Military Reform: Chapultepec Peace Agreement

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Military Reform: Chapultepec Peace Agreement

Implementations

Military Reform – 1992

The accord does not require integration of FMLN into El Salvador’s military. The accord intends to reform the military and make it respectful to human rights and under the control of the civilian government and downsize to below 22,000 personnel. In this regard, the Legislative Assembly met the deadlines for passing constitutional reforms regarding military reform, but the Treasury Police and National Guard failed to formally disband and integrate within the Armed Forces of El Salvador (FAES) on time.1 The Parties subsequently reached a negotiated agreement to present legislation to definitively abolish the National Guard and Treasury Police and establish a “Special Brigade for Military Security” (with no further transfers from military bodies to the National Civil Police) by 30 June 1992.2 The Academic Council of the Military College was established more than two months late, with members finally appointed on 31 July 1992.3

The National Intelligence Department was disbanded ahead of schedule, but the new State Intelligence Agency was founded six weeks late and the director was appointed three months late. The FMLN complained that the FAES were still conducting intelligence operations inside El Salvador, but ONUSAL was not able to verify these claims.4

The FAES ceased making arrests after the commencement of the cessation of armed conflict on 1 February 1992.

In conjunction with the negotiations that brought a formal end to the armed conflict on 15 December 1992, the President of the Republic agreed to implement the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission on purification. President Cristiani promptly responded to the decision of the Commission, but failed to heed all of the Commission’s recommendations.5

There were around 60,000 military personnel in El Salvador in 1991, which decreased to the strength of 49,000 personnel.6 The accord called for the reduction in the armed force to 22,000 personnel.

  1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999), May 26, 1992.
  2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/23999/Add.1), June 16, 1992.
  3. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/24833), November 23, 1992.
  4. ibid. United Nations Security Council (S/24833).
  5. “Letter Dated 7 January 1993 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/25078), January 9, 1993.
  6. Bennett, D. Scott, and Allan Stam, “EUGene: A Conceptual Manual.” International Interactions (2000), 26:179-204.

Military Reform – 1993

Correspondence between President Cristiani and UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali continued regarding the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Commission on purification. The concerns centered around 15 military officers for whom President Cristiani did not follow the recommendations of the Commission at first. On 30 June 1993, the FAES High Command issued an order that removed the officers, bringing the Government into compliance with the Ad Hoc Commission’s recommendations.1

The 22 December 1992 agreement stipulated that the Government of El Salvador should inform the public of the new FAES doctrine, but it was slow to do so.2

As a step towards reform, the military incorporated lessons on the rule of law, international humanitarian law, and respect for human rights into its trainings.3

ONUSAL verified that the National Intelligence Department was formally dismantled in November 1993, and the new State Intelligence Agency was created. It was part of the military reform. It was not clear whether the FAES were still engaged in intelligence activities outside those permitted by the Peace Agreements4

The estimated strength of El Salvadorian armed force remained 49,000 personnel in 1993.5

  1. (S/25078), January 9,1993; “Letter Dated 7 July 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (S/26052), July 8, 1993.
  2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/25812), May 21, 1993; “Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/26790), November 23, 1993.
  3. “Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador up to 30 April 1993,” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/47/968 S/26033), July 2, 1993.
  4. (S/26790), November 23, 1993.
  5. Scott and Stam, “EUGene: A Conceptual Manual,” 26:179-204.

Military Reform – 1994

The ONUSAL Human Rights Division worked with the FAES to develop military training modules in democracy, rule of law, human rights, and the new doctrine of national defense.1 Progress was made in these educational efforts, but evidence of criminal activity by FAES personnel continued to surface.2

Compensation of demobilized members of the FAES, which began on 15 December 1993, proceeded quickly in early 1994, and it was agreed on 28 January 1994 that the indemnities should be fully distributed by 30 June 1994.3

The estimated strength of El Salvadorian armed force reduced to 22,000 personnel in 1994.4

  1. “Tenth report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/49/116 S/1994/385), April 5, 1994.
  2. “Eleventh Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (1 March — 30 June 1994),” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/49/281 S/1994/886), July 28, 1994.
  3. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council (S/1994/561), May 11, 1994.
  4. Scott and Stam, “EUGene: A Conceptual Manual,” 26:179-204.

Military Reform – 1995

ONUSAL reported multiple instances of the FAES conducting public security tasks, despite the transfer of policing responsibilities to the National Civil Police. The Constitution grants the President of the Republic the power to deploy the FAES for public safety in dire cases, and the President indeed authorized the FAES to aid the National Civil Police with law enforcement due to high crime rates.1

The estimated strength of El Salvadorian armed force reduced to 22,000 personnel in 1994.2

  1. “Thirteenth Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),” United Nations General Assembly / Security Council (A/49/888 S/1995/281), April 18, 1995.
  2. Scott and Stam, “EUGene: A Conceptual Manual,” 26:179-204.

Military Reform – 1996

The FAES stayed out of matters of public security and maintained appropriate numbers for conditions of peace.1 The military was sensitized with human rights education and remained under control of civilian government. As of 2002, the strength of the El Salvadorian military was estimated around 17,000 personnel.2 The military was drastically downsized from 60,000 in 1991 to 17,000 in 2002.

  1. “El Salvador: 10th anniversary of Peace Accords, still no justice for victims of human rights violations,” January 16, 2002.
  2. Scott and Stam, “EUGene: A Conceptual Manual,” 26:179-204.

Military Reform – 1997

No further developments observed.

Military Reform – 1998

No further developments observed.

Military Reform – 1999

No further developments observed.

Military Reform – 2000

No further developments observed.

Military Reform – 2001

No further developments observed.