In the 26 December 1994 peace agreement, “[t]he two sides agreed to an immediate ceasefire and the revision of the Constitution and of electoral lists before the next elections. The agreement also provided for an alliance between the faction and the ruling Popular Rally for Progress for ‘the management of affairs’, taken by many to herald the possible inclusion of FRUD members in the government.” The agreement, however, was condemned by a FRUD faction led by Ahmed Dini Ahmed (FRUD-AD) as a “betrayal” of the organization's aims.1

• 1. "Djibouti," Keesing's Record of World Events (Volume 41), January 1995, 40348.

The Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) led by Ahmed Ougoureh Kible and Ali Mohamed Daoud did not return to conflict with the Government in 1995. The FRUD-AD engaged in some violence, but the violence did not escalate to the level of minor war, though it produced some ‘no-go areas’. 

The FRUD-AD engaged in some violence, but the violence did not escalate to the level of minor war, though it produced some ‘no-go areas’. 

The FRUD-AD engaged in some violence, but the violence did not escalate to the level of minor war, though it produced some ‘no-go areas’. 

The original group -- Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) -- led by Ahmed Ougoureh Kible and Ali Mohamed Daoud did not return to conflict in 1999. The Government and FRUD-AD fought a minor war in 1999. The UCDP conflict data program reported about 285 battle related deaths for the year. FRUD-AD and the government initiated negotiations and the conflict terminated in December 1999.2

• 2. "UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia," Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research, www.ucdp.uu.se/database.

A ceasefire agreement was signed between the government and the FRUD-AD on Feb. 7, 2000. 

A peace agreement was signed with FRUD-AD on May 12, 2001. 

Ceasefire was maintained.   

Ceasefire was maintained.   

Ceasefire was maintained.   

On June 9, 1995, President Aptidon appointed two former FRUD rebels to the government. Ali Mohamed Daoud became Minister of Health and Social Affairs and Ougoureh Kifle Ahmed was given the ministry of agriculture and water resources.1

Onwar.com reports that the Djibouti constitution was revised in 1995 incorporating the peace agreement.2

• 1. "Chronology for Afars in Djibouti," Minorities at Risk Project, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2009, accessed September 22, 2010, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/.
• 2. “Djibouti 1800-1999," Onwar.com, accessed September 22, 2010, http://www.onwar.com/aced/nation/day/djibouti/fdjibouti1991.htm.

FRUD was allowed to become a legal party and joined the government in an electoral coalition.  

In the December 1997 elections, FRUD formed an electoral coalition with the governing Popular Rally for Progress (RPP). Candidates of the RPP-FRUD alliance won all 65 seats in the Chamber. The opposition Democratic Renewal Party (PRD) and the National Democratic Party (PND) conceded defeat but alleged flaws in the process.3

• 3. "Djibouti," Keesing's Record of World Events (Volume 43), December 1997, 41950.

In the presidential elections, the pro-government coalition, the Union for a Presidential Majority (UMP) in which FRUD was a coalition partner, won all 65 seats with 62.7 percent (53,293 votes) of the vote. Turnout was recorded at 48.4 per cent and voting was largely peaceful.4

• 4. "Djibouti," Keesing's Record of World Events (Volume 49), January 2003, 45174.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

After signing the peace agreement in December 1994, the Djibouti government initiated a fiscal decentralization planning process in October 1995. The fiscal component of decentralization was intended to increase development and public services.1

• 1. "Republic of Djibouti Public Administration Country Profile," UNDP Programme on Governance in teh Arab Region (POGAR), 2005, accessed September 23, 2010, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan023257.pdf.

No developments observed this year.

No developments observed this year.

No developments observed this year.

With the election of a new President, a Ministry for Decentralization was set up and charged with implementing the decentralization provision. Detailed proposals for inter-departmental cooperation were set up and new regions were to be established.  

No developments observed this year.

No developments observed this year.

Djibouti’s National Assembly, on 7 July 2002 passed the Decentralization and Status of the Regions (Act No. 174/AN/02/4ème L), which created five regional local authorities known as: Regions Arta, Ali Sabieh, Dikhil, Obock and Tadjoura equipped with legal personality under public law and financial autonomy. The decentralization law also made provisions for the establishment and organization of Commons.2

• 2. "Officieal Gazette of the Republic of Djibouti," http://www.presidence.dj/jo/2002/loi174an02.php.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

On 4 November 1995, it was reported that a ceremony took place at Hol Hol military camp to mark the integration of former FRUD soldiers into the Djibouti national army. Several dozen men were made officers and NCOs.1

Those FRUD members who were not integrated into the national army -- about 9,000 ex-combatants -- were demobilized and send home.2

• 1. "DJIBOUTI: Rebel attacks," The Indian Ocean Newsletter, November 4, 1995.
• 2. Kees Kingma, “Post-war Demobilization and the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants into Civilian Life,” (paper presented at USAID Conference, October 30-31, 1997), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACD095.pdf.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

It was recognized that around 12,300 ex-combatants from the government and 3,000 former rebels needed to be socially reintegrated. The first program (1995-96) was conceived as a cost saving exercise to reduce the total number of personnel under arms with allowances paid to both Armee Nationale de la Defense and FRUD to the cost of USD$ 7.8 million.1

• 1. "Ex-Combatants Reintegration Pilot Project (Djibouti), Implementation completion Report (IDA-31540)," World Bank (Report No: 26251), 2003.

No developments observed this year.

As of 1997, only an estimated 3,000 were demobilized.2

• 2. Jos van. Beurden, "Djibouti: External Conflict Internalised," Searching for Peace in Africa, 2000, accessed Feburary 24, 2011, http://www.conflict-prevention.net.

The World Bank funded the Djibouti Ex-Combatants Reintegration Project with $2.7 million with the target of supporting the reintegration of 3,800 ex-combatants.3

• 3. "Ex-Combatants Reintegration Pilot Project (Djibouti), Implementation completion Report (IDA-31540)," World Bank (Report No: 26251), 2003.

France, the European Union and the African Development Bank provided funding for the social reintegration of 8,500 soldiers.4

• 4. Jos van Beurden, "Djibouti: External Conflict Internalised."

Reintegration programs continued. 

Reintegration programs continued. 

It was reported that the reintegration program funded by the World Bank was completed. The program helped 2,926 ex-combatants.5

• 5. "Ex-Combatants Reintegration Pilot Project (Djibouti), Implementation completion Report (IDA-31540)."

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

The Amnesty law was passed by the Djibouti assembly on January 24, 1995 (Act No. 74/AN/94/3ème L). There is general agreement that “FRUD leaders were granted amnesty as agreed in 1994 peace agreement.”1

• 1. “Djibouti Human Rights Practices, 1995,” U.S. Department of State, 1996, accessed September 22, 2010, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1995_hrp_report/95hrp_report_afr....

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

Little progress was reported in terms of resettling IDPs/refugees. According to the US State department Human Rights Practice – 1995 report, an estimated 10,000 to 18,000 Afars displaced by the civil war continued to live in Ethiopia. The major displacement to urban areas (83% of population by 1995 – Inter Government Authority on Development 2001) was only slowly reversed. The Government stated that the Afars were welcome to return, but it suspected that FRUD agitators were persuading the refugees not to return home. Afar refugees also perceived the northern region as being unsafe.1

• 1. “Djibouti Human Rights Practices, 1995,” U.S. Department of State, 1996, accessed September 22, 2010, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1995_hrp_report/95hrp_report_afr....

Progress in resettling IDPs and refugees proceeded slowly. The Government stated that the Afars were welcome to return. However, Afar refugees perceived the northern region as unsafe. In addition, many of the Afars' homes and lands were occupied by Djiboutian soldiers and their families.2

• 2. “Djibouti Human Rights Practices, 1996,” U.S. Department of State, 1997.

The resettling of displaced persons and refugees continued in 1997. According to the UN Secretary General’s report (document A/52/434), the Government needs needs to adequately address specific problems which affect the rehabilitation of affected areas and the reintegration schemes for the returnees. The immediate need, the report stated, was for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged or destroyed social infrastructure (schools, dispensaries, water facilities) in all regions that have been affected by civil strife.3

• 3. "Djibouti; Reconstruction and Development of Djibouti," Africa News, November 24, 1997.

Of the estimated 18,000 Djiboutian Afars that fled to Ethiopia during the 1991-94 civil war, at least 10,000 were said to have repatriated themselves since the 1994 Peace Accord.4

• 4. "Djibouti Human Rights Practices, 1998,” U.S. State Department, 1999.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

Little progress was made in terms of resettling IDPs. According to the US State department Human Rights Practice – 1995 report, an estimated 10,000 to 18,000 Afars displaced by the civil war continued to live in Ethiopia, though not in refugee camps. The Government stated that the Afars were welcome to return, but it suspected that FRUD agitators were persuading the refugees not to return home. Afar refugees also perceived the northern region as being unsafe.1

• 1. “Djibouti Human Rights Practices, 1995,” U.S. Department of State, 1996, accessed September 22, 2010 http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1995_hrp_report/95hrp_report_afr....

Progress in resettling IDPs and Refugees was slow. The Government stated that the Afars were welcome to return. However, Afar refugees perceived the northern region as unsafe. In addition, many of the Afars' homes and lands were occupied by Djiboutian soldiers and their families.2

• 2. “Djibouti Human Rights Practices, 1996,” U.S. Department of State, 1997, accessed September 22, 2010.

According to the UN Secretary General’s report (document A/52/434), the resettlment of displaced persons remained a problem and needed to be addressed through the rehabilitation of affected areas and through reintegration schemes for the returnees. The immediate need, the report states, was for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged or destroyed social infrastructures (schools, dispensaries, water facilities) in all regions that have been affected by civil strife.3

• 3. "Djibouti; Reconstruction and Development of Djibouti," Africa News, November 24, 1997.

According to US State Department Human Rights Practice Report of 1998, 10,000 people were said to have repatriated themselves since the 1994 Peace Accord.4

• 4. Djibouti Human Rights Practices, 1998,” U.S. Department of State, 1999, accessed September 22, 2010.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

The accord called for the reconstruction of war damage and efforts to rebuild Djibouti’s damaged infrastructure were planned. The Djibouti government signed an agreement with Japan to rebuild, upgrade and extend its port facilities. USD 19.5 million was put up by Japan in 1994-95 for this project and for the second stage of a school construction project in the Balbala section of the capital. The French Caisse Franciase de Developpement also contributed to port modernization in Djibouti. Similarly, Djibouti received funds to renovate the north-south Unity Road from Saudi Arabia, which was also giving money to repair damaged schools.1

• 1. "DJIBOUTI: Review 1996," Africa Review World of Information, September 1995.

An agreement was made with the IMF on an austerity program in April 1996. It gives a bleak picture of the economic constraints that the Djibouti government was facing in rebuilding its damaged infrastructure. Nevertheless, the government was considering projects related to agriculture sectors which included increasing the amount of arable land by irrigation schemes and development of the fishing industry.2

• 2. "DJIBOUTI: Review 1997," Africa Review World of Information, February 1997.

It was reported that Djibouti invited Malaysian port operators to participate in its harbour development projects.3

The UN Secretary General, in his report (document A/52/434), highlighted the immediate need for the reconstruction of damaged or destroyed social infrastructures (schools, dispensaries, water facilities) in all regions that have been affected by civil strife. The report described the operational activities of various United Nations agencies, including United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Food Programme (WFP), and World Health Organization (WHO) in Djibouti. It concluded by requesting the international community to provide financial support to enable the continuation of the technical assistance projects, in order to meet urgent socio-economic programs for the reconstruction and development process in Djibouti.4

In 1997, according to a report, the International Development Association (IDA) agreed to a USD6.5 million credit to help finance the economic reform program. The European Union's Development Fund agreed to an Ecu22 million (USD24 million) grant in December 1996 to assist in improving the transport system and living conditions, particularly the supply of water to urban areas. Several developments during 1997 offer encouragement, however. The French agreed to a Ff34 million (USD6 million) loan in early 1997 to assist in the modernization of the port, including the purchase of a new tug boat. More significant, though, was the opening of two oil terminals at the port in February 1997 after a two-year construction period. The Df3.5 billion (USD20 million) project was financed by Japan as part of its non-repayable financial co-operation programme. The terminals mean that Djibouti should once again resume its position as the principal gateway for oil products to the sub-region (Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia), as well as a transit point for other goods. The terminals are forecast to handle 740,000 tonnes of oil products by 2010 compared to 340,000 tonnes in 1992.5

• 3. "Djibouti invites local operators to participate in harbour projects," Business Times (Malaysia), May 7, 1997.
• 4. "Djibouti; Reconstruction and Development of Djibouti," Africa News, November 24, 1997.
• 5. "DJIBOUTI: AFRICA REVIEW 1998," Africa Review World of Information, March 1998.

It was reported that Djibouti wanted Malaysia's help to modernize and develop sectors such as agriculture, power generation, port and airport services. Djibouti was also seeking Malaysian involvement in its economic development especially in ports.6 Djibouti is principally a entrepot for Ethiopia; with 1998-2000 war with Eritrea and end of use of its ports, Ethiopia becomes and remains dependent on Djibouti – which generates vast revenues.

• 6. "DJIBOUTI WANTS MALAYSIA TO USE IT AS GATEWAY TO EAST AFRICA," Malaysia General News, August 3, 1998.

The World Bank approved a US$14.8 million equivalent credit, in May 1999, to support the Republic of Djibouti's efforts in generating low- skilled employment opportunities to directly benefit the poor. The project was expected to enhance the living standards of the poor in the city of Djibouti by “improving the physical environment in poor neighborhoods through construction and rehabilitation of urban infrastructures, such as street works and drainage, social infrastructure, and community neighborhood infrastructure; increasing community participation in project identification and implementation and providing social services to poor communities; building the institutional capacity of various stakeholders involved in the implementation of the project activities.”7

According to a Heritage Foundation report, Djibouti was open to foreign investment but the lack of infrastructure was hindering investment.8

• 7. "Djibouti; Djibouti Creates Job Opportunities For The Poor," Africa News, May 27, 1999.
• 8. "Chapter 6: The Countries; Republic of Djibouti," Heritage Foundation Reports, December 1999.

In 2000, Arab financial institutions agreed to finance development projects in Djibouti to the tune of 196 million dollars. The funds, decided at a meeting of financial backers in Kuwait in May, would be used for development projects in education, health, energy and infrastructure.9

The first Djibouti dry port, valued at US$ 12 million, had been completed.10 In December 2000, Djibouti received $10 Million in credit from the World Bank to support its educational development strategy.11

• 9. "Arab institutions agree 196 million dollars in aid to Djibouti," Agence France Presse – English, June 3, 2000.
• 10. "DJIBOUTI DRY PORT: A project which is advancing on Djibouti," The Indian Ocean Newsletter, October 21, 2000.
• 11. "World Bank discusses new country assistance strategy for Djibouti, approves a US$ 10 million credit for an education program," M2 PRESSWIRE, December 21, 2000.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.

No further developments observed.