National Pact

  • 83%
  • Implementation Score 
    after 10 years
Provisions in this Accord
Cease Fire

TITLE II ON THE FINAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND ON THE SETTLEMENT OF QUESTIONS EMERGING FROM THE SITUATION OF ARMED CONFLICT

5. A permanent cease-fire will come into force at zero hour on the day the signature of the Pact.

Implementation History
1992

Intermediate Implementation

As agreed, the ceasefire agreement came into force at zero hours on 11 April, 1992. The Ceasefire Commission (CCF) was already in place to monitor the ceasefire agreement between the Malian state and the Azawad Unified Movements and Fronts (MFUA), which had been negotiated earlier on 6 January 1991. The CCF monitoring mechanism was still in place but because of the fall of the dictatorship on January 8, 1991- immediately after the ceasefire agreement- the Malian authorities lacked resources to support the CCF. The donors were not supportive of the CCF’s efforts. As negotiated, the CCF was expected to have 10 units in different parts of the country, yet only four became operational. This disparity was due to a lack of resources. Algerians did provide partial support to the CCF (vehicles and some fuel). Notwithstanding the limited resources, the CCF arrested some agitators for violating the ceasefire agreement. There were no violations of the ceasefire reported in 1992. 1

  • 1.   Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, A Peace in Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking (United Nations Publication, 1998), 64-65.
1993

Intermediate Implementation

The CCF lacked resources, and out of the planned ten units, only four units were created and these were sporadically operational. Nevertheless, the CCF units were able to arrest agitators.2 Though hopes were high, a violation of ceasefire occurred when Malian soldiers apprehended three Tuareg refugees trying to return to Mali from Mauritania and stabbed them to death. Regular Malian troops also killed former Tuareg fighters who had joined the Malian army. 3

1994

Intermediate Implementation

A serious violation of the ceasefire agreement took place in 1994. On February 1994 Mouvement Populaire de l’Azawad (MPA) Col. Bilal Saloum was killed, allegedly by Armée révolutionnaire de liberation de l’Azawad (ARLA). This incident incited further violence between these two rebel movements. On June 15, 1994, three Malian Tuareg movements, the Islamic Arab Front of the Azaouad (FIAA), the ARLA, and the PFLA (Front populaire pour la libération de l’Azawad) called on their already integrated soldiers to quit the army and return to their bases in northern Mali. On June 20, 1994, the MUFA, (the group that had negotiated the National Pact on behalf of the Tuareg movement), said that 176 people had been killed by "forces of order" (police or soldiers) in northern Mali. The MUFA also contested that the deployment of the army in the northern part of the country was a violation of the spirit of the peace pact. The violence continued until October 23 1994, when the Tuaregs and the Malian government agreed to end the conflict within 6 months. 4

1995

Intermediate Implementation

Though they had committed in October of 1994 to end the conflict within six months, both sides continued to engage in violence. The Islamic Arab Front of Azawad was the only Tuareg group still thought to be in open conflict with the government. In January of 1995, the government army announced that they had captured the Ti-n-Edemba, headquarters of FIAA (Islamic Arab Front of Azawad). Tuareg rebels also launched three mortar bombs in Timbuktu 5. By the end of the year, however, violence had abated sufficiently. Most of the armed combatants had presented themselves and surrendered weapons in one of the four cantonment sites. 6

  • 5. Ibid.
  • 6.  Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, A Peace in Timbuktu, 77.
1996

Full Implementation

After 1995, sporadic violence was reported but these incidents did not undermine the 1992 National Pact. 

1997

Full Implementation

No ceasefire violation reported.

1998

Full Implementation

No ceasefire violation reported.

1999

Full Implementation

No ceasefire violation reported.

2000

Full Implementation

No ceasefire violation reported.

2001

Full Implementation

No ceasefire violation reported.

Legislative Branch Reform

SUB-TITLE B

MEASURES TO CONSOLIDATE NATIONAL UNITY

Implementation History
1992

Minimum Implementation

The Malian government made a reconciliatory concession by offering four seats in the National Assembly to ensure the real participation of the northern population. These seats were allegedly filled through elections in 1992. 1

1993

Minimum Implementation

Four seats in the National Assembly to ensure the participation of the northern population via the 1992 elections.

1994

Minimum Implementation

Four seats in the National Assembly to ensure the participation of the northern population via the 1992 elections.

1995

Minimum Implementation

Four seats in the National Assembly to ensure the participation of the northern population via the 1992 elections.

1996

Minimum Implementation

Four seats in the National Assembly to ensure the participation of the northern population via the 1992 elections.

1997

Full Implementation

Following the 1992 peace agreement, the first National Assembly elections were held in April 1997. Nevertheless, the results of this election were cancelled by the Constitutional Court due to irregularities on 25 April 1997. The second elections were held again in July and August of 1997. 2 Neither the information regarding by-elections, nor information regarding the persons representing the north, exists. Since this issue was never raised by insurgent groups in the peace process, this provision could be deemed implemented. Furthermore, the Tuareg political organization is fragmented, and has remained defined by traditional clan-based units.

1998

Full Implementation

Since representation of the northern population int he legislative branch of the government was  never raised by insurgent groups in the peace process, this provision could be deemed implemented. 

1999

Full Implementation

Since representation of the northern population int he legislative branch of the government was  never raised by insurgent groups in the peace process, this provision could be deemed implemented. 

2000

Full Implementation

Since representation of the northern population int he legislative branch of the government was  never raised by insurgent groups in the peace process, this provision could be deemed implemented. 

2001

Full Implementation

Since representation of the northern population int he legislative branch of the government was  never raised by insurgent groups in the peace process, this provision could be deemed implemented. 

Decentralization/Federalism

TITLE III SPECIAL STATUS OF THE NORTH OF MALI

Recognising the importance of the organisation and management of the affairs of the populations within the framework of the peaceful and permanent settlement of the armed conflict in the North of Mali, the two parties have agreed on a special status for the North of Mali.

Implementation History
1992

Minimum Implementation

Mali adopted a democratic constitution in February 1992 after overthrowing an authoritarian regime. In Chapter XI, the constitution dictates the rules surrounding regional and local government and section 98, it specifies, “municipal governments are [to be] freely administered by their elected councils, within conditions fixed by the law.” The Malian government’s decision to devolve power to the local government units was a response to three influences: external pressure (from the IMF and World Bank), their own initiatives to consolidate political power, and, finally, domestic pressure from the Taureg threat.1 After the signing of the National Pact, President Alpha Oumar Konar visited Northern Mali and inaugurated new administrative structures. The constitutional provision, the provision for special decentralization for the north, and the inauguration of administrative structures in northern Mali can all be considered serious efforts aimed at devolving power.

  • 1. Jennifer C. Seely, “A Political Analysis of Decentralisation: Co-opting the Tuareg Threat in Mali.” Journal of Modern African Studies 39, no. 3(2001): 499-524.
1993

Intermediate Implementation

In January 1993, the Decentralization Mission (DM) was formed by presidential decree (93-001). This mission was given a mandate to conceive, propose and facilitate decentralization within one year. Ousmane Sy was named director of the twelve-member board. And in February, the first decentralization law (93-008) was passed. The law outlined the rights and responsibilities of territorial collectivities.2 This law devolves power to the national subunits and gives autonomous control over health, education and some infrastructure, within their respective jurisdictions. These units were also allowed to collect revenue in order to facilitate their responsibilities related to health, education and infrastructure. 

  • 2. Ibid., 512, 521.
1994

Intermediate Implementation

The DM, originally established in 1993 to facilitate decentralization within one year, was granted an extension to three years by a presidential decree 94-051 in January 1994. The DM was focused on creating new administrative boundaries by giving villages the opportunity to group themselves into their desired communes. 

1995

Intermediate Implementation

In March 1995, Law 95-022 was passed. This law outlines the role of state functionaries in the administration of the new territorial collectivities. In April, villages began to deliberate on the self-determination of communes. Law 95-034 was passed, which established not only the Territorial Collectivities Code but also the jurisdiction of the new units’ governing bodies at different levels. In May the presidential decree was announced (Decree 95-210) which determined state representation at the level of collectivities.3

The outcome of these decentralization initiatives was the regrouping of the communes into eight regions. Depending on the size of their population, each commune could have a council of 11-15 members popularly elected for five-year terms. Similarly, councils, as provided by the decentralization law (95-034) were to be formed at the circle and regional levels with members drawn from lower collectivity representatives. Though the state was represented through the presence of civil servants at each level, this was a complete transfer of power to the new collectivities.

  • 3. Ibid., 522.
1996

Intermediate Implementation

By 1996, the entire infrastructure related to the devolution of power was finalized through the enactment of various laws and presidential decrees. The DM required all collectivities to be economically viable. And by 1996, 627 rural and 20 urban communes had been self-determined.4 But, elections for decentralized units were yet to be held. 

  • 4. Ibid.,  513.
1997

Intermediate Implementation

All structures for the collectivities were finalized but the elections for these collectivities were yet to be held. A total of 701 collectivities were finalized.5

  • 5. "Mali: Electoral Team Confirms Ruling Party's Victory in Municipal Elections," BBC Monitoring Africa, June 28, 1998.
1998

Intermediate Implementation

Communal level elections took place in 19 municipalities on June 21, 1998. The voter turnout was low due to the opposition’s boycott of the elections. In the elections, the ruling party, the Alliance for Democracy in Mali, (ADEMA) won 16 out of the 19 municipalities. The elections in other collectivities were scheduled for November.6 But the November elections for the remaining 782 municipalities were postponed again upon requests from 17 parties, asking for extra time to campaign. Elections were rescheduled for May 2 and June 6.7

  • 6. Ibid.
  • 7. "Mali local elections postponed, again," Agence France Presse, March 27, 1999.
1999

Full Implementation

In May, elections in 492 towns took place in the Kayes, Koulikoro, Sisasso and Segou regions. In these elections, the ruling Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA) won 4,193 of the 7,124 seats. There were 80 parties but only 30 parties took part in the elections.8 In the remaining towns, elections took place as scheduled on June 6. Following these elections, ethnic clashes occurred between Arab and Kounta communities. These communities fought over the control of Tarkint, a town in the Bourem district;38 people were killed and 13 wounded during the conflict.9

  • 8. "Ruling Mali Party Wins Over 4,000 Seats," Pan African News Agency, May 7, 1999.
  • 9. "Ethnic Clashes Kill 46 in Mali," Panafrican News Agency Daily Newswire, July 19, 1999.
2000

Full Implementation

Decentralization was successfully implemented in Mali. Instead of just devolving political and economic power to northern Mali, the government adopted and successfully implemented a decentralization program throughout the country. 

2001

Full Implementation

Decentralization was successfully implemented in Mali. Instead of just devolving political and economic power to northern Mali, the government adopted and successfully implemented a decentralization program throughout the country. 

Civil Administration Reform

SUB-TITLE B

MEASURES TO CONSOLIDATE NATIONAL UNITY

53. Furthermore, and in the same spirit, the Government will make an effort while taking account of the qualifications required - to integrate officials from the Movements and people from among the populations of Northern Mali, into the various organs of the public and semi-public services.

Implementation History
1992

No Implementation

Integration of former combatants into public and semi-public service did not materialize in 1992. 

1993

No Implementation

Integration of former combatants into public and semi-public service did not materialize in 1993. 

1994

No Implementation

Negotiations between the government and the MUFA took place in April and May of 1994 in Tamanrasset, Algeria. Both sides negotiated a range of issues including the reintegration of former combatants into uniformed forces and the integration of civilians into the civilian administration. Since the Front Islamique Arabe de l’Azawad (FIAA) demanded that 40% of integrated positions be reserved for itself, the government negotiators found themselves mediating between the demands of the two groups.1 Integration into the administration did not take place in 1994. 

  • 1. Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, A Peace in Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking (United Nations Publication, 1998).
1995

No Implementation

Integration into the administration did not take place in 1995.

1996

Full Implementation

Integration into the public administration took place in 1996. Yet different sources report conflicting data regarding this integration. One source reporting from the president’s office on 19 February 1997 claimed that a total of 120 persons were integrated into the civil services. Among them, 20 were senior officers, 20 were higher mid-level officers, 20 were lower mid-level officers, 30 junior officers, and 30 were lower rank. Also in 1996, 100 people were integrated into the customs service and another 50 into the water and forest.2 Another source claimed that a total of 149 persons were integrated into civilian administration.3 This integration of a portion of the former combatants completes the civil administration reform that was agreed upon in the National Pact of 1992. 

1997

Full Implementation

The integration of a portion of the former combatants into the civil administration took place in 1996, thus the civil administration reform, as agreed upon in the National Pact of 1992, was completed.

1998

Full Implementation

The integration of a portion of the former combatants into the civil administration took place in 1996.

1999

Full Implementation

The integration of a portion of the former combatants into the civil administration took place in 1996.

2000

Full Implementation

The integration of a portion of the former combatants into the civil administration took place in 1996.

2001

Full Implementation

The integration of a portion of the former combatants into the civil administration took place in 1996.

Truth or Reconciliation Mechanism

NATIONAL PACT

12. In accordance with the decision reached between the two parties at the Mopti Conference in December 1991, confirmed in their Algiers meeting of January 1992 and repeated at their meeting in March, the Independent Commission of Enquiry will be set up in Mopti within 15 days after signature of the Pact.

Implementation History
1992

No Implementation

Detailed information regarding the establishment of a commission of inquiry to investigate the deaths on both sides to the conflict remains unavailable. Allegedly, the commission of inquiry was established, but by the end of 1992 the commission had not done any work because consensus was lacking among foreign members. Even if the commission was not functional, the government was said to have been taking action. Yet none of the soldiers involved in the killings in the north were arrested.1

1993

No Implementation

Not implemented.

1994

No Implementation

Not implemented.

1995

No Implementation

Not implemented.

1996

No Implementation

Not implemented.

1997

No Implementation

Not implemented.

1998

No Implementation

Not implemented.

1999

No Implementation

Not implemented.

2000

No Implementation

Not implemented.

2001

No Implementation

Not implemented.

Dispute Resolution Committee

TITLE III: SPECIAL STATUS OF THE NORTH OF MALI

15. In accordance with the decision reached between the two parties at the Mopti Conference in December 1991, confirmed in their Algiers meeting of January 1992 and repeated at their meeting in March, the Independent Commission of Enquiry will be set up in Mopti within 15 days after signature of the Pact.

Implementation History
1992

Full Implementation

The commission for the supervision of the National Pact was established on 25 April 1992 at the Ministry of Internal Security. The committee consisted of four representatives from the Malian government, four from the Malians of the Unified Movements and Fronts of the Azaouad, and five Algerians. Mr. Soummana Diallo, the Malian government’s delegate to the north, chaired the commission; the purpose of the commission was to avoid any misunderstanding in the implementation of the National Pact.1 The commission’s first meeting took place on July 11, 1992.2 Active while violence was still taking place, the commission deplored the violence and called for the organization of awareness campaigns on the Pact through radio and television debates.

  • 1. "WEST AFRICA IN BRIEF; Mali national pact follow up committee installed," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 29, 1992.
  • 2. "Mali President meets Algerian and Tuareg delegates; pact committee meeting ends," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 14, 1992.
1993

Full Implementation

The fourth meeting of the National Pact Implementation Commission took place on 13-14 April 1993. The closing ceremony of the commission’s deliberation was presided over by President Konare. During deliberation, the commission reviewed the various phases of the National Pact’s implementation and expressed satisfaction with the progress that had been made.3

  • 3. "West AFrica; Mali: Meeting of National Pact Implementation Committee," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 14, 1993.
1994

Full Implementation

No information is available regarding the implementation commission’s activities. President Konare claimed that the implementation of the peace deal was blocked in October 1993 because an estimated 80,000 Tuareg refugees stood in the way.4

  • 4. "Tuareg front, Mali government edge towards peace deal," Agence France Presse, April 18, 1994.
1995

Full Implementation

No further information is available regarding the Implementation Commission actions as they relate to the National Pact. In fact, the commission could be termed “dysfunctional” as of October 1993. Nevertheless, the Implementation Commission did verify the implementation of the pact in 1992 and 1993. 

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Military Reform

TITLE II

ON THE FINAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND ON THE SETTLEMENT OF QUESTIONS EMERGING FROM THE SITUATION OF ARMED CONFLICT

7. Within sixty days following the signature of the Pact, a programme will be put into effect comprised of the following measures:

Implementation History
1992

No Implementation

No information is available regarding the integration of the Azaouad movement combatants. Nor is any information available on other military reform. Nevertheless, the government that came into power was entirely civilian. This was possible despite the government’s decision to appoint a civilian defense minister which led to an initial period of mistrust between the government and the military.1

  • 1. Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, A Peace in Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking (United Nations Publication, 1998), 88.
1993

Minimum Implementation

Negotiations on reintegration modality took place between the government and the Azaouad movement representatives in 1993. The government of Mali had proposed reintegration be on an individual basis and an optional free choice, while the Tuaregs demanded that this condition be applied to all elements of the Tuaregs who had rebelled against the government. On February 14, 1993, the government of Mali and the Azaouad movement signed an agreement to integrate about 600 Tuaregs into army units.2 Accordingly, a total of 610 Tuaregs combatants were integrated from the following rebel groups:

MPA= Le Mouvement Populaire de l.Azawad (Popular Movement of Azawad) - 120
FPLA = Le Front Populaire de Liberation de l.Azawad (Popular Front for the Liberation of Azawad) - 150
ARLA = L’Armee Revolutionnaire de Liberation de l.Azawad (Revolutionary Army for the Liberation of Azawad) - 140
FIAA = Le Front Islamique Arabe de l.Azawad (The Islamic Arab Front of Azawad) – 190
Independent units – 10 3

  • 2. "Mali: 600 Taureg Rebels Integrated into National Army," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 15, 1993.
  • 3. Kalifa Keita, Conflict And Conflict Resolution in The Sahel: the Tuareg Insurgency in Mali,"Strategic Studies Institute, 1998, accessed June 14, 2011, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub200.pdf.
1994

Minimum Implementation

No significant progress was made in terms of integrating further ex-combatants into the army units. After the April and May negotiations in 1994, the MFUA demanded that the 2,360 combatants be integrated into the security forces, yet feelings of discontent emerged within the rebel movements when MUFA demanded 40% for the FIAA combatants and 20% each for other three movements’ combatants. The MUFA allegedly had 10,000 combatants and demanded that 3,000 of these be integrated into the armed forces and that 4,000 be re-inserted into society. These figures were largely inflated and were larger than the Malian armed force. The government of Mali had offered to take 1,000 MUFA soldiers into the army.4

  • 4. Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, A Peace in Timbuktu, 70.
1995

Minimum Implementation

No significant progress was reported. 

1996

Full Implementation

Some very important developments took place in 1996 regarding the integration of armed combatants and the military code of conduct.  On the integration side, 664 combatants from the MPA, 253 from the FPLA, 148 from the ARLA and 135 from the FIAA were integrated into the army, national guard and gendarmerie. These integrations took place at the ranks of enlisted men, noncommissioned officers, and officers. Altogether 24 combatants were appointed at the rank of officer.5

With regards to the military code of conduct, the Malian defense minister organized a seminar on civil-military relations in July in the capital city Bamako. The aim for the seminar was, in light of the decades of military dictatorship, to impress the new democratic culture onto the armed forces. These seminars were said to enrich the military curricula during the crucial time of training newly integrated former Tuareg rebels.6

  • 5. Kalifa Keita, "Conflict And Conflict Resolution in The Sahel."
  • 6. Robin-Edward Poulton Ibrahim ag Youssouf, A Peace in Timbuktu, 74.
1997

Full Implementation

Military reform and integration took place in 1996 as provided in the 1992 National Pact. 

1998

Full Implementation

Military reform and integration took place in 1996 as provided in the 1992 National Pact.  By 1998, Mali had the following security and military strengths: Army - 7,000 persons; Naval Service 70 persons; Air Service 450 persons; Gendarmerie 1,500 person; National Guard of Mali 700 persons; and National Police 1000 persons.7

  • 7. Kalifa Keita, "Conflict And Conflict Resolution in The Sahel."
1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Police Reform

OF QUESTIONS EMERGING FROM THE SITUATION OF ARMED CONFLICT

8. Within sixty days following the signature of the Pact, a programme will be put into effect comprised of the following measures:

A -Within the framework of measures for restoring confidence, eliminating factors of insecurity, and the installation of a permanent state of security:

Implementation History
1992

No Implementation

No reforms took place in terms of integrating former Tuareg rebels. 

1993

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1994

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1995

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1996

Full Implementation

A police reform took place in 1996 with the integration of 150 former Tuareg rebels into the police force. Among those integrated, two were at the rank of officers, 33 were at the rank of noncommissioned officers, and 115 were agents.1

1997

Full Implementation

Police reform took place in 1996. 

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Demobilization

TITLE II ON THE FINAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND ON THE SETTLEMENT OF QUESTIONS EMERGING FROM THE SITUATION OF ARMED CONFLICT

7. Within sixty days following the signature of the Pact, a programme will be put into effect comprised of the following measures:

A -Within the framework of measures for restoring confidence, eliminating factors of insecurity, and the installation of a permanent state of security:

Implementation History
1992

No Implementation

The demobilization of Tuareg rebels did not take place. 

1993

No Implementation

The demobilization of Tuareg rebels did not take place. 

1994

No Implementation

The demobilization of Tuareg rebels did not take place. 

1995

Minimum Implementation

The process of encamping former rebels in cantonment sites started in November 1995. The Malian government could not find a donor to fund the cantonment process, and only had encouragement from the UNDP. The initiation of the cantonment process was financially challenging because the cantonment dossier reported that the Ministry of the Armed forces and the Veterans had figures of 9,000 potential candidates for demobilization. This would cost the government about five billion CFA Francs. However, a mission was established to find the candidates for demobilization from armed movements and it found that fewer than 2,000 persons were potential candidates. The ministry subsequently estimated that as many as 3,000 combatants were to be demobilized for a cost of about 900 million CFA Francs.1 The cantonment process started on 15 November 1995. 

  • 1. Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, A Peace in Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking (United Nations Publications, 1998), 115.
1996

Full Implementation

The cantonment process started in November 1995 and closed in January 1996. The Malian government extended the cantonment deadline before starting the integration and the demobilization processes. A total of 2,681 combatants from five different rebel groups were encamped in cantonments in five different locations. Among those encamped, 1,648 were integrated into various uniformed armed forces and civil administration positions. The remainder ex-combatants received a demobilization premium of 55,000 CFA Francs (less than $100), which was significant in poverty stricken Mali.

The demobilization process was financed by the UN Trust Fund. Those 3,000 ex-combatants who surrendered their arms received a $200 premium and the 7,000 more ex-combatants who were identified later and did not go through the cantonment process received $100.2

  • 2. Ibid., 116-118.
1997

Full Implementation

Tuareg combatants were demobilized in 1996.

(Note: The demobilization of ex-combatants was completed in 1996. The National Pact of 1992 did not specifically provide for the integration of demobilized ex-combatants. But, the reintegration program was carried out by the UNDP. The Support Programme for the Socio-Economic Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Northern Mali (PAREM) was created and funded by the UNDP’s trust fund. In May 1996, 6,000 ex-combatants who did not go through the cantonment process participated in the PAREM programs. In 1997 this number increased to 7,795 with the participation of an additional 1,659 cantoned ex-combatants who were not taken into the army or civil administration. A total of 866 projects were funded benefiting 9,509 ex-combatants. As a pre-condition for the initial funding for a program, each registered ex-combatants was required to develop a viable project.3)

  • 3. Ibid., 123-132.
1998

Full Implementation

Tuareg combatants were demobilized in 1996.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Disarmament

TITLE II ON THE FINAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND ON THE SETTLEMENT OF QUESTIONS EMERGING FROM THE SITUATION OF ARMED CONFLICT

7. Within sixty days following the signature of the Pact, a programme will be put into effect comprised of the following measures:

A -Within the framework of measures for restoring confidence, eliminating factors of insecurity, and the installation of a permanent state of security:

Implementation History
1992

No Implementation

Disarmament did not take place.

1993

No Implementation

Disarmament did not take place.

1994

No Implementation

Disarmament did not take place.

1995

No Implementation

Disarmament did not take place.

1996

The peace agreement provided for integration contingent upon the return of arms from combatants. In this process, 3,000 weapons were collected and burned in a ceremony called the “Flame of Peace” which transpired on 27 March, 1996 “in the presence of all rebel groups as well as international community including the United Nations”.1

  • 1. Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, A Peace in Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking (United Nations Publications, 1998), 120.
1997

Full Implementation

The disarmament process was completed in 1996, when 3,000 weapons were collected and burned.

1998

Full Implementation

The disarmament process was completed in 1996.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Refugees

TITLE II ON THE FINAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND ON THE SETTLEMENT OF QUESTIONS EMERGING FROM THE SITUATION OF ARMED CONFLICT

Implementation History
1992

No Implementation

In the agreement, “displaced” refers to Tuaregs who were displaced in the African region or who were refugees in neighboring states.

Though the National Pact was signed but many remained doubtful of its ability to secure lasting peace, peace persisted among Tuareg rebels. Even after the signing of the accord, troops continued their attacks on civilians.1 Yet the repartitions also started and refugees from Algeria and Mauritania started to return to Mali. 

  • 1. "MALI NOMADS FLEE ACROSS BORDER; Jacky Rowland in Bassikounou on the refugees who face a bleak future in the camps of Mauritania," The Guardian (London), April 14, 1992.
1993

No Implementation

The repartition of refugees did not occur in 1993. 

1994

No Implementation

The repartition of refugees did not occur in 1994 due to an outbreak of violence, which created 160,000 new refugees in 1994. 2

  • 2. Susanna Wing, Constructing Democracy in Africa: Mali in Transition (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 161.
1995

Intermediate Implementation

According to the UNHCR Report, some 39,022 refugees returned to Mali in 1995.3 In the meantime, government launched a reconciliation program in northern Mali. 

1996

Intermediate Implementation

According to the UNHCR Report, some 22,000 refugees returned in 1996. 4 Situation in Mali significantly improved with the decentralization process going on and the demobilization, disarmament and integration and reintegration of ex-combatants. 

1997

Intermediate Implementation

According to the UNHCR Report, some 34,496 refugees returned to Mali in 1997.5

1998

Intermediate Implementation

According to the UNHCR Report, some 26,889 refugees returned to northern Mali in 1998.6 By 1998, 131,780 refugees returned from Burkina Faso, Algeria, Niger, Senegal and Mauritania. The UNHCR funded the returnees with an assistance program. The program was implemented with help from the WFP and eleven other NGO partners.7

1999

Intermediate Implementation

According to the UNHCR Report, some 5,045 refugees returned to northern Mali between 1999 and 2002.8 The devolution of power to the collectivities also helped to create a friendlier environment for the reintegration of refugees back to the society. However, except for the UNHCR funding, the future of further funding for the reintegration – especially on the governmental level – was unclear. 

  • 8. "2002 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook."
2000

Intermediate Implementation

Refugees returned to northern Mali continued in 2000.9

2001

Intermediate Implementation

Refugees returned to northern Mali continued in 2001.10

Reparations

TITLE II ON THE FINAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND ON THE SETTLEMENT OF QUESTIONS EMERGING FROM THE SITUATION OF ARMED CONFLICT

11. The reinsertion of displaced populations and the assistance to victims of all the consequences of the armed conflict in Northern Mali will give rise to the creation of two Funds:

Implementation History
1992

No Implementation

The CPA had a provision to establish a fund for assistance and compensation to civil and military victims of the two parties and their heirs, for all the consequences of the armed conflict. No information was found on the establishment of such a fund. 

1993

No Implementation

No information was found on the establishment of  a fund for assistance and compensation to civil and military victims.

1994

No Implementation

No information was found on the establishment of  a fund for assistance and compensation to civil and military victims.

1995

No Implementation

No information was found on the establishment of  a fund for assistance and compensation to civil and military victims.

1996

No Implementation

No information was found on the establishment of  a fund for assistance and compensation to civil and military victims.

1997

No Implementation

No information was found on the establishment of  a fund for assistance and compensation to civil and military victims.

1998

No Implementation

No information was found on the establishment of  a fund for assistance and compensation to civil and military victims.

1999

No Implementation

No information was found on the establishment of  a fund for assistance and compensation to civil and military victims.

2000

No Implementation

No information was found on the establishment of  a fund for assistance and compensation to civil and military victims.

2001

No Implementation

No information was found on the establishment of  a fund for assistance and compensation to civil and military victims.

Economic and Social Development

TITLE IV ON THE CONSOLIDATION OF SOLIDARITY AND NATIONAL UNITY IN THE NORTH OF MALI

SUB-TITLE A MEASURES TO CONSOLIDATE NATIONAL SOLIDARITY

44. As mentioned in paragraph 11 title II, the reinsertion of displaced populations and assistance to victims of all the consequences of the armed conflict in the North of Mali, will give rise to the creation of two Funds:

Implementation History
1992

Minimum Implementation

The 1992 National pact called for increased autonomy and development assistance for the north. Though more information on the central government’s involvement in the socio-economic development is not available, the North of Mali was granted a special decentralization status in the country’s constitution. This could be considered an effort to further the development programs provided for in the peace agreement. However, the government was constrained due to the structural reform program. 

1993

Minimum Implementation

The decentralization mission was created in 1993. But the local elections were not held in that year. Nevertheless, the Election Commissioner for development, Manuel Marin, appealed to the government to carry out more development projects for the Tuareg populations of Northern Mali.1

  • 1. "MALI: EC PLEDGES ADDITIONAL STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT SUPPORT," IPS-Inter Press Service, June 3, 1993.
1994

Minimum Implementation

Information is not available on development programs. In 1994, an outbreak of violence in northern Mali might have affected development programs. 

1995

Minimum Implementation

In 1995, Mali championed the women’s literacy program. The program was funded by organizations such as UNESCO and the UN Development Program. The literacy program in the north faced greater challenges, but the UN Children's Fund and other organizations had considerable success with women's literacy programs.2 In July, local government authorities returned to northern Mali. As peace became more prevalent and the area more stable in 1995, development programs began to be implemented for the benefit of northern Mali.3 The promised $200 million donor support for the economic development program in northern Mali was not realized in 1995. Nevertheless, the Timbuktuans were restoring tourism infrastructure.4

  • 2. "Mali: championing women's literacy programs," African Farmer, May 1995.
  • 3. "MALI; Ceremony marks return of local government to northern districts," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 31, 1995.
  • 4. "Mali Tuareg War Ends As Foes Burn Weapons," Africa News, April, 1996.
1996

Full Implementation

Hundreds of reintegration programs designed to reintegrate ex-combatants were supported by the UNDP trust fund. At the same time, 27 different donor and development agencies were involved in different development programs worth more than $200 million.5 These donor agencies along with the government of Mali were involved in various development projects related to agriculture, livestock, water, energy, health, education, and infrastructure buildings (roads etc.).

  • 5. Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, A Peace in Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking (United Nations Publication, 1998), 293-4.
1997

Full Implementation

During this year donor agencies and the government of Mali provided support for the development programs in northern Mali. By 1996, most of the decentralization infrastructures were in place and the local government units had authority to collect taxes and make decisions on issues related to local development. 

1998

Full Implementation

Economic and social development related provisions were implemented. 

1999

Full Implementation

Economic and social development related provisions were implemented. 

2000

Full Implementation

Economic and social development related provisions were implemented. 

2001

Full Implementation

Economic and social development related provisions were implemented. 

Donor Support

TITLE V SUB-REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE SERVICE OF PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT

60. The Republic of Mali commits itself furthermore to request actively the support of relevant international Organisations (UNDP, IFAD, WFP, UNESCO, ADB, IDB ...) to help redress the economic, social and cultural disadvantage of the North of Mali.

Implementation History
1992

Minimum Implementation

After the fall of the dictatorship, Mali did not have any available resources to support the peace process. While donors such as the United States, Germany, Italy, Belgium and the World Food Program set up a development fund jointly controlled by donors and the Mali government, the government did not get support from donor agencies to set up a sub-division of ceasefire commissions. Algeria remained supportive and provided some vehicle and fuel support to the Ceasefire Commission.1

  • 1. Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, A Peace in Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking (United Nations Publication, 1998), 65.
1993

Minimum Implementation

There was not any donor support for the peace process in 1993. However, the UNHCR and other donor agencies supported programs to repatriate refugees. 

1994

Minimum Implementation

There was not any donor support for the peace process in 1994. However, the UNHCR and other donor agencies supported programs to repatriate refugees. 

1995

Minimum Implementation

Once peacemaking initiatives through civilian participation began in 1995, donor agencies started to show some interest in supporting the peace process. With this in mind, the government of Mali held a two-day meeting with donor agencies in northern Mali in July 1995. Donor agencies promised $200 million development aid to northern Mali.2 A number of recommendations were made during this meeting, and many focused on the rehabilitation of those displaced during the conflict and land issues. In the meeting, donors and development partners allegedly acted expeditiously on the funding requirement under the emergency resettlement program, and thus released the funds available.3 But for the cantonment process, donor agencies did not provide support because they were suspicious of the government’s intentions.4 However, the UNHCR did provide support for the repartition of refugees. 

  • 2. "Mali Tuareg War Ends As Foes Burn Weapons," Africa News, April, 1996.
  • 3. "MALI; Government-donors Timbuktu meeting issues recommendations," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 20, 1995.
  • 4. Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, A Peace in Timbuktu.
1996

Full Implementation

After cantoning the Tuareg combatants, donor agencies were interested in providing support for the peace process. The demobilization process was financed by the UN Trust Fund. Those 3,000 ex-combatants who surrendered their arms received a $200 premium and the 7,000 more ex-combatants who were identified later and did not go through the cantonment process received $100.5 Programs to reintegrate ex-combatants were carried out by the UNDP. The Support Program for the Socio-Economic Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Northern Mali (PAREM) was created and funded by the UNDP’s trust fund. In May 1996, 6,000 ex-combatants who did not go through the cantonment process participated in the PAREM programs. In 1997, this number increased to 7,795 with the participation of an additional 1,659 cantoned ex-combatants who were not taken into the army or civil administration. A total of 866 projects were funded benefiting 9,509 ex-combatants. As a pre-condition for the initial funding for a program, each registered ex-combatant was required to develop a viable project.6 27 different donor and development agencies were involved in different development programs worth more than $200 million/7 Donor agencies also contributed to the repartition and rehabilitation of the refugees. 

  • 5. Ibid., 116-118.
  • 6. Ibid., 123-132.
  • 7. Ibid.,  293-4.
1997

Full Implementation

Donor agencies provided support for the rehabilitation of ex-combatants and refugees in 1996. 

1998

Full Implementation

Donor support provision was implemented  by 1996.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Detailed Implementation Timeline

TITLE VI ON THE TIMETABLE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARRANGEMENTS OF THIS NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PACT

62. The two parties are committed to respect the inseparable nature of the totality of the clauses in the present Pact. In order to ensure an smooth implementation, free from disagreement or misunderstanding, the two parties have agreed to the following timetable for implementation:

Implementation History
1992

Minimum Implementation

The decentralization program started in 1992 but implementation of many provisions were not initiated on time.

1993

Minimum Implementation

The decentralization program started in 1992 but implementation of many provisions were not initiated on time.

1994

Minimum Implementation

The decentralization program, started in 1992, continued in spite of the breakdown of the ceasefire in 1994. 

1995

Full Implementation

The decentralization program was ongoing. Other provisions of the agreement related to demobalization and disarmament and of refugees was on track to be implemented.  

1996

Full Implementation

Provisions related to demobalization, diarmament, military reform, police reform, civil administration reform were implemented.   

1997

Full Implementation

Many provisions were implemented in 1996. 

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Withdrawal of Troops

TITLE II: ON THE FINAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND ON THE SETTLEMENT OF QUESTIONS EMERGING FROM THE SITUATION OF ARMED CONFLICT

66. 7. Within sixty days following the signature of the Pact, a programme will be put into effect comprised of the following measures:

Implementation History
1992

Minimum Implementation

The Malian armies were not immediately removed from combat zones after National Pact was signed. In the initial phase, troops were not withdrawn from the North. Later in the year, some reductions were made.1

  • 1. Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, A Peace in Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking (United Nations Publication, 1998), 67.
1993

No Implementation

Violence erupted between the movements and the Malian army and the withdrawal of troops did not take place.2

  • 2. Ibid., 68.
1994

No Implementation

The withdrawal of troops did not take place and the army was engaged in fighting in the north.3

1995

Intermediate Implementation

Civil society became involved in the peace process in 1995. To create an environment suitable for dialogue and reconciliation, the president, in concord with the provisions of the peace agreement, organized the withdrawal of troops from the north. Many of the troops were confined to barracks.4

  • 4. Ibid., 114.
1996

Intermediate Implementation

Information regarding withdrawal of remaining troops not available. 

1997

Intermediate Implementation

Information regarding withdrawal of remaining troops not available. 

1998

Intermediate Implementation

Information regarding withdrawal of remaining troops not available. 

1999

Intermediate Implementation

Information regarding withdrawal of remaining troops not available. 

2000

Intermediate Implementation

Information regarding withdrawal of remaining troops not available. 

2001

Intermediate Implementation

Information regarding withdrawal of remaining troops not available. 

Please always cite: Peace Accords Matrix (Date of retrieval: (10/20/2017),
http://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/national-pact,
Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame.