. The observers worked closely with local authorities, UN agencies and NGOs and assisted human rights and the UNAMIR personnel.7 By the end of the year, there were 85 civilian police observers deployed, who continued to perform monitoring activities. By the end of November, the civilian police component trained some 403 gendarmes and the training of additional 515 was scheduled to be completed by December. The civilian police trained 918 of the 6,000 trained gendarmes needed.8
The Secretary General advised the Security Council on 1 December 1995 that national reconciliation in Rwanda required the creation of conditions for the safe return of refugees and the extension of UNAMIR’s mandate was desirable.9 The Rwandan government, however, officially informed the Secretary General on 8 December 1995 that the UNAMIR as peacekeeping mission did not respond to Rwanda’s priority needs. The government, however, indicated the continued presence of UN for the purpose to assist rehabilitation and reconstruction, including technical expertise, financial assistance and equipment.10 For the smooth withdrawal of the UNAMIR, the Security Council by its resolution 1029 (1995) of 12 December, extended the mandate for a final period until 8 March 1996.11
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/107), February 6, 1995.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/1002), December 1, 1995.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/1002), December 1, 1995.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/297), April 9, 1995.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/457), April 9, 1995.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/297), April 9, 1995.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/297), April 9, 1995.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/1002), December 1, 1995.
- “Rwanda-UNAMIR Facts and Figures.”
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
1996
The mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), ended on 8 March 1996. After the withdrawal of UNAMIR, UN opened its office in Rwanda with major activities to coordination the UN activities at a senior level and serve as an advisory office for Rwanda.1
The observer role of the UNAMIR concluded in Rwanda in 1996. However, UNHCR continued to coordinate the repatriation and rehabilitation of refugees.
- “Rwanda; UN secretary-general’s envoy outlines role of new UN office,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 26, 1996.
1997
The UNAMIR concluded its mandate in March 1996.
1998
No further developments observed.
1999
No further developments observed.
2000
No further developments observed.
2001
No further developments observed.
2002
No further developments observed.
N’sele Cease-fire Agreement between the Government of the Rwandese Republic and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (22 July 1992)
Article I
1. A cease-fire is hereby established throughout the territory of the Republic of Rwanda, between the Government Forces and those of the Rwandese Patriotic Front. The cease-fire shall enter into force at midnight (Rwanda time) on 31st July 1992 at the same time as the deployment of the Neutral Military Observer Group.
Article II
The cease-fire shall imply:
6. The withdrawal of all foreign troops after the effective deployment of the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) except for Military Officers serving in Rwanda under bilateral Cooperation Agreements;
9. The establishment of the Neutral Corridor separating the areas occupied by the two respective forces. This corridor meant to facilitate the monitoring of the cease-fire by the Neutral Military Observer Group shall be determined in consideration of the front-lines of both armies. The demarcation on the field shall be established by the representatives of the two armies in the presence of the Neutral Military Observer Group.
Article III
1. The verification and control of the cease-fire shall be conducted by the neutral military observer group under the supervision of the Secretary-General of OAU.
2. The Neutral Military Observer Group shall be composed of:
– 10 Officers from Nigeria;
– 10 Officers from Senegal;
– 10 Officers from Zimbabwe;
– 10 Officers from an African country to be chosen by the current Chairman of the OAU in collaboration with the President of the United Republic of Tanzania;
– 5 Officers from the Government of Rwanda;
– 5 Officers from the Rwandese Patriotic Front;
3. The Neutral Military Observer Group shall report any violation of the cease-fire to the Secretary-General of OAU and a joint political military commission.
4. The Neutral Military Observer Group shall set up the organs and machinery required for the control and verification of the cease-fire. It shall draft its own rules of procedure. It shall enjoy a status that would enable it to perform its mission as provided in the Cease-fire Agreement; including privileges and immunities enjoyed by the OAU personnel as enshrined in the general agreement.
5. The Neutral Military Observer Group shall have full communication and other equipment it deems necessary to perform its mission. The NMOG officers may have specific uniforms with insignia for easy identification, and light weapons for self-defence.
Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties (3 August 1993)
Article 53: Composition The Neutral International Force shall be under the responsibility and command of the United Nations and shall be composed of contingents provided by countries selected by the Secretary General of the United Nations. Before deciding on a definite list of those countries, he shall require the approval of the two parties. The Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) may, with certain arrangements between all the parties concerned, be partly or entirely integrated into the Neutral International Force, or perform certain duties specifically entrusted to the Neutral International Force.
Article 56: Demarcation of Assembly Zones
The demarcation of Assembly zones shall be undertaken by the United Nations Reconnaissance Mission in collaboration with the NMOG, on the basis of the current positions of the two Forces.
During this demarcation exercise, care will be taken to ensure that the following conditions are fulfilled:
1. The two assembly zones be separated by a demilitarized zone whose width shall be superior to the range of heavy artillery used in the conflict;
2. Each Assembly zone shall contain all the Assembly and Cantonment points of the party concerned;
3. Within the Assembly zones, the Assembly points shall be located in such a way as to avoid clustering;
4. The Assembly and Cantonment points shall be located in such a way to allow the population to use its habitual property and facilities;
5. The Assembly zones shall be demarcated so as to avoid encirclement of one force by another.
Protocol of Agreement on the integration of Armed Forces of both Parties, signed at Arusha on 3rd August, 1993
Paragraph 2: The Neutral International Force
Article 53: Composition
The Neutral International Force shall be under the responsibility and command of the United Nations and shall be composed of contingents provided by countries selected by the Secretary General of the United Nations. Before deciding on a definite list of those countries, he shall require the approval of the two parties.
The Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) may, with certain arrangements between all the parties concerned, be partly or entirely integrated into the Neutral International Force, or perform certain duties specifically entrusted to the Neutral International Force.
Article 54: Missions
The Neutral International Force shall have the following missions:
A. Overall Mission
The Neutral International Neutral Force shall assist in the implementation of the Peace Agreement, more especially through the supervision of the implementation of the Protocol of Agreement on the Integration of Armed Forces of the two parties as well as the provision of all kinds of assistance to the competent authorities and organs.
B. Security Missions
1. Guarantee the overall security of the country and especially verify the maintenance of law and order by the competent authorities and organs.
2. Ensure the security of the distribution of humanitarian aids.
3. Assist in catering for the security of civilians.
4. Assist in the tracking of arms caches and neutralization of armed gangs throughout the country.
5. Undertake mine clearance operations.
6. Assist in the recovery of all weapons distributed to, or illegally acquired by the civilians.
7. Monitor the observance by the two parties of modalities for the definite cessation of hostilities,
provided for in the Peace Agreement.
C. Missions of Supervising the Process of Formation of the National Army
1. Undertake the demarcation of Assembly Zones and identify places for the establishment of Assembly and Cantonment points.
2. The Neutral International Force shall be responsible for the preparation of Assembly and Cantonment points. It shall take in and manage all the equipment and financial resources required for the performance of that duty. The Military barracks may serve as Assembly or Cantonment points, on condition that the two parties be informed. These camps shall be subjected to the monitoring of the Neutral International Force and to requirements of other Assembly or Cantonment points.
3. Determine security parameters for the City of Kigali, in line with the objective of making it a neutral zone.
4. Supervise:
– operations for the disengagement of forces, especially the movement of troops towards Assembly points, and servicemen moving to the Cantonment points for purposes of depositing
heavy weapons;
– the transformation of military barracks into Assembly or Cantonment points;
– verifications following these operations.
5. Ensure that rules of discipline by servicemen inside and outside assembly points are observed.
6. Cross-check inventories of armaments and ammunitions of the two parties and monitor operations for the separation of heavy from light weapons.
7. Keep watch on cantonment points and participate in the guard of light weapons and ammunition magazines located in Assembly points.
8. Supervise operations for the identification of the military personnel to be carried out in the various Assembly points.
9. Supervise operations for the supplies to the troops in the Assembly points, it being understood that the supplies shall be confined to non-lethal items.
10. Participate in the programme designed for the training of members of the new Armed Forces and cater for the security of Training Centres.
11. Supervise the operations for the demobilization of servicemen and gendarmes not eligible to
constitute the new Armed Forces.
12. Assess the status of implementation of the formation process and make recommendations to the Broad-Based Transitional Government, the Army Command High Council and the Command Council of the National Gendarmerie.
UN Peacekeeping Force
1993
On 5 October 1993 the UNAMIR was established and the UNAMIR commander arrived in Kigali on 22 October 1993 followed by an advance party of 21 military personnel on 27 October. On November 1, 1993, the NMOG II was integrated into UNAMIR. The UNAMIR continue to function both as peacekeeping operation and verification mission.1
- “Rwanda-UNAMIR Facts and Figures,” accessed September 27, 2011, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirFT.htm#JUNE.
1994
As the establishment of transitional government was delayed, the security situation deteriorated. Prominent political leaders were assassinated. It was reported that the UNAMIR escorted RPF convoy was ambushed. Under the grave security situation, the secretary general recommended that the UNAMIR should continue to support the negotiations and recommended an extension of the UNAMIR’s mandate. Accordingly, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of UNAMIR until 29 July 1994. However, on 6 April an aircraft carrying President Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi returning from peace negotiations in Tanzania crashed at Kigali airport killing all those on board. This incident was followed by the months of genocidal violence. Due to the continuing violence and lack of acceptance of a ceasefire agreement, On 21 April 1994, the Security Council adopted Resolution 912 that reduced the strength of UNAMIR and adjusted the mandate of the UNAMIR to act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure ceasefire agreement and resume humanitarian reliefs including the security of civilians. As of early May the UNAMIR strength was 444 personnel.1
On 13 May 1994, however, the Secretary-General recommended a new mandate for UNAMIR, which increased the personnel to a total of 5,500 troops. The Security Council, adopted Resolution 918 (17 May 1994), which authorized the expansion of the UNAMIR to 5,500 troops and imposed an arms embargo on Rwanda. The objective of the UNAMIR’s expanded mandate was to promote security in all sectors of Rwanda and create conditions for return and settlement of refugees and IDPs as well as support the humanitarian response. By October, all 5,500 troops were deployed and by 15 november 80 of 90 police observers authorized for UNAMIR were deployed.2 Related to the creating climate of security in camps and facilitating the resettlement of IDPs, In this regard, the UNAMIR undertook an operation from 13 to 15 December 1994 to enhance security in the Kibeho and Ndago displaced persons camps where disruptive elements had been active.3 According to the Secretary General’s report, 60 human rights monitors were deployed in the country to monitor the condition of returning refugees and IDPs. The UNMIR also helped the government to restore its administration capacity in western zones (Source: UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council, S/1994/1133, 6 October 1994).
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/107), February 6, 1995.
1995
The UNAMIR Continued to monitor the security situation. As of January 1995, UNAMIR’s strength was 5,740 all rank forces who were providing security in the IDP camps and the border region. The mission helped in establishing suitable conditions and a favorable climate for the lunching of Operation Retour, which was an integrated inter-agency initiative aimed at facilitating the safe resettlement of IDPs. The UNHCR and the UN Volunteers continued to monitor the human rights situation.1 By the end of November, the force level stood at 1,783 troops and 37 staff officers and 285 military observers.2 The UNAMIR also provided security to the International Tribunal and the Human Rights Field Operations. By the end of November 1995, the UN Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda had some 120 members deployed in Kigali and in 10 field offices located throughout the country.3
The UNMIR troops had been deliberately targeted as the UNAMIR headquarters was hit by grenades and small arms fire on 15 February. While investigating the attack the following day, eight members of a UNAMIR patrol were injured by a landmine. Similarly on March 5, three grenades were thrown at the guard post which injured to soldiers.4 The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) continued to deny UNAMIR access to part of the country, searched and seized UNAMIR vehicles and equipment and participated in anti-UNAMIR demonstrations. The UNAMIR and RPA used to hold meetings on a fortnightly basis which did not take place for months.5
UNAMIR’s civilian police component continued to assist in training a new integrated national police force. As of April report by the UN Sectary General, UNAMIR civilian police component was expecting to complete the training of 300 gendarmes and 20 instructors. It was requested to train additional 400 gendarmes before the training of 100 instructors. The police component also assisted the National Gendarmerie in operational requirements to ensure that the gendarmes were ready and properly equipped for deployment after their training.6 The civilian police component, as part of the UNAMIR’s monitoring and investigatory activities, were deployed in a team of 3-4 observers in each of Rwanda’s 11 prefectures. The observers worked closely with local authorities, UN agencies and NGOs and assisted human rights and the UNAMIR personnel.7 By the end of the year, there were 85 civilian police observers deployed, who continued to perform monitoring activities. By the end of November, the civilian police component trained some 403 gendarmes and training of additional 515 was scheduled to be completed by December. It was said that the civilian police would train 918 out of 6,000 trained gendarmes needed.8
The Secretary General advised the Security Council on 1 December 1995 that national reconciliation in Rwanda required the creation of conditions for the safe return of refugees and the extension of UNAMIR’s mandate was desirable.9 The Rwandan government, however, officially informed the Secretary General on 8 December 1995 that the UNAMIR as peacekeeping mission did not respond to Rwanda’s priority needs. The government, however, indicated the continued presence of UN for the purpose to assist rehabilitation and reconstruction, including technical expertise, financial assistance and equipment.10 For the smooth withdrawal of the UNAMIR, the Security Council by its resolution 1029 (1995) of 12 December, extended the mandate for a final period until 8 March 1996.11
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/107), February 6, 1995.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/1002), December 1 1995.
- Ibid.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/297), April 9, 1995.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/457), April 9, 1995.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/297), April 9, 1995.
- Ibid.
- “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/1995/1002), December 1, 1995.
- “Rwanda-UNAMIR Facts and Figures.”
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
1996
The mandate for the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), ended on 8 March 1996. After the withdrawal of UNAMIR, UN opened its office in Rwanda with major activities to coordination the UN activities at a senior level and serve as an advisory office for Rwanda.1 The UNAMIR concluded its mandate in March 1996.
- “Rwanda; UN secretary-general’s envoy outlines role of new UN office,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 26, 1996.
1997
The UNAMIR concluded its mandate in March 1996.
1998
No further developments observed.
1999
No further developments observed.
2000
No further developments observed.
2001
No further developments observed.
2002
No further developments observed.
Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties (3 August 1993)
Article 53: Composition The Neutral International Force shall be under the responsibility and command of the United Nations and shall be composed of contingents provided by countries selected by the Secretary General of the United Nations. Before deciding on a definite list of those countries, he shall require the approval of the two parties. The Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) may, with certain arrangements between all the parties concerned, be partly or entirely integrated into the Neutral International Force, or perform certain duties specifically entrusted to the Neutral International Force.
Withdrawal of Troops
1993
There was a record of presence of foreign troops in Rwanda after Ugandan based rebels, RPF, stormed into northern Rwanda and seemed to have made a gain against the pro-French regime in October 1990. According to a report, estimated 300 French troops, along with 600 Belgian paratroops and 500 soldiers from DRC seemed to have thwarted a potential assault on the capital.1 Presence of these foreign troops became contentious issues between the government and the rebel during the peace process and therefore the 1992 N’sele Cease-fire Agreement and the 1992 and the 1993 Protocol of Agreement on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties had provision for the withdrawal of foreign troops. In February 1993, the FRP spokesperson in the northern city of Byumba accused that French troops were helping the government soldiers dig trenches and employ canons.2 The presence of France in Rwanda continued as the French Foreign Ministry affirmed that the reinforcement of contingent of 150 French paratroops were sent to Rwanda to protect “the French citizens living in this African country.”3 According to a report, France confirmed its 800-strong contingent stationed in Rwanda to protect French national but the rebel movement had accused the foreign troops, including French, of fighting on the side of the government.4 According to Human Rights Watch Report, France maintained as many as 1,100 there at one time; and as the Rwandan army expanded from fewer than 10,000 to more than 30,000 soldiers, the French gave training both the combatants and soldiers who would in turn serve as instructors for others.5 As of end of 1993, there was no report of withdrawal of foreign troops from Rwanda.
- “Dispatch of French Troops to Troubled Rwanda May Draw Fire in Paris,” The Washington Post, October 7, 1990.
- “Rwanda: France Denies Supporting Government Troops,” IPS-Inter Press Service, February 12, 1993.
- Ibid.
- “Wanda: OAU Sends Its Top Official to Negotiate Peace,” IPS-Inter Press Service, April 6, 1993.
- “Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda,” Human Rights Watch, 2004, accessed September 27, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/rwanda/index.htm#TopOfPage.
1994
On 21 March, France began to withdraw its forces. The withdrawal was completed on 11 December after the first units of UNAMIR had taken up positions in Rwanda.1 Nevertheless, during the genocidal events, foreign troops teamed up for the humanitarian actions.2 Nevertheless, Belgium did withdraw its troops once its force in the UNAMIR came under attack. The Belgian withdrew and also campaigned for the withdrawal of all forces.3
- Howard Adelman, “The Role of Non-African State in the Rwandan Genocide,” accessed September 27, 2011, http://www.library.yorku.ca/find/Record/dspace2662.
- “Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda.”
- Ibid.
1995
No record of foreign troops was found. With the rebel victory, all unauthorized foreign troops were withdrawn.
1996
No further developments observed.
1997
No further developments observed.
1998
No further developments observed.
1999
No further developments observed.
2000
No further developments observed.
2001
No further developments observed.
2002
No further developments observed.
N’sele Cease-fire Agreement between the Government of the Rwandese Republic and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (22 July 1992)
Article II
The cease-fire shall imply:
6. The withdrawal of all foreign troops after the effective deployment of the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) except for Military Officers serving in Rwanda under bilateral Cooperation Agreements;
Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties (3 August 1993)
Article 72: Security Arrangements for the Establishment of Transitional Institutions In general, security shall be catered for by the Neutral International Force and, in case of delay in its
deployment, by the expanded NMOG of which the United Nations assumes responsibility in accordance with Article 53 of this Protocol.
The establishment of transitional institutions shall take place after the deployment of the Neutral International Force or the expanded NMOG and after the withdrawal of foreign troops. The withdrawal of foreign troops shall be implemented in accordance with modalities defined in the March 7, 1993 Dar es Salaam Communique.
Please always cite: “Annualized implementation data on comprehensive intrastate peace accords, 1989–2012.” Madhav Joshi, Jason Michael Quinn, and Patrick M. Regan. Journal of Peace Research 52 (2015): 551-562.