Arusha Accord - 4 August 1993

  • 74%
  • Implementation Score 
    after 10 years
Provisions in this Accord
Cease Fire

N'sele Cease-fire Agreement between the Government of the Rwandese Republic and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (12 July 1992)

Article I

Implementation History
1993

Minimum Implementation

The N’sele Cease-fire Agreement of 12 July 1992 did not result in a cessation of hostilities. Both sides continued to engage in fighting.1 The ceasefire agreement included a provision for a 50-member Neutral Military Observer Group - I (NMOG-I) furnished by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The observers were drawn from Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and Zimbabwe and deployed by the first week of August 1992.2 

Into 1993 the fighting continued and both sides were very much involved in fighting, in violation of the ceasefire agreement to which they had agreed in July 1992, after occupying a large swath of territory in northern Rwanda in the preceding days. The Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) declared an immediate ceasefire on 12 February 1993, which the Rwandese government forces were also expected to respect immediately. The rebel group put forward a plan to achieve the ceasefire implementation through the assistance of the NMOG-I.3 The Government rejected the RPF offer of ceasefire and asked the rebels to withdraw before the ceasefire.4

A new ceasefire agreement was announced and came into effect on 9 March 1993 and parties agreed to hold further talks in Arusha, Tanzania on 15 March.5 In March, the UN Security Council approved the deployment of peacekeepers to monitor the ceasefire.6 Despite the promise of the new ceasefire agreement, it was quickly violated by both sides. As a part of the ceasefire monitoring, “the Security Council in June 1993 established the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) on the Ugandan side of the border to verify that no military assistance reached Rwanda.”7

  • 1. "Rwanda Government and Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) Accuse Each Other of Breaking Cease-Fire," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 8, 1992.
  • 2. "Egypt to Send Ceasefire Observers to Rwanda," Xinhua General News Service, August 4, 1992.
  • 3. "Rwanda; RPF Announces Cease-Fire," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 12, 1993.
  • 4. "Government Insists on Rebel Withdrawal before Cease-Fire," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 15, 1993.
  • 5. "Dates set for cease-fire and Arusha talks," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts/The Monitoring Report, March 9, 1993.
  • 6. "Security Council OKs Cease-Fire Monitors for Rwanda," Associated Press, March 12, 1993.
  • 7. "UNAMIR Background,"  accessed September 9, 2011, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirS.htm.
1994

Minimum Implementation

The UN Security Council reported that an interim civilian government was in place and parties reached a ceasefire agreement on 9 April 1994. This agreement came after the deaths of the Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana and President Cyprian Ntaryamira of Burundi, who died in a plane crash.8 The killings continued and on the sideline of the OAU summit, the RPF and the interim government agreed to a ceasefire.9 The killings from both sides did not stop. On 18 July 1994, the Rwandan rebel commander declared victory against the Hutu-led government and announced an immediate ceasefire after 14 weeks of massacres.10 Estimations of the number killed in the genocide varies from source to source. International Crisis Group in its report suggested between 800,000 to one million genocidal killings in 1994.11 After defeat from the RPF, the interim Hutu government , FAR, interahamwe militia fled along with Hutu refugees to Zaire.

  • 8. "Rwanda Cease-Fire in Effect; Toll High," Washington Times, April 9, 1994.
  • 9. "Rwanda; RPF Representative In Tunis Announces Acceptance of Immediate Cease-Fire," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 16, 1994.
  • 10. "Rebels Declare Victory, Cease-Fire in Rwanda; Flood of Hutu Refugees into Zaire Continues," Washington Post, July 19, 1994, (A; A1).
  • 11. "Five Years After The Genocide In Rwanda: Justice in Question," International Crisis Group, Africa Report N°1, April 7, 1999.
1995

Minimum Implementation

No further information specific to ceasefire violation between the signatories reported this year.12

  • 12. "UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia," Uppsala Conflict Data Program - Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research, accessed September 3, 2012, www.ucdp.uu.se/database.
1996

Minimum Implementation

Limited incursions into Rwanda occurred, presumably by ex-FAR and militia based in Zaire. This led the RPF to invade Zaire in October 1996. The ensuing civil war in Zaire/Congo was directly related to the situation in Rwanda. There was a brief pause in conflict after a rebel victory in 1994; new conflict was initiated in 1996.13

  • 13. Rene Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009).
1997

Minimum Implementation

The Hutu refugees in Zaire started to regroup in refugee camps immediately after the start of 1994. In March 1997, the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR) and the armed wing of the Party for the Liberation of Rwanda (PALIR) declared their desire to overthrow the regime. Rebels infiltrated from Congo and initiated attacks in Rwanda. The government responded with disproportionate force, attacking civilians and relocating tens of thousands in an expulsion campaign. The reported number deaths resulting from the conflict was as high as 767 in 1997. The ALIR consisted two parts; the ALIR I was mainly based in the South Kivu and Maniema Provinces while ALIR II fought alongside the government army in conflicts in the DRC. ALIR I and II became part of a new political-military organization, the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR), in September 2000. In the conflict, the DRC helped the DFLR and the Rwandan government to provide support to the rebels in the DRC.14

  • 14. "UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia," Uppsala Conflict Data Program - Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research, accessed September 3, 2012, www.ucdp.uu.se/database.
1998

Minimum Implementation

No further information specific to ceasefire violation between the signatories reported this year.15 However, other conflicts continued.

1999

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2000

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2001

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2002

Minimum Implementation

No further information specific to ceasefire violation between the signatories reported this year.19 However, other conflicts continued.

The conflict was not active from 1994 to 2003 and beyond. In 2004, the FDLR continued to ask for an inter-Rwandan dialogue, but the government refused such dialogue with a group allegedly connected to the genocide.20 The great lake region was affected significantly by the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 because both the DRC and the Rwandan government supported rebel groups against each other. In December 2008, the DRC government and a rebel group in the east of the country, the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), formalized a ceasefire agreement. In a separate agreement, both the DRC and the Rwandan armed force agreed to launch operations against Rwandan Hutu rebels operating in the same region.10 Despite the joint move by the DRC and the Rwandan armed force against the Hutu rebellion, the conflict was on-going in a limited fashion as of 2010.

  • 19. Ibid.
  • 20. Ibid.
  • 10. "DR Congo, Rwanda Announce Moves to End Rebellions," Agence France Presse, December 5, 2008.
Powersharing Transitional Government

Article 1

Implementation History
1993

No Implementation

The peace process started with the signing of the N’sele Cease-fire Agreement of July 1992. In January 1993, RPF and the government signed the protocol agreement on power-sharing government. There was some effort in July 1993 to reach a consensus on power-sharing government, especially the position of the Prime Minister. In the Arusha Accords, the MDR was allocated the Prime Minister position, and they chose Faustin Twagiramungu as their PM candidate, but internal divisions within the party kept him from assuming office; he was opposed by a new hardline element of the MDR affiliated with Hutu Power. A power-sharing government was not established in 1993.

1994

Full Implementation

Even though power-sharing provisions were negotiated in the 1993 accord, the actual establishment of a power-sharing government stalled as the hard-line Hutus opposed any power-sharing with the minority Tutsis.1 Agathe Uwilingiyimana from MDR became prime minister on 18 July 1993 but was assassinated on 7 April 1994.

After genocidal events, the UNAMIR technical team sought the views of political and military leaders in the camps (in Zaire) regarding the conditions, involving exiled Hutu leadership in all negotiation processes, including a revival of acceptable elements of the Arusha Accord and its power-sharing provisions.2 In September, a power-sharing government was formed and late president Habyarimana's party was excluded.3 After taking over Rwanda, the RPF installed an “Enlarged Transitional Government” on 19-20 July 1994, which they claimed was based on the Arusha Accord. They did allocate positions to the MDR, PL, and PSD as dictated by the Arusha Accords, but they unilaterally excluded the MRND and assumed all of their posts rather than sharing them with the other parties.4 Extremist parties were rendered illegal and, therefore, not part of the power-sharing government. Other political parties were part of the power-sharing government but they were politically weak.5 According to the UN Secretary General’s report, a broad-based government of national unity was installed on 19 July 1994 and that government established control over the Rwandan territory.6

On 17 July 1994, the victorious rebels (RPF) made a declaration establishing inclusive government institutions and renouncing power-sharing with political parties and groups that organized and perpetrated genocide. From MDR, Faustin Twagiramungu was appointed prime minister on 19 July 1994. After the declaration, a protocol agreement between incumbent political forces (RPF, MDR, PDC, PDI, PL, PSD, PSR and UDPR) regarding the establishment of national institutions was signed on 14 November 1994.7

The July declaration and the November protocol agreement, as well as the power-sharing legislature that was loosely associated with the 1993 Arusha accord, were important in the formation of the national unity government.

The Government of National Unity outlined the following eight-point plan:

1. Reinforce a climate of peace and security.

2. Organize the central, prefectural, communal, sector and cell administration.

3. Restore and strengthen national unity.

4. Repatriate and settle of refugees.

5. Improve the people's living conditions and resolve those social problems which were a result of genocide, massacres and war (i.e. those of orphans, widows and the physically handicapped).

6. Re-launch the national economy.

7. Redefine the country's foreign policy.

8. Strengthen democracy in Rwanda.8

Accordingly, a power-sharing national assembly was established on 25 November 1994. Of the 70 seats in the National Assembly, the RPF had 19, MDR 13, PSD 13, PL 13, PDC 6, PSR 2, PDI 2, other 2.9 The RPF installed the Transitional National Assembly on 25 December 1994.

  • 1. "Only God Knows What Will Happen,' Child Cries", The Ottawa Citizen, May 11, 1994
  • 2. "Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1994/1308), November 18, 1994
  • 3. "Some 2,000 Former Soldiers Train for Rwanda's New Military," Agence France Presse, October 15, 1994
  • 4. Timothy Longman, "Obstacles to peace building in Rwanda," Durable peace: Challenges for peacebuilding in Africa, ed. Taisier Ali and Robert O. Matthews, 61-85
  • 5. Rachel Hayman, "Going in the 'Right' Direction? Promotion of Democracy in Rwanda since 1990," Taiwan Journal of Democracy 5, no.1 (2009): 51-75
  • 6. "Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1994/1133), October 6, 1994
  • 7. Wellars Gasamagera, "The Constitution Making Process in Rwanda, Lessons to Be Learnt," 2007, accessed September 13, 2011, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan026620.pdf.
  • 8. "New Prime Minister Says He Will Continue With Government Programme", BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 4, 1995
  • 9. "The World Factbook- 1996," CIA, 1996,  accessed September 11, 2011, http://www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/wofact96/211.htm.
1995

Full Implementation

On 31 August 1995, Pierre-Célestin Rwigema from MDR became prime minister. The power-sharing government which included Hutus and Tutsis was in place in September 1994, but the power-sharing situation remained precarious.10 The power-sharing government and legislature continued in 1995. As a matter of fact, a new government was named on August 31, 1995 after five Hutu ministers, including Prime Minister Twagiramungu, resigned in protest over their lack of real power. As agreed to in the Arusha accord, MDR received the Prime Minister position in the power-sharing government.

  • 10. "East Africa- Rwanda: Opposite Sides Of A Shaky Fence," IPS-Inter Press Service, October 9, 1995
1996

Full Implementation

The power-sharing legislature and government continued in 1996.

1997

Full Implementation

The power-sharing legislature and government continued in 1997. A new government was named on 28 March 1997.

1998

Full Implementation

The power-sharing legislature and government continued in 1998.

1999

Full Implementation

The power-sharing legislature and government continued in 1999. A new government was named on 10 February 1999.

2000

Full Implementation

The power-sharing legislature and government continued in 2000. The composition of the national assembly was rebalanced with RPF receiving 13 seats, MDR 13, PSD 13, PL 13, PDC six, RPA six , PSR two, PDI two, and two going to other parties.11 As agreed to in the accord, MDR received the Prime Minister position.

On 8 March 2000, Prime Minister Pierre-Celestin Rwigema resigned over charges of corruption and was replaced by Bertrand Makuza from the same political party (MRD).12 Paul Kagame, who had been vice president and minister of defense, assumed the presidency on March 24, 2000.13

2001

Full Implementation

The power-sharing legislature and government continued in 2001.

2002

Full Implementation

The power-sharing legislature and government continued in 2002

2003

Full Implementation

On 29 September 2003, elections for the National Assembly took place; the RPF won 40 seats, PSD seven, and PL six. The total number of seats in the National Assembly was only 53.14 This effectively ended power-sharing arrangements in the transitional legislature established by the Arusha Accord of 1993. Nevertheless, the power-sharing government remained in place since the moderate Hutu, Bernard Makuza, continued to serve as Prime Minister. As agreed to in the accord, MDR received the prime minister position--though since the MDR was disbanded prior to the elections, he changed his party affiliation to RPF.

Executive Branch Reform

PROTOCOL OF AGREEMENT ON POWER-SHARING WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A BROAD-BASED TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA AND THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT (9 JANUARY 1993)

Article 4

The Executive power shall be exercised collectively through decisions taken in Cabinet meetings, by the President of the Republic and by the Government.

Implementation History
1993

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1994

Intermediate Implementation

According to the UN Secretary General’s report, a broad-based government of national unity was installed on 19 July 1994 and established control over the Rwandan territory.1 Although the national unity government was in place in 1994, this does not indicate that the reforms agreed in the Arusha accord of 1993 were fully implemented. The president and the victorious RPF dominated government activities and unilaterally assumed the cabinet posts previously allocated to the MRND, then in exile. The RPF also created a powerful post of vice-president not mentioned in the Arusha Accords and occupied by RPF leader Paul Kagame, who simultaneously served as minister of defense. The accord requires a counter signature by the Prime Minister in bills passed by the legislature.

  • 1. "Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1994/1133), October 6, 1994)
1995

Intermediate Implementation

The National Unity Government was in place between July 1994 and 2003 (2003 being the last year of observation in the database). The government had finalized an eight point program in July 1994 forming the basis of the agenda of the National Unity Government, to which the prime minister, in September 1995, said still committed.2 On 8 March 2000, Prime Minister Pierre-Celestin Rwigema resigned on charges of corruption and was replaced by Bertrand Makuza from the same political party (MRD).3 Similarly, on 23 March 2000, Rwanda's Hutu President, Pasteur Bizimungu--in power for almost five years since the genocide of 1994, resigned, thus paving the way for the accession of Vice President and Defense Minister Paul Kagame, who led the RPF rebel force and established it as a more powerful actor on the Rwandan political stage.4 Although the National Unity Government was in place, the reforms sought in the executive branch of the government were not implemented, partly because the president and the prime minister functioned as ceremonial heads of the state and the government, respectively, while real power resided with the defense minister and vice president, Paul Kagame.

On 29 September 2003, elections for National Assembly took place in which RPF won 40, PSD 7, PL 6. The National Assembly was comprised of only 53 seats.5 This effectively ended the power-sharing legislature and provided for increased political influence by the RPF, a former rebel group.

  • 2. "New Prime Minister Says He Will Continue With Government Programme," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 4, 1995
  • 3. "Mazuka Appointed Rwanda Premier," Associated Press Online, March 8, 2000
  • 4. "Rwanda's Post-Genocide Hutu President Quits," Agence France Presse, March 23, 2000
  • 5. "The World Factbook-2003," CIA, 2003, accessed September 11, 2011, http://www.theodora.com/wfb2003/rwanda/rwanda_government.html.
1996

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2002

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

Legislative Branch Reform

Article 9

The "Conseil National de developpement" (CND) shall remain in Office until the Transitional National Assembly is established. However, as from date of signing the Peace Agreement, it shall not enact laws.

Implementation History
1993

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1994

Full Implementation

The Arusha Accords created a multi-party Transitional National Assembly to replace the single-party National Council for Development. After taking power, the RPF installed a power-sharing Transitional National Assembly which was established on 25 November 1994. Of the 70 seats in the National Assembly, the RPF had 19, the MDR 13, the PSD 13, the PL 13, the PDC six, the PSR two, the PDI two, and the final two seats went to other parties.1 The 11 MRND seats were redistributed among various parties but six seats were kept for the army, a decision not provided for by Arusha. This multi-party Transitional National Assembly continued until the composition of the assembly was rebalanced. In the rebalanced Transitional National Assembly, the MDR had 13 seats, the PSD 13, the PL 13, the PDC six, the RPA six, the PSR two, the PDI two, and the other two seats went to other parties.2

1995

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

postscript: Elections for the National Assembly took place on 29 September 2003 and brought with them the termination of the tenure of the Transitional National Assembly.

Constitutional Reform

Article 3

The two parties also agree that the Constitution of 10th June, 1991 and the Arusha Peace Agreement shall constitute indissolubly the Fundamental Law that shall govern the Country during the Transition period, taking into account the following provisions:

Implementation History
1993

No Implementation

Constitutional reform did not take place in 1993.

1994

No Implementation

Constitutional reform did not take place in 1994.

1995

Intermediate Implementation

On 5 May 1995, Rwanda adopted a new constitution. The new constitution consisted of: 1. Constitutional items singled out from the constitution of 10 June 1991; 2. The Arusha peace agreement, signed on 4 August 1993; 3. The RPF [Rwandan Patriotic Front] declaration of 17 July 1994 establishing national institutions; 4. The agreement signed on 24th November 1994 between political parties which were not implicated in the previous year’s genocide; In a 57 member national assembly, 55 members voted in favor of the new constitution and two abstained; The Arusha peace accord was part of the new constitution, but the new constitution also included RPF’s declaration of July 1994 and the protocol agreement of November 1994.

1996

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1997

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1998

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

In 2000, the constitutional drafting commission was established and the constitution drafting process began in Rwanda. The participation of citizens in the process was encouraged and, in this regard, the prime minister called on local leaders to play a role in sensitizing and mobilizing the population towards full participation in the ongoing constitution drafting process.1 Regarding the draft constitution, the commission also consulted prisoners and refugees in Tanzania and South Africa. The draft constitution was defined the system of government and was expected to be finished by July 2003.2

  • 1. "Constitution Needs Participation of All," Africa News, July 12, 2001.
  • 2. "New Constitution for Rwanda by July 2003: Report," Agence France Presse, September 18, 2001
2001

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2002

Intermediate Implementation

In November 2002, the constitutional commission put forward a draft constitution, according to which the transitional period (and under which the government of national unity had been governed since its establishment on 19 July 1994) was set to end in July of the following year.3

Postscript: A two day cabinet meeting was held in February 2003 to discuss the draft constitution. The president, who was presiding over the discussion, then handed over its findings to the national assembly for the national referendum scheduled for 25 May.4 The draft constitution was adopted by the assembly on 23 April 2003.5 In the referendum of 25 May 2003, the draft constitution was adopted with more than 90% voters supporting the proposed draft.6 Once the Rwandan Supreme Court approved the referendum result, president Kagame signed the new constitution which then came into effect on 4 June 2003.7 The RPF-led government implemented extensive gender-based reforms, including changing inheritance laws and property laws to increase women’s rights. The new constitution encouraged the election of many women to public office, particularly parliament.

  • 3. "New Constitution Stipulates Transitional Period to End in July 2003," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 13, 2002
  • 4. "President Opens Two-Day Cabinet Discussions of Draft Constitution," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 28, 2003.
  • 5. "World Briefing Africa: Rwanda: New Constitution," New York Times, April 24, 2003.
  • 6. "Rwanda Voters Approve Draft Constitution," Voice of America News, May 27, 2003.
  • 7. "Rwanda's New Constitution Comes Into Force," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 4, 2003
Inter-ethnic/State Relations

Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Rule of Law (18 August 1992.)

Article 2

Implementation History
1993

No Implementation

As a way out of ethnic conflict in Rwanda, the Arusha accord sought to eliminate ethnic identity and promote inter-ethnic reconciliations. In this regard, the accord called for the deletion of references to ethnic grouping in official documents, as well as a rejection of political ideology based on ethnic identity. No developments occured this year. 

1994

Intermediate Implementation

After the genocide, the national unity government eliminated all ethnic references from official documents. According to a news report, Mr. Kagame, the leader of the victorious rebel movement, said that both the personal identification card and official documents would contain no references to ethnic origins.1

  • 1. "Rwanda's Leaders Vow to Build a Multiparty State for Both Hutu and Tutsi," The New York Times, September 7, 1994
1995

Intermediate Implementation

The mention of ethnicity was officially removed from identity cards when the new government began to issue cards in 1995.2

  • 2. “Rwanda: Procedure for obtaining or replacing a national identification card including a description of the card and information on the 'attestation d'identité' signed by a burgomaster,” Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, June 14, 2007.
1996

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year. 

1997

Intermediate Implementation

It was reported that the Rwandan government continued to eliminate references to ethnic origin from state documents and national identity cards.3

1998

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year. 

1999

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year. 

2000

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year. 

2001

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year. 

2002

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

Postscript: Other reforms related to promoting inter-ethnic relations also took place. In these instances, radical ethnic parties were not invited to join the National Unity Government. The new constitution, which came into force in June 2003, did not only eradicate the ethnic divisions but also rendered propaganda based on ethnic origin punishable by law. The constitution eliminates discrimination based on ethnic identity as well as formation of political organization or party based on ethnic orientation.4

At the same time, some government policies continued to promote ethnic identification. Both the special genocide courts and gacaca courts tried only genocide crimes, and the determination of which crimes were considered genocide was based almost exclusively on ethnic identity. Furthermore, many regime critics have charged that the regime actively discriminates in favor of Tutsi, particularly returned former Tutsi refugees who constitute the core of RPF support. Laws banning ethnic identification make it impossible for people to complain publicly about ethnic discrimination lest they be accused of “divisionism” or supporting “ethnic ideology.”

Electoral/Political Party Reform

Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government (4 August 1993)

Article 61

Implementation History
1993

No Implementation

Provisions related to electoral or political party reform were designed to ensure inclusive politics with a Political Code of Ethics binding on all parties. No developments occured this year. 

1994

No Implementation

After the genocidal violence of 1994, Article 80 was interpreted as banning political parties based on ethnic identity. By banning parties formed based on ethnic identity, Rwanda enacted political reforms aimed at institutionalizing cross-cutting, multi-ethnic or secular political parties. This ban included the former President Habyarimana’s party, the National Revolutionary Movement for Development, and the extremist Hutu Coalition for the Defense of the Republic1 These changes would become part of the 1995 constitution. 

  • 1. "Some 2,000 Former Soldiers Train for Rwanda's New Military," Agence France Presse, October 15, 1994
1995

Intermediate Implementation

The electoral reform provisions of the Arusha Accord became part of the new constitution signed on May 5, 1995. The new constitution consisted of: 1. Constitutional items singled out from the constitution of 10 June 1991; 2. The Arusha peace agreement, signed on 4 August 1993; 3. The RPF [Rwandan Patriotic Front] declaration of 17 July 1994 establishing national institutions; 4. The agreement signed on 24th November 1994 between political parties which were not implicated in the previous year’s genocide; In a 57 member national assembly, 55 members voted in favor of the new constitution and two abstained; The Arusha peace accord was part of the new constitution, but the new constitution also included RPF’s declaration of July 1994 and the protocol agreement of November 1994.

1996

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year. 

1997

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year. 

1998

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year. 

1999

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year. 

2000

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year. 

2001

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year. 

2002

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed. 

Postscript: The transitional period was terminated in 2003 and the new constitution effectively bans ethnic parties in order to promote inter-ethnic and national reconciliation. Once the new constitution came into effect in June 2003, the elections were held based on party list proportional representation.2

Civil Administration Reform

Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons (9 June 1993)

Section 2: Administration and Security in the War Zones

Article 37

Implementation History
1993

No Implementation

The Arusha accord contained a provision for the reconstruction of the civil administration units in place before the conflict. No developments took place this year.

 

1994

Intermediate Implementation

According to the UN Secretary General’s report, the Rwandan government “required assistance in reestablishing system of administration, justice, police, finance, education and health and all other responsibilities a government must discharge”.1 In reestablishing the civil administration, the UNAMIR assisted the government. The southwestern zone was fully coordinated with the UNAMIR and the civil administration was restored. The government installed prefects at Kibuye, Gikongoro and Cyangugu.2

In September 1994, the Rwandan prime minister announced the eight-point program for national unity which included organizing the central, prefectural, communal, sector and cell administrations.3

  • 1. "UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1994/924), August 3, 1994
  • 2. "UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1994/1133), October 6, 1994.
  • 3. "The World Factbook-1996," CIA,1996, accessed September 11, 2011, http://www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/wofact96/211.htm.
1995

Intermediate Implementation

After the establishment of a national unity government and the transitional national assembly, some progress was made in terms of reinstalling administrative entities. According to a report from the UN Secretary General, the administration was mostly restored throughout the country as of February. Nevertheless, the report highlights the challenges a lack of resources presents to running an effective administration.4

Once the civil administration was restored, UNAMIR II provided technical support to various administrative units to start-up operations.5

  • 4. "UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1995/107),  February 6, 1995
  • 5. "UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council,"United Nation (S/1995/134), February 13, 1995.
1996

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year. 

1997

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year. 

1998

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year. 

1999

Intermediate Implementation

For the first time, local officials were elected at the cell and sector levels.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

In 2000, the government announced plans for decentralization and administrative reform.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

In 2001, there was a reorganization of the sub-regional administrative units, moving from 154 communes led by burgomasters to 92 districts plus 14 towns led by mayors. Prefectures governed by prefects were changed to provinces led by mayors but governed by an elected district council. The first district council elections were held in June 2001. Numerous government responsibilities were given to the districts and their sub-units known as sectors and cells, and the districts were to become largely self-financing.

2002

Intermediate Implementation

Civil administration elections were held in March 2002.6

  • 6. Emmanuel Ndahimana, “Rwanda Decentralization Assessment,” Kigali: USAID, July 2002
Truth or Reconciliation Mechanism

Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (9 January 1993)

Chapter IV: Specialised Commissions

Article 24

Implementation History
1993

No Implementation

No developments observed this year. 

1994

No Implementation

No developments observed this year. 

1995

No Implementation

No developments observed this year. 

1996

No Implementation

No developments observed this year. 

1997

Minimum Implementation

On 28 January 1997, a Presidential Decree (Number 25/01) was given to establish the National Commission For Unity And Reconciliation. 

1998

Minimum Implementation

Presidential Decree 25/01 was altered on 21 November 1998 in the cabinet meeting that adopted a legislation setting up a national commission for unity and reconciliation.1

  • 1. "Rwanda: Cabinet Approves Establishment of Commissions on Rights, Reconciliation," BBC Monitoring Africa, November 21, 1998.
1999

Full Implementation

Two years after the presidential decree, the NURC became operational in March 1999, by the law No. 03/99 of 12/03/99.2 The objective of the establishment of the commission was to both foster unity and reconciliation among the people of Rwanda and to promote ethnic reconciliations and human rights.

2000

Full Implementation

Once operational, the NURC was very active and its activities were followed and supported by the European Union.3 The commission actively engaged in organizing conferences throughout the country so that people would exchange ideas and together find solutions to a number of problems facing the country and also took charge of organizing ingando re-education camps for re-integrated soldiers, released prisoners, university students, government officials, and others.4

  • 3. "EU Provides 7.2m Euro To Support Justice System, Civil Society," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, December 14, 2000
  • 4. "Rwanda Holds National Conference on Unity and Reconciliation," Xinhua General News Service, October 18, 2000.
2001

Full Implementation

The NURC reportedly continued to make progress in its efforts to restore normalcy to the country following the 1994 genocide.5

  • 5. "Reconciliation Commission Making Progress, Says Official," Africa News, June 27, 2001
2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed this year. 

Postscript: As of 2003, the commission was active. While critics claim that the NURC had been used to try to promote unity around the RPF and its agenda not to truly promote reconciliations, the use of Gaçaca as a form of transitional justice and reconciliation can be seen as significant effort aimed towards reconciliations. Elections for Gaçaca judges were held in 2001 and the first sessions began in 2002 and fully completed in 2005.

Judiciary Reform

Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (9 January 1993)

Chapter V: The Judiciary: Section 1: General Principles

Article 25

Implementation History
1993

No Implementation

 The accord called for a separation of powers as a general principle and the creation of a competent and independent judiciary. No developments observed this year.

1994

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1995

Minimum Implementation

On 5 May 1995, Rwanda adopted a new constitution which dealt with judicial reform. As of October of 1995, however, it was reported that the judiciary was still non-functional.1 In the first move to revive the judicial system, the national assembly appointed six Supreme Court judges.2

  • 1. "Rwanda-Politics: Patching Up A Tattered Judiciary," IPS-Inter Press Service, October 24, 1995.
  • 2. "Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1995/1002), December 1, 1995.
1996

Intermediate Implementation

In 1996, the courts were operational. Genocide laws were adopted and enforced ex post facto in specially created genocide courts. 

1997

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1998

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

In 1999, the government announced plans to create Gaçaca genocide courts.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

In an effort to build the Rwandan judiciary into a professional and strong institution, the government adopted new merit-based recruitment policies in 2000.3

  • 3. "New Recruitment Policy Part of Overhaul Of Judiciary," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, March 30, 2000.
2001

Full Implementation

Elections for Gaçaca judges were held in 2001. A Rwandan Legal Reform Commission was established by law in July 2001. It was composed of Rwandans belonging to various professional and legal institutions, in particular the Supreme Court, the Ministry of Justice, the Public prosecution service, National University of Rwanda and members of the Bar Association.4 The recommendations of the commission were largely adopted by the government and have been integrated in the new constitution.

2002

Full Implementation

The first sessions for the election of judges began in 2002. In addition, a Commission for Legal Reform proposed a wide-ranging reorganization of the legal system in 2002 that combined elements of the Napoleonic and Common Law systems.

Military Reform

Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties (9 June 1993

The Government of the Republic of Rwanda on the one hand, and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the other;

Agree on the following provisions on the integration of the Armed Forces of the two parties:

Implementation History
1993

No Implementation

No military reforms took place in 1993. 

1994

No Implementation

Rwanda’s armed forces were an estimated 30,000 strong when genocidal violence erupted in 1994. The military strength increased to 70,000 in 2002 and dropped to 33,000 as of 2007.1

The Arusha accord of 1993 contained several provisions for military reform including the composition of the armed forces. According to the accord, government forces were to comprise 60% of the new force and the RPF were to comprise 40%. The proposed armed force was said to be 13,000 strong. After the genocide of 1994, most of the members of Armed Force of Rwanda fled to the Democratic Republic of Congo. The victorious rebel group Rwandan Patriotic Front’s armed wing Rwandan Patriotic Army became the Rwandan Defense Forces on July 19, 1994. This was formally institutionalized in the law N° 19/2002 of 17/05/2002.2

1995

No Implementation

No developments observed this year. 

1996

No Implementation

No developments observed this year. 

1997

Intermediate Implementation

Although the military reform started in Rwanda with the signing of Arusha Accord in 1993, the actual reform was not in line with the Arusha Accord. Reform was, for the most part, domestically driven as tensions arose between the Government of National Unity and international actors i.e. France, U.N. Peacekeeping, who had previously failed to respond to the genocide. The Rwandan government started to reduce the size of the military in response to pressure from international donor agencies in 1997.3 This phase began in September 1997 and continued until February 2001 and involved the demobilization of 18,692 soldiers from the Rwandan army (RPA), 2,364 of whom were child soldiers. In this phase, some 15,000 ex-FAR combatants were integrated into the RPA and approximately 15,000 settled in Rwanda. Even if the overall objective of the RDRP Stage I was to reduce the size of the armed force to an economically sustainable level, the integration of the ex-FRA made the change economically insignificant.4

  • 3. "Rwanda Starts Demobilization," Saint Paul Pioneer Press (Minnesota), September 30, 1997.
  • 4. "The Second Stage of Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (RDRP Stage II)," RDRC, 2002.
1998

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2002

Intermediate Implementation

In an effort to reform the military, the government enacted a law (no. 19/2002) on 17 May 2002 that called for the demobilization of members of Rwandan Defense Force, Former Armed Force of Rwanda, and other formerly armed groups. When the law was enacted in 2002, the RDA controlled 51,000 armed personnel. Through the RDRP Stage II, 22,000 Rwandan Defense Force members were expected to be demobilized resulting in a smaller and more professionalized armed force. As of June 2008, 22,362 RDF soldiers were demobilized exceeding their target.5 This reform initiative was supported by World Bank, DFID, GTZ and Multi Donor Trust Fund, African Union and the government of Rwanda.6

The Rwandan armed force is now an integrated and reformed armed force. Yet, it did not meet the 13,000 personnel goal as agreed to in the Arusha Accord of 1993.

Police Reform

Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties (9 June 1993)

Section 5: Collaboration between the National Gendarmerie and the Communal Police

Article 146

Implementation History
1993

No Implementation

The Arusha Accord of 1993 called for several limited police reforms. The accord called for the National Gendarmerie, or military police, under the Ministry of Interior to be in charge of training the Communal Police (Local Police). The language of article 146 suggests that the local police would recieve some of the same training as the National Gendarmerie. Local police may also work with the military police on security matters to maintain public order and security. However, the local police, not the military police, would enforce laws at the local level. No reforms along these lines were reported in 1993.

1994

No Implementation

No organizational reforms concerning the police consistent with article 146 took place this year. 

1995

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1996

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1997

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1998

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

Prior to 1999, the National Unity Government apparently renegotiated the nature of police reforms that were needed and decided to unify all police forces in the country, which is within their mandate in the accord. In 1999, the Rwandan parliament passed a law establishing a national police force which integrated the national gendarmerie, the communal police, and judicial police.1

  • 1. "Parliament Passes Law Establishing National Police Force," BBC Monitoring Africa, August 21, 1999.
2000

Intermediate Implementation

 A head of the newly formed national police force was appointed in February 2000.2 Another piece of legislation concerning the Rwandan National Police (RNP) was passed under Law No. 09/2000 of June 16, 2000. This law combined further or officially joined the former Gendarmerie Nationale, which was under the Ministry of Defense, with the former Communal Police under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Judicial Police under the Ministry of Justice. 

  • 2. "Head of Newly-Formed Police, Other Top Security Officials Appointed," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, February 16, 2000.
2001

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2002

Intermediate Implementation

The personnel of the newly-formed force went through training and some 3,000 officers underwent classes on human rights.3

Postscript: A political training school was developed in Gishali and National Police Academy was set up in Ruhengeri in 2004.4 Community Partnership Programs and Community Partnership Committees were established at the neighborhood level and any unacceptable police behavior was recorded and communicated to the police hierarchy. The Police Training School was designed to professionalize the police service through the provision of basic training. The National Police Academy immediately removed officers from the force if any form of misconduct was detected. Police units with a Women’s Desk were established.5

Demobilization

Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties (9 June 1993)

Paragraph 3: Disengagement of Forces. Definitions.

Article 55: Definitions

Implementation History
1993

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1994

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1995

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1996

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1997

Intermediate Implementation

Rwanda’s DDR proceeded in two different phases. In the first phase, which began in September 1997 and lasted until February 2001, 18,692 soldiers from the Rwandan army (RPA) - 2,364 of whom were child soldiers and 15,000 of whom were former members of Former Rwandan Armed Force - were demobilized.1

  • 1. "The Second Stage of Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (RDRP Stage II)," RDRC, 2002.
1998

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year. 

1999

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year. 

2000

Intermediate Implementation

No developments observed this year. 

2001

Intermediate Implementation

The second phase of demobilization started in December 2001 and ended in December 2008. In this phase, a total of 20,000 ex-combatants from RPA/RDF and 12,500 members of armed groups were expected to be demobilized. By the end of March 2008, 22,362 RDF were demobilized, thereby exceeding the target number. However, out of the 12,500, only 6,397 ex-combatants from armed groups including 661 child combatants were demobilized.2 Those mobilized received insertion benefits and reintegration allowances.

  • 2. "DDR-Rwanda, January-March 2008," Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, 4, accessed September 19, 2011, www.rdrc.org.rw.
Disarmament

Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties (9 June 1993)

Article 67: Definition of Heavy Weapons

Implementation History
1993

No Implementation

There was no active DDR process to hand over weapons this year.

1994

No Implementation

There was no active DDR process to hand over weapons this year.

1995

No Implementation

There was no active DDR process to hand over weapons this year.

1996

No Implementation

There was no active DDR process to hand over weapons this year.

1997

Intermediate Implementation

Rwanda’s DDR began in 1997 and proceeded in two different phases. In the first phase, which began in September 1997 and lasted until February 2001, 18,692 soldiers from the Rwandan army (RPA) - 2,364 of whom were child soldiers and 15,000 of whom were former members of Former Rwandan Armed Force - were demobilized.1 No estimates were given on the specific number of weapons turned in by troops.  

  • 1. "The Second Stage of Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (RDRP Stage II)," RDRC, 2002.
1998

Intermediate Implementation

The DDR program continued.

1999

Intermediate Implementation

The DDR program continued.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

The DDR program continued until 2001. The Rwandan government sought the disarmament of Hutu militias who remained in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.2 

  • 2. "Rwanda Says No Withdrawal from Congo Without Disarmament of Hutu Militia", Associated Press, November 14, 2000.
2001

Intermediate Implementation

The second phase of demobilization started in December 2001 and ended in December 2008. In this phase, a total of 20,000 ex-combatants from RPA/RDF and 12,500 members of other armed groups were expected to be demobilized. By the end of March 2008, 22,362 RDF were demobilized, thereby exceeding the target number. Another 6,397 ex-combatants from other armed groups including 661 child combatants were demobilized.3 Those mobilized received insertion benefits and reintegration allowances. Turning in arms was part of the DDR processes, but many produced no weapon. No estimates were given on the specific number of weapons turned in by troops.  

  • 3. "DDR-Rwanda,"Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, January-March 2008, 4, accessed September 19, 2011, www.rdrc.org.rw.
2002

Intermediate Implementation

The DDR program continued until 2008.

Postscript: It was reported that Rwanda destroyed 6,000 small arms in late 2004.4

Reintegration

Sub-Section 2: Specific Modalities for Demobilization per Categories of the Personnel to be Demobilized

Article 155

The personnel having the means to take care of their own integration into civil life shall be discharged upon completion of usual formalities.

Article 156

Implementation History
1993

No Implementation

There were no active reintegration programs this year.

1994

No Implementation

There were no active reintegration programs this year. 

1995

No Implementation

There were no active reintegration programs this year. 

1996

No Implementation

There were no active reintegration programs this year. 

1997

Minimum Implementation

Rwanda’s overall DDR process proceeded in two different phases. In the first phase, which began in September 1997 and lasted until February 2001, 18,692 soldiers from the Rwandan army (RPA) - 2,364 of whom were child soldiers and 15,000 of whom were former members of Former Rwandan Armed Force - were demobilized.1

The state’s first reintegration program was reportedly not successful. According to the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, only a small proportion of disabled ex-combatants received any kind of medical rehabilitation, no reintegration benefits were available for the 15,000 ex-FAR combatants who were demobilized. Demobilized RPA combatants received some reintegration support.2

  • 1. "The Second Stage of Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (RDRP Stage II)," RDRC, 2002.
  • 2. Ibid, 7.
1998

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1999

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2000

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2001

Minimum Implementation

The second phase of demobilization started in December of 2001 and ended in December of 2008. In this phase, a total of 20,000 ex-combatants from RPA/RDF and 12,500 members of armed groups were expected to be demobilized. By the end of March 2008, 22,362 RDF were demobilized, thereby exceeding the target number. However, out of the 12,500, only 6,397 ex-combatants from armed groups were demobilized.3 Those mobilized received insertion benefits and reintegration allowances.

The reintegration had economic and social dimensions and was carried out in two distinct phases. Under economic reintegration, combatants received counseling, financial support and formal and informal education. Ex-combatants also received reintegration grants and tool kits. Under the social reintegration phase, activities related to supporting family network and creating informal networks of ex-combatants were carried out in order to develop informal networks.4

2002

Intermediate Implementation

According to several 2008 reports, around 43,669 ex-combatants received reintegration support in the second phase which spanned from 2002 to 2008.5

  • 5. "MDRP-Supported Activities in Rwanda," Multi Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, accessed September 19, 2011, http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/MDRP_RWA_FS_1108.pdf; A. Caramés, “Rwanda (RDRC, 2001-2008),” in Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes in the World during 2008, ed. A. Caramés and E. Sanz (Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace, 2009), 101-108.
Prisoner Release

N'sele Cease-fire Agreement between the Government of the Rwandese Republic and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (12 July 1992)

Article II

The cease-fire shall imply:

4. The release of all prisoners-of-war; the effective release of all persons arrested because and as a result of this war within five days following the entry into force of the Cease-fire Agreement;

Implementation History
1993

No Implementation

 No POWs were reported as being released this year.

1994

No Implementation

No POWs were reported as being released this year. Rwandan Minister for Rehabilitation, Mr Jacques Bihozagoro told reporters that "the Government was holding some soldiers loyal to the former regime as prisoners of war but could not provide an accurate number."1

  • 1. "Lady Chalker flies into Rwanda as the cholera toll continues to rise. Britain backs new regime with £10m," The Herald (Glasgow)July 27, 1994.
1995

No Implementation

No POWs were reported as being released this year.

1996

No Implementation

No POWs were reported as being released this year.

1997

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1998

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1999

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2000

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2001

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2002

No Implementation

No further developments observed.

Human Rights

Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Rule of Law (18 August 1992)

Article 1

Implementation History
1993

No Implementation

The Arusha Accord of 1993 contained three main stipulations regarding human rights: (1) the establishment of a National Commission on Human Rights; (2) the establishment of an International Commission of Enquiry to investigate human rights violations committed during the war; and (3) the ratification of major international human rights treaties. 

None of these stipulations were fulfilled in 1993. 

1994

No Implementation

None of these stipulations were fulfilled in 1994. On April 6, 1994, Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana is killed when his plane is shot down. On April 7, Hutu extremists begin killing their political opponents in violence which escalates to genocide. In July 1994, RPF takes control of the government and the genocide ends.

1995

No Implementation

None of the stipulations regarding human rights were fulfilled this year. 

1996

No Implementation

None of the stipulations regarding human rights were fulfilled this year. 

1997

Minimum Implementation

One of the provisions of the Arusha Accord was to establish a National Human Rights Commission. In November 1997, a presidential decree was given to establish the commission and a law was passed in December of 1997. The commission was not operational and no members were appointed in 1997.2

1998

Minimum Implementation

In 1998, the Rwandan government passed a law making the National Commission for Human Rights a permanent and independent entity.4

  • 4. "Cabinet Approves Establishment of Commissions on Rights, Reconciliation", BBC Monitoring Africa, November 21, 1998
1999

Minimum Implementation

In 1999 the National Commission for Human Rights was formally established and became operational.6

  • 6. "Premier Outlines Government's Achievements," BBC Monitoring Africa, July 16, 1999.
2000

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2001

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2002

Intermediate Implementation

In 2002 the government ratified two international treaties on human rights. The first was the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which involves children in armed conflict. Subsequently, on 14 March, 2002, the government ratified the CRC Optional Protocol Sale of Children 2000.1

Refugees

Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Rule of Law (18 August 1992)

Article 4

Implementation History
1993

No Implementation

None of the articles in the Arusha Accord related to the repatriation of refugees were implemented in 1993. 

1994

Intermediate Implementation

On April 6, 1994, Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana is killed when his plane is shot down and Hutu extremists begin killing their political opponents. In late April, approximately 250,000 Tutsi flee to neighboring Tanzania. In July, approximately one million people, mostly Hutu, begin fleeing to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. By the end of the genocide, an estimated two million people had fled to neighboring countries and an estimated three million were internally displaced.1 In late October, there were an estimated 1.2 million Rwandan refugees in Zaire, 270,000 in Burundi, and over 500,000 in Tanzania.2

The repatriation of refugees began in 1994 with the establishment of the transitional government. Between August and September 1994, an estimated 200,000 refugees returned to Rwanda. Those attempting to return in later months, however, were interrupted due to militia activities. During the same period, some 400,000 refugees (mainly of Tutsi origin, who were in exile in Uganda and Burundi) returned to Rwanda. They settled on lands which had belonged to those who recently had fled creating additional problems related to property rights.3 

The transitional government in its eight point program reiterated that one of its main goals was the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons.4 After the establishment of the transitional government, the Minister for Rehabilitation and Social Integration met with representatives of various NGOs and UN organizations and informed them that all agencies were free to move in all areas of Rwanda.5 A Commission for Repatriation, as called for in the Arusha Accord, was not established in 1994.

By the end of 1994, according to the UNHCR, 1,208,005 refugees had returned to Rwanda.6 

  • 1. "UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1994/924), August 3, 1994
  • 2. "World Report-Rwanda,"Human Rights Watch, 1995,  accessed September 22, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/WR95/AFRICA-08.htm#P397_139563.
  • 3. "UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1994/1308), November 18, 1994.
  • 4. "UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1995/107), February 6, 1995.
  • 5. "Roads And Airport in Rwanda Open to All Relief Agencies," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 28, 1994.
  • 6. "2002-UNHCR Statistical Yearbook-Rwanda," UNHCR, 2004, accessed August 19, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/414ad5a50.html
1995

Intermediate Implementation

The government of Rwanda signed tripartite agreements with UNHCR and the Governments of Burundi and Zaire respectively on the voluntary repatriation of refugees. These agreements defined the conditions for repatriation including returnee protection and land tenure.7 On 18 July 1995, an agreement was signed to establish the tripartite commission of reparation of Rwandese Refugees from Tanzania between the Tanzanian government, the Rwandan government, and the UNHCR representative. The agreement contained provisions for four delegations representing Rwanda, Tanzania, UNHCR and the Organization of the African Unity.8

It was estimated that in January 1995 there were approximately 200,000 refugees in Burundi, 600,000 in Tanzania and 1.4 million in Zaire.9 It was estimated that between 25% to 50% of refugees could return to Rwanda in the next 6 to 12 months.10 UNHCR and the rehabilitation and social integration ministry worked to improve the security sitution for returnees.11

The security situation was said to be hindering the resettlement of IDPs and the increased screening by the Rwandan authorities of the refugees had slowed the repatriation process. A tripartite commission involving the UNHCR, Tanzania and Rwanda took place in September and measures were agreed upon for starting large-scale repatriation of more than 600,000 Rwandan refugees in Tanzania.12 By the end of the year, only 240,698 refugees from neighboring countries had returned.13

  • 7. "UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1995/65), January 25, 1995.
  • 8. "Tripartite Commission of Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees From Tanzania," UNHCR, 1995, accessed September 22, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/type,MULTILATERALTREATY,,RWA,3ee71f004,0.html.
  • 9. "UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1995/65), January 25, 1995.
  • 10. "UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1995/65), January 25, 1995.
  • 11. "Rwanda UNHCR to Set up Refugee Repatriation," Africa News, September 26, 1995.
  • 12. "UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1995/848), October 7, 1995.
  • 13. "2002-UNHCR Statistical Yearbook-Rwanda," UNHCR, 2004, accessed August 19, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/414ad5a50.html.
1996

Intermediate Implementation

It was reported that roughly half of a million people returned to Rwanda during the week of 18 November 1996 after the RPF and the ADFL attacked refugee camps in eastern Congo.14 In 1996, according to the UNHCR statistical record, 1,410,782 refugees returned to Rwanda.15 Most Rwandan refugees in various camps in Tanzania had returned by the end of the year.16 The returnees were directed by Gen. Kagame to settle in unoccupied regions in Rwanda.17

  • 14. "An Update on the Refugees from Rwanda," NPR, November 18, 1996.
  • 15. "2002-UNHCR Statistical Yearbook-Rwanda," UNHCR, 2004, accessed August 19, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/414ad5a50.html.
  • 16. "Rwanda Says All Its Refugees Now Returned From Tanzania," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 30, 1996.
  • 17. "Rwanda's Kagame Suggests Returning Refugees Should Settle in Unoccupied Areas," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 18, 1996.
1997

Full Implementation

By the end of the year, 220,454 refugees returned to Rwanda18 It was reported that Zairian rebels had blocked aid workers from entering refugee camps, raising fears that 100,000 Rwandan refugees might flee the camps into the forests.19 Aid workers reported on 23 April 1997 that approximately 55,000 refugees had fled the camps after battles between Zairian rebels and renegade Rwandan soldiers.20 In December 1997, Hutu rebels attacked a camp for Tutsi refugees in northwestern Rwanda killing up to 200 refugees.21

  • 18. "2002-UNHCR Statistical Yearbook-Rwanda," UNHCR, 2004, accessed August 19, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/414ad5a50.html.
  • 19. "Zairian Rebels Block Rwanda Refugees' Aid," Akron Beacon Journal (Ohio), April 22, 1997.
  • 20. "U.N. Team Find that Rwanda Refugees Have Fled Largest Camp," Associated Press, April 24, 1997.
  • 21. "Up to 200 Tutsi Refugees Killed at Camp in Rwanda," Associated Press, December 11, 1997.
1998

Full Implementation

The repatriation of refugees slowed in 1998 with some 10,939 refugees returning to Rwanda.22

1999

Full Implementation

The UNHCR reported the return of some 38,420 refugees to Rwanda in 1999.23

2000

Full Implementation

Resettlement continued with 26,262 returnees in 2000.24

2001

Full Implementation

Resettlement continued with 21,565 returnees in 2001.25

2002

Full Implementation

Resettlement continued with 38, 643 returnees in 2002.26

Internally Displaced Persons

Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons (9 June 1993)

Article 44

Implementation History
1993

No Implementation

Provisions related to the resettlement of IDPs in the Arusha Accord were not implemented in 1993.  

1994

No Implementation

The genocidal violence of 1994 produced massive waves of displacement. By the end of the genocide, an estimated 2 million people had fled to neighboring countries and an estimated 3 million were internally displaced.1 In late October there were an estimated 1.2 million Rwandan refugees in Zaire, 270,000 in Burundi, and over 500,000 in Tanzania.2 At the end of 1994, there were 2-3 million people displaced. The largest portion sought refuge in the French-controlled Zone Tourquoise in south-west Rwanda. Most of these were Hutu who fled the RPF. When the French pulled out, the IDPs remained in large camps. The transitional government in its eight point program reiterated that one of its main goals was the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons.3 

  • 1. "UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1994/924), August 3, 1994.
  • 2. "World Report-Rwanda," Human Rights Watch, 1995, accessed September 22, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/WR95/AFRICA-08.htm#P397_139563.
  • 3. "UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1995/107), February 6, 1995.
1995

No Implementation

In April 1995, the UN Officials started to close the IDP camps, which initiative was supported by the government. The first operation was launched on 18 April 1995 when the army surrounded Kibeho camp. The government maintained the position that the internal security had improved significantly and therefore the IDPs should return to their communities. To force the IDPs out of the camp, the government adopted a strategy of not providing food to IDPs, it also deployed the army in the camps.4 As such, the RPF sought to close the camps and eventually turned to force. In April 1995, RPF troops opened fire on IDPs at Kibeho, killing several thousand people.

  • 4. "Rwanda; Rehabilitation Minister Discusses Strategy of Closing Displaced Persons' Camps," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 20, 1995.
1996

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1997

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1998

Minimum Implementation

In 1998, the government had started the task of resettling thousands of IDPs in Ruhengeri Prefecture. The IDPs received food items and farming implements.5 The UNHCR, however, reported some 625,000 new IDPs in 1998.6 

  • 5. "Rwanda Begins Resettling Thousands of Villagers in Northwest," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 28, 1998.
  • 6. "2002-UNHCR Statistical Yearbook-Rwanda," UNHCR, 2004, accessed 19 August 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/414ad5a50.html.
1999

Intermediate Implementation

The UNHCR reported the return of some 625,000 IDPs in 1998.7 The organization also reported 38,420 refugees’ return from Zaire.8 

2000

Intermediate Implementation

From 2000 onward, there were no further developments on IDPs reported. 

2001

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2002

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

Citizenship Reform

Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons (9 June 1993)

Article 7

The principle of dual citizenship is hereby accepted. The laws governing the Rwandese citizenship shall be reviewed accordingly.

Implementation History
1993

No Implementation

No legal changes concerning dual citizenship were made this year. 

1994

No Implementation

No legal changes concerning dual citizenship were made this year. 

1995

No Implementation

No legal changes concerning dual citizenship were made this year. 

1996

No Implementation

No legal changes concerning dual citizenship were made this year. 

1997

No Implementation

No legal changes concerning dual citizenship were made this year. 

1998

No Implementation

No legal changes concerning dual citizenship were made this year. 

1999

No Implementation

No legal changes concerning dual citizenship were made this year.

2000

No Implementation

No legal changes concerning dual citizenship were made this year.

2001

No Implementation

No legal changes concerning dual citizenship were made this year.

2002

Full Implementation

Parliament included dual citizenship provision in the draft constitution. "A first draft constitution was published in November 2002, followed by new versions in December 2002 and February 2003."1.

The new constitution was approved by referendum on 26 May 2003. Article 7 of the 2003 constitution provided that:

Every person has a right to nationality. Dual nationality is permitted. No person may be deprived of Rwandan nationality of origin. No person shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her nationality or of the right to change nationality. Rwandans or their descendants who were deprived of their nationality between 1st November 1959 and 31 December 1994 by reason of acquisition of foreign nationalities automatically reacquire Rwandan nationality if they return to settle in Rwanda. All persons originating from Rwanda and their descendants shall, upon their request, be entitled to Rwandan nationality. The conditions of acquisition, retention, enjoyment and deprivation of Rwandan nationality are determined by an organic law.

  • 1. Reyntjens, Filip. "Political governance in post-genocide Rwanda." Cambridge University Press, 2013, page 29
Economic and Social Development

Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Rule of Law (18 August 1992)

Article 9

In order to promote and consolidate the democratic system as described above, the two parties undertake to work for social, economic and cultural development of the country and to fight hunger, ignorance, poverty and disease.

Implementation History
1993

No Implementation

The broad based Commission for the Repatriation composed of Government, UNHCR, OAU and Refugee representatives was not set up. As the result, the basic socioeconomic infrastructures such as schools, health centers, water, access roads which were said to be established by the commission did not materialized. The restoration of socio-economic services as reinstalling administration did not take place.

1994

No Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1995

Minimum Implementation

For the settlement of the refugees, the broad based Commission for Repatriation composed of Government, UNHCR, OAU and Refugee representatives was not set up. However, the Rwandan government signed tripartite agreements with UNHCR and the Governments of Burundi and Zaire on the voluntary repatriation of refugees. These agreements define the conditions for repatriation, including returnee protection and land tenure.1 On 18 July 1995, an agreement was signed to establish the tripartite commission of reparation of Rwandese Refugees from Tanzania between Tanzanian government, Rwandan government and the UNHCR representative. The agreement had provisions for four delegation representing Rwanda, Tanzania, UNHCR and the Organization of the African Unity.2 The rehabilitation and social integration ministry was committed for providing security and protection to returnees.3 Since the civil administration was reestablished. Nevertheless, the report highlights the challenges related to lack of resources to run an effective administration.4

Some progress was made to achieve economic goals as provided in the Arusha accord. In this regard, the Rwandan government had set up a commission to start reviving the People’s Bank. The bank had been initially was set up in 1975 and it had branches in 131 of Rwanda’s 154 communes by early 1994. The infrastructure was destroyed by the conflict in 1994. The revival of the bank was a key to starting recovery of farming and rural economic activities.5

There was sign of economic recovery in the export sector as well. It was reported that farmers in tea growing districts were reviving their plantations, traditionally a hard currency earner, and foreign aid had supported initiatives to repair war-damaged factories.6 Financial supports provided by the European Union ($24.3 Million) had been distributed to rehabilitate buildings, plantations, technical training of staffs, and improving transport.7 In a sense, the economic recovery was underway.

  • 1. "UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1995/65), January 25, 1995.
  • 2. "Tripartite Commission of Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees From Tanzania," UNHCR, 1995, accessed September 22, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/type,MULTILATERALTREATY,,RWA,3ee71f004,0.html.
  • 3. "Rwanda UNHCR to Set Up Refugee Repatriation," Africa News, September 26, 1995.
  • 4. "UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1995/107), February 6, 1995.
  • 5. "Rwanda-Economy: Infusing New Blood in the People's Banks," IPS-Inter Press Service, October 26, 1995.
  • 6. Rwanda-Economy: Brewing Tea Recovery," IPS-Inter Press Service, November 29, 1995.
  • 7. Ibid.
1996

Intermediate Implementation

Almost all civil administration infrastructures were restored throughout Rwanda, which facilitated a gradual repatriation of refugees. In terms of recovery, the Rwandan economy bounced back to the pre-genocide level as reported by the International Monetary Fund.7 According to the news report, some 60 to 70 per cent of enterprises in the tertiary sector, for instance, had re-opened and were thriving as of 1996. Nevertheless, to rebuild its economy, the Rwandan Government needed more than 800 million USD in the years 1996-1998.8

  • 7. "Rwanda: Ravaged Country's Economy Bounces Back," IPS-Inter Press Service, January 24, 1996.
  • 8. "Rwanda; More than 800m US Dollars Needed to Revive Economy," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 24, 1996.
1997

Intermediate Implementation

Rwanda remained heavily indebted with more than 1 billion in foreign debt or 91% of its GDP.9 Nevertheless, Rwanda made efforts to restore the situation to normal by stabilizing society, rehabilitating the judicial system and rebuilding the economy.10 Donor countries and international development agencies were providing rebuilding support throughout the year.

  • 9. "Rwanda: Review 1997," Africa Review World of Information, February 1997.
  • 10. "Albright Arrives in Rwanda, Holds Talks with President Bizimungu," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 13, 1997.
1998

Intermediate Implementation

It was reported that the consolidation of government authority contributed to the economic recovery. The real GDP recovery was 13 percent, which was a rise of 76 per cent in comparison to the pre-war period.11 The relatively improved security situation in the countryside allowed the government to expand its revenue bases. The rebuilding of plantations and favorable international market for tea and coffee helped to generate much needed foreign reserve. In this regard, government also planned to boost trade and commerce and for this purpose export tariffs were reduced. To protect local industry, imports of locally produced goods were heavily taxed.12

In April 1998, the Rwandan government announced a three-year growth plan that included fiscal, monetary and structural reforms to the Rwandan economy, including the overhaul of its tax system to increase revenue. The reforms was expected to overhaul Rwanda’s public services through retrenchment , and measures to encourage domestic private sector investment to help rebuild infrastructure.13

  • 11. "Rwanda: Finance Minister Discusses 1998 Budget, Tax Policy," BBC Monitoring Africa, January 16, 1998.
  • 12. "Rwanda: Africa Review 1998," Africa Review World of Information, March 1998.
  • 13. "Rwanda Announces New Three-Year Growth Plan," Business Day, April 16, 1998.
1999

Intermediate Implementation

Some progress was made in terms of rebuilding social and economic infrastructure. The African Development Fund financed 91 percent of the Rehabilitation of Health Infrastructure project. The economy grew gradually but a reliance on commodity exports was met by repressed prices in the world market. The agriculture sector continued to be the primary export earner. The government was also mulling over plans to exploit natural resources such as natural gas under Lake Kivu with estimated reserve of more than 50bn cu meters.14

  • 14. "Rwanda: Country Profile," Africa Review World of Information, July 1999.
2000

Intermediate Implementation

Little information is available. Nevertheless, the economy grew at the rate of 6 per cent in 1999 compared to 8 per cent in 1998.15 Poverty and AIDS were hindering the Rwanda’s economic rebuilding initiatives.

  • 15. "Kagame: Poverty, AIDS Harm Rwanda," Associated Press Online, September 11, 2000.
2001

Intermediate Implementation

The government’s program of rebuilding social and economic infrastructure continued in 2001. Much of the activities were supported by funding from donor agencies. According to a report, macroeconomic performance during 2001 was strong. A growth in manufacturing, construction, transportation, and communications activities was reported.16

  • 16. "IMF Approves A Three-Year, USD5m PRGF Arrangement for Rwanda," M2 PRESSWIRE, August 13, 2002.
2002

Intermediate Implementation

The government’s program of rebuilding social and economic infrastructure continued in 2002. Much of the activities were supported by funding from donor agencies. In this regard, the IMF provided financial support Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) programs, which contributed rebuilding economic and social infrastructure.17

Not much information available on economic activities. However, donor agencies and countries continued to help to rebuild socio-economic infrastructure of the country. In 2003, the transitional phase ended with the holding of the election for the president and the national assembly in which Kagame was elected president and his party the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) won the majority of seats in the assembly.18

  • 17. Ibid.
  • 18. "Rwanda; 'Rwandans United For a New Era' - President Kagame's Inagural Address," Africa News, September 15, 2003.
Donor Support

The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons (9 June 1993)

Sub-Section 6: Implementation of the Overall Programme of Repatriation

Article 31

Implementation History
1993

No Implementation

The Arusha Accord asked for donor supports to implement the repatriation program as well as for rebuilding war-shattered economy. Unrelated to the repatriation program, the UN appealed for aid to Rwanda to help nearly 1 million people at risk of starvation.1 Further information on funding is not available.

  • 1. "UN Appeals for Aid to Rwanda, Warns of Donor Fatigue," Associated Press, April 17, 1993.
1994

Minimum Implementation

In order to help the repatriation program and with rebuilding the war-torn economy, representatives from about 40-donor governments met in Geneva on 2 August 1994, in which the UN was asking for US$434 million.22 It was not clear whether the donor countries met the request. Also, the poor funding stalled the UN genocide probe projects that required a deployment of human rights monitors across Rwanda.3

  • 2. "Donors Meet to Pledge Funds for Rwanda," Associated Press Worldstream, August 2, 1994.
  • 3. "Rwanda: Poor Funding Stalls UN Genocide Probe; Donor Countries 'Too Cheap' to Pay, Official Charges," Ottawa Citizen, October 23, 1994.
1995

Full Implementation

A donor two-day conference funded by UNDP and attended by some 20 countries concluded in Geneva on 23 January 1995. In the conference, donor countries pleaded US$ 587 million dollars in aid to find the country’s recovery program in the year 1995-6.4 In May, donor countries like the United States, Great Britain, Spain, Belgium, Germany and Norway, among others agreed to fund the international tribunals.5

Donor agencies which pleaded for funding in January met in Rwanda for two days in July to review progress on disbursement of reconstruction funds. According to a report, only 92 million of total 430 million expected had been disbursed.6 Donor representatives again met in November for the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and agreed that their pledges made at the Geneva conference would be reassessed soon. Some countries also made new aid pledges to help Rwanda.7 Rwanda received a total of 702 million bilateral and multilateral assistance of which 662.6 million was grant assistance.8

  • 4. "Rwanda; Western donors pledge 587m dollars in aid," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 23, 1995.
  • 5. "Rwanda; Western Donors Agree to Finance International Genocide Tribunal," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 22, 1995.
  • 6. "International Aid Donors to Rwanda Meet for Progress Review," Agence France Presse, July 6, 1995.
  • 7. "Rwanda; Donors' Meeting Ends, Pledges Detailed," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 24, 1995.
  • 8. "Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients: 1995/1999," Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2001, 216-21.
1996

Full Implementation

The second donor conference was held in Geneva on June 20-21 1996 in which 30 donor countries participated and pledged 617 million dollars to rehabilitate the country. Although, Rwandan government had called on donor countries to provide more than 800 million dollars to the end of 1998. Among the pledges, the EU promised 228 million, the Netherlands promised 100 million over a three year period and the World Bank had promised 50 million dollars.9 Rwanda received a total of 466.5 million dollars in bilateral and multilateral financial assistance of which 423.9 million dollars was grant money.10

  • 9. "Urgent Donors Pledge 617 Million Dollars for Rwanda," Agence France Presse, June 21, 1996.
  • 10. "Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients: 1995/1999," 216-21.
1997

Full Implementation

The donor conference did not take place in 1997. However, Rwanda received at least 178.7 million in bilateral and 50.4 million in multilateral financial assistance, of which 181.5 million was grants.11

1998

Full Implementation

Rwanda received 30.2 million dollars in donor aid for debt servicing.12 Recognizing Rwanda as a special case, the World Bank and donors agreed in June to provide $250 million dollars in support for its economic reform project. In 1998, Rwanda received a total of 349.9 million dollars of which 260.4 million was grant.13

  • 12. "Rwanda Receives 30.2m Dollars in Donor Aid for Debt Servicing," BBC Monitoring Africa - Economic, June 12, 1998.
  • 13. "Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients: 1995/1999," 216-21.
1999

Full Implementation

In 1999, Rwanda received a total of 372.9 million bilateral and multilateral aid of which 287.4 was in grants.14

2000

Full Implementation

A two day donor conference from 8-9 November 2000 took place in Rwanda for the purpose of setting up global strategies to enable Rwanda to escape the vicious circle of perpetual aid, chronic debt and poverty. The conference concluded by reducing both the external debt (1.3 billion USD) and internal debt by half. In the conference, the donor agencies insisted on withdrawing troops from the DRC.15

  • 15. "International Donors Meet in Rwanda," Agence France Presse, November 8, 2000.
2001

Full Implementation

A three day donor conference took place on 14 November 2001 in Rwanda in which around 20 countries and organization including European Union, World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the African Development Bank participated. In the conference, the Rwandan government presented its National Strategic Plan to Reduce Poverty (PRSP) and spelled out progress on development programs.16 It was reported that the donors called for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from DRC, which the finance minister refuted.17 Participants were pledging financial support but the exact amount is not available.

  • 16. "International Donors' Conference Opens in Rwanda," Agence France Presse, November 14, 2001.
  • 17. "Rwanda: Finance Minister Refutes Donors Call for Withdrawal from DR Congo," BBC Monitoring Africa, November 16, 2001.
2002

Full Implementation

Information on donor conference and support are not available. However, Rwanda got net development assistance of 356.1 million in 2002.18

Information on donor conference and support are not available. However, a transitional period ended in 2003 with the holding of the presidential and the parliamentary elections. This effectively terminated the emergency period and also would have led to a declining donor support.19

Detailed Implementation Timeline

There were no specific provisions on timeline but parties had agreed on a timeline on ceasefire mechanism, establishment of transitional government and so on.

Implementation History
1993

Minimum Implementation

Implementation timeline was not followed. The rebel victory created different political reality, although the transitional government respected the Arusha accord.

1994

Minimum Implementation

Implementation timeline was not followed. 

1995

Minimum Implementation

Implementation timeline was not followed. 

1996

Minimum Implementation

Implementation timeline was not followed. 

1997

Minimum Implementation

Implementation timeline was not followed. 

1998

Minimum Implementation

Implementation timeline was not followed. 

1999

Minimum Implementation

Implementation timeline was not followed. 

2000

Minimum Implementation

Implementation timeline was not followed. 

2001

Minimum Implementation

Implementation timeline was not followed. 

2002

Minimum Implementation

Implementation timeline was not followed. 

Verification/Monitoring Mechanism

N'sele Cease-fire Agreement between the Government of the Rwandese Republic and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (22 July 1992)

Article I

Implementation History
1993

Full Implementation

The July 1992 N’sele Cease-fire Agreement had provisions for the deployment of Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) under the supervision of the OAU Secretary General. The NMOG, with 50 military observers, was said to supervise the ceasefire leading to political negotiations and a peace treaty between the two conflicting parties in Rwanda. According to this mandate, the OAU Secretary General appointed his personal representative to Rwanda to supervise a ceasefire on 29 July 1992.The ceasefire agreement was expected to go into effect by the end of July.1 The joint political and military commission comprising representatives of the Rwandan government, the RPF and international observers met at the OAU headquarter and a commander for a NMOG was appointed.2

The ceasefire agreement went into effect and a violation of the ceasefire was reported. However, the NOG was not assembled completely. Nevertheless, Senegal had already dispatched 10 military officers to Rwanda.3

NMOG tried to resolve the accusation and counter accusation of a violation of the ceasefire agreement alleged by both sides. On 22 October 1992, in the joint political and military commission meeting, the Rwandan ambassador representing the Rwandan government side accused the RPF of having shelled the town of Biumba and attacking the government position (which was refuted by the NMOG head by making it clear that the RPF action was in retaliation).4

The RPF alleged that the French troops were providing support to the Habyarimana regime and that the French troops were said to have starting clashing with the NMOG, who were deployed to monitor the ceasefire agreement.5

In January 1993 a violation of ceasefire was reported and a 50-member NOMG had no offensive capability.6 As ceasefire violations continued, the Rwandan government declared ceasefire and asked the NMOG to verify the truce and the return of the RPF to its previous position.7 The commander of the NMOG, however, stressed that his group be strengthened with additional staff and adequate equipment to deal with the situation caused by the resumption of conflict.8 As a matter of fact, the UNMOG was not given authorization by the Kigali Army Head Quarter to go to the spot where the ceasefire was broken off.9
The Rwandan government and the RPF committed themselves to implementing the ceasefire from 9 March after a high-level meeting held from 5th to 7th march. The NMOG’s remained intact as monitoring the ceasefire agreement.10 THE NMOG verified the withdrawal of RPF troops from the Mutara, Byumba and Ruhengeri areas to the 8th February 1993 before position.11 After the withdrawal, the area between the government and the RPF forces became a demilitarized zone and was administered by the NMOG.12

On 3 August 1993, the Arusha accord was signed. According to the agreement the current NMOG would remain in Rwanda until the deployment of international military force.13

On 5 October 1993, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 872 to establish the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda for a period of six months with mandate related to contributing to the security of the capital city, monitoring observance of the ceasefire agreement, assisting with mine clearance, monitoring the repatriation of refugees and resettlement of the IDPs for an initial period of six months.14 The UN Operation operated in four different phases. The first phase would be to establish conditions for the secure installation of national unity government, which was expected by the end of 1993. By the end of this phase, the UNAMIR strength was expected to be 1,428 military personnel. The second phase, expected to last for 90-days, involved the process s of disengagement, demobilization and integration of armed forces and gendarmerie. The UNAMIR strength was expected to be 2,548 by the end of this phase. The third phase, which was expected to last for nine months, would establish, supervise and monitor a new demilitarized zone and the mission strength was expected to reduce to 1,240 personnel. The fourth phase of four month was designed to the final stage leading up to the election. The strength of the UNAMIR was expected to be 930 personnel.15 The authorized strength for the mission was 2,548 military personnel, including 2,217 troops and 331 military observers, and 60 civilian police.16

On 5 October 1993 the UNAMIR was established and the UNAMIR commander arrived in Kigali on 22 October 1993 followed by an advance party of 21 military personnel on 27 October. On November 1, 1993, the NMOG II was integrated into UNAMIR. The UNAMIR continue to function both as peacekeeping operation and verification mission.

  • 1. "OAU to Observe Ceasefire in Rwanda," Xinhua General News Service, July 29, 1992.
  • 2. "Rwanda's Warring Parties Sign Reconciliation Agreement," Xinhua General News Service, August 1, 1992.
  • 3. "Rwanda: Glimmer Of Understanding at Peace Talks," IPS-Inter Press Service, August 14, 1992.
  • 4. "Rwanda RPF Radio Reports on Issues Discussed at Arusha Talks," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 26, 1992.
  • 5. "Rwanda RPF Says Habyarimana Sabotaging Arusha Talks," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 18, 1992.
  • 6. "Rwanda: Peace Negotiations Halted As Fighting Rages on," IPS-Inter Press Service, February 11, 1993.
  • 7. "Rwanda; Government Declares Cease-Fire; Wants RPF to Return to Previous Positions," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 17, 1993.
  • 8. "Rwanda: MOG Wants More Staff and Equipment; Government Proposes Meeting With RPF," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 18, 1993.
  • 9. "Rwanda: Fighting Continues, Reportedly Closer to Kigali," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 6, 1993.
  • 10. "Rwanda: Foreign Minister and Observer Group Commander Discuss Cease-Fire," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 12, 1993.
  • 11. "Rwanda: Government And RPF Sign Proposals on Army Merger; RPF Troop Withdrawals," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts/The Monitoring Report, March 22, 1993.
  • 12. "Rwanda; Military Observer Group Confirms that RPF Has Withdrawn Its Forces," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 22, 1993.
  • 13. "Rwanda: Hundreds Rejoice over Peace Accord," IPS-Inter Press Service, August 4, 1993.
  • 14. "Rwanda – UNAMIR," accessed September 27, 2011, http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unamir_b.htm.
  • 15. Ibid.
  • 16. Ibid.
1994

Full Implementation

As the establishment of transitional government was delayed, the security situation deteriorated. Prominent political leaders were assassinated. It was reported that the UNAMIR escorted RPF convoy was ambushed. Under the grave security situation, the UN Security Council on 30 March 1994, the secretary general recommended that the UNAMIR should continue to support the negotiations and recommended an extension of the UNMIR’s mandate. Accordingly, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of UNAMIR until 29 July 1994. Aircraft carrying President Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi crashed at Kigali airport crashed on 6 April 1994 killing all those on board. This incident was followed by the months of genocidal violence. The UNAMIR tried to bring both sides together for securing a ceasefire but both sides maintained rigid positions. On 21 April 1994, the Security Council adopted a resolution 912 to reduce the number of UNAMIR personnel and adjusted the mandate of the UNAMIR to act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure ceasefire agreement and resume humanitarian reliefs including the security of civilians. As of early May the UNAMIR strength was 444 personnel.17

On 13 May 1994, however, the Secretary-General recommended a new mandate for UNAMIR, which would include 5,500 troops. The Security Council, by its resolution 918 (17 May 1994) authorized the expansion of the UNAMIR to 5,500 troops and imposed an arms embargo on Rwanda. The objective of the UNAMIR’s expanded mandate was to promote security in all sectors of Rwanda and create conditions for return and settlement of refugees and IDPs as well as support the humanitarian response. By October, all 5,500 troops were deployed and by 15 November 80 of 90 police observers authorized for UNAMIR were deployed.18 Related to the creating climate of security in camps and facilitating the resettlement of IDPs, the UNAMIR undertook an operation from 13 to 15 December 1994 to enhance security in the KIBEHO and Ndago displaced persons camps where disruptive elements had been active.19 According to the Secretary General’s report, 60 human rights monitors were deployed in the country to monitor the condition of returning refugees and IDPs. The UNMIR also helped the government to restore its administration capacity in western zones.20

  • 17. Ibid.
  • 18. Ibid.
  • 19. "Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1995/107), February 6, 1995.
  • 20. "UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1994/1133), October 6, 1994.
1995

Full Implementation

The UNAMIR Continued to monitor the situation. As of January 1995, UNAMIR’s strength was 5,740 including all rank forces that were providing security in the IDP camps and the border region. The mission helped a lot in establishing a suitable conditions and a favorable climate for the lunching of Operation Retour, which was an integrated inter-agency initiative aimed at facilitating the safe resettlement of IDPs. The UNHCR and the UN Volunteers continued to monitor the human rights situation.21 By the end of November, the force level stood at 1,783 troops and 37 staff officers and 285 military observers.22 The UNAMIR also provided security to the International Tribunal and the Human Rights Field Operations. By the end of November 1995, the UN Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda had some 120 members deployed in Kigali and in 10 field offices located throughout the country.23

The UNMIR troops had been deliberately targeted as the UNAMIR headquarters was hit by grenades and small arms fire on 15 February. While investigating the attack the following day, eight members of a UNAMIR patrol were injured by a landmine. Similarly on March 5, three grenades were thrown at the guard post which injured to soldiers.24 The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) continued to deny UNAMIR access to part of the country, searched and seized UNAMIR vehicles and equipment, and participated in anti-UNAMIR demonstrations. The UNAMIR and RPA used to hold meetings on a fortnightly basis which did not take place for months.25

UNAMIR’s civilian police component continued to assist in training a new integrated national police force. As of April report by the UN Sectary General, UNAMIR civilian police component was expecting to complete the training of 300 gendarmes and 20 instructors. It was requested to train additional 400 gendarmes before the training of 100 instructors. The police component also assisted the National Gendarmerie in operational requirements to ensure that the gendarmes were ready and properly equipped for deployment after their training.26 The civilian police component, as part of the UNAMIR’s monitoring and investigatory activities, were deployed in a team of 3-4 observers in each of Rwanda’s 11 prefectures. The observers worked closely with local authorities, UN agencies and NGOs and assisted human rights and the UNAMIR personnel.27 By the end of the year, there were 85 civilian police observers deployed, who continued to perform monitoring activities. By the end of November, the civilian police component trained some 403 gendarmes and the training of additional 515 was scheduled to be completed by December. The civilian police trained 918 of the 6,000 trained gendarmes needed.28

The Secretary General advised the Security Council on 1 December 1995 that national reconciliation in Rwanda required the creation of conditions for the safe return of refugees and the extension of UNAMIR’s mandate was desirable.29 The Rwandan government, however, officially informed the Secretary General on 8 December 1995 that the UNAMIR as peacekeeping mission did not respond to Rwanda’s priority needs. The government, however, indicated the continued presence of UN for the purpose to assist rehabilitation and reconstruction, including technical expertise, financial assistance and equipment.30 For the smooth withdrawal of the UNAMIR, the Security Council by its resolution 1029 (1995) of 12 December, extended the mandate for a final period until 8 March 1996.31

  • 21. "Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1995/107), February 6, 1995.
  • 22. "Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1995/1002), December 1, 1995.
  • 23. "Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1995/1002), December 1, 1995.
  • 24. "Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1995/297), April 9, 1995.
  • 25. "Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1995/457), April 9, 1995.
  • 26. "Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1995/297), April 9, 1995.
  • 27. "Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1995/297), April 9, 1995.
  • 28. "Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1995/1002), December 1, 1995.
  • 29. "Rwanda-UNAMIR Facts and Figures."
  • 30. Ibid.
  • 31. Ibid.
1996

Full Implementation

The mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), ended on 8 March 1996. After the withdrawal of UNAMIR, UN opened its office in Rwanda with major activities to coordination the UN activities at a senior level and serve as an advisory office for Rwanda.32

The observer role of the UNAMIR concluded in Rwanda in 1996. However, UNHCR continued to coordinate the repatriation and rehabilitation of refugees.

  • 32. "Rwanda; UN secretary-general's envoy outlines role of new UN office," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 26, 1996.
1997

Full Implementation

The UNAMIR concluded its mandate in March 1996.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

UN Peacekeeping Force

Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties (3 August 1993)

Implementation History
1993

Full Implementation

On 5 October 1993 the UNAMIR was established and the UNAMIR commander arrived in Kigali on 22 October 1993 followed by an advance party of 21 military personnel on 27 October. On November 1, 1993, the NMOG II was integrated into UNAMIR. The UNAMIR continue to function both as peacekeeping operation and verification mission.1

1994

Full Implementation

As the establishment of transitional government was delayed, the security situation deteriorated. Prominent political leaders were assassinated. It was reported that the UNAMIR escorted RPF convoy was ambushed. Under the grave security situation, the secretary general recommended that the UNAMIR should continue to support the negotiations and recommended an extension of the UNAMIR’s mandate. Accordingly, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of UNAMIR until 29 July 1994. However, on 6 April an aircraft carrying President Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi returning from peace negotiations in Tanzania crashed at Kigali airport killing all those on board. This incident was followed by the months of genocidal violence. Due to the continuing violence and lack of acceptance of a ceasefire agreement, On 21 April 1994, the Security Council adopted Resolution 912 that reduced the strength of UNAMIR and adjusted the mandate of the UNAMIR to act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure ceasefire agreement and resume humanitarian reliefs including the security of civilians. As of early May the UNAMIR strength was 444 personnel.2

On 13 May 1994, however, the Secretary-General recommended a new mandate for UNAMIR, which increased the personnel to a total of 5,500 troops. The Security Council, adopted Resolution 918 (17 May 1994), which authorized the expansion of the UNAMIR to 5,500 troops and imposed an arms embargo on Rwanda. The objective of the UNAMIR’s expanded mandate was to promote security in all sectors of Rwanda and create conditions for return and settlement of refugees and IDPs as well as support the humanitarian response. By October, all 5,500 troops were deployed and by 15 november 80 of 90 police observers authorized for UNAMIR were deployed.3 Related to the creating climate of security in camps and facilitating the resettlement of IDPs, In this regard, the UNAMIR undertook an operation from 13 to 15 December 1994 to enhance security in the Kibeho and Ndago displaced persons camps where disruptive elements had been active.4 According to the Secretary General’s report, 60 human rights monitors were deployed in the country to monitor the condition of returning refugees and IDPs. The UNMIR also helped the government to restore its administration capacity in western zones (Source: UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council, S/1994/1133, 6 October 1994).

  • 2. Ibid.
  • 3. Ibid.
  • 4. "Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1995/107), February 6, 1995.
1995

Full Implementation

The UNAMIR Continued to monitor the security situation. As of January 1995, UNAMIR’s strength was 5,740 all rank forces who were providing security in the IDP camps and the border region. The mission helped in establishing suitable conditions and a favorable climate for the lunching of Operation Retour, which was an integrated inter-agency initiative aimed at facilitating the safe resettlement of IDPs. The UNHCR and the UN Volunteers continued to monitor the human rights situation.5 By the end of November, the force level stood at 1,783 troops and 37 staff officers and 285 military observers.6 The UNAMIR also provided security to the International Tribunal and the Human Rights Field Operations. By the end of November 1995, the UN Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda had some 120 members deployed in Kigali and in 10 field offices located throughout the country.7

The UNMIR troops had been deliberately targeted as the UNAMIR headquarters was hit by grenades and small arms fire on 15 February. While investigating the attack the following day, eight members of a UNAMIR patrol were injured by a landmine. Similarly on March 5, three grenades were thrown at the guard post which injured to soldiers.8 The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) continued to deny UNAMIR access to part of the country, searched and seized UNAMIR vehicles and equipment and participated in anti-UNAMIR demonstrations. The UNAMIR and RPA used to hold meetings on a fortnightly basis which did not take place for months.9

UNAMIR’s civilian police component continued to assist in training a new integrated national police force. As of April report by the UN Sectary General, UNAMIR civilian police component was expecting to complete the training of 300 gendarmes and 20 instructors. It was requested to train additional 400 gendarmes before the training of 100 instructors. The police component also assisted the National Gendarmerie in operational requirements to ensure that the gendarmes were ready and properly equipped for deployment after their training.10 The civilian police component, as part of the UNAMIR’s monitoring and investigatory activities, were deployed in a team of 3-4 observers in each of Rwanda’s 11 prefectures. The observers worked closely with local authorities, UN agencies and NGOs and assisted human rights and the UNAMIR personnel.11 By the end of the year, there were 85 civilian police observers deployed, who continued to perform monitoring activities. By the end of November, the civilian police component trained some 403 gendarmes and training of additional 515 was scheduled to be completed by December. It was said that the civilian police would train 918 out of 6,000 trained gendarmes needed.12

The Secretary General advised the Security Council on 1 December 1995 that national reconciliation in Rwanda required the creation of conditions for the safe return of refugees and the extension of UNAMIR’s mandate was desirable.13 The Rwandan government, however, officially informed the Secretary General on 8 December 1995 that the UNAMIR as peacekeeping mission did not respond to Rwanda’s priority needs. The government, however, indicated the continued presence of UN for the purpose to assist rehabilitation and reconstruction, including technical expertise, financial assistance and equipment.14 For the smooth withdrawal of the UNAMIR, the Security Council by its resolution 1029 (1995) of 12 December, extended the mandate for a final period until 8 March 1996.15

  • 5. "Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1995/107), February 6, 1995.
  • 6. "Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1995/1002), December 1 1995.
  • 7. Ibid.
  • 8. "Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1995/297), April 9, 1995.
  • 9. "Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1995/457), April 9, 1995.
  • 10. "Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1995/297), April 9, 1995.
  • 11. Ibid.
  • 12. "Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council," United Nations (S/1995/1002), December 1, 1995.
  • 13. "Rwanda-UNAMIR Facts and Figures."
  • 14. Ibid.
  • 15. Ibid.
1996

Full Implementation

The mandate for the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), ended on 8 March 1996. After the withdrawal of UNAMIR, UN opened its office in Rwanda with major activities to coordination the UN activities at a senior level and serve as an advisory office for Rwanda.16 The UNAMIR concluded its mandate in March 1996.

  • 16. "Rwanda; UN secretary-general's envoy outlines role of new UN office," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 26, 1996.
1997

Full Implementation

The UNAMIR concluded its mandate in March 1996.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Withdrawal of Troops

N'sele Cease-fire Agreement between the Government of the Rwandese Republic and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (22 July 1992)

Article II

The cease-fire shall imply:

6. The withdrawal of all foreign troops after the effective deployment of the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) except for Military Officers serving in Rwanda under bilateral Cooperation Agreements;

Implementation History
1993

No Implementation

There was a record of presence of foreign troops in Rwanda after Ugandan based rebels, RPF, stormed into northern Rwanda and seemed to have made a gain against the pro-French regime in October 1990. According to a report, estimated 300 French troops, along with 600 Belgian paratroops and 500 soldiers from DRC seemed to have thwarted a potential assault on the capital.1 Presence of these foreign troops became contentious issues between the government and the rebel during the peace process and therefore the 1992 N’sele Cease-fire Agreement and the 1992 and the 1993 Protocol of Agreement on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties had provision for the withdrawal of foreign troops. In February 1993, the FRP spokesperson in the northern city of Byumba accused that French troops were helping the government soldiers dig trenches and employ canons.2 The presence of France in Rwanda continued as the French Foreign Ministry affirmed that the reinforcement of contingent of 150 French paratroops were sent to Rwanda to protect “the French citizens living in this African country.”3  According to a report, France confirmed its 800-strong contingent stationed in Rwanda to protect French national but the rebel movement had accused the foreign troops, including French, of fighting on the side of the government.4 According to Human Rights Watch Report, France maintained as many as 1,100 there at one time; and as the Rwandan army expanded from fewer than 10,000 to more than 30,000 soldiers, the French gave training both the combatants and soldiers who would in turn serve as instructors for others.5 As of end of 1993, there was no report of withdrawal of foreign troops from Rwanda.

  • 1. "Dispatch of French Troops to Troubled Rwanda May Draw Fire in Paris," The Washington Post, October 7, 1990.
  • 2. "Rwanda: France Denies Supporting Government Troops," IPS-Inter Press Service, February 12, 1993.
  • 3. Ibid.
  • 4. "Wanda: OAU Sends Its Top Official to Negotiate Peace," IPS-Inter Press Service, April 6, 1993.
  • 5. "Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda," Human Rights Watch, 2004, accessed September 27, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/rwanda/index.htm#TopOfPage.
1994

Full Implementation

On 21 March, France began to withdraw its forces. The withdrawal was completed on 11 December after the first units of UNAMIR had taken up positions in Rwanda.6 Nevertheless, during the genocidal events, foreign troops teamed up for the humanitarian actions.7 Nevertheless, Belgium did withdraw its troops once its force in the UNAMIR came under attack. The Belgian withdrew and also campaigned for the withdrawal of all forces.8

1995

Full Implementation

No record of foreign troops was found. With the rebel victory, all unauthorized foreign troops were withdrawn.

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Please always cite: Peace Accords Matrix (Date of retrieval: (04/28/2017),
http://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/arusha-accord-4-august-1993,
Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame.