Lusaka Protocol

  • 54%
  • Implementation Score 
    after 5 years
Provisions in this Accord
Cease Fire

ANNEX 3: AGENDA ITEM 11.1: MILITARY ISSUES (1)

1. Re-establishment of the cease-fire;

I. Definition and General Principles

1. The reestablished cease-fire consists of the cessation of hostilities between the Government of the Republic of Angola and UNITA with a view to attaining peace throughout the national territory.

Implementation History
1994

No Implementation

Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA leaders signed a peace agreement in Lusaka in November 1994. Observers to the event expressed their immediate skepticism to the press that the ceasefire would hold.1

Portuguese television reported on 17 November 1994 that government troops and UNITA rebels were still fighting. UNITA claimed that after the ceasefire, the government attacked rebel positions throughout the country. The claim was denied by President dos Santos.2

Government forces dropped bombs on Bimbe near Huambo city in the central highlands, killing 11 people.3

UNITA broadcasted that the government continued to attack UNITA positions near Huambo province.4

  • 1. “Angola Warring Parties Agree to Six-Day Ceasefire,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, November 16, 1994.
  • 2. “Fighting Continues in Angola Despite Ceasefire,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, November 17, 1994.
  • 3. “Angola Troops Kill 11,” The Independent (London), November 30, 1994
  • 4. “Angola: UNITA Says Government Attacking UNITA-Controlled Positions in Huambo,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 16, 1994.
1995

Minimum Implementation

UNITA military leaders and government leaders met in February to discuss violations. Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) leaders remarked that UNITA was operating as if there had been no accord and not pulling back to the agreed upon areas.5

The UN Angola Verification Mission-2 investigated a report that the FAA had launched an attack on a UNITA position near Quilombo.6

Angola government troops attacked UNITA strongholds in April in Huila Province. Residents in Huila said that they were in a war.7

UNAVEM-3 reported that 47 of the planned 52 team verification sites for monitoring the ceasefire had been established.8 

The Joint Commission held its 12th regular session on 28 March 1995. It declared phase one of the disengagement of forces as adequately completed.9

UNAVEM-3 reported 137 ceasefire violations in a month.10

UNITA leaders reported that they had uncovered a secret government “war plan” to be carried out against UNITA in the future in an effort to take UNITA’s territory.11 

The New York Times ran a story on competition between groups of Government soldiers and groups of UNITA soldiers mining the Luachimo River for diamonds. Many of the attacks between the two sides were reported as being committed by “freelancers”, often times Generals from both sides that fought only to keep mining.12 

In September, 105 civilians were killed in a rebel attack on Calepi. Residents said that the attacks were personal in nature.13

UNAVEM reported 77 ceasefire violations in October and 71 in November, but concluded that the military situation remained calm in most regions.14

  • 5. “Angola: FAA, UNITA Generals Meet in Waku Kungo, Agree to Limited Disengagement,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 6, 1995.
  • 6. “Angola: Government Troops Reportedly Violate Cease-Fire,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 15, 1995.
  • 7. “Angola: Government Forces Reportedly on the Offensive in Huila Province,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 10, 1995.
  • 8. “Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1995/274), April 7, 1995.
  • 9. Ibid.
  • 10. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1995/588), July 17, 1995.
  • 11. “Angola: UNITA Sources on Government Forces' "War Plan", Breaches of Cease-Fire in East,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 18, 1995.
  • 12. "Foes in Angola Still at Odds, Over Diamonds,” The New York Times, September 15, 1995.
  • 13. "Angola Government Military Claims 105 Dead in UNITA Rebel Attack,” Associated Press Worldstream, September 21, 1995.
  • 14. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1995/1012), December 7, 1995.
1996

Minimum Implementation

Alioune Blondin Beye, the special U.N. envoy to Angola, reported that the peace process in Angola was badly stalled, with both sides still deployed and engaging each other. "Two years? This is beginning to look like a very long time," concedes Mr. Beye.15 

From 27 June to 4 October, UNAVEM reported 55 ceasefire violations (roughly 18 per month).16

  • 15. “Angola: U.N. Officials Worry as UNITA Edges Away From Peace,” IPS-Inter Press Service, October 8, 1996.
  • 16. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1996/827) October 4, 1996.
1997

Minimum Implementation

In November, the UN mission in Angola reported that “ceasefire violations by both the former UNITA rebel group and government forces have escalated in the past month." MINUA reported that over roughly a two week span, 30 ceasefire violations took place, with 14 in the previous week.17

As an indicator of escalating conditions on the ground, the UN mission issued a statement asking the government to “renounce any idea of unleashing a military offensive against the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).”18

MONUA military and civilian police observers, particularly in UNITA-controlled areas, were prevented from carrying out their patrols on several occasions and were even harassed and physically attacked.19

  • 17. “UN Says Ceasefire Violations on the Rise in Angola,” Agence France Presse, November 5, 1997.
  • 18. Ibid.
  • 19. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA),” U.N. Security Council (S/1997/959), December 4, 1997.
1998

No Implementation

In March, 2 UN helicopters were shot at by UNITA troops in the Cambundi Catembo area, which was under UNITA control. Another similar attack on a UN helicopter took place on 18 February in Malanje Province.20

MONUA reported that “Armed attacks against villages, local government authorities, as well as United Nations and other international personnel, have become an almost permanent feature.”21

MONUA observers confirmed various troop movements of the Angolan Armed Forces “in Malange, Uige, Huambo, Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul Provinces.”22 

Major-General Phillip Sibanda of the Zimbabwean army, the former commander of the United Nations Observer Force in Angola, stated that his view of local conditions indicated that the FAA and UNITA were engaged in a “military build-up” to possibly resume war.23 

Over 200 people died in a massacre in the small village of Mussuku as surrounding troops bombed the village. The government stated that UNITA was responsible for the attack and declared that it would retaliate against UNITA. "The government cannot cross its arms when UNITA is kidnapping young people and forcing them into military training, acquiring military equipment, sabotaging the country's infrastructure and attacking and occupying strategic places." 24

In the last issuance of 1998, MONUA reported that the Angolan government and UNITA forces had continued to conduct extensive military operations and that MONUA personnel, under phase IV of their security plan, would withdraw from all provinces.25 

Media sources reported that the Angolan countryside was at war.26

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program coded the conflict between the Angolan government and UNITA as reaching the threshold of “war” in 1998 with over 1000 total deaths in the year.27

  • 20. “Angola Peace Monitor,” Africa News 4, no. 7 (March 1998).
  • 21. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA),” U.N. Security Council (S/1998/524), June 17, 1998.
  • 22. Ibid.
  • 23. “UN Military Commander Says War Build-Up Underway in Angola,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 2, 1998.
  • 24. “Angola Nears Civil War Outbreak: After Four Years, Peace Talks End Amid Massacre,” The Ottawa Citizen, July 26, 1998.
  • 25. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA),” U.N. Security Council (S/1998/1110), November 23, 1998.
  • 26. "UNITA: Back to the Path of War,” Africa News, August 5, 1998.
  • 27. "UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia," Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), accessed February 22, 2013, www.ucdp.uu.se/database.
Powersharing Transitional Government

Annex 6: Agenda Item II.4: National Reconciliation: I. General Principles:

4. National Reconciliation implies: (c) That, in the pursuit of national interest, UNITA members participate adequately al all levels and in the various institutions of political, administrative and economic activity.

Annex 6: Agenda Item II.4: National Reconciliation:II. Specific Principles:

Implementation History
1994

No Implementation

The Lusaka Accord called for political powersharing as part of a reconciliation process. A couple of specific modalities for giving UNITA representation in the central government were outlined. First, the Accord called for 70 UNITA deputies that were elected in the September 1992 legislative elections to be reinstated in the National Assembly. Second, 17 positions in the central government were listed as positions to be filled by UNITA representatives. Neither of these arrangements were fulfilled in 1994.

1995

No Implementation

In February 1995, UNITA held its 8th ordinary congress in Bailundo, Huambo Province with 1,230 delegates from every province in Angola. The UNITA congress adopted 21 resolutions dealing with the peace process and future plans. Article 16, dealing with the Unity Government, stated the following: “Article 16. The eighth congress decides that UNITA will only participate in the government of national unity on the basis of a common programmer of governing. In present circumstances, UNITA prefers to occupy its space of opposition party.”1

  • 1. “Eighth UNITA Congress's 21-Point Resolution," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 14, 1995.
1996

No Implementation

Africa News reported that the Lusaka Accord reserved a number of minister positions for UNITA officials that had not been filled. No reports of UNITA officials occupying any of the 17 positions can be found.2

  • 2. “Angola Combatants Agree On Troop Encampment,” Africa News, January 1996.
1997

Intermediate Implementation

Major steps towards the full implementation of the powersharing component were taken this year regarding the parliament positions and the minister positions that were to be given to UNITA members. On 10 April 1997, President Dos Santos appointed his cabinet of 28 Ministers into the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation. “Among the 28 cabinet ministers, four are from the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), a former rebel movement, according to a decree signed by the President. They are Minister of Geology and Mines Marcos Samondo, Health Minister Anastacio Ruben Sikato, Minister of Trade Victorino Hossi and Jorge Valentim, Minister of Hotels and Tourism. The 24 other ministers are from President Dos Santos' People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)."3

Regarding the seven "Deputy Minister" posts, a report on the formation of the Government of National Unity stated that UNITA occupied four minister posts and seven deputy minister posts.4

Though no names were mentioned for the seven “Deputy Minister” positions, it was later announced that 11 of the top 32 posts in government belonged to UNITA, consisting of the 4 “Minister” positions and the 7 “Deputy Minister” positions.5

On April 11, the National Assembly convened and elected several of the returning UNITA members to commissions in parliament. The Council of Ministers of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation held its first meeting on 18 April 1997.6 

  • 3. “New Cabinet Formed in Angola,” Xinhua News Agency, April 10, 1997.
  • 4. “Roundup: Road to Peace in Angola Tortuous,” Xinhua News Agency, April 11, 1997.
  • 5. “Joint Press Conference With Russian Federation Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov and Angola's Minister of Foreign Affairs Venancio De Sylva Moura,” Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, April 10, 1998.
  • 6. “Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1997/438), June 5, 1997.
1998

Intermediate Implementation

It was reported on March 17 that the process of appointing UNITA candidates to serve as Ambassadors to Canada, Cape Verde, India, Mexico, Poland, and UNESCO, was ongoing.7 

Later in the year, UNITA members were temporarily suspended from the parliament and then reinstated shortly afterward. On 2 September 1998, five leading UNITA figures voted to set up a new faction called UNITA Renewal, or UNITA-R, led by Jorge Valentim, one of the new UNITA ministers. UNITA-R announced that Savimbi should be replaced as the leader of UNITA since he has "proved incapable of meeting the commitments freely accepted in the Lusaka Protocol and has adopted a policy which is contrary to the interests of the party members and the people of Angola."8 President dos Santos moved to quickly recognize the new faction as the legitimate UNITA organization in order to isolate Savimbi.

On 4 September, the Angolan Government announced that it would no longer recognize the old UNITA or any members still loyal to the old UNITA. The recently appointed Minister of Geology and Mines, Marcos Samondo, and the Vice-Minister of Communication, Aurelio Joao Evangelista, who had refused to break from Jonas Savimbi, were formally dismissed by Presidential decree. The 70 UNITA parliamentarians in the National Assembly were also suspended. 55 of the 70 UNITA parliamentarians announced that they were in support of the break with Savimbi. On 25 September, UNITA-R leadership provided the National Assembly with a list of 57 nominees to replace the suspended 70 UNITA members. Of the 57 names, 55 were the previous members who denounced Savimbi plus 2 other new names. The National Assembly approved the list and reinstated the UNITA members on 23 September 1998.9

UNITA, led by Savimbi, and the Angolan Government returned to full civil war by the end of 1998. 

Coding of this case stops in December 1998.

  • 7. “Angola Peace Monitor,” Africa News, Volume IV, March 30, 1998.
  • 8. Ibid.
  • 9. “Angola Peace Monitor,” Africa News, October 7, 1998.
Electoral/Political Party Reform

ANNEX 6: AGENDA ITEM II.4: NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Implementation History
1994

No Implementation

The Lusaka Accord stipulated that UNITA be allowed to become a legitimate political party with Savimbi at its head, which would be followed by UN monitored presidential elections after all the preconditions for free and fair elections were in place. No election or preparation for an election took place in 1994. In addition, there had been no announcement regarding the legal or constitutional changes needed to make UNITA a legal opposition party.

1995

No Implementation

No election or preparation for an election took place in 1995. In addition, there had been no announcement regarding the legal or constitutional changes needed to make UNITA a legal opposition party.

1996

No Implementation

UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi gave a UNITA radio address on 12 February 1996 in which he called on the President of Angola to legalize UNITA as a party and declare general amnesty. Savimbi suggested that these two actions would lead to future progress on military issues. Savimbi declared: “First, the ban on UNITA should be lifted because [words indistinct] UNITA deputies. So this ban should be lifted. Second, the President of the Republic should declare a general and total amnesty because I am not sure whether the men we have confined will be tried in future. These two actions will open the political door that speeds up the military phase. We made the gesture. People have to understand, to present 16,500 men and 16,500 weapons without any reciprocity, it is as if UNITA was surrendering.”1 

No announcement regarding the legal or constitutional changes needed to make UNITA a legal opposition party took place this year. “On 1 October, UNITA submitted proposals for the special status of Mr. Savimbi as the President of the largest opposition party” (UNAVEM III, S/1996/827). No preparation for an election took place this year.2

  • 1. “UNITA Leader Says President Should Reciprocate UNITA's 'Goodwill',” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 13, 1996.
  • 2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1996/827) October 4, 1996.

No Implementation

There was no announcement regarding the legal or constitutional changes needed to make UNITA a legal opposition party this year. No electoral preparations took place.

1998

Full Implementation

Over three years following the Lusaka Accord, the Angolan government announced that UNITA was a fully legal political party -- with Savimbi at the head of the party.3

Later in November, the National Assembly voted to repeal Mr. Savimbi’s position as the legal head of UNITA, by removing his official status and office that was granted to him in March. “On 27 October 1998, by a decision adopted by 115 votes in favor, none against and 61 abstentions, the National Assembly abrogated the law granting a special status to Mr. Savimbi as the leader of the largest opposition political party, which was promulgated in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol. This decision was attributed to Mr. Savimbi's failure to fulfill his party's obligations under the Protocol.”4

In the last issuance of 1998, MONUA reported that the Angolan government and UNITA forces had continued to perform extensive military operations and that MONUA personnel, under phase IV of their security plan, would be withdrawn from all provinces.5

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program coded the conflict between the Angolan government and UNITA as reaching the threshold of “war” in 1998 with over 1000 total deaths in the year. Coding for this case stops December 31, 1998.

  • 3. “Angola Peace Monitor,” Africa News 4, no. 7, (March 1998).
  • 4. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA),” U.N. Security Council (S/1998/1110), November 23, 1998.
  • 5. Ibid.
Decentralization/Federalism

ANNEX 6: AGENDA ITEM II.4: NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

I. General Principles

4. National Reconciliation implies:

(d) That, in accordance with Article 54(d) and (e) and Article 89(c) and (d) of the
Constitutional Law of the Republic of Angola, the administration of the country be effectively decentralized and deconcentrated;

Implementation History
1994

No Implementation

There were no developments regarding administrative decentralization in 1994.

1995

No Implementation

There were no developments regarding administrative decentralization in 1995. The Washington Times published a letter from Jonas Savimbi on the future of Angola in July. In it, Savimbi stated that Angola needed a democracy based on “the separation of powers - executive, legislative and judicial - administrative decentralization, establishment of a bill of rights and equal access to economic opportunities.”1

  • 1. “Lessons Learned in Angola,” The Washington Times, July 9, 1995.
1996

No Implementation

There were no developments regarding administrative decentralization in 1996. Secretary-General Kofi Annan delivered a speech to the National Assembly in March arguing that national renewal “requires a new approach to government and to the State. For example, it requires you, as legislators, to work together with the executive branch of Government, to make decentralization effective. That means that State administration must be extended throughout the country."2

  • 2. “UN Sec-Gen Urges Angola's National Assembly to Take Crucial Final Steps to Ensure Peace Process,” M2 PressWIRE, March 27, 1996.
1997

No Implementation

No developments this year regarding administrative decentralization. The UN Development Programme (UNDP) reported that 67 percent of the Angolan population was living below the poverty line and suggested that policies of decentralization were badly needed.3

  • 3. “Angola News Roundup,” Africa News, November 5, 1997.
1998

No Implementation

There were no further reports regarding decentralization in 1998.

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program coded the conflict between the Angolan government and UNITA as reaching the threshold of “war” in 1998 with over 1000 total deaths in the year. Coding for this case stops December 31, 1998.

Civil Administration Reform

ANNEX 6: AGENDA ITEM II.4: NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

I. General Principles

4. National Reconciliation implies:

(c) That, in the pursuit of national interest, UNITA members participate adequately at all
levels and in the various institutions of political, administrative and economic activity

II. Specific Principles

Implementation History
1994

No Implementation

The Lusaka Accord called for extensive local powersharing in the form of civilian administration quotas for UNITA. In all, 150 administrative positions were mentioned in the Accord. It was thought likely that the 4 Governor positions and 7 Deputy-Governor positions would receive the bulk of attention from the media and/or verification bodies. There were no reported developments on any of the 150 appointments in 1994.

1995

No Implementation

There were no reported developments on any of the appointments. 

1996

No Implementation

There were no reported developments on any of the appointments. 

1997

No Implementation

There were no reported developments on any of the appointments. 

1998

Intermediate Implementation

In 1998 substantial progress was made regarding the appointment of UNITA officials to administrative positions in Angola. State-run television in Angola ran a story on 16 March 1998 that President Dos Santos was firing or relieving governors and deputy-governors of their jobs throughout Angola so that he could reappoint UNITA representatives to those posts, as agreed upon in the Lusaka Accord. Angolan TV reported that “the President of the Republic today issued two decrees relieving Manuel Goncalves Mwandumba, Serafim Ananito Alexandre, and Manuel Dala from their posts as governors of Uige, Lunda Sul, and Cuando Cubango Provinces, respectively” (BBC Monitoring Africa, 1998). 

The President of the Republic appointed new governors and deputy-governors proposed by UNITA to fill the above posts: Joao Domingos Manzahila, Domingos Oliveira, and Jose Cativa were appointed as governors of Uige, Lunda Sul, and Cuando Cubango Provinces, respectively; Bernardo Prata, Americo Chimina, Moises Chivemba, Jose Soma Gaspar, Manuel Bunjo, Antonio Tonga, and Campos Tomas were appointed as deputy-governors of Benguela, Huambo, Bie, Huila, Luanda, Cuanza Sul, and Bengo Provinces, respectively.1

The quota of 3 governors and seven deputy-governors was therefore implemented. No further information could be found on the other positions.

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program coded the conflict between the Angolan government and UNITA as reaching the threshold of “war” in 1998 with over 1000 total deaths in the year. Coding for this case stops December 31, 1998.

  • 1. “President Dos Santos Appoints New Governors Proposed By UNITA,” BBC Monitoring Africa, March 18, 1998.
Military Reform

ANNEX 4: Agenda Item II.1 (continued):

Military Issues (II): d) Completion of the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), including demobilisation.

I. General Principles:

2. The composition of the Angolan Armed Forces will reflect the principle of proportionality between Government and UNITA military forces as provided for in the Bicesse Accords.

Implementation History
1994

No Implementation

The main facet of military reform as outlined in the Lusaka Accord was the military integration of UNITA forces into the national military. Negotiations over the specifics of integration would last for almost 2 years.

1995

No Implementation

One year after the Lusaka Accord, the two sides engaged in sporadic talks over how many UNITA soldiers would be integrated. It was reported that negotiations on the formation of the new “joint” Angolan army had been held on 17 November 1995.1

  • 1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1995/1012), December 7, 1995.
1996

Minimum Implementation

In March, the two sides finally agreed on the number of senior posts in the new FAA to be allocated to UNITA troops. UNITA would provide the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) with 18 Generals, as well as with the Vice-Minister of Defense, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Regional Commander, and Commander of the planned fourth Branch (UNAVEM III, S/1996/248).2

The process of military integration was beset with planning problems. Little progress had been made in the formation of the FAA as set forth in the agreement. As of September 27, only 4,000 out of the planned 26,300 UNITA troops that were to be integrated had even been selected. The selection teams were in place at the camps, but UNITA would not cooperate with the process.3

  • 2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1996/248), April 4, 1996.
  • 3. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1996/827), October 4, 1996.
1997

Intermediate Implementation

The United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) announced on February 14 that 6,000 out of the scheduled 26,300 UNITA troops had been integrated into the National Army of Unity. At the time, 18,000 had been selected to be integrated.4 

As of 5 June 1997, “the number of UNITA troops incorporated into the FAA reached 10,700 personnel” (UNAVEM III, S/1997/438).5 

Toward the end of the year, the “Security Council in resolution 1135 (1997) approved the new measures to be taken by the international community against UNITA” for non-compliance with the Lusaka Protocols (MONUA, S/1997/959). Savimbi announced that the new sanctions would make it even more difficult for him to comply.6 

Three weeks after the imposition of sanctions, UNITA severed all ties with the Government and MONUA.7

  • 4. “Over 6,000 UNITA Soldiers Organized into Angola's Unity Army,” Xinhua News Agency, February 14, 1997.
  • 5. U.N. Security Council. “Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III)” (S/1997/438). 5 June 1997.
  • 6. U.N. Security Council. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)” (S/1997/959). 4 December 1997.
  • 7. Ibid.
1998

Intermediate Implementation

 The verification process broke down in light of increased violence and the sanctions placed on UNITA. MONUA reported that “there have been no contacts between the Government and Mr. Jonas Savimbi and his group, and the joint mechanisms established for the implementation of the peace process at the national and local levels, including the Joint Commission, have been paralyzed.”8

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program coded the conflict between the Angolan government and UNITA as reaching the threshold of “war” in 1998 with over 1000 total deaths in the year. Coding for this case stops December 31, 1998.

  • 8. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA),” U.N. Security Council (S/1998/1110), November 23, 1998.
Police Reform

ANNEX 5: AGENDA ITEM II.2: THE POLICE

I. General Principles

1. The Angolan National Police is the organ of the Angolan State Administration responsible for the maintenance of public order and the defense of the interests, integrity and security of all persons in Angola, irrespective of their nationality, place of birth, race, religion, social origin or political party affiliation.

Implementation History
1994

No Implementation

The Lusaka Accord called for three main police reforms: (1) the integration of 6,700 UNITA troops into the Angolan National Police Force (ANP) following a demobilization process, (2) the monitoring of the ANP during the implementation period, and (3) the quartering of the Rapid Reaction Police Force, as a combat unit that was frequently used against UNITA forces. 

The quartering of troops and the related selection processes for integration were delayed from the beginning. Several days after the Lusaka Accord, Portuguese television media reported that government troops and UNITA rebels were still fighting. UNITA claimed that after the ceasefire, the government attacked rebel positions throughout the country. The claim was denied by President Dos Santos.1

  • 1. “Fighting Continues in Angola Despite Ceasefire,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, November 17, 1994.
1995

No Implementation

The selection process for UNITA troops that were to be integrated into the ANP had not begun. In November of 1995, one full year after the Lusaka Accord, it was reported that “the phased billeting of government and UNITA troops to 15 UN-built quartering areas (now in the process of completion) has not yet begun."1

  • 1. “Angola's Peace Grows More Tense by the Day,” Guardian Weekly, November 5, 1995.
1996

Minimum Implementation

There were no reports on the selection process for UNITA troops that were to be integrated into the ANP. The monitoring component, however, was finally becoming operational. UNAVEM-3 reported that its civilian police component (CIVPOL) was deployed at 40 sites. CIVPOL was tasked with monitoring the behavior of the ANP, the quartering of the Rapid Reaction Police Force, and other training initiatives as called for in the Lusaka Accord. It was reported in October 1996 that 5,458 Rapid Reaction Police officers had been quartered in 13 camps.

1997

Minimum Implementation

There was finally some mention of the selection process for the integration of UNITA troops into the ANP. UNAVEM III (S/1997/115) reported that “The pace of the selection process of UNITA personnel for ANP has been disappointingly slow, with only 625 UNITA elements having been selected as of 1 February.” As of June 1, the total number of the Rapid Reaction Police was 5,450. CIVPOL continued to monitor the activities and verify the quartering of the Rapid Reaction Police.3

  • 3. “Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1997/438), June 5, 1997.
1998

Minimum Implementation

Although the integration process seemed to have continued into 1998 for the military, there were no further reports on the process of selection and integration into the ANP, which appeared to have stalled. The United Nations civilian police component (CIVPOL) continued to monitor and conduct investigations on the conditions of Angolan prisons and on human rights abuses to the best of its ability before being shut down.4 

The verification process and implementation process broke down toward the end of year with the increased violence and the sanctions that were placed on UNITA. MONUA reported in November that “there have been no contacts between the Government and Mr. Jonas Savimbi and his group, and the joint mechanisms established for the implementation of the peace process at the national and local levels, including the Joint Commission, have been paralyzed.”5

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program coded the conflict between the Angolan government and UNITA as reaching the threshold of “war” in 1998 with over 1000 total deaths in the year. Coding for this case stops December 31, 1998.

  • 4. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA),” U.N. Security Council (S/1998/524), June 17, 1998.
  • 5. "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA),” U.N. Security Council (S/1998/1110), November 23, 1998.
Demobilization

ANNEX 4: AGENDA ITEM II.1 (continued), MILITARY ISSUES (II)

Completion of the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), including demobilization.

I. General Principles

Implementation History
1994

No Implementation

Several days after the Lusaka Accord, Portuguese television reported that government troops and UNITA rebels were still fighting. UNITA claimed that after the ceasefire, the government attacked rebel positions throughout the country; the claim was denied by President Dos Santos.1

  • 1. “Fighting Continues in Angola Despite Ceasefire,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, November 17, 1994.
1995

Minimum Implementation

Selection sites for the quartering of troops were being selected with help from the Demobilization and Reintegration Office of UCAH. In a March U.N. Angola Verification Mission-3 (UNAVEM-III) report, demobilization progress was considered high in some areas and completely lacking in others.2

In November of 1995, one full year after the Lusaka Accord, “the phased billeting of government and UNITA troops to 15 UN-built quartering areas (now in the process of completion) has not yet begun.” The plan, coming from the Lusaka Accord, was for 200,000 troops to be merged into a national army, with around half of that number to be later demobilized after a period of on-the-job training.3

Fifteen quartering areas for UNITA troops were under construction and the sites had been approved by the parties. The labor had come from within the UNAVEM military component. The quartering of UNITA troops began with 363 people at Vila Nova. The government claimed that the majority were children with non-working weapons.4

  • 2. “First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1995/177), March 5, 1995.
  • 3. “Angola's Peace Grows More Tense by the Day,” Guardian Weekly, November 5, 1995.
  • 4. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1995/1012), December 7, 1995.
1996

Minimum Implementation

The Secretary-General stated: "It is disturbing that, more than one year after the signing of the Lusaka Protocol (which ended the war in November 1994), the quartering of UNITA troops -- one of the central elements in the peace process -- has not made any significant progress."5  

Little progress was reported on the quartering of UNITA troops. “As of 29 March, 18,595 UNITA soldiers had registered in the first five quartering areas and had handed over a total of 15,169 weapons, an alarmingly small increase over the 16,699 soldiers and 13,728 weapons…reported a month ago. Moreover, 1,163 of the soldiers had subsequently deserted the areas.”6 

UNAVEM-3 announced that 20,039 UNITA troops and 16,837 weapons were confined to Vila Nova, Londuimbali, Negage, Quibaxe, Ngove, Ntuco, and Quibala.7 

U.N. workers and aid workers said it was estimated that 50 percent of the 35,000 UNITA soldiers that registered at the 11 U.N. quartering areas were not UNITA troops.8 

From November 1994 to 27 September 1996, UNITA sent 63,189 declared fighters to the U.N. guarded cantonments to be disarmed and demobilized. Many were civilians who were told by UNITA that the camps were giving out food. When UNAVEM troops asked them to disassemble a weapon, many could not perform the task.9 

As of October 1996, the FAA completed 61 verified troop withdrawals. The number of UNITA troops registered in the 15 quartering camps was 63,189 with 11,500 desertions.10 

UNAVEM announced that the demobilization of approximately 8,000 under-age soldiers would begin in September 1996. It was estimated that 100,000 soldiers remained to be demobilized and that only 27.4 percent of the demobilization and reintegration program costs were covered in the UNAVEM budget.11 

Alioune Blondin Beye, the special U.N. envoy to Angola, reported that the peace process in Angola was badly stalled, with both sides still deployed and engaging each other. "Two years? This is beginning to look like a very long time," conceded Mr. Beye.12

  • 5. “Angola: U.N. Voices Frustration with UNITA,” Inter Press Service (IPS), February 2, 1996.
  • 6. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1996/248), April 4, 1996.
  • 7. “Angola: UN Mission Says Confined UNITA Troops Total 20,039,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 18, 1996.
  • 8. “Angola Army Aims to End UN Peace Role,” Guardian Weekly, June 16, 1996.
  • 9. “Angola: U.N. Officials Worry as UNITA Edges Away From Peace,” Inter Press Service, October 8, 1996.
  • 10. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1996/827), October 4, 1996
  • 11. Ibid.
  • 12. “Angola: U.N. Officials Worry as UNITA Edges Away From Peace,” Inter Press Service, October 8, 1996.
1997

Intermediate Implementation

The U.N. reported that “only 2,100 under-aged UNITA soldiers had been demobilized” as of August (IPS, 1997). Another 7,800 rebel soldiers had been integrated into the joint national army and roughly 18,900 UNITA troops had abandoned the process. It was estimated that UNITA still had 35,000 troops deployed. The U.N. gave UNITA one month to comply with its orders or face sanctions.13

“As of 1 June, a total of 10,321 former UNITA combatants of various categories had been formally demobilized throughout the country,” however, “the number of deserters and absentees exceeded 35 per cent of all the personnel quartered.”14

By the end of 1997, all 15 UNITA quartering areas and demobilization sites were closed. The total number of demobilized UNITA forces was 45,706.15

  • 13. “Angola: U.N.: Last Chance for UNITA,” Inter Press Service, August 26, 1997.
  • 14. “Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1997/438), June 5, 1997.
  • 15. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA),” U.N. Security Council (S/1997/959), December 4, 1997.
1998

Intermediate Implementation

The UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), the Angolan government, and UNITA set a new revised "final" timetable for demobilization, which was to be completed by 28 February. None of the elements in the timetable were met. On 11 March, they set a new timetable of 1 April.16 

On 6 March, Savimbi declared that UNITA had fully demobilized its troops, a claim which was met with skepticism. Expelled UNITA General Manuvakola, who signed the Lusaka Peace Accord, told reporters that Savimbi’s attitude was “ridiculous”. Among observer bodies, there seemed to be near unanimous acceptance that UNITA had maintained its core fighting units as well as almost all its artillery and weapons.17 

In June, Major-General Phillip Sibanda of the Zimbabwean army, the former commander of the United Nations observer force in Angola, stated that his view of local conditions indicated that the FAA and UNITA were engaged in a military build-up to possibly resume war.18 

In July, over 200 people were killed in the massacre of a small village (Mussuku), as surrounding troops shelled the homes. The government stated that UNITA was responsible for the attack and declared that it would retaliate against UNITA. "The government cannot cross its arms when UNITA is kidnapping young people and forcing them into military training, acquiring military equipment, sabotaging the country's infrastructure and attacking and occupying strategic places."19 

Local media reports stated that the Angolan countryside was at war.20

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) coded the conflict between the Angolan government and UNITA as reaching the threshold of “war” in 1998 with over 1000 total deaths in that year.21 

MONUA personnel, under phase IV of their security plan, were withdrawn from all provinces.22

  • 16. “Angola Peace Monitor,” Africa News 4, no. 7 (March 1998).
  • 17. Ibid.
  • 18. “UN Military Commander Says War Build-Up Underway in Angola,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 2, 1998.
  • 19. “Angola Nears Civil War Outbreak: After Four Years, Peace Talks End Amid Massacre,” The Ottawa Citizen, July 26, 1998.
  • 20. “UNITA: Back to the Path of War,” Africa News, August 5, 1998.
  • 21. “UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia,” Uppsala Conflict Data Program, accessed February 22, 2013, www.ucdp.uu.se/database.
  • 22. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA),” U.N. Security Council (S/1998/1110), November 23, 1998.
Disarmament

ANNEX 3: MILITARY ISSUES: AGENDA ITEM II.1: MILITARY ISSUES (I):

II: Specific Principles Relating to the Re-Established Cease-Fire:

8. Within the framework of the process of selection of the personnel for the completion of the formation of the FAA, the United Nations will carry out the collection, storage and custody of the armament of UNITA military forces at the time of quartering.

Implementation History
1994

Several days after the Lusaka Accord, Portuguese televised media reported that government troops and UNITA rebels were still fighting. UNITA claimed that after the ceasefire, the government attacked rebel positions throughout the country. The claim was denied by President Dos Santos.1

  • 1. “Fighting Continues in Angola Despite Ceasefire,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, November 17, 1994.
1995

No Implementation

As of November 1995, one full year after the Lusaka Accord, “the phased billeting of government and UNITA troops to 15 UN-built quartering areas (now in the process of completion) has not yet begun.”2

  • 2. “Angola's Peace Grows More Tense by the Day,” Guardian Weekly, November 5, 1995.
1996

Minimum Implementation

According to the phased disarmament timeline, one-third of UNITA’s forces, around 16,500 troops, should have reported to disarmament camps by February. Out of that number, only 5,100 UNITA rebels had done so. It was also reported that “most” had not brought weapons with them.3 

The Secretary-General argued, "It is disturbing that, more than one year after the signing of the Lusaka Protocol (which ended the war in November 1994), the quartering of UNITA troops -- one of the central elements in the peace process -- has not made any significant progress."4 

Limited progress was reported on the quartering of UNITA troops. “As of 29 March, 18,595 UNITA soldiers had registered in the first five quartering areas and had handed over a total of 15,169 weapons, an alarmingly small increase over the 16,699 soldiers and 13,728 weapons…reported a month ago. Moreover, 1,163 of the soldiers had subsequently deserted the areas.”5 

The U.N. Angola Verification Mission-3 (UNAVEM III) announced that 20,039 UNITA troops were confined to Vila Nova, Londuimbali, Negage, Quibaxe, Ngove, Ntuco, and Quibala and had turned over 16,837 weapons.6 

According to the U.N., half of the people showing up to be disarmed were not UNITA soldiers, one-third had no weapons, and none had heavy weapons. General Matos stated that "UNITA has not even begun a serious effort towards disarming and demobilizing, 18 months after the Lusaka Accords, and there is no sign of any change."7 

UNITA had sent a total of 63,189 declared fighters to the U.N. guarded cantonments to be disarmed and demobilized. However, the U.N. reported that 25,000 came with no weapons and those that did turned in low quality arms.8

UNAVEM reported that after many delays, UNITA finally turned over substantial quantities of weapons. UNITA troops handed in over 28,762 personal weapons and 3,969 heavy or crew-served weapons.9

  • 3. “Security Council Likely to Extend Angola Peace Mission Three Months,” Associated Press, February 6, 1996.
  • 4. “Angola: U.N. Voices Frustration with UNITA,” Inter Press Service (IPS), February 2, 1996.
  • 5. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1996/248), April 4, 1996.
  • 6. “Angola: UN Mission Says Confined UNITA Troops Total 20,039,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 18, 1996.
  • 7. “Angola Army Aims to End UN Peace Role,” Guardian Weekly, June 16, 1996.
  • 8. “Angola: U.N. Officials Worry as UNITA Edges Away From Peace,” Inter Press Service, October 8, 1996.
  • 9. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1996/827), October 4, 1996.
1997

Minimum Implementation

Intelligence sources estimated that UNITA had 18,000 soldiers and several dozen major arms stores in Angola and received new arms weekly from Zambia. “On 2 March FAA found one arms dump with 31 AKM weapons, 47 RPK submachine guns, RPG-7 rocket launchers, 60mm and 82mm mortars, mortar shells, 11 B-10 cannons, one missile, 60 anti-tank mines, 60 anti-personnel mines, 700 rounds of ammunition and 16kg of TNT. On 11 March police uncovered in Caxito, Bengo province, 47 machine guns, 66 anti-personnel mines, seven 60mm mortars and 3,000 rounds of ammunition.”10 

Major-General Phillip Sibanda of the Zimbabwean army, the former commander of the United Nations observer force in Angola, stated that his view of local conditions indicated that the FAA and UNITA were engaged in a military build-up to possibly resume war.11

  • 10. “Angola Peace Monitor,” Africa News 4, no. 7, (March 1998).
  • 11. “U.N. Military Commander Says War Build-Up Underway in Angola,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 2, 1998.
1998

Minimum Implementation

Local media were reporting that the Angolan countryside was at war.12 

In November, MONUA personnel, under phase IV of their security plan, were withdrawn from all provinces in Angola.13 

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program coded the conflict between the Angolan government and UNITA as reaching the threshold of “war” in 1998 with over 1000 total deaths in that year.14 Coding for this case stops December 31 1998.

  • 12. “UNITA: Back to the Path of War,” Africa News, August 5, 1998.
  • 13. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA),” U.N. Security Council (S/1998/1110), November 23, 1998.
  • 14. “UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia,” Uppsala Conflict Data Program, accessed February 22, 2013, www.ucdp.uu.se/database.
Reintegration

ANNEX 4: AGENDA ITEM II.1 (continued): MILITARY ISSUES (II)

4. Completion of the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), including demobilization.

I. General Principles

Implementation History
1994

No Implementation

There were no major developments in November or December. 

1995

Minimum Implementation

As of December 1995, reintegration programs were said to have been in a stage of “preparation”. Fifteen quartering areas for UNITA troops were under construction and the sites had been approved by the parties. The labor had come from within the UNAVEM military component.1

UNAVEM’s end of year report (1995) stated that UNDP, UCAH, and the International Labour Organization were preparing reintegration programs “to support the social integration of demobilized soldiers. These programs, to be administered through the Institute for the Reintegration of Ex-Soldiers and the Ministry of Social Assistance, will provide counseling and referral service, vocational training, business training, micro-credits and tool kits, as well as grants for quick-impact projects.”2

  • 1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1995/1012), December 7, 1995.
  • 2. Ibid.
1996

Minimum Implementation

In August, the Council of Ministers of the National Program for Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants, with assistance from the World Bank and other NGOs, adopted “a set of complementary projects aimed at facilitating the short-, medium- and long-term socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants.”3

The Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit continued its food, health, and sanitation programs for quartered UNITA troops and 120,000 of their dependents who were also residents in the camps, and administered 130,000 medical examinations. Residents received “civic training programs focusing on demobilization and social reintegration of ex-combatants.”4

  • 3. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1996/827), October 4, 1996.
  • 4. Ibid.
1997

Minimum Implementation

As of 1 June 1997, “over 23,000 demobilized soldiers and their dependents had been transported to their areas of origin or choice and provided with basic medical care and multi-purpose reintegration kits.”5

  • 5. “Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1997/438), June 5, 1997.
1998

Minimum Implementation

Over 6,000 demobilized ex-combatants had been registered by the Counseling and Referral Service (SeCOR) from March to June. Vocational training had been given to 6,000 beneficiaries. It was reported that funding remained a major problem for all the reintegration projects.6

In the last issuance of 1998, MONUA reported that the Angolan government and UNITA forces had continued to perform extensive military operation” and that MONUA personnel, under phase IV of their security plan, were withdrawn from all provinces.7

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program coded the conflict between the Angolan government and UNITA as reaching the threshold of “war” in 1998 with over 1000 total deaths in the year. Coding for this case stops December 31, 1998.

  • 6. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)M,” U.N. Security Council (S/1998/524), June 17, 1998.
  • 7. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA),” U.N. Security Council (S/1998/1110), November 23, 1998.
Prisoner Release

ANNEX 3: AGENDA ITEM II.1: MILITARY ISSUES (I)

II. Specific Principles Relating to the Re-Established Cease-fire:

10. Release of all civilian and military prisoners detained or withheld as a consequence of the conflict, under the supervision of the ICRC.

Timetable of the Bilateral Cease-Fire Modalities:

Phase One:

Implementation History
1994

No Implementation

There were no major developments in November or December on this provision.

1995

No Implementation

UNIVEM-3 reported that no further progress had been achieved regarding the release of prisoners.1

  • 1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1995/1012), December 7, 1995.
1996

Full Implementation

In early February, the Angolan government announced that it had fulfilled its pledge to release hundreds of UNITA prisoners.2

UNAVEM noted in its April report that substantial “progress has been recorded regarding the release of prisoners. The Government has freed all of the 354 detainees registered with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and by 1 April UNITA had released 157.”3

  • 2. “Security Council Likely to Extend Angola Peace Mission Three Months,” Associated Press, February 6, 1996.
  • 3. "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1996/248), April 4, 1996.
1997

Full Implementation

There were no further developments regarding the release of war prisoners. 

1998

Full Implementation

There were no further developments regarding the release of war prisoners.

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program coded the conflict between the Angolan government and UNITA as reaching the threshold of “war” in 1998 with over 1000 total deaths in the year. Coding for this case stops December 31 1998.

Human Rights

ANNEX 8: AGENDA ITEM II.3: THE UNITED NATIONS MANDATE, THE ROLE OF THE OBSERVERS OF THE "ACORDOS DE PAZ" AND THE JOINT COMMISSION

A. The United Nations Mandate

I. General Principles

Implementation History
1994

No Implementation

The Lusaka Protocol called for substantial human rights monitoring, investigations of human rights violations, and human rights training and education programs. These programs were not initiated in 1994.

1995

Intermediate Implementation

In 1995, a Human Rights Unit was established with a mandate to verify and monitor the Angolan National Police (ANP), the demobilization of the Rapid Reaction Police, and perform criminal investigations of human rights violations.1

UNAVEM-3 launched a nationwide human rights education program. “The first such seminar, held in Luanda on 23 November, focused on the role of the Lusaka Protocol in the protection of human rights and on UNAVEM III's plan of action in this area for the period up to February 1997. At the same time, the human rights unit of UNAVEM III has formulated an orientation program for the Mission's own military and police observers, with a view to facilitating their monitoring activities.”2

  • 1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1995/1012), December 7, 1995.
  • 2. Ibid.
1996

Intermediate Implementation

UNAVEM was engaged in several projects in 1996 intended to improve human rights conditions in Angola. The civilian police component investigated numerous complaints of human rights violations in 1996. The number of reported allegations had increased from the previous year. UNAVEM focused much of its training resources on the treatment of prisoners in detention centers and on human rights training associated with the military integration process. A plan was also approved in 1996 by the Government to reform the judicial system.

1997

Intermediate Implementation

UNAVEM continued a multifaceted approach to human rights training and education projects to consolidate the rule of law and reform the judicial system and criminal codes. The Joint Commission held eight meetings in which approximately 60 cases of human rights abuses were examined.3

  • 3. “Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1997/438), June 5, 1997.
1998

Intermediate Implementation

The Human Rights Division and the Ministry of Justice established local human rights committees in 4 provinces. MONUA reported that many human rights abuses were committed by the ANP, including “extrajudicial executions, torture, rape, arbitrary arrest and detention”. A dysfunctional judicial system failed, in almost every respect, at bringing perpetrators of gross human rights violations to justice. The prisons were reported as suffering from “gross violations of detainees’ rights.”4

The verification process broke down in light of the increased violence and the sanctions that were placed on UNITA. MONUA reported that “there have been no contacts between the Government and Mr. Jonas Savimbi and his group, and the joint mechanisms established for the implementation of the peace process at the national and local levels, including the Joint Commission, have been paralyzed.”5

In the last issuance of 1998, MONUA reported that the Angolan government and UNITA forces had continued to perform extensive military operations and that MONUA personnel, under phase IV of their security plan, were withdrawn from all provinces.6

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program coded the conflict between the Angolan government and UNITA as reaching the threshold of “war” in 1998 with over 1000 total deaths in the year. Coding for this case stops December 31 1998.

  • 4. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA),”U.N. Security Council (S/1998/524), June 17, 1998.
  • 5. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA),” U.N. Security Council (S/1998/1110), November 23, 1998.
  • 6. Ibid.
Amnesty

ANNEX 6 AGENDA ITEM II.4: NATIONAL RECONCILIATION: I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES:

Implementation History
1994

Minimum Implementation

It was evident from the comments of mediators, such as Alioune Blondin Beye, the U.N. special envoy to Angola who mediated a year of peace talks in Lusaka, that amnesty had been a precondition for the agreement. “Beye said the Angolan parliament last week approved a general amnesty for the war, meaning rebel fighters and officials would be free from prosecution. That likely influenced the rebels to proceed with peace talks.”1 Alioune Beye was referring to “Law No. 18/1994-Amnesty Law” passed on 10 November 1994. The amnesty law contained 8 Articles: 

Article 1 

Amnesty granted for all crimes committed against the internal security of the State and all others related with these, committed by national citizens within the scope of the military conflict after the elections from the 1st October 1992 until the date of signature of the Lusaka Protocol. 

Article 2 

Amnesty granted for all military crimes committed during the period referred to in the previous article, except crimes of fraud with violence which resulted in death, as foreseen in No. 3 of article 18 and No. 3 of article 19 of Law No. 4/94 of the 28th of January. 

Article 3 

Amnesty also granted for all common crimes punishable with sentences of up to 8 years, as well as crimes punishable with correctional sentences and contraventions committed by soldiers and non-soldiers during the period referred to in article 1 of the present law. 

Article 4 

1. Sentences applied according to the punishment of crimes not covered in the present law benefit of a pardon of: 

          1/4 for common crimes and for soldiers, when the crime committed did not result in the death of the victim; 

         1/8 for the rest of military crimes, when they result in the death of the victim. 

2. Contents of the previous number include pending lawsuits, as well as those to be initiated for infringements committed during the period referred to in article 1 of the present law. 

Article 5 

Pardon granted on condition resulting from the beneficiary not committing any fraudulent crime punishable by a heavy prison sentence during the 5 years following the date of publication of this law which terminates the serving of the sentence or during its fulfillment. 

Article 6 

The Law of Amnesty does not cover civil responsibility emerging from crimes committed, in terms of paragraph 1 of article 125, of the Penal Code. 

Article 7 

All which contradict the contents of the present law are revoked. 

Article 8 

The law enters into effect on the date of the signature of the Lusaka Protocol.

 

It was evident that the law contained ambiguities. Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 all add exceptions to the general amnesty contained in Article 1. Furthermore, the amnesty period clearly ended with the signing of the Accord, while UNITA and the Government of Angola continued to engage each other after the Accord. It was uncertain, for instance, whether UNITA troops still deployed in Huambo months or years after the Accord was signed would remain covered.2 

In December of 1994 General Lukamba Paulo Gato, UNITA’s Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs, told reporters that the Lusaka Peace Talks were in danger over ambiguities on amnesty and the military actions of the Government against UNITA following the Accord. General Gato mentioned specifically that he considered the amnesty provision in the Lusaka Accord to be ambiguous as to whether it granted legal amnesty for every UNITA combatant. According to Gato, “…the Lusaka Protocol did not provide for any amnesty whatever. Instead, what it provided for was national reconciliation or, in other words, mutual forgiveness.” 3

  • 1. “Warring Factions in Angola Sign Truce,” The Associated Press, November 15, 1994.
  • 2. "Amnesty Law [Angola]," Law No. 18/1994 of November 10, 1994, November 15, 1994.
  • 3. “Angola: UNITA Warns It Will Have to Defend Itself if Government Continues Logic of War," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 16, 1994.
1995

Minimum Implementation

In February 1995, UNITA held its 8th ordinary congress in Bailundo, Huambo Province with 1,230 delegates from every province in Angola. The UNITA congress adopted 21 resolutions dealing with the peace process and future plans. It was evident by resolution eleven that UNITA did not consider the Lusaka Accord as stipulating full amnesty. Resolution number eleven stated the following: “[F]or the concretization of peace and national reconciliation, the eighth congress demands that a general and total amnesty embracing all the period of the Angolan conflict, be declared.”4

  • 4. “Eighth UNITA Congress's 21-Point Resolution," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 14, 1995.
1996

Minimum Implementation

UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi gave a UNITA radio address on 12 February 1996 in which he called on the President of Angola to legalize UNITA as a party and declare general amnesty. Savimbi suggested that these two actions would lead to future progress on military issues. Savimbi declared: “First, the ban on UNITA should be lifted because [words indistinct] UNITA deputies. So this ban should be lifted. Second, the President of the Republic should declare a general and total amnesty because I am not sure whether the men we have confined will be tried in future. These two actions will open the political door that speeds up the military phase. We made the gesture. People have to understand, to present 16,500 men and 16,500 weapons without any reciprocity, it is as if UNITA was surrendering.”5 

On February 14 1996, the Government of Angola used state media to respond to Savimbi’s comments on amnesty. MPLA Information Secretary Joao Lourenco stated on his radio address that Savimbi was spreading false concerns on issues already settled: “If that amnesty were not in place, Dr. Savimbi himself would not have been able to meet President Jose Eduardo dos Santos on several occasions, as he has done. Without the amnesty, his representatives would not be in Luanda holding talks with the government in the Joint Commission - which has been happening for a fairly long time now. Thus, this amnesty call is a fake problem UNITA is trying to raise because amnesty was granted.”6 

In a another government response, General Higino Carneiro added greater ambiguity to the amnesty issue by suggesting that Savimbi’s refusal to confine the required number of UNITA troops agreed to in the Lusaka Accord had been the problem. This suggested a catch-22 scenario. According to Savimbi, if UNITA troops were being fired upon by Government troops, they didn’t yet have amnesty. Thus, Savimbi said that he must remain mobilized as long as the Government continued to pursue UNITA militarily. Meanwhile, General Higino suggested that the violence continued because UNITA had not demobilized according to the plan. General Carneiro remarked that: “I believe that recent statements by the UNITA leader may result in different interpretations if we are not able to explain the stages of the Lusaka Protocol, including the confinement of soldiers. For instance, we cannot understand the fact that UNITA cannot confine more soldiers than it pledged to unless the government makes a gesture of goodwill. By doing so, UNITA is distancing itself from the Lusaka Protocol. Both sides signed an agreement of their own free will pledging to respect and implement the accords. This is our point of view.”7 

The Washington Post printed an Op-Ed piece on 28 February 1996 by a UNITA representative regarding the issue of amnesty. There was a mention of the government having “discussions of amnesty” that UNITA found unsatisfactory. The UNITA spokesperson stated that the Angolan Government massacred 20,000 civilian UNITA supporters in 1992. The author stated: “Both UNITA and the government should learn from the South African example that a comprehensive amnesty covering both sides is needed immediately.”8 

In March, Bruce McColm, Angola expert and President of the Institute for Democratic Strategies, testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on courses of action for Angola and the current impasse. Stemming from his visit to Angola two weeks earlier (February 18 to February 25, 1996), McColm made 16 recommendations toward achieving peace in Angola. In particular, McColm stated the following recommendations: (#5) “The United States should encourage the FAA to withdraw from its present forward positions in Uige, Huambo, and Bie Provinces so as to create greater security for the garrisoned troops of UNITA and a climate of greater trust among the population” and (#8) “The Angolan Government should take immediate measures to revise the Amnesty Law so as to include incidents from 1992 through the present, covering all sides in the conflict.”9 

Marcos Samondo, UNITA's representative at the United Nations, was calling for the United Nations to make an evaluation of the situation in Angola. Samondo argued that “the starting point would be for the President of the Republic of Angola, in his capacity as Head of State and Commander in Chief of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), to declare a general and total amnesty.”10 

In May 1996, Jardo Muekalia, the UNITA representative in Washington, told reporters that the problem with the amnesty law was that it does not cover the entire war, before 1992. Muekalia made the following statement: "This is easy and can be accomplished with the stroke of a pen. Failure to expeditiously pass a comprehensive amnesty law gives rise to suspicions in UNITA that the Government wants to try UNITA military officials for war crimes as it has threatened so many times in the past.”11 

Savimbi told reporters in June 1996 that the President must issue “a solemn proclamation of the amnesty, pardoning those who had taken up arms again over the past five years following a peace accord which failed to hold.”12 

Jorge Valentim, UNITA’s chief representative at the peace negotiations in Lusaka, told diplomats in July that an amendment to the amnesty law was absolutely and immediately necessary for the peace process to move forward. “No one” Valentim argued, “could expect a UNITA general to come out of the bush and enter one of the UN's demobilization camps if, as a consequence, he would be prosecuted by the government.”13

  • 5. “UNITA Leader Says President Should Reciprocate UNITA's 'Goodwill',” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 13, 1996.
  • 6. “Ruling Party Says UNITA Leader's Amnesty Call Is 'Unjustifiable',” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 14, 1996.
  • 7. “Government Official Rejects UNITA Leader's Proposals on Amnesty,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 14, 1996.
  • 8. “Angola: The Mercenaries Remain,” The Washington Post, February 28, 1996.
  • 9. “Statement of R. Bruce McColm President, Institute for Democratic Strategies for the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Regarding the Angolan Peace Process,” Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, March 12, 1996.
  • 10. “UNITA Criticizes Government Departure from Joint Commission,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 25, 1996.
  • 11. “Angola: UNITA Calls UN Report ‘Misleading’,” Africa News, May 1996.
  • 12. Angola President Sacks Cabinet to Rescue Ailing Economy,”Africa News, June 1996.
  • 13. “Angola Between Decay and Hope, War and Peace,” Swiss Review of World Affairs, July 1, 1996.
1997

Minimum Implementation

In stark contrast to the number of press reports and stories on the amnesty issue from 1994 through 1996, the amnesty issue disappeared toward the end of 1996. The President did not declare comprehensive amnesty and the amnesty law was not revised. In 1997 and 1998, as UNITA and the Government escalated the fight, the amnesty issue was dropped. There were no further developments.

1998

Minimum Implementation

There were no further developments.

Internally Displaced Persons

ANNEX 7: AGENDA ITEM II.5: COMPLETION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS:

II: Specific Principles:

4. (b) Effective guarantee of the functioning of the State Administration and of the normalization of national life throughout the national territory, including the rehabilitation of communication routes and the resettlement of displaced persons.

Implementation History
1994

No Implementation

The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) put the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) at 303,800 for 1994.

1995

Minimum Implementation

The United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) reported that most IDPs would wait until the April farming season before returning to their homes.1 

UNAVEM III reported a slow process of return for IDPs to their areas of origin in 1995. “In mid-October some 700 internally displaced people were transported by the World Food Program (WFF) from Benguela to Huambo in a joint effort by government authorities, United Nations agencies and NGOs.” Overall, they estimated that around 10 percent of the total displaced population of 1.2 million had returned to their homes. The slow rate of return was attributable to security concerns and the rainy season.2

  • 1. “First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1995/177), March 5, 1995.
  • 2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1995/1012), December 7, 1995.
1996

Minimum Implementation

“The spontaneous return of internally displaced persons continues on a limited scale.”3 

It was reported that 1.2 million IDPs in Angola were dependent on food aid and had not yet returned. “[T]he resettlement of internally displaced persons, which was expected to take place on a large scale prior to the 1996/97 agricultural season, did not materialize.”4

  • 3. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1996/248), April 4, 1996.
  • 4. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1996/827), October 4, 1996.
1997

Minimum Implementation

UNAVEM reported that the resettlement of internally displaced persons continues to be limited. No estimates were given.5

  • 5. “Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1997/438), June 5, 1997.
1998

Minimum Implementation

The Government of Angola and UNITA were at war in 1998 and tens of thousands fled from the violence in the countryside. From April to June, there was a “rapid increase in the number of newly displaced persons, as a result of the high level of insecurity.”6

The United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) reported in November of 1998 that the number of internally displaced persons in Angola had tripled in the last three months to 331,000 new IDPs.7

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program coded the conflict between the Angolan government and UNITA as reaching the threshold of “war” in 1998 with over 1000 total deaths in the year. Coding for this case stops December 31, 1998.

  • 6. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA),” U.N. Security Council (S/1998/524), June 17, 1998.
  • 7. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA),” U.N. Security Council (S/1998/1110), November 23, 1998.
Media Reform

ANNEX 6: AGENDA ITEM II.4: NATIONAL RECONCILIATION:

II. Specific Principles:

Implementation History
1994

No Implementation

There were no major developments in 1994 concerning media reform. 

1995

No Implementation

Although the Lusaka Accord and Angola's constitution guaranteed freedom of expression and of the press, the Government violated these laws in practice. In January 1995, the editor of the Luanda-based newspaper Imparcial Fax Ricardo de Mello was shot on the stairs of his home. His wife said that he had recently been threatened by military agents of the MPLA to stop criticizing the Government’s handling of the war. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), “De Mello was killed at the height of his publication's unprecedented coverage of high-level government corruption” (1995). A group of men attempted to abduct Mariano Costa, a reporter, demanding to see his identification, but he was able to flee. Another reporter, Mario Paiva, a writer for Reuters, was told he would be shot by an agent of the Angolan Home Affairs Information Department (SINSO). Paiva stated that his home was under surveillance by SINSO agents.1

UNITA continued to broadcast on its illegal station “Vorgan”. No announcements regarding media reforms were made and no evidence of the initiation of reforms was found. In February 1995, UNITA held its 8th ordinary congress in Bailundo, Huambo Province with 1,230 delegates from every province in Angola. The UNITA congress adopted 21 resolutions dealing with the peace process and future plans. Number 13 dealt with the freedom of the press and media: “The eighth congress demands the institutionalization of a free and exempt press. The eighth congress condemns the intimidation and assassination of journalists as is the case of the late Ricardo de Mello. Without a free press there is no democracy.”2

  • 1. "Attacks on the Press: Angola 1995," Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).
  • 2. “Eighth UNITA Congress's 21-Point Resolution," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 14, 1995.
1996

No Implementation

Antonio Casemero, a reporter in Cabinda for Televisao Popular de Angola, was harassed by police in early October. On 30 October, he was shot and killed by 4 gunmen in his home in Cabinda.3 

No broad media reforms were reported in the country and no progress had taken place regarding turning UNITA’s radio station “Vorgan” into a legal radio channel. It continued to be used by UNITA as a propaganda outlet and neither side had initiated any change. The United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) reported that, “In order to fulfill the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol regarding the transformation of Vorgan into a non-partisan radio station, UNITA has pledged to complete the necessary legal and administrative formalities by presenting the pertinent documents to the Government.”4

  • 3. "Antonio Casemero,” Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).
  • 4. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1996/827), October 4, 1996.
1997

Minimum Implementation

The one radio program believed to be the most unbiased in Angola was banned in 1997 from broadcasting certain content. “In April, the privately owned FM station Radio 2000 in Lubango was banned by the government from broadcasting the Voice of America’s Portugal-to-Africa program, Angola: Linha Directa, Linha Aberta. Radio 2000 was the only station inside Angola carrying this programming, and was believed by many Angolans to be the most informative and unbiased source of information. This action, taken after the implementation of the new unity government, directly contradicted the government’s professed commitment to democracy and freedom of expression.”5 

The Vorgan radio program remained unchanged. UNAVEM reported that “The long-standing issue of the transformation of the UNITA radio station into a non-partisan broadcasting facility has not yet been fully resolved. Although agreement has been reached on the name and other particulars of the station, the question of the allocation of frequencies is still under discussion.”6 

After submitting an application for a shortwave radio license, UNITA was allocated one frequency in Luanda. In October, UNITA requested additional frequencies in other cities. With the imposition of sanctions, UNITA continued to broadcast anti-Government and anti-United Nations propaganda.7

  • 5. "Attacks on the Press 1997: Angola,” Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).
  • 6. “Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1997/438), June 5, 1997.
  • 7. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA),” U.N. Security Council (S/1997/959), December 4,  1997.
1998

Minimum Implementation

Although Angola's constitution guaranteed freedom of expression and the press, the government violated these laws in practice. In February, the Luanda-based independent weekly Agora was set on fire and burned by arsonists. Simao Roberto, a reporter for Jornal de Angola, was shot and killed on 5 June 1998. The Committee to Protect Journalists considered Angola “one of the most dangerous for journalists, and one where those who use violence to silence the press do so with impunity.”8

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program coded the conflict between the Angolan government and UNITA as reaching the threshold of “war” in 1998 with over 1000 total deaths in the year. Coding for this case stops December 31, 1998.

  • 8. "Attacks on the Press 1998: Angola,” Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).
Detailed Implementation Timeline

ANNEX 9: AGENDA ITEM II.5: OTHER PENDING ISSUES; TIMETABLE OF ACTIONS UNDER THE LUSAKA PROTOCOL:

1. D DAY:

Implementation History
1994

No Implementation

The major elements of the timeline – namely, the ceasefire phases and demobilization by the forces of both sides – were not met in 1994.

1995

No Implementation

In November of 1995, one full year after the Lusaka Accord, “the phased billeting of government and UNITA troops to 15 UN-built quartering areas (now in the process of completion) has not yet begun.” The plan, coming from the Lusaka Accord, was for 200,000 troops to be merged into a national army, with around half of that number to be later demobilized after a period of on-the-job training.1

  • 1. “Angola's Peace Grows More Tense by the Day,” Guardian Weekly, November 5, 1995.
1996

No Implementation

"It is disturbing that, more than one year after the signing of the Lusaka Protocol (which ended the war in November 1994), the quartering of UNITA troops -- one of the central elements in the peace process -- has not made any significant progress," argued the Secretary-General (Inter Press Service (IPS), 1996).2 

In March, President José Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA leader Mr. Jonas Savimbi met and agreed to a revised timetable for the Lusaka Accord.3 

Limited progress was reported on the revised timetable and the major elements of the accord. “Expectations which were raised in June and July for the expeditious completion of the quartering of UNITA troops, the selection of its soldiers for incorporation into the Angolan Armed Forces and the demobilization of ex-combatants, have also been disappointed.”4

  • 2. “Angola: U.N. Voices Frustration with UNITA,” Inter Press Service (IPS), February 2, 1996.
  • 3. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1996/248), April 4, 1996.
  • 4. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1996/827), October 4, 1996.
1997

No Implementation

The United Nations Security Council decided to maintain its peacekeeping force in Angola for a final month because the peace timetable of the Lusaka Protocol had not been met.5 

The UN Security Council reported major delays in the formation of the reconciliation government because UNITA, the opposition, had fallen behind in the implementation of the peace timetable.6 

The Joint Commission adopted an updated timetable for the implementation of the outstanding provisions of the Lusaka Accord.7

  • 5. “U.N. Extends its Angola Force One Last Month.” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, February 27, 1997.
  • 6. “U.N. Council Decries Slow Political Settlement in Angola,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, January 30, 1997.
  • 7. “UN Security Council Extends Angola Mission Until 16 April,” M2 PressWIRE, April 2, 1997.
1998

No Implementation

The United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), the Angolan government, and UNITA set another revised "final" timetable for demobilization to be completed by 28 February 1998. It was reported that none of the elements in the timetable had been met. On 11 March, they set another new timetable of 1 April 1998, which was also not met.8 

Angolan media sources reported that the Angolan countryside was at war.9 

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) coded the conflict between the Angolan government and UNITA as reaching the threshold of “war” in 1998 with over 1000 total deaths in the year.10 

In the last issuance of 1998, MONUA reported that the Government of Angola and UNITA forces had continued to perform extensive military operations and that MONUA personnel, under phase IV of their security plan, were withdrawn from all provinces.11

  • 8. “Angola Peace Monitor,” Africa News 4, no. 7 (March 1998).
  • 9. “UNITA: Back to the Path of War,” Africa News, August 5, 1998.
  • 10. “UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia,” Uppsala Conflict Data Program, accessed February 22, 2013.
  • 11. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA),” U.N. Security Council (S/1998/1110), November 23, 1998.
Verification/Monitoring Mechanism

ANNEX 4: AGENDA ITEM II.1 (continued): MILITARY ISSUES (II)

II. Specific Principles

Implementation History
1994

No Implementation

UN verification had not yet been deployed.

1995

Full Implementation

As of 1 March, the United Nations had deployed 418 military and police observers to 38 sites outside Luanda. About 40 more military and police observers were expected to arrive in Luanda.1 

On 1 March 1995, the Joint Commission held its tenth session to discuss issues such as ceasefire violations, demobilization problems and the lack of security in UNITA areas for UN personnel.2

The Joint Commission held its 12th regular session on 28 March 1995. It declared phase one of the disengagement of forces as adequately completed.3

  • 1. “First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1995/177), March 5, 1995.
  • 2. Ibid.
  • 3. “Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1995/274), April 7, 1995.
1996

Full Implementation

The Joint Commission remained active in the implementation process. In Luanda there were almost daily meetings between the government and UNITA delegations to the Joint Commission. The Armed Conflict Prevention Group continued to operate regularly.4

The Joint Commission toured several demobilization sites at N’Gove, N’Tuco and Quibala and found them acceptable.5 

A report on 25 April 1996 stated that the Government of Angola had left the Joint Commission. UNITA broadcasted that “it is still committed to the Angolan peace process” and “deplores the Angolan government's decision to leave the Joint Commission.”6 

The mandate of UNAVEM-3 was extended on 11 July 1996 to 1997. The Joint Commission sent letters of concern to the President of Angola and UNITA over the disappointing lack of progress on the implementation of the Lusaka Accord.7

  • 4. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1996/248), April 4, 1996.
  • 5. Ibid.
  • 6. “UNITA Criticizes Government Departure from Joint Commission,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 25, 1996.
  • 7. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1996/827), October 4, 1996.
1997

Full Implementation

From April to June, the Joint Commission held eight meetings which examined approximately 60 cases of human rights abuses. The number of military and police observers and troops was 4,994 in June.8

Toward the end of the year, the “Security Council in resolution 1135 (1997) approved the new measures to be taken by the international community against UNITA.” Savimbi announced that the new sanctions would make it even more difficult for him to comply with the Lusaka Accord.9

Three weeks after the imposition of sanctions, UNITA severed all ties with the Government and MONUA. The UNITA members are still active in the Joint Commission.10

“The strength of United Nations military personnel now stands at 2, 495, including 192 military observers, 78 military staff officers, 1, 668 troops and 557 military support personnel.”11

  • 8. “Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1997/438), June 5, 1997.
  • 9. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA),” U.N. Security Council (S/1997/959), December 4, 1997.
  • 10. Ibid.
  • 11. Ibid.
1998

Full Implementation

The verification process completely broke down in the midst of violence and the sanctions imposed against UNITA. MONUA reported that “there have been no contacts between the Government and Mr. Jonas Savimbi and his group, and the joint mechanisms established for the implementation of the peace process at the national and local levels, including the Joint Commission, have been paralyzed.”12The Uppsala Conflict Data Program coded the conflict between the Angolan government and UNITA as reaching the threshold of “war” in 1998 with over 1000 total deaths in the year. Coding for this case stops December 31, 1998.

  • 12. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA),” U.N. Security Council (S/1998/1110), November 23, 1998.
UN Peacekeeping Force

ANNEX 3: AGENDA ITEM II.1: MILITARY ISSUES (I): III. MODALITIES:

6. Reinforcement of existing United Nations personnel, both military observers and armed peacekeeping forces.

Timetable of the Bilateral Cease-Fire Modalities:

Implementation History
1994

No Implementation

No troops were deployed in November or December.

1995

Full Implementation

In a 5 March 1995 report, the Secretary General reported that the deployment of UN peacekeeping troops could not take place until certain measures were put in place such as “an effective cease-fire; the full disengagement of Government and UNITA forces; the setting up of verification mechanisms; the establishment of reliable communication links between the Government, UNITA and UNAVEM; the provision to, and verification by, UNAVEM of all relevant military data, including troop itineraries; the designation of all quartering areas; the withdrawal of troops to the nearest barracks; and the early start of de-mining activities” (UNAVEM III, 1995). It was noted that troops would be deployed only if these conditions were met by 25 March. The deployment was scheduled to begin on 9 May 1995.1

As of 30 November 1995, the UNAVEM-3 military component was deployed with 6,184 military personnel, including 331 military observers at 60 locations. The number of civilian police observers (CIVPOL) was 253. Their mandate was to verify and monitor the Angolan National Police, the demobilization of the Rapid Reaction Police, and criminal investigations of human rights violations.2

  • 1. “First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1995/177), March 5, 1995.
  • 2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1995/1012), December 7, 1995.
1996

Full Implementation

As of 29 March, the total size of UNAVEM’s military and police personnel was reported to be 7,071. At that time, UNAVEM III was the largest United Nations peace-keeping operation.3 

As of 27 September, the strength of UNAVEM III military and police personnel stood at 7,264.4

  • 3. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1996/248), April 4, 1996.
  • 4. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1996/827), October 4, 1996.
1997

Full Implementation

“As at 1 June 1997, the strength of the military component of UNAVEM III, including the military observers and staff officers, stood at 4,700 personnel, down from the peak level of over 7,000 military personnel in 1995.”5

  • 5. “Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1997/438), June 5, 1997.
1998

Full Implementation

In January, MONUA reported that its military component was being downsized and repatriated according to the plans of the Security Council. The current size of formed units and staff officers was stated as being 1,604 as of 9 January 1998. It was stated that 8 military observer teams were closed and 15 handed over to CIVPOL, the civilian police component. The total size of military observers was expected to be reduced to 90 officers by 31 January 1998. As of 7 January 1998, the Annex put the number of MONUA “troops” at 1,558.6 

The last MONUA report of 1998 put troop size at 547.7The Uppsala Conflict Data Program coded the conflict between the Angolan government and UNITA as reaching the threshold of “war” in 1998 with over 1000 total deaths in the year. Coding for this case stops December 31, 1998.

  • 6. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA),” U.N. Security Council (S/1998/17), January 12, 1998.
  • 7. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA),” U.N. Security Council (S/1998/1110), November 23, 1998.

Please always cite: Peace Accords Matrix (Date of retrieval: (06/27/2017),
http://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/lusaka-protocol,
Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame.