Luena Memorandum of Understanding

  • 88%
  • Implementation Score 
    after 10 years
Provisions in this Accord
Cease Fire

Chapter 1: Subject and Principles of the Memorandum of Understanding

1.1 SUBJECT

1.2. The objective of the Memorandum of Understanding is collaboration between the parties for the resolution of negative military factors posing an obstacle to the Lusaka Protocol, and the creation of conditions for its definitive conclusion.

2 - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

Implementation History
2002

Full Implementation

In 2001 and early 2002, after several years of renewed civil war following the failed 1994 Lusaka Protocol, the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) closed in on Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA. After destroying most of the defenses surrounding the leader, the number of defections from Savimbi reached an all-time high in early February and the army reported that Savimbi was near the end.1 

On 22 February 2002, the FAA forces killed Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA. The Angolan government immediately called on all UNITA troops to lay down their weapons and surrender.2 

On 30 March 2002, FAA leader G. S. Nunda and UNITA leader Kamorteiro signed an agreement in the city of Luena, ending the civil war.3 

UNITA troops began to travel to the assembly points identified in the Luena Agreement on the same day the agreement was officially signed. UNITA General Samuel Chiwale, a member of the Supreme Command of UNITA forces, instructed his troops to report to the assembly points in the Luena agreement immediately.4 

There were no reports of armed conflict or organized violence following the Luena Agreement in 2002.

  • 1. “Savimbi “Close to the End” as Government Forces Win More Victories,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 19, 2002.
  • 2. “Angola's Government Says Rebel Leader Savimbi Dead,” Agence France Presse, February 22, 2002.
  • 3. “Angola Signs Ceasefire with UNITA Rebels,” Reuters News Agency, March 30, 2002.
  • 4. “UNITA Forces in Northern Front Begin Implementing Luena Accord,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 4, 2002.
2003

Full Implementation

There were no reports of armed conflict, organized violence, or ceasefire violations in 2003.5

In April, Angolans nationally celebrated one year of peace.6

On 9 April, Professor Ibrahim A. Gambari, Under-Secretary-General and Special Adviser on Africa, remarked on the extraordinary turn-around in Angola: “From the moment that cease-fire was declared in March 2002 till today, no single shot has been fired and no skirmishes have been reported in violations of the cease-fire. The process of disarmament of UNITA was completed and members of UNITA forces were integrated into the national army and police.”7

  • 5. “U.N. Taking Active Role in Rebuilding Angola as Ceasefire Holds,” State Department, April 10, 2003.
  • 6. “Angola Celebrates One Year of Peace,” Xinhua General News Service, April 4, 2003.
  • 7. “Angola: Rebuilding the Nation: National Reconciliation and Peace,” Africa News, April 9, 2003.
2004

Full Implementation

No large scale violence reported this year. 

2005

Full Implementation

No large scale violence reported this year. 

2006

Full Implementation

No large scale violence reported this year. 

2007

Full Implementation

No large scale violence reported this year. 

2008

Full Implementation

No large scale violence reported this year. 

2009

Full Implementation

No large scale violence reported this year. 

2010

Full Implementation

No large scale violence reported this year. 

2011

Full Implementation

In April 2011, Angola celebrated almost a decade without civil war. In the six years following the 2002 peace deal, Angola’s GDP rose 260 percent with an annual growth rate of 14 percent.8

  • 8. “Angola Celebrates 11 Years of Peace,” The Korea Herald, April 7, 2013.
Powersharing Transitional Government

(CHAPTER 1) SUBJECT AND PRINCIPLES OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

1 -- SUBJECT

1.2. The objective of the Memorandum of Understanding is collaboration between the parties for the resolution of negative military factors posing an obstacle to the Lusaka Protocol, and the creation of conditions for its definitive conclusion.

2 -- FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

Implementation History
2002

Intermediate Implementation

The 2002 Luena Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) calls for continuing and completing the implementation of the 1994 Lusaka protocol. The Lusaka protocol contained a powersharing provision stipulating that at least 11 top positions in particular ministries in the Angolan Government be reserved for UNITA officials. Powersharing began in 1997. 

On 10 April 1997, President Dos Santos appointed his cabinet of 28 ministers into the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation. According to the decree signed by the President, four of the 28 cabinet ministers were from the former rebel movement, the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). They were the Minister of Geology and Mines, Marcos Samondo; the Health Minister, Anastacio Ruben Sikato; the Minister of Trade, Victorino Hossi; and the Minister of Hotels and Tourism, Jorge Valentim. The 24 other ministers were from President Dos Santos' People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).1

Another report indicated that UNITA occupied four minister posts and seven deputy-minister posts.2

The next year (1998), UNITA and the Angolan Government returned to civil war. During that period of renewed fighting, UNITA officials appear to have continuously held those reserved positions in the cabinet. In 1998, it was announced that 11 of the 32 top posts in government belonged to UNITA.3

On 4 April 2002, the Government and UNITA signed the Luena Memorandum of Understanding which reaffirmed and made some additions to the 1994 Lusaka Protocol. It was reported on 6 December 2002 that President Dos Santos was making changes to his cabinet but that UNITA officials would retain their reserved positions in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol.4

A story in December 2002 suggests that four UNITA officials remained in the cabinet, although two of the names have changed since the formation of the cabinet in 1997. Samondo and Sikato appear to have been replaced by Hamukwaya and Antonio. The report reads: “Four officials from the former UNITA have also been renamed in their previous posts - Albertina Hamukwaya (Health), Jorge Valentim (Hotels and Tourism), Manuel Antonio Africano (Geology and Mines) and Victorino Hossi (Commerce).”5 

  • 1. “New Cabinet Formed in Angola,” Xinhua News Agency, April 10, 1997.
  • 2. “Roundup: Road to Peace in Angola Tortuous,” Xinhua News Agency, April 11, 1997.
  • 3. “Joint Press Conference With Russian Federation Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov and Angola's Minister Of Foreign Affairs Venancio De Sylva Moura,” Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, April 10, 1998.
  • 4. “Angola's President Names New Prime Minister, Reshuffles Cabinet,” Agence France Presse, December 6, 2002.
  • 5. “Finance Minister Ousted in Angolan Cabinet Shake-Up,” World Markets Analysis, December 9, 2002.
2003

Intermediate Implementation

No reports found for 2003. 

2004

Intermediate Implementation

In October of 2004, the president of UNITA gave a speech in Luanda and talked of his concern over the insufficient appointments made by the President in regards to UNITA members in the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN). Specifically, he called for “the replacement of nine of his members, instead of only three carried out by the Head of State.” It was mentioned in the story that President Dos Santos sent a letter to UNITA headquarters reassuring them that he would keep Albertina Hamukwaya in the cabinet; no other names were mentioned.6 

In December of 2004, Jorge Valentim was replaced by Eduardo Chingunji, Albertina Hamukwaya (mentioned previously) was replaced by Sebastiao Veloso, and Hossi was replaced by Muafumua. All appeared to be MPLA members, not UNITA members. Chingunji later contributed to a book on the success of the MPLA. By the end of 2004, only Manuel Africano (Geology and Mines) was listed as a UNITA representative in the cabinet.7 We consider this a reversal of the powersharing arrangment.  

  • 6. “President Dos Santos Reassures UNITA on Government Reshuffling,” Africa News, November 2, 2004.
  • 7. “President Carries Out Another Minor Reshuffle in Angola,” World Markets Analysis, December 8, 2004.
2005

Minimum Implementation

No additional UNITA members joined the cabinet from 2005 to 2007.

2006

Minimum Implementation

No additional UNITA members joined the cabinet from 2005 to 2007.

2007

Minimum Implementation

No additional UNITA members joined the cabinet from 2005 to 2007.

2008

Minimum Implementation

The last story to mention Manuel Africano was in May of 2008, the year that the MPLA swept the elections. The post-election list of cabinet members had Jose Maria Botelho de Vasconcelos replacing Africano.8 

On 21 September 2008, the Angolan Parliament voted and approved the abolishment of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN).9

  • 8. “Polls to Bring Institutional Normality,” Africa News, May 31, 2008.
  • 9. “Angola: Ruling MPLA Praises Unanimous Vote On GURN Abolishment,” Africa News, October 17, 2008.
2009

Minimum Implementation

There was no further UNITA representation in the cabinet from 2009 to 2011.

2010

Minimum Implementation

There was no further UNITA representation in the cabinet from 2009 to 2011.

2011

Minimum Implementation

There was no further UNITA representation in the cabinet from 2009 to 2011.

Electoral/Political Party Reform

CHAPTER 1: SUBJECT AND PRINCIPLES OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

1 -- SUBJECT

1.2. The objective of the Memorandum of Understanding is collaboration between the parties for the resolution of negative military factors posing an obstacle to the Lusaka Protocol, and the creation of conditions for its definitive conclusion.

2 -- FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

Implementation History
2002

Intermediate Implementation

The 2002 Luena Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) calls for continuing and completing the implementation of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol. The Lusaka Accord stipulated that UNITA be allowed to become a legitimate political party to compete in national multi-party elections. In 1998, three years following the Lusaka Accord, the Angolan government announced that UNITA was a fully legalized political party. UNITA would remain a legal political party, although multi-party elections would not be held for several years.1

  • 1. “Angola Peace Monitor,” Africa News 4, no. 7 (March 1998).
2003

Intermediate Implementation

UNITA remained a legal political party this year; multi-party elections would not be held. 

2004

Intermediate Implementation

UNITA remained a legal political party this year; multi-party elections would not be held.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

UNITA remained a legal political party this year; multi-party elections would not be held.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

UNITA remained a legal political party this year; multi-party elections would not be held.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

UNITA remained a legal political party this year; multi-party elections would not be held.

2008

Full Implementation

On 5 September 2008, Angola held national multi-party parliamentary elections for the first time in 16 years. The MPLA won over 80 percent of the seats, with UNITA coming in second with 10 percent.2

  • 2. “Angola to Hold First Election in 16 Years,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, September 5, 2008.
2009

Full Implementation

The stipulation that national elections be held and UNITA be allowed to compete was fulfilled in 2008.

2010

Full Implementation

The stipulation that national elections be held and UNITA be allowed to compete was fulfilled in 2008.

2011

Full Implementation

The stipulation that national elections be held and UNITA be allowed to compete was fulfilled in 2008.

Decentralization/Federalism

CHAPTER 1: SUBJECT AND PRINCIPLES: 

1 -- SUBJECT

1.2. The objective of the Memorandum of Understanding is collaboration between the parties for the resolution of negative military factors posing an obstacle to the Lusaka Protocol, and the creation of conditions for its definitive conclusion.

2 -- FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

Implementation History
2002

Minimum Implementation

The 2002 Luena Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) calls for continuing and completing the decentralization efforts under the 1994 Lusaka Protocol. In February 2002, Fernando Dias Dos Santos Nando, Minister of the Interior, spoke at a national seminar on the topic of renewing the government’s ongoing programs of decentralization.1 

  • 1. “Angola: Savimbi's Death Likely to Lead to Cease-Fire – Minister,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 28, 2002.
2003

Minimum Implementation

No major steps toward decentralizing the government took place in 2003.

2004

Minimum Implementation

A joint study by the UN Development Program and Angola's Ministry of Territorial Administration examined 16 provinces, 47 municipalities, and 47 districts across Angola and recommended greater decentralization of power. Specifically, the report called for fewer government employees at the national and provincial levels and more at the local community level.2

  • 2. “Angola: New UN Report Calls for Greater Decentralisation,” Africa News, May 27, 2004.
2005

Minimum Implementation

Limited decentralization programs were promoted in areas of the country in 2005, although it is unclear whether government functions were transfered to local areas. In 2006, the USAID budget for Angola was 25.5 million and focused on improved governing and democratization. According to USAID, “The Governing Justly and Democratically objective strengthens constituencies and institutions required for democratic governance by strengthening civil society organizations and promoting local government decentralization; fostering an independent media, government transparency, accountability, and capability, and improved dialogue between citizens and government; and laying the groundwork for free and fair elections.”1

  • 1. “State Department Issues Background Note on Angola,” US Fed News, July 1, 2007.
2006

Minimum Implementation

No details on decentralization programs were found for 2006.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

Programs on decentralization and local governance promoted by the Ministry of Territory Administration, in partnership with UNDP, were held in communities throughout Angola in 2007.4 

In August of 2007, the government took a major step toward the administrative decentralization of the country by granting budgetary autonomy to 50 municipalities. According to one report “the government has embarked on a program of decentralization, and in August 2007 the Council of Ministers passed a resolution to grant 50 municipalities control of their own budgets.”5

  • 4. “Angola: Malanje Hosts Workshop on Decentralisation, Governance,” Africa News, November 14, 2007.
  • 5. “State Department Issues Background Note on Angola.” US Fed News, January 1, 2008.
2008

Intermediate Implementation

The creation of the Municipal Management Fund in 2008 was considered an important step for the decentralization process in Angola. Also in 2008, the program on budgetary decentralization was extended to give all municipalities in Angola control over their budget.6

  • 6. “State Department Issues Background Note on Republic of Angola,” Targeted News Service, April 11, 2011.
2009

Intermediate Implementation

Programs on decentralization and local governance continued in 2009.

2010

Full Implementation

A 2010 report claims that Angola has completed “the permanent transfer of competences from the central administration organs to the local administration of state and the reinforcement of the districts' institutional capacity.”7

  • 7. “Angola: Steps Taken for Decentralisation Process Considered Important,” Africa News, October 22, 2010.
2011

Full Implementation

The Ministry of Territory Administration took further steps towards decentralization with the formation of local administrative units and the passage and implementation of new laws such as the Law on the Local Administration Organ Organization and Functioning.8

  • 8. “Angola: Country Takes Positive Steps in Decentralisation Process,” Africa News, November 2, 2010.
Civil Administration Reform

CHAPTER 1: SUBJECT AND PRINCIPLES: 

1 -- SUBJECT

1.2. The objective of the Memorandum of Understanding is collaboration between the parties for the resolution of negative military factors posing an obstacle to the Lusaka Protocol, and the creation of conditions for its definitive conclusion. 

2 -- FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

Implementation History
2002

Intermediate Implementation

The 2002 Luena Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) calls for continuing and completing the implementation of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol which calls for extensive local powersharing in the form of civilian administration quotas for UNITA officials. In all, 150 administrative positions are mentioned in the Lusaka text, although it is likely that the 4 governor positions and 7 deputy governor positions will receive the bulk of media attention. 

It is important to note that substantial progress was made regarding the appointment of UNITA officials to administrative positions in Angola prior to the Luena agreement. President Dos Santos showed a credible commitment to fulfilling this part of the Accord. State-run television in Angola ran a story on 16 March 1998 that standing governors and deputy governors were being relieved of their jobs throughout Angola so that Dos Santos could reappoint UNITA representatives to those posts, as agreed upon in the Lusaka Protocol. 

Angolan TV reported that “the president of the republic today issued two decrees relieving Manuel Goncalves Mwandumba, Serafim Ananito Alexandre, and Manuel Dala from their posts as governors of Uige, Lunda Sul, and Cuando Cubango Provinces, respectively. To fill the above posts, the head of state appointed 3 new governors proposed by UNITA. They were Joao Domingos Manzahila, Domingos Oliveira, and Jose Cativa, who will be governors of Uige, Lunda Sul, and Cuando Cubango Provinces, respectively. The president of the republic also appointed 7 deputy governors proposed by UNITA: Bernardo Prata, Americo Chimina, Moises Chivemba, Jose Soma Gaspar, Manuel Bunjo, Antonio Tonga, and Campos Tomas, deputy governors of Benguela, Huambo, Bie, Huila, Luanda, Cuanza Sul, and Bengo Provinces, respectively.”1 

As for the remaining municipal and local positions, Ibrahim Gambari, the Chairman of the Joint Commission on Implementation, made the following statement to the press in September, which demonstrates the government’s intentions and commitment at that time to making all of the required appointments: “Under the Lusaka Protocol, UNITA is entitled to designate four ministers, seven deputy ministers, six ambassadors, three provincial governors, seven vice governors, 30 municipal administrators, 35 vice municipal administrators, and 75 communal area administrators.”2

Regarding the remaining appointments, a UNITA representative made a statement to the press in September of 2002 which indicated that UNITA was satisfied by the level of UNITA appointments that were being made. According to the UNITA spokesperson, “among the issues to be decided were the appointment of ambassadors, provincial governors, and a couple of local administrators.”3

  • 1. “President Dos Santos Appoints New Governors Proposed By UNITA,” BBC Monitoring Africa, March 18, 1998.
  • 2. “Angola: Interior Minister Nando Denies Alleged Attempt to Stall Peace Process,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 18, 2002.
  • 3. “Angola: Consolidation of Peace Process a Priority, Says UN Envoy,” Africa News, September 17, 2002.
2003

Intermediate Implementation

In July of 2003, the Governor of Northern Uije Province Lazaro Xixima, Municipal Administer Jose Miranda, and Deputy Milunga Raimundo were all removed from their positions. UNITA officials Bernardo Francisco, Deputy Maria Carlota, and Mario Miguel Esperanca were appointed to the vacant posts.4

  • 4. “Uije: Local Governor Appoints Municipal Administrators,” Africa News, July 10, 2003.
2004

Full Implementation

In 2004, UNITA’s Secretary for Information, Adalberto da Costa Junior, told journalists that several tasks remained in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and mentioned the swearing in of UNITA administrators and remaining local level appointments. This statement suggests that most of the positions had been filled.5 

  • 5. “Angola: Government and UNITA Resume Bilateral Talks,” Africa News, January 16, 2004.
2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Dispute Resolution Committee

2 - INTERPRETATION

2.1 Differences in interpretation or implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding are to be submitted to the Joint Military Commission for resolution in a spirit of friendship, tolerance and understanding.

Implementation History
2002

Full Implementation

The Joint Military Commission was set up on the day of the ceasefire and began issuing reports on the demobilization process right away.1 The Joint Military Commission spokesperson,  General Francisco Furtado, announced that the integration of UNITA military forces into the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and National Police would commence on 19 July 2002.2 On 23 October, it was announced that the Joint Commission (the United Nations, UNITA, the Government) had begun reviewing the process of social reintegration of demobilized soldiers.3 

In November of 2002 the Joint Military Commission announced that it had met all of its objectives and would dissolve.4 

  • 1. “Angola Says 25,000 UNITA Rebels Now In Demob Camps,” Agence France Presse, May 3, 2002.
  • 2. “Angola: UNITA Soldiers To Be Integrated Into Armed Forces, Police on 19 July,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 10, 2002.
  • 3. “Angola: Joint Commission Reviews Reintegration of Ex-Soldiers,” Africa News, October 23, 2002.
  • 4. “Angola's Joint Peace Commission is Dissolved,” Agence France Presse, November 21, 2002.
2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Military Reform

CHAPTER 1: SUBJECT AND PRINCIPLES: 

1 -- SUBJECT

1.2. The objective of the Memorandum of Understanding is collaboration between the parties for the resolution of negative military factors posing an obstacle to the Lusaka Protocol, and the creation of conditions for its definitive conclusion. 

2 -- FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

Implementation History
2002

Intermediate Implementation

The Joint Military Commission spokesperson General Francisco Furtado had announced that the integration of UNITA military forces into the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and National Police would commence on 19 July.1 In July, a total of 30 UNITA generals joined the FAA as part of the military integration process.2 The government of Angola reported in August that 224 UNITA troops had been sworn into the national army.3

  • 1. “Angola: UNITA Soldiers to be Integrated into Armed Forces, Police on 19 July,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 10, 2002.
  • 2. “Angola: 30 UNITA Generals Join National Army as Integration of Forces Begins,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 18, 2002.
  • 3. “Angola Gets Unified Army,” Xinhua General News Service, August 1, 2002.
2003

Full Implementation

The Angolan Government reported that 5,007 UNITA troops had been drafted into the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), completing the stipulations of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding and the Lusaka Protocol. According to the announcement, four generals, eight lieutenant-generals, 18 brigadiers, 40 colonels, 60 lieutenant-colonels, 100 majors, 150 captains, 200 lieutenants, 250 sub-lieutenants, 300 aspirants, 300 sergeants, and 3,577 simple soldiers were drafted into the national army. Another 40 generals were incorporated into the National Police: four were lieutenant-generals and 14 were brigadiers who were under the FAA General Staff.4

  • 4. “Angola: 5,007 Ex-UNITA Soldiers Drafted Into National Army,” Africa News, June 19, 2003.
2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Police Reform

CHAPTER 1: SUBJECT AND PRINCIPLES: 

1 -- SUBJECT

1.2. The objective of the Memorandum of Understanding is collaboration between the parties for the resolution of negative military factors posing an obstacle to the Lusaka Protocol, and the creation of conditions for its definitive conclusion.

2 -- FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

Implementation History
2002

Minimum Implementation

The Joint Military Commission spokesperson General Francisco Furtado announced that the integration of UNITA military forces into the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and National Police would commence on 19 July 2002.1

  • 1. “Angola: UNITA Soldiers to be Integrated into Armed Forces, Police on 19 July,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 10, 2002.
2003

Full Implementation

The Angolan government reported that 40 UNITA generals were incorporated into positions within the National Police, fulfilling the requirements of the Luena and Lusaka Accords.2

  • 2. “Angola: 5,007 Ex-UNITA Soldiers Drafted Into National Army,” Africa News, June 19, 2003.
2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Demobilization

CHAPTER 1: SUBJECT AND PRINCIPLES: 

1 -- SUBJECT

1.2. The objective of the Memorandum of Understanding is collaboration between the parties for the resolution of negative military factors posing an obstacle to the Lusaka Protocol, and the creation of conditions for its definitive conclusion.  

2 -- FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

Implementation History
2002

Intermediate Implementation

On 30 March 2002, FAA leader G. S. Nunda and UNITA leader Kamorteiro signed a ceasefire agreement ending the civil war.1 

UNITA troops began to travel to the assembly points identified in the Luena Agreement on the same day the agreement was officially signed. UNITA General Samuel Chiwale, a member of the Supreme Command of UNITA forces, instructed his troops to report to the assembly points in the Luena Agreement immediately.2 

In late April, the Angolan Embassy in Windhoek reported that more than 9,000 UNITA soldiers had entered 33 demobilization areas across Angola since the ceasefire.3 

As of May, some 25,000 UNITA troops had turned themselves in to the demobilization camps.4 

  • 1. “Angola Signs Ceasefire with UNITA Rebels,” Reuters News Agency, March 30, 2002.
  • 2. “UNITA Forces in Northern Front Begin Implementing Luena Accord,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 4, 2002.
  • 3. “Angola: UNITA Soldiers Give Themselves Up,” Africa News, April 29, 2002.
  • 4. “Angola Says 25,000 UNITA Rebels Now in Demob Camps,” Agence France Presse, May 3, 2002.
2003

Full Implementation

By the end of January, about 90,000 ex-soldiers had been registered in the assembly areas.5 

The government reported that 35 UNITA confinement areas, holding 100,000 demobilized UNITA soldiers and their families, would be shut down by the end of February. Under the timeline of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding, the confinement areas should close by the end of 2002.6 

The Angolan Peace Monitor reported that social reintegration programs were being planned to provide professional training for the 105,000 former UNITA fighters and 33,000 former FAA fighters that had been demobilized.7

  • 5. “Angola: Demobilisation and Reintegration Obstacles Highlighted,” Africa News, February 13, 2003.
  • 6. “Angola: UNITA Confinement Areas to Close Down by End of February,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 5, 2003.
  • 7. “Angola: Government Says Resettlement and Reintegration of Ex-Soldiers On Track,” Africa News, September 16, 2003.
2004

Full Implementation

Social reintegration programs continue; no further reports on demobilization found.

2005

Full Implementation

Social reintegration programs continue; no further reports on demobilization found.

2006

Full Implementation

Social reintegration programs continue; no further reports on demobilization found.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Disarmament

Chapter 2 (B) 3.5 (g): The handing over and, in continuation, the collection, storage and subsequent destruction of the entire armament and equipment of the military units and paramilitary structures of the UNITA armed forces.

Implementation History
2002

Intermediate Implementation

In July, it was reported that 5,000 weapons had been turned in from 123,510 people registered at the confinement sites.1 

In November, the United Nation’s Angola Sanctions Monitoring Committee reported that UNITA’s commanders were turning over large quantities of weapons to the Angolan government as part of the demilitarization process.2

  • 1. “Angola: UNITA Soldiers Hand Over Weapons to Government,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 5, 2002.
  • 2. “Angola Weapons,” Voice of America News, November 21, 2002.
2003

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

Reintegration

CHAPTER 2: AGENDA FOR THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING:

3. CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND PENDING MILITARY ISSUES UNDER THE TERMS OF THE LUSAKA PROTOCOL: (F) SOCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL REINTEGRATION OF DEMOBILIZED EXMILITARY FORCES OF UNITA PERSONNEL INTO THE NATIONAL LIFE

Implementation History
2002

Minimum Implementation

The Angolan Government announced that a planned reintegration program, which includes psychological counseling, temporary settlements, general education, and job training for 55,000 former UNITA fighters, would cost an estimated 55 million dollars.1

On 23 October, it was announced that the Joint Commission (the United Nations, UNITA, the Angolan Government) had begun reviewing the process of social reintegration of demobilized soldiers.2

  • 1. “Angola: Socio-Economic Reintegration Programme to Cost 55m US Dollars,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 8, 2002.
  • 2. “Angola: Joint Commission Reviews Reintegration of Ex-Soldiers,” Africa News, October 23, 2002.
2003

Intermediate Implementation

United Nations officials in Angola announced in January that the reintegration program for some 8,000 child soldiers into society had officially begun.3

Speaking at the official opening of the program, the Social Reintegration Minister, Joao Kussumua, announced that the government had made available 125 million dollars for social reintegration programs for former UNITA soldiers and their families.4

After a 4 day visit in August, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees gave the social reintegration programs high marks for their progress over the first six months.5

  • 3. “Angola: Reintegration of Child Soldiers Underway,” Africa News, January 15, 2003.
  • 4. “Angola Earmarks 125m Dollars for Former UNITA Soldiers' Reintegration,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 29, 2003.
  • 5. “Angola: UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Luanda, Says Reintegration of Ex-UNITA Soldiers Remarkable,” Africa News, August 22, 2003.
2004

Intermediate Implementation

Officials from the World Bank, UNDP, and FAO conducted an assessment mission in Huambo on the social reintegration of UNITA soldiers. During the assessment, 50 demobilized UNITA troops received farming kits comprised of various seeds, hoes, files, and harvesting equipment.6

The World Bank donated 33 million USD for the social reintegration of former UNITA combatants and National Army troops.7

In June, two 45-day training courses on plumbing and electrical work commenced in the Balombo municipality.8

Sean Bradley, the World Bank Coordinator for Reintegration, remarked in October that he was not dissatisfied with the amount of progress made thus far. According to Bradley, “Around 50,000 ex-combatants received basic seeds and tools to restart subsistence agriculture activities and about 4,700 were currently involved in economic reintegration activities.”9 

  • 6. “Angola: Huambo: World Bank Mission Assesses Ex-Soldiers Reintegration Process,” Africa News, February 20, 2004.
  • 7. “Angola: World Bank to Grant USD 33 Million for Social Reintegration,” Africa News, April 1, 2004.
  • 8. “Angola: Benguela: Ex-Soldiers Envisage Social and Economic Reintegration,” Africa News, June 2, 2004.
  • 9. “Angola: More Needs to Be Done for Reintegration of Former Soldiers,” Africa News, October 29, 2004.
2005

Intermediate Implementation

The Institute of Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-Militaries (IRSEM) and participating NGOs met in central Bie to assess ongoing social reintegration programs and to develop improved strategies.10

  • 10. “Angola: New Mechanisms for Ex-Soldiers Reintegration Drafted,” Africa News, November 4, 2005.
2006

Full Implementation

A Portuguese NGO (Cooperation, Interchange and Culture) devoted 323,000 USD to the social reintegration of 802 UNITA soldiers in the central Huambo province. The program provided training courses on raising cattle, making fertilizer, carpentry, and the organization of trade and markets. After taking the courses, the participants received equipment associated with their areas of training.11

The Angolan government reported that, as of September, social reintegration programs had been implemented in 17 of Angola’s 18 provinces.12

The UNITA and Government Bilateral Committee reported in October that 107 social reintegration programs were implemented with 82,000 ex-soldiers receiving some kind of job training and assistance package.13

  • 11. “Angola: Portuguese NGO Invests USD 323,000 for Ex-Soldiers' Reintegration,” Africa News, July 13, 2006.
  • 12. “Angola: $28 Million Used in Demobilisation, Reintegration Programme,” Africa News, September 6, 2006.
  • 13. “Angola: Government, UNITA Analyse Ex-Soldiers Reintegration,” Africa News, October 26, 2006.
2007

Full Implementation

In 2007, an American NGO (Care International) spent 1.3 million USD on social reintegration programs in the Bie province, which provided training and equipment to 3,600 demobilized soldiers in the area.14

  • 14. “Angola: Bié - NGO Spends Over USD One Million in Reintegration of Ex-Soldiers,” Africa News, November 30, 2007.
2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Paramilitary Groups

B) DISENGAGEMENT, QUARTERING AND CONCLUSION OF THE DEMILITARIZATION OF UNITA MILITARY FORCES

3.4 The parties reiterate their engagement in the scrupulous fulfillment of their commitments and obligations related to the task of quartering and demilitarizing of UNITA Military Forces (in the spirit foreseen in Annex 3, point II. 1 of the Work Agenda - Military Issues I of the Lusaka Protocol).

Implementation History
2002

Intermediate Implementation

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, UNITA consisted of some 100,000 troops and some 10,000 paramilitary members.1

UNITA troops were given 45 days to turn themselves in and began to travel to the assembly points identified in the Luena Agreement. UNITA General Samuel Chiwale, a member of the Supreme Command of UNITA forces, instructed his troops to report to the assembly points in the Luena agreement immediately.2

From April to May, some 25,000 UNITA troops had turned themselves in to the demobilization camps. It was estimated that UNITA’s force size was around 55,000 at the time of the Luena Accord in April 2002.3

  • 1. “Factfile on Angola,” Agence France Presse, April 2, 2003.
  • 2. “UNITA Forces in Northern Front Begin Implementing Luena Accord,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 4, 2002.
  • 3. “Angola Says 25,000 UNITA Rebels Now in Demob Camps,” Agence France Presse, May 3, 2002.
2003

Full Implementation

By the end of January, about 90,000 ex-soldiers had been registered in the assembly areas – 35,000 more troops than estimated.4

The government reported that 35 UNITA confinement areas, holding over 100,000 demobilized UNITA soldiers and their families, would be shut down by the end of February. Under the timeline of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding, the confinement areas would close by the end of 2002.5

  • 4. “Angola: Demobilisation and Reintegration Obstacles Highlighted,” Africa News, February 13, 2003.
  • 5. “Angola: UNITA Confinement Areas to Close Down by End of February,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 5, 2003.
2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Human Rights

CHAPTER 1: SUBJECT AND PRINCIPLES: 

1 -- SUBJECT

1.2. The objective of the Memorandum of Understanding is collaboration between the parties for the resolution of negative military factors posing an obstacle to the Lusaka Protocol, and the creation of conditions for its definitive conclusion. 

2 -- FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

Implementation History
2002

Intermediate Implementation

The 2002 Luena Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) calls for continuing and completing the implementation of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol. The Lusaka Accord or Protocol calls for substantial human rights monitoring, human rights training and education programs for police and officials, and investigative bodies to investigate human rights violations. In November 1995, UNAVEM-3 established a Human Rights Unit with a mandate to verify and monitor the Angolan National Police, the demobilization of the Rapid Reaction Police, and perform criminal investigations of human rights violations throughout Angola.1

Also in 1995, UNAVEM-3 launched a nationwide human rights education program focused on the role of the Lusaka Protocol in the protection of human rights. UNAVEM focused much of its training resources on the treatment of prisoners in detention centers and on human rights training associated with the military integration process.2 The Human Rights Division and the Ministry of Justice also established local human rights committees in 4 provinces.3

In the wake of the ceasefire, UN Secretary-General Annan called for an expanded UN mandate. The report mentioned the protection of human rights as a primary goal of the new mission. The mission would be called the United Nations Mission in Angola (UNMA) and would have an initial 6 month mandate.4 Sixty sergeants in the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) concluded a new human rights course conducted by the UN Human Rights Division.5 In December, forty Angolan National Police instructors took a human rights training course in Luanda.6

  • 1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1995/1012), December 7, 1995.
  • 2. Ibid.
  • 3. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA),” U.N. Security Council (S/1998/524), June 17, 1998.
  • 4. “Angola: Annan Calls for Expanded UN Mandate,” Africa News, August 2, 2002.
  • 5. “Angola: Huila: FAA Soldiers Instructed On Human Rights,” Africa News, September 9, 2002
  • 6. “Angola: Police Instructors Take a Human Rights Course,” Africa News, December 18, 2002.
2003

Intermediate Implementation

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Sergio Vieira de Melo, took a 2 week trip to Angola to tour conditions and meet with leaders.7 Lerena Pinto, a Human Rights Division specialist at the United Nations Office in Angola, told reporters in March that the number of human rights violations had dropped throughout Angola.8

  • 7. “UN Human Rights Chief to Visit Angola,” Xinhua General News Service, January 8, 2003.
  • 8. “Angola: UN Official Links Drop in Human Rights Violations to Return of Peace,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 31, 2003.
2004

Intermediate Implementation

Speaking in Luanda, the Secretary General of the United Nations for the Defenders of Human Rights, Hina Jilani, remarked that Angola had made progress in making its legal system suitable for the respect of human rights.9

  • 9. “Angola: Legal Framework Suitable for Human Rights Safekeeping – UN,” Africa News, August 17, 2004.
2005

Intermediate Implementation

Sixty-five officials attended a human rights training program in Kuito city held by the National Human Rights Department and the United Nations.10

  • 10. “Angola: Bie: Provincial Justice Department Trains 65 Staff in Human Rights,” Africa News, February 15, 2005.
2006

Intermediate Implementation

The Justice Ministry established a human rights committee on October 24 in Angola's northern Cabinda province.11 

In the northern Uíge province, 50 officers of the National Police attended the second seminar for police instructors on human rights.12

  • 11. “Angola: Human Rights Committee Set Up in Cabinda,” Africa News, October 25, 2006.
  • 12. “Angola: Police Officers Attend Human Rights Course,” Africa News, September 20, 2006.
2007

Intermediate Implementation

Angola ratified four international human rights conventions on torture, racial discrimination, the rights of migrant workers and their families, and the disabled.13 

Police officers, members of the armed forces, state officials, and traditional leaders attended a human rights seminar in central Bie Province promoted by the UN Human Rights Office.14

  • 13. “Angola: Government to Ratify Human Rights Convention,” Africa News, June 3, 2007.
  • 14. “Angola: Bie - Seminar on Human Rights Ends Today in Kuito,” Africa News, August 15, 2007.
2008

Intermediate Implementation

The Government of Angola was commended for its efforts in reforming its human rights conditions by the United Nation's High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, in Geneva Switzerland.15

  • 15. “Angola: High Commissioner Commends Government's Human Rights Effort,” Africa News, March 5, 2008.
2009

Intermediate Implementation

Human Rights Watch released a report on government abuses in Cabinda against the separatist group (FLEC) and urged the government to follow due process and respect international human rights laws and norms.16 

Angola’s Minister of Human Rights responded in the press and denied the abuses reported by Human Rights Watch. He later visited several prisons in the Cabinda region after meeting with local leaders. While the abuses did likely occur, the interaction showed an increased commitment and engagement by government leaders in the area of human rights.17

  • 16. “International Organisation Calls for End to Human Rights Abuses in Angola's Northern Enclave,” Global Insight, June 23, 2009.
  • 17. “Angola: Minister Without Portfolio Denies Human Rights Violation in Cabinda,” Africa News, July 3, 2009.
2010

Intermediate Implementation

The Government of Angola delivered its human rights progress report to the 7th session of the Universal Periodical Review (UPR), a UN human rights monitoring mechanism.18 

The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) arrived in Luanda to evaluate the implementation of human rights reforms in Angola.19

  • 18. “Angola: Optimism on Results of Human Rights Report,” Africa News, February 15, 2010.
  • 19. “Angola: AU Mission in to Assess Human Rights,” Africa News, April 19, 2010.
2011

Intermediate Implementation

Antonio Bento Bembe, Angola’s State Secretary for Human Rights, told reporters that 2011 would see the most progress in human rights conditions in Angola: "The various actions of the Angolan Government carried out throughout the year that is ending soon show that human rights are a fundamental pillar of its foreign and domestic policy."20

  • 20. “Angola: Governmentt Committed to Complying With Human Rights,” Africa News, December 26, 2011.
Amnesty

CHAPTER 2: AGENDA FOR THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

1 GENERAL

1.1. In order to materialize their commitments and obligations under the Lusaka Protocol, the parties accept the following as the Working Agenda for Military Talks:

I - Issues of national reconciliation

Sole item: Amnesty

Implementation History
2002

Full Implementation

The day before the signing of the Luena Accord, the Angolan parliament unanimously approved a general amnesty law for UNITA troops who turn themselves in within 45 days of the passage of the bill for "all crimes against the security of the Angolan state.”1

  • 1. “Angola: Amnesty for Rebels,” The Gazette (Montreal, Quebec), April 3, 2002.
2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Internally Displaced Persons

CHAPTER 1: SUBJECT AND PRINCIPLES: 

1 -- SUBJECT

1.2. The objective of the Memorandum of Understanding is collaboration between the parties for the resolution of negative military factors posing an obstacle to the Lusaka Protocol, and the creation of conditions for its definitive conclusion. 

2 -- FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

Implementation History
2002

Intermediate Implementation

The 2002 Luena Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) calls for continuing and completing the implementation of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol. The Lusaka Protocol calls for the resettlement of displaced persons. 

UNAVEM-3 estimated that around 10 percent of the total displaced population of 1.2 million had returned to their homes by the end of 1995. The slow rate of return was attributable to security concerns and the rainy season.1 

Repatriation continued on a very limited scale in 1996 and 1997 and started to reverse in 1998 as UNITA and the Angolan Government returned to war. In 1998, there was a “rapid increase in the number of newly displaced persons, as a result of the high level of insecurity.”2 

In November of 1998, MONUA reported that the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Angola had tripled in the last three months, amounting to 331,000 new IDPs in a 90 day period.3

The United Nations Mission in Angola (UNMA) estimated that 4 million people were displaced in Angola.4 

The Governor of Bie Province announced that 300,000 displaced persons would be settled in the province in predetermined areas that were being demined by the Hallo Trust demining company.5 

Thousands of displaced persons in Longonjo and Ukuma (west of Huambo) were voluntarily returning to their homes after hearing of the peace agreement signed on 4 April 2002.6 

The Social Reintegration Minister estimated that between 4 April and mid-September of 2002 over 500, 000 displaced persons had left camps and shelters and returned home. The Government had allocated 2 million dollars for the resettlement of displaced persons.7 

The UN Humanitarian Coordinator, Erick de Mull, reported that “two million people have been settled countrywide, through integrated programs of assistance.”8 

  • 1. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” U.N. Security Council (S/1995/1012), December 7, 1995.
  • 2. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA),” U.N. Security Council (S/1998/524), June 17, 1998.
  • 3. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA),” U.N. Security Council (S/1998/1110), November 23, 1998.
  • 4. “Interim report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Angola,” U.N. Security Council (S/2002/1353), December 12, 2002.
  • 5. “Angola: Bie Authorities to Resettle 300,000 War-Displaced Persons,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 17, 2002.
  • 6. “Angola: Internally Displaced Persons Return Voluntarily to Areas of Origin,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 15,  2002.
  • 7. “Angola: Over 500,000 Displaced People Return Home,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 30, 2002.
  • 8. “Angola: One Million Displaced People Back Home,” Africa News, December 12, 2002.
2003

Intermediate Implementation

Authorities in one province, the Northern Kwanza-Norte Province, reported that 45,000 displaced people (out 104,318 in the area) had been resettled in their areas of origin.9 

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA) reported that there were 2.4 million displaced people remaining in Angola, half of which were scheduled to return home within several months.10

  • 9. “Angola: Kwanza-Norte: Over 40,000 Displaced People Resettled,” Africa News, October 14, 2003.
  • 10. “Angola: Almost 2.5m Still Displaced But 1m Expected to Return Home Soon,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 14, 2003.
2004

Intermediate Implementation

Around 425,000 displaced people in Benguela were re-settled in Huambo, Bie, Kwanza-Sul, Namibe and Huila Provinces.11

  • 11. “Angola: Some 425,000 Displaced People Leave Benguela Province,” Africa News, February 4, 2004.
2005

Full Implementation

A joint assessment conducted in 2005 by the United Nations and the Angolan Government reported that since the ceasefire of 2002, four million internally displaced persons (IDPs) had returned home; only 91,000 remained.12

  • 12. “Angola: Ongoing Challenges Facing Almost 100,000 Displaced,” Africa News, October 5, 2005.
2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Media Reform

CHAPTER 1: SUBJECT AND PRINCIPLES: 

1 -- SUBJECT

1.2. The objective of the Memorandum of Understanding is collaboration between the parties for the resolution of negative military factors posing an obstacle to the Lusaka Protocol, and the creation of conditions for its definitive conclusion. 

2 -- FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

Implementation History
2002

No Implementation

(Pre-2002 Status of Media Reform) Although Angola's constitution guaranteed freedom of expression and a free press, the government violated these laws in everyday practice. Ricardo de Mello, the editor of the Luanda-based newspaper Imparcial Fax, was shot on the stairs of his home in January 1995. His wife said that he had recently been threatened by military agents of the MPLA to stop criticizing the Government’s handling of the war. Another reporter, Mario Paiva, a writer for Reuters, was told by an agent of the Angolan Home Affairs Information Department (SINSO) that he would be shot if he continued to criticize the Government.1

In early October 1996, Antonio Casemero, a reporter in Cabinda for Televisao Popular de Angola, was harassed by police for his reporting and a few weeks later shot and killed by 4 gunmen in his home in Cabinda.2

In 1997, the radio program that was believed to be the most unbiased in Angola was banned from broadcasting certain content.3

In February 1998, the Luanda-based independent weekly “Agora” was burned down by arsonists. Simao Roberto, a reporter for Jornal de Angola, was shot and killed on 5 June 1998. The Committee to Protect Journalists considered Angola “one of the most dangerous for journalists, and one where those who use violence to silence the press do so with impunity.”4

(Post-Luena Accord) In 2002, Angola state authorities convicted several journalists of libel and defamation in an effort to suppress criticism of the President and hide corruption. In January, Rafael Marques was convicted in a Luanda court of defamation against President Dos Santos and ordered to pay 950 U.S. dollars in damages. In June, state authorities shut down the radio show “Point of View” for what they considered to be anti-government coverage.5

As of 2002, the Government of Angola ran the country’s only daily newspaper, the only TV station (TPA), and the only national radio station (RNA). At press conferences, journalists had to submit their questions 72 hours in advance and officials chose which ones they would answer. Journalists who criticized the government risked being sent to jail.6 

  • 1. "Attacks on the Press 1995: Angola," Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).
  • 2. "Antonio Casemero,” Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).
  • 3. "Attacks on the Press 1997: Angola,” Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).
  • 4. "Attacks on the Press 1998: Angola,” Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).
  • 5. “Attacks on the Press 2002: Angola,” Committee to Protect Journalists.
  • 6. “Angola: Journalist Paints "Bleak Picture" of Press Freedom,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 25, 2002.
2003

No Implementation

One of the few private radio stations in Angola, Radio Ecclesia, was temporarily suspended in February based on charges of “defamation and false propaganda” against Angolan institutions, said the Minister of Communication Hendrick Neto.7

  • 7. “Angola: Attack on Private Radio Setback for Democracy,” Africa News, February 18, 2003.
2004

No Implementation

In March, the Luanda Provincial Tribunal convicted Felisberto Campos, editor of the weekly Semanario Angolense, of defamation and sentenced him to 45 days in prison or a fine of 1,200 US dollars for articles detailing how some top government officials became multi-millionaires. The Defense Minister, General Kundy Payama, who was profiled in the piece, filed a complaint against Mr. Campos for libel.8

  • 8. “Angola: Global Media Groups Protests Journalist's Jailing,” Africa News, April 7, 2004.
2005

No Implementation

The UN Human Rights Committee ruled that the Government of Angola was in violation of international human rights treaties because journalists were being sent to prison for criticizing the President. The UNHR Commission gave the government 90 days to comply. The Open Society Justice Initiative called on Angolan officials to end the defamation law for public officials.9

  • 9. “Angola: Angola Urged to Reform Press, Defamation Laws,” Africa News, August 31, 2005.
2006

No Implementation

In 10 days, two journalists were murdered in Angola: Augusto Pedro with the Jornal de Angola, and Benicio Wedeinge, the director of the public television station in Cunene. Pedro was attacked at a gas station and beaten to death. Authorities did not convict anyone of the crime. Wedeinge was shot in his home. Avelino Miguel, the president of the Union of Angolan Journalists (SJA), claimed that “the sudden surge of violence was part of a strategy to intimidate the media in the run-up to elections.”10

  • 10. “Angola: Two Journalists Murdered,” BBC Monitoring World Media, July 18, 2006.
2007

No Implementation

Several journalists were detained, beaten, or charged with crimes in 2007. In December, one local journalist, Arnando Chicoca, with Radio Ecclesia was warned by police not to report on public protests against the demolition of informal marketplaces in the area by police. Chicoca reported on the protests anyway and was arrested and convicted under Article 186 “disobeying a police officer.” Later in the year, a more prominent journalist was convicted of libel and sent to prison.11

  • 11. “Attacks on the Press 2007: Angola,” Committee to Protect Journalists, accessed March 3, 2013.
2008

No Implementation

After criticizing the ministerial picks of President Dos Santos in October, three journalists for the national state media outlet, Rádio Nacional de Angola, were fired.12

  • 12. “Attacks on the Press 2008: Angola,” Committee to Protect Journalists, accessed March 3, 2013.
2009

No Implementation

In a June report by Human Rights Watch, the case of journalist Fernando Lelo was documented. Lelo was sentenced to 12 years in prison for security violations associated with his reporting in Cabinda.13

  • 13. “Angola: Protect Press Freedom for Africa Cup - Arrest of Journalists in Cabinda Highlights Climate of Intimidation,” Africa News, December 17, 2009.
2010

No Implementation

Freedom of the press in Angola suffered major legal setbacks in 2010. Numerous journalists were convicted of libel and defamation. In June of 2010, a company named Media Investments, which is alleged to have had ties to the ruling MPLA party in Angola, purchased three independent newspapers known for focusing on corruption in the executive branch of government. The newspapers were close to bankruptcy after all of the companies that had advertised in the newspaper suddenly dropped all their ads.14

In November, Angola's ruling MPLA party passed a state security law making it a criminal offense to use any "words, images, writings, or sound" that insults the president or the government. Violations carry a sentence of up to 2 years in prison.15

  • 14. “Attacks on the Press 2010: Angola,” Committee to Protect Journalists.
  • 15. “Attacks on the Press 2010: Angola,” Committee to Protect Journalists.
2011

No Implementation

On 12 October 2011, Alexandre Neto, the editor of an independent newspaper, was convicted and fined for printing stories about corruption in the executive branch. Convicted of criminal libel, Neto was sentenced to one year in prison and a fine of 105,000 US dollars. The complaint was filed directly by five executive branch officials: Kopelipa (Military Advisor to the President), Maria (Head of Military Intelligence), Groz (Attorney-General), Furtado (Chief of Staff of Armed Forces), and Burity (National Director of Customs). According to Neto’s reporting, the five men gained a contract for a diamond mine in Lunda Norte Province without any process of public competitive bidding.16

  • 16. “Attacks on the Press 2011: Angola,” Committee to Protect Journalists.
Detailed Implementation Timeline

2 - IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE FOR THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

2.1 To accomplish the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding, the Angolan Armed Forces and UNITA Military Forces assume a commitment to the following Implementation Schedule:

1) Effective date for the Memorandum of Understanding - D Day

Implementation History
2002

Full Implementation

Most of the major developments in the timeline, such as amnesty, cease-fire, the creation of the Joint Military Commission, and demobilization, were completed on time. Reintegration began in 2003 and was largely concluded by the end of 2004. 

On 30 March 2002, FAA leader G. S. Nunda and UNITA leader Kamorteiro signed a ceasefire agreement ending the civil war in the city of Luena, Angola.1 

The Joint Military Commission was established before the signing of the Luena Accord and began working on 4 April.2 

The day before the signing of the Luena Accord, the Angolan parliament unanimously approved a general amnesty law for UNITA troops who turn themselves in within 45 days of the passage of the bill for "all crimes against the security of the Angolan state.”3 

Within weeks of the Luena Agreement, some 25,000 UNITA troops had turned themselves in to the demobilization camps.4

  • 1. “Angola Signs Ceasefire with UNITA Rebels,” Reuters News Agency, March 30, 2002.
  • 2. “Angola: Joint Military Commission to Monitor Cease-Fire - Military Chief,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 3, 2002.
  • 3. “Angola: Amnesty for Rebels,” The Gazette (Montreal, Quebec), April 3, 2002.
  • 4. “Angola Says 25,000 UNITA Rebels Now in Demob Camps,” Agence France Presse, May 3, 2002.
2003

Full Implementation

United Nations officials in Angola announced in January that the reintegration program for some 8,000 child soldiers into society had officially begun.5 

The government reported that 35 UNITA confinement areas, holding 100,000 demobilized UNITA soldiers and their families, were scheduled to be shut down by the end of February. Under the timeline of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding, the confinement areas would close by the end of 2002.6

The Angolan Government reported that 5,007 UNITA troops had been drafted into the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and National Police, completing the stipulations of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding and the Lusaka Protocol. According to the report, four generals, eight lieutenant-generals, 18 brigadiers, 40 colonels, 60 lieutenant-colonels, 100 majors, 150 captains, 200 lieutenants, 250 sub-lieutenants, 300 aspirants, 300 sergeants, and 3,577 simple soldiers were drafted into the national army. Another 40 generals were incorporated into the National Police: four of these were lieutenant-generals and 14 were brigadiers who were under the FAA General Staff.7

  • 5. “Angola: Reintegration of Child Soldiers Underway,” Africa News, January 15, 2003.
  • 6. “Angola: UNITA Confinement Areas to Close Down by End of February,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 5, 2003.
  • 7. “Angola: 5,007 Ex-UNITA Soldiers Drafted Into National Army,” Africa News, June 19,  2003.
2004

Full Implementation

Sean Bradley, the World Bank Coordinator for Reintegration, remarked in October that he was not dissatisfied with the amount of progress made thus far. According to Bradley, “Around 50,000 ex-combatants received basic seeds and tools to restart subsistence agriculture activities and about 4,700 were currently involved in economic reintegration activities.”8

  • 8. “Angola: More Needs to be Done for Reintegration of Former Soldiers,” Africa News, October 29, 2004.
2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism

CHAPTER III: COORDINATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

1- COORDINATION OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

1.1. The institutional coordinating structures of the memorandum of Understanding are the following:

a) Joint Military Commission
b) Technical Group

1.3. The Joint Military Commission has the following composition, powers and working rules:

Implementation History
2002

Full Implementation

Following the Luena Memorandum, Security Council Resolution 1433 of August 2002 established the United Nations Mission in Angola (UNMA) to replace UNOA. The UNMA was mandated to chair the Joint Military Commission, to provide 30 military observers, and to coordinate the humanitarian efforts of all other UN agencies.1 

The Joint Military Commission was established and began working the same day as the cease-fire.2 The Joint Military Commission spokesperson, General Francisco Furtado, announced in July that the integration of UNITA military forces into the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and National Police would commence on 19 July.3

The Joint Military Commission reported that it had met all of its objectives and would dissolve.4 

  • 1. “Interim report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Angola,” U.N. Security Council (S/2002/1353), December 12, 2002.
  • 2. “Angola: Joint Military Commission to Monitor Cease-Fire - Military Chief,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 3, 2002.
  • 3. “Angola: UNITA Soldiers to be Integrated Into Armed Forces, Police on 19 July,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 10, 2002.
  • 4. “Angola's Joint Peace Commission is Dissolved,” Agence France Presse, November 21, 2002.
2003

Full Implementation

The UNMA reported that it had completed its political tasks as mandated in resolution 1433 and would close its operation in Angola.5

  • 5. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Angola,” U.N. Security Council (S/2003/158), February 7, 2002.
2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Withdrawal of Troops

CHAPTER 1: SUBJECT AND PRINCIPLES: 

1 -- SUBJECT

1.2. The objective of the Memorandum of Understanding is collaboration between the parties for the resolution of negative military factors posing an obstacle to the Lusaka Protocol, and the creation of conditions for its definitive conclusion. 

2 -- FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

Implementation History
2002

Full Implementation

Immediately following the Luena Accord, foreign troops were pulled out of Angola or quartered in the demobilization camps for repatriation. Members of the Namibian Defense Force (NDF), for example, who were fighting alongside the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) returned home on 22 April 2002 and were welcomed by the Namibian president.1 

The Angolan state news agency reported that “foreign soldiers, mostly Congolese and Rwandan, who had fought alongside UNITA rebels are in Angola's quartering areas awaiting repatriation."2

  • 1. “Namibia's President Nujoma Welcomes Home Armed Forces Who Fought in Angola,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 24, 2002.
  • 2. “Angola: Foreign Troops in Quartering Areas,” Africa News, May 29, 2002.
2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed..

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Please always cite: Peace Accords Matrix (Date of retrieval: (03/26/2017),
http://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/luena-memorandum-understanding,
Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame.