Accra Peace Agreement

2003

Intermediate Implementation

A ceasefire was signed on 17 August 2003. Sporadic fighting between the LURD and government forces continued in the Monrovia area through December 2003. The Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) began meeting on a weekly basis on 1 October 2003. According to the Secretary General, the JMC “has been a valuable mechanism for monitoring the ceasefire, maintaining dialogue among the armed groups, and facilitating contacts between UNMIL and the ground commanders of these groups.” The JMC collected information on armed groups’ personnel and locations, and the government provided information on the structure and location of the 12,000 troops. The LURD and MODEL provided only basic organizational data.¹

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2003/1175), December 15, 2003.

2004

Intermediate Implementation

The terms of the ceasefire were generally upheld, though sporadic violations occurred around Monrovia that involved the continued harassment of civilians. Though LURD and MODEL were slow to provide information regarding the lists and locations of combatants and military equipment to the JMC, the disarmament and demobilization of forces was completed on 31 October 2004. At this time, the JMC had fulfilled its mandate, after having met a total of 14 times during the year to monitor the compliance with the ceasefire agreement.¹

1. “Secretary General’s Reports to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2004/229; S/2004/430; S/2004/725; S/2004/972), March 22, 2004; May 26, 2004; September 10, 2004; December 17, 2004.

2005

Full Implementation

The first round of elections was held on the scheduled date of 11 October 2005. These elections were held for candidates vying for seats in the Senate and House of Representatives, as well as the candidates running for President. In the elections, “22 registered political parties, two alliances and one coalition, which put forward some 205 Senate and 513 House of Representatives candidates, and the 22 presidential candidates, with their running mates, conducted their political campaigns in a generally peaceful manner.”¹ This was a significant post-conflict development in Liberia.

The post-conflict elections in 2005 moved Liberia from a transitional to a normalized political process. This suggests that there were no reports of any major ceasefire violations.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2005/764), December 7, 2005.

2006

Full Implementation

The post-conflict elections in 2005 moved Liberia from a transitional to a normalized political process. This suggests that the ceasefire provision of the agreement was respected.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Intermediate Implementation

President Taylor handed over his presidential power to Vice President Moses Blah on 11 August 2003 in accordance with the peace agreement’s stipulations.¹

The National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) was inaugurated on 14 October 2003. The positions in the cabinet were allocated in accordance with the peace agreement. The Chairman of the NTGL rejected three of the candidates that the LURD nominated for positions in the cabinet. This led to a crisis when the LURD threatened to abandon the peace process. New submissions were subsequently accepted.² In total, 58/67 of the legislative seats had been filled by December and the NTGL’s legislative assembly had approved of 16 of the nominations for senior government positions.³

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2003/875), September 11, 2003.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2003/1175), December 15, 2003.
3. Ibid.

2004

Full Implementation

The process of forming the NTGL was disrupted in early 2004, when appointments for assistant ministerial positions, (which was a provision not covered in the peace agreement), began to occur.¹

The distribution of 84 assistant ministerial positions was not covered in the peace agreement, and disagreement over this issue caused tension in the NTGL. However, the demands for Chairman Bryant resignation by the leaders of MODEL and LURD were quickly rescinded, and the crisis passed after 66 of the candidates submitted by Chairman Bryant to the Transitional Legislative Assembly were accepted.²

The establishment of a transitional government was completed on January 7, 2004 with the induction of the newly appointed Supreme Court bench. It was reported that “five renowned Liberian lawyers, who were months ago nominated by the Liberia National Bar Association swore at the induction ceremony at the Executive Mansion (State House).”³

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2004/229), March 22, 2004.
2. Ibid.
3. “LIBERIA INDUCTS INTERIM SUPREME COURT JUDGES,” Panafrican News Agency (PANA) Daily Newswire, January 8, 2004.

2005

Full Implementation

The power-sharing government continued in 2005 and prepared for Senate, Legislature and Presidential elections. The elections took place on October 11, 2005 and a second round of presidential elections on November 8, 2005.

2006

Full Implementation

After the 2006 elections, Liberia returned to a normalized political process by completing the transitional government provision of the Accra Peace Agreement 2003. The new government was installed in January 2006.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Minimum Implementation

The Constitution of Liberia was suspended to allow the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) to function with executive and legislature branches selected exclusively from the parties to the conflict and civil society rather than through elections. It was planned that the Constitution of Liberia was to come into effect again in 2005 after the first post-accord elections were held.

2004

Full Implementation

NTLA and the NTGL passed an electoral reform bill that altered two provisions of the Constitution. Article 80(d), which required that a census be the basis of allocating seats in the House of Representatives to counties, was dropped. In its place, the results of the voter registration process would be used. Article 52, which required that any candidate for national office hold residency in Liberia for 10 years prior to elections, was also dropped.

2005

Full Implementation

After the October elections, the Constitution of Liberia was restored with the amendments from the electoral reform bill passed in December 2004.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

No Implementation

Electoral reform did not occur in 2003.

2004

Intermediate Implementation

The National Elections Commission (NEC) and the National Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA) were responsible for electoral reform in the post-accord period. The NEC announced in May 2004 that the 1986 Elections Law of Liberia would provide the guiding principles for the 2005 elections. Specifically, the country was to be divided into seven districts, each of which would be administered by a NEC commissioner. The number of electoral districts would remain the same (30) but the number of electoral districts each county held would change. The number of Senate and Parliament seats would remain at 30 and 64 respectively.¹ The NEC also clarified several issues in the spring. First, all NEC employees were required to disaffiliate with political parties. Second, the NEC declared it would only recognize political party leaders elected at party conventions. This requirement was intended to help solve the problem of internal rivalries that several parties, especially LURD, faced.²

The NEC consulted in June and July of 2004 with all the major stakeholders in the 2005 electoral process. This included the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signatories as well as representatives of political parties, civil society groups, the NTLA, ECOWAS, the UN, the AU, and the International Contact Group for Liberia. The goal of the consultative process was to discuss the electoral system and the electoral law proposals, after which the NEC would submit a draft electoral law proposal to the NTLA for approval.³ In addition to consulting with major stakeholders, the NEC also worked with experts from UNMIL, USAID, and the European Commission to draft the electoral law proposal. The draft proposal for electoral reforms was presented to the NTLA on 30 August 2004. The major provisions included in the electoral reform law were as follows:

A) Article 52 of the constitution, which required a 10-year continuous residency in Liberia to run for President or any other major political office, was suspended;

B) The President would be elected through the traditional majoritarian system. In this system, a candidate must receive 60% of the vote, either in the initial round or a run-off election, to win office;

C) The Vice President would be elected through a simple majoritarian system, as would Senators from each county;

D) Seats for the House of Representatives would be allocated through a single, non-transferable vote (STV) formula that was intended to promote the inclusion of a large number of political parties.

E) The terms of the President, Vice President, and Legislature were to be shortened from six to four years;

F) The constitutional requirement that a census be held prior to the 2005 elections was dropped, and finally;

G) The 64 seats in the House of Representatives were to be reallocated, and the county (electoral district) borders were to be redrawn based on the results of the voter registration period from summer 2005.⁴

While the NTLA accepted most of the reforms proposed by the NEC in the draft elections bill, including the system of electing the President, Vice-President, and Senators, it held contention with several aspects of the proposed changes. The NTLA was opposed to cutting term length, the STV formula for electing representatives, and the proposed method of re-allocating representatives to counties. After substantial debate transpired within the NTLA and between the Assembly and the NEC, the NTLA passed an amended electoral reform law on 21 November 2004. The compromise bill failed to pass ratification by the Chairman of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), forcing the bill back into deliberation in the NTLA. When an elections bill was finally passed by both the NTLA and NTGL on 14 December 2004, the proposed changes stood as follows:

A) Article 52 of the constitution was suspended, lowering the required 10 years of continuous residency required to run for office;

B) Electoral formats for the President, Vice-President, and Senate remained unchanged;

C) Representatives would be elected by simple majority vote rather than the initially proposed STV formula;

D) Terms for all offices remained six years;

E) No census would be required before the 2005 elections. Instead, voter registration rolls would be used to re-allocate the 64 representative seats. As before, each county would receive a minimum of two seats;

F) Registration fees for candidates were cut in half to $2,500 for President, $1,500 for Vice-President, $750 for Senator, and $500 for Representative. The Ministry of Finance would collect registration fees as government revenues rather than into the account of the NEC.⁵

1. “Liberia; Elections Laws Will Be Guiding Principles – NEC Boss Assures Political Parties,” Africa News, May 12, 2004.
2. “Liberia; ECOM Recognizes Leaders Elected at Regular Conventions, Meets Political Parties,” Africa News, May 7, 2004.
3. “Liberia; Elections Reform Begins June, Commission Points out Critical Areas,” Africa News, May 3, 2004.
4. “Liberia; ‘No Census for 2005 Elections’ … Says Elections Commission, But,” Africa News, May 7, 2004; “NEC Wants 10-Year Residency Clause Suspended,” Africa News, August 31, 2004; “Elections Reform Bill Undergoes Scrutiny… Deputy Speaker Calls for Referendum,” Africa News, September 16, 2004.
5. “Liberia; NTLA Finally Enacts Electoral Bill,” Africa News, November 22, 2004; “Lawmakers Finally Pass Electoral Reform Bill,” Africa News, November 24, 2004; “Assembly Finally Approves Electoral Reform Bill,” Africa News, December 15 2004.

2005

Full Implementation

Early in 2005, the NEC altered the rules for forming coalitions and alliances between parties in order to make it easier for parties to do so in the hopes of reducing the number of parties on the ballot, which was at that time over 20 total. According to the new guidelines, alliances or coalitions must hold conventions to elect candidates before 1 August 2005; after that date the NEC would not certify any alliance or coalition.¹ After the voter registration process was completed in May, the NEC published the listing of the newly drawn electoral districts within counties on 15 July 2005. In addition, the NEC announced it would require parties and coalitions to field at least 30% female candidates. However, overcoming the traditionally male-dominated politics and the within-party nominating process proved too difficult and only 14% of candidates in the October 2005 elections were female.²

1. “Guidelines for Coalitions, Alliances,” Africa News, February 8, 2005.
2. “Liberia; Statement of the NDI/Carter Center Pre-Election Delegation to Liberia’s 2005 Elections,” September 9, 2005.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

No Implementation

Decentralization did not occur in 2003.

2004

No Implementation

Governance Reform Commission was established in February 2004.¹ On March 31, 2004, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was confirmed as Chairman of the Governance Reform Commission (GRC) by the National Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA). According to a news report, other members of the commission were Former Interim President, Dr. Amos C. Sawyer, Dr. George Klay Kieh, a presidential hopeful of the New Alternative of Liberia (New Deal Movement) and former Planning and Economic Affairs Minister, Francis Carbar.²

The GRC did impressive work and focused on three key areas with the intent of drawing up a 30-year blueprint for a shared national vision for the future of Liberia. These key areas included public sector reform and local governance reform through decentralization.³ As such, decentralization remained a priority in the agenda of the GRC; however, decentralization did not actually occur in 2004.

1. “Liberia; JPC Boss Chairs Elections Commission As Govt. Constitutes Five Commissions,” Africa News, February 2, 2004.
2. “Liberia; Assembly Confirms Ellen As Governance Reform Chairperson,” Africa News, March 31, 2004.
3. “Liberia; Reform Commission Sketches Liberia’s Future, Forecasts 30-Year Blueprint,” Africa News, July 16, 2004.

2005

Minimum Implementation

It was reported that in its work, the GRC promoted decentralization and a very robust consultative process in its reform agenda.¹ But decentralization as governance reform did not take place in 2005.

1. “Liberia; Ellen Sums Up Development Agenda, Africa News, September 19, 2005.

Concrete steps were not taken with respect to decentralization. In 2006, the UNDP published a concept paper that suggested that there was a need for beginning financial management at the county and district level as efforts towards decentralization.¹

1. “LIBERIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME: Towards Decentralization,” UNDP, New York, 2006. http://www.uncdf.org/english/local_development/uploads/concept/UNCDF_Lib…, accessed May 9, 2011.

2007

Minimum Implementation

In August 2007, the Liberian government, as a result of the utility of the GRC, extended its commission and granted it a permanent institution, as Governance Commission (GC). The commission’s members were said to work in the areas of “inclusive, participatory, and just system of governance and decentralization of development.”¹

1. “Liberia; Government Seeks to Increase Power of Influential Commission,” Africa News, August 27, 2007.

2008

Minimum Implementation

No further information is available regarding the extent of which the decentralization of governance took place.

2009

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2004

Minimum Implementation

The Contract and Monopoly Commission, and the Governance Reform Commissions, were established in February 2004 along with five other autonomous commissions mandated by the peace agreement.¹

It is not very clear how these commissions carried out civil administration reform, especially regarding gender balance. Both of these commissions were financially supported by the UNDP.

1. “Liberia; JPC Boss Chairs Elections Commission As Govt. Constitutes Five Commissions,” Africa News, February 2, 2004.

2005

Minimum Implementation

Elections were held in October 2005.

2006

Minimum Implementation

After holding elections in October 2005, the new government took office in January 2006. The Contract and Monopoly Commission was replaced with the Public Procurement & Concessions Commission on January 16, 2006. The PPCA came into force on 16 January 2006 following the inauguration of the elected Government of Liberia. The PPCA was mandated to implement the public procurement and concessions reform program of Liberia.¹

1. Joseph S. Neufville, “PPCC Progress Report On The Public Procurement Reform Program Of Liberia,” PPCC. www.ppcc.gov.lr/doc/PPCC%20Reform.doc, accessed May 10, 2011.

2007

Minimum Implementation

In August 2007 the Liberian government extended the commission and mandated the Governance Commission as a permanent institution.¹

Even if these two commissions were established as mandated by the accord, effectiveness of these commissions on civil service was mixed.

1. “Liberia; Government Seeks to Increase Power of Influential Commission,” Africa News, August 27, 2007.

2008

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

No Implementation

No information is available on the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

2004

Intermediate Implementation

On January 7, 2004, a three-day Technical Work Session, hosted by the National Human Rights Center of Liberia (NHRCL) in collaboration with the Liberia Democracy Watch (LDW) and the NGO Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG), was held regarding the draft act establishing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The UN Mission in Liberia was providing technical support and advice on establishing the commission. The workshop was created with the intention of reviewing the draft act.¹ In late January, Chairman Bryant appointed members of the Truth and Reconciliation commission. Some parties, however, argued that the chairman did not meet the procedural requirement of consulting with the Transitional Legislative assembly before deciding on candidates.²

The TRC was finally established on February 2, 2004. Rev. Dr. Burgess Carr was appointed chair of the eight-member commission.³ During a news briefing in the first week of May, the commissioners of the TRC said that the TRC would intend to “go from city to city, village to village and town to town to keep citizens abreast of the significance of the commission in the quest for genuine and lasting peace in Liberia.”⁴

In a significant development, a member of the TRC, Attorney Moffie Kanneh, resigned once he was appointed spokesperson for the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD).⁵

In order to progress forward, on August 13, 2004 the TRC sent the TRC Draft Act to the Chairman of the Transitional Government. The TRC Draft Act proposed to investigate “perpetrators of massacres, sexual offences, murder, economic crimes, extra-judicial killings, and all incidents of gross human rights abuses and violations, whether isolated or part of a systematic pattern from January 1979 up to the establishment of the TRC.”⁶

1. “Liberia; Human Rights Groups Finish Workshop on Truth And Reconciliation Draft,” Africa News, January 7, 2004.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2004/229), March 22, 2004.
3. “Liberia; JPC Boss Chairs Elections Commission as Govt. Constitutes Five Commissions,” Africa News, February 2, 2004.
4. “Liberia; Truth Commission Speaks Out,” Africa News, May 5, 2004.
5. “Liberia; Commissioner Resigns From Truth Commission After Accepting Factional Appointment,” Africa News, June 11, 2004.
6. “Liberia; Truth Commission Wants Cases Heard From 1979, Presents Draft Act to Govt,” Africa News, August 17, 2004.

2005

Full Implementation

On 9 February, Chairman Bryant endorsed the draft legislation specifying the authority of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.¹

The TRC Draft Act was finally passed by the National Transitional Legislative Assembly on 12 May 2005.² On 10 June 2005, the Chairman of the Transitional Government signed the law passed by the assembly and it became effective.³

No further information is available regarding the work of the TRC.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2005/177), March 17, 2005.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2005/391), June 16, 2005.
3. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2005/560), September 1, 2005.

2006

Full Implementation

The president formally inaugurated the TRC on 20 February 2006. The TRC was mandated to investigate rights abuses and killings from 1979 until 2003.¹ As soon as the commission was established, it began to collect information on alleged human rights violations and atrocities during the civil war years. The TRC commenced operations following the nationwide launch of its public activities programme on 22 June. As of September 2006, the TRC process was ongoing in all counties.² The TRC started taking statements in the counties on 10 October. This however was suspended on 28 November due to a lack of funding needed to pay the salaries of the statement takers.³

1. “Liberia inaugurates truth commission to investigate rights abuses, killings,” Associated Press Worldstream, February 20, 2006.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2006/743), September 12, 2006.
3. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2006/958), December 11, 2006.

2007

Full Implementation

The TRC did not make any significant progress in 2007 because of funding issues. The commission received only $2.2 million out of a project operation budget of $14 million. It was reported that the commission’s mandate was due to expire in September 2008. By August 2007, the commission had only recorded 5,000 out of an estimated 30,000 statements.¹

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2007/479), August 8, 2007.

2008

Full Implementation

The commission made significant progress during this year as it began hosting public hearings nationwide. The TRC requested that the legislature grant them an extension for 9 months, thus pushing the deadline until 30 June 2009. By August 2008, the TRC completed public hearings in all 15 counties and started thematic hearings in July.¹ The UN Secretary General reported to the Security Council that the Liberian TRC had released the findings from its conflict mapping survey on 13 October, 2008. This survey identified that land and property disputes were key threats to Liberia’s fragile peace.² The TRC’s public hearing continued and “the first volume of its report, containing an overview of the root causes of the Liberian conflict, was sent to the Legislature and the President in December 2008.”³

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2008/553), August 15, 2008.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2009/86), February 10, 2009.
3. Ibid.

2009

Full Implementation

After the national reconciliation convention of June brought over 500 delegates from all 15 counties, the TRC concluded its mandate on 30 June and submitted an unedited consolidated report to the legislature and the president. The report outlined the root cause of the conflict and expressed the view that all factions committed violations of domestic as well as international criminal and human rights law. The report had a range of recommendations on accountability, reparations, and amnesty, as well as suggestions for legal and institutional reforms. The report also recommended the establishment of an “extraordinary criminal tribunal to prosecute those identified as having committed gross violations of human rights and economic crimes. Eight leaders of the warring factions, including the former President, Charles Taylor, as well as a list of 98 individuals identified as the ‘most notorious perpetratorsÕ are among those recommended for prosecution. Thirty-six persons have been identified as being responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity, but are not recommended for prosecution because they spoke truthfully before the Commission and expressed remorse. The Commission’s report also includes a ‘non-exhaustiveÕ list of 50 individuals identified as financiers or supporters of the warring factions who the Commission recommends be subject to public sanctions, including being barred from public office for a period of 30 years. That list includes the President, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, among other political figures and serving members of the Government.”¹ On 1 December 2009, the Commission issued a final report, with 10 of its 12 appendices completed. In the final report, the commission expanded its recommendations to include the “Palava Hut” mechanism: a traditional conflict resolution mechanism, which was to be set up in every district, where the perpetrators could publicly request forgiveness.²

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2009/411), August 10, 2009.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2010/88), February 17, 2010.

2010

Full Implementation

The TRC completed its mandate in June 2009. President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf reported on the status of the implementation of the TRC’s recommendations to the legislature on March 10 and informed them that “she had requested the Ministry of Justice and the Law Reform Commission to analyze the recommendations with legal implications and explore options for implementing those without legal implications.”¹

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2010/429), August 10, 2010.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Full Implementation

No major dispute within the NTGL was reported.

2004

Full Implementation

No major dispute within the NTGL was reported.

2005

Full Implementation

No major dispute within the NTGL was reported.

2006

Full Implementation

No major dispute within the NTGL was reported.

2007

Full Implementation

No major dispute within the NTGL was reported.

2008

Full Implementation

No major dispute within the NTGL was reported.

2009

Full Implementation

No major dispute within the NTGL was reported.

2010

Full Implementation

No major dispute within the NTGL was reported.

2011

Full Implementation

No major dispute within the NTGL was reported.

2012

Full Implementation

No major dispute within the NTGL was reported.

2003

Minimum Implementation

As a method of reforming the armed forces of Liberia, “a Military Advisory Committee made up of the Chiefs of Staff of the former government forces, LURD and MODEL has been established and charged with developing proposals for the reform and restructuring of Liberia’s armed forces.”¹ It was reported that the committee’s recommendations would be considered by the NTGL before they were submitted to the UNMIL and other international partners. As of 2003, the military strength of Liberia was comprised of 15,000 personnel.²“Military Statistics – Liberia,” accessed May 10, 2011, http://www.nationmaster.com/time.php?stat=mil_per-military-personnel&cou…

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2003/117), December 15, 2003.

2004

Intermediate Implementation

The United States of America agreed to take the lead in restructuring the Armed Forces of Liberia. The UNMIL began to assist the NTGL in re-documenting the personnel of the armed forces in order to produce a database of personnel records and service history. This database would be used to determine which service members were retired or returned to service.¹

1. John Blaney, Jacques Paul Klein and Sean McFate, “Wider Lessons for Peacebuilding: Security Sector Reform in Liberia Policy Analysis Brief, The Stanley Foundation, 2010.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

The United States of America continued to lead the effort to restructure the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The job of restructuring the armed forces was contracted out to the United States-based corporation, DynCorp International. This company was hired with a 3-year, $200M contract.¹ The first step of the restructuring process was to refurbish the Ministry of Defense as well as the brigade headquarters and battalion barracks at four locations. The second and third components were to restructure and professionalize the Ministry of Defense and to restructure the Armed Forces of Liberia, respectively. The plan for restructuring the AFL required that a 4,000 person force be recruited and put through basic training over two years, with more advanced training to follow.²

The progress of the restructuring was delayed by the decommissioning process that applied to the AFL’s existing personnel. The decommissioning of the former armed forces personnel began on 31 May 2005. In the first phase of decommissioning, the 9,400 irregular personnel, who had been added to the armed forces after the outbreak of civil war in 1989, were demobilized. The process ended on 10 September 2005 and each conscript received $540 in severance pay as well as a photo ID card and a demobilization certificate. An AFL Grievance Committee was established to verify the service of individuals who could not provide documentation that they were war recruits. The second phase, under which the 4,273 regular members of the armed forces were to be retired, began on 17 October 2005. While this process was supposed to be completed in September, acute funding constraints prevented the program from proceeding according to the timeline. By 1 December 2005, only 2,227 of the regular armed forces had been retired. While contributions specifically to the decommissioning program reached $6M, an additional $3M was needed to finish decommissioning the armed forces. Additional fiscal constraints on the government of Liberia forced it to cut the targeted strength of the Armed Forces of Liberia from 4,000 to 2,000 personnel. Because recruitment and training of the new armed forces personnel could not begin until the present armed forces were decommissioned, no further military reform transpired in 2005.³

1. “Liberia; U.S. Govt. Offers $200M for Security Sector Reform,” Africa News, February 3. 2005.
2. “Liberia; AFL Gets Air Force in U.S. Three-Year Restructuring Program,” Africa News, February 4, 2005.
3. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2005/764), December 7, 2005.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

In January, a standoff developed between retired members of the AFL and the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL). A group of soldiers and officers refused to vacate the Camp Schefflin military base as part of the military decommissioning exercise, claiming that the order to do so contravened the Constitution of Liberia and AFL regulations. According to officers leading the protest, the AFL could not be dismissed without a referendum supervised by an elected Government of Liberia because the creation of the AFL was an act of the national legislature (in 1908). In addition, protesting soldiers cited AFL regulations that give personnel a 90-day grace period to remain on military premises after dismissal. They also claimed that the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) did not call for the specific dismissal of the AFL and all of its personnel. In its defense, the NTGL did cite the provisions of the CPA that called for the restructuring and reconstituting of the AFL and also mentioned suspending any parts of the Constitution of Liberia that contravened CPA provisions.¹ Other problems arose in the decommissioning exercise when 800 retired soldiers stormed the Ministry of Defense demanding the full payment of the $860 in retirement benefits promised to them at the onset of the decommissioning exercise. At the time, the government’s retirement package had dropped to $540 per individual. Decommissioned soldiers also protested being required to re-apply to join the AFL as new recruits rather than getting preferential treatment due to their former status in the armed forces.²

The UNMIL began receiving applicants for the newly reformed armed forces in early 2006. The Ministry of Defense established guidelines requiring that all recruits were high school graduates between the ages of 18 and 35.³ Former AFL service members that were not above the retirement age for the armed forces were allowed to re-apply to be new recruits. All applicants had to pass literacy, physical fitness, and medical tests in addition to being screened by the UNMIL. The first group of 110 recruits began basic training on 22 July 2006 and graduated from training on 4 November 2006. An additional 500 recruits had been selected for basic training by the end of the year. An additional 130 middle-level personnel in the armed forces began a 17-week training program funded by the United States to prepare them for posts at the Ministry of Defense.⁴

1. “Liberia; AFL Command Rejects 72-Hr. Ultimatum, Wants Int’l Community to Intervene,” Africa News, January 3, 2006; “Dissolve or not to Dissolve, AFL Gives the Dying Horse’s Kick,” Africa News, January 4, 2006.
2. “Liberia; Demobilized Soldiers Threaten Recruitment, Issue 72 Hr Ultimatum,” Africa News, January 24, 2006.
3. “Liberia; Army launches recruitment drive in central, southeast regions,” BBC Monitoring Africa – Political, May 1, 2008.
4. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2006/958), December 11. 2006.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

The United States contracted another private corporation – Pacific Architects and Engineers – to help with the restructuring of the armed forces. The duties of the restructuring process were split between the two companies involved, with DynCorp handling the recruitment and basic training of personnel and PAE providing advanced training and construction/renovation of facilities.¹
After completing basic training, the first batch of 110 recruits that graduated in November 2006 began advanced individual training. Training for a second recruitment batch, which had been scheduled to begin in January, was postponed until July. This batch of 502 recruits graduated from basic training on 7 September 2007. The Armed Forces of Liberia will be composed of two infantry battalions, an engineering unit, a military police unit, a military band and medical personnel. The first three infantry companies in the first battalion, composed of 128 men each, were activated on 19 December 2007. Though the companies were activated, they would require further training before they were fully operational.²

1. “Liberia: Key Facts on the Armed Forces of Liberia,” Refugee International, September 18, 2007, http://www.refintl.org/content/liberia-key-facts-armed-forces-liberia.
2. “Liberia; AFL Initiates First Infantry Companies,” Africa News, December 19, 2007.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

The United States continued to lead the effort in restructuring the Armed Forces of Liberia. The third batch of 485 recruits graduated from basic training on 11 January 2008, after which they began advanced infantry training. A fourth batch of recruits entered training on 8 March and the final batch of 500 recruits and 29 officer candidates commenced training in June. The full strength of 2,000 personnel was reached in August when the last batch of recruits completed their basic training. The first of two battalions in the Armed Forces of Liberia was commissioned in August and the second followed in December. Nigeria also contributed to the training of AFL recruits by providing advanced training to 200 infantry soldiers from March to September. Additionally, Nigeria provided a total of 5 military advisors to help train AFL troops within Liberia.¹

Officer training hampered the operational capacity of the armed forces. By August, only 45 commissioned officers were in service. Officers from ECOWAS members’ militaries filled a number of key positions in the absence of adequate Liberian officers.²

1. “Liberia; 200 AFL Soldiers Return From Nigeria,” Africa News, September 4, 2008.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2008/553), August 15, 2006.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

The United States continued to lead the effort in restructuring the Armed Forces of Liberia. The two battalions completed the United States Army Training and Evaluation Program in September and December of 2009, respectively. This signaled the end of the United States’ leadership in the restructuring effort, after which they would operate solely in an advisory role. As part of the reduction of their training role, the United States returned control of the Barclay Training Center to the Government of Liberia on 31 July 2009.¹

The UNMIL began to cooperate with the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces of Liberia in focusing on the continued training and mentoring of the new army. The first phase of the process ran from July until December and was concerned with military training exercises. Throughout 2009, the Armed Forces of Liberia, the Ministry of Defense, the United States Embassy, and UNMIL participated in regular working groups designed to prepare the armed forces for operational independence.

As of 1 August, only 58 of the 2,000-strong army were female. With regards to this issue, President Johnson-Sirleaf expressed determination to address the gender imbalance in the new Armed Forces of Liberia.²

1. “Liberia; Barclay Training Center to Be Turned Over to Defense Ministry,” Africa News, July 30, 2009.
2. “Secretary GeneralsÕ Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2009/411), August 10, 2009.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

On 1 January 2010 the United States handed over operational control of the Armed Forces of Liberia to the Government of Liberia. The handover also included the transfer of the armed forcesÕ military equipment to the Government of Liberia. However, for the duration of 2010, the United States continued to control the weapons and ammunition of the Armed Forces of Liberia.

Training of the new armed forces focused on infantry and specialization. The United States deployed 61 training personnel to Liberia to continue to assist in the development of the new armed forces. In addition, the Government of Liberia officially activated the 50-person Liberian Coast Guard, which had procured two out of its fleet of four boats by the end of 2010. The UNMIL began specialized training exercises with select units of the armed forces, including training in engineering, military police, and signal and headquarters responsibilities. By August, the armed forces had developed an annual training plan for its members, a vital step towards self-sufficiency.

The Armed Forces of Liberia are not expected to be fully and operationally independent until mid-2012. Numerous officer positions are still filled by seconded officers from ECOWAS member states. Self-sufficiency is also delayed by the problems surrounding the adoption of an official national defense strategy and the inadequate funding of the armed forces.

The strength of the armed force decreased from 15,000 personnel to 2,000 professional personnel.¹

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council, United Nations Security Council (S/2010/429), August 11, 2010.

2011

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Minimum Implementation

The 2003 agreement required a reform of the police force. The Security Council in its resolution 1509 (2003) also requested such a reform. This resolution requested that the UNMIL assist the NTGL “in monitoring and restructuring the police force of Liberia, to develop a civilian police training programme and to assist in the training of the civilian police, in cooperation with ECOWAS, international organizations and interested States; and to assist the Transitional Government in the formation of a new and restructured Liberian military, also in cooperation with ECOWAS, international organizations, and interested States.”¹ To facilitate the reform of the police force, the UNMIL and the Secretariat developed a concept of operations that envisaged the deployment of 755 civilian police personnel and three formed police units, each comprised of 120 armed police personnel.²

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2003/1175), December 15, 2003.
2. Ibid.

2004

Intermediate Implementation

A training program for a Liberian interim police force of 400 officers was designed to police the capital city of Monrovia until the formation of a new, restructured police force occurred. By 5 March, it was reported that 178 officers had completed the course and 74 were enrolled in the program, which was completed by April.

In his May report, the Secretary General reported to the UN Security Council that the Chairman of the NTGL as well as the spherical representative of the secretary general, had decided to launch a recruitment drive for 3,500 personnel. This group was to be trained over the next two years for positions in the Liberian Police Service. During the recruitment drive, emphasis would be given to ethnic and gender balance. Also, the current members of the Liberia National Police would not be automatically recruited into the new force unless they met the new standard.¹

By early September, “some 31 per cent of the 1,839 application forms distributed nationwide (had) been returned for processing and 385 Liberian National Police personnel (had) been identified to undergo the selection process for entry into the Academy.”² By June 2004, the UNMIL had trained some 646 officers to restore law and order in Monrovia. The UNMIL, in coordination with NTGL, completed an extensive recruitment drive. It was reported that 854 screened and vetted recruits had undergone extensive academic and field training. By December, the registration exercise to verify the number of Liberian National Police Personnel was completed. Some 9,353 personnel were registered.³

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2004/428), May 26, 2004.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2004/725), September 10, 2004.
3. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2004/972), December 17, 2004.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

Reform of the Liberian police moved steadily forward. The goal of training 1,800 Liberian police officers before the October election was met. In addition, 300 police personnel completed specialized training in Nigeria. It was claimed that this group was to be tasked with dealing with riot controls and violent crimes.¹

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2005/764), December 7, 2005.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

By 1 December, 2,214 Liberian National Police had been trained and deployed, while 358 Special Security Services personnel and 155 Seaport Police officers had graduated from the National Police Academy. At that time, an additional 566 police recruits were receiving field training, and 454 recruits were undergoing basic training. In order to reach the target of a trained police force of 3,500 by July 2007, the UNMIL and the Liberian National Police intensified the country-wide recruitment drive.¹

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2006/958), December 11, 2006.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

The July target of training 3,500 police personnel was reached. By the first week of August, 3,522 police officers had graduated from the National Police Academy. Also, to foster the gender balance, the first all-female class, comprised of 110 police recruits, began training on 4 June after completing the special Ministry of Education/Liberian National Police/United Nations police educational support program.¹

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2007/479), August 8, 2007.

2008

Full Implementation

Significant progress was made with respect to police reform. The UNMIL provided basic training for 3,661 officers, including 344 women. More than 1,000 officers had received specialized training. Nevertheless, significant challenges remained regarding the deployment of the police force.¹

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2008/553), August 15, 2008.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Intermediate Implementation

The number of combatants to be demobilized in Liberia varied depending on the sources from 103,000 to 107,000. According to The School for a Culture of Peace’s report on Liberia’s DDRR, combatants were “divided amongst a variety of armed groups and militias, including 35,000 members of the LURD (Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy), 14,000 members of MODEL (Movement for Democracy in Liberia), 16,000 pro-government militia fighters or paramilitaries, and 12,000 Armed Forces soldiers.”¹

The DDRR process was scheduled to begin with the establishment of the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (NCDDRR) on November 15. The NCDDRR was composed of representatives from the Transitional Government, LURD, MODEL, ECOWAS, AU, and the ICG. The Commission was charged with supervising the implementation of the DDRR program. Sixteen “generals” from each faction assisted the NCDDRR and helped move combatants to participate.²

The process of cantonment, disarmament, and demobilization was scheduled to begin by 15 December. The first phase began under the management of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) on 7 December and lasted until 17 December. This phase targeted 1,000 combatants from each armed faction. Women and children were delegated to separate facilities within cantonment sites.³ Each ex-combatant was to receive a total payment of $300. This money came from a trust fund established for the use of the DDRR process and managed by the United Nations Development Program. The first $150 of the payment was to be paid following the initial 2-3 week demobilization process and the remaining $150 paid after reintegration.

The initial phase of the DDRR process was met by protests and riots. These were for the most part enacted by ex-combatants who demanded immediate payment in return for their weapons. The UNMIL restructured the payment scheme in the aftermath of these protests, and decided to provide $75 to ex-combatants immediately after their weapons were turned in, and the remaining $75 of the initial payment 2-3 weeks after the demobilization process was complete.⁴ The turnout for the first phase was high, with 12,664 ex-combatants disarmed. These peoples were given receipts for their participation and in the process 8,686 weapons were collected.⁵

1. “School for a Culture of Peace,” Liberia- DDRR (2009), http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/mapa/liberia09i.pdf, accessed 10 May, 2011.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2003/875), September 11, 2003; “Liberia Country Programme,” United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Center, http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=52, accessed 16 February 2010.
3. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2003/1175), December 15, 2003.
4. “Liberia; Former Fighters in Second Day of Riots, UNMIL Offers Official Payment,” Africa News, December 9, 2003.
5. “Liberia Country Programme,” United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Center, http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=52, accessed February 16, 2010.

2004

Full Implementation

During this year, 103,019 combatants were demobilized. Of these, 91,737 were adults, (78,052 were men and 24,967 were women), and 11,282 were youths.¹

According to a report, “during the demobilization and disarmament process, 612 disarmed combatants had identified themselves as foreign nationals: 50 from C™te dÕIvoire, 1 from Ghana, 308 from Guinea, 4 from Mali, 7 from Nigeria and 242 from Sierra Leone. UNMIL has initiated discussions with neighboring countries on their repatriation. Between 11 and 12 October, a team from UNMIL visited Sierra Leone to discuss with the Government and international partners the modalities for the repatriation of adult Sierra Leonean ex-combatants in Liberia.”²

The demobilization in Liberia was successfully completed in 2004.

1. “School for a Culture of Peace,” Liberia- DDRR (2009), http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/mapa/liberia09i.pdf, accessed 10 May, 2011.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2004/972), December 17, 2004.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Minimum Implementation

The DDRR process was scheduled to begin with the establishment of the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (NCDDRR) on November 15. The NCDDRR was composed of representatives from the Transitional Government, LURD, MODEL, ECOWAS, AU, and the ICG. The Commission was charged with supervising the implementation of the DDRR program. Sixteen “generals” from each faction assisted the NCDDRR and helped move combatants to participate.¹

The process of cantonment, disarmament, and demobilization was scheduled to begin by 15 December. The first phase began under the management of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) on 7 December and lasted until 17 December. This phase targeted 1,000 combatants from each armed faction. Women and children were delegated to separate facilities within cantonment sites.² Each ex-combatant was to receive a total payment of $300. This money came from a trust fund established for the use of the DDRR process and managed by the United Nations Development Program. The first $150 of the payment was to be paid following the initial 2-3 week demobilization process and the remaining $150 was to be paid after reintegration. In addition to combatants who had weapons to turn in, women and children associated with fighting forces, (who took on roles such as cooks, intelligence officers, etc.), were allowed to go through the DDRR process. This is made apparent when one considers the final 4:1 ratio of DDRR participants to weapons turned in.³

The initial phase of the DDRR process was met by protests and riots. These were for the most part enacted by ex-combatants who demanded immediate payment in return for their weapons. The UNMIL restructured their payment scheme in the aftermath of these protests, and decided to provide $75 to ex-combatants immediately after their weapons were turned in, and the remaining $75 of the initial payment 2-3 weeks after the demobilization process was complete.⁴ The turnout for the first phase was high, with 12,664 ex-combatants disarmed. These peoples were given receipts for their participation and in the process, 8,686 weapons were collected.⁵

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2003/875), September 11, 2003; “Liberia Country Programme,” United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Center, http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=52, accessed 16 February 2010.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2003/1175), December 15, 2003.
3. “Liberia; Where Are the Weapons? Is Disarmament Really Working?” Africa News, January 28, 2004.
4. “Liberia; Former Fighters in Second Day of Riots, UNMIL Offers Official Payment,” Africa News, December 9, 2003.
5. “Liberia Country Programme,” United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Center, http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=52, accessed 16 February 2010.

2004

Intermediate Implementation

In the period between Phases I and II of the DDRR process, the UNMIL announced that it would cease to offer payment immediately upon the receipt of weapons and would return to the original DDRR stipend dispersal scheme that dictated $150 be paid following the 2-3 week demobilization process and another $150 be paid after the ex-combatants were reintegrated. The payment upon immediate receipt of weapons was adopted during the December 2003 phase of DDRR merely as a stabilizing mechanism due to the initial unrest associated with the DDRR process.¹

The second phase of demobilization and disarmament began on 15 April. At the beginning of the second phase, all parties except the LURD had submitted partial lists of their combatants, locations, and weapons. Phase 2 involved 4 separate cantonment locations, the last of which closed on 14 September 2004. Phase 3 began on 7 July 2004 and involved an additional four cantonment sites around the country. The DDRR process officially ended on 31 October 2004, at which point 101,449 former combatants had been disarmed and demobilized. 22,313 of these ex-combatants were women and 11,024 were children. 27,892 weapons were collected during the official DDRR process. However, the NCDDRR decided that the UNMIL would still continue to conduct mobile disarmament operations after the official end of the program, especially in the northeast and southeast regions of the country.²

After the DDRR process officially ended on 31 October, individuals still in possession of weapons illegally could be prosecuted.³ Disarmament in these areas of the country remained difficult as ex-combatants held onto their weapons in hopes of reaping benefits from turning in their weapons in the disarmament process in neighboring Cote D’Ivoire. The Ivorian disarmament process promised a total of $900 to each combatant turning in weapons, creating an incentive for Liberian combatants to forgo the $300 associated with the Liberian DDRR process.⁴

102,193 combatants were disarmed by November 2004. During this period, 27,000 weapons were collected, along with 6,153,631 Small Arms Ammunition and 29,794 Other Ammo were collected.⁵

1. “Liberia; UN Discontinues Immediately $75 Cash Payout to Disarmed Fighters,” Africa News, February 20, 2004.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2004/972), December 17, 2004.
3. “Liberia; UN Brings Forward Deadline for Ending Disarmament,” Africa News, September 1, 2004.
4. “Liberia; Rebels are Slow to Disarm in Southeast, UN Says,” Africa News, October 13, 2004.
5. “DDRR Consolidated Report,” NCDDRR (2004), http://www.lr.undp.org/DEX/DDRR%20Consolidated%20Report%20Phases%201,2,3…, accessed May 10, 2011.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

Mobile operations continued to disarm ex-combatants, though at a much slower rate than the formal DDRR process. By March 1, 2005, only an additional 46 combatants had been disarmed. By the end of the year, the UNMIL mobile disarmament teams had collected 400 weapons, as well as 49,062 rounds of ammunition, and 389 pieces of unexploded ordinance through both voluntary disarmament and the seizing of weapons caches.¹

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2005/764), December 7, 2005.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

Mobile operations continued to disarm ex-combatants, though at a much slower rate than the formal DDRR process. By the end of the year, the UNMIL mobile disarmament teams had collected and destroyed 232 weapons, as well as 25,371 rounds of ammunition, and 613 pieces of unexploded ordinance through both voluntary disarmament and the seizing of weapons caches. The UNDP launched a community arms for development program in January 2006.¹

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2006/958), December 11, 2006.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

The disarmament and demobilization program ended in 2005. However, in the aftermath, the UNMIL collected “a total of 748 weapons, 1,390 pieces of unexploded ordnance, 99,980 rounds of ammunition and 11,790 assorted spares and miscellaneous parts have been collected and destroyed by UNMIL. The UNDP community arms collection programme has collected 320 rifles, 36,593 rounds of ammunition, 938 assorted spare parts and 706 pieces of unexploded ordnance since its launch in January 2006.”¹

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2007/479), August 8, 2007.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

Community level disarmament continued.

2009

Full Implementation

The DDRR program officially ended on 22 July 2009. Of the 103,019 combatants disarmed through the program, an estimated 101,495 participated in the war, leaving 1,529 disarmed combatants unaccounted for. Approximately 98,000 of the disarmed combatants had participated in reintegration programs. The programs included formal and vocational education.¹

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2009/299), June 10, 2009.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Minimum Implementation

The DDRR process was scheduled to begin with the establishment of the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (NCDDRR) on November 15. The NCDDRR was composed of representatives from the Transitional Government, LURD, MODEL, ECOWAS, AU, and the ICG. The Commission was charged with supervising the implementation of the DDRR program. Sixteen “generals” from each faction assisted the NCDDRR and helped move combatants to participate.¹

The process of cantonment, disarmament, and demobilization was scheduled to begin by 15 December. The first phase began under the management of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) on 7 December and lasted until 17 December. This phase targeted 1,000 combatants from each armed faction. Women and children were delegated to separate facilities within cantonment sites.² Each ex-combatant was to receive a total payment of $300. This money came from a trust fund established for the use of the DDRR process and managed by the United Nations Development Program. The first $150 of the payment was to be paid to the ex-combatants following the initial 2-3 week demobilization process and the remaining $150 was to be paid after reintegration. In addition to combatants who had weapons to turn in, women and children associated with fighting forces, (who took on roles such as cooks, intelligence officers, etc.), were allowed to go through the DDRR process. This is made apparent when one considers the final 4:1 ratio of DDRR participants to weapons turned in.³

The initial phase of the DDRR process was met by protests and riots. These were for the most part enacted by ex-combatants who demanded immediate payment in return for their weapons. The UNMIL restructured their payment scheme in the aftermath of these protests, and decided to provide $75 to ex-combatants immediately after their weapons were turned in, and the remaining $75 of the initial payment 2-3 weeks after the demobilization process was complete.⁴ The turnout for the first phase was high, with 12,664 ex-combatants disarmed. These peoples were given receipts for their participation and in the process, 8,686 weapons were collected.⁵

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2003/875), September 11, 2003; “Liberia Country Programme,” United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Center, http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=52, accessed 16 February 2010.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2003/1175), December 15, 2003.
3. “Liberia; Where Are the Weapons? Is Disarmament Really Working?” Africa News, January 28, 2004.
4. “Liberia; Former Fighters in Second Day of Riots, UNMIL Offers Official Payment,” Africa News, December 9, 2003.
5. “Liberia Country Programme,” United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Center, accessed February 16, 2010, http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=52.

2004

Minimum Implementation

The reintegration process lagged behind the demobilization of ex-combatants but projects began to function in mid 2004. Reintegration programs were run by a number of different organizations operating inside the country. A USAID-administered reintegration program began in April that focused on reintegrating 10,000 ex-combatants and 10,000 non-combatants through community infrastructure projects. The UN Children’s Fund, (UNICEF), began to develop long-term programs for reintegrating child ex-combatants. Projects were centered on education, skills development, apprenticeship programs, and community-based support. By September 2004, 5,413 out of the 6,403 children soldiers who had been disarmed had been reintegrated into society and reunited with their families. By December, 7,000 child ex-combatants were ready to be absorbed into UNICEF programs. Additionally, a total of 16,190 ex-combatants had been absorbed into reintegration projects funded by the UNDP DDRR trust fund, USAID, and the European Commission. The plan was to absorb 40,000 more in 2005 followed by another 43,000 ex-combatants who were remaining.¹

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2004/972), December 17, 2004.

2005

Minimum Implementation

Delays in the funding of reintegration programs plagued the DDRR process throughout 2005. In January and February, ex-combatants awaiting rehabilitation and reintegration protested daily and became generally more volatile. While 101,495 ex-combatants had been disarmed and demobilized by early March, only 25,591 were participating in a reintegration process. At the time, 44,502 opportunities for rehabilitating ex-combatants had been established, but could not begin because of funding shortfalls. Additionally, the 612 foreign combatants who had been disarmed and demobilized had not been returned or waiting repatriation to their home countries.

In April, the first of several planned referral and counseling offices for ex-combatants opened in Monrovia. By the end of the year, six counseling offices were operating throughout the country.¹

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2005/764), December 7, 2005.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

By June, 66,000 of the 101,874 demobilized ex-combatants had completed or were participating in a UNDP-funded reintegration program. By 2006, the biggest impediment to the recovery process was inadequate funding, which greatly inhibited the reintegration of the remaining 35,000 ex-combatants who were demobilized.¹ By November, 39,000 ex-combatants were still waiting to be absorbed into reintegration programs.

“UNMIL survey conducted in December 2006 revealed that some 23 percent of ex-combatants worked in agriculture, 19 percent were unemployed, and only 17 percent were students. According to the UNDDR, 30,000 ex-combatants enrolled in formal education in 2006. The students were given an allowance for two years and help with uniform and registration expenses. A variety of vocational training opportunities were offered by organizations after approval from the JIU. Many remain active. Approximately two thirds of ex-combatants participated in DDRR Trust Fund programming. The remaining third participated in projects administered by the European Commission, USAID, and UNICEF.”² It was believed that many ex-combatants sold their insertion kit that they received during their reintegration program.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2006/376), June 9, 2006.
2. “School for a Culture of Peace,” Liberia- DDRR, 2009, accessed May 10, 2011, http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/mapa/liberia09i.pdf.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

“In April 2007, due to recommendations by the NCDDRR and Concerned Ex-combatants Union of Liberia (CECUL), President Johnson-Sirleaf extended the reintegration period by an executive decree in order to accommodate a “residual quantity” of approximately 22,000 demobilized individuals. Programming to deal with this residual quantity ended with 9,000 ex-combatants remaining unattended.”¹

1. Ibid.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

The NCDDRR, in collaboration with the UNMIL, continued to implement a one-year reintegration and rehabilitation program for a final group of some 7,251 ex-combatants who had not benefited from any program.¹

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2008/553), August 15, 2008.

2009

Full Implementation

“In July, President Johnson-Sirleaf officially closed the national disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration programme, which had successfully disarmed and demobilized more than 101,000 ex-combatants, and provided reintegration assistance to more than 90,000 former combatants since 2003.”¹

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/2009/411), August 10, 2009.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Full Implementation

The Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), the rebel group which controlled southeastern Liberia, released 28 war detainees to the ICRC on October 29, 2003.¹ The MODEL was the first of three groups to release detainees since the peace agreement.

No further information is available, however the US State Department, in its Human Rights report, suggested that there were not any prisoners of war and detainees in Liberia.²

1. “Liberia; MODEL Releases 28 War Detainees to ICRC,” Africa News, October 29, 2003.
2. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices — Liberia — 2003,” US State Department, accessed May 10, 2004, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27735.htm.

2004

Full Implementation

Detainees and war prisoners were released in 2003.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments occurred this year.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments occurred this year.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments occurred this year.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments occurred this year.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments occurred this year.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments occurred this year.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments occurred this year.

2012

Full Implementation

No further developments occurred this year.

2003

Intermediate Implementation

Process to manage paramilitary groups affiliated with the state armed forces was started in 2003.

2004

Full Implementation

Paramilitary groups affiliated with the state armed forces and rebel forces were disbanded, disarmed, and demobilized during the process of DDRR. The DDRR process achieved substantial progress in late 2004.[fn]”Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations (S/2004/972), December 17, 2004.[/efn_note]

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

No Implementation

Independent National Human Rights Commission was not established.

2004

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2005

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2006

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2007

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2008

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2009

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2010

Full Implementation

In September 2010, the parliament established the Independent National Human Rights Commission after substantial delay through Information Freedom Act of 2010. The Commissioners were confirmed by the Senate in September 2010.[fn]”World Report 2011: Liberia,” Human Rights Watch, 2011, accessed May 10, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/en/world-report-2011/liberia.[/efn_note]

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Full Implementation

A general amnesty was granted to all factions that participated in the civil war prior to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord. However, there was a continued debate over whether Liberia should extend amnesty to those who had committed human rights violations or crimes against humanity during the conflict.

2004

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2005

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2006

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2007

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2009

Full Implementation

The amnesty issue became more intense when the TRC, in June 2009, recommended suggestions that included the role of the president Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf among other individuals and government officials during civil war. As of 2010, general amnesty is still a contentious issue even regarding the combatants who already received general amnesty in 2003.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

No Implementation

Refugee repatriation efforts were not carried out in 2003. However, after heavy fighting between government and rebel forces occurred in the city, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) did help relocate thousands of refugees and IDPs from irregular shelters in Monrovia to refugee and IDP camps. Nevertheless, necessary mechanisms were in place for the repatriation process.[fn]”Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations (S/2003/1175), December 15, 2003. [/efn_note]

2004

Intermediate Implementation

Much of the refugee and IDP repatriation that occurred from 2004 on was assisted by the UNHCR. As the security situation within Liberia improved in the last quarter of 2004, the UNHCR began to facilitate voluntary repatriation. 16,000 individuals were repatriated with UNHCR assistance. All individuals aided by the UNHCR received a basic return package including blankets, mosquito nets, lanterns, plastic mats, plastic sheets, buckets, jerry cans, kitchen sets, soap, and travel bags. The World Food Program (WFP) also provided returnees with 4 months of basic food rations. The food rations were given out in two installments – one upon immediate arrival and one after two months. In addition, 7,500 refugees and IDP families with farming backgrounds received agricultural tools and seeds as part of their return package.¹

1. “Global Report 2004 – Liberia,” UNHCR.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

The UNHCR assisted 260,000 IDPs and 37,900 refugees with resettling. 150,000 refugees returned to their home communities on their own. All refugees and IDPs received standard non-food return packages and food rations from the WFP. In addition, the UNHCR implemented community empowerment projects (CEP). These projects encompassed water, sanitation, education, crop production, shelter, and income generation initiatives. Communities were encouraged to help plan CEP projects. The CEP program was the cornerstone of the reintegration program for the IDPs and refugees. The CEP projects in the main agricultural counties also received seeds and tools to assist with the backyard gardening of rice and vegetables.¹

1. “Global Report 2005,” UNHCR.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

The UNHCR assisted 43,000 refugees and 51,300 IDPs with their return to their home communities. All returnees received household items through standard non-food return packages. The returnees also received 4 months of rations from the WFP. IDP camps were officially closed in April of 2006.¹

1. “Global Report 2006,” UNHCR.

2007

Full Implementation

A total of 40,000 refugees returned to their home communities. 26,000 of these did so with the support of the UNHCR’s food and non-food rations. The UNHCR provided vocational training and human rights information sessions to 6,600 returnees. The attendees of these sessions were mostly women and young people. The voluntary repatriation operation in Liberia ended in June 2007 after it had helped 110,000 refugees return. An additional 50,000 refugees returned without UNHCR support between 2003 and 2007. Nevertheless, there were approximately 80,000 refugees to be repatriated from various countries in the sub-region.¹

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/479), August 8, 2007.

2008

Full Implementation

Most of the refugees had returned by 2007, either through the UNHCR initiatives or via self-repatriation.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Minimum Implementation

Refugee repatriation efforts were not carried out in 2003. However, after heavy fighting between the government and rebel forces occurred in the city, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) did help relocate thousands of refugees and IDPs from irregular shelters in Monrovia to refugee and IDP camps.

2004

Intermediate Implementation

Much of the refugee and IDP repatriation that occurred from 2004 was assisted by the UNHCR. As the security situation within Liberia improved in the last quarter of 2004, the UNHCR began to facilitate voluntary repatriation. 16,000 individuals were repatriated with UNHCR assistance. All individuals aided by the UNHCR received a basic return package including blankets, mosquito nets, lanterns, plastic mats, plastic sheets, buckets, jerry cans, kitchen sets, soap, and travel bags. The World Food Program (WFP) also provided returnees with 4 months of basic food rations. The food rations were given out in two installments – one upon immediate arrival and one after two months. In addition, 7,500 refugees and IDP families with farming backgrounds received agricultural tools and seeds as part of their return package.[fn]”Global Report 2004 – Liberia,” UNHCR.[/efn_note]

2005

Intermediate Implementation

The UNHCR assisted 260,000 IDPs and 37,900 refugees with resettling. 150,000 refugees returned to their home communities on their own. All refugees and IDPs received standard non-food return packages and food rations from the WFP. In addition, the UNHCR implemented community empowerment projects (CEP). These projects encompassed water, sanitation, education, crop production, shelter, and income generation initiatives. Communities were encouraged to help plan CEP projects. The CEP program was the cornerstone of the reintegration program for the IDPs and refugees. CEP projects in the main agricultural counties received seeds and tools to assist with the backyard gardening of rice and vegetables.¹

1. “Global Report 2005,” UNHCR.

2006

Full Implementation

The UNHCR assisted 43,000 refugees and 51,300 IDPs with their return to their home communities. All returnees received household items through standard non-food return packages. The returnees also received 4 months of rations from the WFP. IDP camps were officially closed in April of 2006.¹

1. “Global Report 2006,” UNHCR.

2007

Full Implementation

IDP camps were officially closed in April of 2006. No further developments observed this year.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Minimum Implementation

A group of 8 women from the Mano River Women’s Peace Network (MARWOPNET) participated in the Accra peace talks as observers. Concern over inadequate representation led women’s groups to later publish the Golden Tulip Declaration, which listed women’s priorities and established a follow-up committee to ensure women’s full participation in the post-conflict processes. The Declaration focused on increasing women’s participation in decision making on issues varying from the government to HIV/AIDS prevention.[fn]”The Golden Tulip Declaration of Liberian Women Attending the Peace Talks in Accra Ghana,” PeaceWomen, September 1, 2003, accessed May 10, 2011, http://www.peacewomen.org/publications_enews_issue.php?id=105.[/efn_note]

2004

Minimum Implementation

In a theme that runs throughout the whole of Liberia’s reconstruction, women’s groups demanded more involvement in the process and political sphere. Only 4 of the 75 members of the National Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA) and 3 of the 21 cabinet members in the transitional government were women. This disparity prompted women’s groups to demand that the National Electoral Commission (NEC) require all political parties to field at least 30% female candidates in the 2005 elections.¹

A National Women’s Conference was held from May 10-14 and was supported by the UNDP, UNMIL, USAID, and the Liberian government. 250 participants from women’s organizations attended the conference. The conference set a national agenda for the full participation of women in the reconstruction process.²

1. “Liberia; Women Demand Greater Participation in Politics,” Africa News, September 20, 2004.
2. “Liberia; Nat’l Women Confab Begins Friday,” Africa News, May 6, 2004.

2005

Minimum Implementation

Responding to pressure from women’s groups, the NEC stated it would require parties to field at least 30% female candidates in the October 2005 elections.¹ The within-party nomination process proved difficult and only 14% of candidates in the October 2005 elections were female.²

1. “Liberia; NEC Will Demand 30% Women Candidates says Chairman Morris,” Africa News, June 23, 2005.
2. “Liberia; Statement of the NDI/Carter Center Pre-Election Delegation to Liberia’s 2005 Elections,” September 9, 2005.

2006

Minimum Implementation

The restructuring of the police and armed forces of Liberia was a process that was supposed to result in forces that reflected the national composition of Liberia. Of the 1,633 police officers trained by April 2006, 87 were female. Sources mention difficulty in finding willing recruits.¹

1. “Liberia; Women Snub Police Recruitment Drive,” Africa News, April 21, 2006.

2007

Minimum Implementation

The recruitment of women into both forces lagged substantially behind that of men. In the 4th class of recruits, the National Police Training Academy graduated women at a 4:77 ratio compared to men. Commissioner Alba Williams of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization stated that there were supply problems surrounding the lack of women recruits.¹

1. “Liberia; More Females Encouraged Into Security Service,” Africa News, January 29, 2007.

2008

Minimum Implementation

A five-day national women’s conference was held in Monrovia. The conference was organized by the Ministry of Gender and Development in partnership with the UN and other actors. The theme of the conference was “Advancing Women’s Human Rights in Peace Building, Recovery, and Reconstruction in Liberia.”¹

1. “Liberia; Women are Key to Peace,” Africa News, May 7, 2008.

2009

Minimum Implementation

President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf unveiled the new Liberia National Gender Policy on 18 December, 2009. This policy rose out of consultation with civil society, government ministries, the UN system in Liberia, women’s groups, and local and international NGOs. The policy focused on opening opportunities in employment, compensation, land ownership, credit, literacy, and access to justice for women. The announcement of the policy coincided with the beginning of the Second Annual Rural Women Conference in Monrovia.¹

1. “Liberia; Pres. Sirleaf Launches National Gender Policy Dec. 17,” Africa News, December 16, 2009.

2010

Minimum Implementation

The implementation of the Gender Policy program has not been evaluated.

2011

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Minimum Implementation

Liberia’s three major armed factions (MODEL, LURD, and Government of Liberia forces) used an estimated 15,000 child soldiers during the civil war. Children soldiers participated in the same DDRR program as other combatants. However, instead of vocational training and a safety-net allowance of $300, former child combatants received stipends, uniforms, books, and other incentives to return to school.¹ While child combatants would go through the same initial cantonment process as other combatants, they would remain there only 72 hours and then be lodged in interim care centers run by UNICEF and various NGOs. Children combatants were allowed to spend up to three months in their interim care centers after going through the demobilization process, during which period they received medical aid, counseling, reading lessons, and help locating their families.²

1. “Liberia; UNMIL Outlines Plan for Combatants,” Africa News, November 17, 2003.
2. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations (S/2003/1175), December 15, 2003.

2004

Minimum Implementation

Children combatants participated in the same demobilization programs as adults before spending time in separate interim care centers. By the end of 2004, a total of 8,547 boys and 2,477 girls had been demobilized.¹ While the intended stay in the care centers for these children was 12 weeks, many of them were concerned for their safety and the problems associated with reintegration. Even with the assistance of their families many refused to leave the care centers.²

Several reintegration programs were designed to fit children’s specific needs. One of these, the Women and Children’s Rehabilitation and Reintegration Program, channeled approximately $15M through civil service organizations to provide educational opportunities and psychological support in addition to addressing substance abuse, HIV/AIDS/STDs, gender-based violence, and other problems arising out of the experience of many former combatants. The Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace program focused on not only providing formal education but also equipping youths with conflict management and other psychological skills.³ Outside of the DDRR process, UNICEF launched a Back-to-School campaign that helped put 800,000 children and 20,000 teachers back in schools. UNICEF’s major contributions to the campaign were educational supplies, teacher training, safe water, and sanitation supplies. Part of the return-to-school program included an accelerated learning program that condensed six years of primary education into a three-year span.⁴ According to the Secretary General’s report, additional organizations ran smaller reintegration and education/vocational training programs.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations (S/2003/1175), December 15, 2003.
2. “Liberia; Child Soldiers Too Scared to Go Home – Relief Agencies,” Africa News, June 8, 2004.
3. “Liberia; US Earmarks $50m for Comprehensive Plan in Liberia,” Africa News, March 26, 2004.
4. “Liberia; UNICEF Helps Liberia’s Child Warriors Return to Home and School,” Africa News, August 30, 2004.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

With the assistance of UNICEF, by March, 98% of the 10,963 former child combatants had been demobilized and disarmed and reunited with their families. Many were still undergoing reintegration programs after being reunited.¹ According to the Secretary General’s report, UNICEF continued to contribute materials to schools and teachers to revitalize the education system.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations (S/2005/177), March 17, 2005.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

The skills-based reintegration programs for the children associated with armed conflict began graduating participants in March 2006. This portion of the reintegration program was intended to provide skills training to 5,000 of the children formerly associated with the conflict.¹ Meanwhile, UNICEF and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) helped rebuild 13 government-run schools throughout the country.² UNICEF also continued to provide supplies for schools in Liberia.

1. “Liberia; 116 Children Graduate From Skills Training Programme,” Africa News, March 2, 2006.
2. “Liberia; UNOPS & UNICEF Rebuild Schools in Four Counties,” Africa News, May 18, 2006.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

UNICEF continued to coordinate the reintegration programs for child ex-combatants. By March, 9,704 of an estimated 11,000 child beneficiaries had completed reintegration programs.¹ The reintegration program was terminated in 2007.

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/151), March 15, 2007.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

Children’s reintegration programs were implemented by 2007.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

No Implementation

Progress regarding developmental projects was not available.

2004

Minimum Implementation

The Contract and Monopoly Commission, and the Governance Reform Commissions, were established in February 2004 along with five other autonomous commissions mandated by the peace agreement.¹

1. “Liberia; JPC Boss Chairs Elections Commission As Govt. Constitutes Five Commissions,” Africa News, February 2, 2004.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments occurred this year. In 2005, GDP grew by 5.3 percent.¹“Post_Conflict Liberia: From Tragedy to Opportunity,” Address By Liberia’s President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, University of Legon Accra, Ghana, February 19, 2010, http://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/2_19_10_Address_at_University_of_Legon.pd…

2006

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments occurred this year. In 2006, GDP grew by 7.8 percent, up from 5.3 percent in 2005.¹

1. Ibid.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

By the end of 2007, Liberia had reached US$4.9 billion in external debt. Nevertheless, some of the debts were cancelled under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. Details regarding development projects are not avaiale. Nevertheless, in 2007, GDP grew by 9.5 percent.¹

1. Ibid.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2010

Full Implementation

As of 2010, the external debt had been reduced to US$ 1.7 billion. Liberia had made significant economic progress in the post agreement period. Its mining and forest industries are now back.¹ Liberia is gradually picking up economic activities that are more community driven and sustainable.

1. Ibid.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

No Implementation

A donor conference did not take place in 2003.

2004

Intermediate Implementation

The anticipated Donor’s conference opened on 5 February 2004 at the United Nations. The conference was jointly organized by the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) and a number of UN agencies including the UN Development Program (UNDP) and the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Many high ranking officials from Europe, as well as by the U.S. Secretary of State attended. The conference concluded on Friday, February 6. Donor countries and agencies pledged about $520 million, which surpassed the estimated $500 million donor support.[fn]”UN donor conference on Liberia surpasses 500 million in pledges,” Agence France Presse, February 6, 2004.[/efn_note]

2005

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2006

Full Implementation

A donor conference took place on 12 July 2006. In this conference, Liberia’s Planning and Economic Minister disclosed that 1.1 Billion USD had been pledged since the February 2004 conference. Of this promised sum, 946.5 million had been contributed and about 692 million had been disbursed.¹ In this conference, Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf admitted Liberia was unable to pay its debt obligation to the international community. The conference was attended by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), European Commission and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).² The conference ended on 13 July without pledges or a communiqué.³

1. “Liberia holds donors’ conference for development aid,” Xinhua General News Service, July 12, 2006.
2. “Liberia; We’re Unable To Pay Our Debts, Sirleaf Tells Donor Conference,” Africa News, July 13, 2006.
3. “Liberia; Donor Conference Silent On Aid Pledges,” Africa News, July 14, 2006.

2007

Full Implementation

Liberia’s Partner Forum or donor conference was hosted in the US on 13-14 February 2007. The conference was co-hosted by the World Bank, the United Nations, the Government of the United States, and the European Commission.¹ In the conference the U.S. offered to forgive about $391 million of Liberia’s debt in order to help the country recover from its 14-year civil war.²

1. “Liberia; Partnership Conference Opens in U.S.,” Africa News, February 13, 2007.
2. “Liberia; U.S. Offers Debt Relief,” Africa News, February 14, 2007.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Minimum Implementation

Except for the establishment of the NTGL and the initiation of the DDRR process, the implementation of many of the provisions in the accord was delayed, and did not meet the initial timeline as agreed upon in Annex 3 of the agreement.

2004

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Intermediate Implementation

The main mechanisms for the implementation of the peace agreement, including the Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC), were all in place by October 2003. On 27 November 2003, three armed groups reportedly renewed their demand for more senior government posts. To deal with the situation, the IMC held its first meeting on 28 November, which was chaired jointly by the UNMIL and ECOWAS, and comprised of representatives from the African Union, the European Union and the International Contact Group. In the meeting, the committee condemned the armed groupsÕ attempt to make government positions a precondition for their participation in the DDRR program. The meeting also recommended taking appropriate measures against parties that continued to violate the Cease Fire agreement.[fn]”Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2003/1175), December 15, 2003.[/efn_note]

2004

Full Implementation

In a joint press statement made in October 2004, the IMC issued a warning that the international community would not allow any disruption of the work of the NTGL.¹

Following the completion of the disarmament, demobilization, and disbandment of the armed factions, the task of the IMC and Joint Monitoring Committee was completed.²

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2004/972), December 17, 2004.
2. Ibid.

2005

Full Implementation

When the Liberian Supreme Court ruled that voters should be allowed to cast two votes for the two senatorial seats in each county, “the IMC asked and the International Contact Group on Liberia requested the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mediator, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, to intervene to find a solution which would respect the rule of law while preserving the integrity of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.” The mandate of the Supreme Court was implemented by reeducating the voters.¹

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2005/674), December 7, 2005.

2006

Full Implementation

Most of the IMC and JMC goals were achieved when post-conflict elections were successfully held in October 2005.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Intermediate Implementation

The Security Council resolution of 1509 (2003) from 19 September 2003 mandated the deployment of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) for a period of 12 months. It also instructed that authority be transferred from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) to the UNMIL. The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) assumed peacekeeping responsibilities from ECOMIL on 1 October 2003, at which point all 3,600 ECOMIL troops in Liberia were reassigned to UNMIL. By 12 December, the UNMIL troops consisted of 5,900 military personnel. The Security Council resolution gave a wider mandate to the UNMIL. This mandate ranged from supporting the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement, to security reform and the implementation of the peace process.¹

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2003/1175), December 15, 2003.

2004

Full Implementation

The UNMIL continued to rapidly deploy troops in the early months of 2004. By March 12,731 troops were deployed alongside 518 civilian police personnel. By May the troops numbered above 14,000 military personnel and in December this figure had increased to 14,541, with the number of police personnel at 1,115. The UNMIL managed the DDRR process which had begun again on 15 March 2004.¹

The UNMIL also monitored and mentored the newly formed Liberian National Police (LNP) and managed the recruitment and training of the new LNP members. Prior to recruiting new members for the LNP, the UNMIL provided training to the 530 LNP officers operating as the interim police force. As part of the police restructuring and recruitment process the UNMIL established an “integrity bank.” This was essentially a compilation of background information regarding the candidates for the LNP. In December, 9,353 personnel from the original LNP police force had been registered with the UNMIL and 854 recruits had completed training through the National Police Academy.²

Throughout the year, the UNMIL also assisted in building state capacity by providing human rights training for the LNP and other government personnel. Representatives from the UNMIL also met with the National Electoral Committee and other relevant parties to discuss the provisions of a draft electoral reform bill.³

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2004/972), December 17, 2004.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

2005

Full Implementation

The UNMIL’s troop and police deployments remained at approximately 15,000 and 1,100 personnel respectively throughout 2005. The UNMIL continued to provide border security for Liberia with air, mobile, and foot patrols. UNMIL personnel also engaged in cordon and search operations to find and destroy illegal weapons. Peacekeepers also participated in infrastructure building projects throughout the country, especially where it was necessary to facilitate the deployment of UNMIL and humanitarian assistance.¹

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2005/674), December 7, 2005; (S/2005/560), September 1, 2005.

2006

Full Implementation

Throughout the year, the UNMIL had a strong presence in Liberia. As of December 2006, there were 207 military observers, 110 civilian staff members, 13,994 troops and 1,098 civilian police. The UNMIL remained active in the recruitment and the training of the police personnel.¹

1. “Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations (S/2006/958), December 11, 2006.

2007

Full Implementation

The UNMIL had a very strong presence in Liberia throughout 2007. By August 2007, there were 207 military observers, 117 civilian staff members, 13,799 troops and 1177 civilian police. During this year, the UNMIL achieved its major goal of training 3,500 police officers. The UNMIL remained actively engaged with the rehabilitation of ex-combatants, the consolidation of state authority, and the promotion of human rights, national reconciliation, and the rule of law, as well as economic recovery and reconstruction.¹

1. “Secretary General’s report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations (S/2007/479), August 8, 2007.

2008

Full Implementation

The UNMIL’s presence remained strong in 2008. There were 194 military observers, 125 civilian staff members, 11,728 troops and 1,092 civilian police officers.¹

1. “Secretary General’s report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations (S/2008/553), August 15, 2008.

2009

Full Implementation

With Resolution 1836 (2008), the Security Council extended the mandate of the UNMIL until September 2009. As of August 2009, there were 135 military observers, 82 civilian staff members, 9,970 troops and 488 civilian police officers.¹

1. “Secretary General’s report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations (S/2009/411), August 10, 2009.

2010

Full Implementation

In September 2009, the Security Council again extended the mandate of the UNMIL until 30 September 2010 (Resolution 1995). By August, the mission’s strength was slightly reduced with 128 military observers, 87 civilian staff members, 7,837 troops and 510 police officers.¹

1. “Secretary General’s report to the UN Security Council,” United Nations (S/2010/429), August 11, 2010.

2011

Full Implementation

The Security Council further extended the UNMIL’s mandate until 30 September 2011 with Resolution 1938 (15 September 2010). As of February, there were 128 military observers, 83 civilian staff members, 7,853 troops and 485 civilian police officers. The mission remained engaged with reforming the security sector, building state capacity, holding elections, upholding human rights and with other issues including natural resource management.¹

1. “Secretary General’s report to the Security Council,” United Nations (S/2011/72), February 14, 2011.

2012

Full Implementation

As of 2012, UNMIL was operational in Liberia. The UN Security Council passed a resolution (S/RES/2066/2012) and decided to decrease the military strength of the mission by 4,200 personnel in three phases between 2012 and 2015. The council, however, made a decision to increase the number of police force by 420 personnel.

2003

Full Implementation

On 1 August 2003 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1497, which authorized the deployment of a multinational force to Liberia prior to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) began to deploy a force, ECOMIL, on 4 August 2003. By early September 3,500 troops had been deployed as part of ECOMIL. The UN peacekeeping mission in neighboring Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) provided support for the initial deployment of ECOMIL. The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) assumed peacekeeping responsibilities from ECOMIL on 1 October 2003. At this time all 3,600 ECOMIL troops in Liberia were reassigned to the UNMIL. This deployment in October 2003 completed the regional peacekeeping provision of the accord.

2004

Full Implementation

The UNMIL assumed control over ECOWASÕ regional peacekeeping mandate in 2003.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.