Mali 2015 Accord for Peace and Reconciliation
Date Signed: 5 June, 2015
Accord Type: Comprehensive Peace Agreement
Country: Mali
31.25Implementation Score after 7 years
Provisions in this Accord
Civil Administration Reform
2015
The central government continued to struggle to redeploy the civil service to Northern Mali. Details on the representation of Northerners in the civil service was not available.
2016
The central government continued to struggle to redeploy the civil service to Northern Mali. Details on the representation of Northerners in the civil service was not available.
2017
The central government continued to struggle to redeploy the civil service to Northern Mali. Details on the representation of Northerners in the civil service was not available.
2018
The central government continued to struggle to redeploy the civil service to Northern Mali. Details on the representation of Northerners in the civil service was not available.
2019
The central government continued to struggle to redeploy the civil service to northern Mali. Details on the representation of Northerners in the civil service was not available.
2020
The central government continued to struggle to redeploy the civil service to northern Mali. Details on the representation of Northerners in the civil service was not available.
2021
No further implementation observed.
The 2015 Accord stipulated that steps be taken to increase the representation of Northerners in both regional and national administration. To that end, the government agreed to improve the representation of Northerners in the national bureaucracy.
No implementation observed in 2015.
Decentralization/Federalism
2015
The 2015 agreement devolved a number of national competencies to the regional level. In particular, the Accord created a Regional Assembly that would be directly elected and a President of the Assembly who would serve as the region’s chief executive. The regional government is responsible for economic planning, education, agriculture, some taxes, and local police.
In November, national policies for decentralization were drafted but not operationalized.[1]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali,” United Nations S/2015/1013.
2016
Legislation facilitating the devolution of powers to regional administrations was drafted but not approved in 2016. The Regional Assemblies were not established in 2016.
2017
In September, the National Assembly passed the Territorial Communities Code and the Law on the Free Administration of Territorial Communities, which began the process of devolving powers to the regional governments. The CMA (Coalition of Azawad Movements) claimed that the new legislation did not include some of the competencies agreed to in the 2015 agreement.[1]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2017/1105.
2018
The government held consultations in November with regional stakeholders to discuss the restructuring and competencies of the territorial administrations.[1]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations S/2018/1174.
2019
A decree transferring competencies to the regional governments was adopted in March 2019 but was not fully implemented.[1] Sixteen of 42 identified competencies had been “partially transferred,” with an additional ten in preparation.
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process,” The Carter Center, January, 2020.
2020
No additional progress on decentralization was made in 2020.
2021
No further implementation observed.
| SECTION II: POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
Chapter 3: Institutional framework and territorial reorganisation Article 6: The Parties shall put in place an institutional architecture enabling the populations of the North to manage their own affairs in a spirit of participative citizenship, based on the principle of free administration and enabling wider representation of these populations within national institutions. To this end, the following provisions shall be made: At the local level – a Regional Assembly shall be set up in the Region elected by direct universal suffrage, to which a large number of competences shall be transferred, as well as resources and appropriate judicial, administrative and financial powers; – within this framework the Malian populations and particularly those of the Northern Regions shall manage their own affairs, based on the principle of free administration; – the President of the Assembly shall be elected by direct universal suffrage. He shall also be the Chief Executive of the Regional Administration; – the cercles and communes shall have debating organs (a Cercle Council and a Communal Council) elected by universal direct suffrage and managed by offices with an executive function with a President of a Cercle Council and an elected Mayor at their head; – each region shall have the right to choose its own official name within the framework of the provisions relating to the judicial status and functioning of the regions. Article 8: The regions shall be competent, within the framework defined by legislation and provisions, in the following areas: a) planning and programming economic, social and cultural development; b) territorial management; c) creation and management of public infrastructure and basic social services (basic education and professional training, health, environment, culture, regional road and communication infrastructure, water and sanitation); d) agriculture, livestock, fishing, forestry management, transport, commerce, industry, handicrafts, tourism, interregional transport; e) regional administrative budgets and accounts; f) setting up and collecting local taxes and revenues using parameters specified by the State; g) fee collection institutions; h) accepting and refusing donations, subsidies and legacies; i) disbursement of subsidies; j) acquisition of holdings; k) decentralised cooperation and twinning; l) territorial police and civil protection. |
Demobilization
2015
The 2015 agreement established a DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) program that was facilitated by MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) and overseen by a national commission that included the Accord signatories. Cantonment sites were to be operational within 120 days, and opposition groups were required to provide lists of combatants within 30 days.
The government and opposition groups proposed cantonment sites in late 2015. The DDR process did not begin in 2015.
2016
The National DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) Commission was established by 2016 but was not operational. The DDR program was drafted but was not functioning.[1]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2016/1137.
2017
By 2017, MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission) had prepared eight cantonment sites for the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration).[1] The DDR process was delayed due to disagreements regarding the number of former combatants to be integrated into the new security forces. Opposition groups failed to provide combatant lists in 2017.[2]
[1] “On the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process Evaluation of Implementation in 2018,” The Carter Center, February 18, 2019.
[2] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2017/1105.
2018
The parties agreed to speed up the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) process in the fall of 2018 and established requirements for eligibility for the new armed forces. By 2018, the DDR program had registered 32,908 combatants. 13,019 were under evaluation for integration into the armed forces, while 4,998 were designated for reintegration.[1] It was difficult to assess what percentage of troops needed to be demobilized as this was one of the primary disagreements between the signatories. The opposition groups identified large numbers of eligible fighters, which the government claimed were medically or otherwise ineligible. [2]
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer. Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process Observation period: May 1 to September 30, 2018,” The Carter Center, October 26, 2018.
[2] “Report of the Independent Observer on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process,” The Carter Center, January, 2020.
2019
The DDR program continued to be hindered by disagreements over eligible opposition combatants in 2019. 83,000 to 85,000 potential candidates had been identified by the end of 2019. The independent observer noted that the large number of candidates appeared to be a delaying tactic by the opposition groups.[1]
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process,” The Carter Center, January, 2020.
2020
The DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) program was hampered by protracted negotiations between the parties throughout 2020. By December, approximately 1,776 ex-combatants had been demobilized and disarmed in preparation for integration into the military.[1]
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process, The Carter Center, December 2020.
2021
No further implementation observed.
| Chapter 8: Cantonment, integration and disarmament, demobilisation, and reinsertion (DDR)
Article 18: The cantonment process for combatants seeks to identify those combatants eligible for integration or the DDR programme. This process shall be completed according to the standards and professional practices established by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (la Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Mali, MINUSMA).
Article 19: The Parties shall set up a national committee for DDR, including representatives of the Government and the signatory movements. This Committee shall work closely with the Monitoring Committee for this Agreement. |
Detailed Implementation Timeline
2015
The agreement’s detailed timeline specified that an interim Northern administration should be organized within three months, the government should adopt a new electoral law within 12 months, and that regional and local elections would take place within 18 months. With respect to security, mixed patrols were to be set up within 60 days, cantonment sites were to be identified within 30 days, and operational within 120. Cantonment protocols and combatant lists were required within 30 days. Various DDR oversight bodies were to be established within 60-90 days.
Numerous deadlines for establishing a functioning DDR were missed in 2015. Revisions to the electoral law were delayed.
2016
The DDR Commission was still not fully operational. The new electoral law appeared to be in place but was challenged in court.
2017
The DDR process was still suffering from significant delays in 2017. Regional and local elections were postponed.
2018
The DDR process began in 2018 but was well beyond the original timeline. Elections were again postponed.
2019
No further implementation observed.
2020
No further implementation observed.
2021
No further implementation observed.
| [See Annex 2 for detailed implementation timeline for security provisions] |
Disarmament
2015
Under the agreement, former combatants were to be disarmed as part of the DDR process.
The DDR process did not begin in 2015.
2016
The National DDR Commission was established by 2016 but was not operational. The DDR program was drafted but was not functioning.[1]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2016/1137.
2017
The DDR process was delayed due to disagreements regarding the number of former combatants to be integrated into the new security forces. Opposition groups failed to provide combatant lists in 2017.[1]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2017/1105.
2018
The parties agreed to speed up the DDR process in the fall of 2018 and established requirements for eligibility for the new armed forces. By 2018, the DDR program had registered 32,908 combatants. 13,019 were under evaluation for integration into the armed forces, while 4,998 were designated for reintegration.[1] It was difficult to assess what percentage of troops needed to be demobilized as this was one of the primary disagreements between the signatories. The opposition groups identified large numbers of eligible fighters, which the government claims are medically or otherwise ineligible. [2]
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer. Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process Observation period: May 1 to September 30, 2018,” The Carter Center, October 26, 2018.
[2] “Report of the Independent Observer on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process,” The Carter Center, January, 2020.
2019
The DDR program continued to be hindered by disagreements over eligible opposition combatants in 2019. [1]
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process,” The Carter Center, January, 2020.
2020
The DDR program was hampered by protracted negotiations between the parties throughout 2020. By December, approximately 1,776 ex-combatants had been demobilized and disarmed in preparation for integration into the military.[1]
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process, The Carter Center, December 2020.
2021
No further implementation observed.
Donor Support
2015
The agreement invited international support to facilitate development in northern Mali and humanitarian aid to facilitate the return of displaced persons and refugees.
In October 2015, the International Conference for the Economic Recovery and Development for Mali resulted in pledges of 3.6 billion USD for Mali, a portion of which was earmarked for the northern regions. Estimates of the percentage of pledges fulfilled between 2015 and the end of 2018 ranged from 90 to 99%.[1] However, it is unclear what portion of the funds earmarked for northern Mali were actually disbursed by the central government.[2]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali,” United Nations S/2015/1013.
[2] “Report of the Independent Observer: Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process,” The Carter Center, September 16, 2019.
2016
Estimates of the percentage of pledges fulfilled between 2015 and the end of 2018 ranged from 90 to 99%.[1] However, it is unclear what portion of the funds earmarked for Northern Mali were actually disbursed by the central government.[2]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali,” United Nations S/2015/1013.
[2] “Report of the Independent Observer: Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process,” The Carter Center, September 16, 2019.
2017
Estimates of the percentage of pledges fulfilled between 2015 and the end of 2018 ranged from 90 to 99%.[1] By the end of 2017, the government had disbursed 1.1 billion USD to the Northern Regions.[2]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali,” United Nations S/2015/1013.
[2] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2017/1105.
2018
Estimates of the percentage of pledges fulfilled between 2015 and the end of 2018 ranged from 90 to 99%.[1] However, it is unclear what portion of the funds earmarked for Northern Mali were actually disbursed by the central government.[2]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali,” United Nations S/2015/1013.
[2] “Report of the Independent Observer: Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process,” The Carter Center, September 16, 2019.
2019
No further implementation observed.
2020
France donated 2.4 million USD to the Sustainable Development Fund for northern Mali.[1]
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer: Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process,” The Carter Center, December 2020.
2021
No further implementation observed.
| SECTION IV: SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
Chapter 12: Specific Development Strategy Article 37: A Conference to appeal for funds shall be convened within two months of developing the Specific Development Strategy. The Conference shall institute a Sustainable Development Fund which shall serve as a financing mechanism for the Specific Development Strategy. |
Economic and Social Development
2015
The agreement provided a new development strategy for the northern regions with increased local input and support from intergovernmental organizations such as the World Bank.
The Joint Evaluation Committee for Northern Mali (MIEC) was formed in 2015, and an International Conference for Economic Recovery and Development in Mali was held.[1]
[1] “On the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process Evaluation of Implementation in 2018,” The Carter Center, February 18, 2019.
2016
Work on the Sustainable Development Fund to support economic growth in the Northern Regions began in 2016 but was not completed.[1] The Regional Development Agencies were created in 2016.[2]
[1] “On the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process Evaluation of Implementation in 2018,” The Carter Center, February 18, 2019.
[2] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2016/1137.
2017
The government completed the sustainable development goals in 2017.[1]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2017/1105.
2018
In 2018, the parties continued to prepare for the adoption of legislation needed to implement the development goals of the agreement.[1]
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer. Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process Observation period: May 1 to September 30, 2018,” The Carter Center, October 26, 2018.
2019
The Northern Development Zone outlined in the agreement was created in mid-2019. However, in general, few of the priorities outlined in the agreement had been accomplished. While some institutions, such as the Sustainable Development Fund and the Specific Development Strategy, were nominally operational, they were paralyzed by disagreements between the government and the other parties.[1]
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer: Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process,” The Carter Center, September 16, 2019.
2020
The Sustainable Development Fund and Special Development Strategy remained operational in 2020 but suffered from underfunding and political disagreement between the parties.[1]
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer: Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process,” The Carter Center, December 2020.
2021
No further implementation observed.
| SECTION IV: SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
Chapter 12: Specific Development Strategy Article 32: The Parties agree that the State needs to reposition its local development strategy in favour of greater involvement of local collectivities in formulating their own development strategies based on solidarity, and which are participative and adapted to the socio-cultural and geographic local realities, while ensuring transparency and proper accounting at all levels. Article 33: A Development Zone for the Northern Regions shall be created, with an Interregional Consultative Council made up of representatives of the relevant Regional Assemblies and tasked exclusively with coordinating efforts and resources in order to accelerate local socio-economic development and related questions. Article 34: A Specific Development Strategy shall be prepared for the Zone by the Parties with the support of international partners and financed in particular by a Sustainable Development Fund. Article 35: The Strategy aims to raise the Northern Regions to the same level as the rest of the country in terms of development indicators, within the next 10 to 15 years. The Consultative Council for the Development Zone shall monitor its implementation supported by the competent authorities and institutions. Article 36: The Parties shall set up, under the auspices of the Monitoring Committee for the present Agreement (Comité du Suivi du present Accord, CSA), a “Joint Evaluation Committee for Northern Mali” (“Mission d’Evaluation Conjointe au Nord du Mali, MIEC/NordMali”) in order to identify needs in terms of rapid recovery, reducing poverty and development in the Zone. The mission shall take place no later than three months following signature of the Agreement. The World Bank, the African Development Bank (Banque Africaine de Développement, BAD), and the Islamic Development Bank (Banque Islamique de Développement, BID), shall be invited to lead the mission, together with the Government, other competent international institutions, and representatives of the Zone. Chapter 13: Mobilisation to promote development in the Northern Regions Article 38: The Development Zone of the Northern Regions shall be prioritised in terms of the provisions for State support in the present Agreement. To this end, the Parties shall take all short, medium and long-term measures listed in Annex, relating to socio-economic and cultural development. The Government shall submit a document following the first meetings of the CSA, specifying its commitments in this area, the resources which it plans to mobilise, and the timetable for implementation of the commitments made, in particular in the following areas: – basic social services; – development of human resources; – food security; – rural development (agriculture, livestock farming and pastoral activities); – structural infrastructure to open up the Northern Regions; – mining and solar energy; – employment, particularly for women, young people and former combatants; – creation of local enterprises; – reinsertion and rehabilitation of repatriated and displaced persons and other vulnerable groups; – handicrafts, tourism, commerce and communications; and – education and culture. |
Education Reform
2015
The agreement stipulated that during the Interim Period, resources would be devoted to restarting schooling in northern Mali, repairing damaged facilities, redeploying state teachers, and encouraging students’ return.
2016
The government continued to struggle to reopen schools in Northern Mali. An additional 109 schools were forced to close due to violence.[1]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2016/1137.
2017
School closures continued in 2017, reaching 582 in October. [1]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2017/1105.
2018
School closures continued in 2018, reaching 716 schools by December. [1]
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer. Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process Observation period: May 1 to September 30, 2018,” The Carter Center, October 26, 2018.
2019
The Monitoring Committee met in July to discuss ways to facilitate the return of social services to northern Mali, and produced a plan to do so. However, little progress was made.[1] Schools continued to close in 2019, with 1,051 schools closed by October. [2]
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process,” The Carter Center, January, 2020.
[2] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2019/983.
2020
No progress was made on long-term education reforms in 2020.[1]
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer: Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process,” The Carter Center, December 2020.
2021
No further implementation observed.
| Article 39: The Parties shall take the following measures in the areas of education and culture:
– adaptation of teaching programmes to the socio-cultural situation in the regions; – promotion of local languages and scripts; – strengthening the primary and secondary education system paying particular attention to education for all; – creating higher education institutions; – creating cultural centres and museums; and – promoting the culture of these regions at local, national and international levels. The Agency shall be part of the regional administration under the authority of the President of the Regional Assembly, to which it shall be responsible. |
Internally Displaced Persons
2015
The parties agreed to facilitate the return of IDPs (internally displaced persons) and to invite international humanitarian organizations to support their efforts.
By late 2015, the UNHRC reported 61,920 IDPs in Mali, while security concerns limited the verification of IDP resettlement.[1]
[1] “Mali Situation: UNHRC Regional Update,” UNHCR, November, 2015.
2016
By mid-2016, the UNHRC reported 36,762 IDPs within Mali, while the number of IDPs that had returned was not known.[1]
[1] “Mali Situation: UNHRC Regional Update,” UNHCR, May, 2016.
2017
By the end of 2017, the UNHRC reported that 526,505 IDPs had been resettled, compared with 38,172 who were still displaced.[1]
[1] “Mali Situation: Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Returnees,” United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, December 21, 2017.
2018
The UNHCR reported 562,505 resettled IDPs in Mali by late 2018, compared with 109,892 that were still displaced.[1]
[1] Mali Situation: Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Returnees,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, November 30, 2018.
2019
The UNHCR reported 561,606 IDPs had returned by early 2019, while 218,536 remained displaced.[1]
[1]“Mali: Situation of Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Returnees,” United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, February 29, 2019.
2020
The UNHCR reported 581,550 IDPs had returned by October 2020, while 311,193 remained displaced.[1]
[1]“Mali: Situation of Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Returnees,” United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, February 29, 2019.
2021
No further implementation observed.
Chapter 15: Humanitarian questions
Article 47: The Parties shall create the conditions needed to facilitate the rapid return, repatriation, reintegration and reinsertion of all displaced persons and refugees, and to set up mechanisms to take care of them, in accordance with the relevant African and international instruments, including the UA Convention of 1969 regulating aspects specific to the problems of refugees in Africa, and the 2009 Convention (Kampala Convention) on protection and assistance for displaced persons in Africa.
Article 48: The Parties shall invite humanitarian agencies and organisations to support their efforts to ensure the rapid return repatriation, reintegration and reinsertion of all displaced persons and refugees.
Military Reform
2015
The parties agreed to establish a Security Sector Reform (RSS) Committee to provide military reform recommendations. After cantonment, some former rebel fighters were to be reintegrated into the new security forces.
The first former rebels were not integrated into the security forces until mid-2019.[1] The RSS Committee was not fully operational in 2015.
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer: Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process,” The Carter Center, September 16, 2019.
2016
The first former rebels were not integrated into the security forces until mid-2019.[1] The RSS Committee was established in 2016 but was not fully operational.[2]
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer: Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process,” The Carter Center, September 16, 2019.
[2] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2016/1137.
2017
The government and opposition groups could not agree on the number of former combatants to be integrated, which delayed the launch of the DDR program and in turn, the military integration of former combatants. The National Council for SSR was operational in 2017 and drafted a road map for SSR reform as required by the agreement.[1]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2017/1105.
2018
The National Council for RSS (Security Sector Reform) approved the parties’ recommendations for Security Sector Reform in 2018.[1]
[1]“Report of the Independent Observer. Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process Observation period: May 1 to September 30, 2018,” The Carter Center, October 26, 2018.
2019
1,340 retrained combatants were integrated into the security forces in 2019. [1]
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process,” The Carter Center, January, 2020.
2020
1,840 total retrained combatants had been integrated into the security forces by the end of 2020. Reconstituted units were deployed in northern Mali.[1]
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process, The Carter Center, December 2020.
2021
No further implementation observed.
| Chapter 8: Cantonment, integration and disarmament, demobilisation, and reinsertion (DDR)
Article 20: Integration shall take place as and when the combatants are cantoned, either by integration in the units formed by the State, including in the armed and security forces, or in civilian life. Cantoned ex-combatants who are not integrated shall be subject to DDR. Chapter 9: Redeployment of the Armed and Security Forces Article 22: The redeployed force shall include a substantial number of persons from the Northern Regions, including in positions of command, in order to facilitate the return of confidence and of security in these regions. Chapter 10: Reorganisation of the Armed and Security Forces Article 23: The Parties agree on the need to undertake a fundamental Reform of the Security Sector (Réforme du Secteur de Sécurité, RSS), learning from past experience and based on the relevant documents of the African Union and the United Nations. Article 24: The Government shall, with the help of its international partners, take all necessary measures to set up institutions of defence and security, able to respond to the country’s needs and to contribute to enhancing regional security. Article 25: The Parties shall set up an RSS National Council, sufficiently representative and bringing together the capacities of the different communities, in order to carry out an in-depth reflection on a new vision for national security, taking into account relevant local, regional, national and international factors. Article 26: The RSS National Council shall make recommendations on new mechanisms for appointments to the senior positions of command and of services, in order to strengthen national cohesion and improve the professionalism and efficacy of these posts. Article 27: In the context of reform of the Armed and Security Forces, a police force shall be created, under the authority of territorial collectivities, within the framework of their police powers. Article 28: Local consultative security committees shall be established bringing together representatives of the State, of local and regional authorities, of communities and of traditional leaders, under the authority of the local chief executive. |
Natural Resource Management
2015
The government agreed to consult the regions on natural resource extraction and to transfer some income from natural resources to the regions.
2016
No implementation observed.
2017
No implementation observed.
2018
No implementation observed.
2019
No implementation observed.
2020
No implementation observed.
2021
No implementation observed.
Police Reform
2015
The agreement stipulated the creation of new regional police.
2016
No implementation observed.
2017
No implementation observed.
2018
In late 2018, the parties agreed on the organization and role of the new territorial police.[1]
[1] “On the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process Evaluation of Implementation in 2018,” The Carter Center, February 18, 2019.
2019
No implementation observed.
2020
No implementation observed.
2021
No implementation observed.
Chapter 10: Reorganisation of the Armed and Security Forces
Article 27: In the context of reform of the Armed and Security Forces, a police force shall be created, under the authority of territorial collectivities, within the framework of their police powers.
Refugees
2015
Under the agreement, the parties committed to facilitate the return of refugees and invite international humanitarian organizations to support their efforts.
By late 2015, the UNHRC reported 38,053 refugees had returned to Mali, while 139,187 remained in neighboring countries.[1]
[1] “Mali Situation: UNHRC Regional Update,” UNHCR, November, 2015.
2016
By mid-2016, the UNHRCR reported that 134,262 refugees remained in neighboring countries. Due to continued insecurity in Northern Mali, the UNHCR was only able to verify small numbers of returnees within Mali.[1]
[1] “Mali Situation: UNHRC Regional Update,” UNHCR, May, 2016.
2017
By the end of 2017, UNHRC reported 63,107 refugees had returned to Mali, while 130,429 remained outside the country.[1]
[1] “Mali Situation: Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Returnees,” United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, December 21, 2017.
2018
Work to resettle refugees continued in 2018. The government coordinated with the UNHCR as well as the agreement signatories to facilitate the return of refugees.[1] The UNHRC reported the return of 69,390 refugees by late 2018, compared with 137,852 refugees outside the country.[2]
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer. Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process Observation period: May 1 to September 30, 2018,” The Carter Center, October 26, 2018.
[2] Mali Situation: Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Returnees,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, November 30, 2018.
2019
The UNHRC reported 76,636 refugees had returned to Mali by early 2019, compared with 142,110 who remained in asylum countries.[1]
[1]“Mali: Situation of Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Returnees,” United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, February 29, 2019.
2020
The UNHRC reported 84,473 refugees had returned to Mali by October 2020, compared with 47,378 who remained in asylum countries.[1]
[1]“Mali: Situation of Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Returnees,” United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, February 29, 2019.
2021
No further implementation observed.
| Chapter 15: Humanitarian questions
Article 47: The Parties shall create the conditions needed to facilitate the rapid return, repatriation, reintegration and reinsertion of all displaced persons and refugees, and to set up mechanisms to take care of them, in accordance with the relevant African and international instruments, including the UA Convention of 1969 regulating aspects specific to the problems of refugees in Africa, and the 2009 Convention (Kampala Convention) on protection and assistance for displaced persons in Africa. Article 48: The Parties shall invite humanitarian agencies and organisations to support their efforts to ensure the rapid return repatriation, reintegration and reinsertion of all displaced persons and refugees. |
Reintegration
2015
The agreement contained a DDR process for reintegrating former combatants who were ineligible for integration into the new armed forces.
The DDR process did not begin in 2015.
2016
The National DDR Commission was established by 2016 but was not operational. The DDR program was drafted but was not functioning.[1]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2016/1137.
2017
The DDR process was delayed due to disagreements regarding the number of former combatants to be integrated into the new security forces. Opposition groups failed to provide combatant lists in 2017. The National DDR Commission stated that economic support for former combatants would not begin until the cantonment and disarmament programs had begun.
2018
The parties agreed to speed up the DDR process in the fall of 2018. By 2018, the DDR program had registered 32,908 combatants, with 4,998 designated for reintegration.[1]It was difficult to assess what percentage of troops needed to be demobilized as this was one of the primary disagreements between the signatories. The opposition groups identified large numbers of eligible fighters, which the government claims are medically or otherwise ineligible. [2]
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer. Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process Observation period: May 1 to September 30, 2018,” The Carter Center, October 26, 2018.
[2] “Report of the Independent Observer on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process,” The Carter Center, January, 2020.
2019
The DDR(Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) program continued to be hindered by disagreements over eligible opposition combatants in 2019. [1]
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process,” The Carter Center, January, 2020.
2020
The DDR program continued to be hindered by disagreements over eligible opposition combatants in 2019. [1]
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process,” The Carter Center, January, 2020.
2021
No further implementation observed.
| Chapter 8: Cantonment, integration and disarmament, demobilisation, and reinsertion (DDR)
Article 20: Integration shall take place as and when the combatants are cantoned, either by integration in the units formed by the State, including in the armed and security forces, or in civilian life. Cantoned ex-combatants who are not integrated shall be subject to DDR. |
Truth or Reconciliation Mechanism
2015
The agreement established a Commission for Truth Justice and Reconciliation (CVJR) and an international commission to identify serious human rights violations.
The parties nominated members of the CVJR in late 2015.[1]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali,” United Nations S/2015/1013.
2016
The CVJR (Commission for Truth, Justice and Reconciliation) was operational in 2016, but the international commission was not fully operational.[1] Regional offices of the CVJR in Northern Mali were operational, with the exception of Kidal.[2]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2016/1137.
[2] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2016/1137.
2017
The CVJR (Commission for Truth, Justice and Reconciliation) interviewed 1,598 victims in 2017. [1]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2017/1105.
2018
The international commission was established by early 2018 and visited Mali in October and November.[1] The CVJR (Commission for Truth, Justice and Reconciliation) continued to operate in 2018.
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations S/2018/1174.
2019
The CVJR (Commission for Truth, Justice and Reconciliation) continued to operate in 2019 and collected 15,000 victims’ testimonies. However, the Commission made limited progress in identifying perpetrators or reconciling victims and perpetrators.[1]
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process,” The Carter Center, January, 2020.
2020
The CVJR (Commission for Truth, Justice and Reconciliation) continued to operate in 2020 and collected 18,499 victims’ testimonies. However, the independent observer noted during public hearings that the CVJR did not identify perpetrators and expressed concern at the CVJR’s inability to fulfill the agreement mandate.[1]
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer: Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process,” The Carter Center, December 2020.
2021
No further implementation observed.
| SECTION V: RECONCILIATION, JUSTICE AND HUMANITARIAN QUESTIONS
Chapter 14: Reconciliation and justice Article 47: The Parties shall promote genuine national reconciliation based on the following elements: – creation of transitional justice mechanisms in particular by operationalising the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Council (Commission Vérité, Justice et Réconciliation, CVJR); – creation of an International Committee of Enquiry tasked with investigating all war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, sexual crimes and other serious violations of International Law, Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law throughout Malian territory; – reaffirmation of the inalienable character of war crimes and crimes against humanity and the commitment of the Parties to cooperate with the International Committee of Enquiry; – no amnesty for the authors of war crimes, crimes against humanity and serious violations of Human Rights, including violence against women, girls and infants, related to the conflict; |
Verification/Monitoring Mechanism
2015
The agreement established a Monitoring Committee or Comité du Suivi du present Accord
(CSA) made up of regional states, regional organizations, international organizations, and the signatories to monitor the agreement’s implementation. The CSA was also instructed to nominate an independent observer to verify the agreement.
The CSA was formed in 2015, although disagreements emerged among the signatories regarding the rate of progress on the implementation of the agreement.[1] The Carter Center was not appointed as an independent observer until late 2017.[2]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali,” United Nations S/2015/1013.
[2] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2017/1105.
2016
The Monitoring Committee continued to meet in 2016, although it was hindered by disagreements between representatives of the different parties.[1] The Carter Center was not appointed as an independent observer until late 2017.[2]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2016/1137.
[2] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2017/1105.
2017
The Monitoring Committee continued to meet in 2017. MINUSMA and Algeria agreed to attend all future committee meetings and to mediate disputes. The Committee did have monitoring and verification teams in the Kidal area, but had difficulty investigating alleged ceasefire disputes.[1] The Carter Center was appointed as an independent observer in late 2017.[2]
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2017/1105.
[2] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2017/1105.
2018
The Monitoring Committee or Comité du Suivi du present Accord CSA continued to meet in 2018, although less regularly than planned due to the 2018 Presidential Election. The CSA also suffered from some internal dysfunction and disengagement of the meditators that limited its oversight capacity.[1] The independent observer continued to operate in 2018.
[1] “Report of the Independent Observer. Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process Observation period: May 1 to September 30, 2018,” The Carter Center, October 26, 2018.
2019
The agreement established a Monitoring Committee (CSA) made up of regional states, regional organizations, international organizations, and the signatories to monitor the implementation of the agreement.
The CSA’s operation was briefly interrupted by the Government’s cancellation of a September meeting and the subsequent refusal of the CMA (Coalition of Azawad Movements) to participate until the reasons for the cancellation were clarified. The Secretary General reported that by December 2019, the parties had agreed to resume CSA meetings .[1] The independent observer continued to operate in 2019.
[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” United Nations Security Council S/2019/983.
2020
The Monitoring Committee (CSA) and independent observer continued to operate in 2020.
2021
No further implementation observed.
| Chapter 19: The Agreement Monitoring Committee
Article 57: After signing the Agreement, the Parties shall establish a Committee to monitor implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (CSA). Article 58: The CSA shall be made up as follows: the Government of Mali, the signatory movements of the present Agreement and the Mediation Team (Algeria, as Leader, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, CEDEAO, United Nations, OCI, UA, and the EU). The permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are invited to participate in the work of the Committee. The CSA may invite as necessary, other stakeholders and international financial institutions, to participate in its work. Article 59: The CSA shall be chaired by Algeria, Mediation Team Leader, assisted by Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger and Chad, as Vice-Chairs. The Committee’s headquarters shall be at Bamako; it may occasionally meet elsewhere, as necessary. It shall meet in plenary session at least once a month, and may hold extraordinary meetings as needed. Article 60: the CSA shall fulfil the following remit: – ensure the monitoring, supervision, coordination and active implementation by the Parties of all the provisions of the present Agreement, without prejudice to MINUSMA’s mandate from the Security Council; – prepare a detailed timetable for implementation of the relevant provisions and monitor this; – assist with interpretation of the relevant provisions in case of disagreement between the Parties; – where necessary, reconcile the Parties’ positions; and – encourage the Government to take all necessary measures for the effective implementation i. the location of dispersed and decentralised public services in the North; ii. the careful adoption of constitutional, legislative and regulatory texts to enable implementation of the provisions of the Agreement; iii. the transfer of the resources and funds needed to enable the territorial collectivities to function effectively and exercise their competences; iv. taking measures to enable the new democratic mechanisms convened in the Agreement to be developed locally, particularly by updating electoral registers, encouraging enrolment and participation in local elections, and supporting the creation of new institutions and procedures. Article 61: Subject to its mandate and in the limit of its capacities, MINUSMA shall manage the CSA Secretariat. MINUSMA, together with UA (MISAHEL), OCI, EU and CEDEAO, shall assist CSA to monitor implementation of the Agreement. Article 62: To accomplish its mandate, CSA shall establish four sub-committees covering the following themes: ”political and institutional questions; “defence and security”; “economic, social and cultural development”; and “reconciliation, justice and humanitarian questions”. Chapter 20: Independent observation Article 63: The Parties shall appoint an independent observer for the CSA, tasked with objectively evaluating the implementation status of the present Agreement. It shall publish a detailed report every four months reporting on achievement of the commitments made in the Agreement, identifying any blockages and responsibility for these, and making recommendations on the measures to be taken. Article 64: The Independent Observer shall be provided with the technical support needed to carry out his mandate. |
Please always cite: “Expanding the Peace Accords Matrix Implementation Dataset: Partial peace agreements in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement negotiation and implementation process, 1989–2021.” Madhav Joshi, Matthew Hauenstein, and Jason Quinn. Journal of Peace Research (2025).