Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)

2018

No Implementation

Under R-ARCSS, the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) was required to conduct a review and audit of the petroleum industry, including producing a revenue-sharing framework and regulating the rights of landholders.

The RTGoNU was also required to review the 2008 Land Act regarding land tenure, management, and theft, establish a land registry, and mediate land related conflicts.

In addition, the RTGoNU will develop water, agriculture, livestock, wildlife, and fisheries management policies.

No progress observed in 2018.

2019

No Implementation

No progress observed in 2019.

2020

No Implementation

It was reported that the Economic Cluster of the RTGoNU initiated a study to assess all revenue streams and the current practices of remitting revenue into the public account. It was not clear whether the study was conducted as part of the tasks specified in the agreement or the fiscal hardships from declining oil prices and the COVID-19 pandemic.^[1]

^[1] “Kiir gives Igga green light to introduce economic reforms.” Eye Radio, August 7, 2020.

2021

No Implementation

In 2020, it was reported that the Economic Cluster of the RTGoNU initiated a study to assess all revenue streams and the current practices of remitting revenue into the public account.^[1] It was not clear whether the study continued or not. As per the RJMEC report, the Economic and Financial Management Authority was not established and Oil Stabilization Account and the Future Generations Fund were not operational. Further, there was no reconstruction of the National Petroleum and Gas Commission.^[2]

[1] “Kiir gives Igga green light to introduce economic reforms.” Eye Radio, August 7, 2020.

[2] On the Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (1^st January to 31^st  March 2021). Report no. 010/21. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC). 24 April, 2021.

2022

Minimum Implementation

As per the RJMEC report, the Ministry of Petroleum implemented some reforms specific to petroleum revenue accounts so that the sale of oil could be traced to government accounts. The ministry was said to have produced a petroleum marketing report, identification of loans and advances collateralized by oil, and a review of employment in the oil sector. Further, it was reported that the Public Finance Management Act, Petroleum Revenue Management Act, and Petroleum Act were submitted to the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. No further information is available on establishing the Economic and Financial Management Authority and reconstructing the National Petroleum and Gas Commission.^[1]

[1] RJMEC report 014/2022; 015/2022; 016/2022; 017/2023.

2023

Minimum Implementation

As of December 2023, the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, and the Petroleum Act were submitted to the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. Similarly, the Land Act and the Mining Act are pending in the Council of Ministers. The Land commission is yet to be constituted.^[1]

[1] RJMEC. 2024. On The Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. Report No. 021/23 (January 2024).

2018

No Implementation

Under R-ARCSS, the new constitution would institute a federal system of government.

No progress observed in 2018.

2019

No Implementation

No progress observed in 2019.

2020

No Implementation

After holding consultative meetings with various stakeholders on February 14, President Kiir, through a decree, decided to return the country to ten states (Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, Unity, Lakes, Jonglei, Western Equatoria, Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, and Upper Nile), including three administrative areas such as Abyei, Boma, and Ruweng.^[1] The newly decided number of states and administrative areas could provide the basis for federalism, but the permanent constitution finalizes the federal system.

As a permanent constitution-making process has yet to be initiated, no further information on federalism is available.

^[1] “South Sudan cuts number of states from 32 to 10, unlocking peace process,” Reuters, February 15, 2020; “Progress report no. 6: On the implementation status of the R-ARCSS,” Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, April 20, 2020.

2021

Minimum Implementation

After holding consultative meetings with various stakeholders on February 14, 2020, President Kiir decided, via Presidential decree, to return the country to ten states (Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, Unity, Lakes, Jonglei, Western Equatoria, Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, and Upper Nile), alongside the three administrative areas of Abyei, Boma, and Ruweng.^[1] The newly-decided number of states and administrative areas could provide the basis for federalism, but the permanent constitution finalizes the federal system.

As a permanent constitution-making process is underway, no further information on federalism is available.

[1] “South Sudan cuts number of states from 32 to 10, unlocking peace process,” Reuters, February 15, 2020; “Progress report no. 6: On the implementation status of the R-ARCSS,” Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, April 20, 2020.

2022

Minimum Implementation

As a permanent constitution-making process is underway, no further information is available on federalism.

2023

Minimum Implementation

As a permanent constitution-making process is underway, no further information is available on federalism.

2018

No Implementation

No progress observed in 2018.

2019

No Implementation

No progress observed in 2019.

2020

Minimum Implementation

The cabinet of RTGoNU was appointed on March 23rd. The cabinet consists of 36 ministers and 10 deputy ministers. The cabinet should comprise at least 35% of women, according to the R-ARCSS women’s rights provision. Only one female vice president from the FD was appointed. The incumbent government appointed five women ministers and one deputy minister out of 24 ministers and deputy ministers. The SPLM-IO appointed three ministers, and the SSOA appointed one minister. According to the RJMEC report, only 26% of the cabinet members were women.^[1]

^[1] “RJMEC quarterly report to IGAD on the status of the implementation of R-ARCSS from 1^st January to 31^st March 2020,” Report No. 6. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, April 20, 2020.

2021

Intermediate Implementation

The cabinet of RTGoNU was appointed on March 23rd. The cabinet consists of 36 ministers and ten deputy ministers. According to the R-ARCSS provision specific to women’s rights, the cabinet should comprise at least 35% of women. Only one woman vice president from the FD was appointed. The incumbent government appointed five women ministers and one deputy minister out of 24 ministers and deputy ministers. The SPLM-IO appointed three ministers, and SSOA (South Sudan Opposition Alliance) appointed one minister. According to the RJMEC report, only 26% of the cabinet members were women.^[1]

A total of 32.6% of the 550 members in the reconstituted Transitional National Legislative Assembly were women. In a 100-member Council of States, only 27 or 32.14% were women. Both the Assembly and the Council were reconstituted in May.^[2]

[1] “RJMEC quarterly report to IGAD on the status of the implementation of R-ARCSS from 1^st January to 31^st March 2020,” Report No. 6. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, April 20, 2020.

[2] South Sudan Transitional National Legislative Assembly. Global data on National Parliament. https://data.ipu.org/node/160/basic-information?chamber_id=13580

2022

Intermediate Implementation

Women’s rights were not fully respected. The Revitalized agreement requires at least 35% of representation of women in executive and legislative bodies, which was not met. Only 26% of the cabinet members were women, who comprise 32.6% of the legislative assemblies.^[1]

[1] RJMEC report 014/2022; 015/2022; 016/2022; 017/2023.

2023

Intermediate Implementation

Women’s rights were not fully respected. The Revitalized agreement requires at least 35% of representation of women in executive and legislative bodies, which was not met. Only 26% of the cabinet members were women, and women only comprised 32.6% in the legislative assemblies.^[1]

Further, three major institutions, the Political Parties Council (PPC), the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC), and the National Election Commission (NEC), were reconstituted in 2023. The NEC and NCRC did not meet the gender quota as required in the R-ARCSS. Only one of the nine NEC members is a woman (22%), and only 19 out of 57 (33%) were women in the NCRC.^[2]

[1] RJMEC report 014/2022; 015/2022; 016/2022; 017/2023.

[2] RJMEC. 2024. On The Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. Report No. 021/23 (January 2024)

2018

No Implementation

Under R-ARCSS, the signatories are to ensure that non-South Sudanese armed groups leave the country by the end of the Pre-Transitional Period.

The “withdrawal of allied troops” was listed as outstanding in the November 5^th JMEC report.^[1]

^[1] “Progress report no. 3: On the implementation status of the R-ARCSS 2018,” Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, November 5, 2018.

2019

Minimum Implementation

The RJMEC’s first quarter report for 2019 stated that “there was no evidence of any unauthorized foreign force currently in the country.”^[1] However, the status of the “allied forces” could not be determined.

^[1] “RJMEC quarterly report to IGAD on the status of the implementation of R-ARCSS from 1^st January to 31^st March 2019,” Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, April 08, 2019.

2020

Minimum Implementation

No additional implementation observed.

2021

Minimum Implementation

No additional implementation observed.

2022

Intermediate Implementation

No additional implementation observed. It is possible that all foreign forces in South Sudan left the country.

2023

Intermediate Implementation

No additional implementation observed. It is possible that all foreign forces in South Sudan left the country.

2018

Intermediate Implementation

Under R-ARCSS a number of verification bodies were to be formed or reinstituted:

• The Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC), within 10 days of singing
• The Area Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (AJMCC), within 10 days of signing
• The Joint Military Ceasefire Teams (JMCT), within 10 days of singing
• The Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM), within 10 days of signing
• The Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), within 15 days of signing

The CTSAMVM held its first meeting in Khartoum on September 26, 2018.^[1] The JEMC issued its first report on the implementation of R-ARCSS on September 28, fifteen days after the agreement was signed.^[2] The JMCC was reformed on November 28, 2018. However, it is unclear whether the body was operating as intended in the agreement.^[3]

^[1] “CTSAMVM host board meeting in Khartoum, ‘We must work together to silence the guns in the country,’” Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, September 27, 2018, http://ctsamm.org/ctsamvm-host-board-meeting-in-khartoum-we-must-work-together-to-silence-the-guns-in-the-country/

^[2] “Status of implementation of R-ARCSS 2018,” Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, September 28, 2018.

^[3] “Progress report no. 4: On the implementation status of the R-ARCSS 2018,” Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, December 10, 2018.

2019

Full Implementation

The JMEC and CTSAMVM continued to operate in 2019, although the latter continued to work under interim leadership. The CTSAMVM noted continued access issues in monitoring the ceasefire, particularly in the spring but decreasing through the summer and fall.^[1] The Area Joint Ceasefire Committees began operating in 2019.^[2]

^[1] http://ctsamm.org/ctsamvm-in-action-mvt-bentiu-conducts-joint-visit-with-ajmcc-to-mankien/

^[2] http://ctsamm.org/ctsamvm-in-action-mvt-bentiu-conducts-joint-visit-with-ajmcc-to-mankien/

2020

Full Implementation

All monitoring bodies appeared to be operational throughout 2020.

2021

Full Implementation

All monitoring bodies appeared to be operational throughout 2020.

2022

Full Implementation

All monitoring bodies appeared to be operational throughout 2020.

2023

Full Implementation

All monitoring bodies appeared to be operational throughout 2020.

2018

No Implementation

No progress observed in 2018.

2019

No Implementation

No progress observed in 2019.

2020

No Implementation

The Commission for Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing (CTRH) was not established.

2021

No Implementation

It was reported that a Technical Committee for the National Consultative Process was initiated to establish the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH). While this is an important first step, no further details are available about a timeline for the committee’s work and the establishment of the CTRH^[1].

[1] On the Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (1^st April to 30^th June 2021). Report no. 011/21. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC). 15 July 2021.

2022

No Implementation

The RJMEC in its fourth quarterly report of 2022 noted that the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs is in the process of drafting the Compensation and Reparation Bill. ^[1] There were pressures from citizens and refugee communities to establish and initiate a reconciliation process, but no significant process was made.

[1] RJMEC report 017/2023.

2023

Minimum Implementation

While the public consultation on the formation of the Commission Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH)was already happening in 2022^[1], the commission was established in late 2023, and the Compensation and Reparations bill was tabled in the legislative assembly in December 2023.^[2] No further information is available on the work of the CTRH.

[1] “Government of South Sudan launches public consultations on formation of Truth, Reconciliation and Healing Commission.” UNDP South Sudan. https://www.undp.org/south-sudan/news/government-south-sudan-launches-public-consultations-formation-truth-reconciliation-and-healing-commission, March 21, 2024.

[2] RJMEC. 2024. On The Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. Report No. 021/23 (January 2024).

2018

No Implementation

No progress observed in 2018.

2019

No Implementation

No progress observed in 2019.

2020

Intermediate Implementation

After two extensions of the Pre-Transition Period and under tremendous pressure from the international community, the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) was established on 22nd February 2020. The SPLM-IO leader Reik Machar took the oath of the First Vice President. A nominee of former detainees (FD’s) Rebecca Nyandeng De’Mabior, Hussien Abdelbaggi (South Sudan Opposition Alliance nominee), Wani Igga (Incumbent Transitional Government of National Unity), and Tabang Deng were appointed vice presidents.^[1]

As part of the RTGoNU, President Salva Kiir appointed a 35 member cabinet on March 12. Among the cabinet ministers, 20 members were affiliated to Salva Kiir’s party, the SPLM-IO received nine positions, SSOA and FDs (Former Detainees) received three and two ministries respectively, and one ministry was given to other political parties.^[2] Among the ministers, nine or 26% were women, which did not meet the 35% requirement of the R-ARCSS.^[3]

After a meeting between Kiir and Machar in June, the president appointed governors from his side in six out of ten states (Unity, Eastern Equatoria, Warrap, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Central Equatoria, and Lakes) and administrators for the three administrative regions. Reik Machar’s SPLM-IO received the governorship of three states (Upper Nile, Western Bahr el Ghazal, and Western Equatoria). The SSOA was allocated to receive a governorship in the state of Jonglei. The SSOA opposed the allocation of governorship. Also, the governors of the Jonglei state and Upper Nile state were not appointed in June.^[4]

Nine of ten state governors were appointed by the end of October 2020. Under an agreement reached between the signatories that month, the SPLM/A-IO was chosen to appoint the governor of Upper Nile. The SPLM/A-IO nominate has not been approved by President Kiir. The Transitional National Legislature was not appointed in 2020. ^[5]

^[1] “RJMEC quarterly report to IGAD on the status of the implementation of R-ARCSS from 1^st January to 31^st March 2020,” Report No. 6. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, April 20, 2020.

^[2] “South Sudan announces Cabinet for unity government.” Anadolu Agency, March 12, 2020.

^[3] “RJMEC quarterly report to IGAD on the status of the implementation of R-ARCSS from 1^st January to 31^st March 2020,” Report No. 6. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, April 20, 2020.

^[4] “RJMEC quarterly report to IGAD on the status of the implementation of R-ARCSS from 1^st April to 30^th  June, 2019,” Report No.7. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, July 15, 2020.

^[5] “RJMEC report on the status of implementation of the revitalized agreement on the resolutions of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, for the period 1^st October to 31^st December 2020,” Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluations Commission, February 2, 2021.

2021

Full Implementation

South Sudan’s president Salva Kiir dissolved the Transitional National Legislature and Council of States on May 8, 2021. On May 10, the President reconstituted the Transitional National Legislative Assembly comprising 550 members: Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) 332 members; Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) 128 members; South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA) 50 members; Other Political Parties (OPP) 30 members; and Former Detainees (FDs) 10 members. The Council of States had 100 members. As of July, the SPLM had 46 members, and the SPLM-IO had 27 Members.^[1]

The inaugural meeting of the TNLA (Transitional National Legislative Assembly) and the Council of States was held on 30^th August.^[2] While the speaker and deputy speaker were women, only 32.6% of participants were women, whereas the R-ARCSS calls for at least 35% representation of women. Nevertheless, the reconstitution of the TNLA and the Council of States is a major step forward in terms of implementing the Revitalized agreement.

[1] “Who are the newly-appointed 100 members of the Council of States – Full list”. Sudans Post. 4 July 2021. https://www.sudanspost.com/who-are-the-newly-appointed-100-members-of-the-council-of-states-full-list/

[2] On the Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (1^st July to 30^th September 2021). Report no. 012/21. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC). 20 October 2021. South Sudan Transitional National Legislative Assembly. Global data on National Parliament. https://data.ipu.org/node/160/basic-information?chamber_id=13580

2022

Full Implementation

The RTGoNU specific provision was fully implemented. However, the parties to the R-ARCSS had yet to nominate their representatives in various mechanisms in the spirit of the powersharing deal.^[1]

[1] RJMEC report 017/2023.

2023

Full Implementation

The RTGoNU specific provision was fully implemented. However, the parties to the R-ARCSS has yet to nominate their representatives in various mechanisms in the spirit of the power sharing deal.^[1]

[1] RJMEC report 017/2023.

2018

No Implementation

No progress observed in 2018.

2019

No Implementation

No progress observed in 2019.

2020

No Implementation

Within six months of the establishment of RTGoNU, the accord called for the Compensation and Reparation Authority’s (CAR) establishment to administer the Compensation and Reparation Fund. Therefore, this provision will be active in July 2020. The accord provides for support from the UN, AU, and the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) to facilitate the work of CAR. According to R-JMEC, support was not received from international agencies.^[1]

^[1]  “RJMEC quarterly report to IGAD on the status of the implementation of R-ARCSS from 1^st April to 30^th  June, 2019,” Report No.7. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, July 15, 2020.

2021

No Implementation

According to R-JMEC, the Compensation and Reparation Authority (CAR) was not established as of 2021.^[1]

[1] On the Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (1^st April to 30^th June 2021). Report no. 011/21. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC). 15 July 2021.

2022

No Implementation

The Compensation and Reparation Authority (CAR) was not established as of 2022.^[1] The RJMEC in its fourth quarterly report of 2022 noted that the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs in the process of drafting the Compensation and Reparation Bill. ^[2]

[1] “Violence threatens fragile South Sudan peace.” October 1, 2022. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/violence-threatens-fragile-south-sudan-peace-3969360

[2] RJMEC report 017/2023.

2023

Minimum Implementation

The Compensation and Reparation Authority (CAR) was approved by the Council of Ministers and was tabled in the Revitalized Transitional National Legislative Assembly on 5 December 2023.^[1]

[1] RJMEC. 2024. On The Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. Report No. 021/23 (January 2024).

2018

No Implementation

Under R-ARCSS, following disengagement and cantonment, all former combatants were to be screened for eligibility for the police, military, or other national security forces. Ineligible combatants would be referred to the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) process.

The JMEC’s overview report covering implementation through December 31, 2018, noted that the DDR commission had not been formed and did not mention reintegration.^[1]

^[1] “Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) seventh meeting,” Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, January 19, 2019.

2019

Minimum Implementation

The SPLM/A-IO, SSPDF, and SSOA signed an agreement on February 5^th establishing 25 cantonment sites to begin the DDR Process.^[1] On May 2, 2019, the interim chair of the RJMEC stated that “my greatest concern is the delayed operationalization of the cantonment sites, despite my repeated appeal to the Parties to expedite this process. To my knowledge, as I speak, there is not a single cantonment site that is operational.”^[2] In June, the CTSAMVM began evaluating the proposed cantonment sites and noted logistical issues such as a lack of food, shelter, and medicine.^[3] The CTSAMVM report from September 5 noted that “the cantonment process remains slow.”^[4] On September 18, Special Representative David Shearer reported to the Security Council that government and opposition troops had reported to the cantonment sites and that the troops had begun to be registered.^[5] Shearer and the CTSAMVM both noted continued logistical shortfalls. President Kiir appointed the DDR commission required by the agreement in September; however, the body did not begin its work in 2019.^[6] On December 17^th, the interim chair of the RJMEC reported that “no screening, no selection and no training (of the new unified armed forces) has taken place.”^[7]

^[1] “South Sudan peace partners agree on cantonment sites,” Radio Tamazuj, archived from the original on https://web.archive.org/web/20190207205358/https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/south-sudan-peace-partners-agree-on-cantonment-sites

^[2] “Meeting of the parties to the R-ARCSS held in Addis,” Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, May 2, 2019, https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/press-release/item/441-meeting-of-the-parties-to-the-r-arcss-held-in-addis

^[3] “Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) eleventh meeting,” Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, June 11, 2019.

^[4] “Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) fourteenth meeting,” Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, September 5, 2019.

^[5] “Statement of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General David Shearer Briefing to the Security Council on South Sudan,” United Nations Mission in South Sudan, September 18, 2019.

^[6] “Kiir reconstitutes DDR Commission,” Radio Tamazuj, September 12, 2019.

^[7] “Implementation of the Pre-Transitional period to improve with availability of funds,” Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, December 17, 201.

2020

No Implementation

The RJMEC, in its June report, noted the continued neglect of cantonment sites by the RTGoNU and asked for more support as the cantoned combatants and cantonment sites wait for the next phase.^[1] The DDR Commission was not able to deploy field coordination officers partly related to the COVID-19 pandemic.^[2] The DDR program was not initiated.

^[1] “RJMEC quarterly report to IGAD on the status of the implementation of R-ARCSS from 1^st April to 30^th  June, 2020,” Report No.7. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, July 15, 2020.

^[2] “RJMEC quarterly report to IGAD on the status of the implementation of R-ARCSS from 1^st April to 30^th  June, 2020,” Report No.7. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, July 15, 2020.

2021

Minimum Implementation

The RJMEC, in its fourth quarter report, noted little to no progress in the DDR program.

2022

Minimum Implementation

In its fourth-quarter report, the RJMEC noted little to no progress in the DDR program. The DDR Commission’s submitted strategy, implementation plan, and proposed budget are yet to be approved by the RTGoNU.^[1]

[1] RJMEC report 014/2022; 015/2022; 016/2022; 017/2023.

2023

Minimum Implementation

The DDR Commission’s submitted strategy, implementation plan, and proposed budget are yet to be approved by the RTGoNU.^[1] Reports suggest that the DDR commission was not able advance the process of reintegrating disqualified combatants for the NUF.^[2]

[1] RJMEC report 014/2022; 015/2022; 016/2022; 017/2023.

[2] RJMEC. 2023. On The Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. Report No. 018/23  (April 2023), Report No. Report No. 020/23 (October 2023).

2018

Minimum Implementation

Under R-ARCSS, the parties agreed to facilitate the resettlement of refugees and provide humanitarian assistance.

The United Nations estimated that there were 2.47 million South Sudanese refugees in neighboring countries when R-ARCSS was signed.^[1] The United Nations reported 65 “access incidents” in September, referring to incidents where aid workers were blocked from providing assistance to civilians, either by force or through “bureaucratic and administrative impediments,’’ including to refugees.^[2] The UN estimated 700 refugees returned in September.^[3]

In October, the UN noted that “refugees… are beginning to return home” following the signing of R-ARCSS.^[4] The UN also reported 58 new access incidents, some of which involved refugees.^[5] The UN estimated 5,500 refugees returned in October, 2,000 returned in November, and 7,800 returned in December. ^{[6] [7] [8]} However, the UN stated that “the current conditions [are] not yet conducive for durable, safe and dignified returns.”^[9]

^[1] “Humanitarian bulletin South Sudan” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), September 30, 2018.

^[2] “Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (covering the period from 2 September to 30 November 2018),” United Nations Resolution S/2018/1103, December 10, 2018.

^[3] “Overview of spontaneous refugee returns to South Sudan,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, February 28, 2019.

^[4] “Humanitarian bulletin South Sudan” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), October 30, 2018.

^[5] “Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (covering the period from 2 September to 30 November 2018),” United Nations Resolution S/2018/1103, December 10, 2018.

^[6] “Overview of spontaneous refugee returns to South Sudan,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, February 28, 2019.

^[7] “Overview of spontaneous refugee returns to South Sudan,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, February 28, 2019.

^[8] “Overview of spontaneous refugee returns to South Sudan,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, February 28, 2019.

^[9] “Overview of spontaneous refugee returns to South Sudan,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, February 28, 2019.

2019

Minimum Implementation

The United Nations reported that at the end of 2019, there were 2.15 million South Sudanese refugees^[1] and that nearly 70,000 refugees returned home in 2019.^[2]

^[1] “Operations Portal- South Sudan,” United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, December 31, 2019, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/southsudan.

^[2] “South Sudan situation,” United Nations High Commission for Refugees, January 10, 2020.

2020

Minimum Implementation

The United Nations reported that at the end of 2020, there were 2.2 million South Sudanese refugees and that nearly 99,816 refugees returned home in 2020.^[1]

^[1]  “South Sudan: Overivew of spontaneous refugee returns. UNHCR, January 21, 2020.

2021

Minimum Implementation

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that 148,931, or 7% of South Sudanese, have returned from abroad. According to the report, a total of 33% of refugees returned to South Sudan between 2016 and 2021. ^[1]

[1] International Organization for Migration (IOM), Jul 26 2022. DTM South Sudan — Mobility Tracking Round 12 Initial Data Release. IOM, South Sudan. https://dtm.iom.int/reports/south-sudan-mobility-tracking-round-12-initial-data-release

2022

Minimum Implementation

Reports suggest that displacements are due to conflict, ethnic conflict, and natural disasters. According to the IOM tracking of IDPs, over 2.25 million IDPs were there in South Sudan as of December 2022. ^[1]The RTGoNU is yet to address reconstruction, repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation and reintegration related issues.^[2]

[1] “Thousands Displaced in South Sudan Ethnic Violence, UN Reports.” Voice of America. https://www.voanews.com/a/thousands-displaced-in-south-sudan-ethnic-violence-un-reports/6896731.html, December 29, 2022; “Floods, Displacement and Violence in South Sudan.” International Crisis Group.

https://southsudan.crisisgroup.org/, October 27, 2022.

[2] RJMEC report 014/2022; 015/2022; 016/2022; 017/2023.

2023

Minimum Implementation

Reports suggest conflict, ethnic conflict, and natural disasters have exacerbated refugee issues in South Sudan. While the UNHCR reported an estimated 763,000 South Sudanese refugees returning to the country, over 2.2 million South Sudanese refugees, of which 65% are children, are in precarious conditions in neighboring countries.^[1]

The RTGoNU has yet to address related issues of reconstruction, repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation and reintegration.^[2]

[1] South Sudan Situation, UNHCR Global Focus. https://reporting.unhcr.org/operational/situations/south-sudan-situation , 21 March 2024.

[2] RJMEC. 2024. On The Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. Report No. 021/23 (January 2024).

2018

Full Implementation

The R-ARCSS was to be ratified by the Transitional National Legislature within seven days of signing. R-ARCSS was ratified by the Transitional National Legislature on October 15^th. ^[1]

^[1]  “Progress report no. 3: On the implementation status of the R-ARCSS 2018,” Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, November 5, 2018.

2019

Full Implementation

No further progress observed in 2019.

2020

Full Implementation

No further progress observed in 2020.

2021

Full Implementation

No further progress observed in 2021.

2022

Full Implementation

No further progress observed in 2022.

2023

Full Implementation

No further progress observed in 2023.

2018

Intermediate Implementation

R-ARCSS called for the immediate release of all prisoners of war to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

According to a 2016 list from the Joint Military Ceasefire Commission, the ICRC reported that there were 165 SPLA (SSDF) and 59 SPLM/A-IO prisoners of war (PoWs).^[1] In October, President Kiir announced that all prisoners of war would be released, but there were no details on how that would be achieved. The JEMC reported that the SPLM/A-IO released four prisoners in Western Equatoria. The ICRC reported on October 19 that it had supervised the release of 24 PoWs and noted that it was “the first releases of prisoners supervised by the ICRC…following the signing of the latest peace agreement.”^[2]

^[1]  “Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) fourth meeting,” Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, November 8, 2018.

^[2] “South Sudan: ICRC facilitates release of 24 detainees,” International Committee of the Red Cross, October 19, 2018, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/south-sudan-icrc-facilitates-release-24-detainees.

2019

Intermediate Implementation

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) announced on June 27^th that it had facilitated the release of 15 detainees in South Sudan.^[1] In August, the CTSAMVM reported the release of 2 SSOA officers detained by the SSPDF.^[2] The SPLM/A-IO continued to claim that the government had not released all of its prisoners of war.

^[1] “South Sudan: ICRC facilitates release of 15 detainees,” International Committee of the Red Cross, June 27, 2019, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/south-sudan-icrc-facilitates-release-15-detainees.

^[2]“Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) fourteenth meeting,” Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, September 5, 2019.

2020

Intermediate Implementation

It was reported that the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) facilitated 23 people’s release, including 11 children held by the National Salvation Front (NAS).^[1] President Kiir also pardoned and released 30 inmates. Among the list was a prominent South Sudanese activist Peter Biar Ajak, who was detained in September 2018.^[2]

^[1] “ICRC facilitates release of 23 people held by rebel group.” January 2, 2020.

^[2] “Prominent South Sudan activist released from prison.” WTOP News, January 4, 2020.

2021

Intermediate Implementation

No further information is available about prisoners and their release, except that the International Committee of the Red Cross of South Sudan organized a seminar with the National Prison Service.^[1]

[1] ICRC Annual Report 2021. ICRC. https://www.icrc.org/en/document/annual-report-2021. 27 July 2022.

2022

Full Implementation

The bill amending the National Prison Service Act of 2011 was amended and approved by the President.^[1] No further information is available except that dozens of teachers in Warrap State were arrested and imprisoned following a protest but were released after a court dismissed all charges against them.^[2]

[1] RJMEC report 017/2023.

[2] South Sudan 2022. Amnesty International, https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/east-africa-the-horn-and-great-lakes/south-sudan/report-south-sudan/

2023

Full Implementation

No further information is available. The bill amending the National Prison Service Act of 2011 was amended and approved by the president in 2022.^[1]

[1] RJMEC report 017/2023.

2018

No Implementation

No progress observed in 2018.

2019

Minimum Implementation

In September, the CTSAMVM noted that screening had begun in many cantonment sites, which is the first step in both the reintegration process and the military and police reform. ^[1]

^[1] “Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) fourteenth meeting,” Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, September 5, 2019.

2020

Minimum Implementation

As of January, the cantonment sites were transformed into training sites for all elements of the NUF. As a result, screening for the NUF was shifted to training centers.^[1] The $5 million fund for NUF training was released.^[2]

^[1] “RJMEC quarterly report to IGAD on the status of the implementation of R-ARCSS from 1^st January to 31^st March 2020,” Report No. 6. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, April 20, 2020.

^[2] “Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) seventh meeting,” Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, January 19, 2019.

2021

Minimum Implementation

According to the RJMEC report, the unification of the necessary forces (NUF) did not progress because of the lack of funding, resources, and political will of the unity government.^[1]

[1] On the Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (1^st October to 31^st  December 2021). Report no. 013/21. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC). 2 February 2022. “South Sudan: ‘Headwinds’ warning from UN mission chief over peace accord .” UN News. 15 December 2021. https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/12/1108032

2022

Intermediate Implementation

As of August 2022, 21,973 NUFs graduated from the program, including 4,366 for the national police. While the total number of graduates from the national police force is not available at the end of the year, over 49,000 NUFs graduated. Further, the Transitional National Legislature considered and passed the National Police Service Bill.^[1]

[1] RJMEC report 014/2022; 015/2022; 016/2022; 017/2023.

2023

Intermediate Implementation

It is unclear how progress has been made in deploying NUFs trained for the national police. Nevertheless, it was reported that the UN Police has provided specialized training and community policing to enhance public confidence in police forces. ^[1]

[1] UNMISS. “UNMISS is crucial to free and fair elections in South Sudan.” https://issafrica.org/iss-today/unmiss-is-crucial-to-free-and-fair-elections-in-south-sudan, March 20, 2024. RJMEC. 2023. On The Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.  Report No. 019/23 (July 2023).

2018

No Implementation

Under R-ARCSS, all armed forces in South Sudan were to be considered for integration into the national military, police, or other security services.

No progress observed in 2018.

2019

Minimum Implementation

In September, the CTSAMVM noted that screening had begun in many cantonment sites, which is the first step in both the reintegration process and the military and police reform. ^[1]

^[1] “Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) fourteenth meeting,” Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, September 5, 2019.

2020

Minimum Implementation

As of January, the cantonment sites were transformed into training sites for all elements of the NUF (Necessary Unified Forces) including the military forces. As a result, screening for the NUF was shifted to training centers.^[1] The $5 million fund for NUF training was released.^[2] The CTSAMVM reported the arrival of combatants in training sites without screening and a limited number of screenings for the DDR.^[3] Registrations and screenings were put on hold for COVID-19 pandemic-related health risks.^[4] 

^[1] “RJMEC quarterly report to IGAD on the status of the implementation of R-ARCSS from 1^st January to 31^st March 2020,” Report No. 6. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, April 20, 2020.

^[2] “Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) seventh meeting,” Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, January 19, 2019.

^[3] “Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) Technical Committee Meeting, June 9 2020,” Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, June 18, 2020.

^[4]  “RJMEC Quarterly Report to IGAD on the status of implementation of the R-ARCSS from 1st April to 30th June 2020,” Report No. 7. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, July 15, 2020.

2021

Minimum Implementation

According to the RJMEC report, the unification of the necessary forces (NUF) did not progress because of the lack of funding, resources, and political will of the unity government.^[1]

[1] On the Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (1^st October to 31^st  December 2021). Report no. 013/21. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC). 2 February 2022. “South Sudan: ‘Headwinds’ warning from UN mission chief over peace accord .” UN News. 15 December 2021. https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/12/1108032

2022

Intermediate Implementation

On April 13, President Kiir demoted a number of commanders in the South Sudan Defense Forces in order to accommodate SPLM-IO and SSOA commanders. After this, some progress was reported specific to the military reform provisions in the agreement. The significant element of the military reform provision was the training and deployment of necessary unified forces (NUF). In the first phase, over 49,000 Necessary Unified Forces (NUFs) graduated, which missed the 53,000 target. As for the deployment phase, it is significantly behind with only about 900 soldiers being deployed in Warrap State.^[1]

[1] RJMEC report 014/2022; 015/2022; 016/2022; 017/2023.

2023

Intermediate Implementation

It was reported that 55,000 NUF graduated between August 2022 and January 2023. As part of the reintegration into the SSPDF, 3,777 trained NUF soldiers were deployed in different states, but Phase II training has yet to start. There was a delay in the redeployment of the trained NUF forces due to a lack of funding and unresolved rank harmonization in the middle and lower-level commands.^[1]

[1] RJMEC. 2024. On The Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. Report No. 021/23 (January 2024); RJMEC. 2023. On The Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.  Report No. 019/23 (July 2023).

2018

Minimum Implementation

The R-ARCSS (Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan) stipulated the creation of two bodies to consider the composition and boundaries of states in South Sudan. The Independent Boundaries Commission (IBC) was to be appointed by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), within two weeks of R-ARCSS being signed to make recommendations regarding the “number of States of the Republic of South Sudan, their boundaries, [and] the composition and restructuring of the Council of States.” The Technical Boundary Committee (TBC) was also to be appointed by IGAD “immediately upon the signing of the Revitalised ARCSS… to define and demarcate the tribal areas of South Sudan as they stood on 1 January 1956.”

IGAD and the Troika (the US, UK and Norway) nominated members for the TBC, which met on December 6, 2018, in Juba but then adjourned for the year.^[1]

^[1] “TBC holds its inaugural meeting in Juba,” Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, December 6, 2018, https://www.jmecsouthsudan.com/index.php/media-center/news/item/397-tbc-hold-its-inaugural-meeting-in-juba

2019

Minimum Implementation

The Technical Boundary Committee (TBC) was formed in January 2019.^[1] The TBC’s full report was submitted to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on March 26, 2019.^[2] In mid-March, the Independent Boundaries Commission (IBC) began work.^[3] The IBC’s final report was submitted to IGAD on June 20, 2019; however, the body deadlocked on the recommendation on the number of states.^[4] During a September meeting, Kiir and Machar agreed to form a new committee to address the boundary issue, but this committee was not formed in 2019.

^[1] “Statement by H.E. LT. Gen. Augostino S.K. Njoroge Interim Chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring & Evaluations Commission to the 3^rd RJMEC monthly meeting 1 Wednesday, 23 January 2019 Juba, South Sudan,” Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, January 23, 2019.

^[2] “Statement by H.E. L.T. Gen. Augostino S.K. Njoroge interim chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring & Evaluation Commission to the 5th RJMEC monthly meeting Friday, 12 April 2019 Juba, South Sudan,” Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, April 12, 2019.

^[3] “Statement by H.E. L.T. Gen. Augostino S.K. Njoroge interim chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring & Evaluation Commission to the 5th RJMEC monthly meeting Friday, 12 April 2019 Juba, South Sudan,” Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, April 12, 2019.

^[4] Statement by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development https://twitter.com/IGADPeace/status/1141637030797094912

2020

Intermediate Implementation

On February 4, governors of the 32 states and Abyei Administrative Area met and consulted with the Presidential Advisors and the TGoNU (Transitional Government of National Unity) members of National Pre-Transition Committee (NPTC). The governors then issued a communique expressing their support for the implementation of R-ARCSS (Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan) as well as their commitment to the 32 states and Abyei Administrative Area.^[1] After holding consultative meetings with various stakeholders on February 14, President Kiir, through a decree, made a decision to return the country to ten states (Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, Unity, Lakes, Jonglei, Western Equatoria, Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, and Upper Nile), including three administrative areas, Abyei, Boma, and Ruweng.^[2] In a press statement on the same day the SPLM-IO (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition) leader Reik Mac, appreciated the decision but called upon the President to reconsider the creation of three administrative units. Nevertheless, the breakthrough in the number of states was agreeable to all parties.

On June 10, President Kiir and First Vice President Machar reached a deal to nominate governors. According to a deal, Kirr will nominate governors of six states, including the oil-rich Unity State and Central Equatoria and Machar will nominate governors for three states, including the largest oil producing areas, the Upper Nile state. The South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA) was mandated to nominate a governor for Jonglei state. On June 30, President Kiir appointed governors for eight states (6 SPLM and 2 SPLM-IO) and administrators of three administrative areas. Only SPLM-IO had a woman governor. The R-ARCSS calls for 35% women’s representation.^[3] The number of states and boundaries are to be finalized in the final constitution.

In remarks delivered to the Security Council on September 16, 2020, Special Representative David Shearer noted that President Kiir had refused to appoint Vice President Machar’s preferred governor for Unity State.^[4] The number of states and boundaries are to be finalized in the final constitution.

^[1] “Governors Commnique,” February 4, 2020. Juba.

^[2] “South Sudan cuts number of states from 32 to 10, unlocking peace process,” Reuters, February 15, 2020; “Progress report no. 6: On the implementation status of the R-ARCSS,” Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, April 20, 2020.

^[3] “Progress report no. 7: On the implementation status of the R-ARCSS,” Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, July 15, 2020.

^[4] https://unmiss.unmissions.org/briefing-security-council-special-representative-un-secretary-general-david-shearer

2021

Intermediate Implementation

In February 2020, President Kiir, through a decree, decided to return the country to ten states (Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, Unity, Lakes, Jonglei, Western Equatoria, Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, and Upper Nile), alongside the three administrative areas of Abyei, Boma, and Ruweng.^[1] While the SPLM-IO (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition) asked to reconsider the creation of three administrative units, the number of states was agreeable to all parties. The number of states and boundaries are to be finalized in the final constitution. The constitution writing process started on May 25^{th [2]}.

[1] “South Sudan cuts number of states from 32 to 10, unlocking peace process,” Reuters, February 15, 2020; “Progress report no. 6: On the implementation status of the R-ARCSS,” Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, April 20, 2020.

[2] South Sudan begins constitution-making process supported by The United Nations. ReliefWeb. 26 May 2021.  https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-begins-constitution-making-process-supported-united-nations

2022

Intermediate Implementation

The number of states and boundaries will be finalized in the final constitution. The constitution-writing process started in May 2021.^[1] The permanent constitution-drafting process began with establishing the National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC) in 2021. Still, no significant progress was reported on issues regarding finalizing the number of states and state boundaries.

[1] South Sudan begins constitution-making process supported by The United Nations. ReliefWeb. 26 May 2021.  https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-begins-constitution-making-process-supported-united-nations

2023

Intermediate Implementation

The number of states and boundaries will be finalized in the final constitution. The constitution-writing process started in May 2021 and is still ongoing as of December 2023.^[1]

[1] “RJMEC asks AU Peace and Security Council to focus on South Sudan.” Radio Tamazuj. 17 November 2023 https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/rjmec-asks-au-peace-and-security-council-to-focus-on-south-sudan

2018

No Implementation

No progress observed in 2018.

2019

No Implementation

No progress observed in 2019.

2020

No Implementation

As specified in the revised timeline, implementation of this provision begins within the first three months of the transitional government. However, drafting a permanent constitution has yet to begin.

2021

No Implementation

As specified in the revised timeline, implementation of this provision must begin within the first three months of the transitional government. The process of drafting a permanent constitution has yet to begin.

2022

No Implementation

As specified in the revised timeline, this provision will be implemented within the first three months of the transitional government. The process of drafting a permanent constitution has begun, but the implementation of minority rights-specific provisions has yet to be observed.

2023

No Implementation

The R-ARCSS seeks a people-led permanent constitution, and the NCRC includes a broad range of representations, including ethnic minorities. While the constitution has yet to be drafted and address issues specific to cultural protection, the appointment of ethnic minorities as NCRC members is going in the right direction.^[1]

[1] RJMEC. 2024. On The Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. Report No. 021/23 (January 2024).

2018

No Implementation

Under R-ARCSS, the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) was tasked with restructuring the judiciary following the recommendations of the Judicial Reform Committee (RJC) and the Judicial Service Commission (JSC). In particular, R-ARCSS required the government to establish a Constitutional Court.

No progress observed in 2018.

2019

No Implementation

No progress observed in 2019.

2020

No Implementation

The judiciary reform is related to the transition peroid and expected to be initiated within the first six months of the transition period.^[1] No significant progress was reported.

^[1]  “RJMEC Quarterly Report to IGAD on the status of implementation of the R-ARCSS from 1st April to 30th June 2020,” Report No. 7. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, July 15, 2020.

2021

No Implementation

The Judiciary reform is related to the transition phase and is expected to be initiated within the first six months of the transition period.^[1] No significant progress was reported.

[1] “RJMEC Quarterly Report to IGAD on the status of implementation of the R-ARCSS from 1st April to 30th June 2020,” Report No. 7. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, July 15, 2020.

2022

Minimum Implementation

In June 2022, the ad hoc Judicial Review Committee (JRC) was established with tasks to review and recommend the Judiciary Act, the reconstitution of the Judicial Service Commission, and establishing an independent Constitutional Court. The JRC involves members nominated by the parties, and The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) selects the Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson. The JRC had a six-month mandate and held its first meeting on June 22. By the end of 2022, the JRC had yet to complete its mandate and requested an extension of its tenure.^[1]

[1] RJMEC report 014/2022; 015/2022; 016/2022; 017/2023.

2023

Minimum Implementation

After the establishment of the ad hoc Judicial Review Committee (JRC) in June 2023 for reviewing and recommending the Judiciary Act, the reconstitution of the Judicial Service Commission, and establishing an independent Constitutional Court, the JRC drafted a report as was under review as of December 2023.^[1]

[1] RJMEC. 2024. On The Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. Report No. 021/23 (January 2024).

2018

Minimum Implementation

Under R-ARCSS, the signatories agreed to enable humanitarian assistance for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) during the Pre-Transitional Period. The signatories also guaranteed the right of return for refugees and IDPs.

In September, the United Nations estimated that there were 1.96 million displaced persons within South Sudan.^[1] The UN further reported 65 “access incidents” in September, referring to incidents where aid workers were blocked from providing assistance to civilians, either by force or through “bureaucratic and administrative impediments,’’ including to displaced persons.^[2]

By October, the UN noted that “displaced people are beginning to return home” following the signing of R-ARCSS.^[3] That same month, the UN reported 58 new access incidents, some of which involved displaced persons.^[4] The UN further noted increased displacement in Wau state due to fighting there. ^[5] The UN estimated that there were 1.87 million internally displaced persons within South Sudan in December.”^[6] Despite the reduction, the UN identified thousands of newly displaced persons in Yei and noted “increased operational interference from the authorities.”^[7]

^[1] “Humanitarian bulletin South Sudan” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), September 30, 2018.

^[2] UN 90 Day report

^[3] “Humanitarian bulletin South Sudan” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), October 30, 2018.

^[4] UN 90 Day report

^[5] “Humanitarian bulletin South Sudan” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), October 30, 2018.

^[6]  “Humanitarian bulletin South Sudan” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), December 30, 2018.

^[7]  “Humanitarian bulletin South Sudan” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), December 30, 2018.

2019

Minimum Implementation

The United Nations reported that at the end of 2019 there were 1.46 million internally displaced persons within South Sudan.^[1]

^[1] “South Sudan situation,” United Nations High Commission for Refugees, January 10, 2020.

2020

Minimum Implementation

As of January, the IOM reports displacements due to flood and shows an uptick in the number of IDPs to 1.67 million.^[1]

^[1] “IOM South Sudan External Update – January 2020.” IOM, February 28, 2020.

2021

Minimum Implementation

The RJMEC report suggests conflict-related displacement in its report. Further, the IOM report released in December 2021, shows an uptick in the number of IDPs to over 2 million.^[1] One of the reasons for an increase in IDPs could be related to the net increase in returnees from abroad.

[1]  International Organization for Migration (IOM), Jul 26 2022. DTM South Sudan — Mobility Tracking Round 12 Initial Data Release. IOM, South Sudan. https://dtm.iom.int/reports/south-sudan-mobility-tracking-round-12-initial-data-release

2022

Minimum Implementation

Reports suggest that displacement took place due to the conflict, ethnic strife, and natural disasters. According to the IOM tracking of IDPs, over 2.25 million IDPs were present in South Sudan as of December 2022. ^[1]The RTGoNU has yet to address reconstruction, repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation, and reintegration-related issues.^[2]

[1] “Thousands Displaced in South Sudan Ethnic Violence, UN Reports.” Voice of America. https://www.voanews.com/a/thousands-displaced-in-south-sudan-ethnic-violence-un-reports/6896731.html, December 29, 2022; “Floods, Displacement and Violence in South Sudan.” International Crisis Group.

https://southsudan.crisisgroup.org/, October 27, 2022.

[2] RJMEC report 014/2022; 015/2022; 016/2022; 017/2023.

2023

Minimum Implementation

Reports suggest displacement due to the conflict, ethnic strife, and natural disasters. According to the IOM tracking of IDPs, over 2.3 million IDPs were there in South Sudan as of July 2023.^[1]

[1] “South Sudan .” IOM. https://dtm.iom.int/south-sudan, March 20, 2024.

2018

No Implementation

Under R-ARCSS, the National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC) must update the 2012 Political Parties Act to ensure it “complies with best practices for the free and democratic registration of Political Parties.”

No progress observed in 2018.

2019

No Implementation

No progress observed in 2019.

2020

No Implementation

Transition period started in February with the establishment of the RTGoNU, but no progress was reported with respect to the electoral reform.

2021

No Implementation

The transition period started in February with the establishment of the RTGoNU, but no progress was reported with respect to the electoral reform. In particular, significant issues remained related to the National Election Acts, the Political Parties Act, the reconstitution of National Election Commissions, and the finalization of the armament constitution process.^[1]

[1] On the Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (1^st October to 31^st  December 2021). Report no. 013/21. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC). 2 February 2022.

2022

No Implementation

The reconstitution of National Election Commissions (NEC) did not happen due to lack of consensus on members of the NEC. While the National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC) reviewed the National Election Act of 2012, the draft amendment was submitted to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs in November 2022.^[1] No further progress was reported.

[1] RJMEC report 014/2022; 015/2022; 016/2022; 017/2023.

2023

Minimum Implementation

On November 30, 2023, three institutions, particularly the Political Parties Council (PPC), the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC), and the National Election Commission (NEC), were reconstituted. These institutions are critical for preparing for the December 2024 elections. While these institutions are just reconstituted and members appointed, many election-related tasks, such as voter registration, civic education, voter outreach, and publication of voter registry six months before elections, are yet to be initiated and completed.

It is also noteworthy to mention that the NEC did not meet the gender quota as required in the R-ARCSS. Only one of the nine NEC members is a woman.^[1]

[1] RJMEC. 2024. On The Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. Report No. 021/23 (January 2024).

2018

No Implementation

As donor countries remained skeptical, the Sudanese Foreign Minister called on potential donor countries to support the implementation of R-ARCSS.^[1] The Troika countries (USA, UK and Norway) reiterated their commitment to fund the peace process on the condition that the parties show commitment to implementing the deal.^[2]

^[1] “Sudan’s FM calls on doubtful donors to support South Sudan’s peace,” Sudan Tribune, October 2, 2018.

^[2] “Troika to ‘fund’ South Sudan peace deal with conditions,” BBC news, October 13, 2018.

2019

Minimum Implementation

No direct deposit of funding reported. The AUC, China, Sudan and Egypt were reportedly providing in-kind support.^[1]

^[1] “RJMEC Quarterly Report to IGAD on the status of implementation of the R-ARCSS from 1st July to 30th September 2019,” Report No. 4. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, November 4, 2019.

2020

Minimum Implementation

While the Troika countries reiterated their commitment to the peace of South Sudan, they called upon the parties to fulfill the remaining obligations before the extended February 22 deadline.^[1] The Special Reconstruction Fund (SRF) and its Broad (BSRF) were to be completed within a month of establishing the RTGoNU. The World Bank approved a 45 Million USD grant to South Sudan to improve access to basic infrastructure and strengthen community institutions.^[2] While donor communities are supporting initiatives related to infrastructure development, they are not contributing to the fund created by the R-ARCSS.

^[1] “Troika urges South Sudan leaders to commit to peace.”South Sudan news Agency, January 2, 2020.

^[2] “World Bank offers S Sudan 45-million-dollar grant.” Eye Radio. August 4, 2020.

2021

Minimum Implementation

The Troika countries reiterated their commitment to the peace of South Sudan and noted the slow implementation of the Revitalized Agreement; most of the support from the United States and European countries was focused on the humanitarian issues in South Sudan.^[1] The humanitarian support was not for implementing the peace agreement. As part of the R-ARCSS (Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan), the Special Reconstruction Fund and its board were to be established during the first month of the Transition Period, and a donors’ conference was to be concerned. These did not happen, including the $100 initiation contribution required by the RToGNU.^[2]

[1] “U.S. Government Provides Additional $95 Million in Humanitarian Assistance.” US Embassy Juba. https://ss.usembassy.gov/humanitarian-assistance-04232021/ (April 23, 2021); “EU allocates over €43 million in humanitarian aid to South Sudan.” European Commission. 22 April 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_1847

[2] On the Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (1^st October to 31^st  December 2021). Report no. 013/21. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC). 2 February 2022.

2022

Minimum Implementation

Donor fatigue was reported regarding supporting humanitarian and peacebuilding priorities in South Sudan. Among the Troika countries, the United States withdrew from the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) and the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM), which translated into funding issues for the work of the RJMEC and CTSAMVM.^[1] As part of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), the Special Reconstruction Fund and its board were to be established as well as a donors’ conference. This did not take place even after drawing the attention of the RToGNU by the RJMEC.^[2]

[1] “US Withdraws From Peace Monitoring Groups in South Sudan.” Voice of America.  July 15, 2022. https://www.voanews.com/a/us-withdraws-from-peace-monitoring-groups-in-south-sudan-/6661298.html

[2] RJMEC report 014/2022; 015/2022; 016/2022; 017/2023.

2023

Minimum Implementation

No further information on donor support specific to the peace implementation process is available. While donor partners continuously provide humanitarian support and development projects, the RJMEC calls on international actors to fund critical mechanisms, capacity building, and civil education directly.^[1]

[1] RJMEC. 2024. On The Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. Report No. 021/23 (January 2024).

2018

No Implementation

Under R-ARCSS, the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) was required to review and implement the Strategic Economic Development Roadmap, stabilize public finances, Constituency Development Fund (CDF) program, implement the recommendations of the Private Sector Development Strategy (PSDS), develop Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) among rural populations and the urban poor, establish a Youth Enterprise Development Fund, establish a Women Enterprise Development Fund, establish micro-finance institutions, promote social welfare development policy, and establish Social Security Fund.

No progress observed in 2018.

2019

No Implementation

No progress observed in 2019.

2020

No Implementation

The World Bank approved a 45 Million USD grant to South Sudan to improve access to basic infrastructure and strengthen community institutions.^[1] The government has not provided information on the initiatives.

^[1] “World Bank offers S Sudan 45-million-dollar grant.” Eye Radio. August 4, 2020.

2021

No Implementation

No further information is available specific to development. The Agreement mandates the establishment of the Economic and Financial Management Authority (EFMA), which was not established. There was no specific progress on the oil revenue fund, the National Petroleum and Gas Commission restructuring, and the Nile Petroleum Corporation. Among different enterprise development funds, the Youth Enterprise Development Fund bill was drafted and tabled with the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, but no further progress was reported.^[1]

[1] On the Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (1^st July to 3oth September 2021). Report no. 013/21. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC). 20 October 2022;

2022

Minimum Implementation

No further information is available specific to development. The pressing development challenge in South Sudan is public finance management. Therefore, the agreement includes reforms specific to the public and finance sectors. No significant progress was reported in terms of establishing the Economic and Financial Management Authority (EFMA), the restructuring of the National Petroleum and Gas Commission, and the Nile Petroleum Corporation. Among different enterprise development funds, the Youth Enterprise Development Fund bill was established.^[1]

It was reported that the African Development Bank approved the Youth Enterprise Development and Capacity Building Project that sought to increase the employability of South Sudanese youth between the ages of 18 and 35 by strengthening the private sector, building entrepreneurship skills, and improving enabling environments. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning is currently implementing this project.^[2]

[1] RJMEC report 014/2022; 015/2022; 016/2022; 017/2023.

[2] “South Sudan – Youth Enterprise Development and Capacity Building Project,” https://projectsportal.afdb.org/dataportal/VProject/show/P-SS-I00-008

2023

Minimum Implementation

It was reported that the RTGoNU developed a National Land Policy as outlined in the R-ARCSS. The policy, which is seen as the foundation for long-term economic development, is waiting for the approval of the Council of Ministers. Nevertheless, the independent land registry has yet to be created.^[1]

[1] RJMEC. 2023. On The Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. Report No. 019/23 (July 2023).

2018

No Implementation

Following the disengagement and separation/cantonment of forces, the signatories agreed that non-reintegrated personnel would be demobilized and disarmed, with particular focus on the collection of long and medium range heavy weapons.

The JMEC’s overview report covering implementation through December 31, 2018, noted that the DDR commission had not been formed and that demobilization had not begun.^[1]

^[1] “Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) seventh meeting,” Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, January 19, 2019.

2019

No Implementation

The SPLM/A-IO, SSPDF, and SSOA (South Sudan Opposition Alliance) signed an agreement on February 5^th establishing 25 cantonment sites to begin the DDR Process.^[1] On May 2, 2019, the interim chair of the RJMEC stated that “my greatest concern is the delayed operationalization of the cantonment sites, despite my repeated appeal to the Parties to expedite this process. To my knowledge, as I speak, there is not a single cantonment site that is operational.”^[2] In June, the CTSAMVM began evaluating the proposed cantonment sites, and noted logistical issues such as a lack of food, shelter, and medicine.^[3] The CTSAMVM report from September 5 noted that “the cantonment process remains slow.”^[4] On September 18, Special Representative David Shearer reported to the Security Council that government and opposition troops had reported to the cantonment sites and that the troops had begun to be registered.^[5] Shearer and the CTSAMVM both noted continued logistical shortfalls. President Kiir appointed the DDR commission required by the agreement in September; however, the body did not begin its work in 2019.^[6] On December 17^th, the interim chair of the RJMEC reported that “no screening, no selection and no training (of the new unified armed forces) has taken place.”^[7]

^[1] “South Sudan peace partners agree on cantonment sites,” Radio Tamazuj, archived from the original on https://web.archive.org/web/20190207205358/https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/south-sudan-peace-partners-agree-on-cantonment-sites

^[2] “Meeting of the parties to the R-ARCSS held in Addis,” Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, May 2, 2019, https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/press-release/item/441-meeting-of-the-parties-to-the-r-arcss-held-in-addis

^[3] “Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) eleventh meeting,” Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, June 11, 2019.

^[4] “Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) fourteenth meeting,” Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, September 5, 2019.

^[5] “Statement of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General David Shearer Briefing to the Security Council on South Sudan,” United Nations Mission in South Sudan, September 18, 2019.

^[6] “Kiir reconstitutes DDR Commission,” Radio Tamazuj, September 12, 2019.

^[7] “Implementation of the Pre-Transitional period to improve with availability of funds,” Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, December 17, 201.

2020

No Implementation

As of the end of March, the DDR Commission registered 13,850 ex-combatants in the cantonment sites, barracks, and training centers. The Commission, however, was not fully functional, and no ex-combatant were disarmed.^[1]

^[1] “RJMEC quarterly report to IGAD on the status of the implementation of R-ARCSS from 1^st January to 31^st March 2020,” Report No. 6. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, April 20, 2020.

2021

No Implementation

As of the end of December, little to no progress was made on disarming the combatants.^[1]

[1] On the Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (1^st October to 31^st  December 2021). Report no. 013/21. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC). 2 February 2022.

2022

No Implementation

As of the end of December, little to no progress was made on disarming the combatants.^[1]

[1] On the Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (1st October to 31st December 2022). Report no. 017.

2023

Minimum Implementation

As of the end of December, an estimated 55,000 combatants have graduated to join the NUF, which suggests that those joining the NUF will not go through the disarmament process. It is only for those possessing weapons and did not qualify for the NUF. There were reports of disqualified combatants, their disarmament has not progressed.^[1] Further, it is reported that security forces collected some 2,264 weapons from individuals who were not authorized to possess weapons.^[2]

[1] UNSC. 2023. Assessment of progress achieved on the key benchmarks established in paragraph 2 of resolution 2577 (2021) (S/2023/300). 28 April 2023.

[2] RJMEC. 2024. On The Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. Report No. 021/23 (January 2024)

2018

Minimum Implementation

R-ARCSS contained a detailed implementation timeline in Annexure D. The following activities were to be completed in 2018:

Chapter I

• Nominations to various institutions including the RJMEC within two weeks
• Establishment of the National Pre-Transitional Committee (NPTC) within two weeks
• Establishment of a fund for Pre-Transition Period activities within three weeks

Chapter II

• Disengagement of forces and withdrawal of allied troops within fifteen days
• Releasing Prisoners of war immediately
• Ensuring the departure of non-South Sudanese armed groups from South Sudan within 45 days
• Completion of cantonment within thirty days
• Completion of DDR within 45 days
• Formation of the Joint Transitional Security Committee (JTSC) within fifteen days

Chapter VII

• Reconstitution of the JMEC within fifteen days

Chapter VIII

• Ratification of R-ARCSS by the Transitional National Legislature (TNL) within seven days

With respect to Chapter I issues in R-ARCSS, the nominations to most bodies were completed in 2018. The NPTC (National Pre-Transitional Committee) was established in September. The fund for the Pre-Transitional Period was established in November, as was the JTSC.

With respect to Chapter II issues, disengagement of forces, DDR, withdrawal of troops, and complete release of prisoners did not occur in 2018, as required.

With respect to Chapter VII issues, the RJMEC was formed within fifteen days, as required.

With respect to Chapter VIII issues, R-ARCSS was not ratified by the TNL within seven days as required, but it was ratified in October.^[1]

^[1]  “Progress report no. 3: On the implementation status of the R-ARCSS 2018,” Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, November 5, 2018.

2019

Minimum Implementation

Only one additional provision mentioned in the detailed timeline was completed during the year: the withdrawal of foreign forces from the country. However, more than 50% of the remaining tasks were still outstanding.^[1]

^[1] “RJMEC quarterly report to IGAD on the status of the implementation of R-ARCSS from 1^st January to 31^st March 2019,” Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, April 08, 2019.

2020

Minimum Implementation

All scheduled tasks were either not initiated on schedule or not completed.

2021

Minimum Implementation

All scheduled tasks were either not initiated on schedule or incomplete.

2022

Minimum Implementation

All scheduled tasks were either not initiated on schedule or not completed.

2023

Minimum Implementation

All scheduled tasks were either not initiated on schedule or not completed.

2018

No Implementation

The R-ARCSS signatories agreed to canton their forces within thirty days of signing in order to reintegrate or demobilize and disarm armed groups. The parties agreed to reconstitute the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Re-Integration (DDR) Commission within thirty days.

The JMEC’s overview report covering implementation through December 31, 2018, noted that the DDR commission had not been formed and that demobilization had not begun.^[1]

^[1] “On the status of implementation on the resolution of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan,” Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, January 26, 2019.

2019

Minimum Implementation

The SPLM/A-IO, SSPDF, and SSOA signed an agreement on February 5^th establishing 25 cantonment sites to begin the DDR Process.^[1] On May 2, 2019, the interim chair of the RJMEC stated that “my greatest concern is the delayed operationalization of the cantonment sites, despite my repeated appeal to the Parties to expedite this process. To my knowledge, as I speak, there is not a single cantonment site that is operational.”^[2] In June, the CTSAMVM began evaluating the proposed cantonment sites and noted logistical issues such as a lack of food, shelter, and medicine.^[3] The CTSAMVM report from September 5 noted that “the cantonment process remains slow.”^[4] On September 18, Special Representative David Shearer reported to the Security Council that government and opposition troops had reported to the cantonment sites and that the troops had begun to be registered.^[5] Shearer and the CTSAMVM both noted continued logistical shortfalls. President Kiir appointed the DDR commission required by the agreement in September; however, the body did not begin its work in 2019.^[6] On December 17^th, the interim chair of the RJMEC reported that “no screening, no selection and no training (of the new unified armed forces) has taken place.”^[7]

^[1] “South Sudan peace partners agree on cantonment sites,” Radio Tamazuj, archived from the original on https://web.archive.org/web/20190207205358/https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/south-sudan-peace-partners-agree-on-cantonment-sites

^[2] “Meeting of the parties to the R-ARCSS held in Addis,” Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, May 2, 2019, https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/press-release/item/441-meeting-of-the-parties-to-the-r-arcss-held-in-addis

^[3] “Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) eleventh meeting,” Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, June 11, 2019.

^[4] “Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) fourteenth meeting,” Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, September 5, 2019.

^[5] “Statement of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General David Shearer Briefing to the Security Council on South Sudan,” United Nations Mission in South Sudan, September 18, 2019.

^[6] “Kiir reconstitutes DDR Commission,” Radio Tamazuj, September 12, 2019.

^[7] “Implementation of the Pre-Transitional period to improve with availability of funds,” Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, December 17, 201.

2020

No Implementation

In its June 9th report, the CTSAMVM suggested 75,000 registrations at cantonment sites and an additional 3,500 registrations outside. The Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC) suggested registering 18,732 Government and Other Organized Forces. The CTSAMVM reported a lack of resources to support the cantonment sites that were on the verge of collapse and risk approximately 35,000 combatants returning to their communities without the DDR process.^[1] The RJMEC, in its report, also noted the continued neglect of cantonment sites by the RTGoNU and asked for more support as the cantoned combatants and cantonment sites wait for the next phase.^[2] The DDR Commission was not able to deploy field coordination officers partly related to the COVID-19 pandemic.^[3]

^[1] “Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) Technical Committee Meeting, June 9,” Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, June 18, 2020 .

^[2] “RJMEC quarterly report to IGAD on the status of the implementation of R-ARCSS from 1^st April to 30^th  June, 2020,” Report No.7. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, July 15, 2020.

^[3] “RJMEC quarterly report to IGAD on the status of the implementation of R-ARCSS from 1^st April to 30^th  June, 2020,” Report No.7. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, July 15, 2020.

2021

Minimum Implementation

The RJMEC noted no significant progress specific to the DDR process. However, it was reported that the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) Commission submitted its strategy and policy document to the National Transitional Coordination Committee (NTC), but the RTGoNU has yet to make its decision.^[1]

[1] On the Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (1^st July to 30th September 2021). Report no. 013/21. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC). 20 October 2022;  On the Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (1^st October to 31^st  December 2021). Report no. 013/21. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC). 2 February 2022.

2022

Minimum Implementation

After the first phase of the DDR process, which mostly involved the regrouping of SPLM-IO combatants in cantonments, the DDR process made no significant advancements. More than a year ago, the DDR Commission submitted its strategy and policy document involving the DDR-related issues to the RTGoNU. This has yet to be solidified.^[1]

[1] On the Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (1st October to 31st December 2022). Report no. 017.

2023

Intermediate Implementation

After the first phase of the DDR process, which mostly involved the regrouping of SPLM-IO combatants in cantonments, the DDR process made no significant advancements. The RTGoNU has yet to validate the DDR Commission’s submitted strategy and policy documents involving DDR-related issues. The DDR Commission needs more resources to implement its program.^[1]

By the first quarter of 2023, all 55,000 combatants graduated from the Necessary Unified Forces (NUF) as well as those who were disqualified from joining the NUF. As such, the number of combatants to be demobilized included those who did not qualify to join the NUF. The DDR commission has yet to manage those disqualified combatants.^[2]

[1] RJMEC. 2024. On The Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. Report No. 021/23 (January 2024)

[2] RJMEC. 2023. On The Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. Report No. 019/23 (July 2023).

2018

No Implementation

One of the guiding principles for the constitution writing process was “the right of communities to preserve their history, develop their language, promote their culture and (express) their identities.”

No progress observed in 2018.

2019

No Implementation

No progress observed in 2019.

2020

No Implementation

As a permanent constitution-making process has yet to be initiated, no further information is available on issues related to cultural protection.

2021

No Implementation

As a permanent constitution-making process has yet to be initiated, no further information is available on issues related to cultural protection.

2022

No Implementation

The permanent constitution-making process is required to respect “ethnic and regional diversity and communal rights, including the right of communities to preserve their history, develop their language, promote their culture and expression of their identities.” As a permanent constitution-making process has yet to be fully initiated, no further information is available on issues related to cultural protection.

2023

No Implementation

The R-ARCSS seeks a people-led permanent constitution, and the NCRC includes a broad range of representations, including ethnic minorities. While the constitution has yet to be drafted and address issues specific to cultural protection, the appointment of ethnic minorities as NCRC members is going in the right direction.^[1]

[1] RJMEC. 2024. On The Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. Report No. 021/23 (January 2024).

2018

No Implementation

R-ARCSS stipulated that the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) initiate a permanent constitution drafting process once inaugurated.

No progress observed in 2018.

2019

No Implementation

No progress observed in 2019.

2020

No Implementation

With the appointment of the First Vice President and three of the four Vice Presidents on February 22^nd, the process of drafting a permanent constitution began. The RTGoNU (Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unit) initiated and oversaw the permanent constitution-making process, including an enactment of laws to govern the process, reconstitute the NCAC (National Constitutional Amendment Committee), appoint a preparatory sub-committee for the convening of the National Constitutional Conference. The RJMEC (Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission) convened a workshop moderated by an international institute known for its constitution-making work for the parties.^[1] The parties agreed to a workshop in February 2021 to determine the permanent constitution-making process.

^[1] “Progress report no. 6: On the implementation status of the R-ARCSS,” Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, April 20, 2020.

2021

Minimum Implementation

The National Constitutional Amendment Committee  (NCAC) was operational and active in 2021. The committee drafted the Permanent Constitution Making Process Bill 2021 and presented it to the RTGoNU (Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity) Council of Ministers for their approval on 19 October. The Bill is foundational for reconstituting and establishing institutions and mechanisms tasked with completing the final constitution and providing timelines.^[1]

[1] On the Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (1^st October to 31^st  December 2021). Report no. 013/21. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC). 2 February 2022.

2022

Minimum Implementation

While the National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC) was established in 2021, the process of drafting the permanent constitution had a slow start. The 2022 Constitution Making Process Bill was tabled in the Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA) and was referred to a specialized justice sub-committee. However, the bill was introduced when the SPLM-IO members were boycotting the assembly for amendments introduced in the political parties bill.^[1]

The bill was reintroduced again in the TNLA and was passed in November 2022, and became law in December 2022 with the assent of the President. Following the assent, the RJMEC notes that the constitution-making process would involve implementing 18 different tasks, including reconstituting the National Constitution Review Commission, the Constitution Drafting Committee, the Preparatory Sub-Committee, the National Constitutional Conference, and the Constituent Assembly. Among other tasks are the public consultations of the draft constitution.^[2]

[1] On the Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (1st April to 30th June 2022). Report no. 015/22.

[2] On the Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (1st October to 31st December 2022). Report no. 017.

2023

Minimum Implementation

After the establishment of the National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC) in 2021, the process of drafting the permanent constitution had a slow start. The NCAC reviewed several important laws and drafted new acts and bills. The NCAC is expected to complete its mandate soon. According to the RJMEC report, the NCAC reviewed a total of 25 laws and drafted necessary amendments confirming the provisions in the 2018 agreement.^[1] However, it was only in November 2023 that President Kiir reconstituted the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC). ^[2] The members of the NCRC were sworn in in December 2023. The establishment of the NCRC is a necessary step in making the permanent constitution according to the Constitution Making Process Act of 2022. The 58-member NCRC had representatives from different political parties, civil society, academia, ethnic minorities, business communities, and other sectors, including refugees, IDPs, and persons living with disabilities.^[3] The Commission however did not meet the 33% gender threshold as required by the R-ARCSS.

In the constitution-making process and within the NCRC, the Constitution Drafting Committee members have yet to be appointed, and the Preparatory Sub-Committee is yet to be established.^[4]

[1] RJMEC. 2024. On The Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. Report No. 021/23 (January 2024).

[2] Kiir reconstitutes Elections Commission, Political Parties Council, Constitutional Review Commission. Radio Tamazuj. November 4, 2023. https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/kiir-reconstitutes-elections-commission-political-parties-council-constitutional-review-commission

[3] Kiir reconstitutes Elections Commission, Political Parties Council, Constitutional Review Commission. Radio Tamazuj. November 4, 2023. https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/kiir-reconstitutes-elections-commission-political-parties-council-constitutional-review-commission

[4] RJMEC. 2024. On The Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. Report No. 021/23 (January 2024).

2018

No Implementation

Under the R-ARCSS, the signatories agreed to refrain from recruiting or using child soldiers in their armed forces.

In October, The CTSAMVM reported that it “observed Child Soldiers in the ranks of IO forces” in October in Western Equatoria and Unity states. The SPLM/A-IO claimed that there were no child soldiers in their forces in Western Equatoria and promised to investigate in Unity state.^[1]

In November, The CTSAMVM investigated the use of child soldiers by the SPLM/A-IO in Unity state, as well as child soldiers in the SSPDF that local commanders claimed were part of a militia being integrated into the SSPDF. The transitional government rejected the claim that there were child soldiers in the SSPDF.^[2] The CTSAMVM reported several instances where it had verified the use of child soldiers in the SPLM/A-IO, which the SPLM/A-IO pledged to investigate.^[3]

In December, the CTSAMVM did not report additional observations of child soldiers. The SSPDF claimed that the child soldiers identified in November had been demobilized. The SPLM/A-IO claimed that the child soldiers identified in their ranks in November were orphans. Neither claim was independently verified.^[4]

^[1] “Progress report no. 2: Status of implementation of the R-ARCSS 2018,” Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, October 12, 2018.

^[2] “Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) fourth meeting,” Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, November 8, 2018.

^[3]  “Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) fifth meeting,” Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, November 28, 2018.

^[4]  “Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) sixth meeting,” Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, December 19, 2018.

2019

Minimum Implementation

Sixty-eight child soldiers were released from a militia and began integrated into the SSPDF on January 31^st.^[1]  UNICEF announced that 119 child soldiers were released from the South Sudan National Liberation Movement on February 12.^[2] UNICEF announced that rebel groups had released 32 child soldiers on July 24, 2019.^[3] However, in September, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan reported that “boys under the age of 15 years of age continue to be forcibly recruited—including by members of the SPLA/M-IO and other opposition groups in Juba and Western Bahr el Ghazal, as well as by the Government in Greater Bahr el Ghazal. Ironically, the prospect of a peace deal has accelerated the forced recruitment of children, with various groups now seeking to boost their numbers before they move into the cantonment sites.”^[4]

^[1] “Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) eighth meeting,” Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, February 5, 2019.

^[2] “More than 3,000 children released from armed groups in South Sudan since conflict began, but thousands more continue to be used,” UNICEF, February 12, 2019.

^[3] “32 children released from opposition groups in South Sudan,” UNICEF, July 24, 2019.

^[4] “Statement of the Chairperson and members of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, at the 42^nd Human Rights Council session,” United Nations Human Rights Council, September 16, 2019.

2020

No Implementation

The CTSAMVM received reports of child soldiers. Through the coordination of UNMISS (United Nations Mission in South Sudan), UNICEF, and the National DDR team, 12 child soldiers who were at Lologo Training Center were released.^[1]

^[1] “Outcome of Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) meeting on June 9,” Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, July 20, 2020.

2021

Minimum Implementation

There was no report of recruitment of child soldiers in 2021. However, the second quarterly report published by the RJMEC (Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan) notes the abduction of 84 children in Jonglei in May 2021 by Gawar Nuer and the Dinka youths on Gumuruk and Likungole.^[1] UNICEF reports most children in South Sudan being denied the right to be a child as they were abused and exploited as soldiers, among other things.^[2]  Further, UNICEF reports children’s rights as one of the most neglected issues in South Sudan.

[1] On the Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (1^st April to 30^th June 2021). Report no. 011/21. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC). 15 July 2021.

[2] For every child, a childhood. UNICEF https://www.unicef.org/southsudan/for-every-child-a-childhood#:~:text=Children%20highlight%20most%20children%20in,as%20soldier%2C%20for%20sexual%20purposes%E2%80%A6

2022

Minimum Implementation

During the year, reports from the UN Secretary-General and Human Rights Watch suggested numerous violations against children. Reports noted that children were killed, abducted, and subjected to sexual violence by the state and armed groups. In its report, Human Rights Watch claimed that the South Sudanese authorities failed to investigate abuses of children and additional violations by the National Security Service. In September 2022, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, in its review of the initial report of South Sudan, asked for the government forces and armed groups to recommit to protecting children.^[1]

[1] “Experts of the Committee on the Rights of the Child Praise South Sudan’s Child Act, Ask about the Recruitment of Children by Government Forces and Armed Groups, and about School Feeding Schemes,” UNCHR. 2 September 2022. https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2022/09/experts-committee-rights-child-praise-south-sudans-child-act-ask-about-recruitment

2023

Minimum Implementation

According to a UNICEF report, children in South Sudan faced a higher risk of violence, exploitation, and abuse, including conflict-related sexual violence and gender-based violence. The gender and sexual violence against children was also noted in the UN Mission in South Sudan report.^[1] Also, it is reported that the UN blacklisted the South Sudan’s Defense Forces for recruiting children.^[2]

[1] UNICEF. 2024. Humanitarian Situation Report No. 12 (Reporting Period 1 January to 31 December 2023) https://www.unicef.org/documents/south-sudan-humanitarian-situation-report-end-year-2023. UNMISS. 2024. Brief on Violence Affecting Civilians (October – December 2023). https://unmiss.unmissions.org/press-release-surge-intercommunal-conflict-causing-immense-harm-civilians-south-sudan-according

[2] SSPDF remains on child recruitment blacklist, says DDR. Radio Tamazuj. 13 October 2023. https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/sspdf-remains-on-child-recruitment-blacklist-says-ddr

2018

Intermediate Implementation

The signatories declared a permanent ceasefire in the agreement from the date of signing.

The JMEC (Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission) 15-day implementation report noted fighting in Central Equatoria and Unity states in September.^[1] The Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) was formed and began investigating violations.^[2] Importantly, President Kiir reportedly ordered the armed forces to abide by the ceasefire in response to initial violations.^[3]

The JMEC 30-day implementation report noted that the “CTSAMVM has reported a marked decline in fighting across the country except in Yei River State,” where fighting was ongoing.  However, the report notes that the initiator was an alliance of non-signatory groups identified as the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SWAKA-SSOA), which attacked SPLM/A-IO (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition) positions from October 12 to October 16.^[4] However, on October 20, the National Salvation (NAS) group accused the SPLM/A-IO, the primary non-government signatory, of preparing an attack on their forces in Yei River state.^[5] The JMEC 30-day report claims the NAS is part of the SSOA-SWAKA group, but did not confirm the attack by the SPLM/A-IO. The Federal Democratic Party (FDP) accused the SPLM/A-IO of attacking their positions in the Upper Nile state, which the SPLM/A-IO denied.^[6] The JMEC report similarly did not confirm this attack.

The CTSAMVM report on November 28 noted four ceasefire violation reports in November: two were reported by the SPLM/A-IO and two by the South Sudan People’s Defense Force (SSPDF).  There were two fatalities. In one case, the SSPDF accused the SPLA/M-IO of abducting two soldiers, which the SPLA/M-IO denied but promised to investigate.^[7] Two further violations were noted in the body’s December 19  report, including “widespread SGBV (sexual/gender-based violence) in Bentiu area during November.” Although the report notes “the challenge of Armed Youth linked to the SPLA-IO and SSPDF in Bentiu,” it does not identify the affiliation of the perpetrators.^[8]

The December 19 CTSAMVM report contained five allegations that the ceasefire was violated, including continued SGBV in Bentiu, as well as multiple incidents between the SPLA/M-IO and the SSPDF.^[9] On December 18, the CTSAMVM reported that its monitoring team in Jubek state had been attacked and illegally detained by government forces.^[10]

^[1] “Status of implementation of R-ARCSS 2018,” Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, September 28, 2018.

^[2] “South Sudan ceasefire mechanism holds board meeting in Khartoum,” Sudan Tribune, September 28, 2018.

^[3] “South Sudan’s Kiir directs to abide by ceasefire agreement,” Sudan Tribune, September 25, 2018.

^[4] “Progress report no. 2: Status of implementation of the R-ARCSS 2018,” Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, October 12, 2018.

^[5] “Rebel group claims South Sudan ceasefire has been violated,” Voice of America, October 20, 2018.

^[6] Ibid.

^[7] “CTSAMVM technical committee fifth meeting,” Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, November 28, 2018.

^[8] “Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) sixth meeting,” Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, December 19, 2018.

^[9] Ibid.

^[10] “South Sudanese forces attack ceasefire monitors: CTSAMVM,” Sudan Tribune, December 19, 2018.

2019

Full Implementation

The ceasefire continued to hold in 2019. While the CTSAMVM (Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism) received occasional reports of violations against the SPLA/M-IO (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition) and the SSPDF (South Sudan People’s Defense Force), these were few and limited. In February, the SSPDF appeared to launch an offensive against a non-signatory, the National Salvation Front (NAS).^[1] In April, the CTSAMVM reported further fighting between the SSPDF and the NAS.^[2] In August, the CTSAMVM reported clashes between non-signatories in Aweil East, Raja and Yei River State.^[3]

^[1] “Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) eighth meeting,” Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, February 5, 2019.

^[2] “Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) tenth meeting,” Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, April 26, 2019.

^[3]29 “Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) fourteenth meeting,” Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, September 5, 2019.

2020

Intermediate Implementation

The ceasefire continued to hold in 2020. While the CTSAMVM (Ceasefire & Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring & Verification Mechanism) received occasional reports of violations against the SPLA/M-IO and the SSPDF (South Sudan People’s Defence Forces), these were few and limited. In April, the CTSAMVM reported multiple instances of allegations of attacks involving the SSPDF and SPLM-IO forces. The CTSAMVM investigated the incidents and verified them. The CTSAMVM found both sides in violation of the agreement.^[1] Intercommunal clashes and escalation of fighting involving the SSPDF/SPLA-IO and the National Salvation Front (NAS) were reported in Yei in the Equatoria in May.

^[1] “Fighting in Maiwut County 7 to 11 April 2020,” CTSAMVM Report 2020/04, June 18, 2020.

2021

Full Implementation

The ceasefire continued to hold in 2021. Meanwhile, the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring & Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) received occasional reports of violations against the SPLM-IO and the SSPDF (South Sudan People’s Defence Forces). The  CTSAMVM (Ceasefire & Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring & Verification Mechanism) reported attacks involving the SPLM-IO forces, and defected SPLM-IO members who joined the SSPDF. Clashes were reported in Upper Nile State, Jonglei State.^[1] Nevertheless, the mechanism to address ceasefire related violations was up and running.

[1]On the Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (1 st January to 31 st March 2021). Report no. 010/21. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC). 24 April, 2021; On the Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (1 st October to 31 st December 2021). Report no. 013/21. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC). 24 April, 2021.

2022

Full Implementation

Reports from the RJMEC (Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict), the CTSAMVM (Ceasefire & Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring & Verification Mechanism) and the UN Secretary General indicate the success of the permanent ceasefire arrangements negotiated in the agreement. However, there were reports of numerous ceasefire violations in Upper Nile and Unity States and the Equatorias that involved both the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army – In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) citing internal dynamics created by those who defected from SPLM/A-IO and their forces.^[1] There are also reports of both forces continuing to occupy civilian centers, violating the ceasefire arrangements.

In July 2022, the United States withdrew its support to the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM), which severely limited the mechanism in its monitoring and verification of ceasefire related issues.^[2]

[1] On the Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (1st January to 31st March 2022). Report no. 014/22. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC); On the Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (1st October to 31st December 2022). Report no. 017. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC). Situation in South Sudan: Report of the Secretary General (S/2022/689), 13 September 2022.

[2] US Withdraws from Peace Monitoring Groups in South Sudan, Voice of America, 15 July 2022.

2023

Full Implementation

In general, the ceasefire between the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army – In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) held in 2023. Nevertheless, the CTSAMVM and RJMEC reports suggest clashes between these two armed forces in Eastern and Central Equatoria State, Upper Nile States, Tonga, and Unity State. Part of the reasons for the ceasefire violations were related to the defection of SPLM-IO forces under different generals and commanders. Nevertheless, the CTSAMVM, a mechanism in place to monitor and resolve ceasefire violation related issues, was functioning and stopping the conflagration of the violence.^[1]

[1] RJMEC. 2023. On The Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. Report No. 018/23  (April 2023), Report No. 019/23 (July 2023), Report No. 020/23 (October 2023), Report No. 021/23 (January 2024). RJMEC. 2024. On The Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. Report No. 021/23 (January 2024). RJMEC. 2023. Five Year Progress Report on the Status of Implementation of the Revitilised Peace Agreement (Sept 2018 Dec 2023). December 2023.