General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan

  • 76%
  • Implementation Score 
    after 10 years
Provisions in this Accord
Cease Fire

Agreement between the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, E. S. Rakhmonov, and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition, S. A. Nuri, on the results of the meeting held in Moscow on 23 December 1996:

From the date of signature of the present Agreement, to proclaim a ceasefire and the cessation of other hostile activities for the entire period of the inter-Tajik talks.

Implementation History
1997

Intermediate Implementation

Fighting between UTO forces and the military was not uncommon in 1997, but the CNR was active. There were bombings in September 1997 – after the return of rebel leader, Abdullo Nuri, following five years of exile in Teheran –which injured 16 people.1 On 26 September, the CNR issued an appeal to armed groups in the country whose loyalty was not clear to come forward. It declared that they join the government or the UTO by 16 November. After that date they would be considered illegal.2 

  • 1. "Bomb injures 16 in Tajikistan after return of opposition leader," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, September 12, 1997.
  • 2. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations, (S/1997/859), November 5, 1997.
1998

Intermediate Implementation

In March, a clash between UTO fighters and an army unit led to a gunfight near Romit that killed 40 people. UNMOT and CNR officials restored the ceasefire on 25 March. More fighting took place between UTO elements and government forces on 29 April 1998 near Teppei-Samarkandi and Dushanbe. The main cause of the fighting was related to the arrest of three UTO members on criminal charges. UTO leaders maintained that the fighting was not endorsed by the UTO leadership. After the fighting, UNMOT worked closely with the Contact Group to diffuse the situation. A meeting took place between the government and UTO leaders on 2 May 1998, in which parties agreed to appoint Mr. Turajonzodah to lead a special commission to restore the ceasefire. The ceasefire was restored on 3 May.3

In September of 1998, Otakhon Latifi, a prominent UTO member of the CNR was assassinated outside his home.4 

In October, 38 persons were detained for spoiler type violence and the abduction of the Deputy Mayor of Khujand. Interestingly, 15 were government servicemen and one was a Commander in the Ministry of Interior.5 

  • 3. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations, (S/1998/374), May 6, 1999.
  • 4. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations, (S/1998/1029), November 3, 1998.
  • 5. Ibid.
1999

Full Implementation

The government and UTO remain dedicated to maintaining the ceasefire.6 Sporadic clashes and episodes of violence were reported during the period, but were quickly and effectively managed.7 

  • 6. Rashid Abdullo, "Implementation of the 1997 General Agreement: Success, Dilemmas, and Challenges," in Politics of Compromise: the Tajikistan Peace Process, ed. K. Abdullaev and C. Barnes (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001), Accord 10: 48–53.
  • 7. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations, (S/1998/374), May 6, 1999.
2000

Full Implementation

The CNR concluded in 2000 with no reports of ceasefire violations.

Owed in large part to the continued presence of Russia’s 201st Motor Rifle Division headquartered in Dushanbe, no sustained bouts of organized violence were reported for the remaining period of observation.8  

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed. 

2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed. 

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed. 

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed. 

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed. 

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed. 

Powersharing Transitional Government

PROTOCOL ON POLITICAL QUESTIONS (18 MAY 1997)

Article 3:

Implementation History
1997

No Implementation

Negotiations continued regarding executive positions for UTO leaders.1 
Insiders report that President Rakhmonov and the government felt that they won the civil war and do not have to share power with the UTO.2

  • 1. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations, (S/1997/859), November 5, 1997.
  • 2. Grant R. Smith, “Tajikistan: The Rocky Road to Peace,” Central Asian Survey  18(2) (1999): 243-251.
1998

Intermediate Implementation

A major step in the implementation of the power-sharing provision took place in February 1998 when five UTO members were appointed at the cabinet level. On 27 February 1998, Mr. Akbar Turajonzodah, deputy leader of UTO, was appointed First Deputy Prime Minister. He submitted the names of eight UTO representatives to the President to be appointed to senior posts. The UTO had not named its representatives to fill its 25% of seats on the Central Commission on Elections and Referenda. UTO representatives had not been given any regional or local level positions.3 According to state-owned television broadcast in 1998, several UTO leaders were given government posts. Khudoyberdi Kholiqnazarov was appointed Minister of Labour and Employment, Davlat Muhiddinovich Usmonov was appointed Minister of Economy and Foreign Economic Relations, Davlatbek Maqsudov was given the post of Minister of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, Rahim Karimov was appointed Chairman of the Customs Committee, and Ayub Aliyev was to chair the Government Committee on Safety in Industry and Mining.4 

In October 1998, Zokir Vaziorv was appointed Deputy Prime Minister. Rakhmonov confirms in a letter to Nuri that 19 senior government positions have been given to UTO members suggesting that the process is complete. The Defence Minister was not appointed as of October 1998. The UTO submitted its candidates for its quarter share in the Central Election Commission in October 1998.5

  • 3. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations, (S/1998/374), May 6, 1998.
  • 4. "Tajik Opposition Gets Cabinet Posts," BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, February 13, 1998, Friday.
  • 5. "Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations, (S/1998/1029), November 3, 1998.
1999

Intermediate Implementation

In early July, it was also reported that Ghayrat Sarhadovich Adhamov was appointed the first deputy minister of defence of Tajikistan, and Sarabek Barotovich Murodov was appointed chairman of the Committee on Precious Metals. As for regional positions, Mahmadjon Davlatov was appointed acting chairman of Roh-i Ohan District of Dushanbe.6 

In mid-July it was reported that Saymukhtor Sulaymonovich Qurbonov was appointed acting chairman of Jillikul District of Khatlon Region, and Mahmadshoh Dodikhudoyevich Romov was appointed chairman of Beshkent District of Khatlon Region.7 

In late July, it was reported that the chairman of the CNR sub-commission on military issues, Haybullo Sanginov, was appointed first deputy minister of internal affairs. Former UTO field commanders, Hakim Qalandarov and Mirzokhuja Nizomov, were appointed deputy chairman of the Border Protection Committee and chairman of the Customs Committee. Haqnazar Ghoibnazarov, another UTO CNR member was appointed first deputy minister of social security. Abdurahmon Khudoyberdiyevich Nazarov was appointed deputy minister of transport.8 

In August of 1999, several UTO leaders were given local posts. Sergey Khasanovich Davlatov was appointed acting chairman of Gharm District, Bobomurod Pulatovich Samodov was appointed acting chairman of Norak town of Khatlon Region, Rustam Anvarovich Qandak was appointed acting chairman of Taboshar town of Leninobod Region, Fozilbek Amirbekov was appointed acting chairman of Ishkoshim District of Mountainous Badakhshon Autonomous Region, Sohibnazar Jabborovich Pirov was appointed acting chairman of Panj District of Khatlon Region.9 

The November report by the Secretary General reported a total of 14 UTO appointments to district and city level posts.10 

  • 6. "President Rahmonov gives government posts to opposition," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 9, 1999, Friday.
  • 7. "Tajik President Gives Posts In Southern Local Authorities To Opposition," BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, July 19, 1999.
  • 8. "Opposition get posts in power-wielding bodies," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 21, 1999.
  • 9. "Tajik Head Gives New Local Posts To Opposition Representatives," BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, August 10, 1999, Tuesday.
  • 10. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations, (S/1999/1127), November 4, 1999.
2000

Full Implementation

After elections in February of 2000, the National Reconciliation Commission (CNR) was formally disbanded and UTO appointments ended. According to Nakaya (2009: 271) 54 UTO members were appointed to the government as a whole. After president Rakhmonov had consolidated his power (after 24 months), he removed the majority of the executive positions.11 

  • 11. Sumie Nakaya, “Aid and Transition From a War Economy to an Oligarchy in Post-war Tajikistan,” Central Asian Survey  28(3) (2009): 259-273.
2001

Full Implementation

No UTO appointments were made in 2001. Three prominent UTO members were dismissed from the government in 2000 and 2001.12

  • 12. Sumie Nakaya, “Aid and Transition From a War Economy to an Oligarchy in Post-war Tajikistan,” 259-273.
2002

Full Implementation

At a 2002 news conference celebrating the fifth anniversary of the 1997 General Agreement, former UTO head and leader of the Islamic Revival Party, Sayed Abdullo Nuri made several unexpected comments about the status of the UTO’s 30% quota that suggested he was satisfied with the government’s allocation of 50 appointments. Nuri later stated that UTO representatives received all that was expected, roughly 50 official positions.13 

  • 13. "Threats to Tajik peace still exist, Islamic party leader says," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 7, 2002.
2003

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year. 

2004

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year. 

2005

Full Implementation

No developments observed this year. 

2006

Full Implementation

The 1997 agreement does not give a time frame for the duration of the power-sharing transitional government. By 2006, the power-sharing provision of the 1997 accord was dismantled. The last remaining member of the UTO in a senior government position (Emergency Situation Minister Mirzo Zioyev) was dismissed in 2006. In 2009, he was reportedly killed in a gunfight between security forces and narcotics trafficking gangs along the Tajik-Afghan border.14 

  • 14. Sumie Nakaya, “Aid and Transition From a War Economy to an Oligarchy in Post-war Tajikistan,” 259-273.
Executive Branch Reform

PROTOCOL ON POLITICAL QUESTIONS (18 MAY 1997)

Article 3:

Implementation History
1997

No Implementation

Executive branch reform, as specified in the accord, amounted to a 30 percent quota for UTO leaders. The government reportedly resisted appointing UTO leaders to posts in the executive branch early on.1 

  • 1. Grant R. Smith, “Tajikistan: The Rocky Road to Peace,” Central Asian Survey 18, no. 2 (1999):243-251.
1998

Minimum Implementation

In February 1998 several UTO members were appointed at the cabinet level. On 27 February 1998, Mr. Akbar Turajonzodah, deputy leader of UTO, was appointed First Deputy Prime Minister.2 In October 1998, Zokir Vaziorv was appointed Deputy Prime Minister.3

  • 2. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1998/374), May 6, 1999.
  • 3. "Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1998/1029), November 3, 1998.
1999

Minimum Implementation

In May 1999, it was reported that the government had not appointed any of the 13 pending nominees for high-level posts.4 

  • 4. "Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1999/124), February 8, 1999.
2000

Minimum Implementation

No new UTO appointments were made in 2000. It was reported that three prominent UTO members were dismissed from the government in 2000 and 2001.5 

  • 5. Sumie Nakaya, “Aid and Transition From a War Economy to an Oligarchy in Post-war Tajikistan,” Central Asian Survey 28, no. 3 (2009): 259-273.
2001

Minimum Implementation

No new UTO appointments were made in 2001. At least one prominent UTO member was dismissed from the government in 2001.6 

2002

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2003

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2004

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2005

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2006

Minimum Implementation

The last remaining member of the UTO in the executive branch (Emergency Situation Minister Mirzo Zioyev) was dismissed in 2006.7  According to Nakaya (2009), the 30% quota for UTO members in senior government posts was intended to be permanent, was not fully reached, and was dismantled within several years. Similarly, Freedom House reported that "important provisions of the 1997 peace accord remained unimplemented, with demobilization of opposition factions incomplete and the government failing to meet a 30 percent quota for UTO members in senior government posts".8 

Constitutional Reform

Statute of the Commission on National Reconciliations (23 December 1996)

III. Functions and Powers of the Commission:

7. The Commission shall have the following functions and powers:

Developing proposals for amending the legislation on the functioning of political parties and movements and the mass media.

Implementation History
1997

Minimum Implementation

The proposed changes to the constitution mentioned in the 1997 GA involved, in general terms: the legalization of Islamic political parties, media reform, and the holding of new representative elections. The CNR began to debate and draft proposed changes to the constitution immediately.1 

  • 1. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1997/859), November 5, 1997.
1998

Minimum Implementation

In 1998, the CNR continued to operate and debate proposed changes to the constitution.

1999

Full Implementation

Several constitutional changes were passed by popular referendum in September 1999 with 72 percent of the vote. The major changes included the creation of a new upper house of Parliament, the lifting of the ban on UTO political parties and updating the process to amend the constitution by popular referendum.2 

  • 2. Rahmatillo Zoir and Scott Newton, "Constitutional and Legislative Reform," in Politics of Compromise: the Tajikistan Peace Process, eds. K. Abdullaev and C. Barnes (London: Conciliation Resources), Accord 10:54-59.
2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Electoral/Political Party Reform

Protocol on Political Questions (18 May 1997)

Implementation History
1997

Minimum Implementation

The GA mentioned three electoral reforms: 1) lifting the ban on UTO political parties, 2) the creation of a new upper-house of Parliament and 3) nationwide elections to the new Parliament. In 1997 the CNR debated these changes to the constitution.1 

  • 1. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1997/859), November 5, 1997.
1998

Minimum Implementation

The ban on religious parties was not lifted in 1998 and no elections were held. The CNR continued to debate these changes to the constitution.2 

  • 2. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1998/1029), November 3, 1998.
1999

Intermediate Implementation

The electoral reforms specified in the accord were fully implemented (de jure). In August 1999, the Supreme Court lifted the ban on UTO member parties that had been in effect since 1993.3  In June 1999, Tajikistan's parliament, the Majlisi Oli, adopted the amendments to the constitution prepared by the CNR.4 In September 1999, the constitutional amendments were adopted through a public referendum and passed with 72 percent of the vote.5 

  • 3. Rashid Abdullo,  (2001). "Implementation of the 1997 General Agreement: Success, Dilemmas, and Challenges," in Politics of Compromise: the Tajikistan Peace Process, eds. K. Abdullaev and C. Barnes (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001), Accord 10: 48–53.
  • 4. Rahmatillo Zoir and Scott Newton, "Constitutional and Legislative Reform," in Politics of Compromise: the Tajikistan Peace Process, eds. K. Abdullaev and C. Barnes, (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001), Accord 10:54-59.
  • 5. "Chronology," in Politics of Compromise: the Tajikistan Peace Process, eds. K. Abdullaev and C. Barnes (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001), Accord 10: 82-87.
2000

Full Implementation

In February and March of 2000 parliamentary elections were held on a multi-party basis for the first time in Tajikistan, although they were highly irregular. The number of ballots cast equaled 93 percent of the population and 68 percent of precincts had allowed proxy voting. The president’s party won 33 seats and the Islamic Revival party won 2 seats.6 

  • 6. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/2000/214), March 14, 2000.
2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.  

2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.  

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.  

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.  

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.  

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.  

Dispute Resolution Committee

Protocol on the main functions and powers of the Commission on National Reconciliation (23 December 1996)

Implementation History
1997

Intermediate Implementation

The CNR was a commission representing both sides to monitor and implement the General Agreement and resolve disputes over implementation. Its first meeting took place between 7 and 11 July 1997, and the commission adopted an Act on Mutual Forgiveness. The Act was then adopted by the parliament on 1 August 1997.1  In its September meeting, the CNR started debates on changes to the constitution as well as extending position to UTO leaders.2 The CNR also started to work on settlement of IDPs and Refugees, IDPs and integration and reintegration of UTO combatants. The CNR was also responsible for resolving disputes regarding ceasefire violations and other matters.

  • 1. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1997/686), September 4, 1997.
  • 2. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1997/859), November 5, 1997.
1998

Intermediate Implementation

The CNR was operational in 1998 and the commision debated and drafted several amendments to the Tajikistani constitution.3

  • 3. Rahmatillo Zoir and Scott Newton, "Constitutional and Legislative Reform," in Politics of Compromise: the Tajikistan Peace Process, eds. K. Abdullaev and C. Barnes (London: Conciliation Resources), Accord 10:54-59.
1999

Full Implementation

The CNR remained active in 1999 and most of its mandates were met. Legislative reform was fully implemented. A new upper house of Parliament was established with regional representation on 30 June 1999. Religious political parties were allowed under amended article 28.4 

2000

Full Implementation

The last meeting of CNR took place on 26 March 2000. The meeting was attended by all stakeholders from both sides in presence of the Contact Group of Guarantor States and International Organizations. In the meeting, both sides acknowledged that some tasks mandated by the General Agreement remained unfinished, which could be addressed by appropriate Government bodies. The CNR was dissolved by presidential decree on 1 April 2000.

Parliamentary elections were held in 2000. Over 80 per cent of the members elected or appointed to the new upper house in the 2000 elections were executive branch officials who were allowed to run in the regional house elections.5 Several constitutional changes were passed by popular referendum in September 1999 with 72 percent of the vote. The major changes included the creation of a new upper house of Parliament, the lifting of the ban on UTO political parties and updating the process to amend the constitution by popular referendum.6

2001

Full Implementation

The CNR completed most of its tasks and disbanded in 2000.

2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Judiciary Reform

Statute of the Commission on National Reconciliation (23 December 1996)

III. FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF THE COMMISSION

Implementation History
1997

No Implementation

Although the CNR was operational and was actively implementing other mandates, no measures of integrating the judicial branch or other judicial reforms were reported by the CNR in 1997 or 1998.

1998

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1999

Minimum Implementation

Part of the 1999 referendum that was drafted by the CNR included the creation of a new Judicial Council which would appoint and dismiss judges at various levels of government.1 It appears, however, that this attempt at either compromise or process was captured by Rakhmonov. All of the members of the Judicial Council would be appointed by President Rakhmonov; none were former UTO.2 No evidence of any UTO approved judges or Muslim judges being appointed could be found.  

  • 1. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1999/1127), November 4, 1999.
  • 2. "Rahmonov sets up nine-member Justice Council," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 16, 1999.
2000

Minimum Implementation

No measures of integrating the judicial branch or other judicial reforms were undertaken in 2000.

2001

Minimum Implementation

No measures of integrating the judicial branch or other judicial reforms as mentioned in the 1997 General Agreement were undertaken in 2001.

2002

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

Military Reform

Protocol on Military Issues (8 March 1997)

I. General Provisions:

Implementation History
1997

Minimum Implementation

According to article 5(c), the entire UTO force of roughly 5000 troops were to be integrated into the national army. In 1997, over 1,000 UTO fighters registered for integration in Tavildara and Garm.1 The first group of UTO fighters took the military oath in December 1997.2 

  • 1. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1997/859), November 5, 1997.
  • 2. "Chronology, Accord 10," Conciliation Resources, 2001.
1998

Intermediate Implementation

The Joint Central Review Commission was set up to evaluate the fitness of UTO fighters for military service.3 

  • 3. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1998/1029), November 3, 1998.
1999

Intermediate Implementation

The CNR reported that 2,375 UTO fighters had been assigned to regular military units, as follows: Ministry of Defense – 460 integrated and 464 in the process; Ministry of Interior – 304; Tajik Border Forces – 1,107; and the committee on Emergency Situations – 40.4 

  • 4. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1999/514), May 6, 1999.
2000

Full Implementation

When the CNR was completed in 2000, around 4,498 UTO fighters had been integrated into the armed forces.5

  • 5. Rashid Abdullo, "Implementation of the 1997 General Agreement: Success, Dilemmas, and Challenges," in Politics of Compromise: the Tajikistan Peace Process, eds. K. Abdullaev and C. Barnes (London: Conciliation Resources), Accord 10: 48–53.
2001

Full Implementation

No further efforts to integrate UTO troops into the military were reported after the close of the CNR in 2000.

2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Police Reform

Protocol on Political Questions (18 May 1997)

Implementation History
1997

No Implementation

In 1997, there were no reports of any efforts to incorporate UTO troops into law enforcement agencies. As outlined in the accord text, such a program should have fallen under the jurisdiction of the CNR. 

1998

No Implementation

No reports were found of any programs having to do with the integration of UTO fighters into police forces or law enforcement agencies. The International Crises Group also reported that attempts at police reform undertaken in 1998 and 1999 were unsuccessful.2

  • 2. "Central Asia: The Politics of Police Reform," International Crisis Group, Asia Report no. 42, December 10, 2002.
1999

No Implementation

No reports were found of any programs having to do with the integration of UTO fighters into police forces and law enforcement agencies. The International Crises Group also reported that attempts at police reform undertaken in 1998 and 1999 were unsuccessful.3

2000

No Implementation

As of the end of 2000, when the CNR was wrapping up its planning and oversight activities, there were no reports of UTO fighters being integrated into the police forces. Around 4,498 UTO fighters were integrated into the military or armed forces, but there was no mention of any integration efforts aimed at police forces, whether national or local.4

While it is possible that a compromise was worked out on this issue during the integration of UTO troops into the armed forces that involved some type of substitution of UTO forces, the CNR makes no reference to any such deal. Moreover, the discussion of the integration of UTO troops into the military is in a different section of the accord than the section above that deals with quotas in law enforcement. Integration of UTO troops into the military is covered under "Protocol on Military Issues", while the UTO quotas into law enforcement agencies is covered under "Protocol on Political Questions." 

  • 4. Rashid Abdullo, "Implementation of the 1997 General Agreement: Success, Dilemmas, and Challenges," in Politics of Compromise: the Tajikistan Peace Process, eds. K. Abdullaev and C. Barnes (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001), Accord 10: 48–53.
2001

No Implementation

No reports found of UTO fighters being integrated into the police forces. 

2002

No Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

No Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

No Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

No Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

No Implementation

No further developments observed.

Demobilization

Protocol on Military Issues (8 March 1997)

I. General Provisions:

Implementation History
1997

Intermediate Implementation

The 1997 peace agreement does not include a specific demobilization plan. Instead, it refers to the disbandment of combatants, the details of which will be worked out by a military reform commission. Reintegration was to begin immediately and after the registration and integration process was completed, any remaining troops would be demobilized.1 

After the signing of the accord, UTO fighters were told to go registration sites in order to be considered for integration into the national military and to sign up for reintegration programs (i.e., job training or education). The process of registration of UTO fighters inside Tajikistan was underway by September 1997. Over 1,000 UTO fighters were registered by November.2 

  • 1. Stina Torjesen and S. Neil MacFarlane, “R before D: the case of post conflict reintegration in Tajikistan,” Conflict, Security and Development 7, no. 2 (2007): 311-332.
  • 2. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1997/859), November 5, 1997.
1998

Intermediate Implementation

UTO fighters continued to register for integration into the military and to get job training, however, many did not remain in the assembly areas, or turn in a weapon. According to one observer, the establishment of a demobilization process lagged behind the registration process. As a result, many UTO troops went back to their homes 3 

  • 3. Grant R. Smith, “Tajikistan: The Rocky Road to Peace,” Central Asian Survey 18, no. 2 (1999):243-251).
1999

Full Implementation

UTO leader, Mr. Nuri, formally declared the return of all UTO fighters to Tajikistan, the closing of all bases outside the country and the disbanding of all UTO military forces.4 By early May 1999, according to the UN Secretary General’s report, 6,238 UTO fighters were registered of which 1,917 were relieved from further service.5 By October 1999, a total of 2,370 UTO fighters were demobilized, with another 2,309 integrated into the national military forces.6

  • 4. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1999/124), February 8, 1999.
  • 5. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1999/514), May 6, 1999.
  • 6. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1999/1127), November 4, 1999.
2000

Full Implementation

The demobilization process ended in 1999. 

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Disarmament

Protocol on Military Issues (8 March 1997)

I. General Provisions:

Implementation History
1997

No Implementation

It was reported that UTO fighters were reluctant to disarm due to the government's weak commitment on general amnesty and the fact that UTO representatives were not receiving high-ranking government positions, particularly, in one of the three "power" ministries: Interior, Security or Defense.1 

  • 1. Grant R. Smith, “Tajikistan: The Rocky Road to Peace,” Central Asian Survey 18, no. 2 (1999):243-251.
1998

Minimum Implementation

In July, 153 UTO fighters were repatriated from Afghanistan with a large number of weapons and ammunition by UNMOT.2 Around 36 percent of UTO fighters turned in weapons at registration sites in 1998 according to UNMOT reports.3 

  • 2. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1998/754), August 13, 1998.
  • 3. Stina Torjesen and S. Neil MacFarlane, "R before D: The Case of Post-Conflict Reintegration in Tajikistan," Conflict, Security & Development 7, no. 2 (2007): 311-332.
1999

Minimum Implementation

On 5 January 1999, the CNR issued a formal resolution for all UTO fighters to return to the assembly areas and turn in their weapons.4 Following the public declaration of disbandment from Nuri, a subsequent disarmament campaign was conducted from 5 to 25 of August with members of the CNR. The Secretary General reported that few weapons were collected.5 

  • 4. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1999/124), February 8, 1999.
  • 5. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1999/1127), November 4, 1999.
2000

Minimum Implementation

Disarmament, as a formal process, was disregarded and the CNR was closed.6 

  • 6. A. Kannangara, N. Solijonov and S. Khoshmukhamedov, "Outcome Evaluation Report: Sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants and Conversion of Military Assets to Civilian Use," Dushanbe: UNDP Tajikistan, 2004.
2001

Minimum Implementation

No subsequent disarmament programs took place in Tajikistan.

2002

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Minimum Implementation

No further developments observed.

Reintegration

Protocol on Military Issues (8 March 1997)

I. General Provisions

III. REFORM OF THE POWER STRUCTURES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF TAJIKISTAN

Implementation History
1997

No Implementation

There were no active reintegration programs in 1997. UNMOT plans for a donor conference to be held in Vienna to fund reintegration programs in Tajikistan.1 

  • 1. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1997/859), November 5, 1997.
1998

No Implementation

There were no programs conducted in 1998 that offered training to former combatants. An integrated plan by the UN consisting of vocational training, resettlement grants and jobs for demobilized fighters was proposed and funding was being sought.2 

  • 2. Grant R. Smith, “Tajikistan: The Rocky Road to Peace,” Central Asian Survey 18, no. 2 (1999): 243-251.
1999

Minimum Implementation

No active or ongoing reintegration programs were found in 1999. Planning was reportedly underway for programs to become avtive in the year 2000. There were 836 former UTO fighters who gained employment in a UN project in the Karategin Valley.3 

  • 3. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1999/1127), November 4, 1999.
2000

Intermediate Implementation

Money from Norway, the United States and CIDA funded the first phase of a UNDP reintegration program in the Rasht Valley in the year 2000. More than 1100 fighters went through the rehabilitation project.4 

  • 4. A. Kannangara, N. Solijonov and S. Khoshmukhamedov, "Outcome Evaluation Report: Sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants and Conversion of Military Assets to Civilian Use," Dushanbe: UNDP Tajikistan, 2004.
2001

Intermediate Implementation

Rehabilitation and job training programs were ongoing in 2001 with funding from the European Commission (DG/RELEX), Japan, Belgium, and USAID in the Shaartuz and Kulyab areas.5 

2002

Intermediate Implementation

Rehabilitation and job training programs ended in 2002. A UN report on reintegration estimated that as many as 4,000 former soldiers had participated in a rehabilitation program and that 60% had found employment as self-employed farmers or entrepreneurs.6 

2003

Intermediate Implementation

No reintegration programs were found to be active in 2003.

2004

Intermediate Implementation

No reintegration programs were found to be active in 2004.

2005

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

Prisoner Release

Statute of the Commission on National Reconciliation (23 December 1996)

III. Functions and Powers of the Commission:

7. The Commission shall have the following functions and powers:

Implementation History
1997

Intermediate Implementation

Prisoner swaps began in 1997 and continued at an incremental pace.1 The UTO released two groups of government prisoners, 119 in total on 17 September and 19 October in Tavildara. In turn, the government agreed to release 161 detainees. Roughly half (78) were set free on 20 October with help from UNMOT.2

  • 1. "Tajik Sides Swap Prisoners of War,” The Moscow Times, July 19, 1997.
  • 2. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1998/374), May 6, 1998.
1998

Intermediate Implementation

On 29 March, UTO forces released 16 government soldiers. On 30 March the UTO released another 73 government soldiers.3 

  • 3. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1997/859), November 5, 1997.
1999

Full Implementation

A June 17 Protocol signed by Rakhmonov and Nuri called for the release of 47 UTO supporters who were imprisoned. Rakhmonov granted 40 of the prisoners amnesty, but they were not released. Of the other seven, it was reported that two were killed in prison, two died of illness in prison and three were denied amnesty.4 The UTO submitted an additional list of war prisoners being held in government prisons. According to the U.S. State Department Human Rights Practice Report, by November of 1999, the government had released all UTO prisoners on the list. The government accepted the UTO’s claim that it had released all war prisoners.5 

  • 4. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1999/1127), November 4, 1999.
  • 5. "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- 2000- Tajikistan," U.S. State Department, 2001, accessed August 6, 2012.
2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Paramilitary Groups

Protocol on Military Issues (8 March 1997)

I. General Provisions:

Implementation History
1997

Minimum Implementation

On 26 September, the CNR issued an appeal to armed groups in the country whose loyalty was not clear. The message declared that armed groups must join the government or the UTO by 16 November. After that date they would be considered illegal and would be pursued.1 

  • 1. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1997/859), November 5, 1997.
1998

Full Implementation

The government and the CNR remained firm on their message to paramilitary groups. However, several armed groups remained active in the country or across the border inside a neighboring state. In October, UTO forces and government forces engaged in joint attacks against several armed groups operating east of Dushanbe killing a number of people from both groups.2 In November, government loyalists Colonel Khudoiberdyev led an armed group of 1,000 troops to take Leninabad in northern Tajikistan. A joint Tajik army comprised of former UTO and government soldiers defeated the armed group.3 

  • 2. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1998/1029), November 3, 1998.
  • 3. "Chronology, Accord 10," Conciliation Resources, March 2001, accessed June 3, 2010.
1999

Full Implementation

No further reports of paramilitary related events.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Amnesty

Protocol on Political Questions (18 May 1997)

1. The President and the Commission on National Reconciliation shall adopt the reciprocal-pardon act as the first political decision to be taken during the initial days of the Commission's work. No later than one month after the adoption of the reciprocal-pardon act, the amnesty act shall be adopted.

Implementation History
1997

Minimum Implementation

The CNR began its work in September and formed a working group on the implementation of the amnesty law with equal numbers of UTO and government representatives. Over 700 UTO cases were submitted for review in 1997. The government agreed to release 161 detainees. Roughly half (78) were set free on 20 October with help from UNMOT.1 

  • 1. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1997/859), November 5, 1997.
1998

Minimum Implementation

In January of 1998, Tajikistan’s Prosecutor General dropped all charges against UTO leaders, but did not issue a blanket amnesty for all UTO fighters.2  It was reported at this time that the CNR reviewed 1,370 cases and referred them to the government by May of 1998. By the end of 1998, only 399 were given amnesty.3 

  • 2. "Chronology," in Politics of Compromise: the Tajikistan Peace Process, eds. K. Abdullaev and C. Barnes (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001), Accord 10: 82-87.
  • 3. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1998/374), May 6, 1998.
1999

Full Implementation

By the end of 1999, the government had granted amnesty to approximately 5,000 UTO fighters, although a small number of UTO fighters remained in prison in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast.4  

  • 4. "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- 2000- Tajikistan," U.S. State Department, 2001.
2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Refugees

Statute of the Commission on National Reconciliation (21 February 1997)

III. Functions and Powers of the Commission:

Implementation History
1997

Intermediate Implementation

Many refugees had returned between 1994 and 1996 - before the Commission on National Reconciliation (CNR) began to function. The Protocol on Refugees had established a timeline of 12 to 18 months for the return of refugees and called for the reactivation of the Joint Commission on Refugees. The commission was not reactivated as of June 1997 but refugees and IDPs had already started to return.1 

From July of 1997 to November, roughly 6,700 refugees were reported as having returned to Tajikistan from Qunduz.2 Rashid Abdullo, who served on the staff of UNMOT, reported that tens of thousands of refugees returned home within the first 3 to 4 months.3 Smith (1999) reported another 3,158 people returning from the Sakhi camp near Mazar-i-Sharif on 15 November 1997.4  It was reported that many IDPs and refugees found their homes illegally occupied, but a viable effort seems to have been made to evict the illegal inhabitants.5 

  • 1. "UN Security Council extends mandate of Tajikistan Observer Mission for three months, to 15 Sept," M2 PRESSWIRE, June 13, 1997.
  • 2. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1997/859), November 5, 1997.
  • 3. Rashid Abdullo, "Implementation of the 1997 General Agreement: Success, Dilemmas, and Challenges," in Politics of Compromise: the Tajikistan Peace Process, eds. K. Abdullaev and C. Barnes (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001), Accord 10: 48–53.
  • 4. Grant R. Smith, “Tajikistan: The Rocky Road to Peace,” Central Asian Survey 18, no. 2 (1999):243-251.
  • 5. "Tajikistan Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996," U.S. State Department, 1997.
1998

Intermediate Implementation

In 1998 refugees who had fled to Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan began to come back with assistance from UNHCR and IOM.6 

  • 6. Grant R. Smith, “Tajikistan: The Rocky Road to Peace.”
1999

Intermediate Implementation

It was reported that 4,000 refugees from Turkmenistan, 1,000 from Kyrgyzstan and 1,000 from Kazakhstan were expected to return home in 1999.7 From January to November of 1999, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees stated that assistence had been given to 4,119 Tajik refugees from various countries.8 

  • 7. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1999/514), May 6, 1999.
  • 8. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1999/1127), November 4, 1999.
2000

Full Implementation

It was reported in several sources that the majority of refugees had returned to their homes by mid-2000.9 Shukurjon Zukhurov, who was in charge of reconstruction projects, estimated that roughly 100,000 refugees had returned home (as of early 2000).10   

  • 9. "Chronology," in Politics of Compromise: the Tajikistan Peace Process, eds. K. Abdullaev and C. Barnes (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001), Accord 10: 82-87.
  • 10. "Unsteady peace in Tajikistan as transition ends," Agence France Presse, February 26, 2000.
2001

Full Implementation

The refugee return process was completed in 2000. After 2000, there were no further reports of repatriation activities. 

2002

Full Implementation

There were no further reports of repatriation activities. 

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Internally Displaced Persons

Protocol on Refugees (13 January 1997)

Implementation History
1997

Minimum Implementation

The UNHCR reported an estimated 520,000 IDPs in Tajikistan in 1993. This number was reported as having shrunk to 25,285 by 1996.1 The Protocol on Refugees had established a timeline of 12 to 18 months for the return of IDPs and refugees and called for the reactivation of the Joint Commission on Refugees.2 

  • 1. "2002 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook- Tajikistan," UNHCR, 2004, accessed August 7, 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/414ad5ae7.html.
  • 2. "UN Security Council extends mandate of Tajikistan Observer Mission for three months, to 15 Sept," M2 PRESSWIRE, June 13, 1997.
1998

Minimum Implementation

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees continues assistance to IDPs and refugees in 1998.3 

  • 3. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1998/374), May 6, 1998.
1999

Intermediate Implementation

From January to November of 1999, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees had assisted in the repatriation of 4,119 Tajik refugees. UNHCR did not report on the number of IDPs in Tajikistan.4

  • 4. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1999/1127), November 4, 1999.
2000

Full Implementation

By February 2000, most IDPs were reportedly resettled.5 

  • 5. Chronology," in Politics of Compromise: the Tajikistan Peace Process, eds. K. Abdullaev and C. Barnes (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001), Accord 10: 82-87.
2001

Full Implementation

No further developments concerning IDPs in Tajikistan.

2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Media Reform

Protocol on Political Questions (18 May 1997): 

4. The bans and restrictions on activities by the political parties and movements of the United Tajik Opposition and the mass information media shall be lifted by the authorities of Tajikistan after the completion of the second phase of the implementation of the Protocol on Military Questions.

Implementation History
1997

No Implementation

All Tajik media outlets in 1997 were state-controlled. While the Tajikistani constitution contained a freedom of speech clause, in practice, freedom of speech and freedom of the press was strongly suppressed by the government. According to case files from the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), 29 journalists were murdered in Tajikistan between 1992 and 1996. The CPJ reports that in July of 1997 "President Rakhmonov ordered the temporary closure of non-state television and radio companies until they were licensed, and the appropriation of technical equipment from some local stations for use by state television, ostensibly to improve its quality. Except for national and regional state television, no stations could continue broadcasting until the government officially set the price for a license."1

While the lack of murders since the Accord represents an improvement in conditions, tight control over all forms of media outlets and careful self-censorship by fearful editors and writers continues to be the norm.2

1998

No Implementation

No reported improvements were observed in 1998 regarding freedom of the press or freedom of speech in Tajikistan. "In July, Tajikistan's Minister of Foreign Affairs revoked the accreditation of Yelena Masyuk, a correspondent for the Russian television station NTV and a 1997 recipient of CPJ's International Press Freedom Award. The Tajik Interior Ministry issued a statement claiming that Masyuk's reports on Tajik politics "aim to discredit the Tajik government." Later In October, two masked men broke into the house of Maksujon Guseinov, a reporter for the independent newspaper Charkhi Gardun. He was not home, but the two intruders badly beat his wife, and told her to tell her husband to stop writing.3 

1999

No Implementation

The government continued to intimidate and censor media outlets and reporters in 1999. The last private weekly paper Junbish was forced out of business in October after the state-owned printing press stopped printing the paper.4

  • 4. "Committee to Protect Journalists - Tajikistan: 1999."
2000

No Implementation

The number of media outlets increased in 2000, however, government censorship and control persisted.5 

  • 5. "Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2000 - Tajikistan," U.S. State Department, 2001.
2001

No Implementation

 In 2001, the Tajik government brought criminal charges against Dodojon Atovullo, editor of the opposition newspaper Charogi Ruz for insulting the president. Some media organizations have reported that restrictions on the press have gotten worse in 2001. An increasingly common problem is that politicians are allowed to frivolously sue journalists for defamation and libel and the politicians always seem to win the cases which results in huge fines for the journalists.6 

2002

No Implementation

In October of 2002, three independent television journalists working in the northern city of Khujand who had been reporting on military abuses were all drafted into military service.7

2003

No Implementation

Threats and harassment of private media outlets and journalists who criticize the government continued in 2003. In February, the editor of the independent weekly Nerui Sukhan was investigated by the Dushanbe Prosecutor's Office over a story. Later that year, the paper was investigated by tax inspectors.8 

2004

No Implementation

The government's assault on journalists and freedom of the press continued into 2004. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists: 

"The government repeatedly blocked publication of Ruzi Nav (New Day) and Nerui Sokhan (Power of the Word), two popular Tajik-language opposition weeklies based in the capital, Dushanbe. Rebuffed by state-run printer Sharki Ozod, the newspapers turned to the private publishing house Dzhiyonkhon. But tax authorities shuttered Dzhiyonkhon by the summer, and other private printers refused to do business with the newspapers. By fall, Ruzi Nav turned to a printer in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, only to have the entire November 4 edition impounded by tax authorities when it arrived at the airport in Dushanbe. Later that month, the Ministry of Culture banned distribution of Ruzi Nav for unspecified violations."9 

Later, the Editor-in-Chief of the same paper (Ruzi Nav) was almost beaten to death by an unidentified attacker with an iron bar. Mirzo endured a fractured skull but survived. 

2005

No Implementation

In 2005, the government’s primary weapons against investigative journalism were fraudulent charges and tax evasion.  In January, the prominent independent Tajik-language opposition weekly Nerui Sokhan was closed down for unknown license violations. Later in August, Mukhtor Bokizoda, editor of Nerui Sokhan, was sentenced to two years of forced labor over tax evasion charges surrounding the fact that the printing house that printed his paper had had their electricity shut off by the government.10 

2006

No Implementation

 In addition to committing fraud and violence against reporters who criticize the government, the courts have continuously beefed up the ability of politicians to bring personal civil charges against their critics. As of 2006, the current criminal code of The Republic of Tajikistan (CHAPTER 17: Crimes Against Personal Freedom, Honor, and Dignity) reads as follows:

Article 135. Defamation

(1) Defamation, that is distribution of obviously false information defaming a person's honor, dignity or reputation, is punishable by a fine in the amount of up to 500 times the minimum monthly wage, or up to 2 years of correctional labor.

(2) Defamation in public speeches, printed or multi-copied works or mass media, is punishable by a fine in the amount of 500 to 1000 times the minimum monthly wage, or confinement for a period of 2 to 6 months, or imprisonment for up to 2 years.

(3) Defamation:

a) done jointly with a felony or especially grievous crime;

b) for mercenary and other motives, is punishable by deprivation of freedom for a period of 3 to 5 years.

Article 136. Insult

(1) Insult, that is abasement of honor and dignity, expressed in an indecent way, is punishable by a fine in the amount of up to 200 times the minimum monthly wage, or up to 1 year of correctional labor.

(2) Insult:

a) in public speeches, printed works or mass media;

b) in connection with the discharge of the victim's public duty, is punishable by a fine in the amount of 200 to 500 times the minimum monthly wage, or up to 2 years of correctional labor.

Article 137. Public Insult of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan or Slander Addressed to Him

1. Public insulting the President of the Republic of Tajikistan or slander addressed to him, is punishable by a fine in the amount of 100 to 500 times the minimum monthly wage, or correctional labor for up to 1 year.

2. The same actions committed using press or other means of mass media, are punishable by correctional for up to 2 years, or imprisonment for a period of 2 to 5 years.11 

Donor Support

Protocol on the fundamental principles for establishing peace and national accord in Tajikistan (17 August 1995)

(f) A donors conference for financing the programmes to reintegrate refugees, displaced persons and persons demobilized during the national reconciliation process, and also for providing necessary assistance in restoring the national economy, which has been destroyed by the civil war.

Implementation History
1997

Full Implementation

UNMOT planned a donor conference in Vienna to fund activities related to implementation: political reconciliation and democratization, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, reform of power structures, repatriation and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons and rehabilitation and development for the communities. Some $65 million was sought to cover the cost of the programming.1 A UN-sponsored donor conference took place in November 1997 with some 40 countries pledging $56.6 million to support implementation of the peace agreement for up to 18 months, including return of refugees, demobilization of soldiers and multiparty elections.2 

  • 1. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1997/859), November 5, 1997.
  • 2. "Donors conference raises 56.5 million for Tajikistan," Associated Press, November 25, 1997.
1998

Full Implementation

An appeal for Tajikistan was launched in Geneva in March for a total of $34.6 million for 1998 to extend the humanitarian donor alert, which expired at the end of 1997. In addition, the World Bank organized a Joint Consultative Group meeting in Paris on 20 May in order to mobilize resources for development.3 In April of 1998, Tajikistan received a $50 million loan from the World Bank to finance projects in health care, education, telecommunication, highways and public transportation.4 

  • 3. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1998/374), May 6, 1998.
  • 4. "World Bank Grants 50m-Dollar Loan to Tajikistan," BBC Monitoring Central Asia, April 22, 1998.
1999

Full Implementation

Many of the donor pledges made in Vienna were not realized. It was reported that donors lacked confidence in the peace process in Tajikistan. Key programs such as refugee repatriation and combatant reintegration programs were adequately funded.5 European donors gave $3 million to fund rehabilitation programs in central Tajikistan.6 

  • 5. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1999/514), May 6, 1999.
  • 6. "Donors Pledge Over $3m for Rehabilitation Programme in Central Tajikistan," BBC Monitoring Central Asia, July 23, 1999.
2000

Full Implementation

Norway, USAID and CIDA funded a UNDP reintegration program in the Rasht Valley in the year 2000. More than 1100 fighters went through the rehabilitation project.7

  • 7. A. Kannangara, N. Solijonov and S. Khoshmukhamedov, "Outcome Evaluation Report: Sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants and Conversion of Military Assets to Civilian Use," Dushanbe: UNDP Tajikistan, 2004.
2001

Full Implementation

Funding from the European Commission (DG/RELEX), Japan, Belgium, and USAID supported rehabilitation training in the Shaartuz and Kulyab areas.8 

2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism

Protocol on the guarantees of implementation of the General Agreement on Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan (28 May 1997)

Implementation History
1997

Intermediate Implementation

The U.N. Missions of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) was established in 1994 to monitor the ceasefire between the UTO and the government. After the 1997 general agreement had been reached, the mandate of UNMOT was expanded, via Security Council Resolution 1138 (1997), to include verification and monitoring of the implementation of the peace accord in general, with a particular emphases on the “reintegration, disarmament and disbandment of the armed units of the United Tajik Opposition as well as the reform of the governmental power structures.” UNMOT reports suggest that the organization was primarily focused on verifying the DDR process and the holding of parliamentary elections. The UNMOT mandate was extended to 15 November 1998, via Security Council Resolution 1128 (1997).1 

By the end of 1997, UNMOT was comprised of 44 military observers, and 67 civilian personnel. Per resolution 51/237 of June 1997, the budget for UNMOT was $8. 275 million (US).2 

1998

Intermediate Implementation

In 1998, four members of UNMOT were murdered south of Labi Jar. UNMOT immediately suspended all field activities and kept a small team in Dushanbe. In May 1998, the Secretary-General reported that it was unlikely that elections could be held in 1998 and that the verification mission would require more time than was specified in the timeline of the peace agreement. He recommended an extension of UNMOT's mandate for a further six-month period until 15 November 1998. 

The UNMOT mandate was extended for six months until 15 November 1998.3 As of October 1998, UNMOT comprised 33 military observers and 170 civilian staff. The cost of maintaining UNMOT for a 12-month period was estimated at $20 million dollars (US).4

1999

Full Implementation

UNMOT reported significant progress in the peace process in Tajikistan in 1999. The Secretary General’s November 1999 Report to the Security Council highlighted two important milestones: a constitutional referendum and lifting of the ban on the UTO as a political party, which signaled an opening of the political party system. Parliamentary elections, another key provision of the 1997 accord, were due in February 2000.5 Resolution 1274 (1999) of 12 November 1999 extended the UNMOT mandate another six months (until 15 May 2000).

At the end of 1999, UNMOT comprised 167 civilian staff, and 37 military observers. The UN General Assembly appropriated $18.7 million dollars (US) for the maintenance of UNMOT for the period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000.6 

  • 5. "Tajikistan – UNMOT Background."
  • 6. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan,"  United Nations (S/1999/1127), November 4, 1999.
2000

Full Implementation

In 2000, UNMOT successfully oversaw an election (held on 27 February) concerning 63 available seats, of which 41 seats were single-member constituencies, and 22 seats were to be filled through a party list proportional system. A total of 331 candidates ran in the elections. Turnout was reported as 93.23% of voters casting a ballot. The ruling party (People’s Democracy Party) won 33 seats (18 by direct election and 15 by its list), the Communist Party won 7 seats (2 by direct and 5 through list), Islamic Revival party won 2 seats through list. Independent candidates won eight seats, two of which were declared invalid. In 12 constituencies, candidates did not receive majority votes and elections were announced for those constituencies.7 The election for the 33-seat National Assembly took place on 23 March. After completing these elections, the Commission on National Reconciliation was formally dissolved by presidential decree on 1 April 2000.8 

UNMOT completed its verification mission was formally terminated on 15 May 2000.9 

  • 7. "Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council," United Nations (S/2000/214), March 14, 2000.
  • 8. "Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/2000/387), May 5, 2000.
  • 9. "Tajikistan – UNMOT Background."
2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Regional Peacekeeping Force

Protocol on Military Issues (8 March 1997)

II. THE REINTEGRATION, DISARMAMENT AND DISBANDMENT OF THE ARMED UNITS OF THE UNITED TAJIK OPPOSITION:

5. The reintegration, disarmament and disbandment of the armed units of the United Tajik Opposition shall be carried out in stages.

Implementation History
1997

Full Implementation

Peacekeeping troops from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) had been in Tajikistan since 1994 and began working with UNMOT in 1997. Two CIS peacekeepers were killed in 1997.1 

  • 1. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1997/686), September 4, 1997.
1998

Full Implementation

About 12,000 troops from the Commonwealth of Independent States, mostly from Russia, were engaged in peacekeeping operations in Tajikistan in 1998.2  Under the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States, an estimated 25,000 Russian troops guarded the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan.3 

  • 2. "U.N. observers killed in Tajikistan Japanese, 3 others shot to death in mountainous area," The Daily Yomiuri, July 23, 1998.
  • 3. "Bringing Peace to Tajikistan's Mountain Fiefdoms," Christian Science Monitor, September 15, 1998.
1999

Full Implementation

CIS forces in 1999 were made up the 201st Motorized Division from the Russian Federation and a small battalion from Kazakhstan.4 Kyrgyzstan withdrew its troops (an estimated 500) in March 1999.5 The Security Council reported that the presence of CIS troops greatly enhanced their verification abilities and welcomed the continuous support of the CIS troops.6 

In April 1999, Russia and Tajikistan tentatively agreed to establish Russian military bases in Tajikistan which would provide permanent headquarters for the 6,000-7,000 troops from the 201st Motorized Rifle Division already deployed in Tajikistan.7 Hence the Russian peacekeeping forces were made permanent. As such, the presence of regional peacekeepers in Tajikistan concluded in 1999.

  • 4. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," United Nations (S/1999/514), May 6, 1999.
  • 5. "Kyrgyzstan withdraws peacekeeping troops from Tajikistan," Agence France Presse, March 14, 1999.
  • 6. "Security Council welcomes progress toward peace in Tajikistan," Associated Press, August 19, 1999.
  • 7. "Operational Group of Russian Forces in Tajikistan," accessed August 7, 2012, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/ogrv-tajikistan.htm.
2000

Full Implementation

The presence of regional peacekeepers in Tajikistan concluded in 1999.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2005

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2006

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Please always cite: Peace Accords Matrix (Date of retrieval: (08/23/2017),
http://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/general-agreement-establishment-peace-and-national-accord-tajikistan,
Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame.