General Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and MFDC

  • 33%
  • Implementation Score 
    after 10 years
Provisions in this Accord
Cease Fire

Clause one: The Purpose of the Present Agreement

2. The MFDC solemnly decides to definitively give up armed combat and the use of violence as a means to conduct the political combat which it wants to conduct.

Implementation History
2005

Intermediate Implementation

According to a news report in April 2005, the level of violence was greatly reduced by the peace process.1 Most of the Casamance region was calm, with only isolated incidents of violence connected to criminals and rebels.2

  • 1. “Peace Pact Raises Hope in Senegal,” Africa News, April 28, 2005.
  • 2. “State Department Issues Consular Information Sheet on Senegal,” US Fed News, September 14, 2005.
2006

Intermediate Implementation

In 2006, fighting increased in the Casamance, spanning the Guinea-Bissau and Gambia border regions.3 Guinea-Bissau’s forces joined with Senegalese armed forces to fight the rebels. Fighting also appeared to take place between rebel factions.4 At least two splinter groups from the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC)—that is, the Movement for the Liberation of the People of the Casamance (MLPC) and the Revolutionary Front for Social Equilibrium in Senegal (FPRES)—were involved in the fighting.5 

  • 3. “Fighting Continues Along Border with Guinea-Bissau,” UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, March 17, 2006.
  • 4. “Fighting resumes in Senegal; rebel leader issues ultimatum to factional rival,” BBC Monitoring AfricaBBC Worldwide Monitoring, May 9, 2006.
  • 5. “Senegal - Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor - 2006,” U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, accessed March 6, 2007, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78754.htm.
2007

Intermediate Implementation

Occasional fighting continued throughout 2007.6 In December, the Presidential envoy in charge of the Casamance peace process was shot dead in an attack.7

  • 6. “State Department Issues Consular Information Sheet on Senegal,” US Fed News, November 8, 2007.
  • 7. “Peace negotiator, villager shot dead in Senegal: authorities,” Agence France Presse, December 21, 2007.
2008

Intermediate Implementation

Instances of fighting were reported in 2008.8 The MLPC (a splinter group of the MFDC) and the MFDC itself were reported to be fighting each other.9 The MFDC also appeared to be fighting with government troops as well. The program coordinator of ANCRAC commented (on the demining effort) that “[w]e need to first find a peace agreement between the MFDC and the government of Senegal.10

  • 8. "Republic of Senegal CSI," State Department Press Release, July 8, 2008.
  • 9. “2008 Human Rights Report: Senegal,” U.S. Department of State, accessed February 25, 2009, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119021.htm.
  • 10. “Lack of Peace Accord Hampers Demining in Casamance,” UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, May 9, 2008.
2009

Intermediate Implementation

Violence persisted in 2009 between the MFDC and the government.11 “[T]he region remains plagued by occasional violent crime, political killings, and bouts of fighting between the army and the splintered MFDC,” according to a UN news report.12 Fighting appeared to intensify later in 2009, killing at least 15 Senegalese soldiers.13

  • 11. “Senegal: Violence Flares Up in Casamance Again,” UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, June 15, 2009.
  • 12. “Closer to war than to peace?” UN Integrated Regional Information Networks (Nairobi), September 18, 2009.
  • 13. “Senegal’s PM, chief negotiator air different views on Casamance issue,” Xinhua General News Service, March 29, 2010.
2010

Intermediate Implementation

Fighting between the Senegalese army and separatists occurred in early 2010 due to military operations that were intended to remove rebel bases.14The same month, a MFDC leader was quoted asking the government for “sincere and all inclusive negotiations.” The Senegalese Prime Minister responded that the government was ready to receive MFDC leaders to start negotiations.15 At that point, no meeting between the government and the MFDC had taken place since 1 January 2005.16 A rebel leader responded, stating that the MFDC would welcome negotiations on neutral territory, in another country. The Prime Minister stated he wanted talks to take place in Senegal.17 There were no further reports in the press on negotiations.

In October, the Senegalese army attacked a rebel base near the Gambia border.18 Fighting was also reported in December.19

  • 14. “Senegal army clashes with separatist rebels,” IoL News, March 22, 2010, http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/senegal-army-clashes-with-separatist-re....
  • 15. “Senegal’s PM, chief negotiator air different views on Casamance issue,” Xinhua General News Service, March 29, 2010.
  • 16. “Senegal PM urges Casamance rebels to talk peace,” Agence France Presse, April 23, 2010.
  • 17. “Rebel faction ready for talks on Senegal’s Casamance,” Agence France Presse, April 27, 2010.
  • 18. “Senegal’s Casamance rebels enter Gambia,” Xinhua General News Service, October 6, 2010.
  • 19. “Rebels Attack Southern Senegal Village,” States News Service, December 28, 2010.
2011

Intermediate Implementation

A news report from 2011 stated that despite a number of cease fires, renewed violence “over the past year” had occurred.20 Negotiations were hampered by the MFDC splitting into various factions.21 Levels of violence in the Casamance increased in 2011, and an estimated 83 people were killed as a result of the Casamance conflict.22 According to a news report, negotiations between the government and the various political and military factions of the MFDC were deadlocked.23

  • 20. “Senegal Opposition Searching for Consensus Candidate,” States News Service, May 17, 2011.
  • 21. “Ex-soldiers march for peace in Senegal’s Casamance,” Agence France Presse, February 1, 2011.
  • 22. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011 – Senegal,” U.S. Department of State, May 24, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2011humanrightsreport/index.htm?dli....
  • 23. “Demined land handed back to locals in Senegal’s Casamance,” Agence France Presse, March 12, 2011.
2012

Intermediate Implementation

Violence persisted into 2012.24 According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), clashes continued between government forces and the MFDC.25 Press characterized the conflict as low-level.26

  • 24. “2 soldiers killed in Senegal’s restive South,” International News, March 12, 2012.
  • 25. “The ICRC regional delegation in Dakar - Facts and Figures,” International Committee of the Red Cross, September 21, 2012.
  • 26. “An Aging President Overstays His Welcome and Damages His Country’s Reputation,” Africa.com Blog, January 30, 2012.
2013

Full Implementation

Ceasefire violation was not reported in 2013.  After Macky Sall won presidency in 2012, the government started to negotiate with the MFDC. Sall’s government was serious about finding a solution in Casamance. One of the obstacles however was the split in the MFDC. The MFDC splintered into four different groups and the strongest group was led by César Atoute Badiate who had 80% of combatants estimated between 1200 and 2000. Nevertheless, ceasefire held in 2013.27

  • 27. “Opening the Door to Peace in Casamance,” Africa in Fact. December 1, 2013.
2014

Full Implementation

No violence reported in 2014. In May, one of the leaders of MFDC, Salif Sadio, declared a unilateral ceasefire. The ceasefire was announced after a government and the MFDC delegation met in Rome under the facilitation of the Sant'Egidio Catholic Community. 28

  • 28. “Leaders of Senegal’s Casamance separatists impose cease-fire on troops, BBC Monitoring Africa, May 1, 2014.
Demobilization

Clause two: The Guarantee and Consolidation of the Agreement

Implementation History
2005

No Implementation

According to a World Bank report, implementation of demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration was dependent on the formal receipt from the MFDC to the government of the list of combatants identified for demobilization. To that end, the report stated there were negotiations between the government and the MFDC. The World Bank had initiated a program for the demobilization of combatants, the reintegration of combatants, IDPs and refugees, and the reconstruction of infrastructure in areas of return.1

  • 1. "Implementation Completion and Results Report (IDA-39820)," The World Bank, June 24, 2010.
2006

No Implementation

Contrary to World Bank information, in a news interview in October 2006, Koussaynobo Alphonse Diedhiou, coordinator of the National Agency for the Reconstruction of Casamance (ANRAC) said that "It is very difficult to realise a programme of demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of the rebels, for example, without a peace process in place. There has not been a meeting between the MFDC and the government since 2004" (United Nations, 2006).2 In an interview, Director General of ANRAC argued, “If they (MFDC) are serious about the peace negotiations then they should lay down their weapons. It’s their responsibility to draw up a list and present that to us. How would we know who’s in their rank and file? If they give us a list, we’ll demobilize them. But as long as there is no list, there will be no disarmament and demobilization”.3

  • 2. “No End to Region’s Longest-Running War,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, October 16, 2006.
  • 3. Patty Chang, “No Development, No Peace? Demobilization and Reintegration in Casamance,” 2008 Annual International Studies Association Convention.
2007

No Implementation

In January, the prospect for formal demobilization greatly decreased as the MFDC leader who signed the 2004 peace accord, Abbe Diamacoune Senghor, died. In that context, the evolution of the MFDC from a unified separatist movement aiming to redress Casamance’s grievances to a factional movement driven more by economic considerations further decreased hopes for demobilization.4

  • 4. "Implementation Completion and Results Report (IDA-39820)," The World Bank, June 24, 2010.
2008

No Implementation

After lack of progress, the World Bank transferred its funds away from its demobilization project to other projects.5

  • 5. "Casamance Emergency Reconstruction Support Project," The World Bank, February 20, 2008.
2009

No Implementation

There was no mention of the demobilization program.

2010

No Implementation

There was no mention of the demobilization program.

2011

No Implementation

In 2011, the press reported that “the demobilisation, disarmament and reinsertion of some 2,000 fighters…has never been carried out” (Agence France Presse, 2011).6

  • 6. “Senegal’s president wants to reintegrate rebels,” Agence France Presse, Feb 18, 2011.
2012

No Implementation

In his 2012 new year’s speech, Senegalese President Wade said he would facilitate the process of social reintegration of rebels if disarmament and demobilization took place.7

  • 7. “Dakar Bishop and Wade in Bid to End Rebellion,” The Nation (Nairobi), January 2, 2012.
2013

No Implementation

While President Macky Sall’s government was negotiating with the MFDC on finding solutions, the demobilization was not initiated.

2014

No Implementation

Demobilization was not initiated.

Disarmament

Clause one: The Purpose of the Present Agreement

2. The MFDC solemnly decides to definitively give up armed combat and the use of violence as a means to conduct the political combat which it wants to conduct.

3. The MFDC engages to billet, to disarm and to demobilize its military wing according to the procedures defined by the ANRAC.

Implementation History
2005

No Implementation

There was no mention of the disarmament program.

2006

No Implementation

By August 2006, the promised disarmament process had not been launched.1 In a news interview in October 2006, Koussaynobo Alphonse Diedhiou, coordinator of the National Agency for the Reconstruction of Casamance (ANRAC), said that "It is very difficult to realise a programme of demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of the rebels, for example, without a peace process in place. There has not been a meeting between the MFDC and the government since 2004".2 In an interview, the Director General of ANRAC argued, “If they (MFDC) are serious about the peace negotiations then they should lay down their weapons. It’s their responsibility to draw up a list and present that to use. How would we know who’s in their rank and file? If they give us a list, we’ll demobilize them. But as long as there is no list, there will be no disarmament and demobilization”.3

  • 1. "Caught in the Cross-Fire, Growing up in Casamance,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, August 3, 2006.
  • 2. “No End to Region’s Longest-Running War,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, October 16, 2006
  • 3. Patty Chang, "No Development, No Peace? Demobilization and Reintegration in Casamance,” 2008 Annual International Studies Association Convention.
2007

No Implementation

There was no mention of the disarmament program.

2008

No Implementation

In 2008, a spokesperson for the human rights group Raddho stated that there had been no disarmament in the Casamance.4

  • 4. “Senegal’s Casamance struggles back from 20 years of conflict,” Agence France Presse, May 24, 2008.
2009

No Implementation

There was no mention of the disarmament program.

2010

No Implementation

In 2010, a Senegalese military official told media: “It is certain that they (rebels) have new equipment which they did not before, such as rocket launchers, mortars and machine guns”.5

  • 5. “Violence surges in Casamance as peace process stays blocked,” Agence France Presse, December 30, 2010.
2011

No Implementation

In 2011, the press reported that “the demobilisation, disarmament and reinsertion of some 2,000 fighters…has never been carried out”.6

  • 6. “Senegal’s president wants to reintegrate rebels,” Agence France Presse, Feb 18, 2011.
2012

No Implementation

In his 2012 new year’s speech, Senegalese President Wade said he would facilitate the process of social reintegration of rebels after disarmament and demobilization.7 President Wade later also proposed what he termed a ‘DDP plan’ for the Casamance: disarmament, demining, projects.8

  • 7. “Dakar Bishop and Wade in Bid to End Rebellion,” The Nation (Nairobi), January 2, 2012.
  • 8. “Senegal’s Wade woos voters in strife-torn Casamance,” Agence France Presse, February 11, 2012.
2013

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2014

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

Reintegration

Clause three: Reintegration of Ex-Combatants

1. Exceptionally, the State of Senegal accepts to integrate the ex-combatants of the MFDC in the paramilitary corps, according to the principle of voluntary service following the conditions in force.

Implementation History
2005

No Implementation

There was no mention of the reintegration program.

2006

No Implementation

In a news interview in October 2006, Koussaynobo Alphonse Diedhiou, coordinator of the National Agency for the Reconstruction of Casamance (ANRAC), said that "It is very difficult to realise a programme of demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of the rebels, for example, without a peace process in place. There has not been a meeting between the MFDC and the government since 2004" (United Nations, 2006).1

  • 1. “No End to Region’s Longest-Running War,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, October 16, 2006.
2007

No Implementation

According to an NGO report, as of March 2007 no attempt at reintegration had been made.2

2008

No Implementation

There was no mention of the reintegration program.

2009

No Implementation

There was no mention of the reintegration program.

2010

No Implementation

There was no mention of the reintegration program.

2011

No Implementation

In 2011, the press reported that “the demobilisation, disarmament and reinsertion of some 2,000 fighters…has never been carried out".3 Around the same time, President Wade asked the government to design a national program for the social reintegration of former MFDC fighters.4

  • 3. “Senegal’s president wants to reintegrate rebels,” Agence France Presse, February 18, 2011.
  • 4. Ibid.
2012

No Implementation

In his 2012 new year’s speech, Senegalese President Wade said he would facilitate the process of social reintegration of rebels after disarmament and demobilization.5

  • 5. “Dakar Bishop and Wade in Bid to End Rebellion,” The Nation (Nairobi), January 2, 2012.
2013

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2014

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

Human Rights

Clause one: The Purpose of the Present Agreement

Implementation History
2005

No Implementation

In October 2005, freedom of speech was restricted when the government closed down Senegal’s leading private radio for a day under special instructions from the Interior Ministry after the station interviewed one of the leaders of the MFDC. Employees of the station were detained.1 Earlier that year a minor opposition leader was arrested on charges of inciting unrest. The communications ministry released a statement which argued that Senegal’s democratic institutions could not accommodate what it termed assaults that could lead to chaos.2

  • 1. “Senegal: Authorities Close Radios, Detain Staff Over Interview of Separatist Leader,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, October 17, 2005.
  • 2. “Senegal Government Defends Jailing Opposition Leader,” United States Fed News, May 31, 2005.
2006

No Implementation

According to a news report, the past two years saw an increase in violence against journalists and political activists. Government officials denied violations of freedom of speech.1

  • 1. “VOA News Senegal’s rap artists’ despair over 2007 Elections,” US Fed News, August 4, 2006.
2007

No Implementation

Freedom of speech, press, and assembly were limited nation-wide.4

2008

No Implementation

A report from human rights group Article 19 decried attacks on freedom of speech and freedom of press.5

2009

No Implementation

Amnesty International reported that in general, journalists and opposition politicians were subjected to harassment and legal proceedings for expressing their opinions. Demonstrations were violently suppressed. Overall, there was very little accommodating behavior from the government.6

  • 6. “Senegal must not curtail freedom of expression in election run-up,” Amnesty International, January 26, 2012.
2010

No Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

No Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

No Implementation

No further developments observed.

2013

Minimum Implementation

 

The US State Department Human Rights Report suggested human rights abuses in Senegal. Nevertheless, it was reported that the government was committed to providing protection and assistance to IDPs, refugees, and stateless persons in cooperation with the Office of UN High Commissioner for Refugees. The Sall government also put forth efforts to investigate human rights abuses committed by former Wade administration officials. The freedom of movement was restricted due to MFDC use of mines and banditry.7

In April, the MFDC leader Salif Sadio had asked for the lifting of his arrest warrant as a condition for the dialogue.  As the disclosure made by the Catholic Community of Sant'Egidio – a mediator between the rebel group and the Senegalese government – no international arrest warrant was issued against the MFDC leader Salif Sadio.8

  • 7. "Country Reports on Human Rights Practice for 2013 – Senegal," Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2013.
  • 8. “Mediators say ex-Senegalese rebel chief has no arrest warrant against him,” BBC Monitoring Africa, April 14, 2013.
2014

Minimum Implementation

While efforts to improve human rights situations were intact with the election of Sall as president, the freedom of movement was restricted due to MFDC use of mines and banditry. 9

  • 9. "Country Reports on Human Rights Practice for 2014 – Senegal,' Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2014.
Amnesty

Clause one: The Purpose of the Present Agreement

Implementation History
2005

Full Implementation

In January 2005, Senegal adopted an amnesty law for all political crimes since 1983.1 One month later, it was decided that the law was constitutional.2

  • 1. “Senegal adopts amnesty law for political crimes since 1983,” Agence France Presse, January 7, 2005.
  • 2. “Amnesty law constitutional, Senegal constitutional council says,” Agence France Presse, February 15, 2005.
2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2007

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2008

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2009

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2010

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2011

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2012

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2013

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2014

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Refugees

Clause four: Stimulation of Economic and Social Activities

2. The State engages to take all measures in order to facilitate the returning home of refugees and displaced persons and to give necessary support in favour of their social reintegration.

Implementation History
2005

No Implementation

The government provided returning internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees roofing materials for home construction and sacks of rice.1

  • 1. “Senegal - 2005 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,” United States Department of State, March 8, 2006.
2006

No Implementation

As insecurity affected the Casamance through 2006, residents fled and were displaced.2 More than 4,500 Senegalese refugees sought refuge in Gambia in August 2006.3 By the end of October, the number of refugees had grown to 6,200.4

  • 2. “Some 4,500 Displaced By Clashes Between Separatists, Guinea-Bissau Troops,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, March 20, 2006.
  • 3. “Senegalese Refugees Flood Gambia to Escape Clashes, UN Agency Says,” United Nations News Service, August 23, 2006.
  • 4. "Senegalese Fleeing to Gambia from Clashes in South now Total 6,200," United Nations (United Nations Reports), October 31, 2006.
2007

No Implementation

In January 2007, renewed fighting in Southern Casamance sent Senegalese refugees, who had recently returned from Guinea Bissau, back to Guinea Bissau. In November, a faction of the splintered MFDC warned residents not to return to the Casamance from Guinea Bissau.5

  • 5. “Lack of Basics Blocks Return of War-Weary Displaced,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, January 24, 2008.
2008

No Implementation

Water shortage and fear of mines reportedly kept refugees from returning to their villages in the Casamance.6 In one village, those returning were kidnapped by Casamance rebels.7

  • 6. Ibid.
  • 7. “Rebels Act On Kidnap Threats in Casamance,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, March 20, 2008.
2009

Minimum Implementation

In October 2009, an estimated 1,000 residents fled after fighting occurred in their villages in the Guinea-Bissau border region.8 Many of the people displaced started to return to their homes a few days after the clashes ended.9 

  • 8. “Increased violence in Senegal forces 1,000 residents to flee,” Voice of America News, October 5, 2009.
  • 9. “Confronting aid challenges in volatile Casamance, Integrated Regional Information Networks,” IRIN AFRICA, October 19, 2009.
2010

Minimum Implementation

Rebel fighting in 2010 led to continued migrations and displacements.10 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimated in 2010 that some 40,000 people were still displaced in the Casamance.11

  • 10. “Senegal rebels force hundreds to flee,” Agence France Presse, February 3, 2010.
  • 11. “Senegal: Microprojects restore dignity in Casamance," International Commitee of the Red Cross, March 4, 2010.
2011

Minimum Implementation

Displacement continued during the year. The number fluctuated according to the ebb and flow of the conflict with estimates over 10,000.12

  • 12. “2011 Reports on Human Rights Practices Senegal,” United States Department of State, May 24, 2012.
2012

Minimum Implementation

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the number of refugees residing in Senegal was an estimated 20,600, while the number of refugees originating from Senegal was an estimated 17,700.13

  • 13. “2012 Statistical Snapshot Senegal,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), January 2012.
2013

Minimum Implementation

The US State Department Human Rights Report reported that the government was committed to providing protection and assistance to IDPs, refugees, and stateless persons in cooperation with the Office of UN High Commissioner for Refugees. It was reported that the government permitted unsupervised and informal repatriation of Casamance refugees returning from the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau.14

  • 14. "Country Reports on Human Rights Practice for 2013 – Senegal," Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2013.
2014

Minimum Implementation

Unsupervised and informal repatriation of Casamance refugees from the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau continued in 2014.15

  • 15. "Country Reports on Human Rights Practice for 2014 – Senegal," Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2014.
Internally Displaced Persons

Clause four: Stimulation of Economic and Social Activities

2. The State engages to take all measures in order to facilitate the returning home of refugees and displaced persons and to give necessary support in favour of their social reintegration.

Implementation History
2005

Intermediate Implementation

Improved security conditions after the December 2004 ceasefire meant that internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees continued to return during 2005. The number of IDPs was estimated to be 20,000. The government provided returning IDPs and refugees with roofing materials for home construction and sacks of rice.1

  • 1. "2005 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Senegal)," United States State Department, March 8, 2006.
2006

Intermediate Implementation

As insecurity affected the Casamance through 2006, residents fled and were displaced.2 More than 4,500 Senegalese refugees sought refuge in Gambia in August 2006.3 By the end of October, the number of refugees had grown to 6,200.4 

  • 2. "Some 4,500 Displaced By Clashes Between Separatists, Guinea-Bissau Troops,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, March 20, 2006.
  • 3. “Senegalese Refugees Flood Gambia to Escape Clashes, UN Agency Says,” United Nations News Service, August 23. 2006.
  • 4. "Senegalese Fleeing to Gambia from Clashes in South Now, UN Agency Says," United Nations News Service, August 23, 2000.
2007

Minimum Implementation

In January 2007, renewed fighting in Southern Casamance sent Senegalese refugees, who had recently returned from Guinea Bissau, back to Guinea Bissau. The number of IDPs was an estimated total of 60,000, although it was reported that the government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to internally displaced persons, refugees, asylum seekers, and stateless persons.5 In November, a faction of the splintered MFDC warned residents not to return to the Casamance from Guinea Bissau.6

  • 5. "2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Senegal),” United States Department of State, March 11, 2008.
  • 6. "Lack of Basics Blocks Return of War-Weary Displaced,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, January 24, 2008.
2008

Minimum Implementation

According to reports in 2008, the return of displaced people was made difficult by a lack of water in the abandoned Casamance villages as well as by a fear of mines.7 The director of ANRAC commented that he was not aware of a water shortage problem for people trying to return, but said the agency would be ready to help once a formal demand was received from local authorities.8

The same year, the number of displaced people was estimated to be around 60,000.9 According to the US Department of State, many people were newly displaced.10

  • 7. "Lack of Basics Blocks Return of War-Weary Displaced," United Nations Integrated Regional Information Network, January 24, 2008.
  • 8. Ibid.
  • 9. “Lack of Peace Accord Hampers Demining in Casamance,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, May 9, 2008.
  • 10. "2008 Human Rights Report: Senegal," United States Department of State, February 25, 2009.
2009

Minimum Implementation

Heavy fighting in the Casamance resulted in further displacements in 2009.11 Many of the people displaced started to return to their homes a few days after the clashes ended.12 Some reportedly commuted to their home villages by day to engage in agricultural activities, and left again at night.13

  • 11. “Heaviest Fighting in Years’ Hits Casamance,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, August 26, 2009.
  • 12. “Confronting aid challenges in volatile Casamance,” Integrated Regional Information Networks, October 19, 2009.
  • 13. “New displacement and challenges to durable solutions in Casamance,” iDMC Norwegian Refugee Council, June 18, 2010.
2010

Minimum Implementation

Rebel fighting in 2010 had similar effects.14 While clashes between the MFDC and the Senegalese army continued, no large-scale displacement of civilians was reported. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimated in 2010 that some 40,000 people were still displaced in the Casamance.15

  • 14. “Senegal rebels force hundreds to flee,” Agence France Presse, February 3, 2010.
  • 15. “Senegal: microprojects restore dignity in Casamance,” International Comittee of the Red Cross, March 4, 2010.
2011

Minimum Implementation

According to the US Department of State, many people became newly displaced during the year. The number fluctuated according to the ebb and flow of the conflict; estimates of the number of IDPs ranged from 10,000 to 40,000.16

  • 16. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011 – Senegal,” United States Department of State, May 24, 2012.
2012

Minimum Implementation

As of February 2012, villages remained heavily mined, and “thousands” displaced.17

  • 17. “Senegal’s Wade takes campaign to restive Casamance,” Agence France Presse, February 11, 2012.
2013

Minimum Implementation

 

The US State Department Human Rights Report reported that the government was committed to providing protection and assistance to IDPs, refugees, and stateless persons in cooperation with the Office of UN High Commissioner for Refugees. While it was reported that no significant number of IDPs in the Casamance region attempted to return to their villages, the government supplied food to and enrolled children of IDPs in local schools.18

  • 18. "Country Reports on Human Rights Practice for 2013 – Senegal," Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2013.
2014

Minimum Implementation

No significant improvement reported in terms of the situation of displaced persons or their resettlement.19 Nevertheless, as conflict in the Casamance region subsided with the ongoing peace processes, the situation should have been improved.

  • 19. "Country Reports on Human Rights Practice for 2014 – Senegal," Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2014.
Economic and Social Development

Clause four: Stimulation of Economic and Social Activities

1. The State encourages the ANRAC to mobilize the NGOs and bodies specialized in de-mining, together with the Army and the MFDC ex-combatants to immediately start the clearance of landmines in the Casamance in order to facilitate the resumption of economic activities.

Implementation History
2005

No Implementation

It was agreed that the key to future development was removing land mines in the region. According to a UN study, 93 localities were contaminated by mines and/or unexploded ordnance, affecting 90,000 people. Numerous localities were inaccessible at the time of assessment.1

  • 1. “Violence Flares Up in Casamance Again,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, June 12, 2009.
2006

No Implementation

In 2006, no official demining process took place. The Senegalese army demined pockets of the region on its own terms, and also cooperated with the Moroccan army to demine the Gambia and Guniea Bissau borders. Their efforts came to a halt following attacks from the MFDC.2

  • 2. “Lack of Peace Accord Hampers Demining in Casamance,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, May 9, 2008.
2007

No Implementation

No official demining process took place.

2008

No Implementation

In February – more than three years after the signing of the peace accord -- the government launched a landmine clearance program. A nine-member demining team, led by the government body CNAMS, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the NGO Handicap International (HCI), began modest demining efforts close to the Casamance capital. Three months later, it was reported that there was limited progress, due to a lack of adherence to the 2004 peace accord.3 Nevertheless, commentators identify 2008 as the year when demining activities commenced.4

  • 3. “Lack of Peace Accord Hampers Demining in Casamance,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, May 9, 2008.
  • 4. “Senegal: Demining Faces Slow-Down,” Humanitarian News and Analysis,  July 12, 2012.
2009

No Implementation

Humanitarian demining efforts of the NGO Handicap International were hampered by insecurity in Casamance.5

  • 5. “Confronting Aid Challenges in Volatile Casamance,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks (Nairobi), October 19, 2009.
2010

No Implementation

NGOs were engaged in demining activities.6

  • 6. “Senegal: Demining Faces Slow-Down,” Humanitarian News and Analysis, July 12, 2012.
2011

No Implementation

The conflict continued to limit the economic potential of the agriculturally fertile Casamance region.7 A positive sign was the handing back of land to locals after an internationally-financed operation removed landmines in the area. Sixteen villages were reopened.8

  • 7. “Senegal, Assessing Risks to Stability,” The CSIS Africa Program, June 2011.
  • 8. “Demined land handed back to locals in Senegal’s Casamance,” Agence France Presse,  March 12, 2011.
2012

No Implementation

As of February, many villages remained heavily mined.9 President Wade blamed MFDC rebels, who he argued were the ones that planted landmines, and said that any demining efforts would require rebel participation.10 According to the news, demining efforts were expected to slow down. In the areas of Casamance where fighting continued, mines were reportedly being planted. In other areas, no demining efforts had been made to date.11 The Casamance Head of Mission for the NGO Handicap International, Jean-François Lepetit, estimated that 90 percent of the total mined land is yet to be cleared, most of it in northern Casamance along the Gambian border. Limited progress was nevertheless made, with six villages declared mine-free in June. International actors, such as the EU, supported such efforts financially.12

  • 9. “Senegal’s Wade takes campaign to restive Casamance,” Agence France Presse, February 11, 2012.
  • 10. “Wade woos voters in strife-torn Casamance,” Agence France Presse, February 11, 2012.
  • 11. “Casamance Mine Removal Slows,” United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks (Nairobi), July 12, 2012.
  • 12. “Senegal: Demining Faces Slow-Down,” Humanitarian News and Analysis, July 12, 2012.
2013

No Implementation

As of 2013, many villages remained heavily mined. No meaningful development related activities observed.

2014

No Implementation

As of 2014, many villages remained heavily mined. No meaningful development related activities observed.

Please always cite: Peace Accords Matrix (Date of retrieval: (12/13/2017),
http://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/general-peace-agreement-between-government-republic-senegal-and-mfdc,
Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame.