Accord de paix et de la reconciliation nationale

  • 89%
  • Implementation Score 
    after 10 years
Provisions in this Accord
Cease Fire

Agreement for Peace and National Reconciliation-1994

SECTION VIII: TRANSFORMATION OF FRUD INTO A POLITICAL PARTY

1) Once the present Peace agreement has been signed, FRUD will become a legal political party. It will therefore abandon the armed fight and will fully participate in the national political life, defending its ideas with peaceful means and the Government engages to accept it.

Implementation History
1995

Intermediate Implementation

In the 26 December 1994 peace agreement, “[t]he two sides agreed to an immediate ceasefire and the revision of the Constitution and of electoral lists before the next elections. The agreement also provided for an alliance between the faction and the ruling Popular Rally for Progress for ‘the management of affairs’, taken by many to herald the possible inclusion of FRUD members in the government.” The agreement, however, was condemned by a FRUD faction led by Ahmed Dini Ahmed (FRUD-AD) as a “betrayal” of the organization's aims.1

  • 1. "Djibouti," Keesing's Record of World Events (Volume 41), January 1995, 40348.
1996

Intermediate Implementation

The Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) led by Ahmed Ougoureh Kible and Ali Mohamed Daoud did not return to conflict with the Government in 1995. The FRUD-AD engaged in some violence, but the violence did not escalate to the level of minor war, though it produced some ‘no-go areas’. 

1997

Intermediate Implementation

The FRUD-AD engaged in some violence, but the violence did not escalate to the level of minor war, though it produced some ‘no-go areas’. 

1998

Intermediate Implementation

The FRUD-AD engaged in some violence, but the violence did not escalate to the level of minor war, though it produced some ‘no-go areas’. 

1999

Intermediate Implementation

The original group -- Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) -- led by Ahmed Ougoureh Kible and Ali Mohamed Daoud did not return to conflict in 1999. The Government and FRUD-AD fought a minor war in 1999. The UCDP conflict data program reported about 285 battle related deaths for the year. FRUD-AD and the government initiated negotiations and the conflict terminated in December 1999.2

  • 2. "UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia," Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research, www.ucdp.uu.se/database.
2000

Intermediate Implementation

A ceasefire agreement was signed between the government and the FRUD-AD on Feb. 7, 2000. 

2001

Intermediate Implementation

A peace agreement was signed with FRUD-AD on May 12, 2001. 

2002

Full Implementation

Ceasefire was maintained.   

2003

Full Implementation

Ceasefire was maintained.   

2004

Full Implementation

Ceasefire was maintained.   

Electoral/Political Party Reform

Agreement for Peace and National Reconciliation-1994

SECTION VIII: TRANSFORMATION OF FRUD INTO A POLITICAL PARTY

1) Once the present Peace agreement has been signed, FRUD will become a legal political party. It will therefore abandon the armed fight and will fully participate in the national political life, defending its ideas with peaceful means and the government engages to accept it.

Implementation History
1995

Intermediate Implementation

On June 9, 1995, President Aptidon appointed two former FRUD rebels to the government. Ali Mohamed Daoud became Minister of Health and Social Affairs and Ougoureh Kifle Ahmed was given the ministry of agriculture and water resources.1

Onwar.com reports that the Djibouti constitution was revised in 1995 incorporating the peace agreement.2

1996

Full Implementation

FRUD was allowed to become a legal party and joined the government in an electoral coalition.  

1997

Full Implementation

In the December 1997 elections, FRUD formed an electoral coalition with the governing Popular Rally for Progress (RPP). Candidates of the RPP-FRUD alliance won all 65 seats in the Chamber. The opposition Democratic Renewal Party (PRD) and the National Democratic Party (PND) conceded defeat but alleged flaws in the process.3

  • 3. "Djibouti," Keesing's Record of World Events (Volume 43), December 1997, 41950.
1998

Full Implementation

In the presidential elections, the pro-government coalition, the Union for a Presidential Majority (UMP) in which FRUD was a coalition partner, won all 65 seats with 62.7 percent (53,293 votes) of the vote. Turnout was recorded at 48.4 per cent and voting was largely peaceful.4

  • 4. "Djibouti," Keesing's Record of World Events (Volume 49), January 2003, 45174.
1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Decentralization/Federalism

Agreement for Peace and National Reconciliation-1994

SECTION IX: DECENTRALISATION

After the restoring of peace and national reconciliation a large national decentralization regarding the transfer of certain competences and means towards the “collectivités territoriales” will be instituted in the Republic of Djibouti.

Implementation History
1995

Minimum Implementation

After signing the peace agreement in December 1994, the Djibouti government initiated a fiscal decentralization planning process in October 1995. The fiscal component of decentralization was intended to increase development and public services.1

1996

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1997

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1998

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1999

Minimum Implementation

With the election of a new President, a Ministry for Decentralization was set up and charged with implementing the decentralization provision. Detailed proposals for inter-departmental cooperation were set up and new regions were to be established.  

2000

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2001

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

2002

Full Implementation

Djibouti’s National Assembly, on 7 July 2002 passed the Decentralization and Status of the Regions (Act No. 174/AN/02/4ème L), which created five regional local authorities known as: Regions Arta, Ali Sabieh, Dikhil, Obock and Tadjoura equipped with legal personality under public law and financial autonomy. The decentralization law also made provisions for the establishment and organization of Commons.2

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Military Reform

Agreement for Peace and National Reconciliation-1994

SECTION VI: RE-BALANCING OF THE STATE APPARATUS

Implementation History
1995

Full Implementation

On 4 November 1995, it was reported that a ceremony took place at Hol Hol military camp to mark the integration of former FRUD soldiers into the Djibouti national army. Several dozen men were made officers and NCOs.1

Those FRUD members who were not integrated into the national army -- about 9,000 ex-combatants -- were demobilized and send home.2

  • 1. "DJIBOUTI: Rebel attacks," The Indian Ocean Newsletter, November 4, 1995.
  • 2. Kees Kingma, “Post-war Demobilization and the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants into Civilian Life,” (paper presented at USAID Conference, October 30-31, 1997), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACD095.pdf.
1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Reintegration

Agreement for Peace and National Reconciliation-1994

SECTION VI: RE-BALANCING OF THE STATE APPARATUS

Implementation History
1995

Minimum Implementation

It was recognized that around 12,300 ex-combatants from the government and 3,000 former rebels needed to be socially reintegrated. The first program (1995-96) was conceived as a cost saving exercise to reduce the total number of personnel under arms with allowances paid to both Armee Nationale de la Defense and FRUD to the cost of USD$ 7.8 million.1

  • 1. "Ex-Combatants Reintegration Pilot Project (Djibouti), Implementation completion Report (IDA-31540)," World Bank (Report No: 26251), 2003.
1996

Minimum Implementation

No developments observed this year.

1997

Minimum Implementation

As of 1997, only an estimated 3,000 were demobilized.2

1998

Intermediate Implementation

The World Bank funded the Djibouti Ex-Combatants Reintegration Project with $2.7 million with the target of supporting the reintegration of 3,800 ex-combatants.3

  • 3. "Ex-Combatants Reintegration Pilot Project (Djibouti), Implementation completion Report (IDA-31540)," World Bank (Report No: 26251), 2003.
1999

Intermediate Implementation

France, the European Union and the African Development Bank provided funding for the social reintegration of 8,500 soldiers.4

  • 4. Jos van Beurden, "Djibouti: External Conflict Internalised."
2000

Intermediate Implementation

Reintegration programs continued. 

2001

Intermediate Implementation

Reintegration programs continued. 

2002

Full Implementation

It was reported that the reintegration program funded by the World Bank was completed. The program helped 2,926 ex-combatants.5

  • 5. "Ex-Combatants Reintegration Pilot Project (Djibouti), Implementation completion Report (IDA-31540)."
2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Amnesty

Agreement for Peace and National Reconciliation-1994

SECTION VII: GENERAL AMNESTY

The combatants and exiled militaries of FRUD are amnestied without exception for acts committed before the 12th of June 1994, and thus they recover, in full, their civic rights.

Their security is guaranteed by the State.

Implementation History
1995

Full Implementation

The Amnesty law was passed by the Djibouti assembly on January 24, 1995 (Act No. 74/AN/94/3ème L). There is general agreement that “FRUD leaders were granted amnesty as agreed in 1994 peace agreement.”1

1996

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1997

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1998

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

1999

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2002

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Full Implementation

No further developments observed.

Refugees

Agreement for Peace and National Reconciliation-1994

SECTION III: MANAGEMENT OF THE RETURN TO PEACE

d) FRUD undertakes to encourage the refugees and Djibouti displaced persons, finding themselves outside the national territory because of the war, to return home.

Implementation History
1995

No Implementation

Little progress was reported in terms of resettling IDPs/refugees. According to the US State department Human Rights Practice – 1995 report, an estimated 10,000 to 18,000 Afars displaced by the civil war continued to live in Ethiopia. The major displacement to urban areas (83% of population by 1995 – Inter Government Authority on Development 2001) was only slowly reversed. The Government stated that the Afars were welcome to return, but it suspected that FRUD agitators were persuading the refugees not to return home. Afar refugees also perceived the northern region as being unsafe.1

1996

Minimum Implementation

Progress in resettling IDPs and refugees proceeded slowly. The Government stated that the Afars were welcome to return. However, Afar refugees perceived the northern region as unsafe. In addition, many of the Afars' homes and lands were occupied by Djiboutian soldiers and their families.2

  • 2. “Djibouti Human Rights Practices, 1996,” U.S. Department of State, 1997.
1997

Minimum Implementation

The resettling of displaced persons and refugees continued in 1997. According to the UN Secretary General’s report (document A/52/434), the Government needs needs to adequately address specific problems which affect the rehabilitation of affected areas and the reintegration schemes for the returnees. The immediate need, the report stated, was for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged or destroyed social infrastructure (schools, dispensaries, water facilities) in all regions that have been affected by civil strife.3

  • 3. "Djibouti; Reconstruction and Development of Djibouti," Africa News, November 24, 1997.
1998

Intermediate Implementation

Of the estimated 18,000 Djiboutian Afars that fled to Ethiopia during the 1991-94 civil war, at least 10,000 were said to have repatriated themselves since the 1994 Peace Accord.4

  • 4. "Djibouti Human Rights Practices, 1998,” U.S. State Department, 1999.
1999

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2002

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

Internally Displaced Persons

Agreement for Peace and National Reconciliation-1994

SECTION III: MANAGEMENT OF THE RETURN TO PEACE

d) FRUD undertakes to encourage the refugees and Djibouti displaced persons, finding themselves outside the national territory because of the war, to return home.

Implementation History
1995

No Implementation

Little progress was made in terms of resettling IDPs. According to the US State department Human Rights Practice – 1995 report, an estimated 10,000 to 18,000 Afars displaced by the civil war continued to live in Ethiopia, though not in refugee camps. The Government stated that the Afars were welcome to return, but it suspected that FRUD agitators were persuading the refugees not to return home. Afar refugees also perceived the northern region as being unsafe.1

1996

Minimum Implementation

Progress in resettling IDPs and Refugees was slow. The Government stated that the Afars were welcome to return. However, Afar refugees perceived the northern region as unsafe. In addition, many of the Afars' homes and lands were occupied by Djiboutian soldiers and their families.2

  • 2. “Djibouti Human Rights Practices, 1996,” U.S. Department of State, 1997, accessed September 22, 2010.
1997

Minimum Implementation

According to the UN Secretary General’s report (document A/52/434), the resettlment of displaced persons remained a problem and needed to be addressed through the rehabilitation of affected areas and through reintegration schemes for the returnees. The immediate need, the report states, was for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged or destroyed social infrastructures (schools, dispensaries, water facilities) in all regions that have been affected by civil strife.3

  • 3. "Djibouti; Reconstruction and Development of Djibouti," Africa News, November 24, 1997.
1998

Intermediate Implementation

According to US State Department Human Rights Practice Report of 1998, 10,000 people were said to have repatriated themselves since the 1994 Peace Accord.4

  • 4. Djibouti Human Rights Practices, 1998,” U.S. Department of State, 1999, accessed September 22, 2010.
1999

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2000

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2001

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2002

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

Economic and Social Development

Agreement for Peace and National Reconciliation-1994

SECTION III: MANAGEMENT OF THE RETURN TO PEACE

Implementation History
1995

Minimum Implementation

The accord called for the reconstruction of war damage and efforts to rebuild Djibouti’s damaged infrastructure were planned. The Djibouti government signed an agreement with Japan to rebuild, upgrade and extend its port facilities. USD 19.5 million was put up by Japan in 1994-95 for this project and for the second stage of a school construction project in the Balbala section of the capital. The French Caisse Franciase de Developpement also contributed to port modernization in Djibouti. Similarly, Djibouti received funds to renovate the north-south Unity Road from Saudi Arabia, which was also giving money to repair damaged schools.1

  • 1. "DJIBOUTI: Review 1996," Africa Review World of Information, September 1995.
1996

Minimum Implementation

An agreement was made with the IMF on an austerity program in April 1996. It gives a bleak picture of the economic constraints that the Djibouti government was facing in rebuilding its damaged infrastructure. Nevertheless, the government was considering projects related to agriculture sectors which included increasing the amount of arable land by irrigation schemes and development of the fishing industry.2

  • 2. "DJIBOUTI: Review 1997," Africa Review World of Information, February 1997.
1997

Minimum Implementation

It was reported that Djibouti invited Malaysian port operators to participate in its harbour development projects.3

The UN Secretary General, in his report (document A/52/434), highlighted the immediate need for the reconstruction of damaged or destroyed social infrastructures (schools, dispensaries, water facilities) in all regions that have been affected by civil strife. The report described the operational activities of various United Nations agencies, including United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Food Programme (WFP), and World Health Organization (WHO) in Djibouti. It concluded by requesting the international community to provide financial support to enable the continuation of the technical assistance projects, in order to meet urgent socio-economic programs for the reconstruction and development process in Djibouti.4

In 1997, according to a report, the International Development Association (IDA) agreed to a USD6.5 million credit to help finance the economic reform program. The European Union's Development Fund agreed to an Ecu22 million (USD24 million) grant in December 1996 to assist in improving the transport system and living conditions, particularly the supply of water to urban areas. Several developments during 1997 offer encouragement, however. The French agreed to a Ff34 million (USD6 million) loan in early 1997 to assist in the modernization of the port, including the purchase of a new tug boat. More significant, though, was the opening of two oil terminals at the port in February 1997 after a two-year construction period. The Df3.5 billion (USD20 million) project was financed by Japan as part of its non-repayable financial co-operation programme. The terminals mean that Djibouti should once again resume its position as the principal gateway for oil products to the sub-region (Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia), as well as a transit point for other goods. The terminals are forecast to handle 740,000 tonnes of oil products by 2010 compared to 340,000 tonnes in 1992.5

  • 3. "Djibouti invites local operators to participate in harbour projects," Business Times (Malaysia), May 7, 1997.
  • 4. "Djibouti; Reconstruction and Development of Djibouti," Africa News, November 24, 1997.
  • 5. "DJIBOUTI: AFRICA REVIEW 1998," Africa Review World of Information, March 1998.
1998

Minimum Implementation

It was reported that Djibouti wanted Malaysia's help to modernize and develop sectors such as agriculture, power generation, port and airport services. Djibouti was also seeking Malaysian involvement in its economic development especially in ports.6 Djibouti is principally a entrepot for Ethiopia; with 1998-2000 war with Eritrea and end of use of its ports, Ethiopia becomes and remains dependent on Djibouti – which generates vast revenues.

  • 6. "DJIBOUTI WANTS MALAYSIA TO USE IT AS GATEWAY TO EAST AFRICA," Malaysia General News, August 3, 1998.
1999

Minimum Implementation

The World Bank approved a US$14.8 million equivalent credit, in May 1999, to support the Republic of Djibouti's efforts in generating low- skilled employment opportunities to directly benefit the poor. The project was expected to enhance the living standards of the poor in the city of Djibouti by “improving the physical environment in poor neighborhoods through construction and rehabilitation of urban infrastructures, such as street works and drainage, social infrastructure, and community neighborhood infrastructure; increasing community participation in project identification and implementation and providing social services to poor communities; building the institutional capacity of various stakeholders involved in the implementation of the project activities.”7

According to a Heritage Foundation report, Djibouti was open to foreign investment but the lack of infrastructure was hindering investment.8

  • 7. "Djibouti; Djibouti Creates Job Opportunities For The Poor," Africa News, May 27, 1999.
  • 8. "Chapter 6: The Countries; Republic of Djibouti," Heritage Foundation Reports, December 1999.
2000

Intermediate Implementation

In 2000, Arab financial institutions agreed to finance development projects in Djibouti to the tune of 196 million dollars. The funds, decided at a meeting of financial backers in Kuwait in May, would be used for development projects in education, health, energy and infrastructure.9

The first Djibouti dry port, valued at US$ 12 million, had been completed.10 In December 2000, Djibouti received $10 Million in credit from the World Bank to support its educational development strategy.11

  • 9. "Arab institutions agree 196 million dollars in aid to Djibouti," Agence France Presse – English, June 3, 2000.
  • 10. "DJIBOUTI DRY PORT: A project which is advancing on Djibouti," The Indian Ocean Newsletter, October 21, 2000.
  • 11. "World Bank discusses new country assistance strategy for Djibouti, approves a US$ 10 million credit for an education program," M2 PRESSWIRE, December 21, 2000.
2001

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2002

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2003

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

2004

Intermediate Implementation

No further developments observed.

Please always cite: Peace Accords Matrix (Date of retrieval: (04/28/2017),
http://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/accord-de-paix-et-de-la-reconciliation-nationale,
Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame.